Cf: Pragmatic Theory Of Truth : 21
Thanks, Klaus, I appreciate the way you immediately extracted
one of the overarching themes of Peirce's whole paper, indeed
of his whole work. That allows us to tread lightly past a lot
of verbal nit-picking about the differences among traditional
concepts like belief, fact, knowledge, opinion, etc. and get
right down to the more systems-theoretic ideas about states of
information and inquiry as a process that revises those states.
Here's a bit I wrote a few years back rubricizing Peirce's four ways of
moving from doubt to belief -- from a state of information so unsettled
it puzzles the will to one secure enough on which to act, should the need
for action arise.
* Tenacity, Authority, Plausibility, Inquiry
My favorite polymathematician, Charles Sanders Peirce, gave a fourfold classification
of what he called "methods of fixing belief", or "settling opinion", most notably and
seminally in his paper, "The Fixation of Belief" (1877). Adjusting his nomenclature
very slightly, if only for the sake of preserving a mnemonic rhyme scheme, we may
refer to his four types as Tenacity, Authority, Plausibility (?? priori pleasing
praiseworthiness), and full-fledged Scientific Inquiry.
* Peirce, C.S. (1877), "The Fixation of Belief", Popular Science Monthly 12, 1???15.
On 1/5/2020 3:59 PM, Krippendorff, Klaus wrote:
> I have refrained from this discussion of truth as I have
> other things > to think about but I found the attached paper
> by Peirce about the fixation of beliefs pretty convincing
> especially the distinction of the sources of the fixation:
> authority, logical consistency, habit or tenacity to which
> I would add social acceptability.
> What I found missing are methods of overcoming these fixations.
> Doubt is in My way of thinking not sufficient.
> I am interested in issues of liberation from oppressions.