مذكرة الظلمات والاكراه فى الدين وظلم المراة واتاحة قتل الخارجين على الحاكم

[Namaa AL-Mahdi]

مع العلم بان " مجمع الفقة الاسلامى" يتبع لرئاسة الجمهورية 

الحمد لله والصلاة والسلام على رسول الله وعلى آله وصحبه وسلم:

ناقش المجمع في اجتماعه رقم (1/د5/2017م) تاريخ 22 جمادى الأولى 1438ه الموافق 19 فبراير 2017م وتداول حول التعديلات المقترحة لتعديل الدستور الانتقالي لسنة 2005م تعديل 2017م، وانتهى إلى الآتي:
[1] المادة: (38):حرية الاعتقاد والعبادة والمذهب: حيث جاء في التعديل المقترح:(لكل إنسان الحرية في اختيار رؤى يتخذها عقيدة دينية أو رؤية مذهبية وله أن يمارس أيما شعائر دينية أو احتفالات تذكر بها ويتخذ مواقع لعبادته ولا يكره أحد على دين عيني أو مذهب معين ولا يحظر عليه الحوار والجدال فيما هو حق حسب إيمانه ورأيه)
أولاً: هذا التعديل يخالف نص المادة (5/1) من دستور 2005م التي لم يطالها التغيير والتي تنص على أن:( تكون الشريعة الإسلامية والاجماع مصدراً للتشريعات التي تُسن على المستوى القومي وتطبق على ولايات شمال السودان). مع العلم أن الإسلام لا يكره أحداً على الدخول فيه. قال الله تعالى (لَا إِكْرَاهَ فِي الدِّينِ) البقرة: ٢٥٦.
ثانياً: هذه التعديل يبيح الكفر بالله تعالى والخروج عن الإسلام والتحلل من سائر الأديان، وكل ذلك مناقض لمراد المولى عز وجل، فإنه جلا وعلا لا يرضى لعباده الكفر فقد قال: ( إِنْ تَكْفُرُوا فَإِنَّ اللَّهَ غَنِيٌّ عَنْكُمْ وَلَا يَرْضَى لِعِبَادِهِ الْكُفْرَ وَإِنْ تَشْكُرُوا يَرْضَهُ لَكُمْ وَلَا تَزِرُ وَازِرَةٌ وِزْرَ أُخْرَى ثُمَّ إِلَى رَبِّكُمْ مَرْجِعُكُمْ فَيُنَبِّئُكُمْ بِمَا كُنْتُمْ تَعْمَلُونَ إِنَّهُ عَلِيمٌ بِذَاتِ الصُّدُورِ ) الزمر: ٧. ويقرر الرضى بالكفر بل يشجعه ويقننه دستوراً، مما مما يؤدي إلى فوضى دينية عارمة تقود إلى مزيد من التنافر والتحارب والاقتتال.

ثالثاً: هذه المادة بهذا التعديل تجعل المرجع في اختيار الدين وإنشائه للأهواء والرؤى، فإجازة هذه المادة تؤدي لإحداث أديان وعقائد جديدة. وقد قال الله تعالى: ( وَلَقَدْ بَعَثْنَا فِي كُلِّ أُمَّةٍ رَسُولًا أَنِ اعْبُدُوا اللَّهَ وَاجْتَنِبُوا الطَّاغُوتَ ) النحل: ٣٦، وقال: ( وَاعْبُدُوا اللَّهَ وَلَا تُشْرِكُوا بِهِ شَيْئًا) النساء: ٣٦، وقال: ( إِنَّ الدِّينَ عِنْدَ اللَّهِ الْإِسْلَامُ )آل عمران: ١٩ وقال تعالى: (وَمَنْ يَبْتَغِ غَيْرَ الْإِسْلَامِ دِينًا فَلَنْ يُقْبَلَ مِنْهُ وَهُوَ فِي الْآخِرَةِ مِنَ الْخَاسِرِينَ )آل عمران: ٨٥. وقال النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم كما في حديث أبي هريرة -رضي الله عنه: {وَالَّذِي نَفْسُ مُحَمَّدٍ بِيَدِهِ، لاَ يَسْمَعُ بِي أحد من هذه الأمة لا يَهُودِيٌّ، وَلاَ نَصْرَانِيٌّ، ثُمَّ يَمُوتُ وَلَمْ يُؤْمِنْ بِالَّذِي أُرْسِلْتُ بِهِ إِلاَّ كانَ مِنْ أَصْحَابِ النار}. رواه مسلم؛ بينما الدين مرجعه إلى الله تعالى ولذا أرسل الرسل وأنزل الكتب. 
رابعاً: إجازة هذا التعديل للمادة يؤدي إلى فوضى قانونية وانعدام المرجعية خاصة في مجال الأحوال الشخصية حيث المرجع فيها ديانة الزوجين، ويؤدي إلى يجرائم اجتماعية وأخلاقية لا قبل لنا بمواجهتها تتمثل في:
أن للزوجة الخروج عن الإسلام وسائر الأديان السماوية لمفارقة زوجها.
حدوث فوضى وخلل في الإرث والوصايا وغيرها من الأحكام التي مرجعها الأحوال الشخصية.
إعلان المرتكب لحدٍ الخروج عن الإسلام صراحة للهروب من تطبيق الحدود عليه.
[2] المادة (31) والتعديل المقترح ينص على أن:(الأسرة هي الوحدة الطبيعية والأساسية للمجتمع ولها الحق في حماية القانون وعند بلوغ سن الرشد المقررة قانوناً يجوز التزاوج بين الذكر وأنثى بالتراضي وبالتعاقد مباشرة أو وكالة وتسير الأسرة وفق دين الأطراف أو عرفها ويرعى المتاع والوصايا والمواريث بعد الموت وفق ما يلي المعنيين من دينٍ أو عرف أو قانون).
أولاً: حسب العرف القانوني والدستوري فإن ما ورد في هذا التعديل من التفصيلات محلها القانون لا الدستور.
ثانياً: هذا التعديل مخالف للعرف المستقر في السودان القائم على الشرع. 
ثالثاً: إذن الولي في تزويج المرأة هو الذي عليه عمل المسلمين في تاريخهم في سائر القرون، فهو إجماع عملي استمر واستقر عليه الناس وهذه المادة تقضي على هذا الإجماع وتبطله.
رابعاً: هذه التعديل مخالف لنصوص الولاية التي وردت عن النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم:(لا نكاح إلا بولي) رواه أحمد (2260) وابن ماجة (1880) والترمذي(1101)وقال :(أيما امرأة نكحت بغير إذن وليها فنكاحها باطل فنكاحها باطل فنكاحها باطل) رواه ابن ماجة(1879) وأحمد(25326). وقال:( لاتزوج المرأة المرأة ولا تزوج المرأة نفسها) رواه ابن ماجة(1882).
خامساً: إن إلغاء الولي مطلقاً كما جاء في التعديل المقترح لم يقل به أحد من العلماء ولا مذهب من المذاهب.
سادساً: اشتراط الولي في الزواج لا يقيد حرية المرأة في الاختيار والرضا بالزوج حيث إن الشرع وقانون الأحوال الشخصية قد كفالا ذلك. وفي اشتراط الولي مراعاة لحقوق المرأة وحماية لها وصيانة لوحدة الأسرة، ودفع لكثير من المفاسد التي تنتج من الزواج بغير ولي.
سابعاً: هذا التعديل يؤدي إلى هدم الأعراف القائمة على الشرع مما يقود ذلك إلى فتن في الأمن والسلم الاجتماعي.
[3] المادة (28) والتعديل المقترح ينص على أن:(لكل شخص الحق في أمان روحه وسلامة نفسه وطلاقة مساعيه ولا يحق حرمان شخص من هذا الحق الأصيل في الحياة إلا وفق قانون ماض وقضاء وقضاء فيه فاصل يجيز العقاب لمتهوم ثبتت له جنايته في:
1/ انتهاك حرمة حياة آخر بقتله الا ان فعل ذلك مدافعة عن نفسه وما يليه من حرمة.
ب/ بغي عام قد يفتك بأرواح النفوس وحرمة حقوقها.
ج/ قتل نفس اخرى عدوانا وقضى عليه بالإعدام قصاصاً لا إذا جرى العفو عنه عند الرجوع إلى أي من اولياء الدم):
أولاً: هذا التعديل يتعارض ويناقض المادة (36/1) من دستور 2005م والتي نصها: ( لا يجوز توقيع عقوبة الإعدام إلا قصاصاً أو حداً أو جزاءً على الجرائم بالغة الخطورة، بموجب القانون). 
ثانياً: هذا النص المقترح يحصر عقوبة القتل في البغي وقتل النفس عدواناً. 
ثالثاً: إجازة هذا التعديل يلغي ويعطل عقوبة القتل المنصوص عليها في كثير من الأحكام الشرعية والقانونية كالردة والرجم والخيانة العظمى والاغتصاب وغيرها.
وعليه فإن مجمع الفقه الإسلامي يقرر بأن هذه التعديلات المقترحة مخالفة للشرع ولا يجوز اقرارها أو إجازتها، كما أن للمجمع رؤية متكاملة مؤصلة ومفصَّلة لمواد الدستور يقدمها لاحقاً لمجلسكم الموقر.
والله الهادي لأقوم سبيل

الشيخ/ إبراهيم أحمد الضرير

الأمين العام

من موقع الراكوبة

 

[Namaa AL-Mahdi]

وداعاً ..أمير عبدالله خليل⬛

عندما نتحدث عن ام درمان التاريخ
وام درمان الاصاله...فهذا ينبع من موروث زرعه اجداد وأباء خطوا في التاريخ للمجتمع لوائح ونظم غير مكتوبه...لايحيد عنها احدا من ابنائها رجالا ونساء...شباب وأطفال...خطوا لمجتمعها اسس للتعامل بين ابنائها
والزموهم بتصدير ذلك لخارج محور المدينه لهذا كان يشار الي ابناء ام درمان بالبنان ....اورثهم الجدود حب الوطن والوطنيه...اورثوهم الحب والترابط الاجتماعي الذي اوثقوه بوثاق الالفه والجمال ....والتزم جميع ابناء
ام درمان بهذا الميثاق الاجتماعي وقد
كان هناك رعاة لهذا الميثاق في مقدمتهم امير عبدالله خليل والذي اضاف لميثاق ام درمان الاجتماعي الكثير بالوفاء والحب لأهلها....
بذل كل جهده لزرع معاني الوطنيه في نفوس ابنائها...ودون ان يدري كان هو القدوه لجميع اهل السودان في البذل والعطاء والحب والوفاء...كان رمزا للانسانيه...اهدي وقته وعمره وجهده لوطنه...استلم ونفذ الكثير من الملفات الصعبه...واصعبها ملف الصحه في ام درمان...فلا يذكر اي انجاز صحي في ام درمان الا وكان خلفه امير...
لا يذكر اي نفير في ام درمان الا وكان قائده امير..اضاء العتمه بنوره الوضاء في
كل البلاد...كان منزله دار لبرلمان شعب ام درمان..وكانت مستشفي ام درمان ومرضاها الهم الاول له...وبذل
المال والجهد في سبيل ذلك مضحيا بصحته واضعا نموذجا لنكران الذات
تشهد له عنابر مستشفيات ام درمان
يشهد له المرضي والعاملين...
كان امير اميرا لام درمان...
كان اميرا للحب...
اميرا للوفاء...
بفقده تفقد ام درمان 
والسودان علما وركيزه من ركائز العطاء الشعبي...
يفتقدك مستشفي الحوادث يا أمير...
ويفتقدك فقراء المرضي فقد كنت السند لهم..يفتقدك مواطنوا ام درمان ويحزن لفقدك كل السودان...
وتحزن لفقدك كل الاسر التي كانت تنيخ رحالها تحت ظلك الوريف...
لك الرحمه امير عبدالله خليل

