Cabal Combined Level 1800

[Brittany Bhadd]

Hii'm Kall (in the game) and i'm going to show you a way how to level up from 1-50 level in 3-4 days without doing any regular missions. I thought i should make this post in order to help all the newcomers.

I will keep it simple as possible, practical and easy to read.

Get into a cabal

First things first get into a cabal, it will help you in the end leveling phase and on your way there members of the cabal will answer questions of yours about the game plus you participate in the community by being part of it and get an uo to 20% bonus xp in your group missions with cabal members.

1: Do all the story mission and it's side quests and do NOT spend any fate you gather from it, you will need it in the end leveling phase.

2: Do all the priority missions you can do, they are small maps fast and you gather more fate from it.

3: Keep all the xp boosters you find you will need them in the end leveling phase.

With that being said and by doing these in 2 days you can be already 28-30, simply by doing the story line. Then again if you are not exactly that don't get worried you are close for the end game which comes up next.

That is where your participate in a cabal will help you. You do one thing and ONE thing only to maximize the xp/sec you get in your playtime and that is 4 MAN GROUPED TAROT in impossible difficulty BUFFED with the xp boosters you have gathered so far.The creator of the group MUST be the highest power rating level character for better rewards. With that being said you will be able to get around 8k-12k xp per run or practically 1-2 levels per run. You will be 50 in no time. You may have a build and solo impossible missions also.

NOW one more thing the most doesn't notice. Every system has a reputation and your influence with it grant you rewards. Aethon , Chernobog, Dagnor and Lacaon system give you FATE rewards at some point, check the out.

All the 4 Grouped tarot mission you will do in the end phase make sure your galaxy map is stationed in a system you want to raise your influence with it. So you want lose time do regular missions to raise your influence with them and get the tasty fate rewards. These rewards are another 900 fate. So by doing the end phase leveling you will gather more fate when you get these rewards which you are going to use if needed for MORE 4 man grouped tarot missions in impossible difficulty.

--->Participate in events you get hell of a lot of fate

Throughout Russian history, bouts of political reform have been repeatedly succeeded by reactionary periods of counter-reform. We surmise that this historical alternation of reform and counter-reform has been driven at least in part by comparisons made by Russians between their own situation and that of their counterparts in the west. Such "relative deprivation" understandings of political change are nothing new, but we tie the history of impetus for reform in Russia explicitly to fluctuations in economic performance in the capitalist west, as represented by Kondratiev waves (K-waves) of expansion and stagnation. We posit that periods of expansion in the west have prompted periods of political reform in Russia, while periods of stagnation in the west have enabled periods of counter-reform in Russia. Although a direct causal link cannot be drawn, the timing of periods of reform and counter-reform in Russia seems to be consistent with a relative deprivation interpretation.

As the two-headed imperial Russian eagle symbolizes, Russian politics have always looked both to east and to the west. In the modern era, this has often meant a tension between the liberalizing reforms associated with westernization and a reactionary conservatism associated with the East (Rozov 2006). The direction of the political wind in Russia is an important subject in its own right, but waves of political reform and counter-reform in Russia have historically also had immense impacts well beyond Russia's borders (Panarin 1994). In the nineteenth century, Russian politics were pivotal to the European and central Asian balances of power, while in the twentieth century Russia (as the core constituent republic of the Soviet Union) emerged as a global military, political, and ideological superpower. Since the eighteenth century reign of Peter the Great, Russia has experienced periods of greater and lesser political liberality, but in Russia there seems to have been no general secular trend toward political reform. Instead, periods of reform in Russian history tend to have been followed by periods of counter-reforms that often completely reversed or even more than reversed reforms undertaken in the previous period (Moschelkov 1996; Kholodkovsky 2011). The long-sweep history of Russian political reform has generally been more cyclical than secular (Hale 2005; Mustafin 2015). Indeed, it has been suggested that Kondratiev waves must be taken into account in interpreting major reforms and counter-reforms in Russia (Umov and Lapkin 1992: 64).

