Online Social Choice and Welfare Seminar: Maria Polukarov, Tuesday 9 June
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Marcus Pivato
Jun 5, 2026, 1:41:17 PMJun 5
to social-choice-a...@googlegroups.com, com...@duke.edu
[with apologies for cross-posting]
Dear all,
The next presentation in the Online Social Choice and Welfare Seminar will be next Tuesday (9 June). Here are the details.
Time: 2PM GMT (10AM Toronto/Montréal, 11AM Rio de Janeiro, 3PM London, 4PM Paris, 5PM Istanbul, 7:30PM New Delhi, 11PM Tokyo/Seoul)
Speaker: Maria Polukarov (King's College London)
Title: "Alternative Perspectives on Electoral Control"
Abstract. This talk integrates two complementary perspectives on candidate control in voting. Traditionally, candidate control is studied as a harmful intervention: an external agent changes the candidate set to manipulate the winner, and the main question is whether such control is computationally easy or hard. We broaden this view by asking when candidate control can also be beneficial, not just for election outcomes but for participation and representation. In particular, we connect affirmative-action style interventions that can improve representativeness with models in which candidate entry changes who turns out to vote.
The first part of the talk introduces endogenous turnout, where each candidate attracts a subset of voters, so adding or deleting candidates affects both vote shares and electorate size. The second part studies a dynamic, spatial view of elections in which voters and candidates evolve over time, and candidate control can be evaluated not only by winner selection but also by its effect on substantive representation in fragmented electorates. Together, these perspectives show that candidate control is not a single phenomenon: depending on the setting, it may be a manipulation tool, a turnout mechanism, or a way to repair structural inequities. The common theme is understanding when procedural interventions harm collective decisions, when they help, and how the computational complexity of those choices shapes what is feasible in practice.
Reminder: On the seminar website you can find the video recordings, slides and supplementary materials for all past presentations, as well as information about future presentations.
Dear all,
The next presentation in the Online Social Choice and Welfare Seminar will be next Tuesday (9 June). Here are the details.
Time: 2PM GMT (10AM Toronto/Montréal, 11AM Rio de Janeiro, 3PM London, 4PM Paris, 5PM Istanbul, 7:30PM New Delhi, 11PM Tokyo/Seoul)
Speaker: Maria Polukarov (King's College London)
Title: "Alternative Perspectives on Electoral Control"
Abstract. This talk integrates two complementary perspectives on candidate control in voting. Traditionally, candidate control is studied as a harmful intervention: an external agent changes the candidate set to manipulate the winner, and the main question is whether such control is computationally easy or hard. We broaden this view by asking when candidate control can also be beneficial, not just for election outcomes but for participation and representation. In particular, we connect affirmative-action style interventions that can improve representativeness with models in which candidate entry changes who turns out to vote.
The first part of the talk introduces endogenous turnout, where each candidate attracts a subset of voters, so adding or deleting candidates affects both vote shares and electorate size. The second part studies a dynamic, spatial view of elections in which voters and candidates evolve over time, and candidate control can be evaluated not only by winner selection but also by its effect on substantive representation in fragmented electorates. Together, these perspectives show that candidate control is not a single phenomenon: depending on the setting, it may be a manipulation tool, a turnout mechanism, or a way to repair structural inequities. The common theme is understanding when procedural interventions harm collective decisions, when they help, and how the computational complexity of those choices shapes what is feasible in practice.
To obtain the Zoom link, please subscribe to the Seminar Mailing List, or contact one of the organisers.
Reminder: On the seminar website you can find the video recordings, slides and supplementary materials for all past presentations, as well as information about future presentations.
--
Marcus Pivato
Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne
Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne
Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne
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