Prospects for Peace in Colombia

[Stewart in Colombia]

May

4

Prospects for Peace in Colombia

--by Stewart Vriesinga

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How one views the prospects for peace in Colombia depends on how one understands the conflict and how one defines peace. There are many different stakeholders, each with competing and often conflicting interests.

The ongoing peace negotiations with the Colombian Government and left-wing FARC guerrilla insurgents in Havana, along with a more recent government commitment to enter into a separate talks with the ELN insurgents in Ecuador, are being celebrated both nationally and internationally as the imminent end to the fifty-year conflict in Colombia. Not everyone in Colombia is ready to break out the champagne and celebrate just yet. There remains a great deal of concern over what may happen in a post conflict Colombia.

FARC demobilization postponed indefinitely: The demobilization of the FARC, which was originally expected to take place on March 23rd, 2016, has been postponed indefinitely. The FARC still agrees to disarm, but insist that a third party, not the Colombian government, take custody of their arms. This implies that they want to retain the option of rearming should they decide the government is not keeping its end of the agreement. More significantly it may also imply the FARC wants the government to first put an end neo-paramilitary groups, which are  considered by many to be a far greater on-going threat to human rights than the FARC. Their concern is that these neo-paramilitaries, not the government, would fill the vacuum in territory currently occupied by the FARC and ELN. These concerns are well-founded. In a recent demonstration of power (March 31st, 2016) one such group paralyzed the entire northern part of Colombia; the Urabeños have made it absolutely clear that they, not the state, are the authority in much of Colombia.

The Urabeño paramilitary shut-down is widely held to have been in support of “Marches against Peace” held across the country two days later (Saturday, April 2nd). Hundreds of thousands of supporters of ex-president Uribe, opposing the Santos Government and the Peace Accord and negotiations with the FARC, took to the streets in cities across Colombia. It is noteworthy that former President Alvaro Uribe is himself under suspicion for collaborating with paramilitaries, and accused of playing an active role in Parapolitics, which involved many high-level officials in the military, all levels of government, his own Party and Cabinet, as well as some of his political appointees. Many of of these have been convicted and are now in exile or serving lengthy prison sentences for having collaborated with paramilitaries. The current President, Juan Manuel Santos, denies the existence of paramilitaries. He considers groups like the Urabeños as nothing more than organized criminals involved in drug trafficking and illegal gold mining, not major players in the military conflict, and insists that state will prosecute them as such (see “Failed demobilization of the Paramilitaries in the 2006” below). The Urabeños themselves claim they are politically motivated, and should therefore be included in the clemency being offered to left-wing guerrilla and military combatants under the terms of the transitional justice.

The 1980s Experience of Disarmament in Favour of Political Participation: Doubtlessly the history of the previous 1980’s failed attempt to seek solutions to Colombia’s social problems through negotiation and the integration of insurgents into party politics is also fresh in the minds of FARC and ELN combatants. The Unión Patriótica (UP or Patriotic Union political party) founded by the FARC and Communist Party in 1985 was formed as a way of finding political solutions rather than military ones after peace negotiations with the Conservative Belisario Betancur administration. But violent opposition from drug lords, paramilitaries and security forces agents during the 1980s exterminated the party, along with many of its supporters in what has been described as “political genocide”.

While the state has erased nearly all references to the UP from its official discourse, survivors and supporters of the UP certainly remember it very clearly. The Marcha Patriótica, one of the largest social movements in Colombia today, takes much of its inspiration as well as part of its name from the UP. And like so many survivors of massacres, forced displacement and violence, in addition to an end to armed combat members of the Marcha Patriótica and other social movements want guarantees of non repetition of the massacres that resulted in the deaths of thousands of Patriotic Union members and supporters in 1987:

While the assassination of affiliates of the Marcha Patriótica movement have not reached the number of assassinations of those affiliated with the Patriotic Union Party in the 1980s, there is nonetheless a very clear and present and danger. To date 102 members of the Marcha Patriótica had been assassinated.

