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Clay Blair versus the U-boat history war
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Geoffrey Sinclair
Aug 31, 2016, 9:14:53 AM8/31/16
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In his book Hitler's U-boat War Clay Blair advocates the loss of
merchant shipping off the US coast in 1942 was not the fault of
the USN or Admiral King, indeed they were the competent ones,
everyone else let them down.
The first two chapters of the U-boat war against the Americas
read to me more like an attack on those who disagree with the
conclusion, rather than a history of the actual U-boat operations.
The photographs of the major players tend to have simple biographic,
captions, the two main exceptions are FDR "failed to properly prepare
the USN for the U-Boat threat in the Atlantic" and Admiral Andrews,
commander of the Eastern Sea Frontier, described as able.
In summary, according to Blair, most historians, particularly British, are
astray in accusing US as dumb or inept or criminally neglectful. They
use biased sources and in particular distort Admiral King's position,
distortions which have been allowed to stand for all too long. Instead
King had an unusually firm grip on the U-boat menace, was doing his
utmost to improve things, urging all to prepare for US coastal convoys.
"The British contempt for Admiral King and America's alleged inability
to cope with or its indifference to the U-boat threat", the inability was
quite clear in the tonnage sunk. The question is why and for Blair the
answer is every non USN/USCG player on the allied side. Admiral
King's attitude to the British is never mentioned.
For background the US reserved "coastal" traffic for US ships,
coastal including via the Panama Canal, which meant of the 1,500
US merchant ships in service in 1937 there were 400 on foreign
trade, which included the Americas and Caribbean In 1941 around
260 out of 360 big modern US tankers were transporting coastal oil
cargoes. So for submarine defensive purposes the US needed a
priority on coastal shipping protection, for offensive purposes ocean
going protection.
The pattern of WWII U-boat warfare was a series of repeats, when
the U-boats first operated in an area they generally found plenty of
targets with little or poorly trained defence, then the defences
strengthened and forced them onto other areas, or the boats moved
on to more profitable areas. Only in late 1942 and early 1943 did the
mass U-boat attempt to break the Atlantic convoys occur, successful
at first then defeated. Before then the number of available U-boats,
the number of ships sailing alone and the existence of weak areas
meant convoy battles tended to be the exception.
Doenitz tried for local superiority to reduce his casualties and new
areas to force the allies into providing more anti submarine forces
and lose merchant ship efficiencies via convoys.
Blair starts with an overview of the WWI U-boat operations and then
moves onto the September 1939 to December 1941 operations. In
doing so he sets up a series of standards for good or bad performance.
WWI dates
18 Feb 1915, UK waters declared war zone
Sep 1915 UK blockade called off, U-boats sent to Mediterranean
Feb 1916 blockade restarted
24 Apr 1916 prize rules reinstated.
6 Oct 1916, prize rules in UK area, unrestricted in Mediterranean
1 Feb 1917 unrestricted submarine warfare in UK waters
3 Feb 1917 US broke diplomatic relations
6 Apr 1917 US declared war.
10 May 1917 first convoy Gibraltar to UK
24 May 1917 First convoy US to UK.
Sep 1917 ocean going convoys in full place
Jun 1918 UK coastal convoys
The Admiralty is responsible for lack of anti submarine weapons, tactics
and assets, not the UK government. Only 800 UK merchant ships had
guns as of early 1916, or about 1/3 the 1936 ocean going fleet. It was
a grievous sin to not promptly do convoying, the ocean going system
was fully in place in September 1917.
Convoy means evasion possible, a rock bottom 1 destroyer as escort
was enough as it prevented gun attacks by the U-boat.
Early WWII Blair thinks the UK would have been better off without convoys,
given the lack of U-boats, thanks to the reduction in trade. Note in WWI
the U-boat fleet reached start of WWII size in early 1916. Also Blair
reports in 1917 convoys lost 1 in 150 ships versus 1 in 10 independent,
and the 1918 losses were 999 independents to 134 in convoy. Some
430,000 GRT of merchant shipping was lost to U-boats in 1939, or the
same amount as the first 7 months of WWI. So nearly twice the rate.
In 1939 Blair reports 14 out of 123 ship losses were in convoys. So if no
convoys 14 becomes what? All the evidence suggests a lot more.
Note the mining effort and its effect on trade are not considered when
calculating the loss of UK trade in 1939. Nor neutrals like the US
withdrawing ships. Nor weather. Later in end notes to section those
effects are mentioned. Also while 1940 imports were 75% of 1939,
part of this was the loss of trade to France etc. The declines in 1941
and 1942 were another matter, even more so given the increase in
military imports.
Blair notes 291 ships lost to U-boats on convoys heading to England and
only 19 convoys to all destinations lost 6 or more ships to end 1941. Total
losses to U-boats were 1,062 ships to end 1941.
Blair thinks Atlantic is the decisive theatre, rather like Doenitz, so
gather all forces and move from North America to Berlin. So the
UK decision to fight in the Mediterranean is a mistake given the
loss of ASW assets to the area, no credit is given for the U-boats
sent there in 1941. Similar attitude to U-boats striking off Africa,
only later is the strain on ASW assets noted as a useful effect,
instead of only what ships were sunk.
ASV mark II radar, in early 1940 under test, and 49 in Coastal Command
aircraft by the end of the year, unacceptable production rate for Blair.
The Leigh Light was an October 1940 proposal, 18 months to combat, again
unacceptable. First ASW radar (1.5 metre) on ship at sea 19 June 1940.
Centimetric radar first test on 12 August 1940, 6 months later a ship put
to sea with a set, that is early 1941, with production sets at sea in the
second half of 1941.
USN had a test SG (centimetric) radar at sea in March 1941, none in service
as of 1 January 1942, this is simply a fact, not an unacceptable delay. Nor
is the lack of radar in US ships and aircraft in early 1942.
As of early 1941 US really believed in convoys, except in 1940 they believed
a poorly escorted convoy was worse than independent routing. Blair accepts
this without noting his WWI evasion and "even 1 destroyer" comments. Nor
does he make the connection when he reports that after US coastal convoys
were introduced U-boats had trouble finding targets there and then had
trouble attacking thanks to the presence of escorts.
Blair states a force of 100 B-24 in Coastal Command "could well have
decisively crushed the U-boat peril in the summer of 1941, sparing the
allies the terrible shipping losses in the years ahead." Failure to send
all B-24 to Coastal Command, "one of the worst mistakes the British War
Cabinet made in the war"
B-24 production to end 1941, 1 XB-24, 6 YB/LB-30A, 1 B-24, 9 B-24A,
135 LB-30, 20 LB-30B, 4 B-24C, total 176, of these 93 in Q4/41
UK Liberator imports, 1941, 1 Mar, 3 Apr, 15 May, 4 Jun, 2 Aug (all mark I
to here), 1 Sep, 13 Oct, 25 Nov, 14 Dec, all mark II, total 25 I, 53 II, so
78.
Mark I = YB-24/LB-30A/LB-30B, mark II = LB-30
And of course a number of the early B-24 were not combat worthy and so used
for transports.
As of 1 July Coastal Command had 3 B-24 in one squadron, strength climbed to
4 B-24 by 1 August. And the other B-24s went to BOAC and bomber units
meant for overseas service. Blair keeps using Bomber Command as the
destination.
Blair notes the Short Sunderland had maintenance issues and declares
the US built aircraft were better, citing the report that indicated 2
sorties per month per Sunderland was the expected return.
Coastal Command Sorties per month per aircraft, 1941, 1942, 1943
Catalina 2.87, 2.19, 3.95
Hudson 3.83, 4.56, 7.35
Liberator 1.13, 1.90, 2.597
Sunderland 3.90, 2.81, 3.35
Wellington 3.67, 3.22, 3.77
Hours per sortie
Catalina 13.7, 13.5, 15.44
Hudson 4.8, 5.28, 5.96
Liberator 10.88, 10.92, 12.27
Sunderland 8.42, 10.78, 11.56
Wellington 6.68, 8.14, 8.35
The above derived from sortie and average strength totals. The 8th Air
Force had real problems in maintaining early operations, was continually
expanding until June 1944 then managed 2 crews per heavy bomber in
the second half of 1944, effective sorties per 4 engined bomber per month,
Aug-42 1.18
Sep-42 0.67
Oct-42 0.66
Nov-42 1.22
Dec-42 0.83
Jan-43 1.29
Feb-43 1.96
Mar-43 3.9
Apr-43 1.16
May-43 3.2
Jun-43 2.09
Jul-43 2.7
Aug-43 2.99
Sep-43 3.59
Jan-44 5.6
Feb-44 6.36
Mar-44 5.67
Apr-44 5.99
May-44 6.78
Jun-44 9.56
Jul-44 8.45
Aug-44 8.58
Sep-44 7.81
Oct-44 8.13
Nov-44 7.22
Dec-44 8.35
Jan-45 8.13
Feb-45 11.22
Mar-45 15.27
Apr-45 9.86
Air forces are expensive. Note what the extra sorties per aircraft mean in
terms of total effort. Also treat the above as a guide, not an absolute.
Bomber Command should have kept bombing the U-boat bases before the
shelters were built, they would have prevented the building of the shelters.
