Sandeep Ke Sawal on The Public India: on issue of EVMs
Bobby Ramakant - CNS
Amita Buch
https://youtu.be/xIoA74dS69g?si=BOUmDKIwHbnLNGqM
--
Socialist Party (India)
Website: spi.org.in.
Facebook: facebook.com/socialistpartyindia
Twitter: twitter.com/spiinfo
Email: socialist...@gmail.com
---
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Socialist Party (India)" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to socialist-party-...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web, visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/socialist-party-india/831000483.2405306.1719549615102%40mail.yahoo.com.
Satinath Choudhary
Current VVPAT system has a number of rectifiable problems
Currently, a voter presses a button with the candidate’s profile (name of the candidate, affiliated party name, party symbol, and any serial number provided by the Election Commission of India), right above the vote button. All of the vote buttons are arranged in a row, 16 of them on one voting module. If the number of candidates is more than 16, more than one voting unit would be needed. As a voter enters a poll booth, s/he sees one or more voting modules, and s/he finds the button corresponding to his/her favorite candidate on the voting module and presses the same. A red light right above the vote button is supposed to light up, indicating that a vote has been cast in favor of the intended candidate. But the voter does not know for sure where the vote went. A vote slip/ballot gets printed behind a little tinted glass window, a light gets turned on, and stays lit for 7 seconds before the light turns off. The paper rolls on and is supposed to be ready to print the next voter’s chosen candidate’s profile. I used to think that the paper slip would get cut off and get collected in the VVPAT’s container. But it is possible that it does not get cut off. It simply rolls on, ready to print the next voter’s chosen candidate’s profile (name, party name, party symbol, any serial number, etc.)
Anyway, the paper slip is visible only for 7 seconds. And the voter does not have any recourse to cancelling his/her vote if s/he sees a wrong candidate’s profile behind the glass window, or s/he thinks that it probably was a vote for a wrong candidate. S/he can, theoretically speaking, challenge the correctness of the vote s/he cast. But s/he is discouraged by possibility of a fine of Rs. 10,000 or so if proven wrong. This does not have to be so. First of all, there should be no automatic casting of vote (rolling over or cutting of the VVPAT slip), and secondly, if the voter is not satisfied with the vote that has gotten printed, s/he should have an easy recourse to cancel the same and vote again.
Regarding the use of black glass, someone said in Hindi: “Daal men jaoor kuchh kaalaa hotaa hogaa kaale glass ke pichhe.”
All these things can be taken care of rather easily, as described in the next section.
Solution for problems associated with current VVPAT
These kinds of problems with the current VVPAT can be alleviated with the following two-step voting process, including the replacement of the red light above each of the keys corresponding to various candidates with a monitor (possibly a simple smartphone with the ability of screen capture that will get printed as ballot slip in the printer, as discussed below) with suggested audio (or audio-visual) instructions playing while the voter is voting.
In the following explanation of the new improved voting process, there will be audio instructions playing most of the time after a voter enters a polling booth until s/he comes out after casting his/her vote. The suggested texts of the audio have been printed in bold fonts.
As soon as a voter goes into the polling booth, a green light near the door should change to red indicating that someone is currently voting in that booth. At the same time, an audio recording should start playing with something like the following message: Welcome to this polling booth. As soon as you are ready to vote, please press the blinking START button. The audio may restart if the voter does not press the START button within a few seconds.
When the voter presses the START button, the audio will say: Thank you, now you can go ahead and press the key corresponding to the candidate’s party symbol and name. When the voter presses the key of his/her choice, a more detailed profile of the voter should be displayed on the monitor or the mobile phone. Possibly the ECI may prescribe the format of the first page of the official flyers of candidates running in an election. It may include the candidate’s photo, in addition to the candidate’s name, party name & symbol, and serial number assigned by the ECI. It may also include a bar code and QR code, the purpose of which will be discussed below. The bar code and QR code may expedite the process of counting with the help of sorting machines. The details on the first page would be considered to be the official profile of the candidate. This official profile is the one that should be displayed on the smartphone (functioning as a monitor) when a voter presses the corresponding key. When the voter presses the PRINT button, a smaller-scaled copy of the official profile of the candidate should get printed as his/her ballot. The second page may contain other details of the candidate like his/her qualifications, experience, manifesto, endorsements, etc.
