The Kenosis of Jesus Christ

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The Kenosis of Jesus Christ: What Does It Tell Us about the Son of God?

One subject that has continually initiated considerable controversy is
the issue of Jesus Christ's kenosis. The word kenosis (in this context)
refers to the "self-emptying" of the heavenly Logos, who was with God
"in the beginning" (Ryrie 260-262). It pertains to the act of
self-negation whereby the Son of God "became flesh" and resided among
men (John 1:14). This theological doctrine that we will now examine in
some detail finds its origins in the "hymn" recorded at Phil
2:5-11.

The term "kenotic" derives from the Greek kenoo, which can mean: "to
empty." Apparently, Theodotion was the first theologue to use "kenosis"
as a theological term in his translation of Isa 34:11. However, both
Gregory Nazianzus and Cyril of Alexandria use the word to express the
action whereby Christ "emptied himself." Additionally, the Latin
Vulgate renders Phil 2:7 with the phrase "semetipsum exinanivit," while
Tertullian uses the formula "exhausit semetipsum" in his work Adversus
Marcionem. The real concern for each of these thinkers seems to have
been: 'In what sense did Christ empty himself'? Thus we seem justified
in viewing the term kenosis as an emptying, and in our discussion it
will refer to the Son of God's self-emptying described in Phil 2:6-7.
Admittedly, there have been many theories and a number of approaches to
Christological kenoticism. We shall examine some of these theories and
then analyze the locus classicus of the kenotic event: Phil 2:6-7.

The Traditional View of Christ's Kenosis

Philippians 2:6ff has often been associated with the so-called
hypostatic union of Christ Jesus. Theologians have frequently enlisted
this passage to putatively elucidate the personalistic ontological
uniting they say occurred when he assumed the form of a man.

In this regard, Bishop Cyril declared that Phil 2:6ff demonstrates that
"God [was from] God, being by nature the only-begotten Logos of God,
the radiance of the glory and the express image of the person of him
who begot him" (Pelikan 1:247-248). In other words, Cyril thought that
Phil 2:6ff helps Christians to understand that the "enfleshed" Son of
God was "unchangeable according to nature," and "[remained] completely
what he was and ever is" during his earthly life. Therefore, he
believed that the alleged incarnate God enjoyed "an indivisible unity
[of nature]" while subsisting in the form of a man (1:248).

As shown from Cyril's comments, Phil 2:6-7 has played an eminent role
in the formulation of Christological dogma. It has therefore proven to
be a significant Biblical account vis-à-vis the development of
Christological systematizations. In view of its admitted didactic
character, Pope Leo thought that Christians should interpret the
kenosis of Christ as "the bending down of [the] compassion" of God: not
as the "failing of [God's] power" (Pelikan 1:255-258). The kenosis
event also signified, for Pope Leo, that both natures of the
only-begotten Son of God 'met in one person.' Subsequently "lowliness
[was] assumed by majesty, weakness by power, mortality by eternity."
The upshot of such an exegesis is that we can describe the life of
Christ as somewhat of a dialectical tension between his divine and
human natures. This theological data supposedly explains the seeming
contradictory events in the life of our Lord and Savior. Hence, one who
believes in the incarnation is supposedly able to reconcile the
Biblical occasions where Christ appears to lack divine knowledge and
looks like he is passible, by appealing to the kenosis. As man,
kenoticists contend that Christ was mutable, mortal, lowly, and weak;
as God, however, they claim that he was Impassible, Immortal,
Transcendent and Omnipotent. To resolve the ostensibly conflicting
elements of this theological stance, Christian scholars invoke Phil
2:6ff. Evidently, this Biblical account adequately clarifies the
"enfleshment" (incarnatio) of "God the Son." However, we must ask
whether Paul's words really justify Trinitarian explanations of
Jesus' limitations on earth. For example, what is Phil 2:6-7 speaking
of when it says that Christ "emptied himself"? What are the
implications of this Pauline statement?

The Synod of Antioch in 341 CE decided that Christ emptied himself of
"the being equal with God" (kenosas heauton apo tou einai isa theo)
when he became incarnate. While the Synod thus emphatically affirmed
that Christ is fully God and fully man, it simultaneously contended
that he emptied himself of equality with God during his "incarnation"
(incarnatio). Consequently, it seems that certain fourth century
Christians viewed the kenosis of Christ as the supreme act of humility
whereby God the Son (the second Person of the Trinity) engaged in
self-abnegation vis-à-vis his equal standing with God the Father and
God the Holy Spirit. The kenosis thus serves as an event that
Christians should emulate in their personal lives: "If the divine
majesty lowers itself in such great humility, does human weakness have
the right to make boast of anything?" asked Ambrose of Rupert with
regard to the kenotic event" (Pelikan 3:23). Professor Pelikan also
notes:

In this he was carrying on a way of speaking characteristic of his
fathers and brethren, who took delight in the paradox of the
incarnation. Christ, the Son of God, has undergone humiliation in order
to save mankind, and it was only fitting that his followers should
imitate his humble suffering. (3:23)

Probably one of the most intriguing interpretations of the kenosis
event is the one proposed by Anselm of Canterbury. In his famous work,
Cur Deus Homo, Anselm expounded on Phil 2:6ff and its meaning for the
Christian faith. This theologian thought the kenosis implies that the
Son of God, the Father, and the Holy Spirit all made a determination
that "he [the Son] would not manifest the sublimity of his omnipotence
to the world in any other way than through his death" (Pelikan 3:142).
In Anselm's theological paradigm, Christ the God-man (deus et homo) had
to die in order to effectuate the deliverance of humankind from sin.
The Son (in his preexistent state) was incapable of suffering or dying.
However, by means of the kenosis--the Logos became capable of
suffering, was susceptible to morbidity, and consequently was able to
deliver humanity through his holy blood, which according to Anselm,
possessed infinite worth. The famed bishop of Canterbury thus concluded
that as a result of the Son's utter spontaneity and divine free
heartedness, Christ in the person of God the Son "enfleshed" showed
himself willing to die and satisfy the eminent justice of God. It was
only by means of the kenosis that Christ's death had been possible:
there was no other way for the Impassible to become passible.

While Anselm's treatment of Phil 2:6-7 seems to clear up any conundrums
that may develop when we discuss the enfleshed Christ, the question
still remains--did Anselm really remove the enigmatic features
surrounding the kenosis? Does Phil 2:6-7 serve as clear proof of
Christ's Deity?

Other Interpretations of the Kenotic Event

As can be seen from a brief perusal of the patristic tradition,
theologians have generally interpreted the kenosis of Christ as an
example of divine humility, self-negation and "divine self-limitation."
The idea of divine self-limitation has especially been explored since
the nineteenth century. Gottfried Thomasius is one such theologian who
exerted a profound influence on the teaching concerning the
self-limitation of the Son during his days in the flesh:

The transition into this [human] condition is manifestly a
self-limitation for the eternal Son of God. It is certainly not a
divesting of that which is essential to deity in order to be God, but
it is a divesting of the divine mode of being in favor of the humanly
creaturely form of existence, and eo ipso a renunciation of the divine
glory which he had from the beginning with the Father and exercised
vis-à-vis the world, governing and ruling it throughout. (qt. in Welch
48)

Discoursing on this same theme, Dietrich Bonhoeffer summed up
contemporary notions of the kenotic event when he dramatically stated:

Behold the God who has become man, the unfathomable mystery of the love
of God for the world. God loves man. God loves the world. It is not an
ideal man that He loves, but man as he is; not an ideal world, but the
real world . . . God becomes man, real man (Bonhoeffer 71).

It is apparent that traditionally and contemporarily, the kenosis of
Christ has often been interpreted as an event involving divine
self-negation, humiliation and self-limitation. Kenotic theories have
frequently been employed to explain how Christ could be "fully God and
fully man" (vere deus et vere homo): they have been utilized to
demonstrate how he could be simultaneously Impassible and passible.
With these preliminary points covered, we shall now take the time to
examine this doctrine in the light of Phil 2:6-7.

Philippians 2:6-7: Exegesis and Exposition

One of the most controversial passages of Holy Writ is Phil 2:6-7. In
the NRSV this Bible passage reads: "though he [Christ] was in the form
of God, [he] did not regard equality with God as something to be
exploited, but emptied himself, taking the form of a slave, being born
in human likeness, and being found in human form, he humbled himself."
It is now my intent to analyze closely Phil 2:6-7 and to discern
whether or not the Bible supports any of the kenotic theories set forth
by ancient or contemporary theologians.

>From the outset, we note that the apostle Paul writes: en morphe theou
huparchon ouch harpagmon egesato to einai isa theo. What did the
apostle mean when he penned these rich Greek words? In what sense was
Christ en morphe theou huparchon? Here again, this verse has proven to
be a metaphorical battleground for contemporary theologians and
exegetes. Many have wondered, exactly how did Christ exist en morphe
theou huparchon? Theologian Charles Ryrie makes the following
observation:

J.B. Lightfoot, after a detailed study of morphe in Greek philosophy,
in Philo, and in the New Testament, concludes that it connotes that
which is intrinsic and essential to the thing. Thus here [in Phil 2:6]
it means that our Lord in his preincarnate state possessed essential
Deity" (Ryrie 261).

Spiros Zodhiates echoes the thoughts of Ryrie. He points out that
morphe denotes "form" in that:

Morphe in Philippians 2:6-8 presumes an [objective] reality. None could
be in the form (morphe) of God who was not God. Morphe is the reality
which can be externalized, not some shape that is the result of pure
thought. It is the utterance of the inner life, a life which bespeaks
the existence of God. (Zodhiates 937)

Kenneth Wuest's views are as follows:

It is to this expression of glory that the words, being in the form of
God, refer. The word God is anarthrous here, referring not to any
single person of the Godhead but to deity as such . . . The word
essence in the translation comes from the demands of the Greek text
here since theos is anarthrous. The presence of the Greek article
identifies, its absence qualifies. Its absence emphasizes nature,
essence. In this state of preincarnate being, Paul says that our Lord
thought it not robbery to be equal with God. Equality with God here
does not mean equality with the other person of the Godhead, but
equality with deity as such. The word God is again anarthrous. And this
equality here is not equality in the possession of the divine essence
but in its expression, as the context indicates. However, the
expression presupposes the possession of that essence. (When Jesus
Emptied Himself, Kenneth Wuest, 1958)

As can be discerned from the aforementioned comments, Zodhiates, Ryrie
and Wuest believe that en morphe theou describes the eternal existence
and substantial Deity of Jesus Christ. Christ en morphe theou huparchon
is thus said to signify essential and substantial Godhood. This
conclusion could possibly be true if we understood morphe to signify
"essential, substantial" reality. But is this how we should define
morphe in this particular context?

