REMATCH: Jamal Badawi vs William Lane Craig (but it won't be recorded!)
Denis Giron
According to two different web sites...
http://clmnet.clm.org/www/craig-schedule.nsf
http://www.veritas.org/TexasA&M/
...Dr. Jamal Badawi will be having a second[?] debate with Dr. William
Lane Craig at Texas A&M University this February 17th. I've seen their
first debate from Febraury of 1997, which was very entertaining. As I
have said before in SRI, it is my opinion that of the many
Muslim-Christian debates I have seen, the Muslims have overwhelmingly
done better. Dr. Craig however, seems to thus far have been an
exception to this rule (again, in my opinion). I felt that he pretty
much won his debate with Dr. Badawi hands down, and when Craig debated
Shabir Ally, I generally leaned in favor of his arguments (i.e. Dr.
Craig's) as well.
However, I noticed that Ally did much better than Dr. Badawi (i.e.
Ally's debate with Craig was *much* closer), and I think many who saw
the first debate between Badawi & Craig (and are familiar with
Muslim-Christian debate in general) can agree with me that Badawi took
Craig too lightly and was basically caught off guard or unprepared. It
is very interesting to see what improvements Dr. Badawi can come up
with, especially since he will probably have gained a great amount of
insight from his first debate with Dr. Craig, as well as from Ally's
debates with Dr. Craig and Ally's post-debate thoughts and comments.
I'd imagine that this time around the debate will have at least the
potential to be more exciting, or more evenly contested. Craig's
arguments for the veracity of Christianity (whether he's debating
Muslims or non-Theists or liberal Christians NT scholars) are pretty
much the same, so if Badawi has watched a few tapes, he'll know
Craig's opening salvo practically by heart. However, as was apparent
in Craig's debates with Gerd Ludemann and Antony Flew, Craig also has
a remarkable ability to raise other powerful arguments in his
rebuttals and counter-rebuttals. Dr. Badawi won't be walking in blind,
and probably has a set game-plan he worked out with at least partial
help from Ally. It is for these reasons that I think this will be a
Muslim-Christian debate of a higher calibre than their first
encounter.
Sadly, however, when I emailed the organizer listed at the first link
above (Murphy Smith) to ask how one might buy a recording of the
debate, I was told that the debate will not be recorded! For those of
you who have seen and love Muslim-Christian debates, I'm sure you can
agree this is a shame. Think of your favorite debates involving Shabir
Ally, Jamal Badawi, Zakir Naik, Ahmed Deedat, or someone else, and
imagine what a shame it would have been if no recording of that debate
(or those debates) had been produced! I think if enough people show an
interest, the organizers (or the students) might produce a recording.
The web sites listed above give more information. Also, the Texas A&M
University's Muslim Students' Association website is here:
Texas A&M University's Intervarsity Christian Fellowship website is
here:
http://stuact.tamu.edu/stuorgs/ivcf/
I've already emailed the organizers as well as the local MSA and IVCF
and given my thoughts. I would think that those who are interested
should also give their thoughts, and encourage other like-minded folks
to do the same. It would be terrible if this debate were not recorded.
By the way, Craig's first debate with Dr. Badawi, as well as his four
debates (over the course of four days) were recorded, and can be
purchased here:
http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/menus/resources.html
-Denis Giron
Zain Ali
As yet I have not seen the topic of the debate, though I hope it
incorporates the issue of the who the real Jesus is - i.e., the Jesus
of the Quran or the Bible. Perhaps the above dichotomy oversimplifies
the issues at stake. On the one hand Dr Craig correctly notes that
when historians seek to know the historical Jesus, they turn to the
New Testament. However, in acknowledging the truth of Dr Craig's
sentiment, those same historians also point out much in the NT that is
unhistorical.
On the other hand the Quranic Jesus doesn't seem to correspond very
well to the Jesus of history. Sure there is the issue of a consensus
among the historians as to who and what Jesus was. But there are some
basic 'facts' that historians(religious and secular) do agree on. Note
that Dr Craig never argues for the truth of the crucifixion, why,
because it is a matter backed up by a consensus. The Quran ofcourse
rejects an 'actual' crucifixion of Jesus, it seems ,however, to affirm
the 'mere appearance' of a crucifixion. I have given alot of thought
to the issue of the crucifixion, and as yet I have not decided on an
opinion for myself. The two articles which have affected me the
most,though, are Dr Craigs historical justification of the
resurrection:
{http://www.leaderu.com/truth/1truth22.html}
and a response to Dr Craig by J.J Lowder:
{http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/jeff_lowder/empty.html}.
In addition, to the challange facing the Quran, the Quranic infancy
narratives tend to resemble the post-gospel accounts of Jesus - which
are not generally taken as being historically reliable. And ofcourse
there is the charge of plagiarism, from these post gospel accounts,
which Dr Craig highlighted in a previous debate.
Importantlt, however, Dr Craig also appears to employ a double
standard, while he does present rational arguments and demands that
Islam/Muslims also provide arguments, Dr Craig seems to be fideist at
heart. In his book "Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics"
p.37. He says:
***
I once asked a fellow seminary student, "how do you know Christianity
is true?'He replied 'I really don't know.Does that mean he should give
up Christianity until he finds rational arguments to ground his faith?
Of course not! He knew Christianity was true because he knew Jesus,
regardless of rational arguments. The fact is that we can know the
truth whether we have rational arguments or not"
***
>From my perspective there are three questions that arise from such a
debate:
1) Apart from arguing that the Quranic Jesus is true because the Quran
is the word of God, is there another way to establish that the Quranic
Issa corresponds to the historical Jesus?.
2)What is the relationship between Quranic 'salvation' history and
current historical scholarship?
3)Can we as Muslims, like Dr Craig, invoke Divine Hidayah as a
guarantor of our beliefs, irrespective of rational arguments?
Wassalaam
Zain Ali
Denis Giron
> Salaam / Peace;
Pax Vobis Zain Ali!
For those who wish to see the full context of this discussion, note
that the complete thread has been archived by Google here:
http://groups.google.com/groups?threadm=bac0a2be.0402071343.34f384f7%40posting.google.com
> As yet I have not seen the topic of the debate, though I hope it
> incorporates the issue of the who the real Jesus is - i.e., the Jesus
> of the Quran or the Bible.
I think that will almost certainly be a major part of the debate. I've
seen many of Craig's debates, and they all seem to be very similar
with regard to his opening statements. With regard to Craig's rematch
with Badawi, I imagine his approach will be the same as his first
debate with Badawi or his more extensive series of debates with Ally.
First he will argue that there are good reasons to believe
Christianity (or the Christian conception of God) is true, and then he
will argue that, as he puts it, "there are not comparably good reasons
to believe the Islamic conception is wholly true." While he may very
well have new approaches, I doubt he will not employ his already
familiar approach, which notes that there is good reason to take the
Qur'an's apparent denial that Jesus was executed via crucifixion as
historically inaccurate. Then he will argue that if we understand God
to be the greatest conceivable being, and thus morally perfect, hence
all-loving, the Qur'an's depiction of God's love as being conditional
is "morally inadequate".
Dr. Craig does not have to change his opening statements. As I alluded
to before, it is in the rebuttals and counter-rebuttals that Craig's
strength as a man with a PhD in philosophy becomes more apparent (I
personally felt that this was the most obvious in his debates with
Antony Flew and Gerd Ludemann, where Flew was shown to not be familiar
with more recent arguments from the philosophy of mind, and Ludemann
had no response to Craig bringing up that the philosophical literature
includes objections to Hume's rejection of miracles). Badawi, unlike
Flew, does not have any serious training in philosophy, and I believe
that if Badawi can raise a powerful counter in his opening statements
(I'm certain Craig will speak first), Craig will only step it up with
a heavier assault in his respective rebuttals. It will be interesting
to see if Badawi will be able to respond if such happens.
> On the one hand Dr Craig correctly notes that
> when historians seek to know the historical Jesus, they turn to the
> New Testament. However, in acknowledging the truth of Dr Craig's
> sentiment, those same historians also point out much in the NT that is
> unhistorical.
I agree 100%. However, in Craig's first debate with Badawi, he laid
out his arguments for why he considers Islam problematic and then
concluded: "For these and other reasons, even if I were not a
Christian, I still could not become a Muslim." While his arguments
were not fool-proof, I can't help but to agree with this position.
Nonetheless, what you alluded to is a major problem that a more crafty
Muslim debater could capitalize on. Craig's methodology is to show a
couple examples of things where historical scholarship can be
considered as weighing in favor of Christianity and against Islam. A
Muslim could pick a different set of instances and do the same in
reverse (i.e. start by noting that Islam puts forth the claim that
Jesus did not consider himself divine, then note that present editions
of the Bible present Jesus as divine, follow with a point about how
very few scholars who are not already committed Christians believe
Jesus considered himself divine, and then conclude by citing these as
instances of support for the Islamic view and evidence against the
Christian view).
The thing that makes Craig great is that he takes the debate where he
wants it to be (using a martial arts analogy, one of my friends said
that Craig "takes it to the ground against Muslim strikers," i.e. he
takes Muslim debaters out of their element by forcing them into
debating issues that are not in Islam's favor). The allegedly
unhistorical elements of the NT, however, have been used to Craig's
advantage (particularly in his debate with Shabir Ally on whether or
not Jesus was crucified and resurrected from the dead, where Craig
showed that Shabir was playing a game of "scholarly pick and choose,"
and was trying to support Islam by leaning on elements of the NT that
most scholars consider unhistorical).
If you step outside the appeal to personal dogma, an objective person
would have to lean in favor of the New Testament rather than the
Qur'an as the primary source of information on the historical Jesus.
Furthermore, if one does not take the inerrantist approach to the
Bible, and concedes that the NT is a collection of human documents
that contain "contradictions," even this can be used against the
Qur'an and Islam, because we can treat the "contradictions" as
evidence that these are independent sources, and then treat the points
they agree upon as being all the more corroborated (take any two books
on an American president and you'll find contradictions, but to just
throw both books out in response to these contradictions is to confuse
logic with history).
> In addition, to the challange facing the Quran, the Quranic infancy
> narratives tend to resemble the post-gospel accounts of Jesus - which
> are not generally taken as being historically reliable. And ofcourse
> there is the charge of plagiarism, from these post gospel accounts,
> which Dr Craig highlighted in a previous debate.
This is a wonderful point that, unfortunately, resulted in Craig and
Badawi misunderstanding each other. Craig laid out the argument that
the Qur'an's resemblance to these apocryphal gospels is good reason to
conclude that this reflects borrowed material. Badawi put forth the
standard reply that just because two sources are similar does not mean
the later source borrowed from the earlier source, rather there could
be a third source that they both have been drawn from. Badawi then
implied that this source is the Divine (i.e. Allaah, and he asked a
couple rhetorical questions about who decides what is canonical and
what is apocryphal).
Craig, apparently not familiar with the popular belief among many
Muslims that many of the Christian documents contain elements of a
lost revelation, thought that Badawi was saying that the infancy
gospel in toto was revelation. Craig gave his reasons for rejecting
that, and Badawi also missed Craig's point, which resulted in Jamal
wrongly thinking that what Craig objected to in the infancy gospels
was being claimed by Craig to also be in the Qur'an (like the story
about the boy Jesus killing his playmates when they refuse to do as he
says).
A better approach would have been to concede to Badawi's point that a
third-source or common-source hypothesis is certainly possible, but
then ask why we should accept Badawi's adduced conclusion over Craig's
adduced conclusion. It seems that Badawi's response to borrowing
theories for the Qur'an would be sliced away by Occam's razor since it
appeals to a supernatural explanation when we have perfectly good
natural explanations in the form of the borrowing theories themselves.
Which is the more probable conclusion? It seems that Badawi's defense
of the Qur'an in this instance is less than objective (exempli gratia:
it presupposes that when earlier sources agree with the Qur'an, they
agree because they too reflect elements of divinely revealed truth)
and is ontologically gluttonous (since it indirectly invokes Allaah as
a causal agent when such is not necessary).
> Importantlt, however, Dr Craig also appears to employ a double
> standard, while he does present rational arguments and demands that
> Islam/Muslims also provide arguments, Dr Craig seems to be fideist at
> heart. In his book "Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics"
> p.37. He says:
>
> ***
> I once asked a fellow seminary student, "how do you know Christianity
> is true?'He replied 'I really don't know.Does that mean he should give
> up Christianity until he finds rational arguments to ground his faith?
> Of course not! He knew Christianity was true because he knew Jesus,
> regardless of rational arguments. The fact is that we can know the
> truth whether we have rational arguments or not"
> ***
A similar passage appeared in the introduction to his first book on
the resurrection: "The Son Rises". I think what Craig is saying is
that if there is no evidence in favor of a given Christian doctrine,
that does not mean the doctrine is false. I agree 100%. However, he
himself has said that if there is good reason to doubt a certain
doctrine, then to continue believing in that doctrine without raising
a counter-defense is to essentially be self-deluded. In his debate
with Badawi, Craig noted that his Muslim counterpart (a) did not raise
any positive arguments for the Islamic conception of God, and (b) did
a poor job of defending Islam against the objections Craig had raised.
Which, again, is an example of the value of being able to take the
debate where you want it to be.
> From my perspective there are three questions that arise from such a
> debate:
>
> 1) Apart from arguing that the Quranic Jesus is true because the Quran
> is the word of God, is there another way to establish that the Quranic
> Issa corresponds to the historical Jesus?.
>
> 2)What is the relationship between Quranic 'salvation' history and
> current historical scholarship?
>
> 3)Can we as Muslims, like Dr Craig, invoke Divine Hidayah as a
> guarantor of our beliefs, irrespective of rational arguments?
Three wonderful questions that both Muslims and non-Muslims should
keep in mind if and when they see this debate (as well as afterwards).
With regard to the first question, I have not seen any convincing
arguments that lead one to conclude that the Qur'anic Jesus is
identical to the historical Jesus. At best, there are only the "what
did Jesus really say" sort of arguments that attempt to show he was
not divine by employing an Islamic interpretation of relevant NT
passages, or Shibli Zaman's interesting approach to alleged
similarities between the Qur'anic name "Eesa" and the Syriac
pronunciation "Eesho." While these arguments are creative and
intelligent, neither is very convincing in my opinion (no offense
intended towards those who have formulated or propagated these
arguments).
***Now I'd like to take a moment to address the forum in toto
regarding this debate not being recorded. As I have said before, it
would be a shame if this debate were not recorded (I'm sure even fans
of Badawi can agree with this, not to mention others who enjoy
Muslim-Christian debate). The organizers (Murphy and Kathy Smith) have
told me via email that they decided not to record it because they feel
there is not enough interest in the debate to expend the necessary
time and resources (they made this judgement based on requests for
recordings of past events). There is only a week to go, and I would
ask that Muslims and non-Muslims alike try to ask the organizers to
reconsider, and ask others to do the same. I'd like to give a bit more
information regarding how one can go about doing this.
For those who are interested, you can start by writing to the public
email address given on Craig's site for the organizers, Murphy and
Kathy Smith, at Mur...@iolbv.com and *POLITELY* asking them to
consider recording the event. Another approach is to ask the officers
at Texas A&M university's MSA (Muslims Students Association) to do the
same (as the debate is taking place at Texas A&M, and the local MSA
members can work this effort to get the debate recorded at the grass
roots level). According to the official Texas A&M university website
(http://msa.tamu.edu/), the public email addresses of the club's
officers are: aaha...@neo.tamu.edu, nav...@tamu.edu,
mohammad...@hotmail.com, sana...@hotmail.com
Also, you can send an email to New Life Resources (part of Campus
Crusade for Christ), which usually tapes Craig's debates, at their
official address for such inquiries - resou...@campuscrusade.com -
and ask them to tape the debate. Furthermore, if anyone has the
personal email address of Dr. Jamal Badawi (or Shabir Ally, who
certainly can contact Dr. Badawi) or Dr. William Lane Craig, do *NOT*
share it publically on any forum (unless it is designated as a public
email), but send a polite email saying how you're interested in
getting access to a recording of the debate, and ask them to pull some
strings to get it recorded.
If enough people say they're interested, the debate will get recorded,
but there is only a week left before the debate, so those who are
interested need to act fast. Please encourage others to do the same
(by passing this information to those whom you think would be
interested).
Thank you.
-Denis Giron
Zain Ali
Denis raises a number of key issues in regard to Dr Craig's strategy
that are worth pursuing.My discussion is divided into 2 parts:
A) The moral adequacy of the Quranic description of God
>From memory, Craig's argument accuses the Quran God as being
selectively loving i.e; Allah loves only those who love Him. Indeed
there a multiple Quranic verses that point to God as loving those who
do Good (2:195) and not loving those who do wrong ( 42:40, 28:77)
At this point if I recall correctly Craig quotes Luke 6; 31-34
***
Do to others as you would have them do to you. "If you love those who
love you, what credit is that to you? Even 'sinners' love those who
love them. And if you do good to those who are good to you, what
credit is that to you? Even 'sinners' do that.
***
The point Craig has in mind, I presume, is that the God of the Quran
seems at best to be self serving perhaps even selfish, since his love
is conditional. However, Craig seems to ignore his own scripture,
which also affirms Divine love as being conditional.
Take Psalms 91:13-16, which affirms God's protection and help to
those who love him;
***
You will tread upon the lion and the cobra; you will trample the great
lion and the serpent."Because he loves me," says the LORD , "I will
rescue him; I will protect him, for he acknowledges my name.He will
call upon me, and I will answer him; I will be with him in trouble, I
will deliver him and honor him.
***
And Proverbs 8:13-17 , which affirms God's hate of vice plus and God's
love of those who love him.
***
To fear the LORD is to hate evil; I hate pride and arrogance, evil
behavior and perverse speech.Counsel and sound judgment are mine; I
have understanding and power.By me kings reign and rulers make laws
that are just;by me princes govern, and all nobles who rule on earth.I
love those who love me, and those who seek me find me.
***
At this point I find Craig's case against the Quranic God
unconvincing, for two reasons. First, that the issue of conditional
love, is a Biblical and A Quranic concept. And let's not forget the
fate of the Amekalites:
***
Thus says the Lord of hosts, I will punish the Amekalites for what
they did in opposing the Israelites when they came up out of Egypt.
Now go and attack Amalek, and utterly destroy all that they have; do
not spare them, but kill both man and woman, child and infant, ox and
sheep, camel and donkey."
1 Samuel 15:2
***
Secondly, both Islam and Christianity affirm the love and justice of
God. While we may be able to draw a distinction between an act and the
agent. The idea of God being a judge, I would say entails His right
not only to condemn the act but also the agent. In addition I would
say that there could be no greater condemnation than being excluded
from the love of God.
