Whyis autonomy of interest to feminists? One way to answer thisquestion is to examine what might be considered failures ofautonomy that appear to be linked to practices of genderoppression. This section describes three examples that have beenwidely discussed in the feminist literature on autonomy. Theseare:
We see, then, that feminist philosophers have responded to the hardcases in different ways. The following sections provide a moredetailed elaboration of the theoretical positions behind thesedifferent responses.
On minimalist conceptions of autonomy, most of the agents described inthe hard cases would be autonomous because minimal conditions forflourishing obtain and there is no pathology, cognitive impairment, ordirect coercion present. This characterization has its theoreticaladvantages. For example, Narayan is concerned to limit thejustification for state interference in individual voluntary choice; aminimalist conception may indeed be acceptable for use in theoriesthat regulate relations between the citizen and the state or toaddress issues of paternalism (Holroyd 2009).
Benson employs a parallel notion of normative competence, though itdoes not does require a capacity to track objective morality, butrather an ability to identify and deploy norms that are appropriate toa particular domain (1987, 486). He writes that:
In other words, attempting to exercise normative competence (that is,to promote autonomy) relative to the prevailing norms entails adoptinga set of norms that is oppressive to oneself. Benson suggests that, inorder to promote autonomy, members of marginal groups will need todevelop alternative norms through grassroots activities such asconsciousness-raising.
agency autonomy: in moral and political philosophy autonomy: personal feminist philosophy, interventions: moral psychology feminist philosophy, topics: perspectives on the self Kant, Immanuel: account of reason original position Rawls, John
For other influential feminist-phenomenological analyses of dominationsee Bartky 1990, 2002, Bordo 1993, and Kruks 2001. For helpfuloverviews of feminist phenomenology, see Fisher and Embree 2000, andHeinamaa and Rodemeyer 2010. For a highly influential articulation ofqueer phenomenology, drawing on the work of Husserl, Heidegger,Merleau-Ponty, and Fanon, see Ahmed (2006). For a compellingphenomenological analysis of transgender experience, see Salamon(2010).
Unlike liberal feminists, who view power as a positive social resourcethat ought to be fairly distributed, and feminist phenomenologists,who understand domination in terms of a tension between transcendenceand immanence, radical feminists tend to understand power in terms ofdyadic relations of dominance/subordination, often understood onanalogy with the relationship between master and slave.
Although feminists such as Fraser, Judith Butler, and Wendy Brown havebeen highly critical of the radical feminist account of domination,analytic feminists have found this account more productive. Forexample, Rae Langton (2009) has used speech act theory to defendMacKinnon's claims that pornography both causes and constituteswomen's subordination. More generally, Langton (2009) and SallyHaslanger (2012) have drawn on MacKinnon's work to develop an accountof sexual objectification and to explore the ways that objectificationis often obscured by claims to objectivity (for further discussion ofHaslanger's work, see section 3.7 below).
Socialist feminism fell largely out of fashion during the latter partof the 20th century, fueled in part by the rise of poststructuralism,the prominence of identity and recognition based politics, and theemergence of a neoliberal consensus (for a trenchant critique of thesedevelopments, see Fraser 1996 and 2013). However, in the wake of theglobal financial crisis of 2008, socialist feminism, now oftenreferred to as Social Reproduction Theory (SRT), has made a comeback.SRT has a long history, with important early contributions by SilviaFederici (1975) and Maria Mies (1986) and connections to the Italianwages for housework campaign that began in the 1970s; for more recentdiscussions, see Tithi Bhattacharya (2017), Federici (2014 and 2019),and Alessandra Mezzadri (2019). SRT is a Marxist feminist project thatorients itself to a question that remains implicit in Marx's theory ofvalue: how is labor power, which is the source of value and thus ofexploitation in Marx's account, itself produced, reproduced, andmaintained? SRT maintains that labor power is produced and reproducedoutside of the official economy, largely through women's unpaid laborwithin the family or domestic sphere. For social reproductiontheorists, the production of goods and services is thus possible onlyon the basis of (largely) unpaid social reproduction, which includeschildbirth, domestic work, caring for children, the elderly and otherswho cannot work for wages, and so on. For Federici, this represents anongoing process of expropriation akin to Marx's notion of primitiveaccumulation (Federici 2014). Social reproduction theorists understandproduction and reproduction as parts of an integrated system; indeed,they view the distinction between the two as ultimately misleadinginasmuch as it obscures the ways in which social reproduction isitself productive of value (Mezzadri 2019). For a related attempt tounderstand capitalism as a social totality whose relations ofproduction are made possible by the expropriation of sociallyreproductive labor, environmental resources, and the labor ofdispossessed and colonized peoples, see Fraser in Fraser and Jaeggi(2018).