Thayer's Greek-English Lexicon appears to take a different view of
morphe. Other explicators of Scripture also support the stance
delineated in this work. In his Greek-English Lexicon, Thayer
particularly notes that morphe may denote:

The form by which a person or thing strikes the vision; the external
appearance: children are said to reflect psuches te kai morphes
homoioteta (of their parents) 4 Macc. 15.3 (4); ephanerothe en hetera
morphe, Mark 16:12; en morphe theou huparchon, Phil. 2:6 . . . he [the
Logos] bore the form (in which he appeared to the inhabitants of
heaven) of God (the sovereign, opp. to morph. doulou), yet did not
think that this equality with God was to be eagerly clung to or
retained . . .(Thayer 418)

Thayer's words indicate that one probably should not conscript morphe
to buttress the belief that Jesus is fully God (vere deus). Morphe,
based on Thayer's observations, may simply refer to an "external
appearance" or "outward reflection." In the NT, it evidently does
not refer to the substance or essence of a thing. Christ could
therefore have existed as a reflection of Deity; consequently, he would
not necessarily have subsisted as a member of the triune Godhead. (For
another ancient use of morphe as "outward appearance" with regard to
children, cf. Philo, De Legatione 55.) Instead of being Almighty God
per his essence, Christ could have simply resembled God the Father
outwardly as he lived among the heavenly hosts (John 14:9; Col. 1:15).
A number of scholars have become aware of this point in their study of
the lingual signifier morphe. These individuals have consequently been
unable to avoid concluding that morphe carries the sense of "external
appearance" in Phil 2:6:

By seeing the expression 'in the form of God' against the common wisdom
of Antiquity that offspring bear the visible likeness of their parents,
Paul's thought becomes much clearer. As the Son of God from heaven,
Christ bore the outward morphe of his Father in his existence before
becoming a man and divested himself (heauton ekenosen) of it in order
to take the form of a slave. (Wannamaker 185)

Additionally, in an article entitled "Ernst Lohmeyer's Kurios Jesus,"
Colin Brown writes that morphe "connotes visible appearance" (Martin
and Dodd 27). Upon reading A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament
and Early Christian Literature (BAGD), it is indeed very difficult to
avoid this understanding of morphe. This superb reference work says
that morphe carries the sense of "form, outward appearance, shape." It
is used generically of bodily form in 1 Clement 39:3: "For what can a
mortal man do? Or what strength is there in one made out of the dust?
For it is written, "There was no shape [morphe] before mine eyes, only
I heard a sound" (Cf. Job 4:16 LXX), and the Bible writers also employ
morphe to describe "the shape or form of statues, appearances in
visions similar to persons, [and] the risen Christ ephanerothe en
hetera morphe" (BAGD 528).

BAGD additionally notes that Christ appeared in a "different form"
after his resurrection (Mark 16:12). Paul's use of morphe (in Phil 2:6)
thus suggests that although Jesus existed en morphe theou in his
preexistent state of glory, he did not possess absolute Deity before he
became flesh. In other words, he outwardly resembled God the Father in
heaven, but was evidently inferior to this same God per substance and
rank (John 14:28; 1 Cor. 11:3; 15:24-28). A closer look at the
classical and Scriptural use of morphe will provide further
illumination on this matter. To further discern the Pauline use of
morphe, please note the words of Moises Silva below:

If we stress the classical usage of this term [morphe], the technical
sense of Aristotelian philosophy suggests itself: morphe, although not
equivalent to ousia ("being, essence"), speaks of essential or
characteristic attributes and thus is to be distinguished from schema
(the changeable, external fashion). In a valuable essay on morphe and
schema, [Lightfoot] argued along these lines and remarked that even in
popular usage these respective meanings could be ascertained. The many
references where morphe is used of physical appearance . . . make it
difficult to maintain Lightfoot's precise distinction, though there is
an important element of truth in his treatment. (Silva 113-114)

Upon closer examination, it becomes manifestly obvious that Phil 2:6-7
(by its use of morphe) does not unequivocally establish the essential
deity of Christ. The employment of morphe in Philippians does not
necessarily substantiate the teaching that Christ is God incarnate. To
derive this conclusion from Phil 2:6 demonstrates a mistaken
over-reliance on the Greek term. Moises Silva offers further valuable
comments along these lines as floolws:

[Lightfoot's] claim that morphe (opposite schema) refers to
unchangeable essence can be sustained by some references, but too many
passages speak against it. (Silva 122)

Silva also quotes Plato (Republic 380d) who inquires about God's
ability to alter His "shape" (to autou eidos eis pollas morphas). The
New Testament professor subsequently references Xenophon, Philo, Lucian
and the fourth century writer, Libanius, who wrote: ouch ho tois theos
tes morphen eoikhos (Silva 123). All of these references indicate that
morphe refers to one's external appearance (not to one's intrinsic
essence).

At this point, we must point out that all of the foregoing does not
mean Silva denounces Trinitarianism; he surely does not concede that
Phil 2:6 is dissonant with Trinitarian claims. His comments do help us
to see, however, that one cannot base his or her belief in Christ's
Deity on the mere occurrence of morphe in Phil 2:6. As we shall note
elsewhere in this discussion (contra Silva), the self-emptying
described in Philippians is not necessarily consistent with the claims
of Trinitarianism.

Philippians 2:6-7 and Other Divine Beings

To help us understand this point in more depth, it is beneficial to
consider the observations of Jane Schaberg concerning the respective
semantic fields of elohim and theos. She astutely notes that unity may
be emphasized in the New Testament "without any intended implication of
equality" between the Father and the Son (Schaberg 8). For example,
Jesus claims that he and the Father are one (Jn 10:30). But this verse
need not imply that Jesus is declaring himself equal to the Father in
any way (Jn 14:28). Moreover the apostle John describes Jesus as theos
in his Gospel (Jn 1:1, 18; 20:28). Nevertheless, it appears that the NT
writers utilize theos in a broad monotheistic context. Thus, elohim is
applied to Melchizedek five times in the Qumran document concerning the
ancient priest-King. Philo also applies the word theos to Moses. We may
therefore conclude that the New Testament teaches us there are
subordinate divine beings or godlike ones who are not to be equated
with YHWH (John 10:34-36).

In a similar vein, Phil 2:6-7 tells us that a divine being humbly
became the man Jesus Christ who subsequently lived on earth and
underwent an excruciating and ignominious death. Afterwards, God
resurrected him, subsequently giving Christ a position of authority
more eminent than any other in the universe, save that of the Father
Himself (Phil 2:5-11). According to Phil 2:6-11 and 1 Cor 15:24-28,
however, the Son will eventually hand over the Kingdom to his God and
Father.

Jn 17:3 further assures us that the Son of God is not to be identified
with the only true God. For John, there was only one true God: the
Father. The writer of Philippians also subscribed to the thought found
in the Johannine Gospel. He indicates this belief by his use of morphe
and the cotext of Phil 2:6-7. Let us now return to our consideration of
this pivotal term and also introduce another key word.

Morphe and Harpagmos

Earlier we reviewed Lightfoot's treatment of morphe and his inadequate
claim that the term refers to the substance or essence of a thing in
Phil 2:6. The deficient nature of Lightfoot's argument is also
highlighted by Robert B. Strimple in the Westminster Theological
Journal where Strimple openly relates that for years he too tried to
uphold Lightfoot's distinction between morphe and schema until he had
to admit that there "is really little evidence to support the
conclusion that Paul uses morphe in such a philosophical sense here [in
Phil 2:6]" (Strimple 259). Strimple also cites four instances where
morphe appears in the LXX (Judg 8:18; Job 4:16; Isa 44:13; Dan 3:19).
We now reproduce all four texts for the benefit of our readers:

Anesten kai ouk epegnon eidon kai ouk en morphe pro ophthalmon mou
all' e auran kai phnhn ekouon (Job 4:16 Brenton).

Eklexamenos tekton xulon estesen auto en metro kai en kolle erruthmisen
auto kai epoiesen auto hos morphen andros kai hos horaioteta anthropou
stesai auto en oikos (Isa 44:16 Brenton).

Strimple writes concerning these four passages: "In each instance . . .
morphe refers to the visible form or appearance" (260). Furthermore, it
is worthy of note that Aquila employs morphe in Isa 52:14 to describe
the "outer appearance" of the Messiah.

Since, as Strimple concurs, the theme of Jehovah's Suffering Servant
undoubtedly serves as a backdrop in the Philippians account--it seems
reasonable to assume that morphe as used in Isa 52:14 bears a similar
meaning in Phil 2:6. Strimple concludes: "meager though the Biblical
evidence is, it is sufficient to make a prima facie case for the
reference being to a visible manifestation" (260). These exegetical
insights do not mean that the systematic theologian views the New
Testament account as dissonant with Trinitarianism. Yet, his words do
show the inappropriateness of interpreting the morphe tou theou of the
apostle Paul through Aristotelian lenses. Strimple's words manifestly
show the futility of trying to prove Christ is God via the Biblical use
of morphe and an appeal to Aristotle or Philo's use of the term. (cf.
Wannamaker 185-187 for a clarification of God's "outward appearance.")

Next, the apostle Paul writes: ouch harpagmon egesato to einai isa
theo. What is the significance of this phrase? The Greek word harpagmos
is derived from the term harpazo. Harpazo can depict the act of
stripping, spoiling, snatching, seizing with force, or robbing someone.
The lexical signifier is also used to describe "an open act of violence
in contrast to cunning and secret thieving" (Zodhiates 892). Moreover,
harpazo carries the sense of a forcible seizure, a snatching away or
taking to oneself (See Dunn's observations in Dodd and Martin 77).
Early Christian writers employ it at Acts 8:39, 2 Cor 12:2, 4; 1 Thess
4:17, Rev 12:5, Mt 11:12. The sense of the word in Phil. 2:6 is not so
much retaining as it is that of forceful seizure:

Once we recognize that for Paul Christ did not possess equality with
God in an absolute sense, for the very reason that he was the Son of
God, the meaning of the problematic expression ouch harpagmon hegesato
becomes clear. Every interpretation which assumes the essential
equality of Christ with God is excluded. In spite of certain
difficulties, the sense of ouch harpagmon hegasato must lie in the
direction of res rapienda: the Son of God did not think equality with
God something to be grasped. (Wannamaker 188)

To attribute a passive sense to harpagmos appears to be unwarranted
(Hawthorne 84-85). Exploring this issue further before coming to any
definite conclusions, however, we will now note the exegesis of Moises
Silva:

The ambiguous phrase in v. 6, [ouch harpagmon hegesato], has created a
literature far more extensive than it probably deserves. In particular,
one is impressed by the futility of trying to reach a decision
regarding Jesus' preexistence and deity on the basis of whether
harpagmon has an active meaning or a passive meaning . . . if one opts
for the passive idea, is the nuance positive ("windfall, advantage") or
negative ("booty, prize")? Further, if it carries a negative nuance, we
must decide whether it speaks of a thing already possessed, which one
is tempted to hold on to . . . or a thing not possessed, which one may
be tempted to snatch. (Silva 117)

In the end, Silva concludes that a sense of retaining may be the most
likely meaning of harpagmos in Philippians 2:6ff. But he is forced to
admit that such a conclusion is uncertain and not central to the "hymn"
of Philippians 2:6-11 (117). Furthermore, he adds that the few
instances of harpagmos outside of Christian literature are all active
and not passive (as is the case with harpagma). Consulting Abbott-Smith
also reveals that "there is certainly a presumption in favour of the
active meaning here" since the apostle does not use the LXX form
harpagma. Paul thus speaks of an act of seizing: not a thing seized or
a prize (A-S 60).

Though being a firm advocate of Trinitarianism, Greek Professor Daniel
B. Wallace also openly admits that while it may be theologically
"attractive" to construe harpagmos as a passive voice verb (in Phil.
2:6), "it is not satisfactory" (Wallace 634). Wallace convincingly
demonstrates that we must interpret the verse in the light of the
phrase heauton ekenosen. He concludes that the only translation
harmonious with Philippians 2:7 is "a thing to be grasped" (an active
meaning for harpagmos). We can thus see that an objective look at the
usage of harpagmos in the NT leads one to conclude that harpagmos in
Phil 2:6 evidently carries the active meaning of snatching (i.e., a
usurpation). This apostolic passage therefore appears to be affirming
the fact that Jesus did not aspire to equality with God. To the
contrary, completely antithetical to the first Adam, the one who
existed en morphe theou contentedly subjected himself to his Father in
heaven: "What Christ emptied himself of was his right to be served, his
privileged position as the Son of God, and his visible glory [morphe]
by taking the form of a slave" (Wannamaker 188).[37]

What Philippians 2:6 Tells Us about the Son of God

We now come to the culmination and crowning point of our discussion.
What is Philippians speaking of when it says that Jesus "emptied
himself"? We have touched on this point some in the earlier sections of
this study. Now let us probe this subject a little deeper. In doing so,
we will first note how Charles Ryrie interprets Philippians 2:7-8:

Notice that whatever the emptying involved, it was self-imposed. No one
forced Christ to come into this world and eventually die . . . Other
uses of the verb empty are found in Romans 4:14 (void); 1 Cor. 1:17
(void); 9:15; 2 Cor. 9:3: but they do not really contribute to the
understanding of this passage . . . The self-emptying permitted the
addition of humanity and did not involve in any way the subtraction of
deity or the use of the attributes of deity. There was a change of form
but not of content of the Divine Being . . . He added humanity. And
this in order to be able to die. (262-263)

The observations made by Ryrie show us that he thinks the self-emptying
of Christ in no way involved "the subtraction of deity." The
enfleshed Logos simply "added humanity." Since Ryrie believes that
Christ possessed absolute Deity in heaven, he subsequently argues that
the Messiah was wholly Deity during his incarnation. Ryrie thus
vigorously contends that Christ did not give up any of his divine
attributes when he emptied himself in order to become a man. To
relinquish any of his divine attributes would suggest that Christ was
not the God-man during his relatively brief sojourn with humanity (a
view utterly unthinkable for Ryrie).