B) The Crucifixion
The point which I had in mind here was that the Quran rejects an
'actual' crucifixion of Jesus, it seems ,however, to affirm the 'mere
appearance' of a crucifixion. The distinction is important. While the
Quran rejects the crucifixion of Jesus, it affirms a crucifixion
event. Hence the phrase "ůbut it was made to appear to themů" 4.157
YUSUFALI: That they said (in boast), "We killed Christ Jesus the son
of Mary, the Messenger of Allah";- but they killed him not, nor
crucified him, but so it was made to appear to them..
PICKTHAL: And because of their saying: We slew the Messiah, Jesus son
of Mary, Allah's messenger - they slew him not nor crucified him, but
it appeared so unto them;
SHAKIR: And their saying: Surely we have killed the Messiah, Isa son
of Marium, the messenger of Allah; and they did not kill him nor did
they crucify him, but it appeared to them so (like Isa)...
The verse affirms an event and witnesses (ůappear/ed to themů) who
would have thought that Jesus was killed and crucified. We are not
told how the event was made to appear, but nonetheless a crucifixion
event was observed. At this point the Quran narrative makes the
distinction between reality and appearances, the reality being Jesus
was not crucified, though there was an appearance of him being
crucified. Thus the Quran and Historical scholarship can agree that
there was a crucifixion event with witnesses. In regards to whether
the Quranic distinction is accurate, I suspect it is a question that
lies outside pure historical scholarship. And, while Ockhams razor may
prefer the simpler hypothesis, it may not necessarily be the true
hypothesis.
Regards
Zain Ali
Denis Giron
> Salaam/Peace;
Pax Vobis Zain Ali!
Quick note regarding the Craig-Badawi rematch before I respond to
Zain's post below: the case is now that there will at least be an
audio recording of the debate (the organizers changed their mind due
to "popular demand"), and while it is not certain yet, it might also
be video recorded. If you're interested in the audio, email the
organizers (Murphy and Kathy Smith) at Mur...@ioLbv.com to find out
how much it would cost to send it to your area. With regard to the
video, that will probably be sold by New Life Resources (Campus
Crusade for Christ).
Now I would like to get to Zain's post, a significant portion of which
will be snipped for brevity. Those who wish to get the full context of
Zain's arguments should consult his post from February 13th, which has
been archived by Google here:
http://groups.google.com/groups?selm=fe657e94.0402111840.6149fa6%40posting.google.com
> A) The moral adequacy of the Quranic description of God
>
> [...]
>
> At this point I find Craig's case against the Quranic God
> unconvincing, for two reasons. First, that the issue of conditional
> love, is a Biblical and A Quranic concept.
To prove this point regarding the moral adequacy of the concepts of
God as put forth in the Qur'an and Bible, Zain called to witness
Biblical passages such as Psalms 91:13-16 & Proverbs 8:13-17. In his
debate with Dr. Craig on the subject of "What Must We Do To Be Saved"
back in 2002, Shabir Ally also called to witness Psalms 5:4-5, which
states rather matter of factly that God hates those who do evil. This
is relevant to the passages Zain has brought up.
In response to Ally's objection, Dr. Craig noted that to hate someone
is not the same as not loving them (hate is not a necessary logical
contradiction of love), as many people are in fact involved in
love-hate relationships. To us an analogy, imagine a pious Muslimah
who is married to a less-than-devout Muslim man (i.e. the wife still
has strong faith, but the husband's faith is weak or lacking). Suppose
that occasionally the husband comes home drunk, and is abusive towards
his wife on such occasions. In a moment of frustration the wife yells
"I hate you when you drink." Now, I don't mean to imply that she said
this out of frustration, but did not mean it (rather I noted
"frustration" for an explanation under which she would utter such a
bold statement). Suppose she really does hate her husband when he
drinks (because such behavior is a smack in the face of their faith -
Islam - and further because it makes him abusive); does this mean she
does not love him? Of course not, so hate is not a necessary logical
contradictory of love.
As Dr. Craig noted, the Qur'an on several occasions lists people
(mainly wicked people or unbelievers) whom God does not love, while
there is no such verse in the Bible that says God does not love
sinners, unbelievers, et cetera. I tend to think this is a fairly
straight forward defense of the alleged moral adequacy of the
Christian conception of God vis a vis the alleged moral inadequacy of
the Islamic conception of God.
Furthermore, I would argue that Zain has misunderstood Craig's
argument. The rather frightening passage from 1 Samuel that Zain
called to witness does not portray God's love as conditional, rather
it only shows that God, as Craig would put it, "does not blink at
sin." Similar to the issue of Psalms 5 brought up above, the passage
that Zain called to witness from Proverbs says that God loves those
who love Him, but that does not mean God does not love those who do
not love Him. The same goes for the Psalm that Zain called to witness.
I would agree that Craig's moral argument against Islam is the least
impressive of his various arguments against Islam (interestingly his
wholly different moral argument against Atheism, in which Craig
presupposes that objective moral laws exist [every time Craig asserts
this presupposition, I imagine the ghost of Wittgenstein swinging his
poker at him], is the weakest of his arguments against Atheism, at
least in my opinion). Nonetheless, the issue is that the Christian
conception holds that God loves all humans, while the Islamic
conception holds that God does not love certain humans. Thus if one
agrees with Craig's assumption that God is the greatest of all
conceivable beings, and is thus "morally perfect," hence perfectly
loving, one is forced to accept that a God whose love is conditional
is a morally imperfect being. It is certainly clear that the Qur'an
depicts God's love as conditional since it affirms that He loves some
and positively asserts that He does *NOT* love others. For my own
part, I'm not sure why a deity must be loving at all (while I don't
have any sort of sophisticated argument in favor of this, I'm sure a
case could be made that love is an emotional issue unbecoming of an
omniscient/omnipotent being), but if we accept Craig's definition of
God and moral perfection, the Islamic conception of God does come off
as morally inadequate.
> B) The Crucifixion
>
> The point which I had in mind here was that the Quran rejects an
> 'actual' crucifixion of Jesus, it seems ,however, to affirm the 'mere
> appearance' of a crucifixion. The distinction is important. While the
> Quran rejects the crucifixion of Jesus, it affirms a crucifixion
> event. Hence the phrase "?but it was made to appear to them?" 4.157
>
> [...]
>
> The verse affirms an event and witnesses (?appear/ed to them?) who
> would have thought that Jesus was killed and crucified. We are not
> told how the event was made to appear, but nonetheless a crucifixion
> event was observed. At this point the Quran narrative makes the
> distinction between reality and appearances, the reality being Jesus
> was not crucified, though there was an appearance of him being
> crucified. Thus the Quran and Historical scholarship can agree that
> there was a crucifixion event with witnesses. In regards to whether
> the Quranic distinction is accurate, I suspect it is a question that
> lies outside pure historical scholarship. And, while Ockhams razor may
> prefer the simpler hypothesis, it may not necessarily be the true
> hypothesis.
I agree fully with what Zain is saying here, but I would ask the
following: if we attempted to approach the issue objectively as
historians seeking to reconstruct the life of the historical Jesus, on
what grounds would we argue that he was not actually crucified? Why
would we lean in favor of a hypothesis (as per Zain's reading of the
Qur'an) in which it appeared as if Jesus was executed by crucifixion,
but he was not actually executed via execution? I doubt there are any
serious historians who would consider this hypothesis very accurate.
Zain is correct that while Ockham's razor would lean in favor of the
general concensus of the historians, that does not mean that the
historians are necessarily correct. Maybe the Qur'an is correct. This
is the problem with abduction. Any adduced conclusion is not
necessarily true. For example, suppose you see me visiting a local
masjid, and after I leave someone complains that his shoes had been
stolen. Suppose further that this is a small masjid in which all the
congregants are regulars who know each other well, and this sort of
complaint has never come up before. Suppose further that after a
little investigation it is revealed that in the past I had been
arrested for stealing shoes from a Hindu temple (and I'm a known shoe
theif who preys on easy targets). The best adduced conclusion is that
*I* took the shoes from the masjid, but nothing in the information
above *proves* I was the one who stole the shoes (or if the shoes were
really stolen at all! on what grounds could one argue that it is
impossible for shoes to spontaneously disappear, or be blown into some
dark corner by a strong gust of wind or for the person making the
complaint to be lying?).
So, adduced conclusions are always problematic (the method in which
abduction is employed is deductively invalid - one affirms the
consequent). However, we still should lean in favor of the most likely
scenario. In the case of the Qur'an and the historical Jesus, assuming
the Qur'an does (as most, including myself, agree) positively assert
that Jesus was not executed via crucifixion, the best conclusion seems
to be that the Qur'an is in error here (i.e. that the historical Jesus
was in fact executed via crucifixion). Again, this approach is not
fool proof, and there is certainly room for faith (along the lines
Zain, and before him Abdus-Salaam and Hamid Aziz, has noted).
-Denis Giron
http://www.geocities.com/freethoughtmecca/home.htm
Zain Ali
As always Denis has provided much that is food for thought. However,I
still remain unconvinced by Dr Craig's moral argument against the
Quranic God. Sure the Quranic idea of Divine love is represented as
being conditional though I fail to see how this contingency renders
Allah morally inferior. As I stated previously, surely as part of
God's justice a sinner may very well be placed beyond his love. Now
here's an important distinction, which I think Craig has overlooked,
while the sinner may be denied the love of God, they are not
necessarily deprived of the mercy of God.
The idea of being loved by God, if we were to accept the Quranic
account, can be understood as having some form of intimacy with the
Divine. Thus to be excluded from God's love, entails being excluded
from Divine intimacy, though not necessarily from Divine mercy. To
back up the distinction, an appeal can be made to the ideas of
repentance and forgiveness, which are central themes of the Quran, as
presupposing the ever-present mercy of God.
In addition, I find Craig's "God does not blink" defence of the
Amekalite massacre utterly appalling. God not only commands the men
and women to be killed, but also child, infant, sheep, camel and
donkey. The question for Craig, is simply this, for what sins were the
children, infants, sheep, camels and donkeys of the Amekalites killed?
As for the Crucifixion, I agree with Denis, the historian qua
historian, will affirm the crucifixion of the historical Jesus.The
Quranic account, however, may be affirmed by faith or better yet, an
appeal be made to a more 'history friendly' interpretation.
Wassalaam
Zain Ali
scotus
> Salaam/Peace;
>
> As always Denis has provided much that is food for thought. However,I
> still remain unconvinced by Dr Craig's moral argument against the
> Quranic God. Sure the Quranic idea of Divine love is represented as
> being conditional though I fail to see how this contingency renders
> Allah morally inferior. As I stated previously, surely as part of
> God's justice a sinner may very well be placed beyond his love. Now
> here's an important distinction, which I think Craig has overlooked,
> while the sinner may be denied the love of God, they are not
> necessarily deprived of the mercy of God.
>
> The idea of being loved by God, if we were to accept the Quranic
> account, can be understood as having some form of intimacy with the
> Divine. Thus to be excluded from God's love, entails being excluded
> from Divine intimacy, though not necessarily from Divine mercy. To
> back up the distinction, an appeal can be made to the ideas of
> repentance and forgiveness, which are central themes of the Quran, as
> presupposing the ever-present mercy of God.
>
> In addition, I find Craig's "God does not blink" defence of the
> Amekalite massacre utterly appalling. God not only commands the men
> and women to be killed, but also child, infant, sheep, camel and
> donkey. The question for Craig, is simply this, for what sins were the
> children, infants, sheep, camels and donkeys of the Amekalites killed?
>
Salaam
Before Craigs god incarnated into a human he gave a commandment to
kill every male among the little ones, and kill every woman that
hath known man by lying with him.
18
But all the women-children, that have not known man by lying with him,
keep
alive for yourselves.
Only girls that have not had sex are kept alive. Can Craig please
explain for
what other purpose they were kept alive?
As slaves? If so, why mention sexual purity?
As worker slaves? If so, keep the boys alive because they are stronger
than the
women.
It is true that God states in the quran that He has punished many
nations due to their disbelief and rebelion against Him, but such
punishements were (mostly) of natural disaster types like floods,
hurricanes or rains of firey stones, which caused instant death to all
but did not spare virgin girls who did not lay with men, yet!
Richard Carrier commenting on Craigs debate with Eddy Tabash said :
Craig's only other embarrassing foray into justifying God was equally
shocking: he actually said that forcing captive women to marry their
Israelite captors (and hence forcing them into a contractual agreement
and sexual exploitation against their will) was necessary "to protect
them" because otherwise they would have no other means of support.
Tabash did not rebut this, though a rebuttal would have been easy:
couldn't God have just told the Israelites to support the women?
Forcing these women into sexual relationships is gratuitous and thus
evil, which was Tabash's point, and thus Craig did not really address
it. Of course, had the Israelites not been told by God to murder all
their husbands and fathers to a man, this would not have been an issue
in the first place. Is Craig saying that murder can create a morally
sufficient reason for rape? Whose moral values are twisted here? But
none of this came up.
Denis Giron
> Salaam/Peace;
Pax Vobis Zain Ali!
Those who wish to catch the full context of Zain's statements from
February 16th should note that the complete post has been archived by
Google here:
http://groups.google.com/groups?selm=fe657e94.0402152102.71399702%40posting.google.com
> I still remain unconvinced by Dr Craig's moral argument against the
> Quranic God. Sure the Quranic idea of Divine love is represented as
> being conditional though I fail to see how this contingency renders
> Allah morally inferior. As I stated previously, surely as part of
> God's justice a sinner may very well be placed beyond his love. Now
> here's an important distinction, which I think Craig has overlooked,
> while the sinner may be denied the love of God, they are not
> necessarily deprived of the mercy of God.
As I alluded to (sort of) in my previous contribution to this thread,
I am also unconvinced by this particular portion of Craig's argument
against Islam. This is why I made Craig's definition of God (the
greatest conceivable being, who is thus morally perfect, hence
perfectly loving) an antecedent that needs to be accepted/assumed in
order to agree with this conclusion that the Islamic conception of God
is morally inadequate. The reason I, personally, am unconvinced is
because I don't see why the greatest conceivable being has to be
loving at all. This seems to be a woefully anthropomorphic approach
(at least in my opinion), where we project our own needs and emotions
onto the character of God. Of course, I could be wrong.
However, Zain, in your defense of the Islamic conception of God as per
the text above, you don't seem to be taking the route I have attempted
to take, so I'm going to assume you agree with Craig's definition of
God. If you do, then, unless I'm missing something, it is not
sufficient to accept Allaah's love as conditional and then proceed
from there. If Allaah's love is conditional, it would seem this deity
is morally inadequate when compared to the subject of a non-Islamic
conception of God which holds that the deity's love is unconditional.
This is because the former is not perfectly loving while the latter
is. I don't think Craig is worried about sinners being denied mercy,
as he argues that a perfect being must be both perfectly merciful and
perfectly just (hence the reason the deity does not blink at sin, as
to be too merciful and not hand out justice is to have the mercy
conflict with the justice). The issue for Craig is that if, in the
Islamic conception, Allaah only loves the righteous, then this
conception of God is morally inadequate. Again I have to say that if
we accept this notion of moral perfection which Craig asserts/assumes
must be one of God's attributes, we have to conclude that the Islamic
conception of God is morally inadequate.
> In addition, I find Craig's "God does not blink" defence of the
> Amekalite massacre utterly appalling. God not only commands the men
> and women to be killed, but also child, infant, sheep, camel and
> donkey. The question for Craig, is simply this, for what sins were the
> children, infants, sheep, camels and donkeys of the Amekalites killed?
I have to apologize, as I apparently misunderstood your
reasons/intentions behind bringing up this Biblical tale in your
previous post. I thought you were citing it as proof of the Biblical
God's love being, like the Qur'anic God's love, conditional rather
than unconditional. I don't think it demonstrates God's love to be
conditional. However, if I'm not mistaken, your approach is similar to
that of Riyadh (I mean Scotus here, and I vaguely recall from Imran's
Islamic-PR forum that his name is Riyadh - if I'm wrong I apologize),
which focuses on a passage from Numbers 31. In this approach, it is
shown that the Biblical God's punishments are excessively violent.
If the approach is meant to depict the Biblical conception of God as
morally inadequate on the grounds that such punishments are unjust or
lack mercy, I personally know of no convincing response (Craig has
attempted responses, but they all seem problematic). However, here I
would argue that if we accept this, and we accept Craig's argument
against Islam (i.e. accept his definition of God), then we must
conclude that the Biblical conception of God is morally inadequate on
the grounds that His moral imperfection is rooted in His not being
perfectly just or merciful, while the Islamic conception of God is
morally inadequate on the grounds that His moral imperfection is
rooted in His not being perfectly loving. So we have both conceptions
of God (Biblical and Qur'anic) being morally inadequate, but for
different reasons. It seems that Craig's concluding statement about
Islam in his first debate with Badawi ("even if I were not a
Christian, I still could not become a Muslim") still stands, as does
Craig's admission that while Christianity and Islam cannot both be
right, they can both be wrong. In other words, bringing up such
arguments does not rescue Islam from charges of moral inadequacy;
rather it only heaps an alternate charge of moral inadequacy on
Christianity (and Judaism).
> As for the Crucifixion, I agree with Denis, the historian qua
> historian, will affirm the crucifixion of the historical Jesus. The
> Quranic account, however, may be affirmed by faith or better yet, an
> appeal be made to a more 'history friendly' interpretation.
I agree 100% with Zain.
-Denis Giron
http://www.geocities.com/freethoughtmecca/home.htm
asimm...@yahoo.com
> is morally inadequate when compared to the subject of a non-Islamic
> conception of God which holds that the deity's love is unconditional.
The issue for Craig is that if, in the
> Islamic conception, Allaah only loves the righteous, then this
> conception of God is morally inadequate.
Craig's is judging from a Christian concept of man and it is akin to
childish reasoning. The premise that God's love is unconditional is
morally inadequate and contradicts the very foundations of reality.
The universe is based upon purpose and laws, and it is common
knowledge that if certain laws were not in place, chaos and disorder
would reign. It is obedience to the will and pupose of God, that
justice, mercy, and beauty reign. God's mercy and love is in line
with His purpose, and it is his very love that tells man that by
violating this purpose he will fall into destruction. Morality
necessitates choice, and to claim moral inadequecy on the
conditionality of love is absurd and denies justice in totality.
