Pragmatic Semiotic Information (Ψ)

[Jon Awbrey]

Cf: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2018/08/21/pragmatic-semiotic-information-%cf%88/

Ontologists, Systers, Modelers,

I remember it was back in '76 when I began to notice a subtle shift of
focus in the computer science journals I was reading, from discussing X
to discussing Information About X, or X → Info(X) as I came to notate it.
I suppose this small arc of revolution had been building for years but it
struck me as crossing a threshold to a more explicit, self-conscious stage
about that time.

And thereby hangs a number of tales ...

Jon

--

inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache

[Jon Awbrey]

Ken,

Thanks for the comment. It made me realize that the notation Info(X) is
probably not the best. It tends to mislead us into thinking we already
have X in hand, in other words, that we already have perfect information
about X and are merely abstracting Info(X) as some derivative of it.
But that is not the sort of situation we are concerned with here.

It might be better to say that Info is all the information we have at
a given moment of investigation and X abstracts the portion of Info
that has to do with X. That might lead us to notate it as X(Info).
This brings to mind the way we speak of observables in physics,
as operators on the total state or wave function or whatever.

If I had to concoct an informal linguistic example — which I'd do solely by way
of rough analogy to the formal mathematical situations we'd have much hope of
resolving in our lifetimes — I'd say the sorts of X we're facing here are what
used to be called “definite descriptions” like “Desdemona's infidelity” or
“Manafort's guilt on the 10 mistried counts”.

In those sorts of situations, discussed to death in years gone by,
what a modicum of pragmatic-semiotic insight adds to the mix is that
all descriptions are indefinite to some degree, all syntax is lax to
some extent.

There are, as usual, clear foresights of that insight in Peirce.
And that is what I'll be getting around to prescently.

Regards,

Jon

On 8/21/2018 6:10 PM, Ken Lloyd wrote:
> When speaking of most things, say x, we are indirectly referencing
> all the meta-levels of x - meta signifying beyond which can include
> higher levels of abstraction as well as lower levels of realizations.

[Jon Awbrey]

Systems Science, Structural Modeling,

Here's my blog rehash of a couple earlier comments on the Ontolog list that
may help to explain my use of the term "pragmatic semiotic information".
I forgot that I hadn't shared those comments here, so sorry about that.

Inquiry Driven Systems • Comment 5
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2018/08/19/inquiry-driven-systems-%e2%80%a2-comment-5/

Re: Ontolog Forum • Bruce Schuman
https://groups.google.com/forum/#!msg/ontolog-forum/vo8CmL8jt30/2zAl5v_zDQAJ

I would call that the pragmatic-semiotic point of view
and not find anything shocking in it.

One can find earlier foreshadowings — Plato’s Cratylus and the Stoic lekton
are often mentioned in this connection — but the clearest precursor of the
pragmatic-semiotic perspective occurs in Aristotle’s recognition of the
triadic sign relation, most succinctly in his treatise On Interpretation.

Here’s the little essay Susan Awbrey and I wrote on that, tracing
the continuities of pragmatic semiotics from Aristotle up through
Peirce and Dewey and teasing out the intimate relationship between
the theory of signs and the theory of inquiry.

Interpretation as Action : The Risk of Inquiry
https://www.academia.edu/1266493/Interpretation_as_Action_The_Risk_of_Inquiry

Regards,

[joseph simpson]

Jon:

Interesting section of your paper:

"We discuss the role of the interpreter in the activity of interpretation. 

Aristotle assumes that objects and impressions in the mind are constant across all interpreters. 

Confronting this assumption with the needs of hermeneutic and educational practice, we argue that a comparative 

and developmental understanding of interpreters is required. This in turn demands the more complete theory of 

signs envisioned by Peirce and Dewey, which continues to be developed in the semiotic and pragmatic traditions."

We are working on a paper that addresses different kinds of languages, each that have a 

different type of interpreter.  The augmented model-exchange isomorphism (AMEI) provides a

framework in which the semantics of a given natural language relationship may be evaluated and 

explored to identify a common isomorphic expression across all thee language types.

