Online Social Choice and Welfare Seminar: Steven Kivinen, Tuesday 20 January
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Marcus Pivato
Jan 15, 2026, 4:10:25 AMJan 15
to social-choice-a...@googlegroups.com, com...@duke.edu
[with apologies for cross-posting]
Dear all,
The next presentation in the Online Social Choice and Welfare Seminar will be next Tuesday (20 January). Here are the details.
Time: 2PM GMT (9AM Montréal/Toronto, 11AM Rio de Janeiro, 2PM London, 3PM Graz, 5PM Istanbul, 7:30PM New Delhi, 11PM Tokyo/Seoul)
Speaker: Steven Kivinen (University of Graz)
Title: "Robust Median Voter Rules"
Abstract: Generalized median voter (GMV) rules on the single-peaked preference domain are group strategy-proof. We show that if incomplete information coexists with the ability to commit to coalitional agreements, then GMV rules can be susceptible to insincere voting by groups with heterogeneous beliefs. We identify strategic compromise as a novel source of insincere voting in this environment. Our two main results characterize the set of fair, efficient, and robust voting rules: those that ensure sincere voting under asymmetric information and coalition formation. Each result uses a different notion of robustness, and both give (at most) two alternatives special treatment, with the remaining alternatives chosen according to a type of consensus.
(Joint work with Norovsambuu Tumennasan)
Reminder: On the seminar website you can find the video recordings, slides and supplementary materials for all past presentations, as well as information about future presentations.
Dear all,
The next presentation in the Online Social Choice and Welfare Seminar will be next Tuesday (20 January). Here are the details.
Time: 2PM GMT (9AM Montréal/Toronto, 11AM Rio de Janeiro, 2PM London, 3PM Graz, 5PM Istanbul, 7:30PM New Delhi, 11PM Tokyo/Seoul)
Speaker: Steven Kivinen (University of Graz)
Title: "Robust Median Voter Rules"
Abstract: Generalized median voter (GMV) rules on the single-peaked preference domain are group strategy-proof. We show that if incomplete information coexists with the ability to commit to coalitional agreements, then GMV rules can be susceptible to insincere voting by groups with heterogeneous beliefs. We identify strategic compromise as a novel source of insincere voting in this environment. Our two main results characterize the set of fair, efficient, and robust voting rules: those that ensure sincere voting under asymmetric information and coalition formation. Each result uses a different notion of robustness, and both give (at most) two alternatives special treatment, with the remaining alternatives chosen according to a type of consensus.
(Joint work with Norovsambuu Tumennasan)
To obtain the Zoom link, please subscribe to the Seminar Mailing List, or contact one of the organisers.
Reminder: On the seminar website you can find the video recordings, slides and supplementary materials for all past presentations, as well as information about future presentations.
--
Marcus Pivato
Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne
Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne
Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne
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