I must say at the outset that I vehemently disagree with Ryrie on the
definition of kenoo and its relevance to Phil 2:7. Greek writings
utilize kenoo to delineate the effecting of a complete emptiness, void,
or an absolute negation. In addition, writers of sacred literature
employ kenos to describe vainglory, groundless self esteem, and empty
pride (Phil 2:3, 4 Macc 2:15).

The LXX uses kenos to describe abject emptiness or complete negation
(cf. Gen 31:42, Deut 15:13; Job 22:9). Kenodozos also specifies:
"glorying without reason, conceit, or eagerness for empty glory" (Gal.
5:26).[38] Simply put, kenoo may convey the sense, "to empty" or "make
empty." Thayer therefore understands Phil 2:7 to mean that Christ
"laid aside equality with the form (external appearance) of God." Thus
Christ was made void: emptied (negated) as regards his being en morphe
theou. He completely divested himself of his spirit nature and the
outward form wherewith he subsisted in the presence of God:

The verb kenoun requires an object to be expressed which is understood.
Those who believe that Christ possesses equality with God in his
preexistence naturally urge that Christ emptied himself of his
equality. However, my explanation of vs. 6 has ruled out this
possibility (Wannamaker 188).

No, Christ did not empty himself of ontological equality with God. In
fact, he was never consubstantial with his Father in the first place.
Therefore, when Christ emptied himself of existing in God's form, he
simply stopped subsisting in the external form (outward appearance) of
God.

Now just what does this statement imply? As pointed out by William
Barclay, kenoo in Phil 2:7 seems to imply that even if Christ was
Almighty God (God the Son) in heaven, he surely was not such on earth.
Heb 2:11-17 also supports this conclusion when it reports that Jesus
became like his brothers in every respect. If Jesus was like unto his
human brothers in all respects, then how could he have been God
enfleshed? One way out would be to interpret the term "all" (panta)
in Heb 2:17 in a relative manner. Such a choice, however, must be
determined on the basis of cotext and other grammatical factors. We
must not appeal to the relative sense of panta based on theological
presuppositions alone. While William Barclay admittedly denied that the
kenosis eternally put the Deity of Christ in eternal jeopardy, it is
difficult to see how his contention can be successfully sustained.
Nevertheless, it does seem that Barclay rightly defines kenoo, though
he does not extrapolate the same conclusions from this definition that
I have.

But if kenoo does refer to the total emptying of a container or person,
another conundrum raises it unsightly head vis-à-vis incarnational
dogma. If Jesus emptied himself of subsisting in God's form while he
lived on earth, then he ceased being either God or manifesting the
peerless glory of God. Ryrie argues that such emptying is logically
impossible and that it certainly did not occur in the case of our Lord
(contra Barclay). One has to ignore the clear meaning of kenoo,
however, to argue for such a conclusion. According to BAGD, kenoo can
signify "to empty." Hence, it is reasonable to conclude that when
Paul says Jesus "emptied himself," he possibly meant that Jesus of
Nazareth (the embodied Word of God) ceased to be what he previously was
in the heavenly realm.

Conclusion

What can we therefore extract from this survey of kenotic opinions? To
encapsulate matters, we can say that the Logos in his pre-existent
state subsisted in God's form (God's external likeness). Despite this
basic fact, we can rightly proclaim that he was not God during this
time, but ontologically subordinate to God. In order to die for
humankind and honor his Father--the Logos 'emptied himself' of existing
in God's form, he manifested authentic humility. This emptying
evidently entailed Christ's becoming a man, divesting himself of his
spiritual mode of being, suffering on a stauros and humbly submitting
to an ignominious death. This interpretation of Jesus Christ's kenosis
is the most straightforward exegesis of this controversial passage. It
is a reinterpretation of an opaque teaching about the only-begotten Son
of God.

Aseity and the Trinity

The doctrine of God's aseity is one of Christian theology's primary
tenets. In the theological paradigm of most Christians, God is the
self-existent, self-caused One: "It is to this very property of
absolute independence, or self-existence by nature that we give the
name aseity" (Sauvage).

Anselm of Canterbury was evidently the first theologian to employ the
term aseity: He used it to describe the self-existence of God. Other
thinkers also employed this word and consequently defined God as "the
Absolute, the innominable Self-caused [AUTOPATOR et Causa sui], in
whose transcendent 'I Am,' as the ground, is whatever verily is." Yes,
these theologians viewed God as the One who uniquely enjoys: "eternity,
self-existence, necessary existence, [and] spirituality" (Pelikan
5:189-190). Similarly, the fourth century bishop Athanasius claimed
that it was "an admitted truth about God that he stands in need of
nothing, but is self-sufficient and filled with himself" (1:52-54).

>From this brief perusal of the theological tradition, it is difficult
to see how we can think of God in any other way than self-existent and
necessary. In fact, Professor Jerome Adler reminds us that if "God's
existence were not thought of as independent, unconditioned, and
uncaused existence . . . we would not be thinking of God as the supreme
being" (89). Adler's comments adequately delineate the traditional
Christian view of aseity. Moreover, a cursory historical survey of the
theological terrain reveals that God's necessary existence and His
aseity are also associative attributes. In this regard, Adler
emphatically states that to describe God as independent in His
existence "is just another way of saying that God has a necessary
existence" (89). We can therefore declare that God is self-caused since
He derives His Being from no one. As Owen Thomas writes:

God is revealed as sovereign, free, independent and self-sufficient . .
. Since God's lordship means the divine freedom in relation to the
world, the divine self-sufficiency and independence of the world, many
theologians, beginning with Anselm, have used the philosophical term a
se, by or from the divine self, that God is self-derived. There is no
matter or fate prior to God which conditions the divine freedom. It is
in this case that the term absolute is applied to God (Thomas
"Theology" 82).

Anselm of Canterbury himself writes in a famed passage from his work
Monologium: "Whatever things there are else, then, exist through
something other than themselves, and this alone through itself. But
whatever exists through another is less than that, through which all
things are, and which alone exists through itself. Therefore, that
which exists through itself exists in the greatest degree of all
things" (Deane 88).

These statements go to the very heart of aseity. If God is necessary,
then it seems that from a Trinitarian point of view, the Godhead in its
entirety must also be necessary (since the Godhead is supposed to be
immanently triune). Therefore, it appears that each "person" in the
Godhead must possess esse a se. Thus, if the Godhead in its entirety is
self-existent and necessary, if each divine Person possesses the
quality of aseity, this fact indicates that Trinitarians have seemingly
postulated three self-existent metaphysical entities that collectively
form one God. Indeed, if the premises stated hitherto are valid, then
the specter of tritheism appears to hover over the triune teaching of
God. The ontological dogma of the Trinity once again seems to produce
irresolvable and problematic antinomies!

The Ante-Nicene Fathers and Aseity

A brief look at the Ante-Nicene Fathers demonstrates their affirmation
of God's inimitable self-existent nature. One patristic who elucidated
the notion of God's aseity was Athenagoras. In his writings,
Athenagoras affirms a God who is "uncreated, eternal, invisible,
impassible, incomprehensible, and infinite," one "who created and
now rules the world through the Logos who issues from him" (Embassy For
the Christians 10.1). Further showing that God is esse a se,
Athenagoras transcendently proclaims that "God is in himself all things
to himself: inaccessible light, a complete world, spirit, power,
reason" (Embassy 16.1). True, Athenagoras' words are tinged with
Platonic concepts. Yet they beautifully delineate the self-existent
character of God.

At this point, however, certain readers will probably disagree
vehemently with the conclusion that I extract from the words of
Athenagoras. 'Athenagoras was a Trinitarian,' some will ardently
insist. Are these sentiments true, however?

In the theological model espoused by Athenagoras, the Logos is not on
par with the Father: The Logos is God's "ideal form" and "energizing
power" that gives shape and order to the kosmos. The Logos is not fully
divine (or fully Deity) in Athenagoras' eyes (neither is the Holy
Spirit a third "Person" in Athenagorean theology). To the contrary,
Athenagoras regarded the Holy Spirit as "an effluence of God which
flows forth from him and returns like a ray of the sun." Of course, we
cannot deny that Athenagoras spoke of God the Father, the Logos, and
the Holy Spirit subsisting in simultaneous unity and diversity.
Athenagoras, however, not only worshiped God and His Logos; he also
included "angels" in his theologia as beings worthy of worship (Embassy
10.1ff). This fact suggests that Athenagoras undoubtedly had a very
broad view of what constitutes a "god" (as did Justin Martyr).

With the foregoing in mind, what are we to conclude about Athenagoras'
theologia? In the book Gods and the one God, Robert Grant writes that
Athenagoras constructed his theological concepts from Platonic and
Aristotelian philosophy (Athenagoras also incorporated Stoic thought
when systematizing the nature of God). Grant provides compelling
evidence that Athenagoras' ideas are Trinitarian concepts in utero that
simultaneously employ Platonic and Pythagorean philosophical notions to
explain Christian theology (Grant 158). The bottom line, however, is
that Athenagoras was not a Trinitarian: He subordinated the Logos to
the Father. What is more, we must point out that Athenagoras'
Christology and angelology were tainted and impure. Nevertheless, his
theology does assist us in gaining a proper understanding of
Christianity's traditional view of God's transcendence and aseity
(158).[39]

Is The Trinity Compatible With God's Aseity?

The Patristics did not originate the idea of God's self-existence.
The Bible itself unequivocally teaches that God is self-existent (John
5:26). This peerless book overwhelmingly demonstrates that God alone is
inherently and by His very nature self-existent (self-sufficient). The
concept of God deriving self-existence from a fons divinitatis seems
logically incompatible with the notion of aseity. Theoretically, a
derived kind of divinity or a consequential form of self-existence
appears to be inferior to an underived one as Tertullian implies in
Adversus Hermogenem. How can the Supreme Being receive Godhood? Is this
idea either rational or scriptural? Summing up the problem, Brunner
aptly observes: "In the New Testament the Son, or Jesus Christ, is
never called the Creator. This title is given to the Father alone. It
is He who 'granted unto the Son to have life in Himself' " (Brunner
232). Brunner thus concludes that the Bible raises the "problem" of the
Trinity perhaps, but it does not teach that God is tres personae in una
substantia.

Interestingly, the Amplified Bible renders John 5:26: "For even as the
Father has life in Himself and is self-existent, so he has given to the
Son to have life in Himself and be self-existent." Not only are the
Father and the Son self-existent, Holy Writ also reveals that God will
reward resurrected anointed Christians with the gift of self-existence
(1 John 3:1-3). The charism of aseity will not make such ones equal to
God. Nevertheless, they will perpetually enjoy an uninterrupted state
of deathlessness akin to the very life of God (cf. 1 Cor. 15:51, 52).

Robert Knopp tries to deal with the difficulties produced from John
5:26, when he relates the following: "It is obviously contradictory to
say that the Father gives the Son life in himself . . . How then can
the Son have life in himself if he has been given it by the Father?
John is trying to make human language do what it cannot do--express the
infinite-and of course his human language breaks down in the attempt,
as must all theological language that tries to express divine mystery"
(Knopp 274).