The ability to convert a informal language (natural language) into a formal language in an isomorphic

manner is very valuable for a number of reasons.

At this time we are addressing three natural language relationships that are at the heart of systems science and systems engineering.  These three natural language relationships are:

  1) Part-of  (Necessary to discuss a system with more than one part, part <=> whole)

  2) Precedes (Necessary to discuss a time based process, like creating a system)

  3) Influence (Necessary for the evaluation of system interaction.)

The plan is to have the paper up on Research Gate in a  few days and present the paper contents 

at the September 1st Structural Modeling Project video conference at 9 AM Pacific time.

Take care, be good to yourself and have fun,

Joe

[Jon Awbrey]

I've been following the discussion on the SysSci list that asks
the question, “What Is Systems Science?”. I haven't found the
free time to join in yet but it is very interesting to me on
account of the fact my work on Inquiry Driven Systems for the
last 30 years or so can be seen to ask the converse question,
“How Is Science A (Cybernetic or Dynamic) System?”.

The idea that the sciences operate as (some order of) cybernetic systems
is of course nothing new but there is a lot of work to do detailing that
insight and especially building intelligent software systems that assist
scientific research by availing themselves of that task and user model.

Regards,

[joseph simpson]

Jon:

Many interesting view points and aspects associated with the methods, goals and artifacts associated with science.

Our next focus is the refactoring and refinement of the existing structural modeling software.

Things are moving along slowly, but moving in the right direction.

Take care, be good to yourself and have fun,

Joe

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Structural Modeling" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to structural-mode...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to structura...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

--

Joe Simpson

“Reasonable people adapt themselves to the world. 

Unreasonable people attempt to adapt the world to themselves. 

All progress, therefore, depends on unreasonable people.”

George Bernard Shaw

[joseph simpson]

FYI ..

---------- Forwarded message ---------
From: John F Sowa <so...@bestweb.net>
Date: Mon, Sep 3, 2018 at 12:01 PM
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Re: Pragmatic Semiotic Information (Ψ)
To: <ontolo...@googlegroups.com>

On 9/2/2018 9:54 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
> I've been following the discussion on the SysSci list that asks
> the question, “What Is Systems Science?”.

Systems science, like every other science, is applied semiotic.
The primary difference between the sciences is the subject matter
to which they are applied.

The reason for differences in terminology is historical and
egotistical.  The names that are given to things depend on changing
circumstances, historical accidents, popular fads, and egotistical
desires by people who want to claim that they made a novel discovery.

For example, where are the boundary lines between psychiatry,
psychology, behavioral science, cognitive science, social science,
sociology, educational psychology, and anthropology?

Answer:  It all depends on which textbook you use.

However, there is one basic distinction:  all sciences, whether
the scientists know it or not, are versions of applied mathematics.

Fundamental reason:  Pure mathematics does not depend on any empirical
observation.  Every other subject, including so-called common sense,
use math (formal or informal) to analyze some observable phenomena.

See the attached cspsci.gif.  Note that formal logic and formal
semiotic are two names for the same branch of pure mathematics.
The distinction is whether you call logic a subset of semiotic or
semiotic a subset of logic -- if undecided, flip a coin.

John

--
All contributions to this forum are covered by an open-source license.
For information about the wiki, the license, and how to subscribe or
unsubscribe to the forum, see http://ontologforum.org/info/
---
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "ontolog-forum" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to ontolog-foru...@googlegroups.com.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

[joseph simpson]

Aleksandar:

You wrote:

"Aren't all sciences versions of applied Knowledge Representation Ontology also known as the Sowa Diamond? http://www.jfsowa.com/ontology/toplevel.html"

Great question.

Sowa wrote:

"However, there is one basic distinction:  all sciences, whether
the scientists know it or not, are versions of applied mathematics.

Fundamental reason:  Pure mathematics does not depend on any empirical
observation.  Every other subject, including so-called common sense,
use math (formal or informal) to analyze some observable phenomena."

It seems that there needs to be some empirical observation somewhere in the mix.

