Online Social Choice and Welfare Seminar: Kensei Nakamura, Tuesday 27 May
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Marcus Pivato
May 20, 2025, 5:53:44 PMMay 20
to social-choice-a...@googlegroups.com, com...@duke.edu
[with apologies for cross-posting]
Dear all,
The next presentation in the Online Social Choice and Welfare Seminar will be next Tuesday (27 May). Here are the details.
Time: 9PM GMT (3PM Mexico City, 5PM Toronto/Montréal, 6PM Rio de Janeiro, 10PM London, 11PM Paris, 12AM Istanbul, 6AM Wednesday in Tokyo/Seoul, 7AM Wednesday in Sydney, 9AM Wednesday in Auckland)
Speaker: Kensei Nakamura (Hitotsubashi University)
Title: "When is it (im)possible to respect all individuals' preferences under uncertainty?"
Abstract: When aggregating Subjective Expected Utility preferences, an impossibility result is derived from the Pareto principle unless the individuals have a common belief. This paper examines the source of this impossibility in more detail by considering the aggregation of a general class of incomplete preferences that can represent gradual ambiguity perceptions. Our result shows that the planner cannot avoid ignoring some individuals unless there is a probability distribution that all individuals unanimously think to be most plausible. That is, even if the individuals have similar ambiguity perceptions, the impossibility holds as long as some individual's most plausible belief is slightly different from others.
Reminder: On the seminar website you can find the video recordings, slides and supplementary materials for all past presentations, as well as information about future presentations.
Dear all,
The next presentation in the Online Social Choice and Welfare Seminar will be next Tuesday (27 May). Here are the details.
Time: 9PM GMT (3PM Mexico City, 5PM Toronto/Montréal, 6PM Rio de Janeiro, 10PM London, 11PM Paris, 12AM Istanbul, 6AM Wednesday in Tokyo/Seoul, 7AM Wednesday in Sydney, 9AM Wednesday in Auckland)
Speaker: Kensei Nakamura (Hitotsubashi University)
Title: "When is it (im)possible to respect all individuals' preferences under uncertainty?"
Abstract: When aggregating Subjective Expected Utility preferences, an impossibility result is derived from the Pareto principle unless the individuals have a common belief. This paper examines the source of this impossibility in more detail by considering the aggregation of a general class of incomplete preferences that can represent gradual ambiguity perceptions. Our result shows that the planner cannot avoid ignoring some individuals unless there is a probability distribution that all individuals unanimously think to be most plausible. That is, even if the individuals have similar ambiguity perceptions, the impossibility holds as long as some individual's most plausible belief is slightly different from others.
To obtain the Zoom link, please subscribe to the Seminar Mailing List, or contact one of the organisers.
Reminder: On the seminar website you can find the video recordings, slides and supplementary materials for all past presentations, as well as information about future presentations.
Marcus Pivato
Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne
Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne
Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne
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