It would appear that at this point Knopp finds himself enclosed in a
cognitive labyrinth from which he must try to extricate himself through
linguistic and metaphysical acrobatics. He is hard pressed to explain
how Jesus can be Almighty God and possess self-existence while at the
same time look to his Father to supply the aforesaid self-existent life
(John 5:26; 6:57).

Knopp appeals to the failure of human language to adequately express
the "infinite." Such appeals--although well intentioned--are decidedly
erroneous. Contra Knopp, we think we can safely contend that God has
provided humans with language so that we might efficaciously express
the infinite, though we cannot articulate the infinite exhaustively. As
Carl Henry astutely noted, using human language to convey divine
meaning and authorial intent is essential if we would understand God's
self-disclosure transmitted through the pages of the holy Bible (White
100). In the final analysis, Knopp concludes that the apostle John "is
saying that by generation the Son derives his life from the Father and
that, nevertheless, this divinely generated life is the very life of
God, the very being of God, absolute equality with the Father" (Knopp
274).

Seemingly, this author has successfully delivered himself from the pit
of contradiction, but in actuality, he has done nothing more than stay
the inevitable since he merely asserts the Son's equal essential
standing with God the Father without really providing evidence that
correlates with John 5:26. (The apostle John does not teach what Knopp
asseverates!) Simply put, the idea of derived Deity or aseity is highly
problematic. Therefore, certain theologians reject both the notion of
the eternal begettal of the Son and the eternal spiration of the Spirit
(Zodhiates 306). Hence, the problem of derived aseity still looms in
the horizon.

Despite the foregoing, some thinkers have tried to solve the problems
presented in this essay by positing the Father's dependence on the Son
and the Holy Spirit. That is, some theologues contend that each Person
in the Godhead is dependent on the other two divine Persons.
Nevertheless, theologians in Eastern Christendom have traditionally
viewed the idea of the Father being dependent upon the Son or Holy
Spirit with repugnance and I am not so sure Western theologians
generally accept this stance either. Rightly (mutatis mutandis), Greek
Orthodox theologians have generally viewed the Father as the pele
[source], the arche [principle], and the aitia [cause] of the Godhead.
In the eyes of these eminent authorities:

The Trinity [is] a unity only if "both the Son and the Spirit are led
forth from one cause, the Father"; any other theory [is] "blasphemy"
and a resurgence of the godlessness of polytheism . . . in the guise of
Christianity." Although the Son and Spirit, as well as the Father, were
without beginning, they did nevertheless have a single cause within the
Godhead, namely, the Father, who had no cause distinct from Himself.
Dionysius the Areopagite had taught that "the Father is the only source
of the supersubstantial Godhead; The Trinity could be compared to a
balance scale, in which there was a single operation and center (the
Father), upon which the other two arms (Son and Holy Spirit) both
depended. (Pelikan 2:197)

Eastern theologians have generally not been able to tolerate the
position that contends the Father has vital need of the Son or Holy
Spirit since the Father is considered to be the singular principle in
the Godhead (Burgess 2:50-51). What is more, John 5:26 indicates that
the Father has life in himself independent of any other Person.
Consequently, while the Grecian view of the Godhead eradicates some of
the problems that plague the Western Trinity, it still fails to explain
the concept of derived aseity in the Godhead in a satisfactory manner.

Aseity Does Not Harmonize with the Trinity

The Scriptural testimony seems to reveal that God is indisputably a se
esse. He is Self Caused. This means that He is neither dependent upon
nor derived from anyone. If Trinitarians postulate three personae that
consubstantially possess the property of aseity individually, then they
are positing three gods. If these same believers argue that the Son or
the Holy Spirit is dependent upon the Father, then the said parties
face the dilemma of arguing that neither Christ nor the Holy Spirit are
vere deus. Either way Trinitarians evidently produce an ineluctable
conundrum that they cannot easily expunge. It seems that the concept of
God's aseity conflicts with the Trinity doctrine. Which point of view
will we accept then? Will the reader believe that God is three-in-one
and self-existent or unipersonal and self-existent? The choice is
yours.

Excursus A: John 5:26 and Aseity

The Johannine phrase "life in himself" (zwen en heauto) and its
variant forms is a very interesting and significant formula since John
writes in verse 5:26 of his Gospel: "For just as the Father has life
in himself, so he has granted also to the Son to have life in
himself" (NWT). This dominical passage provides a number of important
details that should influence our view of Biblical Christology.

First, John informs us that the Father has "life in himself." Jesus
makes this observation in a context discussing the resurrection of the
dead, which is an ancient Jewish topic, to be sure. The enfleshed Son
of God reports that the Father has life in Himself to show the role
that the Father plays in the resurrection. The dead come to life when
they hear the Son of God's voice (Jn 5:26-29). Nevertheless, the Son
is able to resurrect those in the memorial tombs (mnemeiois) because
the Father, who has life in Himself, "has granted to the Son to have
life in himself" (Jn 5:26).

What exactly does John mean when he employs the formula "life in
himself" in this particular Bible verse? In what sense can we say the
Father and Son have life in themselves?

Before reviewing the semantics of the text, we need to explore another
passage in which similar language appears. The germane text here is
John 6:53:

"Accordingly Jesus said to them: 'Most truly I say to you, Unless
you eat the flesh of the Son of man and drink his blood, you have no
life in yourselves'" (ouk exete zoen en heautois).

We will not address the Eucharistic controversy surrounding this text.
It is sufficient to note that while certain exegetes contend that
John's words have a bearing on the transubstantiation doctrine of
Roman Catholicism, Paul Anderson has proffered a recent explanation of
John 6:53ff that seems to have refuted the Roman Catholic reading of
this passage (Anderson 139-140). However one may choose to treat the
sacramental issue this text evokes, we now want to concentrate on the
clause: "you have no life in yourselves."

While it is tempting to equate the formula in John 6:53 with the one in
5:26, there is most certainly a difference in view of the context.
While the phrase in 5:26 most surely is a statement about the Father
and Son's ability to impart life to others, John 6:53 evidently does
not predicate such a notion of those who "eat the flesh of the Son of
man and drink his blood." In context, all that 6:53 teaches is that
those subsisting off of the blood and flesh of Christ in a symbolic
manner will have everlasting life and subsequently be resurrected "at
the last day" (note the parallelism in 6:54). The "life"
mentioned in connection with the Father and the Son at John 5:26,
however, is "life" in a unique qualitative sense. J.R. Michaels
recognizes this fact in his commentary on John's Gospel: "In
itself, the phrase does not include the notion that one has the power
to confer that life on others, but such translations as 'source of
life' (both GNB and Jerusalem Bible) can be defended on the basis of
the context, especially the parallelism with v. 21" (93).

We are thus faced with the question as to what type of life is
mentioned by John in John 5:26? What is the point that John is
communicating?

In view of the cotext, it seems that we can rightly infer John is
telling his readers that the Father is self-existent and possesses the
power to both sustain His own life and grant the same ability to
others, namely, the Son. But even the Son depends on the Father to
sustain his life (6:57). Trinitarian commentator Michaels even writes:
"Jesus lives because of the Father both in his life on earth and in
resurrection from the dead, while the disciple lives because of Jesus
in both senses as well" (119). Robertson adds: "The Living God
possesses life wholly in himself and so he has bestowed this power of
life to the Son" (206).

>From the foregoing, it seems that we can set out the following
proposition, to wit, the Father is self-existent and does not depend on
anyone or anything for His continued existence. On the other hand, the
Son has been granted life in himself by the Father. The four Gospels
demonstrate this fact as they detail the earthly sojourn of the Son. We
also witness the truthfulness of John's account as we take note of
the other NT writings that deal with the resurrected Christ, who is a
life-giving spirit (1 Cor 15:45). John 5:26 is another passage that
makes us wonder how Trinitarians can harmonize aseity and the Trinity.
How can the "second Person" of the Trinity derive his own personal
form of self-existence from God the Father? The evidence indicates that
the Son is not Almighty God. He is rather comparable to the Son of Man
in 1 Enoch. In that famed pseudepigraphal book, YHWH makes Enoch the
eschatological Judge, granting him an exalted position in heaven. The
Son of Man in John's Gospel also seems to be a high-ranking godlike
figure: The Judge of the eschaton. Jn 5:26 clearly delineates the
subordinate position of the Christ. He depends upon the Father to
possess the type of life mentioned in the aforesaid Bible verse.

Does Hebrews 1:1-8 Teach that Christ is Almighty God?

Among the many "proof texts" that Trinitarians use to buttress their
belief in Jesus' Deity, Heb 1:8 is considered to be one of the most
striking and explicit examples. In Greek, the verse reads as follows:
pros de ton huion ho thronos sou ho theos eis ton aiona tou aionos kai
he rhabdos tes euthutetos rhabdos tes basileias autou (Westcott-Hort).
TEV translates the passage in a way that would seem to uphold the
notion that Christ is God on some level. It says: "About the Son,
however, God said: "Your kingdom, O God, will last forever and ever!
You rule over your people with justice," whereas Byington's Bible in
Living English renders Heb 1:8 thus: "but as to the Son 'God is your
throne forever and ever, and the scepter of integrity is the scepter of
his reign.'

>From a comparison of the two Bible versions cited above, translational
and theological questions immediately come to the fore. Heb 1:8 makes
us wonder how we are to understand what the book of Hebrews teaches
concerning the ontological status of our Lord and Savior. Does Hebrews
show that Jesus is Almighty God? Alternatively, does it ontologically
subordinate him to the Father?

This essay will try to establish a more moderate claim than the
Christological teaching of Hebrews as a whole. In this chapter, I will
focus on what Heb 1:8 and its cotext has to declare about the Deity
(deity) of Jesus Christ. In order to show the first century writer's
seeming intent and meaning, I will approach Heb 1:8 from three primary
perspectives: (1) From an Old Testament perspective, looking to see
what we can learn from Ps 45:6ff, (2) From a cotextual perspective.
That is, I will examine the word proskuneo in Heb 1:6 and try to
discern how its meaning bears on one's understanding of theos and
thronos in Heb 1:8. (3) Lastly, I will consider the syntax of Heb 1:8
and attempt to determine how one either should or might construe the
word order in the said passage. This paper will argue that we should
interpret Heb 1:8 as a royal account that religiously delineates the
kingly status of the risen and exalted Christ without attributing to
him full Deity. We will therefore begin by outlining the structure of
Heb 1:1-8 and discussing verse by verse how each unit of the text
contributes to understanding Heb 1:8.

The Structure and Cotext of Hebrews 1:1-8

Hebrews 1:1-4 constitutes the exordium of the treatise written to the
first century Christians living in Jerusalem and Judea. It is a
monumental accomplishment, not only religiously and theologically, but
rhetorically as well. Professor Harold W. Attridge interestingly points
out that "the rhetorical artistry of this exordium surpasses that of
any other portion of the New Testament" (Attridge 36). George H.
Guthrie adds: "With its majestic style and high concentration of
programmatic topics, which the author will elaborate throughout the
book, Heb 1:1-4 may be identified as the 'introduction' of the
discourse" (Guthrie 119). Indeed, Heb 1:1-4 will serve as the ab initio
of this discussion.

Hebrews 1:1, 2 initiates the Christological discussion that permeates
the Epistle addressed to certain first century Jewish believers in a
peerless rhetorical fashion. The writer liberally employs the literary
device of alliteration as he writes: polumeros kai polutropos palai ho
theos lalesas tois patrasin en tois prophetais ep' eschatou ton hemeron
touton elalesen hemin en huios (UBS4).

