Scenario 39 Sweep for Bordj Toum Bridge
Scott B
SWEEP FOR BORDJ TOUM BRIDGE
SCENARIO 39, G.I.: ANVIL OF VICTORY
AFTER ACTION REPORT
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Map 1 link, Map 2 link, Map 3 link.
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Bordj Toum Station. Tunisia. 10 December, 1942.
Operation Torch was successfully completed by 16 November. The Allies had secured the Vichy French territories of Morocco and Algeria and gained the Vichy French as allies, or at least not active enemies.. To the east, the British concluded the second Battle of El Alamein on 11 November. This would allow the Allies to mount a pincer operation against the Axis forces between them. The Germans immediately sent troops and supplies to Tunis to counter the US threat from the west.
On the 17th, the Allies started their run for Tunis, hoping to reach the city before the Axis could establish themselves. They advanced down the two roads linking Algeria and Tunisia attempting to take Bizerte and Tunis. They came within twenty miles before Axis resistance stiffening. By the 30th, they had established themselves as far as Chouïgui, Tebourba and the area of Djedeïda.
The next day the Axis counterattacked with the newly arrived 10th Panzer Division. The US failed to use its own doctrine of coordinating troops, armor and artillery, instead confronting the enemy piecemeal. Over the next several days, the Allies fell back approximately six miles to high positions on Longstop Hill (Djebel el Ahmera), Djebel Bou Aouka, and Djebel El Asoud. The Allies pell-mell rush for Tunis had failed.
On 10 December, the Axis attempted to expand its bridgehead with a two pronged attack on both sides of the Medjerda River to attack Medjez el Bab. The western prong was stopped near Bordj Toum by a roadblock of the 16th Combat Engineers. The eastern prong held back by skillful defense and soft ground. At dusk the Allies withdrew to safer positions for re-organization and re-supply before resuming the offensive against Tunis weeks later.
The Commander in Chief, Allied Force, said of the US performance: "I think the best way to describe our operations to date," he wrote, "is that they have violated every recognized principle of war, are in conflict with all operational and logistic methods laid down in textbooks, and will be condemned in their entirety by all Leavenworth and War College classes for the next twenty-five years."
RESOURCES
“Sweep For Bordj Toum Bridge”. G.I.: ANVIL OF VICTORY. Baltimore MD; the Avalon Hill Game Company, 1982. https://storage.googleapis.com/archivesqlt/DAO00039A.pdf
Nixon, Mark C. “Anvil of My Eye: GIs in the Maelstrom”. The Avalon Hill General. Baltimore, MF: Monarch Printing. https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BxBhV3GHa1N8Wlp6RUQtcnlMcWs/view?resourcekey=0-XvEma4hp_RJfSQIPAHL_rg
Howe, George F. “Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West”. Office of the Chief of Military History. Department of the Army. Washington, DC. 1957.
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-MTO-NWA/USA-MTO-NWA-17.html#page328
https://history.army.mil/html/books/006/6-1-1/CMH_Pub_6-1-1.pdf
“Run for Tunis”. Wikipedia.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Run_for_Tunis
“Tunisian Campaign”. Wikipedia.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tunisian_campaign#
“Operation Torch”. Wikipedia.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Torch#
“North African Campaign”. Wikipedia.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_African_campaign#Tunisian_campaign
“The Story of the The First Armored Division”. George Frederick Howe. Combat Forces Press.
https://www.genealogycenter.info/military/wwii/viewpage_1armored.php?realpage=65&display=12
The Battle History of the 1st Armored Division "Old Ironsides"
https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/api/collection/p16040coll3/id/304/download
RULES INTRODUCED
Board 15 introduces level four hills and adds roads to them. A few hills are ‘double crested’ rising two levels in one hex with correspondingly high MP and MF to traverse them. Craggs are outcropping of boulders that offer some protection but prevent vehicles from entering.
Infantry gain the ability to climb cliff sides at one level during the movement phase and advance phase, respectively. However, they may stall or fall, the latter eliminating the unit.