وإنا لله وإنا إليه راجعون

د. عادل سليمان

نهار السبت 2/12/2017

Namaa AL-Mahdi 

UK Mobile  WhatsApp    07427515961

 

[Namaa AL-Mahdi]

أولاً، العودة إلي مربع عام 1989، حينما أصبحت دولة السودان معزولة تماماً عالمياً، وانقطعت كل صلاتها مع اغلبية دول العالم ودول الجوار، بما في ذلك دول الاتحاد الأوربي، والتي تساهم في توفير الدعم المادي، واللوجستي لجريمة قطع طرق المهاجرين العزل، المتوجهيين الي شواطيء اوربا، هرباً من الحروبات، والفقر، والانظمة الشمولية في بلادهم، من خلال صحاري شمال وشرق افريقيا، وإلبحر الابيض المتوسط، وذلك بدعمها الأعمى، لعملية الخرطوم العنصرية، Khartoum 
process.
وبذلك، انقطاع أحد مصادر دخل الدولة والمجلس العسكري ومرتزقة "الجنرال" المخلوع، محمد حمدان دلقو، الشهير ب"حميدتي"

ثانياً، عزل دولة السودان عالميا، ومن المشاركة باسم دولة السودان، في سوق التجارة الدولية، و وبذلك العودة إلي وضع حكومة الانقاذ، في العشرة سنوات الأولى، قبل رجوعهم إلي قواعد الشعب وعقد الاتفاقيات التي مهدت الي اتفاقية السلام الشامل، مما فتح لهم باب التجارة بنفط السودان دولياً. 
وبذلك فقط مصدر الدخل الأساسي لحكومة السودان والذي يسخره لتوظيف اجهزة حماية النظام وقمع الشعب، من صادر المتاجرة بموارد دولة السودان من نفط وذهب ومواد زراعية، ومواشي وكهرباء وغيرها من ثروات الشعب.

ثالثاً، العودة إلي مربع 1989 من حيث التعاون الإقليمي العسكري، والذي يدور الآن باسم الشعب السوداني، ظلماً وبهتاناً، في حرب معسكر الخليج في دولة اليمن، فإن معسكر الخليج وأن ابدر بوادر الوفاق مع حكومة المجلس العسكري الغير شرعية، لن يستطيع التعامل مباشرة مع جيوش دولة غير شرعية، والا اسقط عن نفسه، أحد أهم أسباب دعمه لحرب اليمن، وهي دعم الشرعية "المزعومة" هناك، ولخسر تعاون جيوش وأسلحة الغرب لهم، وتلك أكثر بطشاً ودماراً من الجيوش البشرية، بما فيها السودانية، و لذلك، هذا التعاون أثمن لديهم. 
الشاهد علي فقدان معسكر الخليج، جزءً من تعاون دول الغرب الفعال في الحروب المدمرة، اصدار محكمة بريطانية في ٢٠ يونيو الجاري، حكم بعدم شرعية بيع دولة بريطانيا الأسلحة للمملكة العربية السعودية وحلفائها ، الأمر الذي اودي الي تجميد معاملات الدولة في بيع السلاح لهم حتي يتسنى لدواوين الدولة، النظر في تبعات هذا القرار وذلك بناء علي تقرير الحملة الشعبية ضد بيع السلاح، حول خرق معسكر الخليج للقانون الإنساني الدولي.
الأمر الذي يجعل التعاون مع جيوش دولة غير 
شرعية، مستحيلاً.
وبذلك يتوقف مصدر دخل المجلس العسكري من تعاونه مع معسكر الخليج في الحرب الغير متكافئة 
في دولة اليمن.

رابعا، العزلة الافليمية، من قبل دول الجامعة العربية، أو تعليق عضوية دولة السودان من الجامعة العربية، كما تم تعليق عضويتها في الاتحاد الافريقي، و بذلك قطع العلاقات الرسمية مع الدول العربية كافة. وبذلك تدخل الحكومة الغير شرعية مربع العزلة الاقليمية، وتتوقف قروض البناء والنماء واستثمارات شركات الدول العربية في السودان.
وبذلك تنقطع تلك الموارد، وتعود الحكومة الي وضع حكومة الإنقاذ في العشرة سنوات الاولي، حيث 
العزلة، وتوقف الاستثمار والبناء في البلاد.

خامساً، العودة إلي مربع الفلس، الذريع، حينما يتوقف التعامل العالمي مع السودان، أين سيسوق بضاعته؟ ومن أين يأتي بالأموال الطائلة لاستخدامها في سوء إدارة الدولة. في وجود، مجموعات ضخمة مسلحة، تطلب إدارتها ما يزيد عن 80% من ميزانية دولة السودان السنوية، أو ما يزيد. ففي تلك الحالة، لن يستطيع المجلس العسكري وحكومته الغير شرعية، البقاء وقد تنقلب عليهم جنودهم وأجهزتهم التي تقوم بحمايتهم اليوم.

ذلك غيض، من فيض القيود العالمية والإقليمية التي ستواجه المجلس العسكري، اذا استمر في حكم دولة السودان قسراً، وإنكار حق الثورة الشعبية العارمة، حقها في فرض حكومة مدنية من دون اشراكهم بها، ولو بمقعد واحد، فالحاكمية، والشرعية الدولية ليست للسلاح أو حملة السلاح، ولكنها للشعب، ام القوات المسلحة، فهي جهاز من اجهزة دولة الشعب، من المفترض أن يقتصر دورها في حمايته فقط، وليس في حكمه وان ساد هذا النهج المعوج، في الدولة في السابق.

اما بالنسبة للقانون، وحكم القانون علي الدةلة، فإن المجلس متهم الآن باختراق القانون الدولي والافريقي، معا، في انتهاك حقوق الإنسان، بفض اعتصام القيادة العامة الدموي، وفي ارتكاب محرقة دليج بدارفور، ويجب أن يحاسب وأن لم يحاسب أصدرت المحكمة الافريقية في الاتحاد الافريقي أو الدولية في لاهاي، أمر استدعائهم للمحكمة كما كان وضع الرئيس المخلوع البشير.
وهو متهم، باختراق الميثاق الافريقي للديمقراطية والانتخابات والحكم، والذي وقعت عليه دولة 
السودان في يونيو 2013.

الأمر اليوم مواجهة، بين شرعية حق الشعب في تحقيق مطالبه العادلة، وهي الحرية والسلام والعدالة، من خلال الحكومة المدنية الكاملة، أو الاستسلام لحْكم سارقي ثورة الشعب، مرتكبي المجازر ضد الشعب، بائعي جيوش السودان الباسلة لمعسكر الخليج في اليمن، قاطعي طرق المهاجريين الضعفاء، في الحدود بين السودان و ارتريا، ومصر وليبيا.

وعليه، اما آن الأوان لقوي الحرية والتغيير لتعلن حكومتها، ومن دون المجلس العسكري المجرم، وأن حمل السلاح ضدهم، ولو لحين، فلن يستطيع الاستمرار، مع انقطاع موارد الدخل المتوقعة، والعزلة العالمية، حتي من الدول المتوقع الدعم منها مثل روسيا، والصين وغيرهم.

كل ذلك، مع العلم بأن شعبً حقق 3 ثورات، منذ استقلال دولته، واليوم اسقط حكم البشير الطاغية، رغم الصعوبات الجسيمة، يصعب حكمة، بل يستحيل حكمه من دون إرادته.

نعماء فيصل المهدي

Namaa AL-Mahdi 

UK Mobile  WhatsApp    07427515961

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From: Namaa AL-Mahdi <nam...@hotmail.com>
Sent: Wednesday, December 6, 2017 11:21
Subject: وداعاً ..أمير عبدالله خليل

 

[Namaa AL-Mahdi]

مفهوم حكم العسكر استعماري بحت

حينما حكمت دولة بريطانيا العظمي، العالم من خلال أسلوب الاستعمار القهري، كانت الحكومة، ومقرها في وستمنسر، في العاصمة

 البريطانية، بلندن، تنعت بنظام الأنفصام فى الشخصية، وذلك لأنها كانت تحكم المستعمرات، بآلية عسكرية قاهرة ودولة بريطانيا المصغرة في الجزر البريطانية، من خلال حكومة مدنية يفوضها الشعب للحكم بالانتخاب.

وبينما كانت الدولة في الجزر البريطانية، تتوجه نحو توفير فرص أوسع للاقتراع العام من خلال صناديق الانتخاب، بمنح المرأة دون سن الثلاثين من العمر، حق الاقتراع، كانت تحد، وتمنع مشاركة مواطني الدولة في المستعمرات الممتدة حول العالم، وقد بلغ تعدادها ال 900 مليون نسمة انذاك، في المشاركة في الانتخابات البريطانية بأي صورة أو حال. وبذلك فلقد كانت القلة القليلة من مواطني الجزر البريطانية، والائي لم يتعدي تعدداهم ال34 مليون نسمة، هي من تحدد من يحكم وكيف تحكم، امبراطورية تضم 65 دولة حول العالم، بما فيها الدول الأكثر كثافة سكانية حول العالم، الصين والهند.

الغرض وراء حكم المستعمرات من خلال الحكم العسكري، كان إخضاع تلك الشعوب لحكم المملكة، والتعامل معها من باب الاستعلاء الثقافي والاثني، والذي يفضي إلي التعامل مع مواطني المستعمرات بأسلوب غير انساني، يمهد لاستمرارية خضوع المستعمرات، وتفوق المستعمر بصورة مؤسسية، ومن خلال القمع الهيكلي. اي نظام التمييز العنصري البغيض.

من هنا تأتي تفشي عقلية سيادة العسكر وسمو صوت البندقية في العصر الحديث، والمترسبة في عقول وممارسات تحملها دون وعيًاو ادراك بمصدرها الي فترة ما بعد العصر الحديث الحالية.

كانت سياسية المعايير المزدوجة، في في التعامل مع المستعمرات، هذة، تفسر من خلال نظريات عنصرية، تعتمد في الأساس علي تجريد سكان المستعمرات من الإنسانية الجامعة، والتعامل معهم بدونية ولا مساواة.

منها نظرية عدم ثقة الحكومة والثقافة العامة البريطانية، في مقدرة شعوب المستعمرات، التي كانت تنعت انذاك، بالشعوب المتوحشة، ظلماً وبهتاناً، في اختيار حكوماتها، وعدم ثقة الحاكم، مقدرة تلك الشعوب، التمييز بين الامور، وممارسة حرية الخيار،والمشاركة في العملية الديمقراطية، فتلك المسألة الحضارية، كانت انذاك حصرية للشعوب التي كانت تصنف بالشعوب المتحضرة، ومحظورة لغيرها،وذلك بناءً علي نظرية خاطئة، اثبت العلم الحديث قصورها والخطاء الذي مهدت له، تدعي عدم نضج عقلية انسان المستعمرات، وان كان بالغاَ وراشداً وبذلك عدم مقدرته علي التمييز، باسلوب سليم.

فلقد كانت حقوق الإنسان انذاك تمنح، او تمنع بناءً علي سحنة بشرة البشر و موقع ولادتهم، أي انها كانت حصرية للمجموعات التي تصنف بالبيض، وممنوعة لدي غيرها، الأمر الذي ناضل ضده حزب المؤتمر الافريقي، في في مسيرة اسقاط نظام التمييز العنصري في بلاده، جنوب افريقيا، والذي ناضل ضده، القس مارتن لوثر كنغ في مسيرة تحرير، الامريكان في الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية.الامريكان الافارقة في بلادهم، الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية. ففي كلتا الحالتين، كان حق الاقتراع والمشاركة في عملية الانتخابات العامة، من المطالب الأساسية لتحرير هذة الشعوب.