Further, he fails to realize that Islam recognizes that men will make
mistakes and it is a natural corollary to free-will. Repentance is
part of being righteuous and its purpose is corrective action. thus,
when God says he loves the righteuous it affirms he loves those that
sin, BUT REPENT OF THEIR SINS.
Craig's notion is based upon a purely dualistic relation between faith
and deeds. The Christian concept holds faith and deeds as mutually
exclusive, while in Islam they are organically related. The human
being is not simply a person that thinks, he acts. When God says he
loves the righteuous, the Arabic term is definitive, and is not simply
a person that does good deeds every now and then, just as a sinner is
not one in Islam who falls into sin but continuously falls into over
and over, and does not repent and correct himself and it becomes his
nature to perform them. Thus, God does not love those people, for
they contardict his purpose and will.
Johnny
so how did the debate go? What particular topics were discussed and
how was Dr Jamal Badawi's presentation this time? It would be good to
provide a brief overview of the debate if someone manages to get hold
of the debate.
Zain Ali
I thank Denis for taking time to help clarify Dr Craig's 'moral
argument'. Presented below is what I take to be the heart of the
argument:
1) Allah is perfectly loving
2) Allah does not loving sinners
----------------------------------
Therefore, Allah cannot be perfectly Loving
I hope I'm not attacking a strawman here, but I fail to see how the
conclusion follows, unless you say perfectly loving is synonymous with
unconditional love, or that there is a logical
contradiction/inconsistency between perfect love and conditional love.
But then Justice may also be said to be part of Allah's love,
therefore the sinner, while always having access to Divine mercy, is
denied intimacy with God. Hence, not being loved is merely a form of
Divine censure, i.e., God being Just. In plainer terms God's love, iff
it includes justice, entails the possibility of Divine love being
conditional.
As for the charge of Divine Love being merely an anthropomorphic
construction, I would humbly beg to differ. It's simply question
begging to assume that God (the greatest conceivable being) cannot
have the attribute of Love. Now I'm not an expert of Anslem's
ontological argument, but what I can say, if we were to construe God,
in the words of Kant, as the Moral Author. Then, I think we would have
ample reason ( practical reason that is) to say God was indeed Loving,
Just, and ofcourse Merciful. But, then again, it would depend on how
Love is defined, on Kantian/Quranic terms Love would involve
considerations of the moral law.
Regards
Zain Ali
Denis Giron
>...
Pax Vobis Asim Mehmood!
> Craig's is judging from a Christian concept of man and it is akin to
> childish reasoning. The premise that God's love is unconditional is
> morally inadequate and contradicts the very foundations of reality.
> The universe is based upon purpose and laws, and it is common
> knowledge that if certain laws were not in place, chaos and disorder
> would reign.
With all due respect, I don't think I fully understand your argument
here. Keep in mind, however, that Craig does not deny that "the
universe is based upon purpose and laws," nor does he deny that "if
certain laws were not in place, chaos and disorder would reign." His
criticism of the Islamic conception of God never asks that certain
laws not be in place (or presuppose they are not in place). Further,
it is fairly obvious that the "laws" you speak of are a vague
reference to punishment. Craig does not deny the existence of God's
wrath. So, while I admit that I do not fully understand what you are
saying above, I must also say that I see no reason to believe that it
resucues Islam from Craig's charge of moral inadequacy. Mkore on this
will follow below...
> God's mercy and love is in line
> with His purpose, and it is his very love that tells man that by
> violating this purpose he will fall into destruction.
In no way does Craig deny any of this. With regard to the sentence
above (i.e. if you take it in a vacuum) you and Craig would be in
almost perfect agreement. The critique he applies to the Islamic
conception of God is not based on the belief that God will exhibit His
wrath against some, as such a belief is found not only in Islam, but
in Christianity as well.
> Morality necessitates choice, and to claim moral inadequecy on the
> conditionality of love is absurd and denies justice in totality.
I have no idea how you reached this conclusion, and I wonder if you
fully understand Craig's argument. For the sake of clarity I will
repeat it briefly here: the Christian conception of God holds that
God's love is unconditional - He loves all human beings, including
sinners and evil doers (but this does not mean He will not punish
them!). The Islamic conception of God holds that Allaah's love is
conditional - that Allaah does not love all human beings. A being
whose love is conditional is not perfectly loving, and is thus morally
imperfect, hence the charge that the Islamic conception of God is
morally inadequate. Nothing of what you have written above approaches
these premises.
> Further, he fails to realize that Islam recognizes that men will make
> mistakes and it is a natural corollary to free-will.
On what grounds do you claim Craig does not realize this? Such a
belief is found in both Islam and Christianity, and thus is not
relevant to Craig's charge of moral inadequacy against the Islamic
conception of God.
> Repentance is part of being righteuous and its purpose is
> corrective action.
Again, Craig would agree.
> thus, when God says he loves the righteuous it affirms he loves
> those that sin, BUT REPENT OF THEIR SINS.
So, if I'm not mistaken, you're saying that God's love of the sinner
is conditional on the sinner repenting of his sins. Fine, that is
exactly what Craig believes to be the Islamic doctrine, and it shows
God's love as being conditional, and that is where Craig's argument
comes in.
> Thus, God does not love those people, for
> they contardict his purpose and will.
Right, and this is a major crux of Craig's argument: the God of
Christianity loves all human beings, while the God of Islam does not
love all human beings. Allaah's love is conditional, and thus morally
inadequate. While I know this is getting repetitive, nothing in the
above has dealt with this objection.
-Denis Giron
Denis Giron
> Hi Folks,
Pax Vobis Usman!
I personally have not seen/heard the debate yet, but I know for a fact
that it was recorded. I should get my hands on the audio within the
week, and then I wrill write up my thoughts on SRI. I plan to purchase
the video once it is available from Campus Crusade for Christ, but
that may take a month (though on the Bismika Allaahuma forum, someone
insinuated that the video is already available).
I have gotten a *very* limited amount of information from people who
were there or knew someone who was there (though only the Christian
side). Of the little information I have, the meat of the debate was
the historical accuracy of the NT's conception of Jesus vis a vis the
historical accuracy of the Qur'anic conception of Jesus. From what
I've heard, the claim is that Badawi started out well, and the debate
was cordial, but it later degenerated to the point where Badawi was
offering more abuse than substance. I would not be overly surprised if
this turns out to be true, since, unlike Shabir Ally, Badawi became
frustrated and angry (and mildly abusive) in his first debate with
Craig. The claim I have heard is that this time Badawi even tried to
interrupt Craig while he was speaking, and that too is at least
possible since Badawi seemed tempted to do such in their first debate
when Craig was commenting on John Hick's approach to John 20:28 (as
Craig spoke, Badawi was behind him, shaking his head and waving a copy
of Hick's "The Myth of God Incarnate" to the audience).
However, I have yet to see/hear the debate, and have even yet to
discuss what happened with any Muslims who where there, so the above
view is fractured and one-sided, and may ultimately be subjected to
the charge of being mere hearsay. As I said above, once I have
seen/heard the debate, I will give my thoughts here in SRI. I also
recommend others get their hands on the debate if they are interested.
-Denis Giron
asimm...@yahoo.com
> Again, Craig would agree.
>
Men hold many conflicting and contradicting views and thisvery theme
contradicts in totality the Christian theological position. Sin is
perceived as a mark that cannot be done away with, and guilt and
despair are all reflections of man's helplessness.
> > thus, when God says he loves the righteuous it affirms he loves
> > those that sin, BUT REPENT OF THEIR SINS.
>
> So, if I'm not mistaken, you're saying that God's love of the sinner
> is conditional on the sinner repenting of his sins. Fine, that is
> exactly what Craig believes to be the Islamic doctrine, and it shows
> God's love as being conditional, and that is where Craig's argument
> comes in.
>
It is based upon DUALISM and that men are not defined by their
actions.
I am saying when God says He does not love the sinner, the definitive
word is used. A sinner is one who keeps sinning, persists in his sin,
and does not follow through with correcting himself. It starts to
becomes part of his nature.
Why would God go against the his very laws and purpose, by saying he
loves this man unconditionally, despite the fact that this man
continues to defy God's very law, and what we observe in creation is
that when one defies laws, chaos and disorder emerge?
> > Thus, God does not love those people, for
> > they contardict his purpose and will.
>
> Right, and this is a major crux of Craig's argument: the God of
> Christianity loves all human beings, while the God of Islam does not
> love all human beings. Allaah's love is conditional, and thus morally
> inadequate. While I know this is getting repetitive, nothing in the
> above has dealt with this objection.
>
How is it morally inadequate is the curx of the argument? To assume
morality, one has to assume choice for a Creator. In fact, I can say
its akin to an absolute absurdity to assume a almost la dee da God who
doesn't care what his creation does and gives away his love freely to
defiant men who persist in their defiance kowing what they are doing
is wrong. How is this love perfect? It makes the price cheap, and it
gives absolutely no value to the action of men.
No matter what you say, its dualism. Men cannot be separated from
their ACTION. They are defineid by BOTH THOUGHT AND DEED. To argue
that God loves a man, but hates the actions that have BECOME A PART OF
HIS VERY NATURE, is an absuridty and is dualism thorugh and through.
thebit
> whose love is conditional is not perfectly loving, and is thus morally
> imperfect, hence the charge that the Islamic conception of God is
> morally inadequate.
That doesn't follow. Perhaps you could explain why a 'being whose love
is conditional' is 'morally imperfect'? Why is 'unconditional love'
considered 'morally superior'? Is the criminal equivalent to the
pious? Is good equivalent to evil? This seems a flat contradiction of
the very notion of justice - something the Christian concept of God,
as put forward by Craig and as explained by yourself, seems totally
devoid of.
In any case, I think Zain Ali makes the excellent point, further up,
regarding the mercy of God being 'unconditional' - no man (or woman)
is excluded from His mercy. Our very existence is, for the Muslim, a
sign of His mercy. I am not sure 'mercy' exists in Christian theology,
though I could be mistaken.
In order to uphold the entire edifice of the "original sin" and the
"death of Christ", it needs to posit an 'all or nothing' idea of a
'loving God'. The Muslim understanding is vastly different, as you
well know; we're talking here of core differences in the way the two
will perceive the relationship between God and man. We posit a
purposeful, responsible existence for man, who will be accountable to
God. Not a wishy-washy soap opera!
Another way of looking at the love of God is to say that His love is
for those who have proven themselves worthy of His mercy and His
forgiveness, and are therefore worthy of an intimate connection with
God, in His love. Or, His love can be considered a part of His mercy.
These ideas would underscore the basic point of life in Islam: it is a
'test', an 'endurance' for man, a struggle between 'good' and 'evil',
i.e. not a frivolous act of creation swept away by the supposed
'death' of a 'superhuman'!
In the end Craig is merely pushing forward a polemic, aimed to debase
Islam (yes, Muslims do the same; that is object of polemics!), in a
culture where "unconditional love" is (apparently) a sign of "moral
superiority", because we have forgotten about 'responsibility' and are
desperately seeking for something else or someone else to blame for
our ills (this criticism goes beyond the kind of Christian theology we
are seeing here). And this responsiblity is something 'unconditional
love' makes a mockery of, imho.
Regards
Abdus Salaam
Denis Giron
> Salaam/Peace;
Pax Vobis Zain Ali!
Those who wish to read Zain's post from February 22nd should note that
the complete post has been archived by Google here:
http://groups.google.com/groups?selm=fe657e94.0402222012.16e7bd23%40posting.google.com
> 1) Allah is perfectly loving
> 2) Allah does not loving sinners
> ----------------------------------
> Therefore, Allah cannot be perfectly Loving
>
> I hope I'm not attacking a strawman here, but I fail to see how the
> conclusion follows, unless you say perfectly loving is synonymous with
> unconditional love, or that there is a logical
> contradiction/inconsistency between perfect love and conditional love.
And those are precisely Craig's assumptions, which is why I stressed
the importance of having Craig's definition of God as an antecedent in
order for his argument to work. So, his actual argument (with the
hidden premises made explicit) is *roughly* along the lines of as
follows:
(1) God is the greatest conceivable being.
(2) The Greatest Conceivable being (God) must be morally
perfect.
(3) If a being is morally perfect, then it is perfectly
loving.
(4) If a being is perfectly loving, then its love is not
conditional.
(5) Allah's love is conditional.
(6) Therefore the Islamic conception of God is morally
inadequate (since Allaah is not morally perfect).
Or you could rewrite the conclusion in a slightly different way, along
the lines of one not believing in the Islamic conception of God on the
grounds that Allaah makes for a deity that is hard to believe in (or,
Allaah -the deity that 'exists' in the Islamic conception- is not God,
rather it is a fiction). There are various ways to look at it, but the
rough idea is captured above I believe.
As I alluded to previously, I myself am shaky with regard to (3). In
response, you wrote:
> As for the charge of Divine Love being merely an anthropomorphic
> construction, I would humbly beg to differ. It's simply question
> begging to assume that God (the greatest conceivable being) cannot
> have the attribute of Love.
Maybe I took it too far by saying that such a conception is "woefully
anthropomorphic," but my basic question (for one who agrees with
Craig, and I guess you as well) still stands: why should we believe
that God *must* be loving at all? I'll agree that God *can* be loving,
but I wonder why it is *necessary* that God be loving (as Craig
apparently holds). Isn't it plausible that God could be almost
indifferent? Or, to ask a different question, isn't it possible for
the Creator of the universe to not love? This could be 'to not love
anyone/anything,' or 'to not not love certain persons/things'. I don't
understand why love is a necessary attribute of deity. I used
"anthropomorphic" because I (maybe wrongly) assume this is rooted in
the fact that many theists *need to believe* that they are loved by
God. Regardless of whether I am correct about this assumed need being
the root of such a premise, I still have not seen a reason for why God
must be loving at all.
> But then Justice may also be said to be part of Allah's love,
> therefore the sinner, while always having access to Divine mercy, is
> denied intimacy with God. Hence, not being loved is merely a form of
> Divine censure, i.e., God being Just. In plainer terms God's love, iff
> it includes justice, entails the possibility of Divine love being
> conditional.
Craig offers a different conception of God, in which he argues that
God can still love those whom he metes out judgement to. To use an
analogy, suppose my father is a judge. Suppose further that his love
for me, his son, is beyond question, and suppose yet further that his
being a just judge is also beyond question. If I were to commit a
crime, and be sent before my own father, his being just and his love
for me do not have to be in conflict with one another. He can still
love me even if he does not bend the rules for me; i.e. meting out the
proper justice does not mean love is not present.
So it seems your conception of God unnecessarily limits God's love. If
you were to put this forth as the Islamic conception of God, Craig
would simply restate his argument, and then claim that you agree with
him by tacit that the Islamic conception of God is morally inadequate
(because Allaah is not morally perfect on the grounds that his love is
conditional). Now, you can turn away from God's love, and possibly
meet your own destruction as a result, but that does not mean God does
not love you - just as rejecting your parents love possibly causing
harm to yourself does not mean your parents do not love you.
> Now I'm not an expert of Anslem's
> ontological argument, but what I can say, if we were to construe God,
> in the words of Kant, as the Moral Author. Then, I think we would have
> ample reason ( practical reason that is) to say God was indeed Loving,
> Just, and ofcourse Merciful.
This ties in with my rejection of (3) in the syllogism that attempts
to reconstruct Craig's argument above. I still don't see why the
"Moral Author" must love us, but assuming you are correct, this
strengthens Craig's argument. I take it that you mean the one who
authors our moral laws must Himself be morally perfect, and love is
entailed in this. If so, then (3) becomes true, and your defense of
the Islamic conception of God remains problematic (as far as I can
see). If Allaah's love is conditional, then we should conclude that He
is morally imperfect. As was noted above, making an appeal to God
being perfectly just does not seem like an adequate reason for
limiting God's love.
-Denis Giron
http://www.geocities.com/freethoughtmecca/home.htm
Denis Giron
> ...
Pax Vobis Abdus-Salaam!
> Perhaps you could explain why a 'being whose love
> is conditional' is 'morally imperfect'? Why is 'unconditional love'
> considered 'morally superior'? Is the criminal equivalent to the
> pious? Is good equivalent to evil? This seems a flat contradiction of
> the very notion of justice - something the Christian concept of God,
> as put forward by Craig and as explained by yourself, seems totally
> devoid of.
Well, first of all, as I have noted previously, Craig assumes that a
morally perfect being must be perfectly loving, and he assumes that
God must be morally perfect. With regard to conditional love vs
unconditional love, obviously conditional love is not perfect love. I
don't understand your questions about the criminal being equivalent to
the pious or good being equivalent to evil, and I don't see how the
Christian conception of God is devoid of justice. Do you assume loving
a person means not meting out justice to that person? That is not
Craig's argument at all. Craig's argument is that God loves even those
whom he punishes (elsewhere in this thread I gave the analogy of a
judge who sentences his son, and how upholding justice should not be
taken as a sign that the judge does not love his son).
> In any case, I think Zain Ali makes the excellent point, further up,
> regarding the mercy of God being 'unconditional' - no man (or woman)
> is excluded from His mercy.
Craig would agree that God must be perfectly merciful. Mercy is not
the issue here. What is at issue is the Islamic conception of God
presenting Allaah's love as conditional. This is, as Craig's argument
goes, the difference between the Christian conception of God and the
Islamic conception of God: the former presents God as being perfectly
merciful, perfectly just and perfectly loving, while the latter does
not.
> In order to uphold the entire edifice of the "original sin" and the
> "death of Christ", it needs to posit an 'all or nothing' idea of a
> 'loving God'. The Muslim understanding is vastly different, as you
> well know; we're talking here of core differences in the way the two
> will perceive the relationship between God and man. We posit a
> purposeful, responsible existence for man, who will be accountable to
> God. Not a wishy-washy soap opera!
While I understand that the conceptions of God as put forth in
mainstream Christianity and mainstream Islam are different, I don't
understand what you're getting at above. The Christian conception of
God also holds that man will be responsible for his actions. In light
of your making mention of the "wishy-washy soap opera," I again take
it that you think a perfectly loving God must blink at or overlook
sin. This is not Craig's argument at all. In both Christianity and
Islam God will punish sinners, non-believers, and so on; but it is
only in Islam that God's love is presented as conditional. This is
where Craig says the problem is, and while I personally don't agree
with his hidden premise that God must be loving, I believe that if we
accept that premise, we have to agree with Craig's conclusion that a
God who is perfectly just, perfectly merciful and *imperfectly* loving
is inferior to a God who is perfectly just, perfectly merciful and
*perfectly* loving. Thus *if* we accept Craig's hidden premise, it
seems that the Islamic conception of God is morally inadequate when
compared to the Christian conception of God with regard to the issue
of God's love.