Take care and have fun,

Joe

On Tue, Sep 4, 2018 at 3:17 AM Aleksandar Malečić <ljma...@gmail.com> wrote:

Aren't all sciences versions of applied Knowledge Representation Ontology also known as the Sowa Diamond? http://www.jfsowa.com/ontology/toplevel.htm

Aleksandar

[Jon Awbrey]

Ontologists, Systems Scientists, Structural Modelers,

What I find lacking in these ontological bat-capping games is the
dynamic, functional, transformational side of scientific inquiry,
the process that produces the product. If sciences are bodies
of organized knowledge, what is the physiology of those bodies?
That is the variety of systems theory I learned in my schools,
focusing on the states of systems and how they change over time.

When we apply that systems perspective to information systems,
knowledge systems, systems of belief, received opinion, whatever,
the state under investigation is a state of information, knowledge,
and so on, and the question becomes, “What influences and operations
actually do and optimally ought to update that state of info over time?”

For ease of reference, here is my blog rehash of my last post,
seeing as how the main point of it somehow got snipped out:

Pragmatic Semiotic Information • Discussion 2
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2018/09/02/pragmatic-semiotic-information-%e2%80%a2-discussion-2/

Regards,

Jon

>>>> I've been following the discussion on the SysSci list that asks
>>>> the question, “What Is Systems Science?”.
>>>

>>> Systems science, like every other science, is applied semiotic.
>>> The primary difference between the sciences is the subject matter
>>> to which they are applied.
>>>
>>> The reason for differences in terminology is historical and
>>> egotistical. The names that are given to things depend on changing
>>> circumstances, historical accidents, popular fads, and egotistical
>>> desires by people who want to claim that they made a novel discovery.
>>>
>>> For example, where are the boundary lines between psychiatry,
>>> psychology, behavioral science, cognitive science, social science,
>>> sociology, educational psychology, and anthropology?
>>>
>>> Answer: It all depends on which textbook you use.
>>>
>>> However, there is one basic distinction: all sciences, whether
>>> the scientists know it or not, are versions of applied mathematics.
>>>
>>> Fundamental reason: Pure mathematics does not depend on any empirical
>>> observation. Every other subject, including so-called common sense,
>>> use math (formal or informal) to analyze some observable phenomena.
>>>
>>> See the attached cspsci.gif. Note that formal logic and formal
>>> semiotic are two names for the same branch of pure mathematics.
>>> The distinction is whether you call logic a subset of semiotic or
>>> semiotic a subset of logic -- if undecided, flip a coin.
>>>
>>> John
>>>

[joseph simpson]

Jon:

Interesting point of view and approach.

Another interesting approach was taken by John Warfield.

John's approach explored the minimal, necessary context needed to support the activity of science.  The necessary contextual, environmental components are:

 1) Human beings (more than one)

 2) Language

 3) Reasoning through relationships

 4) Archival representation of artifacts.

These four components are given as the "Universal Priors to Science," in Chapter 2 of "A Science of Generic Design."

The ability of a given group of human beings to clearly communicate and reason has a significant impact on the development of any type of science.

It may be that expending effort on refining and developing these contextual components will have a great impact on the quality and quantity of science produced.

Take care, be good to yourself and have fun,

Joe

--

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Structural Modeling" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to structural-mode...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to structura...@googlegroups.com.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

[Lenard Troncale]

Joe and Teams,

I think your summary of Warfield’s “minimal, necessary context for support of the activity of science” 4 components indicates why John and I had so many disagreements about systems science in our day. Please note that all 4 are on the human level ONLY. There is nothing there about experiments, applying the scientific method, hypotheses, past results, falsifiability, measuring & empirical approaches, or arranging nature to tell us how SHE works and not how WE HUMANS work. Missing these might explain the human role in trying to do science, but it does not explicate in any way the essentials of doing science IMHO. And so his tools might be great for helping humans begin to recognize how their human problems are really systems-level problems, but they do little to harvest and apply the “way nature has settled down to work” or its prescriptions to our newly developing human systems.

