Hube's Pocket - Why do the Russians always lose and what can they do about it?
Scott B
Historical Overview
The strictest Command and Control must be maintained to move an army of 220,000 men. Even more so when it is surrounded on four sides, cut from supplies, and must cross several rivers while engaged in a breakout to friendly lines. That they did not panic, lose direction, suffer halting traffic jams or simply run out of fuel is a testament to Hube and his commanders’ leadership and planning. The First Panzer Army remained combat effective throughout the breakout and even encircled local Russian elements during it’s retreat. After fighting it’s way over three rivers, it lost only 14,242 (6.5%) men of its 220,000. Chapter 6 of ‘Operations of Encircled Forces’, the second reference below, may have been the basis of this scenario and is a worthwhile read for those interested in the story.
‘Operations of Encircled Forces’ also has a chapter on the encirclement at Velikiye Luki and the possible basis for Scenario 6 - Escape from Velikiye Luki.
Reading
Hill, John, ‘Hubes Pocket’. Cross of Iron, The Avalon Hill Game Company, 1978.
United States Army, Center of Military History, Operations of Encircled Forces, CMH Pub 104-15, 1982, pages 43-51.
U.S. Army Center of Military History. (n.d.) CMH Publications by Publication Number. Retreived from https://history.army.mil/catalog/browse/pubnum.html.
Kamenets-Podolsky pocket, in Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kamenets-Podolsky_pocket
The Scenario
In this scenario the Germans win by exiting at least ten trucks in convoy off the west edge. The Russians win by preventing the German Victory Conditions. The Russians enter from the north, into the farmland of Board Four. They must move south into the hills of Board Two and then, at least some, into the forest of Board Five, to interdict the Convoy. The Germans usually fling themselves onto Hill 621 in their attempt to stop them. The Convoy only has two roads to cross from east to west, the furthest from the Russians being the forest-road on board five. The second runs north of Hill 621 and is in easy reach of the Russians. Really, the Germans must destroy the Russian forces to ensure safe passage of the vulnerable Convoy while the Russians try to keep a few forces alive to attack it.
Since this is largely an armor engagement, this After Action Report (AAR) will focus on the armor while acknowledging infantry support is crucial in achieving victory. Significant rules are Armor Height Advantage (77), Convoys (84) and SS Units (83). The Germans are provided a far superior qualitative force and the Russians have a great challenge in contesting them directly. The sole Russian advantage is the vulnerable Convoy which is restricted to roads and easy prey for armor and infantry alike. First we’ll look at how outclassed the Russian armor is and then discuss possible Russian tactics to destroy, immobilize or deny exit to, at least seven German trucks.
First a look at a look why it is so painful to be a Russian tank in this scenario.
The Armor Order of Battle
# Name Hit Kill MP MA TK
German
3 Panther -1 +3/0 15 75LL 9/10/11
2 PzKwIVH 0 +1/-1 13 75L 7/8/9
5 total German tanks
Russian
6 T34/76C 0 +1/0 16 76L 6/7/8(1)
2 T34/85 0 +1/0 16 85L 8/9/10
1 KV/85 -1 +2/+1 13 85L 8/9/10
9 total Russian tanks
(1) Armor Listing, Note MM: All Russian 76L armament hits with L benefit but kills on the 76 column of the To Kill Table - not 76L - Cross of Iron, third edition
Common Situations
Before you can kill something, you have to hit it. For Russian tanks firing at hull down Panthers on Hill 621 that can be a very difficult task. The following table looks at several common situations and the probability of hitting, penetrating and knocking out (TH x TK) their respective opponent. All AFVs are crew exposed, not acquired and front facing unless otherwise indicated. Finally the kill to loss ratio indicates how many enemy kills for each friendly tank loss (or for the Russian how many friendly losses per enemy tank kill). For example, a 4:1 ratio indicates that four enemy tanks are killed for each friendly lost. Conversely, a 1:3 ratio indicates that one enemy tank is killed for three friendly tanks lost.
Remember hill crestlines do create a blind hex (43.6) unless the firing unit is part of the same hill as the crest line in question (43.61). Follow this rule even if the VSQL LOS thingy says clear.