-Denis Giron
http://www.geocities.com/freethoughtmecca/home.htm
Denis Giron
Pax Vobis Asim!
> I am saying when God says He does not love the sinner, the definitive
> word is used. A sinner is one who keeps sinning, persists in his sin,
> and does not follow through with correcting himself. It starts to
> becomes part of his nature.
>
> Why would God go against the his very laws and purpose, by saying he
> loves this man unconditionally, despite the fact that this man
> continues to defy God's very law, and what we observe in creation is
> that when one defies laws, chaos and disorder emerge?
This is where Craig's assumed premise (that I keep making mention of)
comes in. Craig assumes that God must be morally perfect, and assumes
further that a morally perfect being must be perfectly loving. So, if
according to Islam, Allaah's love is conditional, then He is not
perfectly loving, and hence not morally pefect.
With regard to unrepentant sinners, the Christian conception of God
holds that God even loves them. This does not mean that God does not
punish them, and I think this is where the misunderstanding is. God
can punish a person and still love them (even human beings can do
that!). So there are ways to deal with those who defy God's law.
Punishment and the fate of the unreprentant sinner is not the issue
here - the issue is whether God loves such people.
> How is it morally inadequate is the curx of the argument?
The crux of Craig's argument is that any conception of God that
presents God's love as being conditional is a morally inadequate
conception of God, thus the Islamic conception of God is morally
inadequate since it presents Allaah's love as conditional.
> To assume morality, one has to assume choice for a Creator.
> In fact, I can say its akin to an absolute absurdity to assume
> a almost la dee da God who
> doesn't care what his creation does and gives away his love freely to
> defiant men who persist in their defiance kowing what they are doing
> is wrong. How is this love perfect? It makes the price cheap, and it
> gives absolutely no value to the action of men.
Again, you are badly misrepresenting Craig's argument. Craig never
claimed that in the Christian conception, God "doesn't care what His
creation does." Nor does the Christian conception of God make the
actions of men devoid of value. Men will be held accountable for their
actions, thus how one lives (and whether or not one obeys God's laws)
is of great importance if the Christian conception of God is true.
> Men cannot be separated from their ACTION. They are defineid by
> BOTH THOUGHT AND DEED. To argue that God loves a man, but hates
> the actions that have BECOME A PART OF HIS VERY NATURE, is an
> absuridty and is dualism thorugh and through.
This is an interesting argument, but I don't see how the sin can
becomes the core of a man's nature. I would assume that in both the
Islamic and Christian conceptions, as long as man is alive he has a
chance to repent from his sins. If the sin became the man's very
nature, would this mean he could no longer repent? Or is the man
always distinct from his sin and always able to return to the true
path (regardless of whether he chooses to or not)?
Zain Ali
Once again, I appreciate Denis for further clarifying Dr Craigs
argument, which
is as follows:
> (1) God is the greatest conceivable being.
> (2) The Greatest Conceivable being (God) must be morally
> perfect.
> (3) If a being is morally perfect, then it is perfectly
> loving.
> (4) If a being is perfectly loving, then its love is not
> conditional.
> (5) Allah's love is conditional.
> (6) Therefore the Islamic conception of God is morally
> inadequate (since Allaah is not morally perfect).
>
Furthermore the claim is that:
> ...your conception of God unnecessarily limits God's love. If
> you were to put this forth as the Islamic conception of God, Craig
> would simply restate his argument, and then claim that you agree with
> him by tacit that the Islamic conception of God is morally inadequate
> (because Allaah is not morally perfect on the grounds that his love is
> conditional). Now, you can turn away from God's love, and possibly
> meet your own destruction as a result, but that does not mean God does
> not love you - just as rejecting your parents love possibly causing
> harm to yourself does not mean your parents do not love you.
In response, I maintain that unconditional love is not entailed by/
nor does it follow necessarily from the concept of perfect love or
moral perfection. In essence I question premise (4) of the argument
presented above. Surely, God, as part of his justice (i.e., as a form
of punishment) may exclude a person from Divine love (but not mercy).
Or else I could simply rephrase premise (4), to say:
(4) If a being is perfectly loving then, in the absence of a morally
sufficient reason, it is unconditionally loving.
In the scenario I present, one possible morally sufficient reason, for
suspension Divine love (initimacy), maybe the requirement of Divine
censure (i.e., punishment). Importantly though, at issue here, I
suspect, is how we construe the concept of Love. I'm not sure if
Craig's idea of Divine love is the same as the Quranic idea of Divine
love. As I see it Quranic Love implies intimacy with the Divine (i.e.,
Ghazali - Mishkat al Anwar). The difference is that Craig's idea of
love is a generic concept which seems to be synonymous with Quranic
concept of mercy.
As for the Question of why God is to be attributed as being all
loving?. Well, having already termed God as the moral author, implies
not only God embodying the letter of the moral law, but also the
spirit of the moral law.
Regards
Zain Ali
asimm...@yahoo.com
> asimm...@yahoo.com wrote in message news:<92717884.04022...@posting.google.com>...
> >...
>
> Pax Vobis Asim!
>
> > I am saying when God says He does not love the sinner, the definitive
> > word is used. A sinner is one who keeps sinning, persists in his sin,
> > and does not follow through with correcting himself. It starts to
> > becomes part of his nature.
> >
> > Why would God go against the his very laws and purpose, by saying he
> > loves this man unconditionally, despite the fact that this man
> > continues to defy God's very law, and what we observe in creation is
> > that when one defies laws, chaos and disorder emerge?
>
> This is where Craig's assumed premise (that I keep making mention of)
> comes in. Craig assumes that God must be morally perfect, and assumes
> further that a morally perfect being must be perfectly loving. So, if
> according to Islam, Allaah's love is conditional, then He is not
> perfectly loving, and hence not morally pefect.
>
And Craig's reasoning is faulty, because it denies all of God's other
attributes. It is like looking at a piece of paper directly, and
thinking its twelve feet thick. One who creates has will and purpose,
and creation is not a haphazard blind impulse, but based upon purpose
and will. To claim God loves outside his purpose is inherently
flawed, and is a concept not in accordance with any sound based
reasoning. "God is equal to His purpose, but most men know not."
How can one argue that its morally perfect, when Craig's whole
assumption is based upon an inadequate description of what he
considers love? Parents love their children, and forgive their
mistakes, but to assume that they should continue to love them because
of outright defiance and disrespect, is a sign of weakness. It places
a biological relation over moral ideals and is a sogn of weakness. It
is true that God desires the well-being of His slaves, and the reason
He has given revelation is for this very purpose. This is the exact
impolications of Surah Rahman.
> With regard to unrepentant sinners, the Christian conception of God
> holds that God even loves them. This does not mean that God does not
> punish them, and I think this is where the misunderstanding is. God
> can punish a person and still love them (even human beings can do
> that!). So there are ways to deal with those who defy God's law.
> Punishment and the fate of the unreprentant sinner is not the issue
> here - the issue is whether God loves such people.
>
1. Craig's position is based more on a dualistic perspective between
belief and deeds. To argue its morally superior is absurd, and it
contradicts what is observable. Is Craig willing to admit that God
contradicts His own purpose and will, by loving those that FLOUT His
wills and Purpose. When God says He loves the Righteuous, it impells
men to action, and that is a mercy in and of itself.
2. This is a purely rational argument, not a theological one between
Christianity and Islam. God can do many things, even forgive the
idolater, but it is not in accordance with His will. "We have
prescribed mercy for ourselves." "If God were to punish men for their
sins, He would not leave a single thing in the heavens and earth." It
is in God's Power to do anything.
3. The Quran argues that God 'punishes' for many reasons. Sometimes
its an obvious benefit, to cleanse a person and teach him patience and
perseverance. God may punish a slave, because of outright defiance
and total rejection, or kufr. The Quran refers to certain communities
of the past that were ultimately destroyed.
> > How is it morally inadequate is the curx of the argument?
>
> The crux of Craig's argument is that any conception of God that
> presents God's love as being conditional is a morally inadequate
> conception of God, thus the Islamic conception of God is morally
> inadequate since it presents Allaah's love as conditional.
>
Amd Craig does not realize that Creation by its very nature is
conditional. There is WILL AND PURPOSE in it. God has a PURPOSE, and
is equal to his purpose. That includes His Love and Mercy. I am
saying Craig's concpetion of love is childish and one-sided. He
creates his own premise of what is morally superior and defends that,
as if his assumption is correct from the beginning.
>
> Again, you are badly misrepresenting Craig's argument. Craig never
> claimed that in the Christian conception, God "doesn't care what His
> creation does." Nor does the Christian conception of God make the
> actions of men devoid of value. Men will be held accountable for their
> actions, thus how one lives (and whether or not one obeys God's laws)
> is of great importance if the Christian conception of God is true.
>
Of course Craig will say that, and I'm not denying it. But his
premise leads to obviously faulty implications. To say God's love is
unconditional, yet he punishes, leads to a contradiction for God. The
Quran teachse, that when God FINALLY DECIDES TO PUNISH, i.e. "They
reach their appointed term", "He does not look back." That is why the
Prophet (S) would teach his nation that be careful, because when "God
decides to grip, he does not let go." It is the perfect culmination
of justice, and those who are punished are not worthy to be loved or
given respite.
> > Men cannot be separated from their ACTION. They are defineid by
> > BOTH THOUGHT AND DEED. To argue that God loves a man, but hates
> > the actions that have BECOME A PART OF HIS VERY NATURE, is an
> > absuridty and is dualism thorugh and through.
>
> This is an interesting argument, but I don't see how the sin can
> becomes the core of a man's nature. I would assume that in both the
> Islamic and Christian conceptions, as long as man is alive he has a
> chance to repent from his sins. If the sin became the man's very
> nature, would this mean he could no longer repent? Or is the man
> always distinct from his sin and always able to return to the true
> path (regardless of whether he chooses to or not)?
The Quran refers to a paticular state, "Their hearts have become
hardened" and that their "hearts have become sealed". Such phenomenon
happen in this very world, but it is part of the unseen. I, you, or
anybody else have no knowledge of whose heart has become sealed, or
not. Even Prophets do not, and it is only through revelation that
they may become aware of certain people among them who are in such a
state. This is actually one of the differences between a period of a
rasool, and the followers afterwards. But that is a different story.
It is basic psychology that men start to become defined by their
actions and deeds. A person that continues to sin, finds it way more
difficult to change his ways. This is what the Quran refers to when
it says "He smooths his path" or "Makes it difficult". Thus, God is
always watching and is actively involved in the guidance of His
slaves, whethers it towards salvation or doom.
God gives him plenty of time, and provides him with signs in His life
as to understand where He is heading. His mercy is in action, and He
gives men respite. If men make mistakes and sincerely repent, he
forgives and provides further guidance. He strengthens man's resolve.
If man sins, he overlooks, reminds, and sometimes lets the effects of
the sin take hold on the person. "God knows best." And this is what
is referred to as when Men say "It is by the will of God." Will does
not mean blindl following, but an obvious trust of God's mercy and
justice.
This is the whole purpose of revelation in Islam, to make man
conscious of his own actions. There are other aspects of guidance to,
i.e. the moral law inherent in all men. Man is an active participator
in this life.
It is not like Christianity, where man has to await some saving grace
for redemption. To argue love is unconditional is absurd.
thebit
Hello.
I've just read your exchange with Zain Ali regarding this idea (Google
Groups seems a tad slow this week). So I might be repeating some
ideas. My apologies if that is the case.
> Well, first of all, as I have noted previously, Craig assumes that a
> morally perfect being must be perfectly loving, and he assumes that
> God must be morally perfect.
Why does he assume this, and why is he allowed to assume this? What
*exactly* does "perfectly loving" mean in this context? Are we
confusing human ideas of "love" (love between man-woman,
parents-children, brother-sister, etc.) for 'God's love' as is
understand from the Qur'an?
> I
> don't understand your questions about the criminal being equivalent to
> the pious or good being equivalent to evil, and I don't see how the
> Christian conception of God is devoid of justice.
My apologies. I went straight to my conclusion. But the idea that a
criminal, an impious man, the 'crooked', or the "rejectors of truth",
are *deserving* of an intimate relationship with God (i.e. His love)
seems to fly in the face of any idea of "justice". His mercy is still
open to them.
> Craig's argument is that God loves even those
> whom he punishes (elsewhere in this thread I gave the analogy of a
> judge who sentences his son, and how upholding justice should not be
> taken as a sign that the judge does not love his son).
I've read your argument regarding the judge and his son. To me it
seems like we're arguing over words; your explanation using the
analogy of the judge and his son seems (as a first impression) to
mirror the idea of the mercy of God. You're confusing a father-son
relationship for a God-man relationship; but then the former is, I
suppose, part of Christian theology.
I don't see why this kind of 'love' is "morally superior" to the
'Islamic idea'. In fact, there is a flaw in this analogy, afaics. This
love might be seen as a sign of weakness: the judge is *unable* to
give up 'loving his son', because he has some *need* of him. We've all
seen mothers who cry at their child's misdeed, no matter how wrong the
deed was; she is crying because she still loves the child despite his
'evil' action, and this must 'hurt' (if you're a parent, you might
understand this). But God is above such a weakness; he has no need for
us. Might I then suggest that Craig's idea of God is a 'weak-willed'
being, unable to detach himself from his creation?
> In both Christianity and
> Islam God will punish sinners, non-believers, and so on; but it is
> only in Islam that God's love is presented as conditional.
Might His love be a *reward* for the steadfast and good amongst us?
And, so I repeat my questions: Do we reward the criminal? Is good the
same as evil?
> Thus *if* we accept Craig's hidden premise, it
> seems that the Islamic conception of God is morally inadequate [...] regard
> to the issue
> of God's love.
Not at all. Craig's "hidden premise" requires examination, not just to
satisfy the logomachies of theologians and logicians, but to explain
what *exactly* he understands by 'the love of God'.
> -Denis Giron
> http://www.geocities.com/freethoughtmecca/home.htm
Regards
Abdus Salaam
Altway
"Denis Giron" <denis...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
> This is where Craig's assumed premise (that I keep making mention of)
comes in. Craig assumes that God must be morally perfect, and assumes
further that a morally perfect being must be perfectly loving. So, if
according to Islam, Allaah's love is conditional, then He is not
perfectly loving, and hence not morally pefect.
> With regard to unrepentant sinners, the Christian conception of God
holds that God even loves them. This does not mean that God does not
punish them, and I think this is where the misunderstanding is. God
can punish a person and still love them (even human beings can do
that!). So there are ways to deal with those who defy God's law.
Punishment and the fate of the unreprentant sinner is not the issue
here - the issue is whether God loves such people.
Comment:-
There appear to be three fallacies in these arguments.
(1) Firstly, it is assumed that Love is supreme and all things must be
judged by this, including God.
This is false, the Good is that which Allah does.
(2) It is assumed that only a single attribute of Reality exists, namely
Love.
In fact nature displays many attributes of God. It is not possible to
understand one except in relation to others. Nor could the Universe exist
based on only a single principle. The Devil must exist for Love to manifest.
(2) Love is being understood as an abstract thing. Whereas in the
Quran it is sometimes used in its practical sense. When God
punishes it is described as His wrath. When He forgives or rewards
then it is His Love, Mercy, or Benevolence.
As usual these debates are painfully naive.
Hamid S. Aziz
Michael S. Pearl
>This
>love might be seen as a sign of weakness: the judge is *unable* to
>give up 'loving his son', because he has some *need* of him. We've
all
>seen mothers who cry at their child's misdeed, no matter how wrong
the
>deed was; she is crying because she still loves the child despite his
>'evil' action, and this must 'hurt' (if you're a parent, you might
>understand this). But God is above such a weakness; he has no need
for
>us.
>
Michael's comment:
I realize that you say "love *MIGHT* be seen as a sign of weakness"
(emphasis added), and you seem to be presenting this notion in an
attempt to construct a way of rebutting Craig's position by presenting
love as a weakness via association of love with "need".
However, I do not think that such an association works; I do not think
it is a necessary or an ultimately correct association, and,
furthermore, I do not think this is the best approach at your disposal
for dealing with Craig.
I agree with you that "Craig [needs] ... to explain what *exactly* he
understands by 'the love of God'" so that his position can be subject
to a fuller scrutiny, but such a scrutiny will likely never occur in a
formal debate (discussions are more suitable for such pursuits).
Craig's argument, such as it is, appears to be formally valid but
lacking in depth; any depth to his idea of "love" cannot be made
apparent until it is mined for meaning, and, since the limitations of
a public presentation will not afford sufficient time for
investigating just what is supposed to be entailed by "love", the
Muslim response to Craig should not - and, actually, does not need to
- depend on Craig providing a definition.
In fact, since Craig has not limited "love" via definition, it is
somewhat easier for a Muslim to cast reasonable doubt on Craig's claim
about the inferiority of the Islamic conception of God with regards to
love - and this is all that a Muslim has to do to refute Craig since
Craig presents his position as definitive.
However, the notion that "[God] has no need for us" (see also M. S. M.
Saifullah's "God, Logic & Special Pleading" posting of February 18,
2004, where he says that Muslims "believe that God ... is in no need
of His Creation) is a notion that will not well serve the Muslim
argumentative position for at least a couple of reasons.
First of all, this "no need for us" position is not a uniquely Islamic
position; this idea appears in Christianity, and this idea (in some
form) even pre-dates Christianity. In fact, were a Muslim to ask Craig
whether he agreed that God "has no need for us", Craig could - and
probably would - say that such a notion is perfectly compatible with
his claim about unconditional divine love. This is to say that since
the "no need for us" can be common to both the Christian and the
Muslim positions, it will likely end up failing as a definitive way of
dealing with Craig's argument.
This "no need for us" position - especially when presented as opposing
the notion of love - also suggests that "love" cannot legitimately be
associated in any way with the Islamic conception of God, and, at the
very least, a God about whom it is argued that God is not to be
thought of as "loving" is a God who comes across as unconcerned with
or for us. But, then, how could a God that commands us to do certain
things and be certain ways (as does the Islamic God) be a God who is
unconcerned about our beings?
If this were the only difficulty associated with emphasizing the "no
need for us" position, then one could conceivably construct an
argument based on a dispassionately concerned - but not
unconditionally loving - God, but the position that God has no need of
what He is assumed to have created will ultimately run into coherence
problems, if this is a keystone to the whole argument and especially
when one tries to join the idea of "not needing" with the
understanding of the divine attributes as related by Hamid Aziz in a
February 28, 2004, posting in the "Historical Development" thread:
>It depends on whether a person regards the power and knowledge of
>God
>as separate from God. We can certainly think of these as separate
concepts.