Admittedly this Biblical passage is filled with dynamic and skillful
examples of alliteration that instantly grab the reader's attention. It
is imperative, however, not to overlook the vital Christological
message contained in the passage because of its literary features. The
writer of Hebrews makes it clear that in the pre-Messianic age, God (ho
theos) communicated to humankind via numerous and diverse means and
ways through such prophets as Isaiah, Jeremiah, Obadiah as well as
Daniel. A.T. Robertson also explains: "The Old Testament revelation
came at different times and in various stages, and ways, as a
progressive revelation of God to men. God spoke by dream, by direct
voice, by signs, in different ways to different men (Abraham, Jacob,
Moses, Elijah, Isaiah, etc.). The two uses of 'many' are a literary
device meaning 'variously' " (Robertson 557).

While we surely cannot label what Robertson calls, "the Old Testament
revelation," inferior--Heb 1:1, 2 definitely tells us that the divine
revelation recorded in the Old Testament was only a faint adumbration
of the things that were to come (Heb 9:11). For in the last days
(eschatou ton hemeron) of the Jewish system of things, God decided to
speak through "a Son" (NRSV). Before we explore the Epistle's
delineation of God's revelatory activity manifested through the Son,
two points relating to Greek articles and anarthrous constructions now
deserve our attention at this point.

First, we note that the writer of Hebrews utilizes the articular
construction ho theos in Heb 1:1. The article, writes A.T. Robertson,
"is never meaningless in Greek" (Qt. in Young 55). This observation
does not mean that we always understand why a particular writer decided
to use or not to use the article at a particular point in a treatise,
however. For in Philo, we read that the God of the Old Testament (YHWH)
is properly called ho theos (De. Som. 1.229ff). But Philo specifically
remarks that Greek writers call the Logos theos (without the article).
Origen supports this understanding of Greek grammar in Commentary on
John as he too indicates that there is significance in including or
omitting the article.

The use or non-use of the article is a complex issue and we do not want
to suggest that it is a problem one can easily resolve by arbitrarily
differentiating between nouns that have the article and nouns that do
not: "It is very difficult to set forth exact rules [for the article]
that will cover every case" (Young 55). The truthfulness of this
contention can be seen when we note that Ignatius of Antioch clearly
has no trouble describing Jesus of Nazareth as ho theos in his writings
(Eph. 18:2) and John 20:28 prima facie depicts Thomas addressing Jesus
as: ho theos mou kai ho kurios mou. Furthermore, Satan the Devil is
seemingly described as ho theos tou aionos in 2 Cor 4:4, though certain
scholars have suggested (based on the LXX reading of Dan 5:4) that
Jehovah is actually the God alluded to in 2 Cor 4:4 who blinds the
minds of the unbelievers (Scott 85). That is, God allows the minds of
unbelievers to be unreceptive to divine enlightenment (Rom 11:8; 2
Thess 2:11, 12). The position taken in this work, however, is that ha
Satan is the referent delineated by the signifiers ho theos tou aionos
in 2 Cor 4:4.

Regardless of how writers employ the article elsewhere in the New
Testament, it appears that Murray J. Harris is correct as he observes:
"When (ho) theos is used, we are to assume that the NT writers have ho
pater in mind unless the context makes this sense of (ho) theos
impossible" (Harris 47). Indeed, Harris' observation is both astute and
germane to our discussion when we return to Heb 1:1, 2 and note that it
is ho theos, whom the writer of Hebrews argues actually spoke through
the prophets of antiquity. Fittingly, the author of Hebrews employs the
article when speaking of God the Father, for Heb 1:1, 2 definitively
shows that ho theos spoke to humans through a Son (elalesen hemin en
huios). Thus, ho theos in Heb 1:1 must be synonymous with ho pater.
This point additionally means that YHWH spoken of in the Old Testament
(the One also called Alpha and Omega and the Most High God in Ps 83:18)
must be ho pater (not ho huios tou theou). While this fact does not
seem to bother him, Murray Harris does acknowledge: "For the author of
Hebrews (as for all NT writers, one may suggest) 'the God of our
fathers,' Yahweh, was no other than 'the God and Father of our Lord
Jesus Christ' " (Harris 47). This comment in no way implies that Harris
disavows the supposed Deity of Jesus Christ or that of the Holy Spirit.
Nevertheless, Harris' observations serve to make the pivotal point that
the God (ho theos) of Heb 1:1 is none other than the God and Father of
Jesus Christ. In my view, the writer of Hebrews seems to maintain a
crucial ontological distinction between the Most High God and His
anointed Messiah. With that point established, we must move on to the
second issue involving articular and anarthrous constructions in Heb
1:1-2.

As mentioned earlier, while he recounts God's activity carried out
through the Son of God, the writer of Hebrews tells us that God
ultimately and definitively spoke through (instrumental en + the dative
of person) "a Son" (NRSV). Richard A. Young thinks that the anarthrous
construction in Heb 1:2 focuses on "the nature rather than the
personality of the Son." Young thus concludes: "the character of the
Son is contrasted with that of the prophets" (68). He subsequently
points to the anarthrous construction in Heb 5:8 as proof of this
contention, where Hebrews reports that although the man Jesus Christ
was a Son of God, "he learned obedience from the things he suffered."
Young again notes that the focus in Heb 5:8 is on "the character of the
Son rather than his specific identity" (68).

Daniel B. Wallace basically echoes the sentiments of Richard Young,
averring that "a Son" is probably the way Heb 1:2 should be rendered.
Yet overall Wallace thinks that there is no satisfactory way to
compactly and succinctly communicate the writer's intent in Heb 1:2.
Nevertheless, Wallace does decide that the anarthrous construction in
this passage "is clearly qualitative," but closer to the indefinite
category on the continuum (of definite, indefinite and qualitative
forces) than the definite one (Wallace 245). Ultimately, Wallace writes
that Heb 1:2 speaks of the Son in a way that greatly sets him apart
from both angels and men. Should one read this much into the anarthrous
construction in Heb 5:8, however?

As we analyze Heb 1:2, we must note that the expression concerning
Christ could be definite, indefinite, or qualitative. More than likely,
it actually overlaps on the continuum of these three "forces"
(definite, indefinite, and qualitative). Since while the phrase in Heb
5:8 could be either definite, indefinite or qualitative, an indefinite
sense alone (while possible) does not seem likely in Heb 1:2. En huios
could well be definite here (as suggested by Ryrie). However, in view
of the context and the manner in which the writer employs the
anarthrous construction when delineating the exalted position of the
Son throughout the rest of the letter, a qualitative or indefinite
reading is the most likely one in Heb 1:2. Although I tend to concur
with Wallace and Young in viewing Heb 1:2 and 5:8 as qualitative, I
think that they read too much into the anarthrous construction in Heb
1:2. (The present writer actually tends to favor the overlapping notion
advanced by Wallace.)

The character or quality of sonship may be emphasized in Heb 1:2, and
the writer may also stress the Son's superiority to the angels and Old
Testament prophets. These facts, however, do not indicate in and of
themselves that the Son God spoke through was ontologically superior to
or is ontologically better than the holy angels or prophets of God.
That is, the inarticular usage by the author of Hebrews does not mean
the Son is Deity in the writer's eyes (Heb 7:28). He became better than
the angels when he received a new name from God (Heb 1:4).
Nevertheless, when God spoke through this human Son, he was actually
lower than the angels were and on par with his human brothers and
sisters, being like unto them in all respects (excepting sin). We do
well to remember that Heb 1:2 deals with Jesus of Nazareth and his
activity in the sphere of humanity. Therefore, it could very well teach
that Christ was a continuation of the divine prophetic tradition
initiated in times of antiquity. But he was greater than Moses and the
other prophets since he existed before the prophets (Heb 3:1-6). He was
also preeminent since Jehovah God created all things through him as the
preexistent wisdom of God (cf. Heb 1:3; 2:6-16; 4:15).

Hebrews 1:3-4

In Heb 1:3, we come to yet another thorny problem in the exordium of
Hebrews. Writing in delightfully pictorial terms, the author of Hebrews
points out that the Son of God, through whom God made all things
(panton), is the apaugasma tes doxes [tou theou] and the character tes
hupostaseos autou [i.e., theos].

BAGD indicates that we cannot always discern the meaning of apaugasma.
Its active sense is "radiance" or "effulgence"; the passive sense is
"reflection" (BAGD 82). This reference work goes on to demonstrate that
Origen, Gregory of Nyssa, Theodoret and Chrysostom all accepted the
active meaning of apaugasma. F.F. Bruce also suggests construing
apaugasma as active in Heb 1:3 as does A.T. Robertson (Bruce 5;
Robertson 557).

Harold Attridge offers a perspicuous observation regarding this issue,
when he informs us that "the context of Hebrews itself, where apaugasma
is paralleled with 'imprint' (character), may support a passive
understanding of apaugasma, although that second term [character] is
not entirely free from ambiguity" (Attridge 43). In the final analysis,
after discussing Philo and the deuterocanonical book of Wisdom,
Attridge has to admit that the meaning of apaugasma is not easy to pin
down. He seems to think, however, that the passive sense is more
preferable in Heb 1:3 than the active sense. While the precise meaning
of apaugasma and even character may be somewhat ambiguous, the overall
thrust of the words in the text are clear enough.

In Heb 1:3, the Son is manifestly identified as the apaugasma
(reflection or radiance) of God. The expression is similar to Paul's
use of eikon tou theou in Col 1:15 and, furthermore, the phrase informs
us that as the image of God, Christ starkly resembles God and perfectly
reflects his Father's matchless characteristics. He is not, however,
equal to his Father (Buchanan 7). The apostle John pointedly writes
that the One who sends is greater than the one sent (Jn 13:16). Heb 7:7
also communicates the principle that the One who blesses is greater
than the one blessed (Lk 1:42). As the apostle, priest, prophet,
coworker and reflection of God the Father, the Son aptly mirrors God.
Yet, he is not in the same category of being as his Father.

We could make the same point about the Greek word character. The word
indicates that the character is a faithful reproduction of the original
(Lev 13:28). The character bears the form of the original without being
identical to the original (2 Macc 4:10). The Son thus externally
resembles God without being God himself. Time and space do not permit
us to dwell any longer on Heb 1:1-4, however. We must move on to the
next section of Hebrews chapter 1. For more information on character,
consult Abbott-Smith 479.

Hebrews 1:5-8

Guthrie views Heb 1:5-14 as an expositional unit that highlights the
Son's superiority to the angels (145). In this regard, he is followed
by Attridge and William L. Lane. Nevertheless, while these passages
evidently form a literary unit filled with scriptural proofs, it is
outside the scope of this essay to deal with Heb 1:10-14 at this time.
I will consider those passages in volume II of Christology. Now we will
discuss Heb 1:5-8 and its Christological significance.

Hebrews 1:5-8 continues to present an argument a fortiori for the
superiority of the Son over the angels. However, the line of reasoning
employed in this Biblical book does not mean that the writer thinks the
Son of God is Deity. It is in the context of the Son having become
better than the angels and consequently inheriting a name better than
God's holy and heavenly spirit creatures that the words of Heb 1:5
are penned: "For to which of the angels did he ever say, 'Thou art my
Son, today I have begotten thee?' And again, 'I will be to him for a
Father, and he shall be to me for a Son' " (Heb 1:5 ED).

Admittedly, the presupposed answer to the rhetorical questions in Heb
1:5 is an emphatic, "None!" In the Hebrew Scriptures, to be sure, the
angels are called "sons" of God. Indeed they are sons of the Majesty
(the Father) and Bible writers even attribute the appellative elohim to
them (Gen. 6:1-6; Job 1:6-12; 38:1-7; Ps 8:5). Never has God addressed
an angel with the words "my Son," however. After God resurrected the
Son, he took his place at the right hand of the Majesty, and became
head of all government and authority (Eph 1:19-23; Col 2:10; 1 Pet
3:22). He subsequently inherited a name more excellent than the angels
and was in this way deemed the royal and priestly Son of God: "In the
same way, it was not Christ who glorified himself in becoming high
priest, but rather the one who said to him: 'You are my son; this day I
have begotten you" (Heb 5:5, 6 NAB). The catena of passages cited in
Heb 1:5-8 indicate that the royal-priestly status of the Son is being
stressed in Heb 1:5. Conversely, Hebrews chapter one does not
necessarilyteach that the Son is Almighty God.

