Online Social Choice and Welfare Seminar: Christian List, Tuesday 29 April
10 views
Skip to first unread message
Marcus Pivato
Apr 23, 2025, 3:18:42 AMApr 23
to social-choice-a...@googlegroups.com, com...@duke.edu
[with apologies for cross-posting]
Dear all,
The next presentation in the Online Social Choice and Welfare Seminar will be next Tuesday (29 April). Here are the details.
Time: 8PM GMT (2PM Mexico City, 4PM Toronto/Montréal, 5PM Rio de Janeiro, 9PM London, 10PM Munich, 11PM Istanbul, 6AM Wednesday in Sydney, 8AM Wednesday in Auckland) [NOTE UNUSUAL TIME]
Speaker: Christian List (Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München)
Title: The impossibility of non-manipulable probability aggregation
Abstract: A probability aggregation rule assigns to each profile of probability functions across a group of individuals (representing their individual probability assignments to some propositions) a collective probability function (representing the group's probability assignment). The rule is “non-manipulable” if no group member can manipulate the collective probability for any proposition in the direction of his or her own probability by misrepresenting his or her probability function (“strategic voting”). We show that, except in trivial cases, no probability aggregation rule satisfying two very mild conditions (non-dictatorship and consensus preservation) is non-manipulable.
(Joint work with Franz Dietrich. Working paper available here.)
Dear all,
The next presentation in the Online Social Choice and Welfare Seminar will be next Tuesday (29 April). Here are the details.
Time: 8PM GMT (2PM Mexico City, 4PM Toronto/Montréal, 5PM Rio de Janeiro, 9PM London, 10PM Munich, 11PM Istanbul, 6AM Wednesday in Sydney, 8AM Wednesday in Auckland) [NOTE UNUSUAL TIME]
Speaker: Christian List (Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München)
Title: The impossibility of non-manipulable probability aggregation
Abstract: A probability aggregation rule assigns to each profile of probability functions across a group of individuals (representing their individual probability assignments to some propositions) a collective probability function (representing the group's probability assignment). The rule is “non-manipulable” if no group member can manipulate the collective probability for any proposition in the direction of his or her own probability by misrepresenting his or her probability function (“strategic voting”). We show that, except in trivial cases, no probability aggregation rule satisfying two very mild conditions (non-dictatorship and consensus preservation) is non-manipulable.
(Joint work with Franz Dietrich. Working paper available here.)
To obtain the Zoom link, please subscribe to the Seminar Mailing List, or contact one of the organisers.
Reminder: On the seminar website
you can find the video recordings, slides and supplementary materials
for all past presentations, as well as information about future
presentations.--
Marcus Pivato
Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne
Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne
Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne
Reply all
Reply to author
Forward
0 new messages