How militia groups capture states and ruin countries: Sudan’s RSF
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John Ashworth
Jul 18, 2024, 12:41:23 AM (5 days ago) Jul 18
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1. How militia groups capture states and ruin countries: the case of
Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces
Federico Manfredi Firmian
Published: July 17, 2024
The Conversation
The rise of Sudan’s most notorious paramilitary group, the Rapid
Support Forces, shows how armed groups can infiltrate state
institutions – often with disastrous results for society.
Sudan’s central government created the Rapid Support Forces in 2013 as
dictator Omar al-Bashir’s private protection detail. The group has now
become a predator seeking to gain control of Sudan.
Sudan’s war broke out in April 2023 when the military tried to subdue
the Rapid Support Forces.
Since then, fighting has ravaged much of the country, including the
capital Khartoum. At least 15,500 people had been killed by June 2024.
More than 6 million people have been displaced and over 25 million
pushed into acute hunger, according to the United Nations.
The Rapid Support Forces followed a strategy which is similar to those
of other militia groups aiming to infiltrate and co-opt state
institutions. Such strategies have military, economic and political
dimensions.
These groups tend to exploit conflict to enlarge their areas of
influence, weapon stockpiles and numbers of fighters.
They generate revenues from business lines created by conflict.
Partnerships with foreign states and international smuggling networks
are most often involved.
They provide jobs and patronage to get political support in key
constituencies and seek institutional roles.
As a political scientist specialising in conflict studies and
irregular warfare, I have spent over a decade researching insurgents,
paramilitaries, militias and other armed groups. In a recent article,
I examined armed actors pursuing “state capture” – the covert and
gradual infiltration of state institutions to influence policy. In
addition to the cases of Hezbollah in Lebanon and Shia militias in
Iraq, I looked at the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan.
The study involved interviews with a diverse group of participants.
Academics, political analysts, government officials and individuals
affiliated with armed groups were among them.
I found that militias bent on state capture initially pursue their
objectives without openly antagonising the state. They often position
themselves as pro-government. But they also signal that any attempt by
the state to neutralise them would lead to a devastating
confrontation.
Over time, these strategies enable armed groups to gain political
influence and formal institutional roles. This allows them to shape
public policies to their advantage. When armed groups achieve a
measure of state capture, they undermine governmental effectiveness,
contributing to institutional breakdown and state failure.
In Sudan, the Rapid Support Forces now controls vast swaths of
territory, though it’s not yet in full control of the country.
Growing influence
The Rapid Support Forces emerged from the Janjaweed militias, which
spearheaded al-Bashir’s genocidal counterinsurgency in Darfur in
exchange for funding and arms.
In 2013, al-Bashir restructured the Janjaweed into the Rapid Support
Forces to counterbalance the army and preempt potential coups. To lead
this new force, al-Bashir chose a former highway robber turned
Janjaweed commander, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemedti.
Al-Bashir’s support enabled Hemedti to deploy tens of thousands of
battle-hardened fighters across Sudan to secure strategic locations
for the regime. These included the capital, troubled borderlands and
economic hubs like gold mines.
Capitalising on this positioning, the Rapid Support Forces expanded
its involvement in gold mining, smuggling and trading. It also
generated income by supplying mercenaries for conflicts in Yemen and
Libya.
Bashir’s government tacitly endorsed these activities, possibly
calculating that the forces would be cheaper to maintain if
self-funded.
For a time, the Rapid Support Forces collaborated closely with Sudan’s
army. When the military’s leadership decided to oust Bashir in 2019
amid anti-regime protests, Hemedti didn’t oppose the decision.
During the subsequent political transition, Hemedti became vice-chair
of the Sovereign Council. The institution was tasked with guiding the
country towards democratic elections.
This institutional role shocked and dismayed many within Sudanese
civil society. Some, however, argued that attempts to dismantle the
Rapid Support Forces or sideline Hemedti would spark armed conflict.
Both the army and Rapid Support Forces had established secretive
business networks generating billions of dollars. They shared a
short-term interest in protecting their power and economic assets from
any civilian encroachment.
This alignment of interests formed the foundation of their partnership
and paved the way for the October 2021 military coup – which abruptly
halted Sudan’s democratisation process.
As a new regime took hold in Sudan, the Rapid Support Forces grew more
powerful. The forces profited from gold mining, smuggling and business
deals with the United Arab Emirates, Russia’s Wagner Group and Libyan
warlord Khalifa Haftar.
Hemedti’s forces bolstered their arsenal and expanded their ranks.
They presented themselves as champions of ordinary Arabs from Sudan’s
rural provinces and borderlands.