At this point, the audio should say: Thank you for making your choice. Are you satisfied that the profile displayed does correspond to your intended candidate? If not, press the START button again and try pressing your candidate’s button again. If the displayed profile does not correspond to the desired candidate a couple of times, there may be something wrong. Possibly the labels on or above the keys have been glued incorrectly. At this stage, the voter should complain to the Presiding Officer (PO) and should alert the polling agents as well regarding the problem he/she is facing. On the other hand, if the monitor or cell phone display does correspond to the intended candidate, the audio should say: Thanks for making your selection. Now, please go ahead and press the blinking PRINT button.
As soon as the voter presses the PRINT button, the printer should start churning and print a screen capture of the profile seen on the monitor. The audio should then be saying: Thanks for trying to print the profile of the candidate of your choice. Now, please take a look at the printout behind the glass window near the sign YOUR BALLOT is printing here. After the printer has finished printing the ballot, the sign would change to: YOUR BALLOT has been printed, as can be seen behind the glass window here, where the CAST-the-VOTE button is blinking.
Then the audio would continue with the instruction: “Please take a good look at the ballot printed. If the ballot printed is for your intended candidate, please press the button CAST-the-VOTE”. The audio should broadcast this repeatedly until the voter presses the button CAST-the-VOTE. Needless to say, we would ban the use of tinted glass over the printout of the ballot. Only clear glasses will be used.
As soon as the voter presses the CAST-the-VOTE, the printed ballot should get cut off and drop into the ballot box. The audio should then start saying: Thank you very much for casting your vote. Many freedom fighters had to spill a lot of their blood and sweat for you to be granted this privilege to choose their own government. Celebrate that privilege and enjoy this glorious day.
Now you can pick up your things and let the next voter come in and vote. The audio can repeat this last sentence until the voter has left.
After the voter leaves the polling booth, the audio can stop and a light outside the booth would turn green from red, indicating that it is ready for the next voter to come in. As soon as the next voter goes into the polling booth, the green light should change to a red light, and the voting process (inside the booth) would start all over again with the welcome sentence.
In the above voting process we did not see the need for canceling any vote because the voter can visually see the intended candidate’s profile on the monitor (it’s no longer just a red light), which will continue to be displayed for the voter to see and compare with the profile printed on the ballot paper. So, no crooked designer/creator of the VVPAT section would dare design it such that the theft would be immediately caught. However, a vote-cancelling mechanism should be made available so that the PO may be able to resort to a test vote and cancel the same without the necessity of lengthy documentation process of filling out Form 17A & 17B. This test vote and cancellation of the same can be provided, as follows:
The PO may be provided with a CANCEL-the-VOTE switch/button. While a ballot printout can still be seen behind the clear-glass window, on pressing the CANCEL-the-VOTE button, the word CANCELLED should get printed right above the ballot already printed, without severing this CANCELLED portion from the ballot already printed. After the word CANCELLED has been printed, it should be severed from the paper roll. The two together (ballot for an unintended candidate [or the test-vote] and the label CANCELLED) will be longer than usual ballot length, hence easy to be weaned out from a heap of regular ballots during the counting process. With this possibility of cancellation of a vote before it is cast, a voter may even be able to change his/her mind just before casting his/her vote.
At this point allow me to mention that some people have proposed getting the ballot into the hand of the voter and then the voter would drop that ballot into the ballot box. There is one little problem here that these people are overlooking. A voter may be given some money by a rogue agent to vote for a specific candidate, and then instead of dropping the same into the ballot box, bring the ballot out and give it to the rogue agent, and collect the rest of the vote-selling price. After the rogue agent collects a bunch of ballots in favor of the rogue candidate s/he favors, the agent may hand those ballots into the hands of a more trusted voter who is inclined to vote for the rogue candidate already, requesting the latter to drop all of the votes into the ballot box. To stop this kind of cheating one has to figure out a way to prevent the ballots from being taken outside the polling booth for being sold to rogue agents.