ELN demobilization: Despite failure to meet the March 23 date for the demobilization of the FARC guerrillas, the Colombian Government intends to proceed with negotiations with the ELN --the second-largest left-wing guerrilla group in Colombia. President Santos says negotiations with the ELN will result in a more complete peace, and completely put an end to the armed conflict.

The negotiations will run concurrently, but take place separately. (FARC negotiations are taking place in Cuba. ELN negotiations in Ecuador). The ELN is a much smaller guerrilla force than the FARC, but there are reports that FARC combatants and lower-ranking commanders who are not content with the terms being negotiated by FARC representatives in Havana are being recruited into the ELN. According to Ombudsmen and the National Organization of Colombian Indigenous peoples (ONIC) the ELN is now moving into territory once controlled by the FARC. While some civilians who fear a paramilitary takeover of their area may welcome this move, the state considers it to be undermining the primary objectives of its negotiations with the FARC. (The FARC have agreed to a unilateral ceasefire during the negotiations, and are no longer militarily defending their territory.)

The Unnamed Elephant in the Room: Members of the Marcha Patriótica being assassinated are being targeted by some armed group, and, given the similarity between the Marcha Patriótica and the decimated UP, it would be preposterous to claim that they were being killed by the ELN or FARC guerrilla. And the assassinations of Marcha Patriótica affiliates are only the tip of a very large iceberg; Marcha Patriótica members are only a fraction of total number of victims. Human rights defenders are especially hard hit, and the vast majority of these crimes are thought to have been carried out by paramilitaries. In the first seven months of 2015 there were 399 attacks on human rights defenders, including 332 direct threats against individuals, 34 assassinations, 25 assaults and 7 cases of arbitrary arrest or arbitrary detentions..A continual climate of impunity negates any real guarantees of non repetition. Of the 219 assassinations which occurred between 2009 and 2013, 95% of investigations did not proceed past the preliminary phase, and just one case resulted in the sentencing of those responsible.

Relatives of victims of human rights violations who campaigned for justice, as well as members of human rights organizations helping them, faced death threats and other serious human rights violations from paramilitaries and members of the security forces.

--source Amnesty International 2015/2016 Colombia Report

Failed demobilization of the Paramilitaries in the 2006: Whether the AUC (United Self-defence Forces of Colombia) Paramilitaries re-mobilized or never demobilized in the first place is a debated point. There is ample evidence supporting both arguments. The Santos government however, has opted to re-brand neo-paramilitaries as BaCrim --Criminal Bands. Santos dismisses them as criminal profit-motivated mafia-type organizations whose activities are primarily limited to involvement in illegal mining and drug trafficking.This rebranding serves two purposes: First, Santos can present the ongoing negotiations with the FARC and ELN as negotiating an end to the armed conflict in Colombia by simply refusing to acknowledge that paramilitaries continue to play a major role in it. (Victims of paramilitaries know them to be real, active, and very deadly. Santos’ denial of their existence is anything but reassuring for its victims.) Secondly, Santos admission to the continued existence of a paramilitary threat would make evident the total failure of the transitional justice not only under the Peace and Justice Law of his predecessor Alvaro Uribe in 2006; but also the total failure of his own replacement laws -- the Victims Rights Law and Land Restitution Law. Neither the victims of ongoing paramilitary violence, who for the most part fit the same profile as those targeted by the AUC paramilitaries before their supposed demobilization in 2006; nor the neo-paramilitaries themselves who insist that they are not BaCrim, but rather armed participants in the conflict who should be included in the negotiations. There is strong opposition to the use of the term BaCrim from both sides, albeit for very different reasons.

Under the transitional justice of the 2006 Peace Accords with the AUC, paramilitaries who confessed to all of their crimes received a maximum eight-year jail sentence. Many of their confessions implicated even high-up Colombian military commanders and government officials at all levels, including Uribe appointees and members of his own cabinet. These were shown to be willing collaborators with the paramilitaries in massacres and other war crimes as well as co-authors of some of these atrocities. The whole process resulted in more government officials being incarcerated than paramilitaries. This sandal became known as Parapolitics. The lenient sentences offered to the paramilitaries in exchange for their confessions were not offered to the government officials they collaborated with, most of whom are serving much lengthier jail sentences. Most paramilitaries who demobilized under the Peace and Justice Law in 2006 are now back out on the streets, many resuming their former activities.