لذلك فان حكم العسكر، مبني في الاساس علي التمييز العنصري، والاضطهاد، العرقي والثقافي لغيره، والتمهيد لترسيخ مفهوم سيادة وسمو المجموعة الحاكمة، علي غيرهم من البشر.

في فترة الاستعمار، كان الحق في الاستعلاء العرقي، والاثني، حق لا نزاع عليه، الأمر الذي مهد الي استغلال المستعمر للمستعمرات، في نهب خيراتها وبالذات الغنية بالخيرات منها مثل دولة الهند، أو في استغلال سكان المستعمرات للعمل سخرية أو تحت قيود العبودية في مشاريع المستعمر الزراعية، منها مشاريع زراعة وحصد وإنتاج السكر في دول جزر الهند الشرقية، في منطقة بحر الكاريبي، ومشاريع القطن في الهند وإنتاج محصول الشاي في كلتا من الهند والصين وغيرهم.

ان مفهوم تصنيف البشر بالسمو او الدونية، وبناءً علي ذلك، منحهم حقوقهم الإنسانية او سلبها، حسب موقع ولادتهم أو سحنة بشرتهم، مفهوم عنصري، بغيض، و اقصائي بحت وأن كان شائع التعامل به، بالذات في الدول المتحررة من الاستعمار، حتي بعد خروج المستعمر منها، الأمثلة علي ذلك، الاحترام المفرط او التقديس نحو الشخص الابيض أو من يعتبر من دول الغرب في المجتمعات الشرقية، والتعامل بالازدراء المفرط او الاحتقارمع غيرهم، وتفاوت معدل أجور العمال في مجتمعاتنا، بناءً علي جنسية العامل وليس علي نوع وإعباء العمل، وغيرها من الأمور البغيضة، التي تجرد الأنسان من أنسانيته، وتنتهك حقوق الأنسان العالمية.

لذلك، أن استمرارية تفشي حكم العسكر البغيض في مجتمعات يفترض أنها تحررت فعليا من الاستعمار، يشير الي أن التحرر من الاستعمار كان ظاهريا ولكن الاستعمار ما زال راسخاً، وأن تغيير من استعمار بوجه أجنبي الي استعمار باوجه وطنية.

وأن مفهوم الاستعلاء وازدراء البشر وسلبهم حقوقهم ما زال باقياً، وإلا لما فرضوا انفسهم علي الشعب فرضاً.

نعماء فيصل المهدي

[Namaa AL-Mahdi]

لا مكان للمجلس القاتل بين الشعب، وأن لم يقتل، لا مكان للمجلس الفاشل في حماية الشعب

لا امان لمن يمنع المواطنين ممارستهم لحقوقهم بالقتل والقمع والضرب
حق التجمهر وتسيير الحشود حق أساسي من حقوق الإنسان ومن حقوق المواطن الديمقراطية. وفي البلاد الديمقراطية تخرج الشرطة لحماية مسيرات الشعب المضادة للحكم المنتخب وأن كان حديث الانتخاب كما فعلت المجموعات المعارضة لحزب المحافظين البريطاني، فور انتخاب رئيس الوزراء الجديد بوروس جونسون، والتي اطلقت المظاهرات الحاشدة ولمدة اسبوع باكمله، احتجاجاً علي انتخاب جونسون، وكما فعلت في السابق فور فوز رئيسة الوزراء السابقة تيريزا ماي، ومن سبقها من الرؤساء.
وعليه، فان الانتخاب والتفويض الشرعي بالنسبة الأكبر من الأصوات الانتخابية من قبل الشعب، لا يمنح الحكم حق إسكات المعارضة أو توقيف المسيرات المضادة أو توجيه النقد اللاذع المستمر للحكم.
أن القتل، و العنف والضرب والقمع والترهيب والرعب، الذي يواجه به المجلس العسكري حق الجماهير في التجمهر وتسيير الحشود والمسيرات، لا يبشر بأن هذا الكيان مهما كان أو أدعي حسن النوايا، يمكن أن يؤتمن بأي حال من الأحوال، علي إدارة المرحلة الانتقالية، أو جزئية من المرحلة الانتقالية المقبلة، أو أن حكمة قد يمهد لتحول ديمقراطي في البلاد، أو الي تيسير التحول الديمقراطي باي حال من الأحوال، فمن الواضح أن هذا الكيان ليس سوي امتداد لمشروع بطش وقتل النظام السابق، ومن دون شك نهب البلاد ومصادرها حينما يتسني له ذلك، فلقد استهل قبضته في حكم البلاد بنشر المجازر، وقتل وقمع المواطنين بصورة وحشية، فقط لممارستهم حقوقهم المدنية والسياسية، منها مجزرة شمال كردفان في ٢٩ يوليو، وإطلاق الغاز المسيل للدموع علي الثوار العزل في منطقة بري في الخرطوم وأمام جامعة النيلين في ٢٨ يوليو، وإطلاق الرصاص المطاطي والحي علي المتظاهرين في امدرمان والخرطوم في ٢٧ يوليو، واعتقال اللاعب سيف تيري والتعدي السافر علي الموكب المطالب بإطلاق سراحه، ومجزرة السوكي في ولاية سنار في ١٤ يوليو، ومجزرة الضعين في ولاية شرق دارفور في ١٦ يوليو وقتل وترويع المتظاهرين في مسيرة ٣٠ يونيو الملونية، ومجزرة دليج في ولاية وسط دارفور في ١١ يونيو ومجزرة القيادة في ٣ يونيو، حتي أصبح من اللائق إطلاق تسمية مجلس السفاحيبن عليه.

وأصبح من الواجب محاكمة المجلس وقواته القاتلة والتي تسفك في دماء الشعب السوداني عوضا عن التفاوض معه، لمنحه حصة من حكم البلاد.

المجلس الآن متهم بالاجرام والقتل، ويستحق أفراده اذا اثبتت التهمة عليهم السجن المؤبد وليس الجلوس في حكم الشعب، وذلك لأنه تسبب مباشرة في سفك دماءهم ، وأن لم يفعل كما يدعي كاذبا، فإنه المسؤول في المقام الأول عن الجرائم أن فعلها وعن حدوث الجرائم، أن لم يفعل.
ذلك أما بإصدار الأمر بقتل وترويع المواطنين لممارستهم حقوقهم الشرعية، أو بالفشل في حسن إدارة جيوشهم القاتله ومنعها من ترويع وقتل المواطنين، أو بالفشل الزريع في مسؤولية حماية المواطنين من القتل علي ايدي الكتائب مجهولة الهوية حسب ادعاء تقرير لجنة تحقيق النيابة العامة.

ففي كل الأحوال المجلس الذي تقلد مركز الحكم في السودان هو المسؤول عن حماية المواطنين في المقام الأول وتيسير ممارسة حقوقهم الديمقراطية، وليس العكس، كما هو الحال الآن. فهو في كل الأحوال مدان ومسؤول عن كل ما يحدث في أرض السودان في فترة حكمه.

.اذا لا مكان للمجلس القاتل بين الشعب، وأن لم يقتل، لا مكان للمجلس الفاشل في حماية الشعب، وأن لم يفشل فهو المتهم في المقام الأول بالقتل. 

ويحاكم_بس

نعماء فيصل المهدي

[Namaa AL-Mahdi]

ما يقارب ال٣٠ من النشطاء فى سجون الفاشر على اثر حرق مقر شرطة لم تحميهم من مجزرة فتابرنومازالت جروح كتم وفتابرنو تنزف, اذ تم عقابهم بالقتل بسبب حرق بناية متحجرة . مرفق صور لبعض القوات

 التى فضت اعتصام فتابرنو بالعنف المفرط والقتل وصور للمعتقلين على اثر حادثة حرق مبنى الشرطة مع العلم بان مرتكبي جريمة قتل الارواح وحرق مساكن الناس طلقاء. معايير تفضيل حجارة الاقوياء على سلامة ارواح الضعفاء فى دارفور.

هيئة محامي دارفور

                بيان حول 

تعذيب الأستاذ مدني علي عبد الرحمن عضو هيئة محامي دارفور ورفاقه اثناء الإعتقال بواسطة الأجهزة الرسمية لحكومة ولاية شمال دارفور .

التقت الهيئة بعضوها الأستاذ مدني علي عبد الرحمن والذي تم إعتقاله بواسطة اجهزة حكومة ولاية شمال دارفور وتم ترحيله إلي قسم شرطة الفاشر ومن معه من  المعتقلين وعددهم ١٥ معتقلا  وذلك بقسم شرطة الفاشر ، وحسب إفاداتهم ، فقد تعرض جميع المعتقلين الذين التقت بهم الهيئة بقسم شرطة الفاشر للتعذيب المادي والمعنوي من خلال إستخدام العصي الكهربائية وأنابيب الغاز المطلية بالدهون والركل بالأرجل والضرب المبرح والإساءة بالألفاظ الحاطة بالكرامة الإنسانية واصيب غالبيتهم  بالقروح الدامية وحبس البول كما وهنالك اصابات في العيون  . الإجراءات التي اتخذتها اللجنة الأمنية لحكومة ولاية شمال دارفور مخالفة للقانون، كما وان إجراء فتح بلاغات في مواجهة المقبوض عليهم وتعذيبهم لإنتزاع إعترافات قانونية ضد انفسهم مثلما كان يحدث في ظل النظام البائد فيه إنتاج لذات سياسات النظام البائد بفبركة الوقائع  ، إزاء ما تقدم تعلن الهيئة الآتي : 

١ . الإنتهاكات المرتكبة بحق معتقلي كتم مورست بواسطة اجهزة الولاية العليا كما ان الأجهزة العدلية سعت لأحقا فى التأسيس على الإجراءات الباطلة والمخالفة للقانون بفتح بلاغات جنائية في مواجهة المقبوضين .

٢. النائب العام هو صاحب السلطة  الحصرية في الإشراف على الشرعية الإجرائية في الدولة وما حدث من إنتهاكات جسيمة مبينة في البند(ا) اعلاه يستدعي تدخله وتكوين لجنة تقصي وتحقيق لإتخاذ الإجراء الذي يتسق وصحيح تطبيق احكام القانون والتحقيق مع أعضاء اللجنة الأمنية العليا بولاية شمال دارفور .

٣. تطالب الهيئة النائب العام  بإنهاء الحبس غير المشروع لكل المقبوضين بقسم الفاشر تأسيسا على ان البلاغات فتحت  ضدهم قد استندت على إجراءات باطلة ومخالفة للقانون ولا سند له في قانون الإجراءات الجنائية ٩١ ساري المفعول ولا اي قانون آخر ساري المفعول ، وأنها تعتبر قد نشأت معدومة كبلاغات جنائية صحيحة وفقا لأحكام القانون .

٤. امتناع الأستاذ مدني علي عبد الرحمن المجامي عن الإدلاء باقواله ليس فقط بسبب المخالفة الإجرائية في عدم رفع الحصانة التي يتمتع بها على اساس خلفيته المهنية كمحامي اوجب القانون رفع الحصانة عنه قبل مباشرة اي إجراء جنائي ضده وإنما ايضا للبطلان الموضوعي الذي يوجب إنهاء الحبس غير المستند على اساس  قانوني ، وليس على اساس الشطب القانوني .

٥. اللجنة الأمنية بالولاية مسؤولة عن كل ما ارتكب من إنتهاكات وتجاوزات بحق المقبوض عليهم بمن فيهم عضويتها من ممثلي الأجهزة العدلية.