In this paper, we offer a potential explanation for the alternation of periods of reform and reaction that combines theories of democracy and development with a relative deprivation model of political reform. Throughout modern history, Russian leaders have often pursued reforms in response to their perceptions of the material inferiority of Russia in comparison to western powers. Many Russian leaders from Peter the Great onward have seen western economic (and military) success as a validation of western social systems. This tendency has persisted over the course of multiple shifting regime types, both in Russia and in its western referents. The one constant has been the relative wealth of Western Europe (and later North America) when compared to the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and the post-Soviet Russian Federation. Throughout the modern era, the material prosperity of the west has tended to legitimize political forms associated with the west, even as these political forms have themselves shifted in character. As a result, "reform" in Russia has been consistently associated with the importation of western political forms. This is reflected in the long-term tension in Russian political debate between Slavophiles/Eurasianists and Liberalizers/Westernizers, with the key attraction of the west being its perceived relative economic success.

The relative deprivation model of political reform is in a sense the mirror image of Huntington's (1991: 13) concept of "performance legitimacy." For Huntington, performance legitimacy was a tool used by repressive regimes to justify their continued rule: as long as they delivered on economic growth or military conquest, their people might not question their right to rule. Huntington identified performance legitimacy as a substitute for Lipset's (1959: 86) Weberian understanding of legitimacy as flowing from "the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for the society." The relative deprivation model of political reform turns performance legitimacy on its head, hypothesizing that repressive governments feel the least pressure for reform when alternative, successful models are not visible. Thus repressive regimes may have felt particularly little pressure for reform during the Great Depression of the 1930s, since liberal models were not proving themselves especially attractive at that time. By contrast, repressive regimes might have felt much more pressure for reform in the 1990s, when western liberal economies were flourishing. Based on the relative deprivation model of political reform, we expect to find a correspondence between periods of expansion in the western capitalist world-economy and periods of political reform in Russia.

Such action-at-a-distance in the synchronization of structural change across interrelated political systems is not unheard of. In fact, it may be the norm (Chase-Dunn et al 2000). Although ancient examples of such historical ripple effects (for example, those caused by the migrations of the Huns) have long been romanticized, structural synchronization is much more a feature of the modern world. Hegemonic cycles, for example, have in recent centuries become a factor in global economic and political change (Friedman and Christopher Chase-Dunn 2005). In the modern era dating from the end of the "long sixteenth century" in the early 1600 s, the modern world-system is conventionally understood to have fallen under the hegemony of a series of western liberal maritime countries: first the Netherlands, then the UK, and finally the USA (Wallerstein (1984: 40). The western-dominated modern world-system has impinged upon Russia ever since its consolidation in the sixteenth century, and it is this "west" that has constituted the primary competitive model for Russia and other late-developers throughout the modern era. While acknowledging the high prestige of French and (later) German models of reform, when Peter the Great visited "the west" on his Grand Embassy in 1697, he spent most of his time in Amsterdam and London, studying shipbuilding techniques. The equivalent world cities today are London and New York, or Washington. It is this hegemonic Dutch-Anglo-American west that we refer to in this paper, and which we take to have offered an alternative model for Russian development from the time of Peter the Great through that of Vladimir Putin.

The modern world-system has been characterized by a long secular development since the sixteenth century, but that growth has not been smooth. Far from it. Over the last few centuries, the capitalist world-economy has expanded in broad waves of development spanning several decades each. These waves have historically radiated out from the more developed core of the world-economy to impact on semiperipheral areas like Russia (Reati and Toporowski 2004: 397, 404). Thus we expect to find similar, sympathetic waves of political reform in Russian history. The existence of long waves or Kondratiev waves (K-waves) of economic activity in the capitalist world-economy has been the topic of much debate since their initial postulation by Russian economist Nikolai Kondratiev in 1925. Mainstream economics once embraced the idea (Schumpeter 1939; Rostow 1978), but have since disavowed it, with K-waves becoming instead a staple of heterodox economics (Mandel 1995; Solomou 1989), world-systems sociology (Bornschier 1996; Boswell and Chase-Dunn 2000), and future studies (Korotayev et al 2011; Grinin et al 2017). The verdict of mainstream economic historians has long been that K-waves are the sort of thing that analysts who look hard enough will eventually find, whether or not they're really there (Maddison 1991: 105; Bernard et al 2014). Careful econometric analysis suggests that while periods of expansion and stagnation do exist, K-wave periodicity as such may not (Metz 2011). On the other hand, the fact that extended periods of expansion and stagnation can be detected in many economic time series is indisputable and has been confirmed by formal spectral analysis of global output series (Korotayev and Tsirel 2010).

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