However many of the paramilitaries never demobilized at all. Some demobilizations were faked with the collaboration of the military in order to inflate the numbers. Non-combatant civilians were encouraged to present themselves as paramilitaries in exchange for the generous government benefits offered to demobilized paramilitaries. Some AUC members regrouped into smaller groups under new various names, who collectively continue to represent a large and brutal force that controls much of the country (see “FARC demobilization postponed indefinitely” above).

Transitional justice in 2016: One stated objective of the Urabeños is to be included in the even more lenient transitional justice package being offered to both military and guerrilla combatants in the current negotiations. This package being offered as part of the Peace Process with the guerrilla has been broadly criticized by groups on the right as well as human rights defenders. It has been described as little more than an exchange of impunity between two groups of war criminals. The right wants harsh penalties for guerilla war crimes, while the left wants the state to be held accountable for its own many war crimes as well as crimes committed in collaboration with paramilitaries. It should not come as a surprise that neo-paramilitary war criminals want the same opportunity as the state and guerilla to wipe their slates clean again by being included in the generous terms of this new transitional justice deal.

Peace for Whom? An end to the armed conflict with the guerrilla will not benefit everyone equally. Different sectors of society experience and view the conflict very differently, have very different ideas about the primary causes of the conflict, and very different ideas about what a post conflict Colombia would and should look like.

SECTOR ONE: Those who see and experience paramilitaries or the state as the primary perpetrators of violence and injustice want to see changes that go far beyond the demobilization of the guerrillas.

Above we examined ample evidence to show that the demobilization of the AUC right-wing paramilitaries in 2006 never really happened. It is equally important to note that the transitional justice in terms of reparation and land restitution never happened either. Even the act of identifying yourself as a victim and seeking justice is as likely to get you killed. Despite these dangers, since the introduction of the Land Restitution Law in 2008 some 87,000 brave souls made claims for land restitution. To date only 3.4% of these claims have been judicially resolved, indicating that some victims of forced displacement can expect to wait 235 years before they see justice done. (Source El Espectador, 8 April 2016 in Spanish)

Victims of Paramilitary and State violence are under no illusions that the current negotiations with the FARC and ELN will increase their security and redress injustices committed by paramilitaries and the Colombian State. They are clear that these peace talks are intended only to end the armed conflict with the guerrilla, and will do little if anything to address the social conflict, impunity and injustice that persists.

Most of the people belonging to this group may not be supporters of President Santos. Nevertheless, apart from their fears of a paramilitary takeover, after 50 years of war in which they were the primary victims most do want a negotiated solution to the social and armed conflict in Colombia. They support the Peace Accord because they hope that the UN presence and renewed and increased international attention and presence will help reduce impunity, help ensure their safety, and force the State to redress past injustices and begin to address the root causes of the social conflict.

SECTOR TWO: This sector describes the majority of Colombians who re-elected President Santos on a platform of a negotiated end to the armed conflict with the guerrilla. They see the guerrilla as the primary perpetrators of violence and injustice, and/or the primary obstacle to economic growth and prosperity. This sector seeks little additional change apart from change resulting from the demobilization of the guerrilla. (This includes foreign investors, multinational corporations and big business interests in this category.)

Many of those who fall into this category live in the cities, and have had their lives disrupted by guerrilla attacks on infrastructure, their ability to travel Colombia’s highways securely impeded, and are acutely aware of civilian and military deaths and kidnappings carried out by the guerilla. Many of them are all but oblivious to the massacres and brutal repression and forced displacement of campesinos, indigenous peoples and Afro Colombians living in rural areas, the oppression of human rights defenders and labour unions. They tend to get most of their information from mainstream media sources and government propaganda. Consequently many in this sector view the entire rural population as largely cocaine-growing sympathizers of the “Narco-terrorist” guerrilla, and have little sympathy for the millions of displaced people arriving in their cities. They are sick and tired of the war and imagine that Colombia would be a much more peaceful and prosperous place without an armed insurgency.