 ٦. النائب العام  هو المختص دون سواه بإنهاء الحبس غير القانوني لمقبوضي احداث كتم دون التاثير على حق المتاثرين بإنتهاكات الحبس غير القانوني في مقاضاة جميع اعضاء اللجنة الأمنية بالولاية من ذوي الصلة بالتجاوزات والإنتهاكات المرتكبة  .

         هيئة محامي دارفور 

             ٢٦/ ٧/ ٢٠٢٠

تسجيل لحوداث فض اعتصام كتم

https://www.facebook.com/100006475185944/videos/3286048741620933/

[Namaa AL-Mahdi]

#صور_المشردين من مناطق جنوب غرب محلية كاس ، برونقا والقرى المجاورة لشطاية وهم يقطعون وديان قندي وقري في رحلة البحث عن ملجأ آمن يقيهم هجمات مليشيات الجنجويد وجرائمها المتكررة بحق المدنيين الأبرياء

نزوح جديد جنوب غرب مدينة كاس بعد هجوم في اول ايام العيد بمنطقة برونقي بالجنوب من مدينة كاس

منقول

[Namaa AL-Mahdi]

مقتل النازح علي ادم الملقب ب( علي تيري) بمعسكر كساب رميآ بالرصاص الحي بالقرب من منطقة فولو التي تقع شمال مدينة كتم امس،وذلك علي أيدي أحد المليشيات المسلحة (الجنجويد)، وما يظهر في الصورة أدناه هو معروضات القاتل ( المجرم) التي تتمثل في الجمل بكامل أمتعته وإضافة علي ذلك عدد واحد قطعة سلاح كلاشنكوف،وعلمآ تم العثور علي هذه المعروضات بعد ما نفذ القاتل جريمته النكراء وفر هاربآ إلي جهة أهله المستوطنين الجدد .

#الرحمة والمغفرة للشهيد
#التحية إلي كل النازحين
#الخزي والعار للقتلة والمستوطنين الجدد( الجنجويد)
#الثورة مستمرة مهما يبلغ ثمن التضحيات

[Namaa AL-Mahdi]

حرية - سلام -عدالة- الثورة - خيار - الشعب

⚫#صوت كتم الحر

🔴#بيان رقم (٥)

⚫#بيان بخصوص مقتل المواطن/ علي ادم (تيري).

#عزك بيتقاسي المذلة والقهر والقتل والتهميش والحرمان

#وعقاب وراء عقاب من عقود لسنين

#لا شئ فقط لأننا قد حملناكي لونا في الجبين

#شرفاء الشعب السوداني الاحرار

نحن كصوت كتم الحر ظلننا نناشد حكومة المحلية وحكومة الولاية والحكومة المركزية بالنظر في موضوع السلاح العشوائي وبسط هيبة الدولة وتأمين الموسم الزراعي الذي أصبح مهدد اكثر من اي وقت مضي والشروع في توفير الأمن وتأمين حياة المواطنين وطرد المستوطنين الجدد

ولكن بعد حدث اليوم اتضح لنا تماما بما لا يدع مجال للشك أن المليشي الذي يحمل سلاحا ويهدد أمن المواطن ويضر بمصالح المواطنين يحميه جهاز الدولة فعندما تتهاون الأجهزة الأمنية في بسط هيبة الدولة وتحاول أن تجعل السلاح في أيدي جهات معينة وتجرمه وتحرمه علي الآخرين يبقي القصد واضح من هذا التصرف الكيزاني وسنظل نكرر لم تسقط بعد وندعوا كل الأحرار للاصطفاف وسنسقطها ونتحمل مسئوليتها

⁦✍️⁩#جماهير الشعب السوداني الاوفياء

تعود تفاصيل الحادثة إلي أن هناك ثلاث من المواطنين خرجوا للزراعة في منطقة فولوا الواقعة شمال محليه كتم وهجم عليهم ثلاث من المليشيات مسلحين بعدد ٣ كلاشنكوف واعترضوا المواطنين بألا يزرعوا وعندهم سألهم الشهيد لماذا وهذا الارض لنا فما كان من أحدهم ألا وإن أطلق عليه النار فأرداه قتيلا محاولين الهروب ولكن تمكن الاثنان الاخرون من السيطرة علي جمل الجاني وبندقيته ولازوا بالفرار وتوجه المواطنون فورا لفتح بلاغ عن الجناية إلا أن الأجهزة الأمنية بالمحلية رفضت فتح بلاغ لانه القانون . حقنا بيجرم ويحكم في حق الجنجويد حاجة بعيدة فعاد المواطنون الي حيث أسقط الشهيد واتي قوات من الدعم السريع ورفضوا ايضا حمل الشهيد وتأمين الموقع من اي عملية هجوم متوقع فما كان أمام المواطنين الا الاحتماء بقوا اليوناميد خوفا من بطش هولاء المليشيات والان الوضع الأمني بالمحلية مضطربة جدا .

#وبناءا لما سردناه من

#تفاصيل تخص الحدث

#نحن كصوت كتم الحر نوضح الاتي نصه:-

١/ندين ونستنكر هذة الحملات التي تستهدف المواطنين من حين لآخر

٢/نحمل الأجهزة الأمنية بالمحلية تفاصيل ما حدث وما يحدث لأننا نري أنهم يسطرون علي مثل تلك الجرائم ويتقاعسون عن القيام بما عليه من واجبات تجاه المواطن.

٣/ نتهم قوات الدعم السريع بالانحياز الي القبائل العربية وعدم جمع السلاح من أياديهم والسماح لهم بحمل السلاح خلاف الآخرين.

٤/ نحذر المليشيات من الإقدام لأي عملية هجوم والا اننا اقسمنا أن تصمد بسلميتنا المعهودة منذ فجر ثورة ديسمبر بالثبات والصمود امام مدافعهم

٥/نناشد بعثة اليوناميد بالوقوف جنبا مع المواطن وحمايته

٦/ مطالب بالتدخل الدولي لحماية المواطنين طالما فشل الحكومة في حماية المواطنين .

#المجد والخلود لشهداء الثورة

#والحرية لكل الأسري والمعتقلين

#بتاريخ 2020/08/4م

🔴 #إعلام صوت كتم الحر

[Namaa AL-Mahdi]

اعتقلت السلطات بمحلية كتم 5/8/2020 ناشطين , تعود هذا الاعتقالات الي سلسلة من الاعتقالات التي شنتها اللجنة الأمنية لولاية شمال دارفور والاستخبارات العسكرية والأمنية والدعم السريع لتكميم افواه الشباب الثائرين بعد إحداث فض اعتصام كتم حيث أعلن الولاية حالة الطوارئ بمحلية جراء الأحداث. 
بينما لا تزال العشرات من الشباب في المعتقلات بكتم وفاشر 
وهؤلاء المعتقلين الجدد وهم:
1/ موس محمد احمد 
2/ ادم احمد ادم 
3/ صلاح اسماعيل خاطر 
4/ حبيب محمد عبد الرحمن 
5/ حازم عبدالله ادم 
6/ محمد عبدالله اسحق 
7/ ياسر عبدالله ادم ابراهيم 
8/النزيز علي عبدالله 
9/ ابو القاسم ادم

إعلام صوت كتم الحر

[Namaa AL-Mahdi]

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
بيان من مسؤول القوى السياسية بالمجلس الأعلى لنظارات البجا والعموديات المستقلة

التحية لشهيدنا المغدور اركة ولكل شهداء القضية البجاوية وشهداء ثورة ديسمبر المجيدة.

تابع كل السودانيون ما يمر به إقليم البجا/شرق السودان من أحداث أودت بالسلام الاجتماعي في الاقليم، ولاحظ الجميع تجاهل المركز لتلك الفتنة التي يعلم العالم انها قد تمثل نهاية السودان بشكلة التقليدي الموروث من الاستعمار وتأثيرها على المحيط وعلى أمن البحر الأحمر وعلى السلام العالمي بشكل عام.
المجلس الأعلى أكد للحكومة وللشعب وللا علام بأن ذلك يحدث نتيجة لتآمر خارجي من قوى خارجية على شعب هذا الإقليم بهدف احتلاله والاستفادة من موارده وتغييره ديمغرافيا، وأكد للعالم بالمذكرات والمراسلات والإعلام أن إقليم البجا الان هو ضحية لسياسات دول أخرى في التخلص من القوى المعارضة لها بطمرها وتذويبها في الاقليم ونزع جنسيتها الأصيلة عنها ومنحها جنسية وهوية شعب آخر بالتزوير وباستخدام اتفاقيات خبيثة وغير معلنة مع نظام البشير البائد، كما أنه ضحية لتاثيرات ومترتبات صراع واطماع خارجية في ثروات و موقع ومقدرات هذا الإقليم.

عليه تؤكد القوى السياسية بالمجلس الأعلى للبجا الاتي

١- أن قضيتنا في الاقليم ليست قضية والي ولا قضية مسار تفاوضي، قضيتنا هي أننا ندافع عن أرضنا وعن هويتنا ونتمسك بثرواتنا وبحقنا التاريخي في هذه الأرض ونرفض الاحتلال الأجنبي إذا تم محاولة تسليمه اقليمنا عبر مسار الشرق في جوبا أو عبر الأنفاق التي صنعتها المعارضة الارترية في جسم كيان الحرية والتغيير السوداني لتمرير تعيين والي كسلا اما عبر مفاوضات جوبا أو عبر قوى الثورة، أو عبر اي تسوية سياسية حتى لو تم منح البجا منصب رئيس السودان.
كما أنها قضية ظلم تاريخي وإقصاء مستمر عن السلطة والخدمات ونهب لثروات دام بعمر الدولة الوطنية المختلة. 

٢- تؤكد القوى السياسية بالمجلس رفضها القاطع للوالي صالح عمار عديم الخبرة، وترفض اصلاً أن يتم تعيين والي رفضته كل مكونات الاقليم بوصاية مركزية او بضغوط خارجية، كما تؤكد رفضها لمسار الشرق أشعل الحرب في الاقليم وأنهى السلام الذي كان قائما في الشرق، وتحمل مسؤولية انفراط الأمن بالإقليم للمجلس المركزي للحرية والتغيير والمجلس الوزراء والمجلس السيادي الانتقالي.

٣- نعلن عن بدأ التصعيد الثوري بالإقليم، وندعوا كل أحزابنا و شبابنا لدعم اعتصامي كسلا وسنكات و لتتريس الشوارع بالاقليم وإستخدام كل الوسائل الثورية السلمية التي أتت بحكومة المركز السيادية والتنفيذية انطلاقا من الروح القومية مؤكدين تمسكنا بوحدة السودان، و دفاعنا بارواحنا عن الأمن القومي للبلاد من أن يتم اختراقه من قبل أرضنا واقليمنا، ونشدد على التمسك بسلمية الثورة. والثبات على ذلك حتى تتم الاستجابة لمطالب المجلس الأعلى للبجا الممثلة في إلغاء تعين والي كسلا، و تجميد مسار الشرق في جوبا، وتنفيذ شروط القلد، وعقد مؤتمر الإقليم. 
وفيما عدا ذلك فإننا نؤكد لحكومة المركز أن دخول هذا الوالي أو غيره من مفرزات المسار الغريب لن يتم والبجا أحياء.. فباطن الأرض خير لنا من ظاهرها على أن نتخلى عن أرضنا وهويتنا وتاريخها وثرواتنا وسلطتنا التاريخية واسهامنا الاجتماعي والبشر والحضاري في تأسيس الدولة السودانية.

