Online Social Choice and Welfare Seminar: Souvik Roy, Tuesday 1 April
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Marcus Pivato
Mar 26, 2025, 5:05:19 AMMar 26
to social-choice-a...@googlegroups.com, com...@duke.edu
[with apologies for cross-posting]
Dear all,
The next presentation in the Online Social Choice and Welfare Seminar will be next Tuesday (1 April). Here are the details.
Time: 9 AM GMT (5AM Toronto/Montreal, 6AM Rio de Janeiro, 10AM London, 11AM Paris, 12PM Istanbul, 2:30PM Kolkata, 6PM Tokyo/Seoul, 8PM Sydney, 10PM Auckland)
Speaker: Souvik Roy (Indian Statistical Institute)
Title: Aggregation of Choice Functions on Non-Rational Domains
Abstract: We consider the problem of aggregating choice functions satisfying the Pareto axiom and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) on a class of domains. We first show that when agents have rational choice functions on all the binary sets (that is, all subsets of cardinality two), a choice aggregator satisfies the Pareto axiom and IIA if and only if it is a dictatorial choice aggregator. Next, we consider two domains of non-rational choice functions: limitedly rational domains and partially rational domains, and provide the structure of choice aggregators satisfying the Pareto axiom and IIA.
Reminder: On the seminar website you can find the video recordings, slides and supplementary materials for all past presentations, as well as information about future presentations.
Dear all,
The next presentation in the Online Social Choice and Welfare Seminar will be next Tuesday (1 April). Here are the details.
Time: 9 AM GMT (5AM Toronto/Montreal, 6AM Rio de Janeiro, 10AM London, 11AM Paris, 12PM Istanbul, 2:30PM Kolkata, 6PM Tokyo/Seoul, 8PM Sydney, 10PM Auckland)
Speaker: Souvik Roy (Indian Statistical Institute)
Title: Aggregation of Choice Functions on Non-Rational Domains
Abstract: We consider the problem of aggregating choice functions satisfying the Pareto axiom and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) on a class of domains. We first show that when agents have rational choice functions on all the binary sets (that is, all subsets of cardinality two), a choice aggregator satisfies the Pareto axiom and IIA if and only if it is a dictatorial choice aggregator. Next, we consider two domains of non-rational choice functions: limitedly rational domains and partially rational domains, and provide the structure of choice aggregators satisfying the Pareto axiom and IIA.
To obtain the Zoom link, please subscribe to the Seminar Mailing List, or contact one of the organisers.
Reminder: On the seminar website you can find the video recordings, slides and supplementary materials for all past presentations, as well as information about future presentations.
--
Marcus Pivato
Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne
Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne
Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne
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