Both national and international investors also see ending Colombia’s fifty-year conflict with armed left-wing insurgents as the removal of the greatest obstacle to the extraction and exploitation of Colombia’s great wealth in land and mineral resources. This elite group is perhaps the group that would benefit most from an end to the left-wing armed insurgency.

SECTOR THREE: There are hundreds of thousands of ex-president (now senator) Uribe supporters who categorically oppose any solution other than a military solution to the armed conflict with the guerrilla. This group is comprised primarily of the landed oligarchy and includes those who benefited the most from past forced displacements and land grabs and fear that a negotiated solution may jeopardize their hold on their ill-gotten gains.

SECTOR FOUR: The neo-paramilitary groups, who in the context of a civil war against left-wing insurgents were able to remain in the shadows, have a lot at stake. During the conflict the state had rebranded and downplayed their role as Bacrim (Criminal Bands), but in a “post-conflict” situation they would suddenly become much more visible and harder to dismiss. The Colombian State will be under immense pressure to eliminate them, once it is no longer preoccupied with the more pressing issue of fighting a civil war. Furthermore any possibility of neo-paramilitary groups being included in the transitional justice as a political armed actor would be nil in a post conflict Colombia.

SECTOR FIVE: There is a fifth category of people who have been threatened, killed, kidnapped and displaced by the guerrilla.These include communities and friends and family of communities who have been victims of propane cylinder bombs, land mines, extortion and kidnappings. It also includes indigenous peoples living in Nariño and Aruca for example, caught up in turf wars between the ELN and FARC. Some of these same people have also been the victims of paramilitary threats and violence and state violence as well, and may not have voted for Santos in the 2014 elections.

SECTOR SIX: Colombia’s state security forces have a lot at stake as well. President Santos cannot afford to lose the support of the military and state security forces, and including them in the lenient transitional justice plan --something his predecessor Alvaro Uribe did not do-- will go a long way towards retaining their support and collaboration in a post-accord Colombia. Nevertheless Colombia’s security forces are likely to take a serious hit in terms of its size, budget, power and control. This may not go over well with the top brass, some of whom are doubtlessly opposed to a diminished role after a negotiated end to the armed conflict.

These six sectors are not intended to capture the entire spectrum of opinion in Colombia. Opinion within each sector are undoubtedly more varied and nuanced than these broad categories can accommodate. There may also be significant overlap between sectors. They do indicate that there are a variety of major stakeholders, both in favour of and opposed to these negotiations; and that even within those two groups a wide variety of competing and sometimes incompatible objectives.

Peace and Justice for the Most Vulnerable Colombians is still far from assured:  How one views the prospects for peace in Colombia depends on how one understands the conflict and how one defines peace. There are many different stakeholders, each with competing and often conflicting interests.

The largest sector is SECTOR TWO. Most members of this sector do not feel particularly threatened by anyone other than the guerilla insurgents, and are likely to contend with successful negotiation of the demobilization of the guerrilla, which they will construe as the end of the fifty-year conflict and the beginning of peace and prosperity.

Those in SECTOR ONE, who feel more oppressed and threatened by paramilitary armed actors and the state itself, are largely dependent on the political will of SECTOR TWO and the State to include them as full participants in building a common future. It is not at all clear that the state and those in the SECTOR TWO, having achieved their own goals, will be disposed to making concessions to accommodate the goals and full participation of those in SECTOR ONE. SECTOR ONE will likely continue to press for solutions to the unresolved social conflict, as they and their allies non-violently resist and mobilize in their struggle for dignity, respect and social justice.

SECTORS THREE and FOUR stand to lose a significant amount of wealth, power and control in a post accords Colombia, and are likely to do whatever they can to sabotage the process.

A lot depends on the collaboration of SECTOR SIX, the military and State security forces, which have a history of collaborating with SECTORS THREE and FOUR.

Those interested in promoting peace with justice in Colombia must not allow themselves to be lulled into a false sense of complacency by rhetoric of peace and a litany of stated laudable intentions. Good intentions and pleasing rhetoric, as the saying goes, is what the road to hell has always been paved with.