Buchanan picks up on this important and indispensable detail, when he
declares: "Both quotations in [Heb] 1:5 are related to kings who are
called God's sons . . . The first quotation (Ps 2:7) is from an
enthronement Psalm. It pictures the kings of surrounding nations
plotting against the Lord and his anointed one, meaning his anointed
king" (13). Buchanan goes on to add: "It is such a powerful king as
this who is called God's Son and his anointed one" (13). In this
capacity, the Son of God is empowered by his Father to sit at the right
hand of the Majesty (a term for God). Appropriately, Buchanan therefore
reminds us that Rabbi Yudan (in the Midrashim) remarked that God would
fulfill the promises contained in Ps 2 for the Messiah: "This means
that the rabbis considered the Messiah to be a king, Son of God, and
Son of man" (14). The first citation included in Heb 1:5 thus points to
a royal interpretation of the passage and it demonstrates why Heb 1:5
does not negate the filial status of angels (See Robertson 558). We
also better understand the Messiah's role in God's purposes as well.

((( s.r.c.b-s is a moderated group. All posts are approved by a moderator. )))
((( Read http://srcbs.org for details about this group BEFORE you post. )))

[lsen...@hotmail.com]

basicallyblues wrote:
> The Kenosis of Jesus Christ: What Does It Tell Us about the Son of
God?

Who wrote this?
Where and when did you get permission to quote at such length?
Did you submit the said permission to the moderator?

This is a discussion group. We are not here to copy and paste entire
manuscripts written by others.

I know on SRC you never would have been allowed to post this without
authorization.

[basicallyblues]

>Who wrote this?

edgar foster..I thought I had included his name like I did on the
others.

[Matthew Johnson]

In article <085.18.08.0...@srcbs.org>, basicallyblues says...

>The Kenosis of Jesus Christ: What Does It Tell Us about the Son of God?
>
>One subject that has continually initiated considerable controversy is
>the issue of Jesus Christ's kenosis. The word kenosis (in this context)
>refers to the "self-emptying" of the heavenly Logos, who was with God
>"in the beginning" (Ryrie 260-262). It pertains to the act of
>self-negation whereby the Son of God "became flesh" and resided among
>men (John 1:14). This theological doctrine that we will now examine in
>some detail finds its origins in the "hymn" recorded at Phil
>2:5-11.

This is a pretty good beginning of the discussion of the topic. But I
am not sure why you think it finds its _origins_ in Phil 2:5-11. After
all, there are enough references to 'kenosis' (although using
different words to express it) throughout the Gospels, too. In fact,
you mention one of the more famous such passages below.

>The term "kenotic" derives from the Greek kenoo, which can mean: "to
>empty."

Unless the reader already knows what verb you are talking about, he
will not be able to find it based on _that_ spelling! The first 'o' is
omicron, the second omega. It is Strong's #2758.

> Apparently, Theodotion was the first theologue to use "kenosis"

'Theologue'? What is a 'theologue'? And why are you so sure it was
Theodotion himself? Theodotion was no _Christian_ theologian, he was
merely a translator. And much of what has been traditionally
attributed to him is now known to be much earlier than his time.

Are you really unaware of what a _pretentious_ tone you have given to
your own post with the inappropriate use of outdated words like
'theologue'?

>as a theological term in his translation of Isa 34:11. However, both
>Gregory Nazianzus and Cyril of Alexandria use the word to express the
>action whereby Christ "emptied himself." Additionally, the Latin
>Vulgate renders Phil 2:7 with the phrase "semetipsum exinanivit,"
>while Tertullian uses the formula "exhausit semetipsum" in his work
>Adversus Marcionem. The real concern for each of these thinkers seems
>to have been: 'In what sense did Christ empty himself'? Thus we seem
>justified in viewing the term kenosis as an emptying, and in our
>discussion it will refer to the Son of God's self-emptying described
>in Phil 2:6-7. Admittedly, there have been many theories and a
>number of approaches to Christological kenoticism. We shall examine
>some of these theories and then analyze the locus classicus of the
>kenotic event: Phil 2:6-7.

>The Traditional View of Christ's Kenosis
>
>Philippians 2:6ff has often been associated with the so-called
>hypostatic union of Christ Jesus.

But wait a minute: once you introduce the term "hypostatic union" you
have _already_ departed from the "traditional view of Christ's
Kenosis". For the theology of the "hypostatic union" had too many
severe limitations to be able to express Orthodox theology correctly,
which is why it soon became the exclusive intellectual property of the
Nestorians.

If you had actually _read_ Pelikan's section on the kenosis, instead
of pcking and choosing only what is conveneint for your ideological
warfare, you would know this.

This is why the Orthodox delegates to the Council greeted the Tome of
Leo with such joy, proclaiming "Peter has spoken through the mouth of
Leo". Because Leo, in his Tome, overcame _all_ the limitations of the
theology of the "hypostatic union" by introducing the language of
kenosis, and the langauge about the _two_ natures of Christ, one
human, one divine.

>Theologians have frequently enlisted this passage to putatively
>elucidate the personalistic ontological uniting they say occurred
>when he assumed the form of a man.

"Personalistic ontological uniting"?? What was _that_ supposed to mean?

>In this regard, Bishop Cyril declared that Phil 2:6ff demonstrates that
>"God [was from] God, being by nature the only-begotten Logos of God,
>the radiance of the glory and the express image of the person of him
>who begot him" (Pelikan 1:247-248).

I am glad to see you are finally reading Pelikan! His history is
excellent, although I must admit that I find his style often tiresome
and at times even confusing. So don't be too surprised if I say you
have misunderstood him at certain points;)

But one must remember that when he wrote that book, he was still
Lutheran. It was only later that he finally returned to his roots and
became Orthodox. I am sure the exposure to Orthodoxy he had while
doing the research for that book was very influential.

>In other words, Cyril thought that Phil 2:6ff helps Christians to
>understand that the "enfleshed" Son of God was "unchangeable
>according to nature," and "[remained] completely what he was and ever
>is" during his earthly life.

Cyril was right. It does.

>Therefore, he believed that the alleged incarnate God enjoyed "an
>indivisible unity [of nature]" while subsisting in the form of a man
>(1:248).

'Alleged' incarnate God? Pelikan certainly did not say that! And
notice the problem: Cyril is leaning strongly toward speaking about
only ONE nature in Christ. In another couple of generations, the
Monophysites would insist that this meant there was only ONE nature in
Christ, the divine, which "swallows up" all that is human. But their
mistake was to fail to notice that the word 'nature' was still in
flux: it was rash to assume that Cyril meant the same as Dioscorus.

>As shown from Cyril's comments, Phil 2:6-7 has played an eminent role
>in the formulation of Christological dogma.

This much is certainly true.

>It has therefore proven to be a significant Biblical account
>vis-à-vis the development of Christological systematizations.

This much is also certainly true.

>In view of its admitted didactic character, Pope Leo thought that
>Christians should interpret the kenosis of Christ as "the bending
>down of [the] compassion" of God: not as the "failing of [God's]
>power" (Pelikan 1:255-258). The kenosis event also signified, for
>Pope Leo, that both natures of the only-begotten Son of God 'met in
>one person.' Subsequently "lowliness [was] assumed by majesty,
>weakness by power, mortality by eternity."

Good...

>The upshot of such an exegesis is that we can describe the life of
>Christ as somewhat of a dialectical tension between his divine and
>human natures.

What? "Dialectical tension"? What was this supposed to mean? Is this a
Hegelian reading of Leo?

>This theological data supposedly explains the seeming contradictory
>events in the life of our Lord and Savior.

It didn't just 'supposedly' explain them. It really does explain
them. If you had a shred of respect for basic intellecual honesty, you
would take the time to _learn_ the explanations before you dismiss
them so lightly. But as it is...

Again, you would know this if you had actually read pp 259 - 266 of
Pelikan Vol I. For his description of Leo's own description of these
"seemingly contradictory events" is almost lyrical in tone, and really
hard to miss! For he said:

This was the meaning of the stories in the Gospels, all of which,
both the evidences of kenosis and the proofs of continuing divine
power, had to be accounted for in a christological doctrine: both
the lowliness of the swaddling clothes and the glory of the angels'
song; both the vulnerability to Herod and the adoration of the
Magi; "both being pierced with nails and opening the gates of
Paradise to the faith of the thief" on the cross. And so, "the
rhythm of his language swings to and fro like a pendulum, from the
divine side to the human side, from the transcendence of God to the
immanence of our earthly history."
(Pelikan The Christian Tradtioin Vol I p 259)

So you see, Leo's christology achieves what you keep avoiding:
accounting for _both_ his divine power and human weakness.

>Hence, one who believes in the incarnation is supposedly able to
>reconcile the Biblical occasions where Christ appears to lack divine
>knowledge and looks like he is passible, by appealing to the
>kenosis. As man, kenoticists contend that Christ was mutable, mortal,
>lowly, and weak; as God, however, they claim that he was Impassible,
>Immortal, Transcendent and Omnipotent.

And we see _both_ these often in the Gospels! Leo outlined all of this
in the Tome. We see his omnipotence when He raises the dead by His own
word, without the special measures Elisha had to resort to. We see His
omnipotence when the demons cower before Him, knowing that He has the
power/authority to send them into the abyss forever. But we see the
weakness when He dies on the cross, followed again by seeing his
omnipotence when He rises from the dead.

And notice again: this same rising from the dead is in _one_ place
referred to as the Father raising Him from the dead, yet in another
place the Son raising _Himself_ from the dead (Jon 2:19-21). So yes,
this is the divine omnipotence of the _Son_. Again: Leo accounts for
this, you do not.

>To resolve the ostensibly conflicting elements of this theological
>stance, Christian scholars invoke Phil 2:6ff.

Oh, we do much more than just invoke this one verse. It sounds like
you stopped reading Pelikan too soon.

>Evidently, this Biblical account adequately clarifies the
>"enfleshment" (incarnatio) of "God the Son." However, we must ask
>whether Paul's words really justify Trinitarian explanations of
>Jesus' limitations on earth. For example, what is Phil 2:6-7 speaking
>of when it says that Christ "emptied himself"? What are the
>implications of this Pauline statement?

>The Synod of Antioch in 341 CE decided that Christ emptied himself of
>"the being equal with God" (kenosas heauton apo tou einai isa theo)
>when he became incarnate.

That's all very nice, but why are you jumping from Chalcedon in 451 to
Antioch a century ago? And this Synod of Antioch was not even _close_
to Ecumenical in authority. All the five "dogmatic formulas" resulting
from this Synod of Antioch were _rejected_ by the Church, many of them
on the grounds that they were thinly-disguised Arianism.

Even worse than this, this is the Synod where they unjustly condemned
the heroic defender of the true faith, St. Athanasius.

>While the Synod thus emphatically affirmed that Christ is fully God
>and fully man,

No, this Synod did NOT emphatically affirm this. On the contrary:
their affirmation of it was handicapped by their conservatism. That is
why their formulas had to be rejected and replaced with the Nicene
Creed.

But what is even more clear is that they too anathematize all those
who believe your theology, when they say:

"If anyone teaches, contrary to the healthy and true faith of
Scriptures, saying that there were or was a time or an age before the
birth of the Son, let him be anathema.

If any says, that the Son is a creation, as first of creation, or
born, as one of those born, let him be anathema.

Those who assert, that the Son is from nothing (EX OYK ONTWN) and not
from God and that there was at ime, when He was not, these are
considered strangers to the Catholic Church".