Now Off-board artillery may plot normally during the rally phase but resolve radio contact, battery access and accuracy to the defensive fire phase, thus neither side knows if or where an FFE will land until after movement.
Finally, indirect fire vs concealed units is no longer halved. However, if no enemy units are in the spotters LOS, he must pass an ‘7’ MC or a fire mission is used without effect.
INITIAL PLACEMENT
US Comments
The Combat Engineers cover the bottle-neck between the Chateau and Building J on board six. A roadblock closes the eastern (bottom) rout. A flame thrower sits in Building J, waiting. Further east (lower) on board 15 they form a main line of resistance along the heights.
GAME TURNS ONE AND TWO
German Comments
The victory conditions seem very difficult. 8 turns in the scenario. The Germans have to keep moving forward regardless of casualties. So a good mix of fire and maneuver is required, as well as good dice-rolling, to get into victory position of normal inherent range.
Pre-battle analysis:
1. The soft ground that adds 1MP to non-road hex vehicle movement is a huge planning consideration in a negative sense. The 13MP of the German tanks means they can’t go far turn-to-turn, especially when climbing to higher terrain.
2. Need height advantage to be comfortable going toe-to-toe with the US Lees. This takes time and a lot of MPs, but can be done.
3. The direct road approach route to the bridge area is obviously faster, but the mortar, MMGS, 37LL ATGs and the Lees, can quickly chew up the soft skinned trucks and the halftracks. A walking infantry assault along the road is just asking for mortar and MMG pain. So have to figure the probability of knocking out the ATG crews and the Lees to clear a safer path via the road. To me, not a high probability at all.
4. OBA- 80mm is better than nothing. Initial thought is OBA for Smoke is most likely. OBA is too unreliable to count on it consistently. If the OBA was 100mm or 120mm I would consider it for HE FFEs that could be punishing, but since they only have 80mm, mostly like use for smoke.
5. The forces on map 6 are too far for any powerful mutually-supporting fires with the main effort east of the river. They may be able to help each other, but they mostly must act independently.
6. I don’t have any hopes for victory, so will do things that may not be exactly tactically correct to work the rules, as we are systematically going through the GIAV programmed instructions.
Map board 2 and 15: This is the main effort. German setup and initial move is predicated on survival- don’t allow the US multiple shots at vehicles and infantry. Keep as many forces in good order for as long as possible. Keep the US defensive fire dispersed. German armor provides some longer range HE and MG fires to suppress US ATG and MG crews and squads. The village in the valley-center of the high ground feels like a killing zone, so the Germans avoid the village and consolidate in the vicinity of Hill 621 for concentrated effort vs Hill 783.
A small kampfgruppe of 3 x Halftracks w/ 1 x Mk III escorts start a flanking maneuver at board’s edge to further diffuse the US defensive fire capabilities and if luck prevails, get a good amount of forces in victory condition position. This move is more in the fun category than tactically-necessary category. Do it and see what happens.
Map board 6: This is a supporting effort. Is obviously very dangerous to advance given the US forces in the large stone building and the US long range fires from the hills. Going west (top of mapboard) around the large stone building will be easier to stop, I think, than a movement along the river, even with the roadblocks. If I can get there, will try to remove the roadblocks.
Because normal inherent range is not defined for an AFV, we decide that 12 hexes is the normal inherent range for the German tanks. Of course I would have preferred 16 hexes…but can live with 12.
US Comments
With the German flanking force threatening the rear of board 15, it is already time to pull back off of the 783 ridge. The value of the position was denying the enemy movement in open ground, slowing down his advance. However, the ridge is a terrible line to hold because there is no cover and no place to rout. The German infantry will soon form fire groups and the US will break. It is time to pop smoke and head to better cover.
