Online Social Choice and Welfare Seminar: Huaxia Zeng, Tuesday 6 January
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Marcus Pivato
Jan 1, 2026, 8:45:33 AM (12 days ago) Jan 1
to social-choice-a...@googlegroups.com, com...@duke.edu
[with apologies for cross-posting]
Dear all,
Happy New Year! The next presentation in the Online Social Choice and Welfare Seminar will be next Tuesday (6 January). Here are the details.
Dear all,
Happy New Year! The next presentation in the Online Social Choice and Welfare Seminar will be next Tuesday (6 January). Here are the details.
Time:
9AM GMT (6AM Rio de Janeiro, 9AM London, 10AM Paris, 12PM Istanbul,
2:30PM New Delhi, 5PM Beijing, 6PM Tokyo/Seoul, 8PM Sydney, 10PM
Auckland)
Speaker: Huaxia Zeng (School of Economics, SUFE)
Title: "Equity in Strategic Exchange"
Abstract: New fairness notions aligned with the merit principle are proposed for designing exchange rules. We show that for an obviously strategy-proof, efficient and individually rational rule, (i) an agent receives her favorite object when others unanimously perceive her object the best, if and only if preferences are single-peaked, and (ii) an upper bound on fairness attainable is that, if two agents' objects are considered the best by all agents partitioned evenly into two groups, it is guaranteed that one, not both, gets her favorite object. This indicates an unambiguous trade-off between incentives and fairness in the design of exchange rules.
Reminder: On the seminar website you can find the video recordings, slides and supplementary materials for all past presentations, as well as information about future presentations.
Speaker: Huaxia Zeng (School of Economics, SUFE)
Title: "Equity in Strategic Exchange"
Abstract: New fairness notions aligned with the merit principle are proposed for designing exchange rules. We show that for an obviously strategy-proof, efficient and individually rational rule, (i) an agent receives her favorite object when others unanimously perceive her object the best, if and only if preferences are single-peaked, and (ii) an upper bound on fairness attainable is that, if two agents' objects are considered the best by all agents partitioned evenly into two groups, it is guaranteed that one, not both, gets her favorite object. This indicates an unambiguous trade-off between incentives and fairness in the design of exchange rules.
To obtain the Zoom link, please subscribe to the Seminar Mailing List, or contact one of the organisers.
Reminder: On the seminar website you can find the video recordings, slides and supplementary materials for all past presentations, as well as information about future presentations.
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Marcus Pivato
Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne
Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne
Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne
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