>But in Reality Allah is One. All His attributes are aspects of the
same
>thing.
>
In one sense, there is absolutely no problem with understanding why
God would be described as "in no need", and this sense would relate to
the idea of God as utterly self-sufficient; God would be God even if
there had never been a Creation, and God will continue to be God
regardless of whatever happens to or within Creation.
Craig might even invoke modal logic terminology at this point whereby
he would refer to God as a (or "the") necessary being - meaning that
God exists in all possible worlds, even that possible world which does
not contain any creation whatsoever - such that God exists not only
prior to but also without creation.
The coherence problem with the position that God is "in no need"
starts to show up when some of the divine attributes are considered.
Even if there were no Creation, God could be al-'Aziz (The Mighty
One), God could be al-'Alim (The All-Knowing), God would certainly be
al-'Azim (The Great One), but how would God be ar-Rahim (The Merciful)
or al-Khaliq (The Creator) or ar-Rahman (The Compassionate) or
al-Ghaffar (The All-Forgiving)?
In one sense of "need", God can be said to need Creation in order for
at least some of the divine attributes to be true, and the very
ambiguity in the term "need" recommends against using the "in no need"
argument so facilely as it is usually presented in this forum - but
especially as a contraposition to "love". Furthermore, if one were
inclined to posit a concerned God who is strictly dispassionate with
regards to Creation, then how could God be ar-Rahman? Such a position
would be self-refuting.
Even if God does not "need" Creation, does this mean that God cannot
or does not "want" Creation or that God does not care about what He
has created?
Clearly, God can want without needing in the same way that love does
not mean need.
Were I to argue against Craig's depiction, I would probably take a
course along these lines:
According to Islam, God is ar-Rahman, the Compassionate. To be
"compassionate", to have "compassion", is to be sympathetic, to have
tenderness, kindness, sorrow for the sufferings of others.
Does Craig's divine love entail this compassion?
Of course it must, and then, since according to M. I. Siddiqi, in
_Ninety-nine Names of Allah_ (Adam Publishers & Distributors, Delhi):
"The term Rahman is derived from Rahmat ... to denote [a] type of
tenderness ... Its connotation is wide enough to cover the qualities
of love, compassion, benevolence, and generosity ... [Allah] gives
blessings ... to all beings without any disparity."
and since at least al-Baidawi has said that ar-Rahman "expresses that
universal attribute ... which Almighty Allah extends to all mankind,
the wicked and the good, believers and unbelievers" (also from
Siddiqi's book), Craig no longer has a basis for claiming that Allah,
the Muslims' conception of God, does not love unconditionally.
This same sort of approach could also be used with other of the divine
characteristics that Craig might then try to reserve for Christianity
alone, such as with the nature of divine forgiveness, for example, but
that discussion can be pursued some other time.
Now, whether any Muslims would want to designate as unIslamic any of
the ideas presented in this posting, that, too, can be pursued later,
but I hope that I have made the advantages of this approach
sufficiently clear.
Michael
Altway
"Michael S. Pearl" <mpe...@clarkrd.com> wrote in message
news:1f8dca8f.04022...@posting.google.com...
> However, the notion that "[God] has no need for us" (see also M. S. M.
Saifullah's "God, Logic & Special Pleading" posting of February 18,
2004, where he says that Muslims "believe that God ... is in no need
of His Creation) is a notion that will not well serve the Muslim
argumentative position for at least a couple of reasons.
> This "no need for us" position - especially when presented as opposing
the notion of love - also suggests that "love" cannot legitimately be
associated in any way with the Islamic conception of God, and, at the
very least, a God about whom it is argued that God is not to be
thought of as "loving" is a God who comes across as unconcerned with
or for us. But, then, how could a God that commands us to do certain
things and be certain ways (as does the Islamic God) be a God who is
unconcerned about our beings?
....God, but the position that God has no need of
what He is assumed to have created will ultimately run into coherence
problems, if this is a keystone to the whole argument and especially
when one tries to join the idea of "not needing" with the
understanding of the divine attributes as related by Hamid Aziz in a
February 28, 2004, posting in the "Historical Development" thread:
> >It depends on whether a person regards the power and knowledge of
God as separate from God. We can certainly think of these as separate
concepts. But in Reality Allah is One. All His attributes are aspects of
the
same thing.
Comment:-
To tell the Truth I have no idea what this argument is all about
and I think this argument by limited human minds about the Infinite God
is inappropriate and quite meaningless.
By Revelation Allah is the Compassionate and the Merciful and He is
Infinite, Eternal and Absolute. He is One, Unique and indivisible.
He is self-existing and self-sufficient, the Creator of all things.
We do not separate His attributes from each other or from Him,
except in thought which refers to our relationship with Him
and that of the created world.
There cannot be any argument about this.
> Even if there were no Creation, God could be al-'Aziz (The Mighty
One), God could be al-'Alim (The All-Knowing), God would certainly be
al-'Azim (The Great One), but how would God be ar-Rahim (The Merciful)
or al-Khaliq (The Creator) or ar-Rahman (The Compassionate) or
al-Ghaffar (The All-Forgiving)?
Comment:-
The attributes of God are described in relation to each other and to the
created world.
If there were no Creation then these attributes would have no meaning.
But there is Creation.
Hamid S. Aziz
Michael S. Pearl
>To tell the Truth I have no idea what this argument is all about
>and I think this argument by limited human minds about the Infinite
God
>is inappropriate and quite meaningless.
>
Michael's comment:
Are you saying that the discussion is "inappropriate and quite
meaningless" as a result of the fact that you "have no idea what [it]
is all about"?
It cannot be "inappropriate and quite meaningless" simply because it
is "by limited human minds about the Infinite God", because that would
make everything you have ever written about God and Islam
"inappropriate and quite meaningless" - and, yet, you keep on writing.
If there is some part of the discussion/argument that you do not
understand or that you think is not stated with sufficient clarity,
why do you not just indicate the part of the discussion about which
you would like some further explanation?
Hamid Aziz wrote:
>By Revelation Allah is the Compassionate and the Merciful and He is
>Infinite, Eternal and Absolute. He is One, Unique and indivisible.
>He is self-existing and self-sufficient, the Creator of all things.
>We do not separate His attributes from each other or from Him,
>except in thought which refers to our relationship with Him
>and that of the created world.
>
>There cannot be any argument about this.
>
Michael's comment:
Who says that there cannot be any arguments/discussions regarding just
what such a belief entails (not to mention whether such a belief is
true)?
You?
The matter of fideism has already been addressed; maybe you would like
to present an argument that presents fideism as necessary for
rectitude or Godliness or Islam.
Michael
Altway
> >To tell the Truth I have no idea what this argument is all about
> >and I think this argument by limited human minds about the Infinite
> God is inappropriate and quite meaningless.
> Michael's comment:
> Are you saying that the discussion is "inappropriate and quite
meaningless" as a result of the fact that you "have no idea what [it]
is all about"?
Comment:-
Did I say is was the result?
I gave my explanation of why it is meaningless.
The arguments are trying to refute revelation with human reason.
> It cannot be "inappropriate and quite meaningless" simply because it
is "by limited human minds about the Infinite God", because that would
make everything you have ever written about God and Islam
"inappropriate and quite meaningless" - and, yet, you keep on writing.
Comment:-
I do not refute revelation with reason, but I do try to apply the reason God
has given me
to understand the revelation.
You appear to be confused as some others are about applying reason
to the Nature of God and applying it to His creations
> If there is some part of the discussion/argument that you do not
understand or that you think is not stated with sufficient clarity,
why do you not just indicate the part of the discussion about which
you would like some further explanation?
Comment:-
I have indicated that I find the argument unreasonable.
I did not say that I did not understand the argument. What I said was
"I do not know what the argument is about" - i.e what the motives or objects
behind it are?
Perhaps you would like to explain these.
But then you have succeeded in getting me on to futile ground already.
Hamid S. Aziz
Denis Giron
> Salaam/Peace;
Pax Vobis Zain!
For the sake of context, I would like to repeat my syllogism which
attempts to capture Craig's argument that the Qur'anic conception of
God is morally inadequate:
(1) God is the greatest conceivable being.
(2) The Greatest Conceivable being (God) must be morally
perfect.
(3) If a being is morally perfect, then it is perfectly
loving.
(4) If a being is perfectly loving, then its love is not
conditional.
(5) Allah's love is conditional.
(6) Therefore the Islamic conception of God is morally
inadequate (since Allaah is not morally perfect).
> In response, I maintain that unconditional love is not entailed by/
> nor does it follow necessarily from the concept of perfect love or
> moral perfection. In essence I question premise (4) of the argument
> presented above. Surely, God, as part of his justice (i.e., as a form
> of punishment) may exclude a person from Divine love (but not mercy).
> Or else I could simply rephrase premise (4), to say:
>
> (4) If a being is perfectly loving then, in the absence of a morally
> sufficient reason, it is unconditionally loving.
>
> In the scenario I present, one possible morally sufficient reason, for
> suspension Divine love (initimacy), maybe the requirement of Divine
> censure (i.e., punishment). Importantly though, at issue here, I
> suspect, is how we construe the concept of Love. I'm not sure if
> Craig's idea of Divine love is the same as the Quranic idea of Divine
> love. As I see it Quranic Love implies intimacy with the Divine (i.e.,
> Ghazali - Mishkat al Anwar). The difference is that Craig's idea of
> love is a generic concept which seems to be synonymous with Quranic
> concept of mercy.
Well, I myself have admitted that I do not agree that God must
necessarily be loving (and I will attempt to respond to your point
with regard to that below). Nonetheless, the Qur'an, like the Bible,
does affirm that God possesses the attribute of love. So, *if* God
possesses the attribute of love, then necessarily God must be
perfectly loving. So, even if I were successful in demonstrating that
love is not a necessary attribute of God, the argument should now be
that the Qur'an presents Allaah as possessing the attribute of love,
but being imperfectly loving, hence the charge of "moral inadequacy".
In light of your objection above, I would like to attempt to explain
why I agree with Craig that conditional love is incompatible with
being perfectly loving. I would like to quote a relevant passage from
the Sermon on the Mount, as it is recorded in Matthew 5:43-48, where
Jesus is alleged to have said:
"You have heard that it was said, 'Love your neighbor and hate your
enemy.' But I tell you: Love your enemies and pray for those who
persecute you, that you may be sons of your Father in heaven. He
causes his sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sends rain on the
righteous and the unrighteous. If you love those who love you, what
reward will you get? Are not even the tax collectors doing that? And
if you greet only your brothers, what are you doing more than others?
Do not even pagans do that? Be perfect, therefore, as your heavenly
Father is perfect."
In the last line, God is defined as "perfect," and this is obviously
within the context of His love, hence it can be sensibly argued that
the passage asserts that God is perfectly loving (more importantly,
the Bible asserts that God possesses the attribute of love, and as was
noted above, if that is true, God must be perfectlty loving). God's
perfect love is contrasted with the love of those who only love those
who love them. While the passage only refers to God giving gifts (the
sun, the rain) to the evil and unrighteous, the implication of the
analogy is that this is because God loves even them (this is inferred
from the context - I am not claiming giving gifts necessarily implies
love).
So, in other words, perfect love involves even loving those who do not
love you, while the Qur'anic conception of God ultimately presents
Allaah as only loving those who love and/or fear Him. In one of his
debates with Shabir Ally, Dr. William Lane Craig gave the analogy of
your parents telling you "I will only love you if you measure up to my
standard." He followed by noting that some of the students in the
audience probably had parents like that, and if so, they know the sort
of emotional scarring such a relationship can leave.
While I would concede that I am coming dangerously close to making an
appeal to emotion (or maybe I've already crossed that line), I think
that this sort of explanation helps to elucidate why one should
believe that unconditional love is far more in line with being
perfectly loving than is conditional love. This is why I agree that if
the Islamic conception of God holds that Allaah's love is conditional,
such a conception presents Allaah as *imperfectly* loving.
With regard to your point about Allaah excluding those from his love,
I don't see why it is necessary. Previously in this thread I have
given the analogy of your parents continuing to love you even if *you*
reject their love (and doing such causes you harm). I would agree
that, within the either the Christian or the Islamic paradigm,
removing oneself from God's love can ultimately lead to one's own
destruction, but that does not have to mean that God does not love
them. In his second meeting with Dr. Badawi, Dr. Craig attempted to
elucidate precisely this point in one of his comparisons of the
Christian conception to the Islamic conception. It happened in the
question and answer section, and Dr. Craig said the following:
"[God] loves even those whom His justice requires that He punish. And
so, on the Christian view, in contrast to the Qur'anic view, God loves
even those who reject Him. He loves even sinners and unbelievers who
refuse Him; He has no pleasure in their death or in their judgement.
They bring it upon themselves by refusing His love, but that does not
mean that God ceases to love them."
As for the comparison of Craig's notion of love to the Qur'anic
conception of love, I hope what I have written above touches on that
(if not, please elaborate on what you mean). I think it is fairly
obvious that Craig's notion of divine love includes intimacy with the
divine, but his argument is that just because you reject God's law,
and are thus barred access to that intimacy, does not mean that God
does not love you.
> As for the Question of why God is to be attributed as being all
> loving?. Well, having already termed God as the moral author, implies
> not only God embodying the letter of the moral law, but also the
> spirit of the moral law.
With all due respect, I do not understand why this means God must be
loving. Could not the moral author give laws yet still be devoid of
love? Regardless, as I have said several times above, both the Bible
and Qur'an depict God as possessing the attribute of love, and I would
agree that this renders my objection somewhat irrelevent, because if
God is loving at all, He must necessarily be perfectly loving.
With that, I would like to shift gears for a moment. Since we are on
the topic of divine love, I would like to put forth another argument
which makes an appeal to such. This argument was alluded to by Dr.
Craig in one of his debates with Shabir Ally, and also comes up in
Richard Swinburne's book "The Christian God" (I think around pp.
177-180). The version of the argument I will present may differ
somewhat from how Craig and Swinburne presented it.
I'm interested in this argument because it attempts to use an appeal
to divine love as a way to disprove the monadic ontology of God that
has developed in Orthodox Islam (and Orthodox Judaism). It could be an
argument either for polytheism, or for a multipersonal ontology of a
single God (such as the Christian conception, which holds God to be
tripersonal). A Jewish friend of mine, who was in the same
undergraduate philosophy progam as me, said he considers it to be a
thudding refutation of Judaism and Islam. I don't mean to argue that
this argument is true (and hence Islam is false) because some
anonymous Jewish friend said so; I'm simply noting that I am not the
only non-Christian to find this argument to be rather powerful. Even
if you are not convinced by it, I'm sure you'll at least agree it is
"cute".
The argument will assume that God possesses the attribute of love (and
hence assumes God is perfectly loving). The argument also presupposes
that God's perfect love implies God is necessarily perfectly loving,
which means He is perfectly loving in all realms of logical space,
hence there was no time that God was not perfectly loving. Without any
more of this long-winded introduction, let me present this second
appeal to divine love for why the Christian conception of God is more
plausible than the Islamic conception of God.
In order for a being to be loving at all, there must be another (at
least one other) being that serves as an object of that love. In one
sense, human beings can be seen as presently fulfilling that role with
regard to God's love. But human beings were created in time, thus
there was a time before human beings existed. The same would go for
any other created being. There could not have been a time when there
existed no being who served as an object of God's love, because at
such a hypothetical time God would not have been perfectly loving (as
one cannot be loving if one does not love anything). Therefore, if God
is perfectly loving, there has to have been at least one other being
who existed with God since before the very cosmos began.
The conclusion can, as was noted above, support either polytheism or a
multipersonal conception of God. Nonetheless, the conclusion seems to
be that God necessarily must be at least multipersonal (exempli
gratia: tripersonal, as Christianity holds). The Qur'anic/Islamic
conception of God is in conflict with this conclusion (I think this is
somewhat in line with the charge of Jameel posted to SRI a couple
times that Islam makes Allaah out to be a "sterile monad"). Assuming
the conclusion of the argument is true, compare the conclusion with
the Christian conception of God's relation with Jesus (as presented in
John 1:1-3, Colossians 1:15-17, Hebrews 1:1-3, and especially John
17:5) with the Islamic conception of God.
I have argued in other threads that the doctrine of the Trinity is not
logically incoherent. Now, I think that if one starts from the
assumption that God possesses the attribute of love, one may have
reason (in light of this "cute" argument) to conclude that the
Christian conception of God is more reasonable than the Islamic
conception of God. In other words, it is an argument in favor of
assigning partners with Allaah - it is rational shirk.
-Denis Giron
http://www.geocities.com/freethoughtmecca/home.htm
Omar Mirza
<snip>
> Nonetheless, the Qur'an, like the Bible,
> does affirm that God possesses the attribute of love. So, *if* God
> possesses the attribute of love, then necessarily God must be
> perfectly loving.
I suggest you think about this last conditional statement again,
Denis. Are you sure that being perfect does not entail restrictions on
some of the divine attributes?
At any rate, there is an ambiguity in "perfectly loving". Does this
mean "loving each creature to the maximum degree"? Or does it mean
"love which is always appropriate to its object"?
If the former, then I think your conditional statement above is
obviously false.
If the latter, then I don't see the problem for the Quranic conception
of God.
Denis Giron
Pax Vobis Abdus-Salaam!
> Hello.
Indeed, hello..
> I've just read your exchange with Zain Ali regarding this idea (Google
> Groups seems a tad slow this week). So I might be repeating some
> ideas. My apologies if that is the case.
I didn't see any repetition, and actually the charge falls on me. I
responded to Zain's post without having read your post, thus I
proceeded there without having in mind questions that would have
altered my approach.
> Why does he assume this, and why is he allowed to assume this?
This is the question I have no answer to. Why should we assume God is
perfectly loving? I have no reason to assume God is loving at all.
However, if God, the greatest conceivable being, possesses the
attribute of love, then He must be perfectly loving rather than
imperfectly loving. So while I don't agree with Craig's a priori
assumption that the greatest conceivable being must possess the
attribute of love, I do feel that *if* God possesses this attribute,
He must possess it in a maximal way. The Qur'an affirms that Allaah
possesses the attribute of love, which is why I hold the Qur'an to
Craig's definitions.
> Are we confusing human ideas of "love" (love between man-woman,
> parents-children, brother-sister, etc.) for 'God's love' as is
> understand from the Qur'an?