Situations To Hit To Kill KO Kill/Loss
A Range 13-24, Ger is HD, Rus in open ground
Panther, -1LL, +1 AM, -1 HA ‘9’ (83%) ‘9’ (83%) 69% 30/1
T34/76, -1L, -1 Sz, +3 AM ‘5’ (28%) ‘3’ (8%) 2.3% 1/30
B Range 7-12, Ger is HD, Rus in open ground
Panther, +1 AM, -1 HA ‘9’ (83%) ‘9’ (83%) 69% 30/1
T34/76, -1 Sz, +3 AM ‘5’ (28%) ‘3’ (8%) 2.3% 1/30
C Ranger 7-12, Ger is HD, Rus in open ground
Panther, +1 AM, -1 HA ‘9’ (83%) ‘9’ (83%) 70% 9/1
T34/85, -1 Sz, +3 AM ‘5’ (28%) ‘5’ (28%) 8% 1/9
D Range 7-12, Ger and Rus in open ground
Panther, +1AM 9’ (83%) ‘8’ (72%) 60% 9/1
T34/76, -1 Sz, +3 AM ‘9’ (83%) ‘3’ (8%) 7% 1/9
E Range 7-12, Ger and Rus in open ground
Panther, +1 AM ‘9’ (83%) ‘8’ (72%) 60% 2.5/1
T34/85, -1 Sz, +3 AM ‘9’ (83%) ‘5’ (28%) 23% 1/2.5
F Range 1-6, Ger is HD and Rus in open ground
Panther, +2 TCA, +1AM, -1Pen, -1HA ‘8’ (83%) ‘10’ (92%) 66% 2/1
T34/76, Side shot, -1 Sz, +0 AM ‘7’ (58%) ‘7’ (58%) 34% 1/2
G Range 1-6, Ger is HD, Rus in open ground
Panther, +1 AM, -1Pen, -1 HA ‘10’ (92%) ‘10’ (92%) 84% 8/1
T34/76, -1 Sz, +3 AM, -1 Pen ‘7’ (58%) ‘4’ (17%) 10% 1/8
H Range 7-12, Ger and Rus are HD
Panther, -1 Sz, +2 AM, -1 HA ‘6’ (42%) ‘8’ (72%) 30% 4/1
KV/85, -1 Sz, +3 AM ‘5’ (28%) ‘5’ (28%) 8% 1/4
Key:
Sz = Target Size, HA = Height Advantage, L/LL = Gun Type, AM = Armor Modifier, Pen = Penetration, HD = Hull Down
Situations A to E
These are typical ranges and positions found in Hube’s Pocket. The Germans have little to fear with Kill/Loss ratios that range from 30/1 to 2.5/1. These ratios don’t account for the benefit of the Panthers’ first DFPH shot and acquisition as the Russians move into position. Russian Advancing Fire shots are generally useless and don’t provide acquisition, further increasing the disparity. The Russian lesson is don’t engage the Panthers head on, you won’t win.
The Panthers can exploit a quirk in the rules to double the size of their front facing. Face the front of the vehicle covered arc against the Russians on the second level hill (D, E) and all of their hits are against the front facing (64.11). Face the turret covered arc against the vehicles to which you are Hull Down (A, B, C, G, H) and they too, have a front facing target (64.11). The hit location of turret or hull is only in the Supplemental Rules and not introduced into the rules until Crescendo of Doom’s “Location & Frequency of Vehicular Hits” (130).
Situation F
In reality this is a hypothetical situation and not frequently encountered as the German will either simply kill the offending Russian AFV, move down a level out of LOS, pivot to a front facing or pop discharger smoke. However, it demonstrates the vulnerability of the Panther’s side and rear, especially if not Hull Down. Practically, it is a very difficult situation to find and can not be relied upon as a winning tactic.
Situation H
The lesson for the Russian player is don’t bother with this position. The German will probably focus all AFVs on the KV and it won’t last long. A lucky shot is possible but most times i’ve just seen a hull down burning wreck. Save your AFVs for something more probable.
Situation X
The situation for a Russian tank on Hill 621 is missing. A competent German player will cover the hill with panzerfausts and panzerschrecks, making a charge up close a very dangerous action, if not suicidal. It is not a viable tactic.
Situation ‘Stunner’
Nestled under a Panther in 2Q6 are a 10-2, 6-5-8 and HMG, whom I affectionately call the Stunner. All the Russian AFVs are within normal range of his 6 FP +0 shot against their exposed crews. He has about a 25% chance of Stunning any exposed Russian crew each time he fires, so one could expect one Stun ever two game turns. The Russian player must decide to Buttoned Up or risk incurring a Stun and subsequent +2 To Hit DRM penalty, + 1 for the Stun and +1 for buttoned up. This penalty is disproportionality hard on the Russians with their already low To Hit numbers.
The Lesson
There are five German tanks to nine Russian tanks, a ratio of 1:1.8. Even situation F, the most favorable Russian, will not result in victory when accounting for the German’s first DFPH shot. The Russian can not afford to go toe-to-toe with the German on Hill 621.
Conversely, the German player should move directly onto the north side of Hill 621 on turn 1 to give the Panthers an opportunity to start firing immediately as the Russians enter. Position the infantry with panzerfausts to cover the slopes of Hill 621 and protect the Panthers. Controlling Hill 621 extends your LOS to the surrounding boards where you can use your superior arms to destroy the enemy armor from range - this is what the Panther was designed to do.
Possible Russian Strategy
It is improbable the Russians will prevail against the German armor and, fortunately, they don’t need to. The Russians only need to prevent seven trucks from exiting and must focus on that goal. To that end, they need to achieve three objectives, first close off the Board Five forest-road to the convoy. Second they must slow the convoy with obstacles along the road north of Hill 621 and third they must remain alive long enough to prevent the convoy’s exit.