سيد علي أبوآمنة
مسؤول القوى السياسية بالمجلس

[Namaa AL-Mahdi]

[Namaa AL-Mahdi]

https://www.facebook.com/100001656358570/videos/3296927450372434

https://www.facebook.com/watch/live/?v=630858967569321&ref=watch_permalink

[Namaa AL-Mahdi]

Economics of Imperialism

Analysis of how the world economy works

The Lebanon Complex

In the wake of the devastating explosion in Beirut, the western media has had an almost universal response. That is to focus on corruption and incompetence in Lebanon’s ruling groups and to demand change. Lebanon’s populace is also exasperated with the political elites, and many protestors have even threatened to kill them. But an examination of Lebanon’s political system shows not only how it has been shaped by its former colonisers; its workings also follow from the limits that imperialism today places on economic and political development.

Confessional modes

Lebanon’s political system falls outside of the standard democratic model lauded by the Anglosphere, because there is an allocation of political positions according to the different religious groups in the country. Yet, looking a little more closely at the reality of the former model, one will find how the middle classes manipulate the system in their favour, how it depends on mutual favours, how rich families have multi-generational power and how they have legions of hangers on. But different strokes for different folks, so let us consider the evolution of Lebanon’s confessional one.

This mode of having a government shared out among different religious groups has a history dating back to the first half of the 19th century.[1] Lebanon was then a minor province of the Ottoman Empire and made up of a number of different religious communities, principally Maronite Christians but also Islamic sects. There were clashes between such communities in the Empire, sometimes ending in bloodshed, even massacres, and religious labels often fundamentally confused what was really a class struggle, particularly between peasants and landlords. Being aware of the different groups, the Ottoman’s policy was essentially one where people could follow their own religion and were left alone, as long as they paid their taxes to the Sublime Porte in Constantinople (later called Istanbul) and didn’t cause trouble.[2]

In May-June 1860, a massacre of Christians in Lebanon was the pretext for European powers to get involved and to take advantage of the declining Ottoman Empire. In an early version of today’s imperial hype of ‘responsibility to protect’, the Europeans, especially France, put pressure on the Ottomans to grant Mount Lebanon special status. France had interests in the Eastern Mediterranean region and had already developed links with the Catholic Maronites in Lebanon.[3]

A conference of European powers and the Ottoman Empire met in September 1860 to determine how Lebanon should be governed. The outcome was to create an autonomous sanjak or province of Mount Lebanon, with a non-Lebanese Christian governor chosen by the Ottoman sultan, assisted by a 12-member council chosen on a confessional basis. This was under the protection of the six powers – Britain, France, Russia, Prussia, Austria and Turkey. This new ‘autonomous Lebanon’ excluded Beirut, Tyre and Sidon on the coast and the Bekaa Valley to the East.

After some debate, in 1864 the 12-member council was amended. Instead of each of the six main religious groups having two members each – which under-represented the Maronites, who made up the majority of the population (perhaps 60% of the total)[4] – the Maronites were now to have four seats. Three seats were allocated to the Druze, two for Greek Orthodox Christians, one for a Greek Catholic, and one each from the Sunni and Shia communities. This gave the Christians a majority of 7:5, as well as a Christian governor. It also set the course for a sectarian representative system in Lebanon, rather than a system being based on political leaders chosen by the whole country in a democratic vote.

Political reallocation

There was a problem with France’s new pied à terre of Mount Lebanon. It was too small to be economically viable and even the Maronites, although happy to be in a majority, were concerned that there might be shortages of food and little room for development.[5] Feeling ever so free to reorganise somebody else’s land, like other colonists, France later dealt with that situation when it joined the British in carving up the Ottoman Empire.

France gained a Mandate from the League of Nations after World War One to rule the former Ottoman regions of Lebanon and Syria. Being worried about the viability of Mount Lebanon, and also worried about resurgent Arab nationalism in Syria, it decided to expand Lebanon at Syria’s expense. By adding the Beirut, Sidon, Tyre and Bekaa regions to Mount Lebanon, the geographical Lebanon we know today was born as Le Grand Liban, or Greater Lebanon. This reduced the numerical preponderance of the Maronites and other Christian groups versus the Muslims, but that was an easy price to pay when you could also fix the politics.

In 1926, France imposed a constitution for Lebanon that set up a bicameral parliament and a president. Seats in parliament and in the cabinet were distributed on the basis of religious affiliation: the president was always to be a Maronite, the prime minister a Sunni and the president of the Chamber of Deputies a Shia. There would always be a Greek Orthodox and a Druze member of the cabinet, while the Maronite president had the right to choose the prime minister.

So far so good for the French, but it was far from a lasting fait accompli.

Economic and political evolution

Arab nationalists in Syria and elsewhere opposed French control of Lebanon. Just as importantly, in Lebanon there was discontent with France’s limits on what the government could do and with whom it could have political and economic relationships. What made this troublesome for France was its weak position by the 1930s, when it had little to offer, while within Lebanon there was a growing cooperation between the Maronite and the Sunni elites.

What brought the latter together was a joint interest in developing commercial and financial relationships with other countries. Even the ‘Greater Lebanon’ was still only a very small state, with few natural resources and a tiny population of less than one million people. It was never going to be a base for significant industry or agriculture. However, Lebanon had several key ports, especially in Beirut, was well positioned on the eastern Mediterranean and had long been a trading centre with financing available. The Maronite elites had traditionally looked westerly, while the Sunni merchants had stronger relationships in the Arab hinterland. France had played a useful role for them both as a sponsoring power, and France had better ties with the Maronites, but they would both be open to other deals.

This came to a head by the early 1940s, prompted by the disruption of the Second World War. Lebanon got a version of independence from France in 1943, and the ‘Free French’ who had invaded Lebanon in 1941 to oust the Vichy regime left Lebanon in 1946 under pressure from the British.[6]

In 1943, a National Pact was agreed. This was a version of earlier deals in which the Maronites held on to the main sources of political power. The 1943 Pact gave the Christians a slightly lower 6:5 ministerial advantage, but still an advantage despite Christians no longer being a majority of the population. The previous rule was kept that the president was to be a Maronite and the prime minister a Sunni; the parliamentary speaker was to be a Shia. The wider political agreement in the Pact was that the Christians would no longer look to France and Muslims would not look to Syria or to Arab union. Ties with the west and with Arab states were allowed if Lebanon’s independence were recognised.

This continuing advantage of the Christians might look anomalous, but the Pact signalled the fundamental

‘unity of the Christian and Muslim [mainly Sunni - TN] members of the commercial-financial bourgeoisie … By working together in an independent Lebanon, the Muslim and Christian bourgeoisies could build a trading and banking centre which would serve as an entrepôt for the West and the Arab world.’[7]

It was in the Arab bourgeoisie’s interests to keep Christian majority rule. This was both because the ability to pursue their common interests with the Christians might otherwise be threatened, and also because increased Muslim representation, including more for the Shia, would have limited the Sunni control of state institutions. This had the desired effect. For example, the Sunni poor tended to see the rich as only the Christians, and they kept to an Arab/Muslim loyalty, rather than a class one. The Christian-dominated state and President in Lebanon were more likely to be the focus of their discontent, not capitalism or their own confessional leaders.

Some redistribution, on confessional lines

While the confessional form of government and political authority helped to hide class divisions, it also had a downside for the different ruling elites. They now had to deliver for their particular communities, and any inter-communal conflict would also put them on the spot: ‘what are you doing to defend us?’ To make the system workable, there had to be agreement between the different groups on sharing out jobs, privileges and influence, and to make sure that those in the weakest position would not cause trouble. This was reflected in the National Pact of 1943, and also in the various other forms of agreement that came after.

In practice, this still meant a strong position of the Christians, especially the Maronites, given their economic prominence. However, the Maronites depended upon the presence of other Christian sects to add to their number, and they too saw that a deal with the Muslims was essential.

On the Muslim side, the Sunni group was in the most favourable economic position. They had done relatively well in the Ottoman Empire and remained probably the largest of the Islamic sects up to the 1970s. The Shia, the second largest Muslim community up to that point (after which they probably outnumbered the Sunni) tend to be lower down the economic scale, and have made up most of the poor in rural, suburban and city areas. At least partly as a result, they have been the most under-represented in Lebanon’s political system. This is not saying that every Sunni is rich and every Shia is poor, but the characterisation holds for each group as a whole.

The result of this political evolution was a peculiar ‘welfare state’ managed largely through the different confessional groups. This is the origin of what the western media likes to disparage as ‘corruption’, but is the type of government that arose in an ex-colony that was unable to create a single, or a more united ruling class to lord it over the rest of the population.

No escape from the imperial environment

Lebanon had a prime position in the regional economy as a commercial and financial centre after the Second World War. Heading into the post-war boom, what could possibly go wrong? It turned out that the delicate balance of internal forces was easily disrupted even in the absence of direct colonial power, both by external forces and by internal ones. These combined to produce a bewildering array of multi-faceted and changing alliances – something that one might have expected, given the disparate nature of Lebanon’s domestic political groups that were also in the process of changing. This article will not attempt to cover all these issues, but to discuss only the most important ones.

On the external side, a very significant event for Lebanon was the turmoil caused by the big powers setting up the state of Israel in Palestine in 1948, and Israel’s expulsion of Palestinian refugees.[8] Broader events in the Middle East region likewise had an impact on Lebanon. For example, pro-western Christian President Camille Chamoun did not break relations with the French and British who, along with Israel, had invaded Egypt in the Suez adventure of 1956. He also seemed to be open to US and British plans for an anti-Soviet military alliance, the Baghdad Pact set up in 1955. In 1958, he opposed Lebanon joining the newly created (but short-lived) United Arab Republic of Syria and Egypt, and he invited the US to intervene with troops in the 1958 crisis that is sometimes called Lebanon’s first civil war. The Maronites were worried about the security of their position in the country, while at the same time going against a lot of Muslim opinion.

Together with the former ‘external factors’ – the quotation marks reflecting the more-than-usual artificial nature of country borders in the Middle East – Syria, Saudi Arabia and, after the 1979 revolution, later Iran, also had interests in Lebanon.

Palestinian refugees and repercussions

More than 100,000 Palestinian refugees went across the northern border to Lebanon in 1947-48; many more followed in later years, particularly after the war in 1967. This influx of mainly Muslim refugees was a problem for a country with less than 1.5 million people in 1948 and still only around 2.5 million by 1975.[9] Apart from being an economic burden, this further exacerbated Christian worries about Arab nationalism. As Palestinian militants fought back against their dispossession by Israel, this also made other Lebanese communities, particularly those in the south of the country, fearful that Israel would attack them too.

By the mid-1970s, the results were toxic, and also not entirely predictable. Many Shia in southern Lebanon resented the presence of Palestinian fighters and one group, the Amal Movement, principally made up of Shia, turned against and attacked them in 1976. However, Maronite forces were the main opponents of the Palestinians and their armed groups, the most important of which was the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO).

The principal Maronite political group was the Phalanges Party. It started as a paramilitary youth organisation in 1937, modelled after the Spanish and Italian fascist parties, and had a version of Lebanese nationalism that was opposed especially to pan-Arabism. It came to greater prominence from the 1950s. Until the 1980s, it ran the most organised militias in Lebanon, fighting both Palestinian and leftist groups. Its record shows how it gained a gruesome expertise in large-scale killings, with implicit or explicit help from other forces.

Events in Lebanon often have a murky chain of causation and even outcome, and there are sometimes plausible claims of ‘false flag’ attacks or assassinations to provoke a response between different armed groups in Lebanon. However, there is little dispute about the Phalange militia being involved in the 1975 bus massacre that killed 27 people and wounded 19, mainly Palestinians but also Lebanese. Many writers have even regarded this as the start of the prolonged 1975-1990 civil war.