Blair notes Bomber Command strikes on towns in Germany and essentially
wants them shifted to U-boat bases in 1941. The trouble is the lack of hits
on the German fleet units in French ports in 1941, around 3,260 long tons
aimed at the fleet, 2,430 aimed at ports, 64 tons at U-boats. Out of 31,735
tons for the year, 23,050 dropped on Germany. There is little doubt bombing
would have delayed the construction of the U-boat shelters, but not stopped
them. They were completed around the end of the first quarter of 1942.
While Blair concentrates on the B-24 he does not mention the RAF four
engined bombers coming into service in 1941, the Halifax and Stirling
which had comparable range to the Sunderland but with bigger bomb loads.
The Halifax did 468 sorties in Bomber Command in 1941, the Stirling 814,
versus 1,466 Sunderland, 51 B-24, and 1,024 Catalina in Coastal Command.
First Bomber Command operations were, Stirling in February 1941, Halifax
in March 41 and by the end of August 2 Halifax and 2 Stirling squadrons
were operational, by end of year it was 3 Halifax, 3 Stirling. 1941 losses
by operational units 48 Halifax, 68 Stirling. On 31 August 1941 Bomber
Command reported 11 serviceable Halifax and 9 serviceable Stirling with
crews. That rose to 12 Halifax and 24 Stirling on 31 December 1941.
There is little doubt sending a squadron of each to Coastal Command would
have produced a better return in 1941.
Blair decides a failure to vigorously patrol the Bay of Biscay ranks
along with the lack of bombing as an "omission in 1941 of regrettable
proportions". Since there were patrols we are left with what the definition
of vigorous is plus the availability of aircraft to do the task.
As of 3rd September 1939 the RAF had 9,554 aircraft 3,265 bombers, 1,122
fighters, 823 General Reconnaissance, 337 army co-operation, 171 flying
boats and transports, 184 naval types, 3,539 trainer and misc. Counting
anything still classified as on strength.
USN strength 1 July 1941, 1,774 combat, 183 transport/utility, 1,444
training, 31 misc., 7 blimp, total 3,432 aircraft. As of 1 July 1942, 3,191
combat, 461 transport/utility, 3,378 training, 28 misc., 16 blimp, total
7,058 aircraft. Which implies the USN had over half the number of aircraft
in early 1942 as the RAF had in September 1939. Blair notes the lack
of RAF anti submarine aircraft as a failure, but not the USN strength.
In 1940 the PBY was a relatively old design, 12 built in 1936, 86 in 1937,
97 in 1938,16 in 1939 (1 UK), 21 (12 Commonwealth) in 1940, 395 (192
Commonwealth) in 1941. UK Catalina imports, 1 Jan, 9 Feb, 16 Mar,
12 Apr, 18 May, 17 Jun, 4 Jul, 1 Sep, 6 Nov, 4 Dec, total 88. Coastal
Command had 4 on 1 April 1941, 21 on 1 May, 30 on 1 June and 43 on
1 August.
There was around a 15 month gap between the end of PBY-4 production in 1939
and PBY-5 production beginning in September 1940. The Martin Mariner had 20
accepted September 1940 to April 1941, then nothing to April 1942. So when
it comes to long range patrol aircraft the USN had production gaps.
Since start of production in 1936 to end 1941 the USN had received 422 PBY,
foreign buyers had received 205. The USN received another 264 January to
May 1942 versus foreign production of 15.
As of 12 January 1942 the Atlantic fleet held 100 Catalinas plus 50 smaller
types, from Iceland to Brazil.
On 14 January 1942 the USN asked for 400 B-24 and 900 B-25, which
would be all B-24 production until end April 1942 or alternatively every
B-24 built January to May 1942, the 900th B-25 was built in early August
1942, 172 had been built to end 1941. This request is passed without
comment, instead noting how the USAAF "grudgingly" agreed to equip
one USN squadron with landplanes, trouble is those 20 aircraft were
accepted by the USN in September 1941, not the 1942 implied.
Blair states FDR resisted the USN being able to operate large landplanes,
otherwise it would undermine the Army's absolute hold on strategic air
power. Secretary of War Stimson did not get along with King, his diaries
providing quotes, apparently few to none historians suggest Stimson was
anything but objective. Blair decides a presidential ruling was required
and it was yet another failure by FDR who again escapes all blame.
None of the USAAF units had anti U-boat training, so no chance of them doing
effective ASW quickly. No mention of USN training. The USN PBY in Atlantic
primary role was eyes of fleet, like they did so well at Midway.
USAAF believed in offensive patrols, Blair declares the results an abysmal
failure, as only 1 U-boat was sunk by USAAF unassisted to end August 1942.
So According to Paul Kemp, unassisted U-boat kills by US forces January to
August 1942,
USN patrol aircraft sank 2 in March, 1 in June, 1 in August (2 of these were
around Atlantic convoys)
USAAF aircraft 1 in July
USN ships 1 in April,
USGC ships 1 in May, 1 in June
USGC aircraft 1 in August.
Blair makes no attempt to measure other US ASW effectiveness via unassisted
kills.
Nor are the aircraft tactics related to the fact there were no US coastal
convoys to escort until mid May 1942.
Blair concludes the failure to not make the USN alone responsible for anti
submarine warfare until mid 1943 "one of the greatest military misfortunes
of World War II". FDR allowed it to persist.
The USN received its first B-24 in August 1942, 51 by end of year.
Blair lists the USN R&D on anti U-boat weapons and Radar, and concludes
this shows the USN understood the menace. No mention of WWI Admiralty
R&D that ultimately included active sonar for example, or other force's
R&D being used as evidence.
Blair says the RN Hunt class were supposed to be for Atlantic escorts and
failed, except with 240 tons of fuel range was less then the pre war fleet
destroyers, the sloops had 400 tons of fuel, the flower class 232 tons, the
later vessels 340 tons.
The 50 old destroyers and 10 large coast guard cutters sent to British
would have been enough to do US east cost convoys. However Blair fails
to mention the USN converted 8 old destroyers to minelayers pre war,
while in 1940 seven were converted to fast transports and 17 to
minesweepers. As far as I know these could still do anti submarine
operations but it seems when their other role was not needed.
Essentially as of the first half of 1942 the USN ASW forces were loaned
destroyers and PBY when available. Apart from escorting the bigger
units of the fleet the major employer of USN destroyers was troop convoy
protection, when the RN used 6 destroyers to protect a US troop convoy
near Britain the USN rated it as an unacceptably small escort and moved
to end to end USN protection. PBY patrols also followed this priority.
Blair endorses the protection of troop transports was the most important USN
mission in Atlantic and decides the zero US troop losses in the move to
England to end August 1942 was a significant victory. One reason for US
troop movements is given as repelling a possible German invasion of Britain
in Spring 1942. Abandoning two troop convoys in January 1942 "in order to
hunt an unknown number of U-boats who had only sunk two ships in waters
of the Eastern Sea frontier would not only have vastly upset all convoy and
warship schedules but also incurred the wrath of the US army". So the
U-boat threat is too small to mount operations but too big to release
destroyers from the troop convoys, including the one headed to the Pacific.
Simply put the decision to move troops into position to invade France in
1942, and to form a defensive ring around the expanded Japanese Empire
tied up a large number of US ASW assets, given the lack of such assets
the US had to make the choices. Blair is solidly behind the idea the USN
made exactly the right decisions, all those destroyers and USN aircraft
sorties were needed where they were sent.
Blair decides there was no possibility of moving escorts from the ocean
work, the U-boats travelling alone across the Atlantic could inflict
catastrophic damage on a weakly escorted convoy, the U-boats guarding
Norway in the Iceland Faeroes gap could hit unescorted convoys near
Britain (yes he actually says unescorted). Canadian escorts were
needed in Canada and were too far from their supplies if operating in
US waters.
Blair is solid in his condemnation of just about anything FDR did in
relation to the USN. The PC and SC programs, small coastal anti
submarine boats, of 110 and 173 feet are condemned as no good, and
an FDR special, though the USN liked them for training purposes,
however Blair then lists the USCG cutters, the 125 and 165 foot types
as useful additions and indeed they and the PC and SC formed the
protection for the first informal US coastal convoys, the bucket brigade,
staying close to the coast and making port before night.
As for the Destroyer Escorts (DE). The Normal Friedman time line is,
1937 revival of the WWI eagle boat, became the 173 foot PC, used in naval
reserve during peace and local ASW in wartime.
June 1939 first proposal of second line ocean going destroyer/escort.
16 August 1939 request for 750 to 900 ton AA fast destroyer escort (25 to 30
knots) (In September 1940 the AA DE would require 1,200 tons at least.)
September 1939 request for a design of second line destroyer/escort, the
characteristics were the essential DE design. Instead they tried to rework
the earliest modern US destroyer design, the Farragut. This could not be
done.
January 1940 USN conclusion building repeat 1,630 ton Destroyers a better
idea than escorts.
August 1940 Gibbs&Cox lightweight destroyers, 4 ordered in September.
September 1940 escort design, four 5 inch guns, two quad 1.1 inch, 24.5
knots, 1,175 tons, 5,000 miles at 15 knots. Cost $6.8 million. Dropping two
5 inch guns and halving power to 6,000 SHP reduced size to 875 tons.
(Note cost estimates of $6.8 million for DE versus $8.1 million for a 1,630
ton DD, in 1943 the DE, with 3 inch guns, $5.3 to $6.1 million, DD $10.4
million.)