Len

[joseph simpson]

Len:

Interesting point of view and observations.

It appears to me that the  "Universal Priors to Science," might be simply evaluated by asking some simple questions.

These  questions are:

   1 - Can science exist without human beings?  

   2 - Can science exist without language (both formal and informal)?

   3 - Can science exist without reasoning through relationships?

   4 - Can science exist without archival representation of artifacts?

If humans did not exist, who would do science?  What would it look like?

If language did not exist, how would humans (or any entity doing science) communicate the results of science ?

If reasoning through relationships did not exist, how would hypothesis testing be done? 

If archival representation of scientific artifacts did not exist, how would we know about the past results of science?

It appears to me that the name, "Universal Priors to Science," is well formed and correct in this case.

Take care, be good to yourself and have fun,

Joe

[Lenard Troncale]

Joe,

I love this repartee and extended questions you pose. However, they do expose our different worldviews quite explicitly. I do not think at all that humans are the only sentient and conscious beings in the universe. Over my 40 years of teaching evolution, I consistently told my students that due to the universal architecture and behavior of the universe there were undoubtedly other planetary systems. And on some of those there would be intelligent life. That seemed a pure speculation during those decades.

But now we know that exoplanets exist and there are numerous examples. Who could have predicted that such evidence would emerge in my own lifetime? I mock exoplanet experts in their search for water (now seen on both the moon and Mars). Given a general systems viewpoint, water is not necessary for intelligent life at all. Something at drastically different temperatures and densities might have similar properties as water for analogues in silicon instead of carbon. All this just shows how terribly limited human thinking is. Completely limited to our ways and conditions. Now I do not want to get into the possibilities of alien life or not, or civilizations or not, or their nature or not, because such questions cannot be answered clearly yet. So why get into endless debates. I think the writing is on the wall though.

Notice how this changes your questions below. Yes to all. It might not be human science or human language and it might be better capacity for reasoning than we presently have, but science, or the mechanics of how nature’s systems work are enduring patterns that should exist and can be found whether we are the lone intelligent beings in the universe or just one of many.

Open your minds. Dogma and humanocentrism are the mind-killers. I am having fun.

Len

[Jack Ring]

On Sep 5, 2018, at 09:14, Lenard Troncale <lrtro...@cpp.edu> wrote:

Joe and Teams,

I think your summary of Warfield’s “minimal, necessary context for support of the activity of science” 4 components indicates why John and I had so many disagreements about systems science in our day. Please note that all 4 are on the human level ONLY.

Obviously. What other animal, vegetable or mineral does science?

There is nothing there about experiments, applying the scientific method, hypotheses, past results, falsifiability, measuring & empirical approaches,

That’s why it is labeled “support the activity of science.”  Your list denotes some of the activity, but not all.

or arranging nature to tell us how SHE works and not how WE HUMANS work.

Who but humans arranges nature and the fictitious SHE? 

Perhaps the first step is to acknowledge "We see things not as they are but as we are.”