GAME TURN THREE
German Comments
a. Starting at the top of map on board 6 (west of river): my concentration of forces naturally attracts a concentration of US forces, including a Lee. Fire breaks out, denying woods cover further movement along the river. So much for that axis of advance (pun intended). So forces need to shift west. First things first- destroy the Lee without height advantage- so need close range (within 6 x hexes) shots. Fortunately I have a 2-to-1 advantage in tanks and can use a bit of maneuver to corner the beast (so long as the MkIIIs aren’t turned to charred metal piecemeal themselves).
b. East of the river (bottom part of mapboard): most obviously, dispersed harassing OBA smoke floats over Hill 714, allowing more confident German infantry movements. Bases of fire are still being set up (takes a long time to get anywhere) in the Hill 621 area, to include MMGs and Mk IV with 75 gun (which has S8 ammo). These bases are at long range, but are the best for their mission of suppressing US height-advantaged ATGs and MMGs.
The US does start to break in their forward positions, but have enough reverse-slope mobile forces to react to wherever the Germans push, to include the kampfgruppe halftrack excursion along the river. Having a MkIII escort really doesn’t help matters. Maybe I should have waited with the halftracks in a safe position until the MkIII established a Lee kill or some sort of advantage. But time is of the essence. The Lees are good halftrack killers, and the MMGs do a good job STUNing a halftrack. So ⅔ of my halftrack force is already toast or in deep trouble. The ⅓ remaining halftrack says “nichts!” am not going there.. So he disembarks his infantry.
I try and have some fun with the motorcycles. I put one on a halftrack as part of the flanking movement, disembarking it with its driver near the river. The other motorcycle-riding leader isn’t really getting anything accomplished.
C. German squads do have infantry smoke (exponent of 1), but of course I forget to try it.
US Comments
The Lees tried to flank the German armor on Board 6 by pushing forward one Lee and placing the other three the hills of board 15. They hoped to gain numerical superiority for a turn or two and eliminate at least one. However, the large size of the Lee and inferior gunnery proved no match for the PzKw IIIs 50L. They mistakenly gave up the first shot advantage and suffered a stun and KO in the exchange.
The Germans push ran into strong defensive fire in the form of a Critical Hit, Shock and an FT KIA and fire. That broke them up and stopped their momentum. Both sides suffered broken units and need to rally back to fighting trim.
GAME TURNS FOUR TO SIX
German Comments
a. Starting at top of map on board 6 (west of river): obvious westward shift of the advance due to the fire allows the US, with interior lines, to quickly react and make life difficult for the infantry. 1xMkIII escapes by using bypass 6K9 at top of mapboard.
In a move more based on fun and working the rules (as I had already decided I have no chance to win) , the other MkIII becomes a flaming wreck in 6K8 as he is lit up by a US flamethrower in 6L6 before he could overrun 6L6, and possibly prompt the US to try a thrown demo charge from 6M7 into the overrun hex 6L6 to try and KO the tank, while possibly having a friendly fire incident that might have made national news at the time. But the fun was not to be. I forgot that The TK of a FT is doubled at 1xhex. So instead of a TK of 3 vs Front (which I can live with), the TK was actually 6 (which I am generally not comfortable with). So not remembering that FT TK adjustment cost those panzertruppen their lives.
The infantry is bottled up and has no chance to do anything.
b. East of the river (bottom part of mapboard): Bottom line: there is no way I can get the needed infantry into victory condition range by turn 8. I don’t have much infantry left. Overall, the suppression of the US on the high ground has been successful, but it took too long. The failure of the halftrack kampfgruppe looms large..as well as the decision to try it being questioned by my higher command. But was worth a try- it drew US forces away from the bridge area, but the quick elimination of the halftrack threat allows the US to re-balance for the required Germans rush for victory points.
I will try for OBA harassing smoke again versus US strongpoint at 15R8.
For fun, at southeastern end, an intrepid tanker will try to roll-up Hill 714 alone. Would be better if the Germans had 2 x tanks there, but so be it. All the tanks go CE at this time, as doesn’t matter now if they get STUNned or not, plus they need the road movement rate.
c. The German tanks overall do a good job of eliminating US armor (by AT6 there is 1 x Lee remaining), and have so-so success vs US infantry, mostly due to BMG and CMG.
