From: Rob Gross (moderator)
<GR...@BCVMS.BITNET/GR...@BCVMS.BC.EDU>
Monday, December 20, 1993, 19:45 EST
Arms Discussion Digest
Volume 11 : Issue 13
All submissions to ARM...@BUACCA.BU.EDU (ARM...@BUACCA.BITNET)
Please do not post articles, as they have a high probability
of being lost.
Today's topics:
Russia's Doomsday Machine (Dave Caulkins)
Doomsday device (Adkins)
Conflict ("Wm. Michael Dante")
Information Request (Michael A. Salvo)
Security Dialogue (Harnby, Louise)
Chaos/complexity theory research ("Philip S. Kronenberg")
1st.Post: Concept De Opresso Liber ("Aldo Pier Solari")
RE: Arms-l listserv ("Aaron A. Leaman")
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Sat, 9 Oct 93 15:08:15 PDT
From: Dave Caulkins <dcau...@igc.apc.org>
Subject: Russia's Doomsday Machine
Russia's Doomsday Machine
By Bruce G. Blair
(Blair is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, and
author of "The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War")
New York Times OP-ED, October 8, 1993
On Nov. 13, 1984, U.S. intelligence tracked two Soviet long-range
missiles fired 40 minutes apart. What seemed to be an
unremarkable test, however, turned out to be far from ordinary.
The Soviets were exercising a secret doomsday system: a fantastic
scheme in which spasms of the dead hand of the Soviet leadership
would unleash a massive counter-strike after it had been wiped
out by a nuclear attack.
Soviet wizards of Armageddon devised the scheme in the 1970's to
prevent a sudden nuclear strike from paralyzing their arsenal.
Their invention enabled thousands of nuclear warheads to be
launched automatically if the top nuclear commanders were killed
or otherwise neutralized.
A closer look at the 1984 exercise reveals how it worked then,
and indeed how it works today. Yes, this doomsday machine still
exists. The Russians lavish resources on its modernization to
keep it on combat alert at all times. The risk of its launching
weapons by accident is impossible to know, but it clearly
increases in a nuclear crisis.
Russia, of course, holds no monopoly on nuclear relics of the
cold war. The United States still runs its bombers up to the
north pole on simulated strikes against Russia, and maintains a
nuclear vigil with thousands of warheads ready to strike at a
moment's notice. And despite the widespread belief that the
Russian and U.S. military establishments cannot physically mount
a nuclear attack unless they first obtain essential codes from
their respective presidents, in fact they have custody of all the
codes needed to order an all-out strategic attack.
The portrait of the Soviet doomsday machine emerged in interviews
with Russians who designed and operated the system, and with U.S.
officials who corroborated key details of their accounts. The
Soviet general staff - the highest military body - activated the
machine at the start of the exercise. From a simulated war room
in Leningrad, it transmitted a "fail deadly" message to a special
radio station in the Moscow military district. In an actual
nuclear crisis today, this message would be likely to flow from
the Russian general staff's underground war room in Moscow to a
radio bunker 40 miles south at Chekov.
The "fail deadly" message contains a component of the "unlock"
codes held by the general staff to keep lower echelons from
launching nuclear missiles without authority. By transmitting
this component, the general staff activates the radio station and
enables it to function autonomously in firing nuclear missiles
under conditions of enemy nuclear attack. Only a small team
needs to be present to carry out certain mechanical procedures;
the rest of the doomsday apparatus is totally automated.
Using electronic devices that register a break in communications
with the general staff and detect nuclear explosions in the
vicinity, the apparatus forms an order to launch, complete with
unlock codes, and transmits it through a nearby buried
low-frequency radio antenna to yet another set of special
complexes as far as 600 miles away. There, emergency
communications rockets hidden in SS-17 silos or on mobile SS-25
launchers automatically record the launching instructions and
then automatically fire themselves on trajectories that traverse
all the nuclear missile fields in the former Soviet Union.
During their 30-minute flight, they transmit signals to fire
directly to the modern classes of nuclear-armed intercontinental
missiles in the strategic rocket forces.