November 1940 Gibb&Cox design changed to September 1940 USN design.
31 January 1941, USN recommendation to build 50 escort vessels for use
against submarines in western Atlantic as part of the 4th supplemental
estimate for 1941.
7 February Secretary of Navy authorised construction as soon as the design
was settled.
February 1941, DE design, 12,000 SHP, two 5 inch guns, one quad 1.1 inch,
depth charge throwers, 1,125 tons 6,000 miles at 12 knots but no modern
AA fire control. The design was drawn up after examination of British
designs as well as US requirements.
April/May 1941 USN General Board recommends against building any DE,
lack of AA fire and cost cited as reasons.
16 May 1941 Chief of Naval Operations proposed no DE, 19 May order for 50
cancelled.
17 June 1941 Admiral Stark requested UK escort design details.
23 June 1941 The British had heard about the February 1941 design and asked
for 100.
July 1941 BDE design, three 3 inch guns, depth charge throwers, 12,000 SHP
1,144 tons, 6,000 miles at 12 knots.
15 August 1941 50 DE for RN approved by FDR.
1 November 1941 RN order for 50 DE placed.
January 1942 250 more DE ordered to be split between RN and USN
By September 1942 420 more DE ordered
USN secretary of the Navy,
Claude A. Swanson Virginia March 4, 1933 - July 7, 1939
Charles Edison New Jersey July 7, 1939 - January 2, 1940 (Acting?), January
2, 1940 - June 24, 1940
(acting) Lewis Compton June 24, 1940 - July 11, 1940
Frank Knox Illinois July 11, 1940 - April 28, 1944
Chief of Naval Operations.
FADM William D. Leahy 2 January 1937 1 August 1939
ADM Harold R. Stark 1 August 1939 2 March 1942
FADM Ernest J. King 2 March 1942 15 December 1945
Blair says DE design in was around in 1941 (not 1940) but when Stark and
Edison presented them to FDR, it was disapproved. Note when Edison was
in office. Then FDR approved 50 RN DE but no USN. King and USN right in
always pushing for DE while FDR was totally wrong, always stopping any
attempt. This totally contradicts Friedman who notes the USN kept coming
back to building the 1,630 ton destroyers as the better option.
Later Blair decides the March 18 1942 letter where FDR criticises the USN
was untrue, repeated recommendations to built DE were rejected by FDR,
and when initially built they were 10th priority, well behind the PC and SC.
The letter could be interpreted as "groveling" to the British according to
Blair.
March 1942 DE ranked priority below major surface craft, July near top,
below landing craft, October 1943 8th place, June 1944 13th out of 13.
King asked for UK escorts to set up Caribbean convoys, British offered a Mid
Ocean Escort group, King refused. The lack of escorts was due to FDR's PC
and SC program being behind schedule (so no good and late), Blair says 12
PC January to April 1942. The War Production Board says 1 in November 1941,
4 in December, 5 in January 1942, 4 in March, 11 in April, 13 in May, 12 in
June. SC production was 1 in August 1941, 1 in January 1942, 4 in March
plus 1 conversion, 16 in April, 16 in May, 9 in June.
As an aside Blair puts the USN production program as 10 battleships and
31 Essex class carriers in 1941, yet it actually was 17 Battleship (10 laid
down) and 12 Essex before the US was attacked, 2 more Essex in
December 1941, 10 more in August 1942, 3 more in June 1943, total 26,
6 more were proposed in 1945 but disapproved by the president.
The USN initiated anti U-boat measures, merchant ship captains ignored them
and lost ships. The captains were advised to watch smoke emissions, stay in
inshore lanes, lay in port overnight, zig zag and minimise radio. And yes
Blair's language implies the captains were responsible. Non USN people
ignoring the USN and taking losses.
>From 6 to 8 February the USN had 7 destroyers available for escort work.
Blair states none of the 34 British ASW ships promised had arrived and
would not do so for weeks. Looks like 24 ASW trawlers were offered in
late January while on 22 January 10 corvettes under construction or
refitting were offered.
However Blair wants the reader to know they had not turned up a fortnight
after being promised. Those non USN people failing again.
12 February, the USN decided no coastal convoys until adequate escorts
could be provided, up to 68 required, 56 minimum.
March 1942 14 different USN destroyers spent 63 days on ASW patrols.
On 20 March 1942 King ordered convoys, from Trinidad to Halifax and Boston
to Halifax, nothing happened for two months but Blair says this shows the
impression King could not do convoys is wrong. As opposed to asking for
them.
Blair reports the USN needed to avoid a major setback in the Pacific, Port
Moresby or new Caledonia or even Australia falling. Such a setback might
topple Churchill or even cause the impeachment of FDR. So Blair fully
understands while the RN chief Admiral Pound arrived in Washington on
20 April 1942 and left on 26 April Admiral King leaving for San Francisco
25 to 27 April is correct. The joint plans made in San Francisco were for
Coral Sea, except Lexington was ordered into the area on 20 April and
Yorktown was already there. King approved Nimitz's plans, Blair has him
as co-author.
The Washington meetings expected US coastal convoys in the first 2 weeks
of May, covering the oil runs and US east coat but not the Gulf Coast or the
rest of the Caribbean. Of the four convoy routes three were to be protected
by Commonwealth forces, the fourth had 43 warships, made up of 8 USN
destroyers, 17 British ships, while the rest were the small USN and USCG
ships, cutters and PC/SC.
Seems the first permanent assignment of USN destroyers to ASW was in April
Some 140 ASW patrol days by USN destroyers, including the assigned ships.
In May it was 184patrol days. Note without convoys to protect they were
patrolling, just like the USAAF aircraft. The patrol days are mentioned in
Blair but not what a patrol meant.
US suspended tanker sailings 16 to 29 April, as did the British in the area
18 to 23 April, then the British began routing tankers from the Caribbean to
Freetown in Africa then to Britain.
The U-boats switched to the 4 rotor Enigma on 1 February 1942, the
capture of some code material in October 1942 gave a way in and
signals were often being decrypted in a timely manner in December.
The statement classified silliest by Blair is from the official UK
intelligence history which states the lack of convoys and air cover meant
reading the German signal traffic would not really have helped.
Blair says untrue, Enigma traffic would have revealed the US operations
were the one Doenitz was pushing for maximum effort, that is if you ignore
the major defend Norway/attack Arctic convoys (those U-boats off Britain
waiting for the unescorted convoys Blair feared for example) and the
Mediterranean which took some 50 boats. This also ignores the lack of
German wolf pack traffic and where the sinkings were occurring.
Enigma would have told the allies the type VII boats were being used, so
increasing the threat. The lack of any other U-boat attacks was not enough.
Enigma would have reported U-tankers were being used for the first
time, telling the allies much earlier so they could have gate crashed the
refueling operations, the implication of what that would tell the Germans
is not explored. British intelligence "for all too many months" refused to
credit the existence of U-tankers. The first tanker operation was U-A
as a trial, it spent 24 March to 3 April off Newfoundland. The first
purpose built U tanker began operations on 18 April 1942, 500 miles
off Bermuda. As of 8 April U-boat command informed boats off
America they no longer needed to worry as much about fuel reserves.
The next 3 U tanker operations were May/June, June/July and July.
Blair notes for April refueling extended the average patrol by "merely" 7
days. Also they did not result in increased sinkings. It was not until
May/June and the operations on the US Gulf Coast and towards
Mexico did refueling make a difference.
Blair thinks the USN required enigma messages to work out the U-boats would
operate where the continental shelf was narrowest, not a map or the location
of the attacks.
Enigma would have revealed the U-boats were operating alone. The radio
silence and lack of the volume of radio traffic needed to set up a pack
attack was not enough for Blair.
Enigma confirming single boat tactics meant weakly protected US coastal
convoys might have been risked, since one boat at a time was handleable
and besides the U-boats under radio silence would not summon other
U-boats. So the lack of traffic again was no clue nor the fact if the
U-boats wanted to do pack attacks they had to signal convoy locations.
Enigma would have revealed the inability of German surface ships to mount
operations into the Atlantic, despite Tirpitz being operational, releasing
more destroyers.
The Germans were reading RN and merchant ship codes, Enigma would have
revealed this.
Of course Blair thinks the failure of the British to fully brief the US
about Enigma and the decoding techniques is a major reason for the
long blackout. Now if the allies halved the around 10 month blackout
period to 5 months that would be end July 1942, just as the U-boats
were being forced out of the Caribbean.
It should be pointed out the western Atlantic and Caribbean operations
meant few Atlantic convoy operations in the first half of 1942. In the
intelligence war that was probably fortunate for the allies. Doenitz was
suspicious his messages were being read during 1941 as convoys
evaded U-boat patrols. Had the fighting been in the Atlantic after the
U-boat code change in February 1942 the probable sudden increase
in convoy sightings would have been a solid clue the allies were able
to read 3 rotor Enigma traffic.
Blair criticises the US Maritime Commission for its idea losses were not
that important if they could be out built but later advances the idea the
1942 losses were not that bad because the allies nearly replaced the
tonnage that year.
So in summary according to Blair,
The USN was fully aware of the U-boat menace and it, along with its
admirals, put in a near faultless use of what assets it had. The lack of
ships was due to FDR, the lack of intelligence due to the British, the lack
of effective airpower due to the USAAF, some merchant ship losses were
due to USN advice being ignored by captains, the use of strong escorts
on troop convoys completely correct. The 4 month delay between the first
US coastal sinkings and the first convoys (ignoring the bucket brigade
efforts) completely understandable. USN future weapons projects and
orders to form convoys months before any were run is additional proof
the USN did its job.