To stop ballots from being taken out of a poll booth one may resort to a mechanism that is used to prevent taking a book out of a library without getting it properly checked out at the checkout desk. The mechanism used by the libraries comes in the form of strips made of ferromagnetic material that is not magnetized at first. In that state it will respond to a low-frequency magnetic field by producing harmonics of the driving frequency that can be picked up in the theft detector pedestal at the door of the poll booth and an alarm will ring. To disable it, it is magnetized far into the saturation area. Perhaps, one can mix a fine powder of ferrite in a thin paint-like liquid/glue and paint a thin stripe of the same on the ballot paper. This will prevent the ballots from being taken out of the poll booths, thus preventing ballot theft and buying & selling of votes. However, I am not sure how much ferrite would be needed and how practical this would be.
Problems with ballots getting into the hands of voters, and remedies
The access of a voter to the paper ballot would require major modification of the ballot paper to prevent it from being smuggled out of the voting booth and being sold to rogue agents. In the two-step process described above, when the ballot paper does not get severed from the paper roll “automatically,” there is ample time in the hands of the voter to be satisfied that the printed ballot is indeed for the candidate the voter intended to vote for.
For the sake of argument, in the unlikely case, if, on inspection of the printed ballot, it is found to be of an unintended candidate, i.e., the profile on the ballot is different from what is still being displayed right above the voting module, the voter would have two options: (A) Report to the PO that the intended candidate, still displaying on the monitor, is different from the what is printed on the ballot. At the same time, the voter should, with permission of the PO, alert all polling agents of the clearcut fraudulent ballot printing. (B) If somehow, the voter wants to keep his/her vote confidential even from the PO, s/he should be able to simply request the PO to cancel and try voting again. The PO should cancel a vote when requested, without asking any question. If in the next voting ballot printout is the same as the intended one, s/he can press the CAST-the-VOTE button, and forget about the mismatch the previous time. However, if the voter repeatedly finds a mismatch between the ballot printout and the display of the intended candidate, the PO will have to tell the voter that s/he (the PO) will have to observe the mismatch by himself/herself before canceling a vote again. At this point, all of the polling agents will need to be alerted regarding the mismatch between the printed ballot and the displayed ballot. The mismatch will be right there for the whole world to see. There will be no need to fill out Forms 17A and 17B. The voting will have to be stopped, at least in that polling booth and the matter thoroughly investigated.
I said, “In the unlikely case,” because given the robust system described above no one is going to have the gumption to do that kind of mischief by rigging the software or hardware. It would indicate something is wrong with this machine or all machines. In any case, if the PO wants to cast a few test votes, there should be a provision for “test voting”.
Thus the two-step process is: (A) the voter can see the ballot of the candidate s/he intends to vote for on the monitor, and then only s/he can press the PRINT button; (B) then go over to the printer and after verifying that the printed ballot is indeed for the intended candidate just like the candidate-profile (ballot) displayed of the monitor, the voter would press the “CAST-the-VOTE” button. The printed ballot would then get cut off and drop into the ballot box. The ballot would not get automatically cut off from the paper roll and would not drop into the ballot box automatically.
Providing voters with alternate ways of voting for a candidate:
There is just one more little modification that can make it easy for the ECI to accommodate many more candidates than just 16 or so. The modification is that aside from the piano-type keyboard voting unit, the voter may be provided with two more alternatives to cause his/her favorite candidate’s profile to be displayed on the smartphone serving the purpose of the monitor.
(a) The voter should be able to type in the candidate’s Serial number on a keypad. This addition will allow for the accommodation of a much larger number of candidates to be chosen from.
(b) Further, a QR code may also be made a part of the candidate profile. The QR code can simplify getting one’s favorite candidate’s profile displayed on the monitor. All that a voter will need to do is to bring his/her favorite candidate’s flyer with the QR code into the poll booth and place the same at a designated place (frame) in front of the smartphone serving the purpose of a monitor. When the camera of the smartphone detects a QR code in front of its camera, it will pull out the profile of the candidate from its memory and display the same on its screen. Thus the same smartphone can serve the purpose of the camera to see the QR code on a candidate’s flyer as well as display the candidate’s profile.