In that 1984 exercise, the radio station in the Moscow military
district sent the launching order to an SS-20 communications
rocket at the Kapustin Yar test site. The missile then flew
automatically within radio range of distant SS-18 missiles based
in Kazakhstan. From space, the SS-20 relayed the launching order
to an SS-18 taking part in the exercise, which fired out of its
silo on a path to a test impact area on the Kamchatka peninsula.
In a real nuclear crisis, communications rockets launched
automatically by radio command, would relay fire orders to
nuclear combat missiles in Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and
Ukraine. The doomsday machine provides for a massive salvo of
these forces without any participation by local crews. Weapons
commanders in the field may be completely bypassed. Even the
mobile missiles on trucks would fire automatically, triggered by
commands from the communications rockets.
The existence of the doomsday machine is symptomatic of a nuclear
dependence that still afflicts Russia. Other symptoms abound -
for instance, the continuing construction of deep underground
command posts in the Urals with hardened antennas for ordering a
retaliatory strike by deeply submerged submarines. The Russians
also still keep thousands of strategic warheads poised for
immediate launching, and continue to play nuclear war games with
Western foes in mind. During a major exercise of strategic
forces several months ago, Russia fought an all-out nuclear war
with the United States.
The United States has its own version of the doomsday machine,
with less technical gadgetry but more distribution of launching
authority. U.S. military commanders have traditionally been
vested with the authority to order nuclear retaliation under
conditions similar to those that trigger Russia's automatic
launching - notably, loss of communications with national
authorities and signs of nuclear detonations on American soil.
Variants of these arrangements for nuclear "pre-delegation"
existed from the 1950's through at least the mid-1980's, and they
presumably remain in effect.
For the sake of U.S.-Russian reconciliation, to set an example of
responsible nuclear custodianship and to reduce the danger that a
doomsday system might be set in motion by mistake, it's time to
relax the combative stance of the arsenals. Arms negotiations
are all well and good, but the higher priority is to eliminate
the hair trigger on those arms that remain. Neither side, alas,
has embraced the wisdom; both have preserved the operational
stances of the cold war.
For the United States' part, new Presidential guidance is needed
to bring nuclear field operations into the modern era. Believe
it or not, the latest Presidential policy on nuclear planning is
National Security Decision Directive 13, the notorious tract on
nuclear-war fighting signed by Ronald Reagan in 1981. This cold
war document advanced the preposterous premise that it was
possible to fight and win a protracted nuclear war. It is an
absurd basis for current planning.
New guidance should de-emphasize the importance of nuclear
weapons, strengthen safeguards on weapons and revoke any
"pre-delegation" to launch a nuclear strike without the explicit
permission of civilian leaders. It should slash the number of
targets in the strategic war plan and reject faddish and
misguided notions like forming a nuclear expeditionary force
aimed at China and the third world. The guidance should also lay
the groundwork for taking all nuclear forces off alert and
separating warheads from their delivery systems.
Even with international cooperation, dismantling the doomsday
systems will take more than a stroke from a President's pen.
Domestic politics involving civil-military relations would be
deeply engaged on both the Russian and American sides. But the
end of the cold war encourages greater determination to become
something more than cogs in the nuclear machinery. It is time to
be its master, not its minion.
{Some comments: another absurd and preposterous policy actively
considered by the U.S. military was the 'decapitating first
strike'; a nuclear attack aimed specifically at Russian leaders
and their command-and-control facilities. The rationale was
simple (not to say simple-minded) - if we blow up all the Soviet
decision-makers, there will be no one left to order a
counter-strike on the U.S. The Russian doomsday system may have
been their response to this reasonably well-known bit of U.S.
nuclear doctrine.
A fairly wide range of Launch-Under-Attack (LUA) strategies was
considered in an attempt to avoid the 'use-'em-or-lose-'em'
dilemma involved in waiting out an enemy counterforce first
strike. All of these suffered from the same ghastly problem
exhibited by doomsday machines of all kinds; the result of the
strike-and-counterstrike sequence of events was a maximizing of
the number of nuclear explosions on both countries, and a very
large number of casualties all over the world.
