Atomberg v. Eureka Forbes : Section 106 Steps Out of the Shadows
SpicyIP
In Atomberg v. Eureka Forbes, the Supreme Court clarified a small but significant corner of Indian patent law. The Court recognised that suits against groundless threats of infringement have their own independent footing under Section 106 of the Patents Act – and aren’t automatically overridden by an infringement action. Hafsah Azhar Ansari breaks down the Court’s judgement and explains its significance. Hafsah is a third-year student at NALSAR University of Law, Hyderabad.
Image from hereAtomberg v. Eureka Forbes : Section 106 Steps Out of the Shadows
It’s not every day that a patent dispute reaches the Supreme Court and ends up clarifying a half-forgotten part of Indian IP law. That’s exactly what happened in Atomberg v. Eureka Forbes, where the Court quietly but firmly reshaped how Indian patent law treats “groundless threats.”
By holding that a Section 106 action (which provides relief against groundless threats of patent infringement proceedings) stands independently of an infringement suit, the Court not only cleared a long-standing ambiguity but also drew a sharper line between legitimate patent enforcement and market bullying.
The story starts, rather unexpectedly, with a patent dispute over water purifiers that spiralled into duelling lawsuits between Atomberg and Eureka Forbes.
How it Started
In June 2025, Atomberg launched its Intellon water purifier. Soon after, Eureka allegedly began warning distributors that Atomberg’s purifier infringed its patents. Atomberg responded by filing a groundless threats suit before the Bombay High Court under Section 106 of the Patents Act, 1970 on July 1. A week later, Eureka filed a patent infringement suit before the Delhi High Court, claiming Atomberg’s purifier copied its patented technology. Both sides then approached the Supreme Court, each asking to transfer the other’s case (read more about all this, here & here).
That’s how we got Atomberg Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. Eureka Forbes Ltd (2025 INSC 1253), decided on October 17, 2025.
Section 106 Gets Its Moment
The key issue wasn’t about who actually infringed, but what Section 106 really allows. The Court compared it with its predecessor, Section 36 of the Patents and Designs Act, 1911 (see page 26 of the document), which permitted groundless threat suits but barred them once a patentee filed an infringement action “with due diligence.”
When Parliament replaced the 1911 law with the 1970 Act, that proviso was deleted. On this, the Court notes in Para 9: the “negatory provision… has been done away with.” The Court read this to mean that under the 1970 Act, a groundless threats action is an independent cause of action, not something that disappears once an infringement case begins. To my understanding, the change also reflects a broader policy intent – to prevent the kind of patent intimidation that can discourage competition and the working of inventions. The Ayyangar Committee Report, which led to the 1970 Act, was clear about this as well – in the discussion on Clause 66 , Justice Ayyangar explicitly called the older provisio an ‘anachronism’ (page 240). This echoed his agreement with the judgement of Evershed M.R’s in Benmax v. Austin Motor Co. Ltd., 1955 – who had endorsed the deletion of the corresponding provisio in the UK Acts, considering them ‘unnecessary.’
This clarification fixes a long-standing confusion. In some earlier judgments, like Bristol Myers v. Natco Pharma (2020), courts have raised questions regarding the application of Section 106 (paras 14 & 15), which the Supreme Court has now clarified.
Forum Shopping & the Delhi-Bombay Tug of War
Eureka claimed that its Delhi suit was the ‘main’ dispute, since infringement involves more technical issues. Atomberg pushed back, pointing out that both companies are based in Mumbai, that its Bombay case was filed first, and that Eureka’s claim of Delhi jurisdiction rested only on a single online purchase and delivery – a pretty thin basis for hauling the case to Delhi.
The Supreme Court agreed. Citing Chitivalasa Jute Mills v. Jaypee Rewa Cement (2004), it noted that both suits involved the same parties, facts, and patents, and that trying them separately would mean duplicating evidence and risking inconsistent findings. The Court therefore transferred Eureka’s Delhi infringement suit to the Bombay High Court, where Atomberg’s Section 106 case was already pending. It also refused to decide which suit was ‘more substantive,’ clarifying that under Section 25 CPC, its role was to prevent multiplicity of proceedings, not to decide which dispute looked more important. Since the Bombay case was filed first, it naturally took priority – a quiet reaffirmation that under Section 25, first filed matters more than more important.
While the judgment doesn’t use the phrase ‘forum shopping,’ the message is hard to miss. Relying on one token online sale to justify Delhi jurisdiction when there was already a parallel proceeding in the city where both parties are based, was, at best, creative (but the Court wasn’t buying it). The order effectively shuts down that tactic
Burden of Proof Under Section 106
Although the judgment mainly dealt with procedure, it also touched upon how the burden of proof operates in groundless-threat suits. Once the plaintiff (here, Atomberg) shows that threats were made, the patentee who made them (Eureka) must justify those threats by showing that there was at least a reasonable basis for alleging infringement. This doesn’t mean the patentee has to prove infringement within the threat suit (the remedies and evidentiary standards are different), but it must demonstrate that its warnings weren’t made recklessly or without cause.
The Supreme Court noted that the two suits – the threat action and the infringement action – raise overlapping questions on validity and alleged infringement. By transferring both to the same court, it avoided the risk of inconsistent findings while keeping each suit within its proper procedural lane.
How This Differs from Trademark & Copyright Law
Section 60 of the Copyright Act (read more here) also deals with groundless threats but still keeps the old rule: once the right-holder files an infringement case “with due diligence,” the threats suit can’t continue.
Trademark law takes a similar approach: Section 142 of the Trade Marks Act lets anyone threatened with infringement proceedings sue to stop such threats – but again, this remedy vanishes if the trade mark owner promptly files and prosecutes an infringement action. (That provision’s been getting attention lately after the Bro Code dispute, where the Madras High Court restrained baseless threats over the film title – read here).
Patent law is different by design. Parliament dropped that bar in 1970, and the Supreme Court’s reading in Atomberg confirms it wasn’t by accident. This gives Section 106 real teeth – it allows businesses to challenge intimidation tactics even if the patentee later files a lawsuit.
A Quiet but Significant Shift
At first glance, Atomberg v. Eureka Forbes might look like a routine transfer order. But it’s actually a rare instance of the Supreme Court clarifying how Section 106 fits into India’s patent framework. It acknowledges that threats can be just as disruptive as infringement itself, and that the law treats them seriously.
In doing so, the Court gave an underused provision a moment in the spotlight, reminding patentees that words – especially threatening ones – can carry legal consequences.
(For further reading on groundless threats jurisprudence, see Section 60 of the Copyright Act: Finally, Some Answers?; Sections 105 and 106 of the Patents Act, A comparative study, and Karnataka High Court’s 2023 decision under Section 60.)
I thank Swaraj Sir and Praharsh for their comments and suggestions!