Since the RN was in decline and the USN in ascension in 1942 the result was
British jealousy which historians echo. Anybody who criticises USN actions
tends to get an adjective from Blair, obtuse and ignorant sort of thing.
U-boat strength assigned to the Atlantic front, including the North Sea went
from 65 to 99 boats January to July 1942, then by 1 January 1943 it was up
to 166.
The saving grace for the allies, as Blair repeatedly points out, and also in
1941, was this sort of rapid expansion diluted quality, the average U-boat
was not as effective as in 1940 until it gained experience. Another point
is it seems the very small pre war Canadian navy hit a major training
problem, it lacked experienced people while building more warships than
the training programs could cope with. The result was underperformance
which tended to mean the RN and USN bad treatment of the RCN had an excuse.
There is no doubt the allies were going to take a defeat in the western
Atlantic and Caribbean in the same way other U-boat operations tended
to have high success when they first operated in areas. And there were
plenty of people and organisations on the allied side that underperformed.
Blair actually provides the evidence that forming weakly protected convoys
reduced losses compared with independent sailings and strongly protected
convoys reduced losses even more. He then has to cope with the 4 month
gap between the first sinkings in US waters and the first coastal convoys.
He removes the USN destroyers and search aircraft on more important
missions, he lists a series of failings by non USN participants and ignores
what he says about other operations and the effects of convoys to conclude
no coastal convoys, not even experimental it seems, were possible before
they actually occurred or apparently would have made any difference if
they had been done earlier, or else they might have made a difference but
the outside failures left the USN unable to know key information to show
this.
For Blair for non USN organisations heavy losses and elapsed time to put
in place counter measures are signs of their failure. For the USN the same
thing is proof of (all)) other organisation's failure
The Blair conclusion is wrong.
Finally a note on tankers.
When talking about losses Blair does not seem to note the increase in fuel
consumption and movements. Though he does note the switch from using
coastal tankers to pipelines and rail within the US.
Britain used about 200,000 tons of oil products a week in 1938, September
1939 to May 1940 212,000 tons/week, June 1940 to May 1941 230,000 tons,
for the next two years around 240,000 tons a week, so stable, then June 1943
to May 1944 307,000 tons per week. Aviation fuel consumption was 10,000
tons/week 1940/41, 16,000 tons/week 1941/42, 28,000 tons/week 1942/43
and 60,000 tons/week 1943/44.
In a series of snapshots of British tankers in use carrying fuel in 1941 for
every 5 tons employed to supply Britain 4 tons were on cross trades. This
has to be taken into account if you use total tanker tonnage, versus just
Atlantic tonnage.
Blair misses that while large amounts of Norwegian and Dutch tankers came
under formal UK control in 1940 many of them were already at least partly in
allied service, for example 340,000 deadweight tons of Dutch tankers in
early 1940 were in allied trades. On the other had there was no need to
supply France with fuel after June 1940, given its tanker fleet in June 1939
was 43 ships of 294,000 GRT
Tanker losses September 1939 to end November 1941 were 2,105,000
deadweight tons, then 1,859,000 DWT December 1941 to May 1942, another
754,000 DWT June to August 1942. The allied tanker fleet did not regain its
November 1941 strength until around November 1943, the fleet spent most of
1942 to February 1943 down a nett 1.7 million GRT.
Or to put in another way in 1942 UK fuel imports were lower than 1938, down
to 10.26 million tons, a drop of nearly 3 million tons from 1941, versus
11.61 million tons of consumption in 1942. In 1943 imports were around 2
million tons more than consumption.
The allied tanker fleet grew 4.2 million DWT May 1943 to May 1944 plus 0.6
million less DWT was under repair, so a gain of 4.8 million in use versus
10.4 million in use in May 1943, and the allies still considered themselves
short of tankers. One hidden factor was the new tankers were faster and
could load and discharge faster.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.
merchant shipping off the US coast in 1942 was not the fault of
the USN or Admiral King, indeed they were the competent ones,
everyone else let them down.
The first two chapters of the U-boat war against the Americas
read to me more like an attack on those who disagree with the
conclusion, rather than a history of the actual U-boat operations.
The photographs of the major players tend to have simple biographic,
captions, the two main exceptions are FDR "failed to properly prepare
the USN for the U-Boat threat in the Atlantic" and Admiral Andrews,
commander of the Eastern Sea Frontier, described as able.
In summary, according to Blair, most historians, particularly British, are
astray in accusing US as dumb or inept or criminally neglectful. They
use biased sources and in particular distort Admiral King's position,
distortions which have been allowed to stand for all too long. Instead
King had an unusually firm grip on the U-boat menace, was doing his
utmost to improve things, urging all to prepare for US coastal convoys.
"The British contempt for Admiral King and America's alleged inability
to cope with or its indifference to the U-boat threat", the inability was
quite clear in the tonnage sunk. The question is why and for Blair the
answer is every non USN/USCG player on the allied side. Admiral
King's attitude to the British is never mentioned.
For background the US reserved "coastal" traffic for US ships,
coastal including via the Panama Canal, which meant of the 1,500
US merchant ships in service in 1937 there were 400 on foreign
trade, which included the Americas and Caribbean In 1941 around
260 out of 360 big modern US tankers were transporting coastal oil
cargoes. So for submarine defensive purposes the US needed a
priority on coastal shipping protection, for offensive purposes ocean
going protection.
The pattern of WWII U-boat warfare was a series of repeats, when
the U-boats first operated in an area they generally found plenty of
targets with little or poorly trained defence, then the defences
strengthened and forced them onto other areas, or the boats moved
on to more profitable areas. Only in late 1942 and early 1943 did the
mass U-boat attempt to break the Atlantic convoys occur, successful
at first then defeated. Before then the number of available U-boats,
the number of ships sailing alone and the existence of weak areas
meant convoy battles tended to be the exception.
Doenitz tried for local superiority to reduce his casualties and new
areas to force the allies into providing more anti submarine forces
and lose merchant ship efficiencies via convoys.
Blair starts with an overview of the WWI U-boat operations and then
moves onto the September 1939 to December 1941 operations. In
doing so he sets up a series of standards for good or bad performance.
WWI dates
18 Feb 1915, UK waters declared war zone
Sep 1915 UK blockade called off, U-boats sent to Mediterranean
Feb 1916 blockade restarted
24 Apr 1916 prize rules reinstated.
6 Oct 1916, prize rules in UK area, unrestricted in Mediterranean
1 Feb 1917 unrestricted submarine warfare in UK waters
3 Feb 1917 US broke diplomatic relations
6 Apr 1917 US declared war.
10 May 1917 first convoy Gibraltar to UK
24 May 1917 First convoy US to UK.
Sep 1917 ocean going convoys in full place
Jun 1918 UK coastal convoys
The Admiralty is responsible for lack of anti submarine weapons, tactics
and assets, not the UK government. Only 800 UK merchant ships had
guns as of early 1916, or about 1/3 the 1936 ocean going fleet. It was
a grievous sin to not promptly do convoying, the ocean going system
was fully in place in September 1917.
Convoy means evasion possible, a rock bottom 1 destroyer as escort
was enough as it prevented gun attacks by the U-boat.
Early WWII Blair thinks the UK would have been better off without convoys,
given the lack of U-boats, thanks to the reduction in trade. Note in WWI
the U-boat fleet reached start of WWII size in early 1916. Also Blair
reports in 1917 convoys lost 1 in 150 ships versus 1 in 10 independent,
and the 1918 losses were 999 independents to 134 in convoy. Some
430,000 GRT of merchant shipping was lost to U-boats in 1939, or the
same amount as the first 7 months of WWI. So nearly twice the rate.
In 1939 Blair reports 14 out of 123 ship losses were in convoys. So if no
convoys 14 becomes what? All the evidence suggests a lot more.
Note the mining effort and its effect on trade are not considered when
calculating the loss of UK trade in 1939. Nor neutrals like the US
withdrawing ships. Nor weather. Later in end notes to section those
effects are mentioned. Also while 1940 imports were 75% of 1939,
part of this was the loss of trade to France etc. The declines in 1941
and 1942 were another matter, even more so given the increase in
military imports.
Blair notes 291 ships lost to U-boats on convoys heading to England and
only 19 convoys to all destinations lost 6 or more ships to end 1941. Total
losses to U-boats were 1,062 ships to end 1941.
Blair thinks Atlantic is the decisive theatre, rather like Doenitz, so
gather all forces and move from North America to Berlin. So the
UK decision to fight in the Mediterranean is a mistake given the
loss of ASW assets to the area, no credit is given for the U-boats
sent there in 1941. Similar attitude to U-boats striking off Africa,
only later is the strain on ASW assets noted as a useful effect,
instead of only what ships were sunk.
ASV mark II radar, in early 1940 under test, and 49 in Coastal Command
aircraft by the end of the year, unacceptable production rate for Blair.
The Leigh Light was an October 1940 proposal, 18 months to combat, again
unacceptable. First ASW radar (1.5 metre) on ship at sea 19 June 1940.