Palestinians in Lebanon did not only face the Phalangists. In 1976, Syrian troops entered Lebanon on the invitation of the Syrian president, and shortly began operations against the PLO whom they blamed for destabilising the country. In August 1976, supported by Syria, Maronite forces attacked the Tel-al-Zaatar Palestinian refugee camp in East Beirut and murdered 1,000-1,500 civilians.

The Maronite militia had been supplied with weapons and military advisers by Israel, which was pleased with the result. This relationship continued in an even more outrageous crime in 1982; one that has had a more prominent place in the history books, so it need only be noted briefly here: the massacres at Sabra and Chatila.

In 1982, after their second invasion of Lebanon (the first was in 1978), Israel moved to eliminate the Palestinians in Beirut, targeting areas where they claimed PLO fighters were based.[10] Principally, the Israelis used their Phalangist allies for this. The direct Israeli action was shelling the Sabra refugee camp and the Chatila neighbourhood, blocking off exits and illuminating the area with flares, then allowing the Phalangists to go to work. Killing and massacre are words too clinical to describe the murder, mutilation, gang rape and torture that resulted. From 16-18 September, anywhere from 1,400 to 3,500 people died, overwhelmingly civilians, both Palestinians and Lebanese Shia.[11]

Israeli intervention in Lebanon was undoubtedly a critical factor in the fracturing of Lebanese politics, but it was far from being the only one. Israel managed to engineer the expulsion of the PLO from Lebanon, but it was unable to cement a lasting alliance with the Maronites, who themselves were losing political ground in the country. The result of the 1982 episode of war, after Israeli troops eventually pulled out (except for their continued occupation of the Shebaa Farms area), was the increased presence of Syria and the rise of Hezbollah.

Syria

The rationale for the Syrian government’s intervention in Lebanon was its fear of regional disruption caused by conflict with the Israelis, including in Syria. This was together with its concern about growing Sunni influence via the PLO. Syria backed anti-PLO Palestinian and Lebanese groups and sought more influence in Lebanon. Syria’s political system, like Lebanon’s, was an uneasy compromise between rival groups. But in contrast to Lebanon, it was one that had resulted in a stronger central government.

From 1976 to 2005, Syria had more than 20,000 troops in Lebanon, and initially the Arab League endorsed these as a peacekeeping force. Although Lebanon had asked Syria to leave in 1986, Syria’s presence gained some legitimacy by 1991 and the two countries signed a treaty and a security pact. These gave Syria responsibility for the defence of Lebanon from external threats, while Lebanon promised that it would not be a threat to Syria. Over time, however, Syria’s military presence in Lebanon came to be opposed both by internal and external forces, and Syrian troops pulled out in 2005.

The Taif Agreement

Syria’s military exit was its delayed response to the 1989 Taif Agreement. This was a plan negotiated in Taif, Saudi Arabia, for ending the civil war and the implementing political changes in Lebanon. As one might have expected, a number of other countries were involved in drawing up the Agreement, otherwise known as the National Reconciliation Accord. These included Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, France, Iran and the US.

The Agreement took away some of the Lebanese (Maronite) President’s powers, enhanced the power of the Sunni prime Minister and, a little more in line with demographic reality, gave the Christians and Muslims an equal number of seats in the Chamber of Deputies. This abolished the advantage previously favouring Christians, but they were still over-represented. Various studies have put the Christian share of the population at well below 50% at that point, and still lower today, partly due to emigration, but there has been no official government breakdown of the population by religion since 1932. Some statistics are just too dangerous, because they might contradict the (only?) political deal that the ruling elites find manageable.

One other important aspect of the Taif Agreement was how it called for the disarmament of the many armed groups within Lebanon. Such militias were rife, since a divided bourgeoisie does not often have a national army it can rely upon. However, there was an exception to the rule on militias: Hezbollah.

Hezbollah

If you were religious, it would be difficult to think of a better name for your political group than the ‘Party of God’. Due to Hezbollah’s important role in fighting Israel from 1982 and its wider significance in Lebanon, especially among the Shia community, the Taif Agreement allowed it to keep its arms as a ‘resistance force’.

Hezbollah began after 1979 as a rival to the older Amal Movement in southern Lebanon and was backed by Iran after the Islamic revolution of that year overthrew the Shah. It grew to have support in many areas of the country, with the key points of its 1985 manifesto gaining resonance: to expel the French and Americans from Lebanon, to bring the Phalangists to justice and to allow people to choose the form of government they want. Naturally, it also called on people to choose an Islamic government, but that did not stop it getting support from people who did not want one.

Together with Amal, Hezbollah today represents most of the Shia in Lebanon, but just noting that would greatly underestimate its political clout. It is a key player in Lebanon’s parliament, including having alliances with other parties, even Maronites; it has the most effective military force in the country and it runs an extensive social welfare programme in Lebanon, including hospitals and educational facilities.

In military terms, Hezbollah has many claims to fame, although it has not said that all the things attributed to it were its responsibility, and they may not be. Notable are: the April 1983 suicide bombing of the US Embassy in Beirut, with 17 US dead, including two senior CIA officers; in October 1983, more than 240 US marines and 58 French paratroopers were killed by a truck bomb in Beirut; in March 1984, the kidnapping of William Buckley, CIA station chief in Beirut (he died in captivity in June 1985). There were many more.

Perhaps the biggest episode was the war with Israel in July-August 2006. After Hezbollah fighters crossed into Israel and killed or imprisoned a number of Israeli soldiers, Israel bombed southern Lebanon and Beirut and began the massive destruction of civilian infrastructure, including schools, roads, bridges, mosques, churches and medical facilities. Over 1,000 Lebanese were killed, the vast majority civilians, more than 4,000 were injured and a million people were displaced. Israel’s land, sea and air blockade on Lebanon lasted until September 2006.[12]

Despite the destruction in Lebanon, Hezbollah gained political ground both in Lebanon and outside. It had managed to survive, not to surrender, and was able to inflict embarrassing losses on the much more powerful, US-funded Israeli forces. This has made Hezbollah difficult for Israel and western powers to deal with. The US and the UK have declared that Hezbollah is a ‘terrorist’ organisation, and the EU has used that term for its military wing. But its prominent status in Lebanon has been unchanged, and in recent years it has used its military experience to fight against ISIL both in Syria and in Iraq.

Saudi and Iranian money

While Israel’s mode of influence in Lebanon was via Christian politicians, as well as via direct military attacks and intervention, Saudi Arabian and Iranian influence has been through the Muslim community, which makes up more than half the population. The two biggest Muslim groups in Lebanon are the Sunnis and the Shia, roughly equal in size, and the principal links have been Saudi-Sunni and Iran-Shia.

Saudi influence in Lebanon has been led by money, including bribes. Along with some other Gulf states, Saudi Arabia has been an important source of subsidy for the Lebanese economy, helping to finance projects, including reconstruction after the 2006 war with Israel. To that extent, it has been of some benefit to all Lebanese, not just Sunnis, but this subsidy has been under threat in recent years. This is both because of Saudi Arabia’s anger at Iranian and Syrian involvement in Lebanon and because of lower oil prices reducing Saudi revenues.

Iran has far less available money than Saudi Arabia, but has also had a significant role in Lebanese politics. It is able to be far more effective in providing not only military supplies and training, but also food aid and other assistance. The western media focus is on Iran’s support for Hezbollah, but this should not be overstated. Just as the Saudis cannot entirely control the politics of the Sunnis, Iran is also limited in what it can do. Compromise between different Lebanese factions is a necessity that all domestic players accept, whatever the pressures may be from their external sponsors.

Lebanon’s economy

Data on Lebanon’s economy are patchy and unreliable. The war in Syria from 2011, which led at one point to more than a million refugees fleeing to Lebanon, has added to the data problem. But one has to deal with what is available. Here I briefly examine some balance of payments data that throw more light on Lebanon, rather than focus on the latest period of crisis that has seen inflation accelerate to around 90% and the economy in a state of collapse, even before the explosion at Beirut’s port.

At first sight, the broad patterns in these data are consistent with what one would expect from a small economy that was very involved in international trade. For example, exports and imports of goods and services are each a large share of GDP. However, the average for exports from 1990-2010 was a bit over 30% of GDP while the average for imports was nearly 60%.[13] This massive gap of close to 24% of GDP is unusual, and it was at close to the same rate in later years. The total of other factors on the current account did not reduce this gap in ‘current’ payments. Although one, remittances from expatriate Lebanese workers, saw significant inflows, others, including payments on debt servicing, saw big outflows. This implies – if the data are at all indicative of reality – that there had been a persistent and large net inflow of funds into Lebanon on the country’s financial accounts.

These net financial inflows tally with the sharp rise in Lebanon’s foreign debt to around 150% of its GDP. They also reflect the large scale of financial support for Lebanon from Saudi Arabia and others that are not fully documented. Part of this support has come in the form of foreign investment, especially into Lebanese real estate; other money has come in the form of deposits in Lebanese banks, including the central bank. Media reports in recent years have noted a flight of money from Lebanon. Saudi Arabia’s funding of Lebanon’s balance of payments, unwittingly or not, will have made this exit less costly for Lebanon’s capitalists.

Conclusion

Lebanon highlights many features of imperialism today. Despite its colonial past and a system of government that was bound to exacerbate communal tensions, it might still have managed to carve out a niche for itself and become a relatively prosperous trading centre in the Eastern Mediterranean.[14] But that prospect was crushed by the geopolitics of the region, from the creation of the Israeli state, to the interference of the major powers, to the impact of crises in surrounding countries as they too tried to forge some kind of future.

It is especially galling to have media pundits cite ‘corruption’ in Lebanon as the problem when the country’s history has been shaped by outside forces, and when the choices it faced for development meant fitting in with the colonial or imperial set up.

The imperial focus today is on Hezbollah. It has provided Lebanon with the only effective force to counter persistent attacks from Israel, and also runs a much-needed welfare system. That is bad enough for ‘western’ opinion; worse still are its links with Iran and Syria – other countries that do not do what they are told.

So, never letting a crisis go to waste, in the wake of the devastating explosion in the port of Beirut we find that curbing, or eliminating, Hezbollah’s role in Lebanon is a major imperial objective, one shared by both Saudi Arabia and Israel. This is the rationale behind their calls for ‘reform’ in Lebanon, and would appear to be a condition for giving the country anything more than minimal aid.

All citizens of Lebanon are angry at the political regime, and they have wanted to change it for decades. But there is no chance of them being able to decide on a new system without external pressure. Imperialism today presents many countries with problems that cannot be resolved. Lebanon is one of them.

Tony Norfield, 26 August 2020

https://economicsofimperialism.blogspot.com

Economics of Imperialism China’s importance in the world economy means that these exclusion tactics cannot easily be extended. Although the US administration has trumpeted, so to speak, a new objective to cut China out of the supply chains that its big corporations have profitably been using for decades, even the ‘great again’ America must know that this would take many years to achieve. economicsofimperialism.blogspot.com

[Namaa AL-Mahdi]

From the Book, Egypt and the Struggle for Power in Sudan

From World War II to Nasserism 

Muhammad ‘Ali, who arrived in Egypt in 1801 as a young Ottoman officer, managed cunningly and ruthlessly to be appointed Ottoman governor of the province of Egypt in 1805. After he consolidated his hegemony over Egypt, he decided to build up his own

empire. The occupation of Sudan was part of his expansionist policy to establish regional hegemony. From that stage on, Egyptians regarded Sudan as “our historic fatherland” – an inseparable part of Egypt throughout history.