Posted 1 week ago by Stewart Vriesinga:

Labels: Christian Peacemaker Teams ELN FARC guerrilla paramilitaries peace Stewart in Colombia

Stewart in Colombia

Christian Peacemaker Teams' volunteer Stewart shares his experiences while doing accompaniment and advocacy work with those most affected by neocolonialism and violence in the Middle Magdalena River region of Colombia

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May

5

Defensor de los derechos humanos Carlos Morales finalmente liberado de la cárcel!

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Defensor de los derechos humanos Carlos Morales finalmente liberado de la cárcel!

Agradecemos los esfuerzos que desde las distintas organizaciones se han realizado en este caso y solicitamos el acompañamiento para la pronta y efectiva libertad de Carlos quien actualmente está recluido en Palogordo.   --CAHUCOPANA

Hoy Carlos Morales, nuestro querido amigo y defensor de los derechos humanos de CAHUCOPANA, tuvo por fin  una audiencia en el Palacio de Justicia en Barrancabermeja después de pasar ocho meses encarcelado.

May

5

HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDER CARLOS MORALES FINALLY RELEASED FROM PRISON!

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HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDER CARLOS MORALES FINALLY RELEASED FROM PRISON!

We appreciate all  the efforts of the various organizations who have supported us in this case and request their continued accompaniment for the prompt release of Carlos who is currently still being detained in Palogordo prison.

May

4

Prospects for Peace in Colombia

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Prospects for Peace in Colombia

--by Stewart Vriesinga

How one views the prospects for peace in Colombia depends on how one understands the conflict and how one defines peace. There are many different stakeholders, each with competing and often conflicting interests.

Dec

31

Christmas Refugees: Then, Now, There and Here

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Christmas Refugees: Then, Now, There  and Here

(Dec 23rd, 2014)

And the governing body of the holy land

was that of King Herod, a paranoid man,

who, when he heard there was a baby born, King of the Jews,

sent death squads to kill all male children under two.

Jun

19

Justice Denied

A web-based documentary series profiling pivotal cases of foreign-funded mining exploitation in Colombia, and how these projects often violate human rights.

Apr

29

Call to Action on Colombia from SOA Watch

Victims of human rights abuses want an end to impunity and assurances that past atrocities won't be repeated. This is why School of the Americas (SOA) Watch wants to invoke the Leahy Law, which prohibits the US Government from aiding someone guilty of human rights abuses. There are actions you can take. Click on the embedded links.

Apr

2

The People's Land Summit, March's March, and an Ultimatum

--by Stewart Vriesinga

CAHUCOPANA, a grass-roots campesino organization that formed to defend the land and human rights of the campesinos in north-east Antioquia, has learnt that sometimes you have to leave your home to defend it. CAHUCOPANA asked the CPT Colombian team to accompany a caravan of dozens of buses from the department of Antioquia to join about 30 thousand demonstrators in a march in Colombia's capital, Bogotá, on the 17th of March of this year.

Mar

26

Human rights Report: An Open Letter to the Government of Canada

Dear supporters,  I wanted to share the following letter with you, which I wrote on behalf of our team to the Canadian government. You may recall that the Canadian Government committed to producing an annual Human Rights Impact Report as part and parcel of the Canada-Colombia Free Trade Agreement (C-CFTA). 

The first report in May 2012 was pretty much a non-report because "sufficient trade data is not available".

Mar

3

Join CPT Colombia's May 2014 Organized Labour Delegation

Our May delegation should be especially appealing to those involved in organized labour. Colombia continues to be considered the most dangerous place on earth to be a trade unionist. Participants in this delegation will meet with public and private sector union leaders, as well as organized informal sector self-employed workers. Activists in all three groups are threatened because of their efforts to protect workers rights and their livelihoods.

Jan

5

Five 'Creative' New Year's Re-Solutions for Economic Recovery

For those of you worrying about our common future, don't! Rest assured that the best decision-makers on the planet have the situation well in hand. Here are some of their well-thought-out solutions to ensure continued economic growth and prosperity in the New Year. With any luck maybe it will even last until the next election!

The problems: (Authors note: Since all of the problems outlined here have already been resolved you can just skip all this and go back to your football game or whatever.

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