(from
http://www.holytrinitymission.org/books/russian/vselenskie_sobory_kartashev.htm)

>it simultaneously contended that he emptied himself of equality with
>God during his "incarnation" (incarnatio). Consequently, it seems
>that certain fourth century Christians viewed the kenosis of Christ
>as the supreme act of humility whereby God the Son (the second Person
>of the Trinity) engaged in self-abnegation vis-à-vis his equal
>standing with God the Father and God the Holy Spirit. The kenosis
>thus serves as an event that Christians should emulate in their
>personal lives: "If the divine majesty lowers itself in such great
>humility, does human weakness have the right to make boast of
>anything?" asked Ambrose of Rupert with regard to the kenotic event"
>(Pelikan 3:23). Professor Pelikan also notes:

>In this he was carrying on a way of speaking characteristic of his
>fathers and brethren, who took delight in the paradox of the
>incarnation. Christ, the Son of God, has undergone humiliation in order
>to save mankind, and it was only fitting that his followers should
>imitate his humble suffering. (3:23)

This IS the central moral significance of the dogma of the
kenosis. Why do you resist this humility so strenuously? Don't you
know that God resists the proud? Don't you know that the proud man is
an abomination before God (Prv 16:5)? And Paul himself points out this
same moral significance here: it is NOT an invention of the 4th
century theologians. For the very preceding verse, Phil 2:5 says,

Therefore think this among yourself as Christ thought (Phi 2:5)

And what was it He thought? Kenosis! And why does Paul tell them to do
this? So that they might:

Do nothing from selfishness or conceit, but in humility count
others better than yourselves. (Phi 2:3 RSVA)

>Probably one of the most intriguing interpretations of the kenosis
>event is the one proposed by Anselm of Canterbury. In his famous
>work, Cur Deus Homo, Anselm expounded on Phil 2:6ff and its meaning
>for the Christian faith. This theologian thought the kenosis implies
>that the Son of God, the Father, and the Holy Spirit all made a
>determination that "he [the Son] would not manifest the sublimity of
>his omnipotence to the world in any other way than through his death"
>(Pelikan 3:142).

I don't know why you consider _his_ the most intriguing. It just
sounds like confusion to me.

[snip]

>did Anselm really remove the enigmatic features
>surrounding the kenosis?

Of course not. Anselm achieved little or nothing in his Cur Deus Homo.

> Does Phil 2:6-7 serve as clear proof of
>Christ's Deity?

Yes. For as Theophylact explains:

"He, being in the form of God did not consider it robbery to be
equal to God" See, how many heretics fall at this verse! Marcion
of Pontus said that the world and flesh are evil, and that for this
reason God did not accept flesh. Marcellus the Galatian, Photinus
and Sophronius said thatthe Word of God was a power, and not a
hypostatic being, that this power lived in Him, who came out of the
seed of David. And Paul of Samosata said that the Father, Son and
Holy Spirit are simple names, attributted to one person. Arius said
that the Son is a creation. Apollinarius said that He did not
accept a rational soul. And so, see, how all these heretics fall at
this one blow: "being in the form of God". How then can you,
Marcellians, say that the Word is a power and not a being? The
being of God is called 'form of God' just like the natgure of a
slave is called the from of a slave. And how can you, Paul of
Samosata, say that He began His being from Mary? For He existed
befre in the form and substance of God. But look, how even
Sabellius halls. "He did not consider it robbery", the Apostle
says, "to be equal to God. But we do not say "equal" about one
person; if 'equal', then He is equal TO someone.In the same manner,
it is clear that the Apostle is speaking about two Persons. And
Arius too is refuted by many means: "from of God", that is,
essence. And he did not say "having been (GEGONWS)", but "being
(UPARXWN), which is like the verse, "I AM WHO I AM (Ex
3:14)". And:"He did not consider it robbery TO BE EQUAL to God"; do
you see the equality? How can you say after this, that the Father
is greater and the Son lesser? ... Thus He both chose humiliation,
and in that humiliation preserved His greatness.
(fm: www.pagez.ru/lsn)

>
>Other Interpretations of the Kenotic Event
>
>As can be seen from a brief perusal of the patristic tradition,
>theologians have generally interpreted the kenosis of Christ as an
>example of divine humility, self-negation and "divine self-limitation."

The first two can be seen. But your third here is not so clear.

>The idea of divine self-limitation has especially been explored since
>the nineteenth century. Gottfried Thomasius is one such theologian who
>exerted a profound influence on the teaching concerning the
>self-limitation of the Son during his days in the flesh:

Why do you even _bother_ listing these long citations from 19-20th
century theologians only to turn up your nose at them and believe
Thayer's scanty lexicon entry instead? Do you really have no idea how
-UNCONVINCING- this is? You didn't rebut them at all, you just
_ignored_ them and chose to believe Thayer instead.

[snip]

> But is this how we should define
>morphe in this particular context?

Yes, it is.

>Thayer's Greek-English Lexicon appears to take a different view of
>morphe.

So what? The difference is not as big as you make it out to
be. Besides: Thayer's entry is far too scanty to give us anything more
than the basic sense of the word. But that is far too little to settle
this debate. ALL of the 19th century theologians you quoted put more
thought into the meaning of the word than that.

> Other explicators of Scripture also support the stance
>delineated in this work. In his Greek-English Lexicon, Thayer
>particularly notes that morphe may denote:
>
>The form by which a person or thing strikes the vision; the external
>appearance: children are said to reflect psuches te kai morphes
>homoioteta (of their parents) 4 Macc. 15.3 (4); ephanerothe en hetera
>morphe, Mark 16:12; en morphe theou huparchon, Phil. 2:6 . . . he [the
>Logos] bore the form (in which he appeared to the inhabitants of
>heaven) of God (the sovereign, opp. to morph. doulou), yet did not
>think that this equality with God was to be eagerly clung to or
>retained . . .(Thayer 418)
>
>Thayer's words indicate that one probably should not conscript morphe
>to buttress the belief that Jesus is fully God (vere deus).

No, they indicate no such thing. You are letting your imagination run
away with itself again.

> Morphe,
>based on Thayer's observations, may simply refer to an "external
>appearance" or "outward reflection."

But this is where Thayer's lexicon entry has let you down. As all the
theologian's you quoted above showed, and as the most famous
Greek-English lexicon of all time confirms, MORFH does not just denote
_any_ external appearance, but an external appearance faithfully
representing the essential reality.

Nor does this _contradict_ the Thayer entry. But THayer simply didn't
bother to SAY whether MORFH can be used of _any_ external appearance
or not.

This is why Thayer's lexicon is outdated and unreliable, while LSJ is neither.

> In the NT, it evidently does
>not refer to the substance or essence of a thing.

No. Where _do_ you get this nonsense?

> Christ could
>therefore have existed as a reflection of Deity; consequently, he would
>not necessarily have subsisted as a member of the triune Godhead. (For
>another ancient use of morphe as "outward appearance" with regard to
>children, cf. Philo, De Legatione 55.)

I have seen it. The usage there still conforms to the rule I mentioned
above of reflecting essential reality. It does not support you at all.

> Instead of being Almighty God
>per his essence, Christ could have simply resembled God the Father
>outwardly as he lived among the heavenly hosts (John 14:9; Col. 1:15).
>A number of scholars have become aware of this point in their study of
>the lingual signifier morphe. These individuals have consequently been
>unable to avoid concluding that morphe carries the sense of "external
>appearance" in Phil 2:6:

It is typical of you to exalt as 'enlightenment' what is really
succumbing to apostasy. These so-called 'scholars' you mention are
they who succumbed to the _real_ apostasy of the 19th and 20th
centuries, in which so many Western 'christians' submitted to the
temptation to "be wise in their own sight (Prv 12:15, 26:12)" instead
of learning the Wisdom that comes from God (Prv 3:5-7).

We know this is so because your so-called 'scholars' were so deluded
by their pride, they thought they knew the language better than the
native speakers of the language, whose commentary is preserved in so
many of the Fathers. They ALL agree: Phil 2:6 is the undoing of many
christological heresies.
[snip]

>Jn 17:3 further assures us that the Son of God is not to be identified
>with the only true God.

No, it assures us of no such thing. For it only says that the Father
is "the only true God". It does NOT say that the Son is not the SAME
"only true God". But we can safely conclude from so many other verses
that He is. You have been steadfastly ignoring the citation I and
others have given you that prove this.

>For John, there was only one true God: the
>Father.

No, the Son is that same one true God.

>The writer of Philippians also subscribed to the thought found
>in the Johannine Gospel. He indicates this belief by his use of morphe
>and the cotext of Phil 2:6-7. Let us now return to our consideration of
>this pivotal term and also introduce another key word.
>
>Morphe and Harpagmos
>
>Earlier we reviewed Lightfoot's treatment of morphe and his inadequate
>claim that the term refers to the substance or essence of a thing in
>Phil 2:6.

You _reviewed_ it, yes. But your 'review' relied entirely on the
'scholarship' of men blinded by their own pride, deluded into thinking
that they knew Hellenistic Greek better than the native speakers of
the language. They relied on rationalization, not scholarship, to
claim that MORFH does not reflect innner essential reality.

[snip]

> The deficient nature of Lightfoot's argument is also
>highlighted by Robert B. Strimple in the Westminster Theological
>Journal where Strimple openly relates that for years he too tried to
>uphold Lightfoot's distinction between morphe and schema until he had
>to admit that there "is really little evidence to support the
>conclusion that Paul uses morphe in such a philosophical sense here [in
>Phil 2:6]" (Strimple 259). Strimple also cites four instances where
>morphe appears in the LXX (Judg 8:18; Job 4:16; Isa 44:13; Dan 3:19).
>We now reproduce all four texts for the benefit of our readers:
>
>Anesten kai ouk epegnon eidon kai ouk en morphe pro ophthalmon mou
>all' e auran kai phnhn ekouon (Job 4:16 Brenton).
>
>Eklexamenos tekton xulon estesen auto en metro kai en kolle erruthmisen
>auto kai epoiesen auto hos morphen andros kai hos horaioteta anthropou
>stesai auto en oikos (Isa 44:16 Brenton).
>
>Strimple writes concerning these four passages: "In each instance . . .
>morphe refers to the visible form or appearance" (260).

Duh! But both you and Strimple miss the point: the visible form
manifests an inner essential reality. Your so-called 'scholar' does
not even _understand_ the view he is criticizing.

>Furthermore, it
>is worthy of note that Aquila employs morphe in Isa 52:14 to describe
>the "outer appearance" of the Messiah.
>
>Since, as Strimple concurs, the theme of Jehovah's Suffering Servant
>undoubtedly serves as a backdrop in the Philippians account--it seems
>reasonable to assume that morphe as used in Isa 52:14 bears a similar
>meaning in Phil 2:6.

This is s-o-o-o BOGUS! It is so bogus, I can't help but think of "Car
Talk", where one of the brothers says B_O_O_O_O_OGUS!

First of all, no it is not clear that it is the backdrop. That is
Strimple's unwarranted assumption. Perhaps he made this unwarranted
assumption just to make his argument _look_ sound. Second, even if it
were the background, that is really weak grounds to assume similar
meaning.

> Strimple concludes: "meager though the Biblical
>evidence is, it is sufficient to make a prima facie case for the
>reference being to a visible manifestation" (260). These exegetical
>insights

These are NOT 'insights'. They are pseudo-scholarly ramblings
misappropriated as excuses for heresy.

[snip]

>We now come to the culmination and crowning point of our discussion.

And such a poor 'culmination' it is!

>What is Philippians speaking of when it says that Jesus "emptied
>himself"?

You have Leo's answer. You should have been content with that. It was
much better than anything you or your sources have come up with.

>We have touched on this point some in the earlier sections of
>this study. Now let us probe this subject a little deeper. In doing so,
>we will first note how Charles Ryrie interprets Philippians 2:7-8:

Why bother? Leo did it better.

[snip]

>The observations made by Ryrie show us that he thinks the self-emptying
>of Christ in no way involved "the subtraction of deity."

And he is right. Leo showed the same many centuries ahead of him.

> The enfleshed Logos simply "added humanity." Since Ryrie believes
>that Christ possessed absolute Deity in heaven, he subsequently
>argues that the Messiah was wholly Deity during his
>incarnation.

