Online Social Choice and Welfare Seminar: Barton Lee, Tuesday 23 June
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Marcus Pivato
Jun 18, 2026, 10:08:07 AMJun 18
to social-choice-a...@googlegroups.com, com...@duke.edu
[with apologies for cross-posting]
Dear all,
The next presentation in the Online Social Choice and Welfare Seminar will be next Tuesday (23 June). Here are the details.
Dear all,
The next presentation in the Online Social Choice and Welfare Seminar will be next Tuesday (23 June). Here are the details.
Time: 2PM GMT (10AM Toronto/Montréal, 11AM Rio de Janeiro, 3PM London, 4PM Zürich, 5PM Istanbul, 7:30PM New Delhi, 11PM Tokyo/Seoul)
Speaker: Barton Lee (ETH Zürich)
Title: "When Growth leads to Zero-sum Conflict"
Abstract. Individuals often face a tradeoff between cooperating to expand a collective good (the “pie”) or competing to expand their share of it. We study this tradeoff as a dynamic public goods problem where the pie’s size and its shares can only be gradually changed and contributions to the pie are irreversible. In the unique subgame perfect equilibrium, growth of pie occurs but halts at an inefficiently low level, at which point perpetual conflict over the shares ensues. Growth ultimately leads to a prisoner’s dilemma stage game, but cooperation is unsustainable for any discount factor. We also explore the dynamics of growth and conflict and empirical relevance of our results.
(Joint work with Álvaro Delgado-Vega)
Reminder: On the seminar website you can find the video recordings, slides and supplementary materials for all past presentations, as well as information about future presentations.
Speaker: Barton Lee (ETH Zürich)
Title: "When Growth leads to Zero-sum Conflict"
Abstract. Individuals often face a tradeoff between cooperating to expand a collective good (the “pie”) or competing to expand their share of it. We study this tradeoff as a dynamic public goods problem where the pie’s size and its shares can only be gradually changed and contributions to the pie are irreversible. In the unique subgame perfect equilibrium, growth of pie occurs but halts at an inefficiently low level, at which point perpetual conflict over the shares ensues. Growth ultimately leads to a prisoner’s dilemma stage game, but cooperation is unsustainable for any discount factor. We also explore the dynamics of growth and conflict and empirical relevance of our results.
(Joint work with Álvaro Delgado-Vega)
To obtain the Zoom link, please subscribe to the Seminar Mailing List, or contact one of the organisers.
Reminder: On the seminar website you can find the video recordings, slides and supplementary materials for all past presentations, as well as information about future presentations.
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Marcus Pivato
Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne
Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne
Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne
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