This is the question that stopped me cold. I actually can't define
love at all. Yes, I did hand in mind specifically the love a father
would have for his son (hence the analogies), but I don't even know
what that is exactly. I'm not sure how to define love (in any sense)
specifically, and I admit that is a serious handicap (but as was said,
in a very general sense I had in mind precisely the kind of love a
father has for a son).
> My apologies. I went straight to my conclusion. But the idea that a
> criminal, an impious man, the 'crooked', or the "rejectors of truth",
> are *deserving* of an intimate relationship with God (i.e. His love)
> seems to fly in the face of any idea of "justice".
I disagree strongly here. Craig's conception of God holds the Divine
to be both perfectly loving and perfectly just, thus He punishes those
whom His justice requires that He punish, but this does not mean that
He does not love them. As Craig puts it, they have removed themselves
from His love, but that does not mean He ceases to love them. And then
he contrasts that with the Qur'an, which holds that God does not love
sinners, et cetera...
But really I should stop and wait to see how you respond to my present
inability to define love precisely.
-Denis Giron
Denis Giron
Pax Vobis Asim!
I want to try to make this quick. With regard to your objection to
Craig's argument, if I am not mistaken, you summed up best when you
wrote:
> To say God's love is
> unconditional, yet he punishes, leads to a contradiction for God.
The reason we are stuck, I believe, is precisely because you believe
that punishment contradicts or negates love. I see no reason to assume
such. In fact, particularly in parent-child relationships, one being
can punish another being, yet still love that being. Thus, there is no
logical contradiction between love and punishment.
However, shifting gears somewhat, I would say that where I did
perceive a possible contradiction was in the second part of your post,
which attempted to explain the Qur'anic notion of punishing those
whose hearts are sealed.
For example, I believe that, under the right interpretation, your
statement that...
> God is always watching and is actively involved in the guidance of His
> slaves, whethers it towards salvation or doom.
...may contradict...
> God gives him plenty of time, and provides him with signs in His life
> as to understand where He is heading.
Maybe I'm reading too much into what you wrote, but I would assume
that if Allaah is actively leading people to their doom (i.e. He leads
astray whom He wills), that seems to come into conflict with a notion
of acountability. It is not explicit in the two statements above, but
I got the impression that you're saying that Allaah leads some astray
on the one hand, yet state that Allaah wants you to repent on the
other. I note that you stated that "man is an active participator in
this life," but how true is that for those whom Allaah is leading
astray? Or is their something I have missed?
asimm...@yahoo.com
> > To say God's love is
> > unconditional, yet he punishes, leads to a contradiction for God.
>
> The reason we are stuck, I believe, is precisely because you believe
> that punishment contradicts or negates love. I see no reason to assume
> such. In fact, particularly in parent-child relationships, one being
> can punish another being, yet still love that being. Thus, there is no
> logical contradiction between love and punishment.
>
I never denied that one can love a child and punish him... what I did
say it is weakness when a person's love overcomes the moral ideal..
how can one argue moral superiority, when love often causes parents to
overlook the heinous deeds many of their children commit... love
contardicts morality in this instance.. especially when a child has
become habituated in sin and depite all means of reformation does not
reform... the sin is ingrained in him...
The Quran clearly stipulates that punishment can be a mercy of God,
and a means to turn people back to God Almighty. The point is in
reference to a person who constantly persists in his defiance and
rejects God, despite knowing it as truth. even after God has given
him signs to correct himself... this person rejects the signs, and
opposed them with all his might... to claim God loves hits person, is
saying God contradicts hiw own will and purpose, his own LOVE OF THE
MORAL GOOD..
Yes, from a rational point of view, God can love anybody he wants...
no Muslim would ever deny this... In the same manner, God can be
merciful to whomsoever he wants forever... but to argue that God's
love being unconditional as morally superior is absurd.. is it a
morally perfect concept of God if I were to say, "yea, my God he
doesn't inflict any pain on his creatures"... is this is a morally
perfect concept of mercy?
I note that you stated that "man is an active participator in
> this life," but how true is that for those whom Allaah is leading
> astray? Or is their something I have missed?
when a person sins, God gives him time to repent.. often times he
overlooks them... the Quran states that it is God's law that when
people continue to persist in heedlessness and sinning, it becomes
harder for them to turn away from it... if a person continues to act
on the path of virtue, it becaomes easier and easier for him to follow
the path of virtue... he is guided on the path of virtue, just as a
sinner may be guided to the path of doom...
the concept of accountability in Islam, is not just in the next
life... one's sins or one's good deeds affect him in this very life...
it is the next life, where the actual manifestations of one's actions
become apparent... the veils of delusion are lifted for the deniers.
the Quran, when it refers to the unbeliever, on the Day of Judgement
says the limbs of the people will speak, and their mouths shut. The
sinners will be known with marks... they will not get any chance
because 'they will see their destiny tied around their own neck'.
They will not be questioned and judged, for their destination will be
known on that day. their accounts will be presented to them, their
books shown to them, where they will have no chance to deny.. the Day
of Judgement for them will be the Day of their admittance of their own
wrong-doings..
Denis Giron
> ...
Pax Vobis Omar Mirza!
> I suggest you think about this last conditional statement again,
> Denis. Are you sure that being perfect does not entail restrictions on
> some of the divine attributes?
Well, with regard to the necessity of the conditional proposition, I
would agree that it is rooted within a very Anselmian conception of
God. If there was a less-than Anselmian being who created the
universe, revealed the Qur'an, et cetera, I would imagine that many
Muslims would be willing to consider that being to be God.
With regard to your question, I would say it depends on what the
attribute in question is. With regard to love, I agree with Craig (and
the philosophy expressed in the Sermon on the Mount) that perfect love
would entail even loving those who do not love you. A number of
analogies can be drawn from human relationships to help elucidate this
position.
> At any rate, there is an ambiguity in "perfectly loving". Does this
> mean "loving each creature to the maximum degree"? Or does it mean
> "love which is always appropriate to its object"?
>
> If the former, then I think your conditional statement above is
> obviously false.
I would lean closer to the former, though you consider it to be false.
Indeed, it seems you wish to side with a love that is conditional, but
as I have attempted to argue, conditional love seems to be contrary to
perfect love. Again, analogies can be drawn from human relations,
where those who are conditionally loving are such precisely because
they are imperfectly loving.
This is why I side with William Lane Craig's position that a
conception of God (such as the Islamic conception of God) that
presents God's love as conditionally would be a morally inadequate
conception of God. Though admittedly, this is a purely Anselmian
approach.
-Denis Giron
http://www.geocities.com/freethoughtmecca/home.htm
Denis Giron
> I never denied that one can love a child and punish him... what I did
> say it is weakness when a person's love overcomes the moral ideal..
> how can one argue moral superiority, when love often causes parents to
> overlook the heinous deeds many of their children commit...
Ah, it seems then that you have misunderstood Craig's argument. Craig
has argued that a God who is both perfectly just and perfectly loving
would love those whom His justice requires that He punish. As Craig
has noted, being perfectly loving does not entail that God blink at
sin, and not punish those whom His justice requires that He punish. So
love and punishment are, contrary to what you have claimed, not
contradictory.
As for human accountability in Islam, I think there are only two
possibilities. Either (1) the sinner *always* has a chance to turn
back as long as he is still alive and the day of judgement has not
arrived, or (2) there is a point when too much sinning results in the
person in essence becoming the sin itself. On the latter view, if the
person is identical to the sin, and Allaah does not love the sin, then
Allaah will not love this person. But on this second view, it would
seem the person has not chance of turning back, which seems highly
problematic. I would think the first notion is more sensible in a
religion that calls for repentance. To call for repentance when none
is possible seems to be a contradiction, and even in conflict with
free will. If a person can turn away from their sins, then they are
never identical in essence to their sins.
asimm...@yahoo.com
> love and punishment are, contrary to what you have claimed, not
> contradictory.
>
And the Quran doesn't claim they have to be mutually contradictory
also... This does not still absolve Craig of the argument. God has
the power to love everybody.
For once again, if a person continues to persist in sin, he goes
against God's purpose of moral good and justice. How can one argue a
morally superior God, when one argues God loves those that go against
his will and purpose? you have contradictions of notions of morality
in the same sentence...
Denis Giron
> also...
Good, so thus far we are in agreement that love and punishment are not
contradictory to one another. So now let's see what arguments you have
left regarding Craig's charge that the Islamic conception of God is
morally inadequate (because Islam presents Allaah's love as
conditional).
> For once again, if a person continues to persist in sin, he goes
> against God's purpose of moral good and justice. How can one argue a
> morally superior God, when one argues God loves those that go against
> his will and purpose? you have contradictions of notions of morality
> in the same sentence...
The difference, again, is between conditional and unconditional love.
Perfect love would entail even loving those who do not love you, not
simply loving only those who measure up to your standard. I see no
contradiction in God loving those who are sinners. The contradiction
would only be present if a perfectly just God chose not to punish
those whom His justice required that He punish.
So I think above you still have notions of justice and punishment in
mind. God will punish those who are opposed to Him, but this does not
entail that He cease to love them. God is morally superior *precisely*
because He loves even those who are attempting to oppose Him (this
notion of perfect love is well expressed in the Sermon on the Mount).
For these reasons, I think you have failed to rebut Craig's argument.
I think that Craig's charge of moral inadequacy against the Islamic
conception of God is quite relevant.
Syed
> The difference, again, is between conditional and unconditional love.
> Perfect love would entail even loving those who do not love you, not
> simply loving only those who measure up to your standard.
Hi Denis, just some points I think you are unclear on.
You said the difference is between conditional and unconditional love,
then you state that perfect love is unconditional. Perfect in whos
eyes?
> I see no contradiction in God loving those who are sinners.
OK, agreed on this statement when looked at alone. However, what about
the bigger picture? In Islam, you have God creating mankind so that we
may worship him, ie please him, ie love him. ie God created us so that
we should do the opposite of sin. Why should God love us if we then
sin? It goes against His very reasons for creating us.
Also, moving away from logic towards emotion - how could God be "just"
and still "love" a man who has killed, raped and tortured thousands of
other humans whom He loves (not talking about any man, just a
scenario)? The picture you seem to be painting is that God MUST love,
ie he is bound by it, to love everything, that He cannot not love.
Thats quite a strong restriction.
> The contradiction
> would only be present if a perfectly just God chose not to punish
> those whom His justice required that He punish.
> So I think above you still have notions of justice and punishment in
> mind. God will punish those who are opposed to Him, but this does not
> entail that He cease to love them. God is morally superior *precisely*
> because He loves even those who are attempting to oppose Him (this
> notion of perfect love is well expressed in the Sermon on the Mount).
That is purely youre opinion is it not? I think God is inferior if He
*cannot* choose to not love his creations.
> For these reasons, I think you have failed to rebut Craig's argument.
> I think that Craig's charge of moral inadequacy against the Islamic
> conception of God is quite relevant.
I dont think perfect love is unconditional, eg previous example of God
loving someone so evil.
There must be limits for God's love in Christianity. Again, I just
cant see how God can be just, yet love something evil as much as He
loves everything that is good. Does He love an evil man less then He
loves a good man? Surely God loves his prophets pbut more than the
average man? Does God love Satan as much as God loves his prophets?
Thing is, if you say His love is unconditional, then He cannot love
one person more than the other, because if He loves His Prophets more
than He loves Satan, then that is surely conditional, because that
added or lessened love is due to some actions?
Sorry if im confused
Syed
thebit
> I have no reason to assume God is loving at all.
I agree. This is why 'reason' cannot define or determine God's
attributes. These can only, imho, be known through Revelation.
> I do feel that *if* God possesses this attribute,
> He must possess it in a maximal way.
I then need to ask the question: Why is "perfectly loving" taken to
mean "loving all and everyone"? What lets Craig (or anyone else)
assume this? Imho, this whole argument of Craig's is built on an
assumption which presupposes what 'love' is, and is therefore an
implicit assumption in the logical argument. This question ("what is
love?") is one which, imho, which can only be answered by
understanding cultural, social, historical differences of God-man
relationships in Christianity (Father-Son analogy) and Islamic ideas
of God-man relationships (Creator-creation, God-slave).
> > Are we confusing human ideas of "love" (love between man-woman,
> > parents-children, brother-sister, etc.) for 'God's love' as is
> > understand from the Qur'an?
>
> This is the question that stopped me cold. [snipped for brevity]
Then we're probably just arguing over words. As was said before, maybe
what Craig calls 'love', the Qur'an calls 'mercy'? Maybe, as Hamid
(Altway) pointed out, the Qur'an uses this word in some practical
sense? Or maybe it is defined in Sufi literature (someone pointed out
_The Niche_ by al-Ghazali)?
> -Denis Giron
Regards
Abdus Salaam
Altway
"Syed" <syed...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:63a36338.04032...@posting.google.com...
> Hi Denis, just some points I think you are unclear on.
> You said the difference is between conditional and unconditional love,
then you state that perfect love is unconditional. Perfect in whos
eyes?
Comment:-
You have hit the point.
Some people impose their own idea of perfection onto God.
But from the Islamic point of view Allah IS Perfect and that makes all his
attributes including compassion, mercy and benevolence Perfect. And these do
not contradict the other attributes such as Justice, Power and Truth.
There cannot be any argument about Allah as he is the Creator of all things.
It is even logically absurd for a small part of dependent creation (man) to
judge the All-pervading Origin of all things.
There is a fundamental and irreconcilable difference between the Islamic
concept of God and those, like Christians, who have the anthropomorphic view
that God is a man or appears as man. As these are fundamental notions on
which the whole world view, perception, motivation and conscious behaviour
of people depends, it is unlikely that those who adhere to these unislamic
notions will ever be able to understand the Islamic position. These debates,
where people are concerned mainly with defending their pre-existing
positions, therefore, remain futile.
> > I see no contradiction in God loving those who are sinners.
> OK, agreed on this statement when looked at alone. However, what about
the bigger picture? In Islam, you have God creating mankind so that we
may worship him, ie please him, ie love him. ie God created us so that
we should do the opposite of sin. Why should God love us if we then
sin? It goes against His very reasons for creating us.
> Also, moving away from logic towards emotion - how could God be "just"
and still "love" a man who has killed, raped and tortured thousands of
other humans whom He loves (not talking about any man, just a
scenario)? The picture you seem to be painting is that God MUST love,
ie he is bound by it, to love everything, that He cannot not love.
Thats quite a strong restriction.
Comment:-
The Quran tells us:-
"Say: Whose is that which is in the heavens and the earth? Say: Allah's. He
has prescribed mercy on Himself. He will surely gather you together on the
Day (of Resurrection and Judgment), of which there is no doubt. But those
who ruin their own souls will not believe. " 6:12
This appears to indicate that Allah transcends all the attributes, but
Mercy is a restriction that He has imposed on himself.
(This restriction applies only to the created world.)
It is not God but man who harms himself
When the Quran speaks about the mercy and wrath of God it is speaking about
what appears in practice as consequences, not in the abstract. These
consequences
do not flout the Mercy of God though human beings may judge some of them as
evils.
Human judgements refer to things as they relate to them. That is,
we judge things according to our likes and dislikes, pain and pleasure
which does not necessarily have any objective significance.
Hamid S. Aziz
..
Denis Giron
> ...
Pax Vobis Syed!
> You said the difference is between conditional
> and unconditional love, then you state that
> perfect love is unconditional. Perfect in whos
> eyes?
Great question. I was just attempting to explain this in my most
recent response to Abdus-Salaam. I think that if we look at it
objectively, we can conclude that unconditional love is more in line
with perfect love than is conditional love. I realize that you
disagree, so I will explain why I hold this position, and then attempt
to answer your objections.
Unconditional love and conditional love are logical contradictories of
one another, and perfect love and imperfect love are logical
contradictories of one another. So if one's love is conditional, it is
either perfect or imperfect. Now, several times in this thread I have
repeated Craig's analogy of the father who tells his son "I will only
love you if you measure up to my standard." Indeed, such father-son
relationships do exist, but they exist precisely because the father is
imperfectly loving. The philosophy expressed in the Sermon on the
Mount presents perfect love as being a state in which one loves even
those who do not love them, and is contrasted with those who love only
those who love them.
Now, the Qur'an presents Allaah as loving only those who fear/love
Him, and the love is clearly conditional. This picture to me seems to
be analogous to the father who loves his son only if he measures up,
and to me, it is a sad picture. Since Allaah's love is conditional, He
is imperfectly loving (for the reasons I attempted to lay out above).
> > I see no contradiction in God loving those who are sinners.
>
> OK, agreed on this statement when looked at alone. However,
> what about the bigger picture? In Islam, you have God
> creating mankind so that we may worship him, ie please him,
> ie love him. ie God created us so that we should do the
> opposite of sin. Why should God love us if we then
> sin? It goes against His very reasons for creating us.
I think this begins to move over to an issue of justice rather than
love. God can be both perfectly just and perfectly loving, and thus
still love those whom His justice requires that He punish. The analogy
that I have given previously in this thread is that of a judge who has
his own son come before him. He can still love his son without
compromising his being just, and thus give his son the required
punishment for his crime without compromising his love.
Now, you also brought up the example of rapists, murderers, and how
they compare with more righteous individuals in terms of God's love.
First of all, as I have argued with Asim Mehmood, assuming free will
exists, and judgement day has not arrived, it seems a human can always
turn back from his sins, and is thus never synonomous with his sins
(no matter how brutal). Thus God can have no love for the sins, yet
continue to love a person despite committing those sins, because (on
the free will model just expressed) the person is always separate from
his sins (in the sense that he is non identical to his sins). To love
those who keep the law more than those who break it brings us back to
the father who only loves his son when he measures up. A God who is
perfectly loving can love all individuals equally, and love them
despite their sins, while His being perfectly just will require that
He not blink at sin.
> The picture you seem to be painting is that God MUST
> love, ie he is bound by it, to love everything, that
> He cannot not love. Thats quite a strong restriction.
> [...] I think God is inferior if He *cannot* choose
> to not love his creations.
The issue here is the definitions of the terms employed. I think it is
at least possible to envision a scenario in which Allaah chooses not
to love certain individuals. In fact, analogously, I would also argue
that it is possible for Allaah to choose to reward sinners and punish
the righteous. God can do whatever He wants, but if He punishes
righteousness and rewards sin, then He cannot be termed perfectly
just; rather, He would be imperfectly just, or unjust. So too, while
God can choose to not love whomever He pleases, such a God is
imperfectly loving. This seems to be the God affirmed on the Islamic
conception, and thus I agree with Craig that such a conception of God
presents Allaah as imperfectly loving.
-Denis Giron
http://www.geocities.com/freethoughtmecca/home.htm
Denis Giron
> ...