1. 1961 copyright, Seduction of the Minotaur by Anaïs Nin, Quote Page 124, The Swallow Press, Chicago, Illinois. (Afterword added in 1969; sixth printing in 1972) (Verified on paper in sixth printing 1972) 
2. 1961 copyright, Seduction of the Minotaur by Anaïs Nin, Quote Page 124, The Swallow Press, Chicago, Illinois. (Afterword added in 1969; sixth printing in 1972) (Verified on paper in sixth printing 1972) 
3. 2005 January 9, Newsweek, How We See Sharon—and Israel by Marc Gellman (Newsweek Web Exclusive) (Online Newsweek archive at newsweek.com; accessed January 14, 2014) link 
4. Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Berakoth, Folio 55b, Translated into English by Maurice Simon, Under the editorship of Rabbi Dr. Isidore Epstein. (Online at halakhah.com – accessed March 8, 2014) link 
5. 1801, Sermons by the Reverend Sydney Smith (Late Fellow of New College, Oxford), Second Edition, Volume 1 of 2, On the Predisposing Causes to the Reception of Republican Opinions, Start Page 102, Quote Page 103 and 104, Printed for Longman & Rees by Mundell & Son, London. (Google Books Full View) link 
6. 1876, Nicolai’s Marriage: A Picture of Danish Family Life by Henrik Scharling, (Translated from Danish), Volume 2 of 2, Quote Page 211, Richard Bentley and Son, London. (Google Books Full View) link 
7. 1890 March, The Popular Science Monthly, The Psychology of Prejudice by G. T. W. Patrick (Professor of Philosophy at the State University of Iowa), Start Page 633, Quote Page 634, D. Appleton and Company, New York. (Google Books Full View) link 
8. 1890 June, Current Literature, Random Reading–Current Thought and Opinion, (Reprint of excerpt from “The Psychology of Prejudice” by G. T. W. Patrick in “The Popular Science Monthly” of March 1890), Start Page 439, Quote Page 440, The Current Literature Publishing Company, New York. (Google Books Full View) link 
9. 1891, The Province of Expression: A Search for Principles Underlying Adequate Methods of Developing Dramatic and Oratoric Delivery by S. S. Curry (Samuel Silas Curry) (Dean, School of Expression: Instructor of Elocution, Harvard College), Quote Page 392, Published by School of Expression, Boston, Massachusetts. (Google Books Full View) link 
10. 1914 June 8, Jersey Journal, Christian Endeavor Activities, Quote Page 8, Column 4, Jersey City, New Jersey. (GenealogyBank) 
11. 1931, Out of Soundings by H. M. Tomlinson (Henry Major Tomlinson), The Gift, Start Page 148, Quote Page 149, Harper & Brothers, New York. (Verified on paper) 
12. 1950 November 30, Trenton Evening Times, Quotable Quotes, Quote Page 16, Column 6, Trenton, New Jersey. (GenealogyBank) 
13. 1970 January 17, Greensboro Record, A Happening: We Only See As We Are by Dr. Joseph Garrison, Quote Page A7, Column 2, Greensboro, North Carolina. (GenealogyBank) 
14. 1991, Think and Grow Rich: A Black Choice by Dennis Kimbro and Napoleon Hill, Quote Page 245, Published by Fawcett Columbine, New York. (Verified with scans) 
15. 2004, The Seven Habits of Highly Effective People: Powerful Lessons in Personal Change by Stephen R. Covey, Quote Page 28, Free Press: A Division of Simon & Schuster, New York. (Google Books Preview) 

Missing these might explain the human role in trying to do science, but it does not explicate in any way the essentials of doing science IMHO.

Perhaps the first step: HUMILITY. See above.

And so his tools might be great for helping humans begin to recognize how their human problems are really systems-level problems, but they do little to harvest and apply the “way nature has settled down to work” or its prescriptions to our newly developing human systems.

Apparently you have not read the book or experienced the Interactive Management method of designing and conducting fallibility detection.

Relax. 

Jack

[Jack Ring]

On Sep 5, 2018, at 10:56, Lenard Troncale <lrtro...@cpp.edu> wrote:

Joe,

I love this repartee and extended questions you pose. However, they do expose our different worldviews quite explicitly. I do not think at all that humans are the only sentient and conscious beings in the universe. Over my 40 years of teaching evolution, I consistently told my students that due to the universal architecture and behavior of the universe there were undoubtedly other planetary systems. And on some of those there would be intelligent life. That seemed a pure speculation during those decades.

Good conjecturing. Where’s the science?

But now we know that exoplanets exist and there are numerous examples. Who could have predicted that such evidence would emerge in my own lifetime?

Apparently not you.

I mock exoplanet experts in their search for water (now seen on both the moon and Mars). Given a general systems viewpoint, water is not necessary for intelligent life at all.

Ahhh, now ‘life’ is undefined.

Something at drastically different temperatures and densities might have similar properties as water for analogues in silicon instead of carbon. All this just shows how terribly limited human thinking is. Completely limited to our ways and conditions. Now I do not want to get into the possibilities of alien life or not, or civilizations or not, or their nature or not, because such questions cannot be answered clearly yet. So why get into endless debates. I think the writing is on the wall though.