And rightly so! This is what was revealed on the mountain top during
the Transfiguration. The glory which Christ had had all that time was
only then revealed to James, John and Peter.

> Ryrie thus vigorously contends that Christ did not give
>up any of his divine attributes when he emptied himself in order to
>become a man. To relinquish any of his divine attributes would
>suggest that Christ was not the God-man during his relatively brief
>sojourn with humanity (a view utterly unthinkable for Ryrie).

And it should be unthinkable for you, since it _is_ unthinkable!

>I must say at the outset that I vehemently disagree with Ryrie on the
>definition of kenoo and its relevance to Phil 2:7.

No surprise there.

>Greek writings
>utilize kenoo to delineate the effecting of a complete emptiness, void,
>or an absolute negation.

Such radical emptying is not the ONLY use of the verb...

>In addition, writers of sacred literature
>employ kenos to describe vainglory, groundless self esteem, and empty
>pride (Phil 2:3, 4 Macc 2:15).

True, but this is the adjective, not the verb. The adjective and the
verb are from the same root, but that does not mean they that each can
only derive the same meanings from the root as the other does.

>The LXX uses kenos to describe abject emptiness or complete negation
>(cf. Gen 31:42, Deut 15:13; Job 22:9).

Once again, as you have done _so_ often in your brief time in this NG,
you are stringing together a list of citation that do NOT even support
you!

How, for example do you get _abject_ emptiness out of Gen 31:42? All
it says is:

If the God of my father, the God of Abraham and the Fear of Isaac,
had not been on my side, surely now you would have sent me away
empty-handed. God saw my affliction and the labor of my hands, and
rebuked you last night." (Gen 31:42 RSVA)

'Empty-handed' is NOT "abject emptiness".

>Kenodozos also specifies:
>"glorying without reason, conceit, or eagerness for empty glory" (Gal.
>5:26).[38] Simply put, kenoo may convey the sense, "to empty" or "make
>empty." Thayer therefore understands Phil 2:7 to mean that Christ
>"laid aside equality with the form (external appearance) of God." Thus
>Christ was made void: emptied (negated) as regards his being en morphe
>theou. He completely divested himself of his spirit nature and the
>outward form wherewith he subsisted in the presence of God:

Thayer may have thought that. But that is just an example of how
Thayer set aside all the wisdom that he _might_ have learned from his
scholarship, and chose to be wise in his own sight instead. For no, it
is simply FALSE that "Christ was made void".

>The verb kenoun requires an object to be expressed which is understood.

This is absolute nonsense.

>Those who believe that Christ possesses equality with God in his
>preexistence naturally urge that Christ emptied himself of his
>equality. However, my explanation of vs. 6 has ruled out this
>possibility (Wannamaker 188).

And his 'explanation' was bunk. Perhaps that is why you like it so much.

>No, Christ did not empty himself of ontological equality with God. In
>fact, he was never consubstantial with his Father in the first place.

No, this is where you boldly contradict Scripture itself in so many
places! Of _course_ he was and is consubstantial to the Father. Even
the Fathers of the Synod of Antioch in 341 whom you quote concering
'kenosis' insisted on this.

>Therefore, when Christ emptied himself of existing in God's form, he
>simply stopped subsisting in the external form (outward appearance) of
>God.
>
>Now just what does this statement imply?

It implies monstrous heresy. It also implies contradiction with the
language of Scripture itself, rationalized by pretending you know
Hellenistic Greek better than the highly educated native speakers I
have already quoted and referenced.

[snip]

>What can we therefore extract from this survey of kenotic opinions?

We can extract that you have been extremely prejudicial in your choice
of which 'scholars' to believe and cite. We can extract that you do
this out of a burning desire to deny the Scriptures and believe heresy
instead. Other than that, there is not much we can extract from such a
badly done survey.

[snip]

>A brief look at the Ante-Nicene Fathers demonstrates their affirmation
>of God's inimitable self-existent nature. One patristic who elucidated
>the notion of God's aseity was Athenagoras. In his writings,
>Athenagoras affirms a God who is "uncreated, eternal, invisible,
>impassible, incomprehensible, and infinite," one "who created and
>now rules the world through the Logos who issues from him" (Embassy For
>the Christians 10.1). Further showing that God is esse a se,
>Athenagoras transcendently proclaims that "God is in himself all things
>to himself: inaccessible light, a complete world, spirit, power,
>reason" (Embassy 16.1). True, Athenagoras' words are tinged with
>Platonic concepts. Yet they beautifully delineate the self-existent
>character of God.
>
>At this point, however, certain readers will probably disagree
>vehemently with the conclusion that I extract from the words of
>Athenagoras. 'Athenagoras was a Trinitarian,' some will ardently
>insist. Are these sentiments true, however?

Of course they are true. And they are more than just 'sentiments',
too. If you did not again resort to the dishonest device of
prejudically selective citation, this would be obvious.

Why, for example, if not because of your dishonesty, did you stop with
Embassy 16.1? Why, the very same work blows your conclusion to
pieces with:

10.1 We recognise then even the Son of God. Nor do we consider it
ridiculous for God to have a Son. Nor, though, do we think about
God and Father or about the Son as do the poets composing myths,
who make the gods no better than men. But the Son of God is the
Word of the Father in idea and operation; for from Him and through
Him are all things made, although the Father and Son are
one. Although the Father is in the Son, and the Son in the Father,
in unity and power of spirit, the mind and Word of the Father is
the Son of God.But if, in your surpassing intelligence, it occurs
to you to inquire what is meant by the Son, I will state briefly
that He is the first progeny of the Father, not as having been made
(for from eternity God had in Himself the Word as from all eternity
rational), but that He came forth to be the idea and energizing
power of all material things, which lay like a nature without
attributes, and an inactive earth, the grosser particles being
mixed up with the lighter.

So yes, he says God has a Son, but that this does NOT mean the same as
for Zeus to have a son! And he takes a stab at describing the
difference between the pagan notion of "son of god" and the Christian
notion of "Son of God". But he describes it only in a thumbnail sketch.

But he _does_ describe the Son and Spirit as consubstantial to the
Father, confirming the Trinitarian interpretaion of these passages
(allued to above) in John. And as if this was not clear enough, we
also have:

24. To the extent that we call 'God' both the Son His word, and the
Holy Spirit, united according to power, we call 'God' the Father
and Son and Holy Spirit, because the Son is the mind, word and
wisdom of the Father, and the Spirit is an outpouring, like light
from fire, from the Father.

So at one moment, Athenagoras recognizes them as distinct, but at
another time and in another way, as identical. And he calls Father,
Son and Holy Spirit ALL one God! This IS the Trinity! But he still
uses metaphors that are misleading or unworthy of the Trinity, such as
'outpouring', which make the Spirit sound like a substance, not a
Person. It was to address such deficiencies in language that the 4th
century language for the Trinity (e.g. 'consubstantial', one essence,
three persons) was developed.

But note well! He used a metaphor that _sounds_ like the Holy Spirit
is not a person, but he never _said_ He was not a Person.

But that has never stopped you from claiming that he did. This
stubborn insistence on nonsense is where you prove yourself guilty of
the accusation you raise against us: you insist on seeing your own
theology in passages where it is WHOLLY ABSENT!

>In the theological model espoused by Athenagoras, the Logos is not on
>par with the Father: The Logos is God's "ideal form" and "energizing
>power" that gives shape and order to the kosmos. The Logos is not fully
>divine (or fully Deity) in Athenagoras' eyes (neither is the Holy
>Spirit a third "Person" in Athenagorean theology).

Oh let us never never doubt, what nobody is sure about! Why are _you_
so sure that "ideal form" implies "not on a par"? And no, Athenagoras
did NOT say that the Holy Spirit is not a third Person. He doesn't
answer this question at all, only hinting 'yes' at one point and
'maybe not' at another.

But you, of course, see only what you want to see, so you misread him
as supporting your badly perverted theology.

>To the contrary,
>Athenagoras regarded the Holy Spirit as "an effluence of God which
>flows forth from him and returns like a ray of the sun." Of course, we
>cannot deny that Athenagoras spoke of God the Father, the Logos, and
>the Holy Spirit subsisting in simultaneous unity and diversity.

But you _have_ denied it. For you denied that the Son is co-eternal
with the Father. But this co-eternity follows from Athenagoras. For
when was the Father ever without His mind or Wisdom?

>Athenagoras, however, not only worshiped God and His Logos; he also
>included "angels" in his theologia as beings worthy of worship (Embassy
>10.1ff). This fact suggests that Athenagoras undoubtedly had a very
>broad view of what constitutes a "god" (as did Justin Martyr).

What are you talking about? He mentions other powers, he mentions that
they are involved in _governing_ creation, but he says NOTHING about
worhipping them.

Yet again, 'Blue', you have made a mockery of scholarly procedure,
pretending to be scholarly with your numerous citations, even
including some badly mis-spelled Greek, only to ruin it all with
eisegesis, reading into the text your own theology, which is NOT
there.

>With the foregoing in mind, what are we to conclude about Athenagoras'
>theologia?

We are to conclude that you have completely misrepresented it. You
have committed the same 'eisegesis' on Athenagoras that you commit on
the Scriptures themselves.

[snip]

>Despite the foregoing, some thinkers have tried to solve the problems
>presented in this essay by positing the Father's dependence on the Son
>and the Holy Spirit.

But that is a stupid attempt. Anyone who seriously thinks that that
can 'solve' anything is too ignorant or dense to deserve the title
'thinker'.

> That is, some theologues

In _modern_ US English, a 'theologue' is NOT a theologian, a
'theologue' is a _student_ of theology. And judging from the examples
you have put forth, I would say a very bad student.

> contend that each Person
>in the Godhead is dependent on the other two divine Persons.
>Nevertheless, theologians in Eastern Christendom have traditionally
>viewed the idea of the Father being dependent upon the Son or Holy
>Spirit with repugnance and I am not so sure Western theologians
>generally accept this stance either.

If you are not sure, then WHY are you bringing it up? Why couldn't you
do your homework before you posted?

>Rightly (mutatis mutandis), Greek
>Orthodox theologians have generally viewed the Father as the pele

There IS no such word in Greek. Will you stop pretending you know the langauge?

>[source], the arche [principle], and the aitia [cause] of the Godhead.
>In the eyes of these eminent authorities:

Finally, you recognize their eminence. What a pity you only do so
sarcastically.

>The Trinity [is] a unity only if "both the Son and the Spirit are led
>forth from one cause, the Father"; any other theory [is] "blasphemy"
>and a resurgence of the godlessness of polytheism . . . in the guise of
>Christianity." Although the Son and Spirit, as well as the Father, were
>without beginning, they did nevertheless have a single cause within the
>Godhead, namely, the Father, who had no cause distinct from Himself.
>Dionysius the Areopagite had taught that "the Father is the only source
>of the supersubstantial Godhead; The Trinity could be compared to a
>balance scale, in which there was a single operation and center (the
>Father), upon which the other two arms (Son and Holy Spirit) both
>depended. (Pelikan 2:197)
>
>Eastern theologians have generally not been able to tolerate the
>position that contends the Father has vital need of the Son or Holy
>Spirit since the Father is considered to be the singular principle in
>the Godhead (Burgess 2:50-51).

Why did you so quickly switch from a knowledgeable source to such a
poor source? Pelikan got it right, Burgess is confused.

> What is more, John 5:26 indicates that
>the Father has life in himself independent of any other Person.
>Consequently, while the Grecian view of the Godhead eradicates some of
>the problems that plague the Western Trinity, it still fails to explain
>the concept of derived aseity in the Godhead in a satisfactory manner.

Did it ever occur to you that perhaps this is because the term
"derived aseity" is a nonsensical notion in the first place?

[snip]

--
---------------------------
Subudcat se sibi ut haereat Deo
quidquid boni habet, tribuat illi a quo factus est.
(St. Augustine, Ser. 96)