What Americans Should Know About Biological and Chemical Weapons By J.R. Nyquist 10.02.01

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What Americans Should Know About Biological and Chemical Weapons
By J.R. Nyquist 10.02.01

http://web.archive.org/web/20020209022518/www.sierratimes.com/archive/files/oct/02/nyquist.htm

Fourteen years ago I became interested in weapons of mass destruction.
Bascially, there are three categories of these weapons -- nuclear,
chemical and biological. Much has been written on nuclear weapons, but
surprisingly little has been written on biological and chemical
weapons. In 1987 the literature on the subject was scant. The United
States government, in fact, had long been disinterested in biological
warfare. In 1969 President Richard Nixon ordered the U.S. biowar
stockpiles destroyed.

What Nixon did not understand was that biological weapons, in the
hands of a technically sophisticated country, were fast becoming the
most lethal and flexible weapons of all. Biological warfare enables a
competent attacker to immunize his own troops or personnel while
killing millions of enemy soldiers or civilians. Biological weapons
can also be used to kill crops, birds, cattle and other livestock.
Famines as well as economic sabotage can be effected with these
weapons.

Even more frightening, leading countries have plotted genocidal
biological attacks. It was recently revealed, for example, that
Russia's war plan against the United States back in the 1980s included
a follow-up attack with smallpox. As radiation weakens the immune
system, the U.S. population would be ripe for infection. The disease
would easily spread as sanitation systems broke down under nuclear
bombardment, as food shortages became worse -- and most of the
survivors would be wiped out.

World War III is certainly the worst-case scenario in this regard. On
the other hand, consider the potential for the anonymous use of
biological weapons. That's right, an attacker doesn't necessarily
expose his or her identity by unleashing a deadly microorganism. In
other words, a biological attack could be launched against a country
by a clandestine network of operatives.

Of course, it must be stated that delivering a biological attack
presents many technical difficulties for the attacker. Chemicals,
toxins and poisons are easier to use and manage than microorginisms.
Biological weapons are notorious for dying on the shelf or on the way
to deployment. Worse yet, biological weapons have been known to kill
their creators.

The first aggressive experiments in biological warfare were carried
out by Soviet Russia and Imperial Japan. In the 1930s Stalin became
fascinated with bubonic plague. It seems that he hoped to inflict a
massive epidemic on his Western enemies. To this end his subordinates
conducted experiements in Mongolia. Gulag prisoners were exposed to
infected rats. But some of the prisoners managed to escape and a
serious epidemic broke out among the Mongol locals. Thousands died and
the Soviets were lucky enought to contain the outbreak.

The Mongolian catastrophe was not enough to deter Stalin, who
spearheaded more research. In World War II the Red Army attempted to
infect the German Army with various illnesses, but nothing much
happened. Biological weapons were shown to be ineffective on the
battlefield.

Imperial Japan had a biowar project which also met with disaster.
Whatever they were working on, it killed some of Japans leading
researchers and put an end to Tokyo's first experiments.

During and after World War II the United States and Great Britain
focused on the weaponization of anthrax, a lethal bacteria. There are
two main types of anthrax illness. One is called "Siberian ulcer," and
is usually contracted when a person eats tainted meat. Basically, the
digestive tract becomes inflamed with a 30 percent chance of death.
Even more lethal is pulmonary anthrax, also known as "woolsorter's
disease." In this version infection results from inhaling anthrax
spores in sufficient quantity to produce an immune reaction. The
symptoms are like those of a chest cold, only it is about 97 percent
fatal with death occuring in 3 to 5 days.

Americans developed biological weaponry to an unprecedented level of
sophistication in the 1950s and early 1960s. United States Army
researchers learned that the most effective form of biological attack
was aerosal spraying. By using special machines the United States
military could seed a cold air front with lethal microorganisms. By
regulating particle size to between one and five microns in diameter,
an effective attack biological could be assured (given ideal weather
conditions).

Readers should understand that biological weaponry is not easy to
develop or use. Consequently, today's would-be bio-terrorists have yet
to strike a decisive blow. There are other factors, as well, which
work against biological weaponry. In the first place there is weather.
Strong winds, heat and sunshine can prevent an effective biological
attack.

In almost every respect, chemical and toxic weapons are far easier for
terrorists to make and use. Poisoning a city's water supply or
unleashing a rudimentary type of nerve gas at a major sporting event
is operationally easier than attempting to trigger an epidemic.
However, such attacks are unlikely to kill more than a few hundred (or
at worst) a few thousand people. This is because the quanitities of
poison needed to kill millions of people are difficult to transport
and conceal.

The problem of the terrorist is that he necessarily depends on stealth
and concealment. Therefore, any attempt to operate complex or large
machines could lead to detection. Note the recent flap over crop
dusting aircraft in the United States and Great Britain, and the
parallel flap over suspicious persons attempting to get permits to
transport hazardous materials. Operations involving special equipment
frequently involve the terrorist in licensing problems which often
lead to inquiries by government officials.

Here we see why the Sept. 11 attack was so successful. The terrorists
used everyday items to sieze defenseless airliners which they used as
bombs against heavily peopled buildings. The diabolical ingenuity of
this attack is that none of the weapons used, none of the logistical
preparations, were likely to arouse much suspicion.

Today we are hearing more and more about a possible biological or
chemical attack on our cities. We must not be complacent because an
attack is always possible. At the same time, we must not panic.
Biological and chemical weapons have serious drawbacks.

There are reasons why these weapons have yet to be used.