Notice how this changes your questions below. Yes to all.

Where is your fallibility experiment design? Necessary ingredient of scientific method. 

It might not be human science or human language and it might be better capacity for reasoning than we presently have, but science, or the mechanics of how nature’s systems work are enduring patterns that should exist and can be found whether we are the lone intelligent beings in the universe or just one of many.

Open your minds. Dogma and humanocentrism are the mind-killers. I am having fun.

Have all the fun you want. Just be aware that you haven’t killed any minds over here.

[Jon Awbrey]

Ontologists, Systems Scientists, Structural Modelers,

A question arising on another blog, perhaps incidentally, perhaps of the essence,
bought to mind recent discussions in these forums regarding the nature of systems,
variables, and the measurements that give systematic state variables their values.
My current focus being what it is, I couched my answer in pragmatic semiotic terms.

⁂

Measurement is an extension of perception.
Measurement gives us data about an object
system the way perception gives us percepts,
which we may consider just a species of data.

If we ask when we first became self-conscious about this
whole process of perception and measurement, I don't know,
but Aristotle broke ground in a very articulate way with his
treatise “On Interpretation”. Sense data are “impressions”
on the mind and they have their consensual, communicable
derivatives in spoken and written “signs”. This triple
interaction among objects, ideas, and signs is the
cornerstone of our contemporary theories of signs,
collectively known as “semiotics”.

⁂

Regards,

[Jon Awbrey]

Azamat, All,

Of course it's not that simple. I called it a cornerstone
not a whole building but it gives us a starting point and
a first approach to a pragmatic semiotic architecture
still being built as we speak.

There is more detail and a trace of semiotic's later development in this paper:

• Awbrey and Awbrey (1995), “Interpretation as Action : The Risk of Inquiry”
https://www.academia.edu/1266493/Interpretation_as_Action_The_Risk_of_Inquiry

We began by quoting the founding paragraph from Aristotle:

<QUOTE>

Words spoken are symbols or signs (symbola) of affections or impressions (pathemata) of
the soul (psyche); written words are the signs of words spoken. As writing, so also is
speech not the same for all races of men. But the mental affections themselves, of which
these words are primarily signs (semeia), are the same for the whole of mankind, as are also
the objects (pragmata) of which those affections are representations or likenesses, images,
copies (homoiomata). (Aristotle, De Interp. i. 16a4).

</QUOTE>

We used the following Figure to highlight the structure of the triadic
relation among objects (pragmata), affections or impressions (pathemata),
and symbols or signs (symbola, semeia) as given in Aristotle's account:

• Figure 1. The Sign Relation in Aristotle
https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2016/03/awbrey-awbrey-1995-figure-1.png

The triadic nexus marked “R” in the Figure is what graph theorists
would call a node or point of degree 3 and it provides a graphical
picture of a relational triple that can be taken in any convenient
order so long as we keep it constant throughout a given discussion.
For example, we could take Aristotle's object, sign or symbol, and
impression in the order (o, s, i), mostly just because I find that
convenient in later developments.

Diagrams of that sort, whether triangular or tri-radial in form, have long been
in common use for conveying the properties of triadic sign relations. But the
intervening years have taught me to my dismay that people tend to be led astray
by pictures like that, often getting stuck on square one, or rather triangle one.
That is, they get stuck on single triples of sign relations rather than grasping
them as they should, as prototypical examples of a whole class of ordered triples.

Regards,

Jon

On 9/10/2018 3:23 AM, Azamat Abdoullaev wrote:
> It is not so simple.
> There are generally two kinds of signs: conventional and natural.
> Mental ideas and images are also signs, natural signs, being themselves
> meanings and intentions, or "mental words".
> Natural signs are causally related.
> Natural signs are the source of meaning for conventional signs.
> Thus the mind is the medium through which words signify things.