In response to these sorts of criticisms of intersectionality, somescholars have attempted to reformulate the concept by understanding itas a family resemblance concept (Garry 2011) or by highlighting itsprovisionality (Carastathis, 2014). Others have argued for anexpansion of the intersectional framework to better account for theexperiences of diasporic subjects (Sheth 2014) or for a rethinking ofthis framework in relation to a Deleuzian notion of assemblage (Puar2007 and 2012). Collins (2019) has proposed the development ofintersectionality as a critical social theory through a reflection onits genealogy, epistemology, and methodology.
Postcolonial and decolonial theory offer overlapping critiques ofhistorical and contemporary practices and discourses of imperial andcolonial domination. Yet they also have distinct lineages, theoreticalcommitments, and implications (for helpful discussion, see Bhambra2014 and Ramamurthy and Tambe 2017). Postcolonial theory rose toprominence in the late 20th century, in association with thegroundbreaking work of Edward Said (1979) and the Subaltern StudiesCollective, and has been most influential in literary and culturalstudies. Taking as its primary point of reference the northernEuropean colonization of Southeast Asia and focusing primarily on thediscursive and cultural effects of colonialism, postcolonial theory isdeeply (though not uncritically) influenced by poststruturalism,particularly the work of Foucault and Jacques Derrida. Decolonialtheory emerged somewhat later, in the early 2000s, in association withthe Latin American and Carribean scholars in the Modernity/Colonialitygroup. Its primary point of reference is the colonization of theAmericas that began in 1492. Heavily influenced by Latin AmericanMarxism, world systems theory, and indigenous political struggles,decolonial theory focuses on the connections between capitalism,colonialism, and racial hierarchies. Although these two approaches arenot mutually exclusive, decolonial theory is often viewed as the moreradical of the two, due to its broader historical range and its callsfor epistemic decolonization and delinking from capitalistmodernity/coloniality (Ruz 2021).
Although most of the approaches to dominaiton discussed above havebeen informed by the Continental philosophical tradition, analyticfeminists have made important contributions to the feminist literatureon domination as well. For example, Ann Cudd (2006) draws on theframework of rational choice theory to analyze oppression (for relatedwork on rational choice theory and power, see Dowding 2001 and 2009;for critical discussion, see Allen 2008c).
The concept of power is central to a wide variety of debates infeminist philosophy. Indeed, the very centrality of this concept tofeminist theorizing creates difficulties in writing an entry such asthis one: since the concept of power is operative on one way oranother in almost all work in feminist theory, it is extremelydifficult to place limits on the relevant sources. Throughout, I haveemphasized those texts and debates in which the concept of power is acentral theme, even if sometimes an implicit one. I have alsoprioritized those authors and texts that have been most influentialwithin feminist philosophy, as opposed to the wider terrain offeminist theory or gender studies, though I acknowledge that thisdistinction is difficult to maintain and perhaps not always terriblyuseful. Debatable as such framing choices may be, they do offer somemuch needed help in delimiting the range of relevant sources andproviding focus and structure to the discussion.
Arendt, Hannah Beauvoir, Simone de critical theory existentialism feminist philosophy, approaches: analytic philosophy feminist philosophy, approaches: continental philosophy feminist philosophy, approaches: intersections between analytic and continental philosophy feminist philosophy, interventions: liberal feminism feminist philosophy, topics: perspectives on class and work feminist philosophy, topics: perspectives on sex and gender feminist philosophy, topics: perspectives on the body feminist philosophy, topics: perspectives on the self Foucault, Michel identity politics Marx, Karl phenomenology race
Originating in late 18th-century Europe, feminist movements have campaigned and continue to campaign for women's rights, including the right to vote, run for public office, work, earn equal pay, own property, receive education, enter into contracts, have equal rights within marriage, and maternity leave. Feminists have also worked to ensure access to contraception, legal abortions, and social integration; and to protect women and girls from sexual assault, sexual harassment, and domestic violence.[7] Changes in female dress standards and acceptable physical activities for women have also been part of feminist movements.[8]
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