NE&EP webinar on Monday 8th: Matt Adler on Pigou-Dalton and Separability

[may...@gmail.com]

Dear all,

 

Our next webinar will be on Monday, December 8th, at 5pm Zurich time. 

 

Matt Adler (Duke) will present:

 Pigou-Dalton and Separability:  Is Equity-Regarding Moral Betterness Separable across Persons? (Abstract below)

 

You can join the webinar with the following link: https://uio.zoom.us/j/64683320451

 

We are looking forward to seeing you there!

 

Maya Eden and Paolo Piacquadio

 

Title: “Pigou-Dalton and Separability:  Is Equity-Regarding Moral Betterness Separable across Persons?” (Matthew Adler and Susumu Cato). 

Abstract: The Separability axiom (shorthand for person-separability) arises frequently in the literature on formal axiology.  It is a fixed-population axiom (an axiom that constrains the ranking of a pair of worlds in which the very same individuals exist), which says:  If some individuals are equally well off in the two worlds, the moral ranking of the two is independent of those individuals’ well-being levels.  Variable-Population Separability is a logically stronger version of Separability that applies to any pair of worlds.  It says: if some individuals are equally well off in the two worlds, the moral ranking of the two is independent of those individuals’ well-being levels and their existence.

The question of Separability has often been tied up with utilitarianism.  A utilitarian world-ranking satisfies Separability; thus an argument for utilitarianism is, automatically, an argument for Separability.

This paper engages Separability from a different angle.  It starts from the Pigou-Dalton axiom: the standard axiom expressing a concern for the equitable distribution of well-being.  The Pigou-Dalton axiom states: a pure, gap-diminishing transfer of well-being from someone better off, to someone worse off, leaving everyone else unaffected, is a moral improvement.  Utilitarianism violates Pigou-Dalton.

Notably, Pigou-Dalton itself is neutral on the issue of Separability.  Some prominent Pigou-Dalton-respecting world-rankings satisfy Separability (in particular, prioritarianism, leximin, and Pigou-Dalton-respecting sufficientarianism), while others do not (in particular, generalized Gini-world/rank-weighted world-rankings).

The paper reviews and critically evaluates the main arguments for and against Separability, given the non-utilitarian concern for equity embodied in the Pigou-Dalton axiom.  This is an important topic for formal axiologists who endorse that axiom—and a topic that has not, to date, been systematically addressed. The paper reaches a tentative conclusion in favor of Separability, but defending that conclusion is not its main ambition.  Rather, it chiefly aims to foster robust debate about whether Separability aligns with non-utilitarian, Pigou-Dalton-respecting, moral value.