>
> On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 4:55 AM Jon Awbrey <jaw...@att.net> wrote:
>
>> Ontologists,
>>

>> A question arising on another blog, perhaps incidentally, perhaps of the essence,

>> brought to mind recent discussions in these forums regarding the nature of systems,

>> variables, and the measurements that give systematic state variables their values.
>> My current focus being what it is, I couched my answer in pragmatic semiotic terms.
>>
>> ⁂
>>
>> Measurement is an extension of perception.
>> Measurement gives us data about an object
>> system the way perception gives us percepts,
>> which we may consider just a species of data.
>>
>> If we ask when we first became self-conscious about this
>> whole process of perception and measurement, I don't know,
>> but Aristotle broke ground in a very articulate way with his
>> treatise “On Interpretation”. Sense data are “impressions”
>> on the mind and they have their consensual, communicable
>> derivatives in spoken and written “signs”. This triple
>> interaction among objects, ideas, and signs is the
>> cornerstone of our contemporary theories of signs,
>> collectively known as “semiotics”.
>>
>> ⁂
>>
>> Regards,
>>

[joseph simpson]

Jon:

Interesting collection of concepts and insights.

It appears to me that it is very difficult to fully grasp the fundamental issues associated with pragmatic semiotic information when the natural language of the individual conducting the inquiry is the main object of study.

I find that the analysis of the languages supported by the "Talking Drums" of Africa help me understand the signaling process at a deeper level.

John Carrington produced some work in this area in the 1940's.

See:

https://biblicalstudies.org.uk/pdf/bq/36-8_396.pdf

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_F._Carrington

A key feature of these "sign exchanges" or "communication events" is the use of redundant signs or "signal phrases" to eliminate the uncertainty associated with the information exchange.

The physical medium of communication (drum, impact vibration, air pressure) is different between human speech and drum speech.

Human speech has much greater pitch control and tonal variability than "drum speech."  The information loss associated with the restricted drum mechanics is compensated for by repeating many phrases that only make logical sense if they are interrupted in a specific manner.

For example, assume drum speech can not make a clear distinction between the words baby and tree.  

If the drummer wanted to communicate about a tree then there would be statements like, 'Go climb high in the XXX' or 'The fruit is on the XXX."

If the drummer wanted to communicate about a baby the there would be statements like, 'Feed the XXX' or 'The XXX is little and smart."

This type of redundant sign transmission may be used to achieve the semantic goals of the communication. 

However, the redundant sign transmission is just preparing the state of the interpreter.

There are interesting connections between Shannon's information theory and Carrington's analysis of the talking drums.

It would be interesting to map these different views of information exchange to the components of your Figure 1 - The Sign Relation in Aristotle.  Another task to add to the very long "to do" list.

Given the structure of your Theme One Program, you may have already given this type of approach some consideration.

Take care, be good to yourself and have fun,

Joe

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Structural Modeling" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to structural-mode...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to structura...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

[joseph simpson]

This section above:

"The information loss associated with the restricted drum mechanics is compensated for by repeating many phrases that only make logical sense if they are interrupted in a specific manner."

Should read:

"The information loss associated with the restricted drum mechanics is compensated for by repeating many phrases that only make logical sense if they are interpreted in a specific manner.

[Jon Awbrey]

Joe, All,

The subject of natural languages and their relation to formal languages,
for example, logical calculi, logical graphs, and programming languages,
has come up periodically in our discussions and I've been struggling to
arrive at something both cogent and coherent to say about it. But what
the heck, here's a few thoughts off the cuff.

We naturally use our mother tongues as metalanguages to talk among ourselves
in fora like these, not only about well-formalized object languages but also
about the object domains that supply them with semantic substance, in a word,
“meaning”. Nothing about that makes “the natural language of the individual
conducting the inquiry ... the main object of study”. At least, that is not
how I'd personally understand the main task at hand.

I started using the run-on formula “pragmatic-semiotic point of view” during
a few exchanges with Bruce Schuman and John Sowa as a way of alluding to the
line of thinking about signs stretching from Aristotle to Peirce, Dewey, and
pragmatists of that stripe. Here's a link to my blog rehash of that episode:

• Inquiry Driven Systems • Comment 5
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2018/08/19/inquiry-driven-systems-%e2%80%a2-comment-5/

Have to break here ... to be continued ...