Egypt’s involvement in modern time – directly and indirectly – with Sudan and the Sudanese may be divided into several major historical phases: first, from its occupation until the rise of the Mahdi movement in the early 1880s; second, after a short period of Mahdi rule, Sudan was reconquered by Egyptian and British forces (1896–1898), and in January

1899 the two countries concluded the condominium treaty, establishing dual Anglo–Egyptian rule over Sudan – a British imperialist invention; and third, the condominium epoch (1899–1953) and the transitional period of Sudanese self-government (1953–1956), which led to independent Sudan.

The case of Sudan was quite unique: an internally divided country (north and south) that was ruled (1899–1956) by two foreign imperialist powers, one regional and the other global – Egypt and Britain.

Formally, Egypt ruled Sudan on behalf of the Ottoman Empire until 1914. However, practically speaking, prior to British occupation (1882), Egypt was an autonomous entity with a separate army and independent foreign and

domestic policies. Common wisdom suggests that colonialism “is a form of domination – the control by individuals or groups over the territory and/or behavior of other individuals or groups.” It is also often seen as a form of economic exploitation and a “culture-change process.”

Why were Egyptians so determined to control Sudan? As this study shows there were several reasons. A central one was control over the Nile, Egypt’s lifeline, which passes through Sudan. Controlling Sudan would make it easier to closely monitor the flow of the Nile water and safeguard its sources from neighboring countries. Economically, the utilization and exploitation of Sudan’s natural resources and agrarian land were weighty considerations. Furthermore, Sudan could have

accommodated substantial Egyptian emigration, especially among peasants, which could solve one of Egypt’s most acute problems: its high population density.

Moreover, Egyptian writers spoke of a cultural and civilizational mission, giving expression to fantasies of controlling and civilizing Sudan, especially the non-Arab and non-Muslim southern Sudan, where the population was diverse in ethnic and linguistic terms. Nevertheless, neither Egyptian nor British rule over Sudan may be characterized as “settler colonialism,” according to which “settlers in significant number migrate permanently to the colony from the colonizing power.”

Imperialism is a more suitable definition as it suggests that only “few, if any, permanent settlers from the imperial homeland migrate to the colony.” Egyptian emigration into Sudan was made impossible as Britain as the dominant partner in the condominium exercised full control over the influx of Egyptians into Sudan. Anti-British sentiments in Egypt had grown constantly throughout the condominium period. The unity of the Nile valley was a national consensual issue uniting “territorialists and supra-Egyptianist spokesmen alike.”

 

Nevertheless, their vantage points of a united Egyptian– Sudanese country differed. Whereas territorial nationalists emphasized the centrality of material factors, Islamic nationalists considered both Egypt and Sudan as an integral part of al-Umma al-Islamiyya.

The Egyptian nationalist consensus, seeking unification of the Nile valley under the Egyptian crown, was shared by all political groups, with one exception: the Egyptian communists were the only group that viewed the Sudanese as equals, a people who should have their own right to self-determination and to shape their own future. The slogan of the mainstream ran: “the unity of the Nile valley: one Nile, one people, one king” [wahdat wadi al-nil – Nil wahid – sha‘b wahid – malik wahid].

The communists promoted a very different slogan: “political and economic independence and a common struggle with the Sudanese people and its right to self-determination” [al-istiqlal al-siyasi wa-al-iqtisadi waal- kifah al-mushtarak ma‘a al-sha‘b al-sudani wa-haqhu fi taqrir masirihi].

Was the unity of the Nile valley a manifestation of an “imagined community,” to employ Benedict Anderson’s concept on the development of national identity, or was it an “imaginary community,” a product of the Egyptian colonialist vision? Anderson defines an “imagined community” as a group in which people living in the same administrative unit, usually a state, share similar life experiences, i.e., their daily lives are shaped by a similar economic, political, and social reality. Anderson’s

concept is based on the assumption that the majority of the people living within a territory share that collective identity.

 By contrast, the reality molding daily life experience in Egypt and Sudan was rather diverse, and most people inhabiting Sudan did not share the Egyptian vision of a unified Nile valley under the Egyptian crown. An “imaginary community” can thus be depicted as an imposed identity by a dominant community/ group of people on other groups of peoples inhabiting a disputed “common territory” who do not share or accept that identity, as was the case with Egypt seeking to expand its sovereignty over Sudan.

The troubled Anglo–Egyptian relations of the late nineteenth century through the late 1950s have been the subject of many studies. These studies have placed great emphasis on the various political, social, economic, and cultural issues related to the question of Sudan.8 As these studies have shown, soon after the conclusion of World War II, successive Egyptian governments launched a large-scale campaign to promote Egypt’s interests in Sudan – a campaign that the British attempted to thwart by any means necessary. The British exploited their substantial leverage as the dominant power in both Egypt and Sudan to reduce Egyptian influence in Sudan to the greatest extent possible. In addition,

some studies have addressed the Anglo–Egyptian struggle over control of the Sudanese educational system.

They examine Britain’s activity in the field of education and illustrate the way in which it developed, nurtured, and improved the Sudanese educational system to promote Sudanese national identity and encourage anti-Egyptian separatist tendencies.

Several studies, mostly in Arabic, have directly and indirectly dealt with the subject of the unity of the Nile valley. They may be divided into two main groups: those written by Egyptian academics and intellectuals before and after Sudan’s independence, and those written by Sudanese thinkers mainly in the post-independence era. The two groups represent contradictory approaches vis-à-vis Egypt’s claims for a united Nile valley. In general, Egyptian writers wrote favorably of the colonialist experience in Sudan; the blame for thwarting the prospect of a united Nile valley was placed mainly with Britain and to a certain extent with Sudanese territorial nationalists. These studies focused on the political and social aspects

of the problematic triangle of Anglo–Egyptian–Sudanese relations.

We can learn from these works that until the early 1950s, Egypt’s demand to unite the Nile valley was supported by all successive governments including the new military regime during its first months in power.

These governments categorically refused to come to terms with Britain on any agreement in which Sudan would be separated from Egypt. Britain, for its part, took every possible measure to split the two countries;

it had its own reasons for, and interests in, such an outcome. Perhaps the most prominent work to describe and analyze in detail the political stages in Egypt’s twofold struggle for independence and for the unity of the Nile valley is Muhammad ‘Abd al-Hamid Ahmad Hannawi’s Ma‘rakat al-jala’ wa-wahdat wadi al-nil, 1945–1954 (Cairo, 1998). His study was based mostly on British and Egyptian archival material, official documents, and impressive secondary sources and interviews.

However, the methods, tactics, and arguments employed on both the diplomatic and the propaganda levels by Egyptian politicians and intellectuals to justify the call for unity and to persuade the international community to support its realization have not yet received attention in the literature. Moreover, the internal, at times stormy, political and

public polemic discourse within Egypt still awaits thorough, systematic, and critical examination.

This book endeavors to address these issues. It describes and analyzes the intense Egyptian efforts to prove categorically that Egypt and Sudan constituted a single territorial unit. These efforts, as it demonstrates,

were clustered around several dominant theoretical layers: history, geography, economy, culture, and ethnography. Furthermore, the book takes pains to explain the ideological, social, and political undercurrents that led to the dramatic shift in 1953 in the stance of Egypt’s new military regime, which allowed the Sudanese people to exercise their right to self-determination, thus paving the way for the demise of the idea of the unity of the Nile valley.

The conclusion of the Book

The national consensus in Egypt regarding the unity of the Nile valley crossed party and ideological lines. The Egyptian political elite was determined not to let the process of de-colonialization following World War II pass by the valley, and official Egypt made extensive

international diplomatic efforts to persuade the international community of the validity of its claims regarding an inextricable historical connection between the populations inhabiting the valley.

As part of the struggle for international public opinion the Egyptian political establishment recruited intellectuals, theoreticians, academics, and journalists who worked indefatigably and out of deep conviction to help achieve this primary national objective. Given that they chose to act in the service of the political elite, they may well have fit in with what

Bourdieu described as the “dominated fraction of the dominant class,” that is, as intellectuals they were socially perceived as both privileged and subordinate. Their mission was clear: to formulate and disseminate the doctrine of the unity of the Nile valley.

The material produced by these varied sources, which was sent, inter alia, to many member states of the United Nations to garner support, asserted that the Egyptian demand for unification was based on shared historical foundations: physical-geographical, economic, cultural, and ethnographic.

The Egyptian press – whether independent such as al-Ahram or politically oriented – served the national cause. As we have seen, from the early 1940s the communist movement was the only social/political movement to swim against the nationalist current. The communists wanted to see the Sudanese people exercising independently their right to self- determination.

The communists foresaw the postcolonial new order and the decline of the traditional empires, particularly Britain. For better comprehension of the role played by right- and left-wing opposition groups some aspects of social movements theory may be useful. Social movement as defined by Zald and McCarthy is “a set of opinions and beliefs in a population, which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society.”

The Egyptian right- and left-wing opposition movements were social/political movements that may be portrayed as “decisive agents of historical transformation,” to employ Boggs’s phrase.  In his view, “It is by studying social movements that one becomes able to construct a new image of society.”

Indeed, the communists and the Muslim Brothers as well as other opposition groups radicalized the political and social spheres to advance their radical platforms – each wanted to reshape and reconstruct society like clay in the hands of the potter. Radicalization as defined by Wilner and Dubouloz is “a personal process in which individuals adopt extreme political, social, and/or religious ideals and aspirations, and where the attainment of particular goals justifies the use of indiscriminate violence.”

 Although physical violence did not play a role in these movements’ struggle to advance their platforms on the issue of the unity of the Nile valley, they did employ verbal violence in their publications, directed particularly against British imperialism. After the Egyptian unilateral abrogation of the 1936 treaty in October 1951, they shifted temporarily to physical violence in the form of an armed struggle against British targets in the Suez Canal zone (November 1951–January 1952).

In the monarchial era (1922–1952), Egyptians of all political stripes unquestioningly accepted the doctrine of the unity of the Nile valley as an axiom. Successive Egyptian governments incorporated that doctrine as a central item of their political platforms. The only prime minister in the pre-revolution period who was more realistic and was willing to make some compromise over the Sudan issue was Isma‘il Sidqi (February 1946–December 1946).

The draft agreement (October 1946) that he reached with Ernest Bevin, according to which Britain agreed to recognize symbolic Egyptian sovereignty over Sudan, was the best Egypt could get from the British. However, the wide harsh and demagogic criticism voiced by his political opponents and the Wafd-led opposition contributed to Sidqi’s downfall and to the political burial of the agreement.

The British hardened their position on Sudan following Nuqrashi’s appeal to the UN Security Council (July 1947–August 1947). They now argued that Britain was in favor of eventual self-government for the Sudanese, and only the Sudanese should decide on their future, whether they wanted independence, some form of association with Egypt, or even

complete union with Egypt. Therefore, the British rejected Nuqrashi’s complaint about a British policy of “inciting the Sudanese to secede from Egypt.”