Pax Vobis Abdus-Salaam!
> > I have no reason to assume God is loving at all.
>
> I agree. This is why 'reason' cannot define or
> determine God's attributes. These can only, imho,
> be known through Revelation.
Well, that seems even more problematic, but nonethless it too boils
down to assumptions. If we're going to presuppose the Qur'an (or the
Bible, or the Gita) is an accurate source of information with regard
to God's attributes, I don't see how that is different from
presupposing an Anselmian conception of God is necessarily true.
Furthermore, as I noted, the Anselmian conception of God is not
necessarily true, but it seems that is not a very valuable option for
Islam. The Islamic conception of God still comes off as presenting
Allaah as imperfectly loving, in my view, and just because that is
possible or logically coherent does not make me feel any better about
it. If I were to believe in God, and start with a bunch of
presuppositions anyway, I'd rather presuppose God is perfectly loving
than imperfectly loving.
> > I do feel that *if* God possesses this attribute,
> > He must possess it in a maximal way.
>
> I then need to ask the question: Why is "perfectly
> loving" taken to mean "loving all and everyone"? What
> lets Craig (or anyone else) assume this?
Well, it is based on choices made between binary options, and these
choices being made with the help of analogies from human experience. I
will assume we can agree to treat conditional love as a logical
contradictory of unconditional love, and perfect love as a logical
contradictory of imperfect love (both by definition).
So, Allaah's love is either conditional or unconditional. The Qur'an
is clear that Allaah's love is conditional, while the philosophy
expressed in the Sermon on the Mount presents God's love as
unconditional (i.e. He loves even those who do not love Him). Now the
question is, which is more in line with perfect love. The
aformentioned philosophy expressed in the Sermon on the Mount presents
unconditional love as perfect love. Now, assuming that is true,
conditional love is imperfect love. So why should we accept this
philosophy as true?
It is here that analogies can be drawn from human models. Craig has
asked that we imagine a father who tells his son "I will love you only
if you measure up to my standard." In his debate with Shabir Ally,
Craig used this analogy and then looked into the audience and said
that some in attendance had parents like that, and know the sort of
emotional pain such a relationship can cause. So, while we can point
to relationships in which the love is conditional, it is that way
precisely because such people are imperfectly loving.
This is why, it seems, that if we are going to choose which is closer
to perfect love, one must pick unconditional love over conditional
love. As the Sermon on the Mount roughly asks, if you only love those
who love you, what value is there in that? This is why I agree with
Craig when he argues that the Islamic conception of God presents
Allaah as imperfectly loving.
> Then we're probably just arguing over words. As was
> said before, maybe what Craig calls 'love', the
> Qur'an calls 'mercy'?
I think I should have been more careful with my words in the last
post. What I meant was that I find it extremely difficult to define
"love" precisely, but I feel the same way about "mercy" (to use an
analogy, "time" might be another example - I know what "time" means
but I'm not sure I could define it clearly). I still think I know and
understand the difference between love and mercy, and when I speak of
love, I mean love. However, I find it interesting that you roughly
noted that the love expressed in the Qur'an is more analogous to the
love that exists between a master and his slave than between a father
and his son. I think even this hints at the Qur'anic conception of God
putting forth an imperfect conception of love.
-Denis Giron
asimm...@yahoo.com
1. This is what YOU think... It is baseless, for one cannot place a
moral judgement on love... one can love something unjustly...
2. Nobody is denying the power of God to love even a sinner. "God
has prescribed mercy for himself". This is purely a philosphical
argument, but once again, it has no applicability to reality.
3. One may say.. yeah God punishes out of love... but I may
counteract that and say, well, to even inflict a small amount of pain
on somebody is not unconditional love... God, being infinitely
creative, can produce another means towards correcting his slave
without placing some pain on him...
4. God says it is by his Mercy taht he Continues to warn... but
neither does the Sermon on the Mount nor the Quran teach that God will
continue to love his slaves... further, calling people vipers and
wolves in sheeps clothing demonstrate that love reaches a particular
point...
Denis Giron
> ...
Pax Vobis Asim!
> 1. This is what YOU think... It is baseless, for one cannot place a
> moral judgement on love... one can love something unjustly...
I'm at a loss with regard to what you mean here. Could you elaborate,
and specifically explain how this relates to the arguments I have
raised?
> 2. Nobody is denying the power of God to love even a sinner.
Right, so the claim that God does or does not love sinners is a
contingent theological position. The problem is that a God who does
not love sinners would be conditionally loving, only loving those who
measured up, only loving those who loved/feared Him. The precise
argument that I have presented is that this is the God affirmed in the
Qur'an, and that this model is morally indadequate (on the grounds
that it presents God as imperfectly loving).
> God says it is by his Mercy taht he Continues to warn... but
> neither does the Sermon on the Mount nor the Quran teach that God will
> continue to love his slaves...
Actually, the Sermon on the Mount defines God as perfectly loving, and
defines perfect love as loving even those who do not love you. Thus it
seems that the Sermon on the Mount presents a model that is perfectly
in line with what I have been arguing in this thread. Of course,
others may argue that the Qur'anic model is analogous to the OT model,
and I would agree (though, unlike the Qur'an, the OT possesses no
verses that specifically states God does not love a certain
individual).
-Denis Giron
ConvertstoIslam
>Of course,
>others may argue that the Qur'anic model is analogous to the OT model,
>and I would agree
Wasn't the OT God and Jesus the same God in Trinitarian Christianity? So the
repeated genocides in the OT were actually committed by Jesus in celestial
form?
Whether Jesus was calm or not in the 33 years on earth, is no excuse for his
claimed Divine side, killing anything that moved for 3,300 years in the OT.
>(though, unlike the Qur'an, the OT possesses no
>verses that specifically states God does not love a certain
>individual).
actions speak louder than words ;-) Where in the Quran does it specifically
say that the entire world and everything in it was killed as it does in the
Bible via Noah's flood?
Why would Jesus' celestial form in the Bible, want everyone to drown before he
comes down and has a chance to die for them?
The Quran again by actions rather than words, shows superior love over the
Bible by saying that Jesus was not killed.
Besides the Bible hating Jesus, it apparently also hated Moses because Moses in
the OT was killed by God (Deuteronomy 32:48-52), unlike in the Quran.
So while your looking for a certain phrase to match between the Bible and
Quran, I believe the comparative actions between the two are more important:
"Those who believe, and do deeds of righteousness, and establish regular
prayers and regular charity, will have their reward with their Lord: on them
shall be no fear, nor shall they grieve." (Quran 2:277)
Actions of Love will receive Love, what comes around, goes around.
There is no hateful fist beating by an army, no hateful whipping with nails,
no hateful barb wire tightened around a skull, no hateful dragging through the
streets, and no hateful stapling to a cross and being stabbed while on the
cross in the Salvation of Islam.
Since the Quran offers Salvation not dependant on the grotesque murder of a
Messiah, the Quran is thus more loving.
In conclusion, actions are more important than words, and the actions displayed
in the Quran are more loving than those detailed in the Bible.
To answer your question, yes, the OT does say God does not love certain people;
"Hate the evil, and love the good-" (Am 5:15)
"I began to hate them. Because of the wickedness of their deeds I will drive
them out of my house. I will love them no more; all their princes are rebels."
(Ho 9:15)
and also in the NT, Christians are taught not to love anything in this world;
"Do not love the world or anything in the world. If anyone loves the world,
*the love of the Father is not in him*. " (I John 2:15-17)
"As it is written, Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated." (Ro 9:13)
In conclusion, both the Bible and Quran use similar conditional love, which I
see nothing wrong with, who wants an indifferent God, allowing people like
Sharon or Hitler in Heaven?
I hope you found the exact phrase your looking for, but again, I believe the
actions (which are more powerful than words) in the Quran compared to those in
the Bible offer a much more loving, non-hating path to Salvation.
"That is (the Bounty) whereof Allah gives Glad Tidings to His Servants who
believe and do righteous deeds. Say: (O Muhammad, unto mankind): "No reward do
I ask of you for this except the love of those near of kin." And if any one
earns any good, We shall give him an increase of good in respect thereof: for
Allah is Oft-Forgiving, Most Ready to appreciate (service)." (Quran 42:23)
Allah wants nothing from us except to be righteous and loving, and whether we
are righteous and loving or not, does not effect Allah, it only effects our own
fate:
"O ye men! It is ye that have need of Allah: but Allah is the One Free of all
wants, the Praised One." (Quran 35:15)
"If ye reject (Allah), then Truly Allah is Self-sufficient above all need of
you; but He liketh not ingratitude from His servants: if ye are grateful, He is
pleased with you. No bearer of burdens can bear the burden of another. In the
end, to your Lord is your Return, when He will tell you the truth of all that
ye did (in this life). for He knoweth well all that is in (men's) hearts."
(Quran 39:7)
The fact that Allah does not need us yet we need Allah, and Allah blesses us in
various ways, is in itself proof of how much Allah loves humans, it is
unconditional love in the sense that Allah does not need anything from us.
It is conditional love in that Allah will not place evil people in Heaven with
us, which is even a greater love for us from Allah, because Allah in Heaven
will protect us from evil people by separating us from them, even though it
does not effect Allah either way.
Peace
Mohamed Ghounem
Denis Giron
> asalamu alykum Denis,
Pax Vobis Mohamed!
> Wasn't the OT God and Jesus the same God in Trinitarian Christianity?
Christians would certainly argue so. However, the heterodox Marcionite
sect was so troubled by the apparent differences between the Old and
New Testaments that they tried to portray them as putting forth
different conceptions of God that were so contradictory that they had
to be referring to two different Gods (and your find in Hosea may
support this, as I will note below).
As for your claims about the brutality in the OT, I agree for the most
part, but as I noted in my discussion with Zain Ali elsewhere here in
SRI, this does not really help the Qur'an escape from Craig's charge
of moral inadequacy. Craig's argument is that the Qur'anic conception
of God is morally inadequate because it presents Allaah as imperfectly
loving (your wonderful find in Hosea may allow us to raise a similar
charge against the Biblical conception of God). The alleged problems
with the OT (which I agree with, though Craig does not) would show
that the Biblical conception of God is morally inadequate, but for a
different reason: it presents God as imperfectly just.
This does not save the Qur'an from the objections brought up, however.
It seems that if your arguments are correct, then we conclude that
both the Qur'an and the OT put forth morally inadequate conceptions of
God. In other words, heaping the charge of moral inadequacy on another
text does not relieve the Qur'an of this charge.
> actions speak louder than words ;-)
Words speak loud enough. The text in question (be it the Qur'an or
some other text) presents a conception of God. If the text claims God
is a certain way, we can attack that conception of God (assuming there
is grounds to attack it on). The Qur'an presents Allaah as imperfectly
loving, hence the charge of moral inadequacy against the conception of
God put forth in the text.
> To answer your question, yes, the OT does say God does not love
> certain people;
>
> [...]
>
> "I began to hate them. Because of the wickedness of their deeds I will drive
> them out of my house. I will love them no more; all their princes are rebels."
> (Ho 9:15)
This is the one verse where I think you have found something, and I
think it is a great find. In light of verse 14 (i.e. the previous
verse), one *might* argue that this is still Hose'a speaking. That
interpretation, however, might be strained in light of the words
"mi-beyti agharshem" (I will expell/push them from my house). So,
assuming this is God speaking here (I mean, assuming that is the
intention of the text - to present it as the words of God), then it
seems that we can raise a charge of moral inadequacy against the
Biblical conception of God, similar to the one raised against the
Qur'anic conception of God.
Worse yet, if (as I believe) the Sermon on the Mount presents God as
perfectly loving (unconditionally loving, loving even those who do not
love you), then we can even claim that the Biblical conception of God
is logically inconsistent (which would seem to lean slightly in favor
of some sort of neo-Marcionism). I'd be interested in how Dr. Craig
would respond to Hosea 9:15, but I do not know him personally, and
thus cannot ask him directly.
It seems to me that it is reasonable to conclude that both the Qur'an
and the OT present God as imperfectly loving, thus both conceptions of
God (or are they roughly the same conception of God?) are morally
inadequate. This seems to be good philosophical grounds on which to
reject the big Monotheistic three (Judaism, Christianity and Islam, at
least in their Orthodox forms). So even if I finally conceded to
Craig's powerful arguments for God's existence, I could not possibly
adhere to one of these faiths (though the aforementioned
Neo-Marcionism might still be an option, or maybe the ultra liberal
approach to scripture found among American Episcopalian parishes?).
In his debate with Jamal Badawi, Craig laid out his arguments against
Islam, and then said "for these and other reasons, even if I were not
a Christian, I cannot possibly be a Muslim." I agree. In Hose'a 9:15,
you may have finally given me concrete philosophical grounds on which
to reject Christianity (as of recent I have reconsidered the main
reasons I originally apostatized from Christianity years ago, and
found most of them wanting), but I have seen no reason to find Islam
immune to similar philosophical objections.
Thank you very much for a wonderful post. I look forward to your next
contribution akhi...
-Denis Giron
http://www.geocities.com/freethoughtmecca/home.htm
Altway
convert...@aol.com (ConvertstoIslam) wrote in message
> Wasn't the OT God and Jesus the same God in Trinitarian Christianity?
Comment:-
Some Christians think so.
But they are mistaken.
As The NT tells us Jesus was sent by God and that he was saying and doing
what
God had taught him. He was not doing anything of his own.
(John 6:38, 57, 7:16, 8:28, 10:37-38, 12:49)
Jesus was representing God on earth and was speaking on behalf of God
and that is where the misinterpretation lies.
Christians have mistaken the Messenger for God.
This has led them into the error of trinitarianism and of vicarious
atonement.
It also leads them into the error of trying to judge God, because
Jesus, being human, had limitations and his behaviour illustrates
only certain aspects and attributes of God.
Christians emphasise Love while ignoring Justice and Truth.
People like Denis Giron and Craig seem unable to understand
that as God (the one Jesus calls Father and known in Islam as Allah)
is the creator of all things, He cannot be judged by His creatures.
Perfection belongs to Him and all things are judged by Him.
The result of this failure is endless nonsensicle arguments.
Hamid S. Aziz
ConvertstoIslam
>the heterodox Marcionite
>sect was so troubled by the apparent differences between the Old and
>New Testaments that they tried to portray them as putting forth
>different conceptions of God that were so contradictory that they had
>to be referring to two different Gods
although that would solve the issues in Trinity, the Marcionite position would
run right into Polytheism, no matter how nice those 2 gods were.
>In other words, heaping the charge of moral inadequacy on another
>text does not relieve the Qur'an of this charge.
your right in the sense that both teach conditional love, although this is not
morally inadequate. The focus needs to be on two realities: (free will of
humans) and (God as Self Sufficient). When these two factors are equated, then
it's understood that the love in the Quran towers above the deceptive notions
Craig offers.
A Christian Hitler (the worlds biggest Jew murderer) in Heaven with Jesus (an
ethnic Jew) seems to be a satisfactory and acceptable notion to Craig. In
other words, the murdered would be heaped together with the murderers in
Craig's Heaven.
This is a ludicrous and disgusting theory, in fact, such an environment would
be full of violence because the murdered would seek vengeance on their
murderers as they do here on earth with attempted murders.
While in Islam, the righteous are separated from their evil murderers. So in
Islam, the fact that entrance into Heaven is conditional, shows a more caring /
loving God than in the Gospel. Whether humans murder each other on earth or in
Heaven, makes no difference to God because God is not dependant on humans, so
the fact that God conditionally separates us, is for *our own benefit*.
As far as those evil people are concerned, they had the free choice not to be
evil, so again, it is not God in Islam who harms them, they harm themselves:
"Each one of them We seized for his crime: of them, against some We sent a
violent tornado (with showers of stones); some were caught by a (mighty) Blast;
some We caused the earth to swallow up; and some We drowned (in the waters): It
was not Allah Who injured (or oppressed) them:" They injured (and oppressed)
their own souls." (Quran 29:40)
So based on the foundation of free choice and an independent God, we realize
that God loves us without needing to love us, which is the meaning of
unconditional love, and the only aspect of love that may seem conditional, is
the filtration process in which God separates the Hitlers from the Jesuses of
the world, which in fact is another display of unconditional love towards the
righteous, who by their own free choice, made the decision to be who they are.
Craig's Heaven is a hateful place where the unjustly murderered are fused
together with their killers, and the killer is rewarded as much as the killed,
degrading the value of Heaven, the meaning of retribution, and worse of all,
showing a heartless God, unfeeling the suffering caused on the victims. Thus,
the Quran teaches a perfectly loving God, giving good for the good, and bad for
the bad, or in other words, giving what people ask for or what they choose.
>> "I began to hate them. Because of the wickedness of their deeds I will
>drive
>> them out of my house. I will love them no more; all their princes are
>rebels."
>> (Ho 9:15)
>
>This is the one verse where I think you have found something, and I
>think it is a great find.
ask and you shall receive ;-) I would have shown it to you sooner, but I did
not understand at first that you were looking for more than just "I will hate
you" in the Bible, you were looking for "I will not love you" since you didn't
fully accept that hate was the exact contradiction of love.
The fact that Craig falsely propagates no such passage appears in the Bible,
only shows Craig's ignorance towards his own Bible, as well as a false sales
pitch about the Heaven filled with evil murderers.
>Worse yet, if (as I believe) the Sermon on the Mount presents God as
>perfectly loving (unconditionally loving, loving even those who do not
>love you), then we can even claim that the Biblical conception of God
>is logically inconsistent (which would seem to lean slightly in favor
>of some sort of neo-Marcionism).
there are hundreds of inconsistent notions in the Bible that the Quran corrects
:-)
http://www.muslimplanet.com/Islamic-book-store/quran-corrects-bible.htm
>I'd be interested in how Dr. Craig
>would respond to Hosea 9:15, but I do not know him personally, and
>thus cannot ask him directly.
you won't have to wait, I can already tell you how other apologetics respond;
"It's in the OT, so it doesn't count, only the NT counts"...
Norman Geisler uses that excuse dozens of times in "When Critics ask".
>Thank you very much for a wonderful post. I look forward to your next
>contribution akhi...
like wise, I appreciate your skeptical questions, it helps us analyze and
compare the Quran to the Bible, which in my opinion, shows how the Quran towers
in Truth.
Peace
Mohamed Ghounem
Denis Giron
>
> People like Denis Giron and Craig seem unable to understand
> that as God (the one Jesus calls Father and known in Islam as Allah)
> is the creator of all things, He cannot be judged by His creatures.
> Perfection belongs to Him and all things are judged by Him.