Jon

[joseph simpson]

Jon:

My phrase:

"pragmatic semiotic information when the natural language of the individual conducting the inquiry is the main object of study."

Is cryptic and may not convey my original meaning (semantics), but I think it is close.

The drum example is designed to highlight a small number of ideas and aspects of communication. Two of these aspects are:

1) Multiple language encoding processes combined with two or more communication channels.

2) One communication channel having a higher rate of uncertainty that the other communication channels.  How does the rate of sign (or symbol) uncertainty impact the form and semantics of a specific message.  With an uncertain channel, the message form can be changed to support the intended semantics.  

Next, I will outline another  example based on highway signs.

During a construction and repair event involving a draw bridge and a number of interconnecting surface roads, temporary road signs were placed along the roadway. The existing permanent signs were covered with black plastic to block out the sign messages.  This specific work area was congested and contained many permanent traffic signs among which the temporary traffic signs were dispersed. 

The combined collection of temporary and permanent signs created a situation where the existing "blanked out" permanent signs blocked some areas of the temporary signs.  When I was driving down the road a temporary sign displayed the following:

"Reduce speed to 'blocked out'  5."

So what is the new speed limit?  The speed limit can not be read from the sign.

However, the new speed limit can be estimated using the following contextual information:

Speed limits are given in steps of 5 miles an hour.

The current speed limit is 40 miles an hour.

Traffic ahead appears to b going over 20 miles and hour.

So, the new speed limit is either, 25 or 35 miles an hour.

The information from the road signs is combined with:

Known rules,

Current observations,

Analytical process,

to produce the highest valued estimate of the new speed limit.

So the new speed limit is either 25 or 35 miles an hour.

In this case, the interpreter selects the relevant decision elements from existing the existing knowledge base and contextual facts and makes a decision to reduce speed.  The only question is how much to reduce speed.

In this case symbols exist but the message is incomplete.

Information theory allows some insight in to the value of the message.

These ideas are not well formed yet, but I wanted to send out an initial message to capture these first ragged thoughts.

[Jon Awbrey]

Joe, All,

JS: It appears to me that it is very difficult to fully grasp the

fundamental issues associated with pragmatic semiotic information
when the natural language of the individual conducting the inquiry
is the main object of study.

That one took me a double take, but if I understand the “when” clause
as a hypothetical condition, not the assertion of a fixed intention
then I'd naturally agree:

IF the natural language of the individual conducting the inquiry

is the main object of study

THEN it is very difficult to fully grasp the fundamental issues
associated with pragmatic semiotic information.

It is naturally worth the effort to reflect on the properties of our
embedding languages but we normally meet with limited, partial, and
well-circumscribed success on any given trial. That is why we study
formalized object languages as microcosms of the enveloping spheres.

So we'll continue on that understanding ...

Regards,

Jon

On 9/11/2018 10:39 PM, joseph simpson wrote:

[joseph simpson]

Jon:

Great restatement and comments.

I have three general communication event types that I need to describe.

The Talking Drums communication event is Type One. (Preliminary description of this event is in progress.)

The Draw Bridge Sign event is Type Two. (First cut at describing this event is complete.)

The Native American Language event is Type Three. (This event is not described yet.)

Natural language derives meaning from contextual information.  The Talking Drums and Draw Bridge events are designed to help establish a rich event context that is needed to explore the impact of changing context information on event semantics.

Formal language derives meaning from two sets of rules: 1) Syntax rules detailing allowable symbols and 2) Semantic rules that detail the meaning of the symbols.

My goal is the establishment and refinement of three standard event communication types to serve as a rich contextual foundation that supports natural language to formal language analysis.  The event descriptions are simple stories that provide context.  

The ideas associated with the events and event descriptions are just forming now so, things may be in a dynamic state for a short while.

We will see if these ideas prove useful.