Online Social Choice and Welfare Seminar: Pablo Arribillaga, Tuesday 13 May
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Marcus Pivato
May 6, 2025, 6:49:07 PMMay 6
to social-choice-a...@googlegroups.com, com...@duke.edu
[with apologies for cross-posting]
Dear all,
The next presentation in the Online Social Choice and Welfare Seminar will be next Tuesday (13 May). Here are the details.
Time: 2PM GMT (10AM Toronto/Montréal, 11AM San Luis, 3PM London, 4PM Paris, 5PM Istanbul, 7:30PM New Delhi, 11PM Tokyo/Seoul)
Speaker: Pablo Arribillaga (Universidad Nacional de San Luis)
Title: "Obvious Strategy-proofness with Respect to a Partition"
Abstract: We define and study obvious strategy-proofness with respect to a partition of the set of agents. It encompasses strategy-proofness as a special case when the partition is the coarsest one and obvious strategy-proofness when the partition is the finest. For any partition, it falls between these two extremes. We establish two general properties of this new notion and apply it to the simple voting problem with two alternatives and strict preferences.
(Joint work with Jordi Massó and Alejandro Neme)
Reminder: On the seminar website you can find the video recordings, slides and supplementary materials for all past presentations, as well as information about future presentations.
Dear all,
The next presentation in the Online Social Choice and Welfare Seminar will be next Tuesday (13 May). Here are the details.
Time: 2PM GMT (10AM Toronto/Montréal, 11AM San Luis, 3PM London, 4PM Paris, 5PM Istanbul, 7:30PM New Delhi, 11PM Tokyo/Seoul)
Speaker: Pablo Arribillaga (Universidad Nacional de San Luis)
Title: "Obvious Strategy-proofness with Respect to a Partition"
Abstract: We define and study obvious strategy-proofness with respect to a partition of the set of agents. It encompasses strategy-proofness as a special case when the partition is the coarsest one and obvious strategy-proofness when the partition is the finest. For any partition, it falls between these two extremes. We establish two general properties of this new notion and apply it to the simple voting problem with two alternatives and strict preferences.
(Joint work with Jordi Massó and Alejandro Neme)
To obtain the Zoom link, please subscribe to the Seminar Mailing List, or contact one of the organisers.
Reminder: On the seminar website you can find the video recordings, slides and supplementary materials for all past presentations, as well as information about future presentations.
--
Marcus Pivato
Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne
Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne
Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne
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