US Comments
To the west (upper board), a lucky fire and stone chateau pushed the German advance westward,toward stone building 6J8. From there, they’ll have a wall to cover their movement toward the VC to the south (left) . The US forces left the Chateau to establish and hold a line against them.
East of the river (lower boards), the defense on Hill 714 (Board 15 left hill) is disrupted but the center and right flank are holding, with the right slightly out of position. Two M3 Lees met the German flank attack and succeeded in stopping it. However, they extended themselves too far, and once the Germans took the height of Hill 783 they had nowhere to go and were quickly KOed along with the 105 halftrack. The US only has one M3 Lee remaining.
The Germans are in position for their final push toward the victory hexes, with two movements remaining.
German Comments
Although no chance of victory, the Germans do eliminate the last remaining Lee. My tactical gameplay has devolved into “working the rules” just to keep exercising rules and formulas. I did an Overrun in 15T9 just for grins and giggles (since my prior Overrrun of a flamethrower on board 6 didn’t work out so well..but it did work the rules!), and of course the Pz IV became immediately immobilized, in a perfect example of the need to “work the rules”.. I rolled 1d6 (39.1) to determine immobilization in woods, completely forgetting that GIAV changed it to 2d6! (144.8). That is just one example..
Out west (across the river, top of board), the German infantry completely falls apart, not that it had any chance of making an impact.
East of the river (main battle area), Germans just trying to shoot up whatever they can find.
US Comments
The Germans infantry had to push through open ground and the US had to force and dice to stop them.
AFTERMATH
German Comments
A fun and challenging scenario for both sides. Once you do the setup, you are pretty much committed to your plan.. The SSR MP penalty for non-road vehicle movement does not allow for rapid shifting of mobile forces once forward of the road network at far East (bottom of map). The loss of the halftracks had a big impact..although that flanking movement forces the US to shift forces, it did cost too much and in hindsight maybe hold them off for a conditions-based (smoke, destruction of ATG crews, Lees, etc) run to possible victory locations for infantry.
Germans did get 4 x OBA FFEs, used for smoke purposes only if I recall correctly.
The US set up and moved to good locations with open ground fields-of-fire that precluded German infantry non-vehicle movement to anywhere near victory locations. Maybe a better use of HE rounds from the panzers vs the infantry locations would be better..but still had to worry about the pesky ATGs and Lees. The German vehicles would be needed to provide the bulk of the victory points, so had to preserve them.
The game length of 8 turns forced the Germans to continue moving and make tough five vs movement decisions.
US Comments
I’ll start with what went wrong. The US commander (me) mis-managed his armor with two serious blunders. First was moving forward to engage the enemy and giving him the first defensive fire shot. They should have hung back behind some hedges and let the German come to him. This would have given them first shot and some beneficial penetration modifiers.
Second was moving to a hull down position in the hills in LOS of too many German tanks. The Lees must crest to use the 75 and also have +1 size modifier. That is a bad combination when every German tank can see you.
Finally, the 105 off-board artillery underperformed. It only landed twice against low density enemy units. The 105 has sixteen firepower factors and the potential to disrupt the German advance with one FFE. However, it couldn’t secure Battery Access and had little effect in the battle.
On-the-other-hand, the US infantry did well and the FT had infinite ammunition, firing four or five times to good effect. It started the fire that drove the German advance westward (top). The infantry, armor and anti-tank guns also did well against the halftracks, stopping their flanking thrust. The Germans realistically ran out of troops by turn six, and some late game successful fire combats could not be exploited for lack of manpower.
The important takeaway is scenario balance. I think this one is strongly US favored considering the underperforming armor and OBA. Maybe a German charge down the road would yield better results, but my gut says it would only sustain high losses and fall short of the victory conditions. Still, worth playing for its large board size, M-3 Lees and US 37LL that fire canister.