Centimetric radar first test on 12 August 1940, 6 months later a ship put
to sea with a set, that is early 1941, with production sets at sea in the
second half of 1941.
USN had a test SG (centimetric) radar at sea in March 1941, none in service
as of 1 January 1942, this is simply a fact, not an unacceptable delay. Nor
is the lack of radar in US ships and aircraft in early 1942.
As of early 1941 US really believed in convoys, except in 1940 they believed
a poorly escorted convoy was worse than independent routing. Blair accepts
this without noting his WWI evasion and "even 1 destroyer" comments. Nor
does he make the connection when he reports that after US coastal convoys
were introduced U-boats had trouble finding targets there and then had
trouble attacking thanks to the presence of escorts.
Blair states a force of 100 B-24 in Coastal Command "could well have
decisively crushed the U-boat peril in the summer of 1941, sparing the
allies the terrible shipping losses in the years ahead." Failure to send
all B-24 to Coastal Command, "one of the worst mistakes the British War
Cabinet made in the war"
B-24 production to end 1941, 1 XB-24, 6 YB/LB-30A, 1 B-24, 9 B-24A,
135 LB-30, 20 LB-30B, 4 B-24C, total 176, of these 93 in Q4/41
UK Liberator imports, 1941, 1 Mar, 3 Apr, 15 May, 4 Jun, 2 Aug (all mark I
to here), 1 Sep, 13 Oct, 25 Nov, 14 Dec, all mark II, total 25 I, 53 II, so
78.
Mark I = YB-24/LB-30A/LB-30B, mark II = LB-30
And of course a number of the early B-24 were not combat worthy and so used
for transports.
As of 1 July Coastal Command had 3 B-24 in one squadron, strength climbed to
4 B-24 by 1 August. And the other B-24s went to BOAC and bomber units
meant for overseas service. Blair keeps using Bomber Command as the
destination.
Blair notes the Short Sunderland had maintenance issues and declares
the US built aircraft were better, citing the report that indicated 2
sorties per month per Sunderland was the expected return.
Coastal Command Sorties per month per aircraft, 1941, 1942, 1943
Catalina 2.87, 2.19, 3.95
Hudson 3.83, 4.56, 7.35
Liberator 1.13, 1.90, 2.597
Sunderland 3.90, 2.81, 3.35
Wellington 3.67, 3.22, 3.77
Hours per sortie
Catalina 13.7, 13.5, 15.44
Hudson 4.8, 5.28, 5.96
Liberator 10.88, 10.92, 12.27
Sunderland 8.42, 10.78, 11.56
Wellington 6.68, 8.14, 8.35
The above derived from sortie and average strength totals. The 8th Air
Force had real problems in maintaining early operations, was continually
expanding until June 1944 then managed 2 crews per heavy bomber in
the second half of 1944, effective sorties per 4 engined bomber per month,
Aug-42 1.18
Sep-42 0.67
Oct-42 0.66
Nov-42 1.22
Dec-42 0.83
Jan-43 1.29
Feb-43 1.96
Mar-43 3.9
Apr-43 1.16
May-43 3.2
Jun-43 2.09
Jul-43 2.7
Aug-43 2.99
Sep-43 3.59
Jan-44 5.6
Feb-44 6.36
Mar-44 5.67
Apr-44 5.99
May-44 6.78
Jun-44 9.56
Jul-44 8.45
Aug-44 8.58
Sep-44 7.81
Oct-44 8.13
Nov-44 7.22
Dec-44 8.35
Jan-45 8.13
Feb-45 11.22
Mar-45 15.27
Apr-45 9.86
Air forces are expensive. Note what the extra sorties per aircraft mean in
terms of total effort. Also treat the above as a guide, not an absolute.
Bomber Command should have kept bombing the U-boat bases before the
shelters were built, they would have prevented the building of the shelters.
Blair notes Bomber Command strikes on towns in Germany and essentially
wants them shifted to U-boat bases in 1941. The trouble is the lack of hits
on the German fleet units in French ports in 1941, around 3,260 long tons
aimed at the fleet, 2,430 aimed at ports, 64 tons at U-boats. Out of 31,735
tons for the year, 23,050 dropped on Germany. There is little doubt bombing
would have delayed the construction of the U-boat shelters, but not stopped
them. They were completed around the end of the first quarter of 1942.
While Blair concentrates on the B-24 he does not mention the RAF four
engined bombers coming into service in 1941, the Halifax and Stirling
which had comparable range to the Sunderland but with bigger bomb loads.
The Halifax did 468 sorties in Bomber Command in 1941, the Stirling 814,
versus 1,466 Sunderland, 51 B-24, and 1,024 Catalina in Coastal Command.
First Bomber Command operations were, Stirling in February 1941, Halifax
in March 41 and by the end of August 2 Halifax and 2 Stirling squadrons
were operational, by end of year it was 3 Halifax, 3 Stirling. 1941 losses
by operational units 48 Halifax, 68 Stirling. On 31 August 1941 Bomber
Command reported 11 serviceable Halifax and 9 serviceable Stirling with
crews. That rose to 12 Halifax and 24 Stirling on 31 December 1941.
There is little doubt sending a squadron of each to Coastal Command would
have produced a better return in 1941.
Blair decides a failure to vigorously patrol the Bay of Biscay ranks
along with the lack of bombing as an "omission in 1941 of regrettable
proportions". Since there were patrols we are left with what the definition
of vigorous is plus the availability of aircraft to do the task.
As of 3rd September 1939 the RAF had 9,554 aircraft 3,265 bombers, 1,122
fighters, 823 General Reconnaissance, 337 army co-operation, 171 flying
boats and transports, 184 naval types, 3,539 trainer and misc. Counting
anything still classified as on strength.
USN strength 1 July 1941, 1,774 combat, 183 transport/utility, 1,444
training, 31 misc., 7 blimp, total 3,432 aircraft. As of 1 July 1942, 3,191
combat, 461 transport/utility, 3,378 training, 28 misc., 16 blimp, total
7,058 aircraft. Which implies the USN had over half the number of aircraft
in early 1942 as the RAF had in September 1939. Blair notes the lack
of RAF anti submarine aircraft as a failure, but not the USN strength.
In 1940 the PBY was a relatively old design, 12 built in 1936, 86 in 1937,
97 in 1938,16 in 1939 (1 UK), 21 (12 Commonwealth) in 1940, 395 (192
Commonwealth) in 1941. UK Catalina imports, 1 Jan, 9 Feb, 16 Mar,
12 Apr, 18 May, 17 Jun, 4 Jul, 1 Sep, 6 Nov, 4 Dec, total 88. Coastal
Command had 4 on 1 April 1941, 21 on 1 May, 30 on 1 June and 43 on
1 August.
There was around a 15 month gap between the end of PBY-4 production in 1939
and PBY-5 production beginning in September 1940. The Martin Mariner had 20
accepted September 1940 to April 1941, then nothing to April 1942. So when
it comes to long range patrol aircraft the USN had production gaps.
Since start of production in 1936 to end 1941 the USN had received 422 PBY,
foreign buyers had received 205. The USN received another 264 January to
May 1942 versus foreign production of 15.
As of 12 January 1942 the Atlantic fleet held 100 Catalinas plus 50 smaller
types, from Iceland to Brazil.
On 14 January 1942 the USN asked for 400 B-24 and 900 B-25, which
would be all B-24 production until end April 1942 or alternatively every
B-24 built January to May 1942, the 900th B-25 was built in early August
1942, 172 had been built to end 1941. This request is passed without
comment, instead noting how the USAAF "grudgingly" agreed to equip
one USN squadron with landplanes, trouble is those 20 aircraft were
accepted by the USN in September 1941, not the 1942 implied.
Blair states FDR resisted the USN being able to operate large landplanes,
otherwise it would undermine the Army's absolute hold on strategic air
power. Secretary of War Stimson did not get along with King, his diaries
providing quotes, apparently few to none historians suggest Stimson was
anything but objective. Blair decides a presidential ruling was required
and it was yet another failure by FDR who again escapes all blame.
None of the USAAF units had anti U-boat training, so no chance of them doing
effective ASW quickly. No mention of USN training. The USN PBY in Atlantic
primary role was eyes of fleet, like they did so well at Midway.
USAAF believed in offensive patrols, Blair declares the results an abysmal
failure, as only 1 U-boat was sunk by USAAF unassisted to end August 1942.
So According to Paul Kemp, unassisted U-boat kills by US forces January to
August 1942,
USN patrol aircraft sank 2 in March, 1 in June, 1 in August (2 of these were
around Atlantic convoys)
USAAF aircraft 1 in July
USN ships 1 in April,
USGC ships 1 in May, 1 in June
USGC aircraft 1 in August.
Blair makes no attempt to measure other US ASW effectiveness via unassisted
kills.
Nor are the aircraft tactics related to the fact there were no US coastal
convoys to escort until mid May 1942.
Blair concludes the failure to not make the USN alone responsible for anti
submarine warfare until mid 1943 "one of the greatest military misfortunes
of World War II". FDR allowed it to persist.
The USN received its first B-24 in August 1942, 51 by end of year.
Blair lists the USN R&D on anti U-boat weapons and Radar, and concludes
this shows the USN understood the menace. No mention of WWI Admiralty
R&D that ultimately included active sonar for example, or other force's
R&D being used as evidence.