Concerned by these developments, the Sudanese Armed Forces attempted
to forcefully integrate the Rapid Support Forces into the military
chain of command. But by the time the military launched its ill-fated
offensive in April 2023, the Rapid Support Forces had fielded 100,000
fighters equipped for highly mobile urban warfare.
They quickly inflicted heavy losses on the military and seized control
of most of Khartoum. They also took over the adjoining Gezira state,
Darfur in the west and Kordofan in the centre, shattering both the
Sudanese state and society.
In areas under their sway, the Rapid Support Forces have perpetrated
crimes against humanity and war crimes, including ethnic cleansing,
massacres, rape, torture and widespread looting.
The Sudanese army, which retains control of Port Sudan, has blocked
humanitarian aid from reaching territories under the Rapid Support
Forces. This has contributed to an impending famine.
Bleak prospects
The prospects for a peaceful resolution to Sudan’s conflict currently
appear bleak. Even a temporary ceasefire to facilitate humanitarian
aid remains improbable. The United Nations Security Council remains
deeply divided, and the African Union has yet to propose a workable
plan.
The United States and its European allies have squandered their
political capital in Sudan. They failed to adequately support the
2019-2021 democratic transition and to reverse the 2021 coup.
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Russia bear significant
responsibility for the current situation. Their support for opposing
sides has deepened divisions, contributing to the failure of
initiatives like the Jeddah peace talks.
Local neighbourhood committees, once pivotal in grassroots
democratisation, have been marginalised by armed actors.
International actors aiming to help Sudan should recognise that these
civil society groups still represent the country’s best hope. They
possess a deep understanding of the country’s most pressing needs.
These include unimpeded humanitarian aid, as well as exposing and
curtailing the military and financial lifelines of leading armed
actors. This could help foster a political transition free from these
actors’ influence.
https://theconversation.com/how-militia-groups-capture-states-and-ruin-countries-the-case-of-sudans-rapid-support-forces-234650
END1
2. Attached please find a paper from the Sudan Transparency and Policy
Tracker entitled "Fueling Sudan's War: How Oil Exports, Imports and
Smuggling Are Prolonging the Conflict", July 2024.
https://mcusercontent.com/b3101ea3866029414729ab5e5/files/082b201c-f23b-8407-f4d3-246af8be50dc/FuelingSudansWarEN.pdf
END2
______________________
John Ashworth
ashwor...@gmail.com
+254 725 926 297 (Kenya mobile, WhatsApp and Signal)
PO Box 403 - 00206, Kiserian, Kenya
Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces
Federico Manfredi Firmian
Published: July 17, 2024
The Conversation
The rise of Sudan’s most notorious paramilitary group, the Rapid
Support Forces, shows how armed groups can infiltrate state
institutions – often with disastrous results for society.
Sudan’s central government created the Rapid Support Forces in 2013 as
dictator Omar al-Bashir’s private protection detail. The group has now
become a predator seeking to gain control of Sudan.
Sudan’s war broke out in April 2023 when the military tried to subdue
the Rapid Support Forces.
Since then, fighting has ravaged much of the country, including the
capital Khartoum. At least 15,500 people had been killed by June 2024.
More than 6 million people have been displaced and over 25 million
pushed into acute hunger, according to the United Nations.
The Rapid Support Forces followed a strategy which is similar to those
of other militia groups aiming to infiltrate and co-opt state
institutions. Such strategies have military, economic and political
dimensions.
These groups tend to exploit conflict to enlarge their areas of
influence, weapon stockpiles and numbers of fighters.
They generate revenues from business lines created by conflict.
Partnerships with foreign states and international smuggling networks
are most often involved.
They provide jobs and patronage to get political support in key
constituencies and seek institutional roles.
As a political scientist specialising in conflict studies and
irregular warfare, I have spent over a decade researching insurgents,
paramilitaries, militias and other armed groups. In a recent article,
I examined armed actors pursuing “state capture” – the covert and
gradual infiltration of state institutions to influence policy. In
addition to the cases of Hezbollah in Lebanon and Shia militias in
Iraq, I looked at the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan.
The study involved interviews with a diverse group of participants.
Academics, political analysts, government officials and individuals
affiliated with armed groups were among them.
I found that militias bent on state capture initially pursue their
objectives without openly antagonising the state. They often position
themselves as pro-government. But they also signal that any attempt by
the state to neutralise them would lead to a devastating
confrontation.
Over time, these strategies enable armed groups to gain political
influence and formal institutional roles. This allows them to shape
public policies to their advantage. When armed groups achieve a
measure of state capture, they undermine governmental effectiveness,
contributing to institutional breakdown and state failure.
In Sudan, the Rapid Support Forces now controls vast swaths of
territory, though it’s not yet in full control of the country.