APPENDIX
THE MEDJERDA VALLEY
The Medjerda valley extends generally southwest to northeast about 125 miles across Tunisia from headwaters beyond the Algerian border to its outlet north of Tunis. It consists of several alluvial plains connected by gorges, and the river for most of its length has steep-sided banks. After heavy rains the clay soil of the fertile plains turned into some of the softest mud known to soldiers. The countryside between the towns was dotted with many French farms and estates, on which were buildings of white and pink stucco, with somewhat fewer villas in classic style. There were also many small Arab villages of gray, mud-and-straw huts. Between Medjez el Bab and Tebourba, the Medjerda ran close to the base of lofty hills, with a narrow shelf from which a railroad and highway continued across the plain to Tunis. The river was bridged at Djedeida (fifteen miles from Tunis), where the stream turned more sharply northward, and at eight other points farther upstream at intervals of six to ten miles, all within the area in which the Allied troops were to concentrate or to engage the enemy. 281
THE COUNTER ATTACK
Early on 10 December, the 86th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, as part of the Fifth Panzer Army's effort to expand the bridgehead, started a two-pronged offensive along both sides of the river, each prong supported by a company of tanks. The 7th Panzer Regiment began a southerly loop through Massicault, Furna, and Sidi Mediene (later known as "Peter's Corner") to attack Medjez el Bab from the southeast. This regiment (less its 2d Battalion) was reinforced by elements of the 501st Panzer Battalion, whose armament included Mark VI ("Tiger") tanks, an antitank company, and a battery of 100-mm. guns.34 Combat Command B, 1st Armored Division, was caught at Djebel Bou Aoukaz in an exposed position. The closest supporting positions were those of British units six to ten miles farther to the west. It was in danger of being cut off on the southeastern side of the river if enemy forces attacking from Tebourba gap got control of the Bordj Toum bridge at the same time that the enveloping sweep of 7th Panzer Regiment blocked access to the bridge at Medjez el Bab. The American armored unit fought throughout the day on rain-soaked ground which offered serious hazard to vehicular movement except by road.
An encounter took place at the Allied roadblock on the northwest bank near the railroad station of Bordj Toum, protected by mines laid by the U.S. 16th Combat Engineers and by antitank guns. These were supported by medium tanks of the 2d Battalion, U.S. 13th Armored Regiment, and by 105-mm. howitzers of Battery B, 27th Field Artillery Battalion, firing across the river, as well as by Battery A, 175th Field Artillery Battalion, and the Headquarters Platoon, 13th Armored Regiment, on the northwest side. The engagement stopped the Germans and protected the bridgehead but left it under fire and subject to threat of renewed attack at nightfall. On the east bank, the second prong of the German attack was held back by skillful defense and by soft ground, which limited maneuver. But the attack by the third enemy column, after overrunning elements of the 1st Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment, reached a roadblock about two miles east of Medjez el Bab. Elements of the 4th Mixed Zouaves and Tirailleurs Regiment (4 MZI) plus the 3d Battalion, French 62d Artillery Regiment, and another French battery firing from the far side of the Medjerda river held up the advanced section of the enemy column about 1400, after knocking out four tanks and causing other losses.
Combat Command B tried to intercept the main enemy column with a flank attack, using elements of the 1st Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment, and of Company C, 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion. The Germans turned back to meet this threat. The American light tanks were outgunned by the enemy and mired when they maneuvered off the road; nineteen were lost. The tank destroyers claimed ten German medium tanks knocked out before being put out of action themselves. The enemy had successfully run the gauntlet until stopped by the French roadblock and the American counterattack. He then pulled back to Massicault leaving a small blocking detachment at Sidi Mediene. He had suffered only moderate losses, but at the end of the day, both the bridge at Medjez el Bab and that at Bordj Toum remained in Allied possession.
At dusk, the plans for Combat Command B's withdrawal behind the approved line from the southeast side of the Medjerda were arranged in a roadside conference west of Medjez el Bab by Generals Allfrey, Evelegh, Oliver, and Robinett and by visits to other British commanders. British units were to cover Combat B's route, including the vital Bordj Toum bridge. Two platoons of infantry, operating as a patrol, were designated for this mission.