Blair says the RN Hunt class were supposed to be for Atlantic escorts and
failed, except with 240 tons of fuel range was less then the pre war fleet
destroyers, the sloops had 400 tons of fuel, the flower class 232 tons, the
later vessels 340 tons.
The 50 old destroyers and 10 large coast guard cutters sent to British
would have been enough to do US east cost convoys. However Blair fails
to mention the USN converted 8 old destroyers to minelayers pre war,
while in 1940 seven were converted to fast transports and 17 to
minesweepers. As far as I know these could still do anti submarine
operations but it seems when their other role was not needed.
Essentially as of the first half of 1942 the USN ASW forces were loaned
destroyers and PBY when available. Apart from escorting the bigger
units of the fleet the major employer of USN destroyers was troop convoy
protection, when the RN used 6 destroyers to protect a US troop convoy
near Britain the USN rated it as an unacceptably small escort and moved
to end to end USN protection. PBY patrols also followed this priority.
Blair endorses the protection of troop transports was the most important USN
mission in Atlantic and decides the zero US troop losses in the move to
England to end August 1942 was a significant victory. One reason for US
troop movements is given as repelling a possible German invasion of Britain
in Spring 1942. Abandoning two troop convoys in January 1942 "in order to
hunt an unknown number of U-boats who had only sunk two ships in waters
of the Eastern Sea frontier would not only have vastly upset all convoy and
warship schedules but also incurred the wrath of the US army". So the
U-boat threat is too small to mount operations but too big to release
destroyers from the troop convoys, including the one headed to the Pacific.
Simply put the decision to move troops into position to invade France in
1942, and to form a defensive ring around the expanded Japanese Empire
tied up a large number of US ASW assets, given the lack of such assets
the US had to make the choices. Blair is solidly behind the idea the USN
made exactly the right decisions, all those destroyers and USN aircraft
sorties were needed where they were sent.
Blair decides there was no possibility of moving escorts from the ocean
work, the U-boats travelling alone across the Atlantic could inflict
catastrophic damage on a weakly escorted convoy, the U-boats guarding
Norway in the Iceland Faeroes gap could hit unescorted convoys near
Britain (yes he actually says unescorted). Canadian escorts were
needed in Canada and were too far from their supplies if operating in
US waters.
Blair is solid in his condemnation of just about anything FDR did in
relation to the USN. The PC and SC programs, small coastal anti
submarine boats, of 110 and 173 feet are condemned as no good, and
an FDR special, though the USN liked them for training purposes,
however Blair then lists the USCG cutters, the 125 and 165 foot types
as useful additions and indeed they and the PC and SC formed the
protection for the first informal US coastal convoys, the bucket brigade,
staying close to the coast and making port before night.
As for the Destroyer Escorts (DE). The Normal Friedman time line is,
1937 revival of the WWI eagle boat, became the 173 foot PC, used in naval
reserve during peace and local ASW in wartime.
June 1939 first proposal of second line ocean going destroyer/escort.
16 August 1939 request for 750 to 900 ton AA fast destroyer escort (25 to 30
knots) (In September 1940 the AA DE would require 1,200 tons at least.)
September 1939 request for a design of second line destroyer/escort, the
characteristics were the essential DE design. Instead they tried to rework
the earliest modern US destroyer design, the Farragut. This could not be
done.
January 1940 USN conclusion building repeat 1,630 ton Destroyers a better
idea than escorts.
August 1940 Gibbs&Cox lightweight destroyers, 4 ordered in September.
September 1940 escort design, four 5 inch guns, two quad 1.1 inch, 24.5
knots, 1,175 tons, 5,000 miles at 15 knots. Cost $6.8 million. Dropping two
5 inch guns and halving power to 6,000 SHP reduced size to 875 tons.
(Note cost estimates of $6.8 million for DE versus $8.1 million for a 1,630
ton DD, in 1943 the DE, with 3 inch guns, $5.3 to $6.1 million, DD $10.4
million.)
November 1940 Gibb&Cox design changed to September 1940 USN design.
31 January 1941, USN recommendation to build 50 escort vessels for use
against submarines in western Atlantic as part of the 4th supplemental
estimate for 1941.
7 February Secretary of Navy authorised construction as soon as the design
was settled.
February 1941, DE design, 12,000 SHP, two 5 inch guns, one quad 1.1 inch,
depth charge throwers, 1,125 tons 6,000 miles at 12 knots but no modern
AA fire control. The design was drawn up after examination of British
designs as well as US requirements.
April/May 1941 USN General Board recommends against building any DE,
lack of AA fire and cost cited as reasons.
16 May 1941 Chief of Naval Operations proposed no DE, 19 May order for 50
cancelled.
17 June 1941 Admiral Stark requested UK escort design details.
23 June 1941 The British had heard about the February 1941 design and asked
for 100.
July 1941 BDE design, three 3 inch guns, depth charge throwers, 12,000 SHP
1,144 tons, 6,000 miles at 12 knots.
15 August 1941 50 DE for RN approved by FDR.
1 November 1941 RN order for 50 DE placed.
January 1942 250 more DE ordered to be split between RN and USN
By September 1942 420 more DE ordered
USN secretary of the Navy,
Claude A. Swanson Virginia March 4, 1933 - July 7, 1939
Charles Edison New Jersey July 7, 1939 - January 2, 1940 (Acting?), January
2, 1940 - June 24, 1940
(acting) Lewis Compton June 24, 1940 - July 11, 1940
Frank Knox Illinois July 11, 1940 - April 28, 1944
Chief of Naval Operations.
FADM William D. Leahy 2 January 1937 1 August 1939
ADM Harold R. Stark 1 August 1939 2 March 1942
FADM Ernest J. King 2 March 1942 15 December 1945
Blair says DE design in was around in 1941 (not 1940) but when Stark and
Edison presented them to FDR, it was disapproved. Note when Edison was
in office. Then FDR approved 50 RN DE but no USN. King and USN right in
always pushing for DE while FDR was totally wrong, always stopping any
attempt. This totally contradicts Friedman who notes the USN kept coming
back to building the 1,630 ton destroyers as the better option.
Later Blair decides the March 18 1942 letter where FDR criticises the USN
was untrue, repeated recommendations to built DE were rejected by FDR,
and when initially built they were 10th priority, well behind the PC and SC.
The letter could be interpreted as "groveling" to the British according to
Blair.
March 1942 DE ranked priority below major surface craft, July near top,
below landing craft, October 1943 8th place, June 1944 13th out of 13.
King asked for UK escorts to set up Caribbean convoys, British offered a Mid
Ocean Escort group, King refused. The lack of escorts was due to FDR's PC
and SC program being behind schedule (so no good and late), Blair says 12
PC January to April 1942. The War Production Board says 1 in November 1941,
4 in December, 5 in January 1942, 4 in March, 11 in April, 13 in May, 12 in
June. SC production was 1 in August 1941, 1 in January 1942, 4 in March
plus 1 conversion, 16 in April, 16 in May, 9 in June.
As an aside Blair puts the USN production program as 10 battleships and
31 Essex class carriers in 1941, yet it actually was 17 Battleship (10 laid
down) and 12 Essex before the US was attacked, 2 more Essex in
December 1941, 10 more in August 1942, 3 more in June 1943, total 26,
6 more were proposed in 1945 but disapproved by the president.
The USN initiated anti U-boat measures, merchant ship captains ignored them
and lost ships. The captains were advised to watch smoke emissions, stay in
inshore lanes, lay in port overnight, zig zag and minimise radio. And yes
Blair's language implies the captains were responsible. Non USN people
ignoring the USN and taking losses.
>From 6 to 8 February the USN had 7 destroyers available for escort work.
Blair states none of the 34 British ASW ships promised had arrived and
would not do so for weeks. Looks like 24 ASW trawlers were offered in
late January while on 22 January 10 corvettes under construction or
refitting were offered.
However Blair wants the reader to know they had not turned up a fortnight
after being promised. Those non USN people failing again.
12 February, the USN decided no coastal convoys until adequate escorts
could be provided, up to 68 required, 56 minimum.
March 1942 14 different USN destroyers spent 63 days on ASW patrols.
On 20 March 1942 King ordered convoys, from Trinidad to Halifax and Boston
to Halifax, nothing happened for two months but Blair says this shows the
impression King could not do convoys is wrong. As opposed to asking for
them.
Blair reports the USN needed to avoid a major setback in the Pacific, Port
Moresby or new Caledonia or even Australia falling. Such a setback might
topple Churchill or even cause the impeachment of FDR. So Blair fully
understands while the RN chief Admiral Pound arrived in Washington on
20 April 1942 and left on 26 April Admiral King leaving for San Francisco
25 to 27 April is correct. The joint plans made in San Francisco were for
Coral Sea, except Lexington was ordered into the area on 20 April and
Yorktown was already there. King approved Nimitz's plans, Blair has him
as co-author.
The Washington meetings expected US coastal convoys in the first 2 weeks
of May, covering the oil runs and US east coat but not the Gulf Coast or the
rest of the Caribbean. Of the four convoy routes three were to be protected
by Commonwealth forces, the fourth had 43 warships, made up of 8 USN
destroyers, 17 British ships, while the rest were the small USN and USCG
ships, cutters and PC/SC.
Seems the first permanent assignment of USN destroyers to ASW was in April
Some 140 ASW patrol days by USN destroyers, including the assigned ships.