When the voter is satisfied that the displayed profile is of the intended candidate, s/he can press the PRINT button to print the same profile onto the ballot paper. The smartphone can then screen-capture the ballot on its screen and transmit the same to the printer for printing. If the voter is satisfied that the printed ballot is one meant for his/her favorite candidate, (still on display on the smartphone monitor,) s/he will press the CAST-the-VOTE.
Further, if a bar code could be made a part of a candidate’s flyer, sorting the ballot papers may be expedited, as explained later.
Improvements in the counting process
This completes the voting process. Next, we will see how the counting process can be improved.
If the ballots are made on somewhat sturdy paper similar to money bills, they may be amenable to counting by machines like those available to bank tellers. The ballots will need to be oriented (orientation may be necessary particularly if machines are to be used for sorting with the help of bar codes on each ballot), sorted, and finally, counted, with spot checking by manual counting, or full manual counting.
The bank tellers always count the money bills by hand and then run them through the machine to verify their hand counts. These machines are usually taken help for instant verification of the manual ballot counts.
One big advantage of the alternative ways of inputting candidates’ info into the system is that when the number of candidates is more than what the keyboard type of input system can accommodate or deal with, the keypads may come in handy. The QR code too can easily facilitate a large number of candidates running in an election, as well as candidates for different elected bodies.
The other advantage of the keypad system is that it would be easy for the ECI to set up a mock polling booth in every panchayat office for the people to come and get familiar with the voting process. The whole VVPAT setup can be left in the panchayat office so that they can make use of the same for their own electoral processes as well as for any referendum or initiatives, making direct democracy possible at the local level.
When the machine is being used for training the voters, instead of real ballot paper they could arrange for projecting the favorite candidate's flyer/profile at the place where that VVPAT slip was to be printed and displayed for the voter to see and be satisfied that the ballot has been correctly printed. If the voter is satisfied with it (the projected ballot), pressing the CAST-the-VOTE key near the mock printer would cause the mock ballot to vanish (as if it has been cut and made to drop into the ballot box). Otherwise, pressing the CANCEL button will print the word "CANCELLED" at the top of the un-detached unintended ballot. Ultimately, when the voter is satisfied that the ballot already printed has been canceled s/he can press the CAST-the-VOTE button. Doing so will cause the unintended ballot together with the word "CANCELLED" will vanish, as if they were cut and dropped into the ballot box. In this kind of system, a voter will get trained to vote without wasting ballot papers.
A computer too should be provided in the panchayat office so that a voter, as well as a candidate, should be able to type in her/his name or birthday or other particulars and search for their names and other particulars, and make sure that they are in the system and that the particulars about them are correct. If not, they should be able to complain to the appropriate authorities and get the mistake(s) rectified. When a voter knows the ID number of the candidate s/he intends to vote for, the candidate’s profile should be displayed on the monitor/smartphone. The voter can then go on and finish the mock polling exercise. Alternatively, if the voter has the official flyer of the candidate s/he intends to vote for, the flyer should be placed in front of the smartphone. This too should cause the profile of his/her candidate to be displayed on the smartphone.
Further, they should also be able to run training videos for the prospective polling agents as well as counting agents, and also, prospective Counting Officers (COs) as well as Presiding Officers (POs) (and any other officers involved in the election process). In these training videos, the locking mechanism for the ballot boxes, as well as control units (if electronic counting has not been abolished yet), should be shown. Proper training of voters, candidates, and polling & counting agents cannot be over-emphasized.
We will now pay attention to the locking mechanism of the ballot boxes and control units (if electronic counting has not been abolished yet.)
We have observed that a counting officer (CO) brings out a ballot box, showing that the box-opening hole is still covered by unpunctured paper tape. S/he asks the counting agents if the paper tape is still un-punctured. The counting agents (CAs) speak in unison that it is not punctured. The CO then proceeds to puncture the paper tape with a finger and then uses the finger to push or pull the spring-loaded latch inside the ballot box to open the same. S/he then pulls out the paper tape and goes ahead to drop the paper tape in a waste basket. None of the CAs ask for the paper tape to make sure whether the tape is the original duly signed paper tape signed by various polling agents, or not. None of the CAs have been given copies of the duly signed original paper tape.