Although Nuqrashi (1946–1948) and his successors agreed to prepare Sudan, jointly with Britain, for self-government and self-determination, they insisted that such a development would be within the framework of the unity between Egypt and Sudan under the common crown. Nuqrashi’s failure to harness the international community in Egypt’s favor and to force the British to evacuate the Nile valley brought the Sudan question to a standstill. His successors refused to come to terms with Britain on any future agreements in which Sudan would be separated from Egypt. Britain, for its part, took all possible measures to split the two countries – it had its own reasons for and interests in such an outcome. British policy toward and interests in Egypt and Sudan were derived from Britain’s broader economic, political, and strategic interests in the Middle East and colonial Africa. Before the disintegration of the British Empire, Egypt (the Suez Canal) and Sudan were an essential link in a long chain of territories that the British controlled directly or indirectly to protect their interests in India, the “jewel in the crown.” In the post– World War II period the emphasis changed, however. With the outbreak of the Cold War, the desire to contain future Soviet expansionist plans into the Middle East and Africa reinforced the strategic vitality of the Nile valley. In the case of Egypt, the British could temporarily rely on their 1936 treaty, which allowed Britain to deploy military forces along the Suez Canal for twenty years. Egypt was an independent country, whereas Sudan was practically speaking ruled by the British. The geographic location of Sudan could be a strategic advantage given that the Nile, Egypt’s main artery, passed through the country. British control of Sudan meant control of the Egyptian nerve center. The British assumption was that in future Anglo–Egyptian disputes, Egyptian governments would have to consider their positions cautiously vis-à-vis Britain. The British were wrong. The Nahhas government (1950–1952) adopted a neutralist policy in the inter-bloc conflict and even abrogated the 1936 treaty in pursuit of an independent foreign policy. Efficient control of the Nile valley, the British believed, required the establishment of a proxy Sudanese political administration, and for that reason it was essential to promote and develop Sudanese self-government, which “in itself will militate against Egyptian re-entry into

the Sudan,” as the British put it.

Until the Sudanese would be able to rule themselves, it was essential to keep the condominium arrangements intact. Therefore Britain made sure that it remained the dominant party and that the Egyptians stayed away from power centers, by diminishing their influence, culturally, economically, politically, and socially.

In brief, the goal was to drive a wedge between Egyptians and Sudanese by championing Sudanese self-government and enhancing their separate national identity, so that in the long term, they would favor Britain over Egypt as their senior partner. The British developed and enhanced Sudanese collective identity and encouraged anti-Egyptian separatist trends. One of the means to achieve that goal was the development of separatist Sudanese nationalism.

Therefore the British had to concentrate on the development and nurturing of the Sudanese educational system, which would serve as a hotbed for the emergence of a new generation of political and social elites with a clear vision toward the building of a nation-state independent from foreign control. Sudanization of as many posts as possible in all administrative fields and in the military became Britain’s official doctrine in the post–World War II period.

As future events were to demonstrate, British endeavors were successful – Sudanese nationalism did emerge.

How did the Egyptian elite perceive Sudanese and Sudan? Although they spoke of them as “equal brothers” who shared a common land, it was noticeable throughout that they held a patronizing approach in their dealing with Sudan and Sudanese. They believed that Sudanese would prefer to tie their future to Egypt as a more advanced and sophisticated

country. Egypt could fulfill their needs and requirements and protect them from future adversaries. Egypt was the savior of Sudan: it saved the Sudanese from the fate “of almost all other African peoples, who have been suffering from European exploitation ever since the partition of the Dark Continent,” as ‘Ammar put it.

 For Egyptians of all political currents (except for communists), it was taken for granted that the Sudanese desired unification and were not seeking any alternatives. Moreover, they posited point-blank that it was in the “interests of the Sudan in general, and the people of its southern regions in particular that this part of the Upper Nile should be converted to Islam.”

British political streams of all stripes disputed Egyptian allegations that Sudan was an integral part of Egypt. The new labor government that took power in 1945 continued its conservative predecessor’s policy toward Sudan and even hardened its objection to Egypt’s demand for the unity of the Nile valley. The Fabian society, which was associated with the

Labor Party, published a pamphlet on Sudan, ruling categorically that the Sudanese were not Egyptians. Except for the north of Sudan during the era of the Pharaohs, Sudan was never controlled by Egypt. The first Egyptian leader to occupy the entire Sudan was Muhammad ‘Ali.

The Egyptians regarded the Sudanese “as barbarians,” and throughout the period of Egyptian suzerainty, they plundered the country rather than governed it . . . the Sudan has never been a united country. It has been rather a part of Africa where for hundreds of years encroaching Arabs gradually pushed out the original inhabitants, a land of vague African kingdoms where inter-tribal war was constant and where no strong unifying government ever existed. Its frontiers were not the present frontiers but rather the frontiers between Arab and black, a frontier which a man or woman crossed to the North only as slave.

Egyptian scholars ridiculed such allegations, particularly that the Egyptians encroached Sudanese territories and drove out the indigenous populations. They opined that if that were true, then “one would have expected rigid racial barriers, with distinct ethnic regions – a feature totally absent from the Sudan.”

Egyptians argued that Sudan was an integral part of Egypt from ancient time. Was it correct historically? As we have seen, such assertions were disputable, and there were deep and extended historical hiatuses in Egypt’s presence in Sudanese lands. There was a consensus, however, between the British and the Egyptians that Sudan was annexed by Egypt in the early nineteenth century following its occupation by Muhammad ‘Ali – an occupation that was purely based on imperialist calculations and motivations.

Tellingly, Egypt did not promote the development of Sudan and in fact exploited the country economically for decades until the Mahdi uprising in the 1880s. Sudan experienced more significant development under the condominium administration.

However, both imperialist masters – Britain and Egypt – failed to equally develop and nurture the south of Sudan, which continued to be neglected in all fields, particularly education. In fact, there were no rational or substantial reasons, other than imperialist ones, to link between the more developed north and the underdeveloped south. The

inhabitants of the Nile valley were not all of the “same race, language and religion” as Egyptians often argued. Although Arabs constituted the largest ethnic group in northern Sudan, and Islam was the dominant religion there, Sudan in its entirety comprised many ethnic/linguistic groups of a variety of origins, which were divergent culturally and religiously.

True, for hundreds of years, parts of Sudan were directly and indirectly ruled by Egyptian dynasties in pre-Islamic and Islamic eras, yet it would be utterly incorrect to speak of the inhabitants of the Nile valley as one people, as Egyptian politicians, intellectuals, scholars, journalists, and other advocates of the unity of the Nile valley argued vehemently.

*The doctrine of the unity of the Nile valley was invented and constructed in monarchial Egypt – from the inarticulate and inconsistent conceptions of the interwar period to the detailed and systematic formulations of the post–World War II years. It was an “imaginary” community rather than an “imagined” one, to employ Benedict Anderson’s concept.

An “imagined community” functions because people living in the same administrative unit, usually a state, share similar life experiences, i.e., their daily lives are shaped by a similar economic, political, and social reality.*

 Anderson’s concept is based on the assumption that the majority of the people living within a territory share that collective identity. Conversely, the reality shaping daily-life experience in Egypt and Sudan was rather diverse, and most people living in Sudan did not share the Egyptian vision of a unified Nile valley under the Egyptian crown. It would not have been impossible for Egyptian protagonists of the unity of the Nile valley to create a mirage of one Egyptian–Sudanese people who shared a common language, history, and land from ancient time. A united Egypt–Sudan could have become a state that was no different than many other existing political entities worldwide that were built on diversity. There were many cases in history in which countries with a multiplicity of languages, traditions, cultures, and ethnic origins

managed to pursue a policy of integration that united them under the umbrella of one nation (France, Germany, and the United States, to name just a few).

The doctrine of the unity of the Nile valley failed because it was colonialist in its nature and as such was rejected by the British – the stronger imperialist power that dominated Sudan – and the newly born Sudanese nationalist movement that emerged in the postcolonial epoch. The Egyptian architects of the unity of the Nile valley never offered the Sudanese a Sudanese–Egyptian entity based on full partnership, equality, and “unity in diversity,” to employ the Volls’ phrase. 

In fact, pre-2011 Sudan had experienced constant waves of various imperialisms. It started with Muhammad ‘Ali’s occupation of the early nineteenth century and continued with the dual Anglo–Egyptian imperialist rule from 1899 until 1953. Independent Sudan was divided into two entities, north and south, while the latter was subordinated to the north, which employed imperialist methods in its handling of the south.

However, years of civil war and constant struggle for self-determination led eventually to the partition of Sudan and the formation of the new state of South Sudan.

Why did revolutionary Egypt decide to abandon the doctrine of the unity of the Nile valley? As we have seen, Egypt’s decision to refrain from further insisting on the unity of the Nile valley was made soon after the downfall of the monarchy. However, several weeks before the overthrow of King Faruq there appeared to be fissures in the Egyptian consensus

regarding the unity of the Nile valley. The change occurred following the objection of Sudanese parties to Egypt’s unilateral abrogation of the 1936 treaty and their refusal to recognize Britain’s authority under the circumstances. The abolition of the condominium by Egypt, they argued, created a power vacuum in Sudan. The short-lived Egyptian government, led by Najib al-Hilali, was the first that nearly came to an agreement with Sudanese nationalists on the future of their country.

The military regime that took the reins of power following the 23 July Revolution was determined to reach an agreement with those Sudanese nationalists. The pragmatic and realistic approach that the Free Officers exercised during their talks with their Sudanese counterparts led to the abandonment of the doctrine of the unity of the Nile valley. The doctrine of the unity of the Nile valley was historically associated with the Muhammad ‘Ali dynasty and moreover with the hated, deposed

King Faruq. As they explicitly declared, the Free Officers wanted to eradicate all symbols and traces of the monarchy – one of which was the unity of the Nile valley under the Egyptian crown. They realized that to gain international support for their demand for the withdrawal of British troops from Egypt, substantial concessions in Sudan were required. Whereas they displayed a rigid and uncompromising line throughout the Anglo–Egyptian talks on the liberation of Egypt – insisting on a full and speedy withdrawal of British troops from Egypt with no conditions attached – they showed a willingness to relinquish their demands over Sudan, a moderate and realpolitik stand that soon paved the way to an Anglo–Egyptian agreement over Sudan in February 1953. *This was preceded by an agreement concluded on 19 October

1952 between the Egyptian government, led by General Muhammad Najib, and representatives of the Umma Party and the other Sudanese parties that favored independence. It was then that Egypt recognized for the first time the Sudanese right to self-determination and self-government – the condominium rule was to be abolished.

The revolutionary regime and Nasser as the strongest figure behind the scenes believed that the Sudan issue should be approached differently – not from a patronizing position but rather from one based on equality

and mutual respect. They thus came to terms with the Sudanese because they appreciated that the overthrow of King Faruq (who was against an agreement with the Sudanese) and their willingness to grant the Sudanese people the right to self-determination would in turn improve the chances that the Sudanese would eventually favor unity with Egypt.

Their assessment was soon to be proven wrong. 

Isma‘il al-Azhari, the newly elected Sudanese leader (1954–1956) and the former champion of the unity of the Nile valley, responded pragmatically to the changing reality and opted for independent Sudan.

The British, who had been active in sabotaging the Egyptian plan to annex Sudan under its crown, did indeed succeed. However, their gain was short-lived. Years of British imperialist manipulations and maneuvers in the Nile valley also came to an end with the declaration of Sudan’s independence in 1956. The game was over for both of the competing imperialist powers, the regional one and the global one. In the case of Britain, this was an integral part of the process of the disintegration of a worldwide empire.

In the Egyptian case, this was the shattering of a dream that had been kept in the hearts of Egyptians for decades. For those who had continued to dream of the unity of the Nile valley, the Sadat–Numayri convergence,  which led the two leaders to announce the Integration Charter in 1974 that was officially signed only in 1981, was a dream come true. The two countries were supposed to cooperate closely in a wide range of areas, which would eventually lead to full unity. However, this unity dream was shattered too following the downfall of Numayri’s regime in 1985.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/egypt-and-the-struggle-for-power-in-sudan/5BB31B833F603AE1CA50C53988713CD3

Egypt and the Struggle for Power in Sudan by Rami Ginat For decades, the doctrine of the 'Unity of the Nile Valley' united Egyptians of a variety of political and nationalist backgrounds. Many Egyptians regarded Sudan as an integral part of their homeland, and therefore battled to rid the entire Nile Valley of British imperialism and unite its inhabitants under the Egyptian crown. www.cambridge.org

[Namaa AL-Mahdi]

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