In May it was 184patrol days. Note without convoys to protect they were
patrolling, just like the USAAF aircraft. The patrol days are mentioned in
Blair but not what a patrol meant.
US suspended tanker sailings 16 to 29 April, as did the British in the area
18 to 23 April, then the British began routing tankers from the Caribbean to
Freetown in Africa then to Britain.
The U-boats switched to the 4 rotor Enigma on 1 February 1942, the
capture of some code material in October 1942 gave a way in and
signals were often being decrypted in a timely manner in December.
The statement classified silliest by Blair is from the official UK
intelligence history which states the lack of convoys and air cover meant
reading the German signal traffic would not really have helped.
Blair says untrue, Enigma traffic would have revealed the US operations
were the one Doenitz was pushing for maximum effort, that is if you ignore
the major defend Norway/attack Arctic convoys (those U-boats off Britain
waiting for the unescorted convoys Blair feared for example) and the
Mediterranean which took some 50 boats. This also ignores the lack of
German wolf pack traffic and where the sinkings were occurring.
Enigma would have told the allies the type VII boats were being used, so
increasing the threat. The lack of any other U-boat attacks was not enough.
Enigma would have reported U-tankers were being used for the first
time, telling the allies much earlier so they could have gate crashed the
refueling operations, the implication of what that would tell the Germans
is not explored. British intelligence "for all too many months" refused to
credit the existence of U-tankers. The first tanker operation was U-A
as a trial, it spent 24 March to 3 April off Newfoundland. The first
purpose built U tanker began operations on 18 April 1942, 500 miles
off Bermuda. As of 8 April U-boat command informed boats off
America they no longer needed to worry as much about fuel reserves.
The next 3 U tanker operations were May/June, June/July and July.
Blair notes for April refueling extended the average patrol by "merely" 7
days. Also they did not result in increased sinkings. It was not until
May/June and the operations on the US Gulf Coast and towards
Mexico did refueling make a difference.
Blair thinks the USN required enigma messages to work out the U-boats would
operate where the continental shelf was narrowest, not a map or the location
of the attacks.
Enigma would have revealed the U-boats were operating alone. The radio
silence and lack of the volume of radio traffic needed to set up a pack
attack was not enough for Blair.
Enigma confirming single boat tactics meant weakly protected US coastal
convoys might have been risked, since one boat at a time was handleable
and besides the U-boats under radio silence would not summon other
U-boats. So the lack of traffic again was no clue nor the fact if the
U-boats wanted to do pack attacks they had to signal convoy locations.
Enigma would have revealed the inability of German surface ships to mount
operations into the Atlantic, despite Tirpitz being operational, releasing
more destroyers.
The Germans were reading RN and merchant ship codes, Enigma would have
revealed this.
Of course Blair thinks the failure of the British to fully brief the US
about Enigma and the decoding techniques is a major reason for the
long blackout. Now if the allies halved the around 10 month blackout
period to 5 months that would be end July 1942, just as the U-boats
were being forced out of the Caribbean.
It should be pointed out the western Atlantic and Caribbean operations
meant few Atlantic convoy operations in the first half of 1942. In the
intelligence war that was probably fortunate for the allies. Doenitz was
suspicious his messages were being read during 1941 as convoys
evaded U-boat patrols. Had the fighting been in the Atlantic after the
U-boat code change in February 1942 the probable sudden increase
in convoy sightings would have been a solid clue the allies were able
to read 3 rotor Enigma traffic.
Blair criticises the US Maritime Commission for its idea losses were not
that important if they could be out built but later advances the idea the
1942 losses were not that bad because the allies nearly replaced the
tonnage that year.
So in summary according to Blair,
The USN was fully aware of the U-boat menace and it, along with its
admirals, put in a near faultless use of what assets it had. The lack of
ships was due to FDR, the lack of intelligence due to the British, the lack
of effective airpower due to the USAAF, some merchant ship losses were
due to USN advice being ignored by captains, the use of strong escorts
on troop convoys completely correct. The 4 month delay between the first
US coastal sinkings and the first convoys (ignoring the bucket brigade
efforts) completely understandable. USN future weapons projects and
orders to form convoys months before any were run is additional proof
the USN did its job.
Since the RN was in decline and the USN in ascension in 1942 the result was
British jealousy which historians echo. Anybody who criticises USN actions
tends to get an adjective from Blair, obtuse and ignorant sort of thing.
U-boat strength assigned to the Atlantic front, including the North Sea went
from 65 to 99 boats January to July 1942, then by 1 January 1943 it was up
to 166.
The saving grace for the allies, as Blair repeatedly points out, and also in
1941, was this sort of rapid expansion diluted quality, the average U-boat
was not as effective as in 1940 until it gained experience. Another point
is it seems the very small pre war Canadian navy hit a major training
problem, it lacked experienced people while building more warships than
the training programs could cope with. The result was underperformance
which tended to mean the RN and USN bad treatment of the RCN had an excuse.
There is no doubt the allies were going to take a defeat in the western
Atlantic and Caribbean in the same way other U-boat operations tended
to have high success when they first operated in areas. And there were
plenty of people and organisations on the allied side that underperformed.
Blair actually provides the evidence that forming weakly protected convoys
reduced losses compared with independent sailings and strongly protected
convoys reduced losses even more. He then has to cope with the 4 month
gap between the first sinkings in US waters and the first coastal convoys.
He removes the USN destroyers and search aircraft on more important
missions, he lists a series of failings by non USN participants and ignores
what he says about other operations and the effects of convoys to conclude
no coastal convoys, not even experimental it seems, were possible before
they actually occurred or apparently would have made any difference if
they had been done earlier, or else they might have made a difference but
the outside failures left the USN unable to know key information to show
this.
For Blair for non USN organisations heavy losses and elapsed time to put
in place counter measures are signs of their failure. For the USN the same
thing is proof of (all)) other organisation's failure
The Blair conclusion is wrong.
Finally a note on tankers.
When talking about losses Blair does not seem to note the increase in fuel
consumption and movements. Though he does note the switch from using
coastal tankers to pipelines and rail within the US.
Britain used about 200,000 tons of oil products a week in 1938, September
1939 to May 1940 212,000 tons/week, June 1940 to May 1941 230,000 tons,
for the next two years around 240,000 tons a week, so stable, then June 1943
to May 1944 307,000 tons per week. Aviation fuel consumption was 10,000
tons/week 1940/41, 16,000 tons/week 1941/42, 28,000 tons/week 1942/43
and 60,000 tons/week 1943/44.
In a series of snapshots of British tankers in use carrying fuel in 1941 for
every 5 tons employed to supply Britain 4 tons were on cross trades. This
has to be taken into account if you use total tanker tonnage, versus just
Atlantic tonnage.
Blair misses that while large amounts of Norwegian and Dutch tankers came
under formal UK control in 1940 many of them were already at least partly in
allied service, for example 340,000 deadweight tons of Dutch tankers in
early 1940 were in allied trades. On the other had there was no need to
supply France with fuel after June 1940, given its tanker fleet in June 1939
was 43 ships of 294,000 GRT
Tanker losses September 1939 to end November 1941 were 2,105,000
deadweight tons, then 1,859,000 DWT December 1941 to May 1942, another
754,000 DWT June to August 1942. The allied tanker fleet did not regain its
November 1941 strength until around November 1943, the fleet spent most of
1942 to February 1943 down a nett 1.7 million GRT.
Or to put in another way in 1942 UK fuel imports were lower than 1938, down
to 10.26 million tons, a drop of nearly 3 million tons from 1941, versus
11.61 million tons of consumption in 1942. In 1943 imports were around 2
million tons more than consumption.
The allied tanker fleet grew 4.2 million DWT May 1943 to May 1944 plus 0.6
million less DWT was under repair, so a gain of 4.8 million in use versus
10.4 million in use in May 1943, and the allies still considered themselves
short of tankers. One hidden factor was the new tankers were faster and
could load and discharge faster.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.
Rich Rostrom
Aug 31, 2016, 3:28:08 PM8/31/16
to
"Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinc...@froggy.com.au> wrote:
> In his book Hitler's U-boat War Clay Blair advocates the loss of
> merchant shipping off the US coast in 1942 was not the fault of
> the USN or Admiral King, indeed they were the competent ones,
> everyone else let them down.
And you don't agree, and see a lot of special pleading by Blair
> In his book Hitler's U-boat War Clay Blair advocates the loss of
> merchant shipping off the US coast in 1942 was not the fault of
> the USN or Admiral King, indeed they were the competent ones,
> everyone else let them down.
that those numbers are combat sorties / total aircraft
in service, including planes in transit from factories,
planes used in training, etc.
I can't believe only two sorties/month for PBYs in
1942, for instance. Dan Gallery in _U-505_ discussed
the difficulties of operating PBYs from Iceland. I
don't recall how many sorties per day he needed to
mount to maintain a continuous patrol over a convoy
to the south... Call it N. He stated that each plane,
after a day's run, would spend the next day being
checked out and maintained. So 2 X N.
Every plane needed a full three-day engine tear-down
and rebuild once a month; another 10%.
Spares for accidents and breakdowns: another 20%
So 2.64 N planes required - then x 2 again for
training, etc. (Though he offered to make to with
only 50% reserves.) He calculated that he should
have had 26 planes - but he only had 12.