This, I think, is a rather poor argument. It seems it may even render
a blow to Islamic notions of fitra (in the sense that one who is in a
pure state of fitra may be able to infer truths about Allaah without
the aid of revelation or the claims of religious authorities - or have
I misunderstood what fitra is?). It seems that Altway wishes to deny
that we can infer any truths about God, which is a position I doubt he
really holds to.
Suppose tomorrow I claim to get a revelation in which God told me that
He is actually four inches tall and green, and this four inch tall
green deity has told me to kill all human children. I imagine Altway
would be hugely skeptical about this being an accurate description of
God. But how would he respond if I claimed that he has no right to
judge God - that God is not subject to his whims and fancies?
It seems that there are certain things we can know about God (assuming
there is a God). Even Altway seems to think that He is perfect. Does
Altway also believe He is omnipotent, omnipresent, omniscient,
eternal, et cetera? Or would Altway be willing to accept the
possibility that Allaah is imperfect, limited in power and knowledge,
or mortal (i.e. subject to possible anihilation or death)? I would
imagine that Altway too holds certain a priori positions about the
nature of God.
The issue with the charge of moral inadequacy is not one where we
criticize God. Rather this is an argument in which we cast certain
conceptions of God into doubt. So in other words, in this discussion
on moral inadequacy I have been attempting to lay the philosophical
grounds on which one might reject the Islamic conception of God.
Denis Giron
> Salam Denis,
Pax Vobis Mohamed!
> although that would solve the issues in Trinity, the Marcionite position
> would run right into Polytheism, no matter how nice those 2 gods were.
Yes, the Marcionites (as I understand it) were full on ditheists,
which believed in two gods - one an evil God, worshipped by the Jews,
and another benevolent an merciful God who came down in the form of
Jesus to rescue us from the evil OT God. I'm not too fond of ditheism,
which is why I joked about a sort of "Neo-Marcionism" - the
Marcionites rejected the entire OT (and parts of the NT). So if there
was some brand of Christianity that did that (without the ditheist
theology), I'd find it interesting.
> A Christian Hitler (the worlds biggest Jew murderer) in Heaven with Jesus (an
> ethnic Jew) seems to be a satisfactory and acceptable notion to Craig. In
> other words, the murdered would be heaped together with the murderers in
> Craig's Heaven.
Not at all. You seem to have misunderstood Craig's argument, that a
God who is both perfectly just and perfectly loving can love those
whom His justice requires that He punish (and He can therefore punish
even those whom He loves). The issue that you have missed is the one
of God not loving certain individuals - God's love being conditional
and imperfect. It is for this reason that the Islamic conception of
God is morally inadequate.
> there are hundreds of inconsistent notions in the Bible that the
> Quran corrects :-)
>
> http://www.muslimplanet.com/Islamic-book-store/quran-corrects-bible.htm
An add for your book (which I may have access to soon ;D), but I did
not find any immediate examples. I know many Muslims argue/claim that
the Qur'an corrects the Bible on a number of fronts, but I have not
seen any examples that I find particularly convincing. Care to give an
example or two?
> like wise, I appreciate your skeptical questions, it helps us analyze and
> compare the Quran to the Bible, which in my opinion, shows how the Quran
> towers in Truth.
I'm not so sure. The only conclusions I've come to in this thread are
the following:
(1) The Biblical conception of God is logically inconsistent
(as it puts different conceptions of God).
(2) The OT conception of God suffers from moral inadequacy.
(3) The Qur'anic conception of God suffers from moral inadequacy.
(4) The NT conception of God does not suffer from moral inadequacy.
In other words, my position is that there are philosophical grounds on
which to reject the OT and the Qur'an, and as long as the NT and
Christianity is attached to the OT, there are philosophical grounds to
reject that as well.
-Denis Giron
Mike Hutton
>
> > Wasn't the OT God and Jesus the same God in Trinitarian Christianity?
>
> Comment:-
>
> Some Christians think so.
> But they are mistaken.
Read the question.
Read your answer.
The OT God and Jesus *are* the same God in Trinitarian Christianity,
regardless of your opinion (or, it has to be said, the opinions of any
Christians whatsoever!).
This is just not the Muslim view of things. It *is* the Trinitarian
view of things.
<snip>
> Christians emphasise Love while ignoring Justice and Truth.
Does this mean that Muslims emphasise Justice and Truth, while
ignoring Love?
Come on; it is one thing to say that Christians are deluded (a common
view amongst Muslims). It is quite another to say that Christians
*ignore* justice (is this not part of Jesus' teaching in the NT?), or
truth (a cornerstone of Christian conduct).
> People like Denis Giron and Craig seem unable to understand
> that as God (the one Jesus calls Father and known in Islam as Allah)
> is the creator of all things, He cannot be judged by His creatures.
What makes you so sure that this misunderstanding has indeed taken
place?
I do not presume to judge God, merely let Him be who He is, and learn
what I can about Him. But my sources for discovering what I can know
of Him are different from yours. You cannot say that my lack of faith
in the Qu'ran by necessity means that I am judging God, and nor can I
say that your lack of faith in Jesus means that you are.
> Perfection belongs to Him and all things are judged by Him.
Indeed, and so it shall remain.
Mike.
Altway
"Mike Hutton" <hu...@yahoo.co.uk> wrote in message
news:e12001aa.04041...@posting.google.com...
> > > Wasn't the OT God and Jesus the same God in Trinitarian Christianity?
But they are mistaken.
> Read the question.
Read your answer.
> The OT God and Jesus *are* the same God in Trinitarian Christianity,
This is just not the Muslim view of things. It *is* the Trinitarian
view of things.
Comment:-
Read my answer.
Some Christians believe in Trinitarian Christianity.
They are mistaken.
> > Christians emphasise Love while ignoring Justice and Truth.
> Does this mean that Muslims emphasise Justice and Truth, while
ignoring Love?
Comment:-
No of course not.
Every chapter in the Quran tells us that Allah is Compassionate, Benevolent
and Merciful
>> Come on; it is one thing to say that Christians are deluded (a common
view amongst Muslims). It is quite another to say that Christians
*ignore* justice (is this not part of Jesus' teaching in the NT?), or
truth (a cornerstone of Christian conduct).
Comment:-
Sorry, my apologies, what I should have written,
as I have written in most of my other articles on this subject is:-
The three religions, Hebrewism, Christianity and Islam, though they
recognise the Justice, Love and Truth of God, they place their emphasis
on different aspects of God.
Hebrewism appears to place it mainly on His Justice,
Christianity on His Love and Islam on Truth.
Hebrewism is the Religion of Law and Justice.
Christianity is the religion of Motives and Love.
Islam is the religion of Awareness and Truth.
Each adds something to the previous dispensation and appeals
to a deeper level.
"He it is who sent His Messenger with guidance and the Religion of Truth,
to make it prevail over every other religion, however averse to this the
misbelievers may be!" 9:33
"Say: I exhort you only to one thing that ye awake for Allah's sake (or
stand up before Allah) in twos or singly, then ponder..." 34:46
Hamid S. Aziz
Altway
"Denis Giron" <denis...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:bac0a2be.04041...@posting.google.com...
> > People like Denis Giron and Craig seem unable to understand
that as God (the one Jesus calls Father and known in Islam as Allah)
is the creator of all things, He cannot be judged by His creatures.
Perfection belongs to Him and all things are judged by Him.
> This, I think, is a rather poor argument. It seems it may even render
a blow to Islamic notions of fitra (in the sense that one who is in a
pure state of fitra may be able to infer truths about Allaah without
the aid of revelation or the claims of religious authorities - or have
I misunderstood what fitra is?). It seems that Altway wishes to deny
that we can infer any truths about God, which is a position I doubt he
really holds to.
Comment:-
Unfortunately, the assumptions behind these statements show
the same misconceptions that have not been understood.
We do not infer truths. We perceive them.
It is not a question of thinking but of consciousness, awareness.
To use Christian terminology, the spirit of God in man
discerns the things of God.
See John 8:47 and Quran 6:104-105, 11:24, 22:46, 34:46 and many more.
But no doubt, you wish to cling to your own "opinions" and "reasoning",
while
I base my argument on an understanding of revelations which I regard
as comming from a higher source. (The normally conscious part of ordinary
man is
only a small part of the sensitivity and activity of his brain)
The rest of your statements are nonsense and require no
further reply.
Hamid S. Aziz
Syed
Salam Dennis,
> I think that if we look at it
> objectively, we can conclude that unconditional love is more in line
> with perfect love than is conditional love. I realize that you
> disagree, so I will explain why I hold this position, and then attempt
> to answer your objections.
My disagreement is with the term perfect love - it is completely your
opinion as to what is perfect and what isnt.
> Unconditional love and conditional love are logical contradictories of
> one another, and perfect love and imperfect love are logical
> contradictories of one another. So if one's love is conditional, it is
> either perfect or imperfect.
OK, agreed, conditional love is either pefrect or imperfect.
> Now, several times in this thread I have
> repeated Craig's analogy of the father who tells his son "I will only
> love you if you measure up to my standard." Indeed, such father-son
> relationships do exist, but they exist precisely because the father is
> imperfectly loving.
Imperfectly loving puyrely because you think it is.
> The philosophy expressed in the Sermon on the
> Mount presents perfect love as being a state in which one loves even
> those who do not love them, and is contrasted with those who love only
> those who love them.
Again, perfect *in your eyes*. You think it is perfect, but you havent
shown that it is.
> Now, the Qur'an presents Allaah as loving only those who fear/love
> Him, and the love is clearly conditional. This picture to me seems to
> be analogous to the father who loves his son only if he measures up,
> and to me, it is a sad picture. Since Allaah's love is conditional, He
> is imperfectly loving (for the reasons I attempted to lay out above).
You even admit that this is your opinion "...to me, it is a sad
picture".
Allah loves those who l49:9 ...: for Allah loves those who are fair
(and just)
Again, personally, I think conditional love is far more "perfect" than
unconditional, as I dont like the idea of God still loving an evil
being no matter what he does.
> I think this begins to move over to an issue of justice rather than
> love. God can be both perfectly just and perfectly loving, and thus
> still love those whom His justice requires that He punish. The analogy
> that I have given previously in this thread is that of a judge who has
> his own son come before him. He can still love his son without
> compromising his being just, and thus give his son the required
> punishment for his crime without compromising his love.
Yes - this is still the case in Islam, as God can love those who
fear/love Him yet still punish them for their sins. But again, you
havent proved that perfect love is unconditional.
> Now, you also brought up the example of rapists, murderers, and how
> they compare with more righteous individuals in terms of God's love.
> First of all, as I have argued with Asim Mehmood, assuming free will
> exists, and judgement day has not arrived, it seems a human can always
> turn back from his sins, and is thus never synonomous with his sins
> (no matter how brutal).
Im not sure this is the case in Islam. Only Allah can forgive a man's
sins, and he will never know till the Day of Judgement. If I remember
correctly, Islamic teaching is that with every major sin, the soul is
affected (this maybe more hadith material). So he is synonomous with
his sins unless Allah forgives them.
> To love
> those who keep the law more than those who break it brings us back to
> the father who only loves his son when he measures up. A God who is
> perfectly loving can love all individuals equally, and love them
> despite their sins, while His being perfectly just will require that
> He not blink at sin.
Firstly, you havent dealt with the issue I raised, of God loving some
people more than he loves others (eg Prophets). I believe this to be
the case, and I dont really know if there are passages in the Bible of
God showing special love for some people than he would for the rest of
us, but since I believe that God will and does love the very righteous
more than the less righteous (which I think is perfect), then I have
to conclude that conditional love is the perfect love.
Secondly, again, you simply state what a perfectly loving God can or
cant do, without providing a solid arguement as to why perfect love =
unconditional love.
> I think it is
> at least possible to envision a scenario in which Allaah chooses not
> to love certain individuals. In fact, analogously, I would also argue
> that it is possible for Allaah to choose to reward sinners and punish
> the righteous. God can do whatever He wants, but if He punishes
> righteousness and rewards sin, then He cannot be termed perfectly
> just; rather, He would be imperfectly just, or unjust. So too, while
> God can choose to not love whomever He pleases, such a God is
> imperfectly loving.
Basically, you are arguing that perfectly just means being just to
everyone, and *therefore* perfectly loving means being loving to
everyone.
That is ignoring the semantics - "just" by definition means that if
God is unjust to a single person, He is not perfectly just. However,
the same does not apply to love - if God does not love one person, it
does not mean He is imperfectly loving.
To summarise, this is what you have argued:
You can be just or unjust:
If you are always just, you are perfectly just.
If you are sometimes unjust or always unjust, you are not perfectly
just.
You can be loving or unloving:
If you are always loving, you are perfectly loving.
If you are sometimes unloving or always unlvoing, you are not
perfectly loving.
Personally, though I agree with the "just" case, both of them are
incorrect, purely because perfection here is purely an opinion. If you
are arguing about completeness, then that is totally irrelevant and a
completely useless point being made - for example, God can be
completely angry to everyone, that doesnt make it better than being
incompletely angry (ie not always). Again, it is purely opinion as to
if it is better if God loves everyone regardless and will always love
them, or if God's love is conditional on certain actions and you can
gain God's love or more of it by doing good or great deeds. Who are
you to argue as if it were a fact that one is better than the other?
> This seems to be the God affirmed on the Islamic
> conception, and thus I agree with Craig that such a conception of God
> presents Allaah as imperfectly loving.
Again, purely on the basis of opinion.
I dont think this is an arguement that either side could win, as
christians will say "God having perfect love means loving everyone
regardless" and muslims will say "God having perfect love is loving
everyone based on their love/fear of God/good deeds/evil actions", and
it is purely what is perfect to the individual.
After all, I love Nutella and I hate (ie not love) Marmite which I
think tastes like acidic sewage, some with the same like and dislike
will say I have perfect taste, Craig comes along and says "to have
perfect taste you must love both". Thats his opinion, and nothing
else.
Taher
I will begin by tackling this issue using two differents approches :
First I will assume :
1- Allah is Perfectly Just.
And conclude how must be the nature of Allah's Love ( Conditional or Not).
Secondly I will assume :
2 - Allah's Love is *UNConditional*
And Conclude How could be His Justice ( Perfect or Not).
- If We assume point 1, "Allah is Perfectly Just", then this Perfect
Justice must also be applicable to His Love (Justly Loving), Then He must be
loving His creatures Justly , thus, more Loving for those who merits more
love and lesser loving for those who merits lesser love. The distinction
between who merits more or less Love is based upon fixed criteria made known
for All people.
Thus we can easily conclude that Being Perfectly JUST implies Conditional
Love.
- If We Assume point 2, "Allah's Love is *UNConditional*", then Allah Love
is equal to All creatures. Then He must be equally loving to All people
even if they dont merit the same degree of Love. Thus UNConditional Love
implies UNPerfect Justice.
>From Conclusions to point 1 and 2 we can conclude :
Perfect Justice implies Conditional Love.
UNConditional Love implies UNPerfect Justice.
Now , I would ask the question : Is Conditional Love IMPerfect ?
If Yes, on who's eyes ?
If Someone is among the more beloved people he would answer that Conditional
Love is rather Perfect because He did more deeds to merit that degree of
love than people who are less beloved.
For those who are less beloved I can't see why they would think Conditional
Love is IMPerfect ?
--
Taher
(remove _ANTI_SPAM to respond by email)
> denis...@hotmail.com (Denis Giron) wrote in message
news:<bac0a2be.04040...@posting.google.com>...
> > I think that if we look at it
Denis Giron
> Salam Dennis,
Pax Vobis Syed...
Sorry for the delay; my studies took up much of my time...
> > The philosophy expressed in the Sermon on the
> > Mount presents perfect love as being a state in which one loves even
> > those who do not love them, and is contrasted with those who love only
> > those who love them.
>
> Again, perfect *in your eyes*. You think it is perfect, but you havent
> shown that it is.
Quickly, this is also "perfect" according to the Sermon on the Mount,
but I agree that doesn't make a difference (and I enjoyed your Nutella
vs Marmite analogy). So let me again try to explain why I consider
conditional love to be perfect love.
It is a position that is drawn out of agreement with the philosophy
expressed in the sermon on the mount. The issue is as follows: if a
person *only* loves those who love him, or only those who does what he
says, or only those whom are of some benefit to him, a certain amount
of selfishness comes into play. So, I would argue that selfless love
is superior to the sort of love just mentioned. If this position of
mine is correct, then selfless love would entail loving even those who
do not love you.
> Im not sure this is the case in Islam. Only Allah can forgive a man's
> sins, and he will never know till the Day of Judgement.
If in Islam it is held that a man is synonomous with his sins, then I
see a real problem with the notion of repentance. I understand that
forgiveness would ultimately be up to God, but I would imagine that
Islam still holds that God's forgiveness is not exactly arbitrary. For
example, if both you and I are career criminals, and then you turn
your life around and embrace Islam while I continue to harm and
exploit people, it would seem that the Islamic position would be that
you're at least a great deal more likely to receive Allaah's
forgiveness than I am. Thus it would seem that repentance is an
option. If one is synonomous with or identical too their sins, they
cannot turn away from their sins. If they cannot turn away from their
sins, then repentance is not possible. Based on these conditional
propositions, if repentance is possible, we are not synonomous with
our sins.
> Firstly, you havent dealt with the issue I raised, of God loving some
> people more than he loves others (eg Prophets). I believe this to be
> the case, and I dont really know if there are passages in the Bible of
> God showing special love for some people
Actually, as Mohamed Ghounem has shown elsewhere in
soc.religion.islam, Hosea 9:15 can very sensibly be interpreted as
presenting God's love as being conditional. Thus if this argument
employed by me (which, admittedly, I have adapted from a Christian
philosopher) is correct/sound, then Judaism and Christianity would
also be subject to the same charge of moral inadequacy that I have
heaped upon Islam.
However, with regard specifically to God loving some more than others,
this gets back to the issue I brought up above. It would seem on this
model God shares his love based on how well a person heeds His word,
how serious a person is about following His rules, whether or not the
person loves Him or not. Thus what we get is a God that only loves
those who love/fear Him. This becomes a God whose love is not
selfless, but rather is closer to being self-centered. It is difficult
for me to seriously consider self-centered love superior to selfless
love.
> Basically, you are arguing that perfectly just means being just to
> everyone, and *therefore* perfectly loving means being loving to
> everyone.
I was simply arguing that it is *possible* that God not be perfectly
just or perfectly loving, but in such a case He would be open to the
charge of being imperfectly just or imperfectly loving. That was all.
-Denis Giron