Growing influence
The Rapid Support Forces emerged from the Janjaweed militias, which
spearheaded al-Bashir’s genocidal counterinsurgency in Darfur in
exchange for funding and arms.
In 2013, al-Bashir restructured the Janjaweed into the Rapid Support
Forces to counterbalance the army and preempt potential coups. To lead
this new force, al-Bashir chose a former highway robber turned
Janjaweed commander, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemedti.
Al-Bashir’s support enabled Hemedti to deploy tens of thousands of
battle-hardened fighters across Sudan to secure strategic locations
for the regime. These included the capital, troubled borderlands and
economic hubs like gold mines.
Capitalising on this positioning, the Rapid Support Forces expanded
its involvement in gold mining, smuggling and trading. It also
generated income by supplying mercenaries for conflicts in Yemen and
Libya.
Bashir’s government tacitly endorsed these activities, possibly
calculating that the forces would be cheaper to maintain if
self-funded.
For a time, the Rapid Support Forces collaborated closely with Sudan’s
army. When the military’s leadership decided to oust Bashir in 2019
amid anti-regime protests, Hemedti didn’t oppose the decision.
During the subsequent political transition, Hemedti became vice-chair
of the Sovereign Council. The institution was tasked with guiding the
country towards democratic elections.
This institutional role shocked and dismayed many within Sudanese
civil society. Some, however, argued that attempts to dismantle the
Rapid Support Forces or sideline Hemedti would spark armed conflict.
Both the army and Rapid Support Forces had established secretive
business networks generating billions of dollars. They shared a
short-term interest in protecting their power and economic assets from
any civilian encroachment.
This alignment of interests formed the foundation of their partnership
and paved the way for the October 2021 military coup – which abruptly
halted Sudan’s democratisation process.
As a new regime took hold in Sudan, the Rapid Support Forces grew more
powerful. The forces profited from gold mining, smuggling and business
deals with the United Arab Emirates, Russia’s Wagner Group and Libyan
warlord Khalifa Haftar.
Hemedti’s forces bolstered their arsenal and expanded their ranks.
They presented themselves as champions of ordinary Arabs from Sudan’s
rural provinces and borderlands.
Concerned by these developments, the Sudanese Armed Forces attempted
to forcefully integrate the Rapid Support Forces into the military
chain of command. But by the time the military launched its ill-fated
offensive in April 2023, the Rapid Support Forces had fielded 100,000
fighters equipped for highly mobile urban warfare.
They quickly inflicted heavy losses on the military and seized control
of most of Khartoum. They also took over the adjoining Gezira state,
Darfur in the west and Kordofan in the centre, shattering both the
Sudanese state and society.
In areas under their sway, the Rapid Support Forces have perpetrated
crimes against humanity and war crimes, including ethnic cleansing,
massacres, rape, torture and widespread looting.
The Sudanese army, which retains control of Port Sudan, has blocked
humanitarian aid from reaching territories under the Rapid Support
Forces. This has contributed to an impending famine.
Bleak prospects
The prospects for a peaceful resolution to Sudan’s conflict currently
appear bleak. Even a temporary ceasefire to facilitate humanitarian
aid remains improbable. The United Nations Security Council remains
deeply divided, and the African Union has yet to propose a workable
plan.
The United States and its European allies have squandered their
political capital in Sudan. They failed to adequately support the
2019-2021 democratic transition and to reverse the 2021 coup.
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Russia bear significant
responsibility for the current situation. Their support for opposing
sides has deepened divisions, contributing to the failure of
initiatives like the Jeddah peace talks.
Local neighbourhood committees, once pivotal in grassroots
democratisation, have been marginalised by armed actors.
International actors aiming to help Sudan should recognise that these
civil society groups still represent the country’s best hope. They
possess a deep understanding of the country’s most pressing needs.
These include unimpeded humanitarian aid, as well as exposing and
curtailing the military and financial lifelines of leading armed
actors. This could help foster a political transition free from these
actors’ influence.
https://theconversation.com/how-militia-groups-capture-states-and-ruin-countries-the-case-of-sudans-rapid-support-forces-234650
END1
2. Attached please find a paper from the Sudan Transparency and Policy
Tracker entitled "Fueling Sudan's War: How Oil Exports, Imports and
Smuggling Are Prolonging the Conflict", July 2024.
https://mcusercontent.com/b3101ea3866029414729ab5e5/files/082b201c-f23b-8407-f4d3-246af8be50dc/FuelingSudansWarEN.pdf
END2
______________________
John Ashworth
ashwor...@gmail.com
+254 725 926 297 (Kenya mobile, WhatsApp and Signal)
PO Box 403 - 00206, Kiserian, Kenya
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