In the absence of the verification, of whether the paper tape is the original one bearing the original signatures of the CAs present at the polling booths, the paper tape locking mechanism is like an elegant lock that appears to be locked but has never really been properly locked; it just looks locked. With the polling agents (PAs) signing the paper tape, the key has been prepared. But the PAs never take a copy of the key and give the same to CAs for comparing it with the keys (paper tapes) taken out of the ballot box to make sure that the paper tapes are indeed the original ones signed by the poll agents at the booths. During the days that pass by between voting and counting, or during their transport from the polling booths to the strong rooms, the ballot boxes may have been replaced with new boxes with similar outside insignia. It is only if the paper tapes pulled out of the box are compared with copies of the original paper tapes that one can be sure that the box is the same original box checked and locked in the presence of various polling agents, and that it has not been tampered with or replaced.
To rectify the above-mentioned lacuna, the poll agents as well as counting agents have to be properly trained. They have to be trained to understand the necessity of taking pictures of the duly signed paper tape, getting the same printed, and giving the printouts to their respective party headquarters. Then it will be the duty of the head-quarter officials to duly distribute the copies of the paper tapes to proper counting agents. Also, the necessity of comparing the tapes pulled out of the ballot box and control unit against photocopies of the tapes supplied to the CAs via respective party headquarters cannot be overemphasized.
Using the locking mechanism of ballot boxes properly
To use the locking mechanism properly, the polling and counting agents as well as officers have to be instructed/trained appropriately, as shown below:
- Check the poll boxes to make sure they do not already have any votes in them.
- Put your (polling agents’) signatures on the paper tape that is to be used for sealing the ballot box.
- Get a carbon copy of the paper tape, or if there are too many polling agents and not enough carbon copies, take a picture of the duly signed tape in your smartphone. The next day, the PAs who took pictures of the paper tapes should get the pictures printed to the size of the original tape. These pictures and carbon copies (from those lucky enough to get them) must be handed over to respective party headquarters (PHQs). The PHQs must provide pictures of the paper tapes (or the carbon copies) to appropriate Counting Agents (CAs) on the counting day(s).
- Make sure that the Presiding Officer (PO) inserts the paper tape properly in appropriate slots, so that the paper tape covers the “opening hole” on the box, and then shuts the lid of the ballot box, which gets locked with the help of a spring-loaded locking mechanism. Make sure that the box is indeed locked internally and cannot be opened. After the box is locked, it cannot be opened without puncturing the paper tape and inserting a finger into the “opening hole” to open the spring-loaded mechanism that locks the box lid in place.
- The box should have a slot at the top through which the ballots/paper slips can drop in after they are cut off when the voter presses the CAST-the-VOTE switch next to the printer.
- The poll agents then have to sit there, keeping a watch, making sure that nothing fishy happens during the voting phase.
- A Close of Voting Period Form (CVPF) should be filled by the PO and signed by him/her and counter-signed by the polling agents present at the close of the voting period. The CVPF should be the last thing dropped into the ballot box. The CVPF should contain the number of voters who have voted and the number of canceled votes.
- There must be a provision in the box to pull a self-locking shutter to cover the slot so that nothing can be dropped into the same after the box’s shutter is closed, nothing can be taken out as well. This provision may be in the form of a spring-loaded shutter that can be pulled to shut the slot, and the spring-loaded mechanism would prevent it from opening without opening the box by perforating the paper tape already inserted. The polling agents should make sure that after they countersign the CVPF form, and drop it into the box, the box’s slot is shuttered and locked with the self-locking mechanism.
- The polling agents should get a printout of the pictures of the duly signed and countersigned CVPF form, and hand the printouts over to their respective Party Head Quarters (PHQs). Thus there are two printouts to be handed over to the PHQs: (a) Printouts of the duly signed paper tapes by the morning polling agents, and (b) copies of the CVPF form duly signed by POs and countersigned by the polling agents present in the evening at vote closing time.