Herman Kahn, the first of the serious hawk scholars of nuclear
war, invented the doomsday machine before 1960. He rejected the
idea because (among other drawbacks) doomsday machines were not
controllable. They were also universally rejected by both senior
military officers and civilian DoD people. It is tragic that we
and the Russians allowed them to creep into existence.
--------------------
Date: 11 Oct 1993 11:00:53 -0400 (EDT)
From: ADK...@caer.uky.edu
Subject: Doomsday device
On National Public Radio, the other day, there was a discussion
of some of what we have supposedly found out about the Russian
"doomsday" fail-dangerous system. It appears to have been much
more automated than we ever suspected.
Something on the order of: computer detects loss of communication
with the appropriate controlling group (in Moscow?); computer
directs firing of some rockets; rockets transmit nuclear control
codes; missiles fire. Little human intervention. As opposed to
the "local commander final authority" of the U.S.
Anyone have any confirmation/expansion? If so, are we now
actually less safe from both internal strife, and the fact that
technology is quickly lost in a fall to "barbarism".
The interviewee on NPR sounded knowledgable and non-quackish.
Name I cannot remember. (Blair, or something like?)
Bill Adkins, UK Center for Applied Energy Research.
--------------------
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 93 13:00:33 -0400
From: "Wm. Michael Dante" <dan...@sc3d1053h.acq.osd.mil>
Subject: Conflict
RE: David Altman's posting on "Conflict"
>Reduced to its essential element arms serve the purpose of protection and
>intimidation.
Ah, you mean the good guys use arms for "protection", the bad guys for
"intimidation". (Loaded words?)
>If we, the world community of nations, can establish a "police" force, that
>will be multilateral in nature, strictly neutral in code, and with assets
>that will allow for mobility and enforcement
We already have. We call this "police" force: "United Nations
Peacekeepers".
>plus of course a body that will have the political independence and will to
>use it
Here of course is the sticking point. We have the UN but the UN
is not politically independent. Think about this. What do you
mean by politically independent? By "politically independent"
most people mean "in agreement with their politics." For
example, suppose that Mr. Altman is a fan of letting "all the
people" decide. That is a minority political view. Most
countries in the world are run according to philosophies that say
that only certain people should decide. In the United States,
for example, we say that the majority should decide. And then we
adjust this viewpoint to insure that certain minorities at least
have a voice (let's see: one Black, two Women - does that sound
right?) And we also try to insure that other minorities (e.g.
the various supremacist groups) are deprived of influence. Now I
personally don't see a better system anywhere, but certainly many
people feel left out. (Some even fight back successfully - AARP,
Religious Right, etc.)
I surely would not want to see a supra-national body, politically
independent of the US point of view, have the power to enforce
protection from "abuse". For example, what about the "abuse" of
being rich (like almost everyone in the U.S. - including many
"below the poverty level") while many starve. Should this abuse
be "met with an overwhelming economic and military response" that
would insure that no one have income or assets greater than some
international average? Perhaps, for example, one could require
all businesses with assets over a Million Dollars to relocate a
sufficient portion of their business so that their payroll would
be divided among developed and undeveloped nations in proportion
to population? What do you think would be the response in the US
if a supra-national body tried to enforce such a ruling - would
that response be "protection" or "intimidation"?
I would suggest that when they really think about it, no one
actually wants a body that is politically independent with
"assets that will allow for mobility and enforcement" making the
kinds of decisions that could require an "overwhelming economic
and military response" to enforce.
--------------------
Date: Sun, 7 Nov 1993 21:19:01 -0500
From: sal...@rpi.edu (Michael A. Salvo)
Subject: Information Request
To Whom It May Concern:
I am in search of information, including any specific
data, regarding the effects of the collapse of the Soviet Union.
This would include medical, economic, and political information.
Any data regarding these issues would be most appreciated.
