Fwd: Shah Bano's Case Could Have Paved the Way for A Uniform Civil Code in India
Suryanarayana Ambadipudi
Shah Bano's Case Could Have Paved the Way for A Uniform Civil Code in IndiaBut votebank politics killed the hope. The Emraan Hashmi-Yami Gautam movie is based on this true story
Haq, the movie that is scheduled for release on Nov 7, 2025 stars Emraan Hashmi and Yami Gautam. It is based on the historic 1985 Shah Bano case. This case could have redefined the lives of Muslim women but political ugliness meant Rajiv Gandhi’s government beat the daylights out of Muslim women’s rights. What should have been a great step forward for women’s rights in India became a sham because of vote bank politics. The story so far: Shah Bano and Mohammed Khan married in 1932 and had five children together. In 1946, Khan took a second wife, and the three of them lived together for several decades under Muslim law. Around 1975 Khan asked Shah Bano to live separately. In 1978, he stopped paying maintenance. Thanks for reading Your Reading Room(mate)! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work. When she went to court under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), Khan divorced her by way of Triple Talaq. He contended that he didn’t have to pay maintenance to her anymore. However, a lower court, the High Court in Madhya Pradesh and finally the Supreme Court in 1985 all sided with Bano. You can read about it in detail in our Instagram post here. The story continues:When the case was escalated to the Supreme Court. Justices Murtaza Fazal Ali and A. Varadarajan, who presided over the initial hearing, referred Khan’s appeal to a larger bench given the case’s constitutional significance. Two influential religious bodies intervened in support of Khan: The All India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB) and Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind. Both organizations argued that courts could not interfere in Muslim Personal Law, as such interference would violate religious freedom guaranteed under the Constitution. On 23 April 1985, a five-member bench comprising Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud, Justice Rangnath Misra, Justice D.A. Desai, Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy, and Justice E.S. Venkataramiah delivered a unanimous judgment dismissing Khan’s appeal and upholding the High Court’s decision. The Supreme Court declared: “There is no conflict between the provisions of Section 125 and those of the Muslim Personal Law on the question of the Muslim husband’s obligation to provide maintenance for a divorced wife who is unable to maintain herself.” In his landmark decision, Chief Justice Chandrachud wrote: “Section 125 was enacted in order to provide a quick and summary remedy to a class of persons who are unable to maintain themselves. What difference would it then make as to what is the religion professed by the neglected wife, child or parent? Neglect by a person of sufficient means to maintain these persons and the inability of these persons to maintain themselves are the objective criteria which determine the applicability of Section 125. Such provisions, which are essentially of a prophylactic nature, cut across the barriers of religion.” The Court emphasized that Section 125 CrPC is a secular, criminal law provision designed to prevent vagrancy and destitution, applicable to all citizens irrespective of their religious affiliation. Citation: Mohd. Ahmed Khan vs Shah Bano Begum and Ors, AIR 1985 SC 945; (1985) 2 SCC 556 A Victory Short-Lived
The Shah Bano judgment was celebrated as a great victory for Muslim women and for gender equality. The case went beyond customary interpretations of personal law to address the necessity of implementing a Uniform Civil Code, a directive principle under Article 44 of the Indian Constitution. It acknowledged the importance of upholding gender equality even when religious principles were involved. However, the celebration was short-lived. Like the dramatic twists in Indian television serials, this legal victory was about to take an unexpected turn. Orthodox Muslim religious leaders and organizations took to the streets in protest against the judgment. They viewed the ruling as unwarranted interference in Islamic law and an attack on their constitutionally protected religious personal laws. The AIMPLB spearheaded nationwide demonstrations, framing the issue as one of religious freedom rather than women’s rights. The Rajiv Gandhi-led Congress government, which had come to power in a landslide victory in December 1984, viewed these protests with alarm. Concerned about losing Muslim votes in upcoming elections, the government chose votebank politics over judicial integrity. On 19 May 1986, the Parliament of India passed The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, effectively nullifying the Supreme Court’s Shah Bano judgment. Under this Act: · Muslim men are liable to pay maintenance only during the iddat period (approximately 90 days) · After iddat, if a woman is incapable of supporting herself, the ruling magistrate can direct the State Wakf Board—not the husband—to provide support for the woman and her dependent children · The responsibility shifts from the individual husband to the community’s charitable institution This legislative intervention was widely criticized as a betrayal of women’s rights and judicial authority. Citation: The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 (Act No. 25 of 1986) The Fallout: Reactions and Protests
Several sections of Indian society strongly protested the new Act. The All India Democratic Women’s Association (AIDWA) organized demonstrations where Muslim women voiced their opposition to being deprived of rights that Hindu, Christian, and Parsi women enjoyed under secular law. Women’s rights activists argued that the Act created a discriminatory two-tier system where a woman’s access to justice depended on her religious identity. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) regarded the Act as “appeasement” of the Muslim community and viewed it as discriminatory toward non-Muslim men. The party characterized it as a “violation of the sanctity of the country’s highest court” and used it to advance their narrative about “pseudo-secularism.” Political commentator Makarand Paranjape described the overruling of the Supreme Court verdict in the Shah Bano case as an example of “cynical manipulation of religion for political ends.” Lawyer and former Law Minister Ram Jethmalani termed the Act “retrogressive obscurantism for short-term minority populism.” Perhaps most significantly, Arif Mohammad Khan, who was a Minister of State in Rajiv Gandhi’s cabinet and a Congress party member, resigned from both his ministerial post and the party in protest. Khan had argued passionately against the Bill in Parliament, insisting that it violated both constitutional principles and true Islamic teachings on women’s rights. Indian Express - What is Shah Bano Case Wikipedia - Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum The Judicial Course CorrectionShah Bano’s lawyer, Danial Latifi, filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court challenging the constitutional validity of the 1986 Act. He argued that the Act violated Articles 14 (equality before law), 15 (prohibition of discrimination), and 21 (right to life) of the Indian Constitution. On 28 September 2001, the Supreme Court delivered its judgment in Danial Latifi v. Union of India. While the Court upheld the constitutional validity of the 1986 Act, it provided a purposive and progressive interpretation that fundamentally altered its application. The Court ruled that: · A Muslim husband’s liability to provide maintenance is not restricted merely to the iddat period · The husband must make “reasonable and fair provision” for his divorced wife’s future, which should be paid at the time of divorce · This provision should be adequate for her lifetime maintenance unless she remarries · If the amount fixed at divorce proves insufficient, the divorced woman can seek further maintenance Through this interpretation, the Supreme Court effectively restored much of what had been lost in the Shah Bano case, while maintaining the technical validity of the 1986 Act. The judgment recognized women’s claim for treatment with equality and dignity, particularly in cases involving marriage and divorce. Citation: Danial Latifi & Ors. v. Union of India, (2001) 7 SCC 740; AIR 2001 SC 3958 The principles established in the Shah Bano and Danial Latifi cases continue to be tested and refined in contemporary courts. In 2022, the Allahabad High Court delivered another landmark ruling that expanded maintenance rights for divorced Muslim women. Zahid Khatoon married Nurul Haque Khan in 1989. After more than a decade of marriage, Nurul divorced Zahid through triple talaq to marry another woman. He refused to return the property (stridhan) that Zahid had brought into the marriage, failed to pay her mehr (the mandatory gift from husband to wife as part of the Islamic marriage contract), and provided no maintenance. What is Mehr: According to Islamic law, mehr is the amount of wealth or property that a husband commits to give his wife at the time of marriage. It is considered the wife’s exclusive property and an essential component of a valid Islamic marriage. Zahid filed an application in the Ghazipur Magistrate’s Court seeking maintenance. The case was transferred to the Ghazipur Family Court in 2014. In September 2022, the Family Court ordered the husband to pay maintenance at a rate of ₹1,500 per month, but only for the duration of iddat—three months and thirteen days. This decision ignored the Supreme Court’s interpretation in the Danial Latifi case. Dissatisfied with the limited relief, Zahid appealed to the Allahabad High Court. On December 7, 2022, the High Court delivered a progressive judgment that reinforced earlier precedents. The Court cited the Supreme Court’s decisions in Danial Latifi (2001) and Sabra Shamim vs. Maqsood Ansari, (2004) 9 SCC 616, noting that: “A divorced wife is entitled to maintenance not only until the iddat period but also beyond that until she remarries.” The High Court clarified that a Muslim woman who has been divorced has the right to maintenance from her ex-husband throughout her entire life, or until she remarries, if she is unable to support herself. The Court ordered the respondent-husband to pay the appellant ₹5,000 per month as interim maintenance on or before the 10th of each month, either for three months or until the case’s final determination, whichever came first. Citation: Zahid Khatoon vs Nurul Haque Khan, First Appeal No. 787 of 2022, Allahabad High Court, decided on 7 December 2022 The Triple Talaq Ban (2017-2019)While the Shah Bano case focused on maintenance rights, another significant development has fundamentally altered Muslim divorce law in India. In Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017), the Supreme Court declared the practice of instant triple talaq (talaq-e-biddat) unconstitutional by a 3-2 majority, holding that it violated fundamental rights under Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Indian Constitution. Subsequently, Parliament passed The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019, which: · Declares instant triple talaq void and illegal · Makes the practice a criminal offense · Provides for imprisonment up to three years and a fine for husbands who practice instant triple talaq · Came into force with retrospective effect from 19 September 2018 This means that the very mechanism by which Mohammed Ahmed Khan divorced Shah Bano in 1978, instant triple talaq, is now illegal in India. Shah Bano’s Legacy
Shah Bano Begum passed away in 1992 at the age of 76, just seven years after her landmark legal victory. She did not live to see the Supreme Court’s reinterpretation in the Danial Latifi case (2001) that ultimately vindicated many of the principles for which she had fought. From Court Records to Cinema: ‘Haq’ (2025) Shah Bano’s fight for ₹200 in monthly maintenance transformed into a movement that fundamentally reshaped the discourse around Muslim women’s rights in India. Her case brought to the fore the tensions between religious personal laws and constitutional guarantees of equality, between political expediency and judicial integrity, between community identity and individual rights. Though Parliament attempted to nullify her victory in 1986, the judiciary gradually restored and even expanded the rights she fought for through subsequent interpretations. Cases like Danial Latifi (2001) and Zahid Khatoon (2022) demonstrate that Shah Bano’s legal battle planted seeds that continue to bear fruit. The banning of instant triple talaq in 2017-2019 is another milestone in the journey toward gender justice for Muslim women. Thanks for reading Your Reading Room(mate)! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.
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Rajaram Krishnamurthy
The Shah Bano vs. Union of India case was a landmark 1985 Supreme Court judgment that affirmed a divorced Muslim woman's right to maintenance under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) beyond the iddat period. The court ruled that a divorced Muslim woman who cannot support herself is entitled to maintenance from her former husband, asserting that personal laws must be subservient to secular, statutory law. In response to public pressure, Parliament later passed the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, which limited maintenance to the iddat period, but this was later partially modified by the court in the Danial Latifi case. KR IRS 71125