Closing the southern road forces the convoy north into the bulk of the Russian infantry. It is easy to block the convoy on Board Five because it can not pass infantry (51.2) or AFVs/wrecks in a forest-road hex (81.3). Even a broken infantry unit can stop the convoy then rout back to the next forest-road hex and stop it again. Entrenchments cost 6 MP for a convoy truck, even if the infantry that made them are dead or moved. The convoy may not pass an AFV or wreck in a forest-road at all (81.3). Furthermore, a wreck takes three game turns to clear (40.4), one to move adjacent, one to start adjacent and one to move into the old wreck hex. It is probably the best place to lose a T34 because it continues to impede the German effort from beyond the grave.
I think immediately sending all six T34/76s mounted with infantry without a leader to the forest-road hexes of board five a worthwhile endeavor. Any three obstacles of wreck or entrenched infantry should be enough to dissuade the German convoy from the southern route, channeling him to the north against, hopefully, dug in Russian infantry and tanks. Once the obstacles are complete, unneeded infantry and AFVs may be assigned elsewhere. The southern road thus blocked, the convoy must take the northern road.
The convoy enters on turn five and has eight Mphs available to exit ten trucks(2). If traveling over open ground road, it will take five Mphs to exit the final truck during German turn nine. The convoy may also delay entry up to turn eight and exit the final truck during German turn twelve. Since the convoy travels at the slowest vehicle’s speed, obstacles can significantly increase the number of Mphs required to exit and can even outright deny the ability to exit ten trucks. The ideal distance between two obstacles is equal to the number of trucks in the convoy. (ie: a distance of sixteen hexes for a sixteen truck convoy). Picture the last truck of the Convoy on a wreck and realize the length of the convoy, sixteen hexes, has paid the 6 MP penalty from that single wreck hex. Further picture a wreck in the following hex and the process starting all over again. That is effectively thirty-two hexs at 6 MP per hex. The Russian must recognize placing obstacles on the convoy’s path can severely slow the convoy and is critical to achieving his second and third goals.
(2) Supporting calculation for turns and obstacles are here, for ten and sixteen truck convoys.
To illustrate how successful obstacles are at delaying the convoy, let's look at the affect of two non-convoy wrecks on a sixteen truck convoy and a ten truck convoy(3). If two wrecks are on 2T2 and 2E3 then it will take ten MPhs and eighth MPhs to exit a sixteen truck convoy and a ten truck convoy, respectively. So with only eight MPhs available, the sixteen truck convoy could not fulfill the Victory Conditions at all and the ten truck convoy could not delay entry at all. Entrenchments provide the same delay while Convoy wrecks are generally less effective by a turn or two. This means the Russian could stop the convoy without firing a shot if it is sufficiently slowed by obstacles.
(3) Passing a non-convoy wreck and convoy wreck are 6 and 4 MPs, respectively. See calculations here.
When encountering obstacles the German is faced with several decisions. A longer traverse time may prevent delaying the convoy’s entry beyond turn five and before Russian forces are sufficiently reduced. Additionally, the German may choose to speed the convoy over obstacles by detaching (84.7) up to six trucks. However, this makes it more susceptible to damage, with the loss of a single truck preventing fulfillment of the Victory Conditions. Conceding an early convoy entry or reduced convoy size may force the German to reduce the Russian force more quickly while additionally allocating resources to clear the road of wrecks. This could overload the German resources and allow the Russians to survive long enough to interdict the convoy and eliminate, immobilize or delay seven trucks.
Finally, convoys must remain on the road hexes at all times to preserve their convoy status (84.1), so any infantry, even broken or an AFV in the road stops the convoy until removed from the hex. Infantry in an entrenchment is a particularly good combination on the road.
Conclusion
The Russian armor may not be good at killing Panthers but it is good at killing time. It must avoid the Panthers unless engaging them supports one of the three goals. Stay out of their LOS. Instead the Russian must attack the German resources of time and position. Most importantly, use obstacles to close off the southern route and obstruct the northern route thus reducing the turn the convoy must enter or reducing the convoy size. Sadly, the Russian armor is more valuable as wrecks than fighting Panthers and one should not hesitate to place them on the roads in lieu of fighting German tanks. Should the Russian coordinate closing the southern route, obstructing the northern route and surviving, the German may be hard pressed to overcome them and forced to run the convoy through a gauntlet of Russian infantry.
After Action Report
In my game, the Russians took the initiative and kept the Germans off balance for the game. The Germans had solid dice and defeated the Russian armor with only one PzKw IV lost. However, the Germans were reacting to Russian initiative instead of projecting their own. When the Russians broke through to Board Five and sealed it off, the Germans were left reacting unsuccessfully. When the Russians encircled them on hill 621 from the north, south and east, the Germans were again reacting. When the German player was looking at the wrecks on the road north of Hill 621 and calculating the resulting convoy delay, again he was reacting. It was the Russians that set tempo and that was different from prior games where the Russians engaged the German armor. While unsuccessful this game, they demonstrate, with a little help from obstacles, what they could achieve - stopping the convoy.
Thanks to Barry for an interesting game.
Scott
A better formatted PDF is available at this link.