Online Social Choice and Welfare Seminar: Florian Mudekereza, Tuesday 24 June
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Marcus Pivato
Jun 17, 2025, 4:28:41 PMJun 17
to social-choice-a...@googlegroups.com, com...@duke.edu
[with apologies for cross-posting]
Dear all,
The next presentation in the Online Social Choice and Welfare Seminar will be next Tuesday (24 June). Here are the details.
Dear all,
The next presentation in the Online Social Choice and Welfare Seminar will be next Tuesday (24 June). Here are the details.
Time: 9PM
GMT (2PM Vancouver, 5PM Boston, 6PM Rio de Janeiro, 10PM London, 11PM
Paris, 12AM Istanbul, 6AM Wednesday in Seoul, 9AM Wednesday in Auckland) [note unusual time]
Speaker: Florian Mudekereza (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Title: "Robust Aggregation of Preferences"
Abstract: This paper analyzes a society composed of individuals who have diverse sets of beliefs (or models) and diverse tastes (or utility functions). It characterizes the model selection process of a social planner who wishes to aggregate individuals' beliefs and tastes but is concerned that their beliefs are misspecified (or distorted). A novel impossibility result emerges: a utilitarian social planner who seeks robustness to misspecification never aggregates individuals' beliefs but instead behaves systematically as a dictator by selecting a single individual's belief. This tension between robustness and aggregation exists because aggregation yields policy-contingent beliefs, which are very sensitive to policy outcomes. Restoring the possibility of belief aggregation requires individuals to have heterogeneous tastes and some common beliefs. This analysis reveals that misspecification has significant economic implications for welfare aggregation. These implications are illustrated in treatment choice, asset pricing, and dynamic macroeconomics.
Reminder: On the seminar website you can find the video recordings, slides and supplementary materials for all past presentations, as well as information about future presentations.
Speaker: Florian Mudekereza (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Title: "Robust Aggregation of Preferences"
Abstract: This paper analyzes a society composed of individuals who have diverse sets of beliefs (or models) and diverse tastes (or utility functions). It characterizes the model selection process of a social planner who wishes to aggregate individuals' beliefs and tastes but is concerned that their beliefs are misspecified (or distorted). A novel impossibility result emerges: a utilitarian social planner who seeks robustness to misspecification never aggregates individuals' beliefs but instead behaves systematically as a dictator by selecting a single individual's belief. This tension between robustness and aggregation exists because aggregation yields policy-contingent beliefs, which are very sensitive to policy outcomes. Restoring the possibility of belief aggregation requires individuals to have heterogeneous tastes and some common beliefs. This analysis reveals that misspecification has significant economic implications for welfare aggregation. These implications are illustrated in treatment choice, asset pricing, and dynamic macroeconomics.
To obtain the Zoom link, please subscribe to the Seminar Mailing List, or contact one of the organisers.
Reminder: On the seminar website you can find the video recordings, slides and supplementary materials for all past presentations, as well as information about future presentations.
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Marcus Pivato
Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne
Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne
Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne
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