- When the transport bus comes to pick up the vote box, if there is enough room, the polling agent should hop in and accompany the ballot box to the strong room.
- The poll agents (PAs) should make sure that their respective PHQs give the paper tape copies (or carbon copies) and copies of CVPFs to the counting agent (CAs) on the counting day.
- At the counting time, the Counting Agents (CAs) should be ready with the pictures of appropriate duly signed original paper tapes for sealing the ballot boxes, to compare them with the original tapes, as they are pulled out of the ballot boxes by the counting Officers. They should also compare the CVPF forms taken out of the box with the copies of the pictures of duly signed CVOF forms taken by their polling agents at the close of the voting time.
- The CAs should insist on taking a close look at the paper tapes as well as the CVPF, as they are pulled out of the ballot boxes by COs, and they (the CAs) should compare them with the appropriate photocopies given to them by their party headquarters. If they do not match, the box is considered as tampered or changed and the ballots in them cannot be relied upon. New voting must be ordered in such cases, for the concerned polling centers. In case of large-scale tampering, constituency-wide re-polling has to be ordered.
After the CAs make sure that the paper tape that was used for locking the ballot box was the original tape, and hence the box has not been tampered with or replaced, the contents of the ballot boxes can be dumped over a counting table. Counting officers will first fish out the CVPF form and hand it over to the CAs of various parties to compare the same with their copies in the hands of CAs. If the original paper tape and CVPF match with their copies in the hands of CAs, we can be sure the ballot boxes have not been tampered with. If not, the boxes have been tampered with and votes at least at the concerned booth have to be canceled and re-polling ordered. If any tampering is found, perhaps re-polling of the whole constituency has to be ordered.
After the paper tape and CVPF are found to match the copies of the same in the hands of the CAs, we can be reasonably sure that the boxes have not been tampered with. We can then wean out the canceled votes and count the valid votes as well as canceled votes and make sure they tally with the numbers given on the CVPF.
The polling booth’s valid ballots are now ready to be mixed with those of other booths so that one would not be able to tell which colonies/communities voted or did not vote for whom. This is done to prevent bias in the minds of elected officials against communities that did not vote in favor of the elected officials.
After the valid votes of a sufficient number of booths have been mixed, each of the ballots may be properly oriented (topside up) so that mechanical sorting and counting machines, if available, may be used for help and verification.
After orienting the ballots properly, they may be sorted mechanically (with the help of a bar code on each ballot), and spot-checked manually.
The sorted ballots may then be counted manually and verified mechanically a couple of times, or vice-versa, as the bank tellers do.
Votes for different candidates may be bundled separately and their votes may be added together to make sure that the total tallies with the original counts before orienting, sorting, and counting. If they do not tally, the counting will have to be repeated manually.
Besides, the counted and bundled ballots can be sent over to another room (without letting them know of counts for the various bundles) to count the ballots for various candidates all over again. The counting agents in the second room would simply have to do recounting of the correctly sorted and oriented ballots. They would not have to orient and sort all of the ballots, saving a lot of time.
If everything appears to be AOK, the bundles have to be sent over to RO. The RO will keep count of each of the bundles under the hawk eyes of the CAs of various parties. ROs, however highly designated, should be taken to be above any kind of suspicion. At the hands of COs, small-scale pilferage may take place. But at the hands of ROs, if improprieties take place, they would more like be like robberies, and they do happen.
That’s why concerned governments pay special attention to the appointments of friendly ROs. That’s why at least at the RO level it is crucially important to have two ROs from the opposing sides, one from the incumbent government side, while the other one should be picked by the opposition. In case of conflicting opinions of the two ROs, the matter may be referred to a judicial bench.
Satinath Choudhary
To view this discussion on the web, visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/socialist-party-india/CANsY08%3D%3DswQeU%2B2Ly0W-G%2Bbs%3D5%2BjAtw64RD-b_AcnZM8fSs1Qw%40mail.gmail.com.