Online Social Choice and Welfare Seminar: Vassili Vergopoulos, Tuesday 17 March
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Marcus Pivato
Mar 10, 2026, 6:13:20 PM (5 days ago) Mar 10
to social-choice-a...@googlegroups.com, com...@duke.edu
[with apologies for cross-posting]
Dear all,
The next presentation in the Online Social Choice and Welfare Seminar will be next Tuesday (17 March). Here are the details.
Time: 9AM GMT (6AM Rio de Janeiro, 9AM London, 10AM Paris, 12PM Istanbul, 2:30PM New Delhi, 6PM Tokyo/Seoul, 8PM Sydney, 10PM Auckland)
Speaker: Vassili Vergopoulos (Université Paris II Panthéon-Assas)
Title: "Egalitarianism in Preference Aggregation under Uncertainty"
Abstract. This paper puts forward a theory of preference aggregation under uncertainty that incorporates egalitarian concerns both ex ante and ex post and accommodates heterogeneity in individual utilities and beliefs. Existing approaches often appeal to a compromise between an ex ante perspective committing to the Pareto Condition (PC) and an ex post perspective committing to Subjective Expected Utility (SEU). In contrast, we maintain each of PC and SEU in their full force on adequately restricted domains. Key to our approach is Choquet integration and its Fubini-like properties.
(Joint work with Federica Ceron)
Reminder: On the seminar website you can find the video recordings, slides and supplementary materials for all past presentations, as well as information about future presentations.
Dear all,
The next presentation in the Online Social Choice and Welfare Seminar will be next Tuesday (17 March). Here are the details.
Time: 9AM GMT (6AM Rio de Janeiro, 9AM London, 10AM Paris, 12PM Istanbul, 2:30PM New Delhi, 6PM Tokyo/Seoul, 8PM Sydney, 10PM Auckland)
Speaker: Vassili Vergopoulos (Université Paris II Panthéon-Assas)
Title: "Egalitarianism in Preference Aggregation under Uncertainty"
Abstract. This paper puts forward a theory of preference aggregation under uncertainty that incorporates egalitarian concerns both ex ante and ex post and accommodates heterogeneity in individual utilities and beliefs. Existing approaches often appeal to a compromise between an ex ante perspective committing to the Pareto Condition (PC) and an ex post perspective committing to Subjective Expected Utility (SEU). In contrast, we maintain each of PC and SEU in their full force on adequately restricted domains. Key to our approach is Choquet integration and its Fubini-like properties.
(Joint work with Federica Ceron)
To obtain the Zoom link, please subscribe to the Seminar Mailing List, or contact one of the organisers.
Reminder: On the seminar website you can find the video recordings, slides and supplementary materials for all past presentations, as well as information about future presentations.
--
Marcus Pivato
Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne
Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne
Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne
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