Sincerely,
Michael Salvo
--------------------
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 14:52:32 gmt
From: har...@sageltd.co.uk (Harnby, Louise)
Subject: Security Dialogue
Magne Barth from the International Peace Research Association, Oslo
(PRIO), is the editor of an international quarterly journal called
Security Dialogue. The journal discusses contemporary international
and intergroup affairs, searching for solutions to conflict situations
in the light of general peace research theory.
If you would like to contribute, contact Magne Barth, The Editor,
Security dialogue, Fuglehauggata 11, N-0260 Oslo, Norway.
The journal is published by SAGE Publications, and further information
can be obtained from Louise Harnby at har...@sageltd.co.uk
--------------------
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 21:55:02 EST
From: "Philip S. Kronenberg" <PH...@VTVM1.BITNET>
Subject: Chaos/complexity theory research
I am attempting to put together a list of scholars who are
currently working on inquiry about public policy development,
planning, and the strategic management of national institutions
("public" or "private") based on concepts drawn from
chaos/nonlinear systems, evolutionary metaphors and complexity
theories, among others.
My concern is to identify those who use chaos/complexity
theories, not necessarily to the exclusion of other bodies of
theory. Most of us come upon chaos/complexity as an extension to
other theoretical commitments that are more central to our work.
If you or a colleague are engaged in either theory-building or
substantive analytical studies at a national or cross-national
level that draw on chaos/complexity (along with other related
ideas), please let me know:
- name, institution, address, telephone, electronic
address (any or all of these will be helpful!)
- brief description of current projects (papers, books,
articles under development or recently published)
- your ontological/epistemological/paradigmatic
orientation (functionalist, nominalist, positivist,
Marxist, interpretivist, whatever...)
- your primary disciplinary association (sociology,
economics, political science, anthropology,
mathematics, psychology, physics, ????)
- your primary substantive interests (health, labor,
international security, education, ????)
Let me thank you in advance for taking your time to respond.
Philip S. Kronenberg
Professor of Public Policy
Virginia Tech
Northern Virginia Graduate Center
Falls Church, VA 22042-1287
BITNET: philk@vtvm1 INTERNET: ph...@vtvm1.cc.vt.edu
--------------------
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 1993 07:26:44 GMT
From: "Aldo Pier Solari" <G32...@cicei.ulpgc.es>
Subject: 1st.Post: Concept De Opresso Liber
People with good will who love freedom have to arm themselves.
Wars are started by the self interests of evil systems, like the
nazis, the fascists and the commies. Arms by themselves are not
evil. Arms may be used for right causes, to liberate people from
oppression and slavery. This right is reconized in the Human
Chart Rights (1948). Regards, Aldo-Pier.
Aldo-Pier Solari (MSc, PhD cand.),
Fisheries Research Group,
University of Las Palmas (ULP), Box 50,
35017 LAS PALMAS - CANARY ISLANDS (Spain)
International: <SOL...@OBERON.ULPGC.ES>, <SOL...@EDI.ULPGC.ES>;
Local: <G32...@CICEI.ULPGC.ES>; fax: <34 (28) 45 29 22>.
--------------------
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 1993 19:26:35 -0500 (EST)
From: "Aaron A. Leaman" <aale...@mailbox.syr.edu>
Subject: RE: Arms-l listserv
Hello. I am a new subscriber to this list and a student at
Syracuse University. I am also a member of the University Debate
Team. This semester, our resolution reads "Resolved: That U.S.
military intervention to foster democratic government is
appropriate in a post cold war world."
I was wondering if anyone on the listserv might have suggestions
for books or articles that would be appropriate to research on this
topic. In addition, I would be especially interested in hearing
ideas about possible scenarios for such intervention (i.e.
Bosnia, North Korea, or perhaps in the Third World). I will be
putting together several arguments and scenarios to support both
sides of the resolution, and would appreciate any assistance you
could provide.
Thanks,
Aaron Leaman
P.S. I am new to this group, and I haven't had a chance to read
the archives, so if this thread seems to far out of the scope of
this list, please feel free to ignore me.
--------------------------
End of Arms-Discussion Digest
**************************