> The Germans were reading RN and merchant ship codes,
> Enigma would have revealed this.
were reading most naval Enigma, the Admiralty did not
realize the Germans were reading BAMS. Some analysts
suggested this, but were dismissed. IIRC, the Admiralty
was finally persuaded only in 1943 by Rodger Winn of
the Tracking Room, and only after a long campaing by him.
> Now if the allies halved the around 10 month
Which would be nice - but the break into TRITON couldn't
happen until the capture of key Enigma and other German
coding material (the additional Enigma wheels and the Short
Signal Book). That was a matter of luck (and extraordinary
courage). I don't think the USN could have done anything to
hasten it.
--
The real Velvet Revolution - and the would-be hijacker.
http://originalvelvetrevolution.com
Geoffrey Sinclair
Sep 1, 2016, 12:25:18 PM9/1/16
to
"Rich Rostrom" <rros...@comcast.net> wrote in message
news:rrostrom-9C8FBE...@news.eternal-september.org...
convoys, followed by pleading the USN did not have the
resources for even lightly protected coastal convoys until
May 1942.
As for strengths they are aircraft in combat units, end of
story, from the regular Orders of Battle. They do not count
reserves, do not count planes en route, though in the 8th AF
case they may include the assembly ships as they were on
group strength.
I looked up the OOB and strength figures for the combat
units. I did not add reserves.
For example, the 8th Air force heavy bomber units as of
6 June 1944, group, aircraft type, strength, location.
91 B-17 48 Bassingbourn
92 B-17 61 Podington
303 B-17 58 Molesworth
305 B-17 39 Chelveston
306 B-17 57 Thurleigh
351 B-17 55 Polebrook
379 B-17 60 Kimbolton
381 B-17 62 Ridgewell
384 B-17 53 Grafton Underwood
398 B-17 68 Nuthampstead
401 B-17 57 Deenethorpe
457 B-17 61 Glatton
44 B-24 55 Shipdham
93 B-24 58 Hardwick
389 B-24 57 Hethel
392 B-24 66 Wendling
445 B-24 69 Tibenham
446 B-24 72 Bungay
448 B-24 71 Seething
453 B-24 71 Old Buckenham
458 B-24 57 Horsham St Faith
466 B-24 72 Attlebridge
467 B-24 65 Rackheath
489 B-24 65 Halesworth
491 B-24 75 Metfield
492 B-24 65 North Pickenham
34 B-24 71 Mendelsham
94 B-17 53 Bury St Edmunds
95 B-17 65 Horham
96 B-17 41 Snetterton Heath
100 B-17 61 Thorpe Abbots
385 B-17 65 Great Ashfield
388 B-17 55 Knettishall
390 B-17 61 Framlingham
447 B-17 64 Rattlesden
452 B-17 55 Deopham Green
486 B-24 64 Sudbury
487 B-24 58 Lavenham
490 B-24 54 Eye
493 B-24 61 Debach
Total 2,424 aircraft in 40 groups.
On 13 June there were 2,496 heavy bombers on group strength,
on 20 June 2,419, on 27 June 2,161, average for the month
using these four dates, 2,375.
For the month 22,713 effective bomber sorties from 28,925 airborne.
The 8th Air Force did at least weekly strength reports, I do not have
all of them, I have ranging between 1 and 5 per month.
Coastal Command strengths are monthly.
Yes the sorties figures look very low, that is the result, apart
from the aircraft themselves there needs to be crews ready
to go. After an all day sortie how much rest do you think
a crew needed before going again? The 8th Air Force
noted it could use 2 crews per heavy bomber.
Then add weather, there were plenty of no fly days.
> I can't believe only two sorties/month for PBYs in
> 1942, for instance. Dan Gallery in _U-505_ discussed
> the difficulties of operating PBYs from Iceland. I
> don't recall how many sorties per day he needed to
> mount to maintain a continuous patrol over a convoy
> to the south... Call it N. He stated that each plane,
> after a day's run, would spend the next day being
> checked out and maintained. So 2 X N.
>
> Every plane needed a full three-day engine tear-down
> and rebuild once a month; another 10%.
>
> Spares for accidents and breakdowns: another 20%
>
> So 2.64 N planes required - then x 2 again for
> training, etc. (Though he offered to make to with
> only 50% reserves.) He calculated that he should
> have had 26 planes - but he only had 12.
So the convoy requires cover for a given number of days
from Iceland, before/after which aircraft from Britain/Canada
etc. would take over, so he needed 26 aircraft on hand to
cover a convoy for how many days? What does he say
about the sortie totals generated by his escort carrier?
Does he mention the number of available crews?
There were gaps between convoys.
I agree the numbers look low, I also understand the real
problems in maintenance, the availability of spare parts,
and multi person crews, the entire crew has to be ready.
I also have reports from 10 squadron RAAF that indicate
they flew more than 3 sorties per Sunderland per month
on a number of occasions.
At the same time I am using the official combat sortie
totals and combat unit strengths. If these have omitted
combat sorties I would be surprised.
We know the problems the allies had in building enough
aircraft and training crews in the 1940 to 1943 period,
add spare parts production and providing those spare
parts to units along with the heavier maintenance
facilities. Particularly US aircraft in England, and aircraft
in Iceland and Gibraltar in general.
The combat units did need training sorties. According to
the USAAF in the European Theatre its combat aircraft
did 4,289,376 hours flying combat out of 5,946,310 hours
total flying, or about 2.5 hours combat to 1 hour training,
for the heavy bombers it was 2.2 hours combat to 1 hour
training. Or to put it another way for 1942 the heavy bomber
flying time was 47% combat, in 1943 54%. In 1944 with
on average better trained crews arriving and a higher
operational tempo it was 73% of hours on combat.
All air forces assumed a squadron would rarely put up all its
aircraft. The RAF for much of the war broke squadron strength
into two, with some of the strength called I.R., the initial reserve.
Sunderland squadrons had nine aircraft, in theory 6 serviceable,
2 in reserve, 1 in maintenance.
For the period 1 April 1942 to 10 May 1945, when Bomber
Command recorded strength, serviceable, crews and aircraft
available with crew on a daily basis, so 1,136 days, the averages
were,
1,308.5 aircraft on strength, 989.29 serviceable, 1180.7 crews
939.71 aircraft with crews. So around 71.8% of strength was
available on average. For 1 April to 31 December 1942 it
was 62.4%
In April 1942 there were just over 4,000 sorties generated from
an average strength of 713.9 aircraft, 389.5 aircraft with crews.
June 1943, 6,000 sorties, 1,079.6 average aircraft strength,
772.9 aircraft with crews.
The June 1944 maximum effort, 17,853 sorties, average strength
1,666.5 aircraft, 1,350.2 aircraft with crews.
Now one of the problems Coastal Command had was its need
for crews trained in over water navigation and long flight times,
add radar operators. It also had the problem of plenty of
different types in service and what that meant in terms of
matching an aircraft with an available crew.
So of 34 squadrons on 1 January 1941 it had Ansons, Battles,
Beauforts, Beaufighters, Blenheims, Hudsons, Lerwicks, Londons,
Stranraers, Sunderlands, Wellingtons and Whitleys. Total 510
aircraft 386 serviceable.
Remembering it was anti shipping as well as trade protection.
The 38 squadrons as of 1 January 1942, Beaufighters, Blenheims,
Catalinas, Hudsons, Hurricanes (Iceland), Liberators, Northrop
(Norwegian), Sunderlands, Wellingtons and Whitleys. Total 552
aircraft, 370 serviceable
The 41 squadrons as of 1 January 1943, Beaufighters, Catalinas,
Fortresses, Halifaxes, Hampdens, Hudsons, Liberators, Northrop
(Norwegian), Sunderlands, Wellingtons and Whitleys. Total 721
aircraft, 345 serviceable.
Even ignoring the anti shipping units think of the anti submarine
crew training requirements.
>> The Germans were reading RN and merchant ship codes,
>> Enigma would have revealed this.
>
> Not directly. In July 1941-Jan 1942, when the British
> were reading most naval Enigma, the Admiralty did not
> realize the Germans were reading BAMS. Some analysts
> suggested this, but were dismissed. IIRC, the Admiralty
> was finally persuaded only in 1943 by Rodger Winn of
> the Tracking Room, and only after a long campaing by him.
As noted it is Blair's idea about Enigma giving the information,
agreed about how the 1940/41 breaks did not easily reveal
the German successes. And the point Blair keeps ignoring
the lone wolf tactics used in the western Atlantic minimised
the need for radio traffic.
>> Now if the allies halved the around 10 month
>> blackout period to 5 months that would be end July 1942...
>
> Which would be nice - but the break into TRITON couldn't
> happen until the capture of key Enigma and other German
> coding material (the additional Enigma wheels and the Short
> Signal Book). That was a matter of luck (and extraordinary
> courage). I don't think the USN could have done anything to
> hasten it.
I would put it more that the break happened when it did
because of the capture, the 4 rotor bombes were being
made.
news:rrostrom-9C8FBE...@news.eternal-september.org...
> "Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinc...@froggy.com.au> wrote:
>
>> In his book Hitler's U-boat War Clay Blair advocates the loss of
>> merchant shipping off the US coast in 1942 was not the fault of
>> the USN or Admiral King, indeed they were the competent ones,
>> everyone else let them down.
>
> And you don't agree, and see a lot of special pleading by Blair
Essentially pleading to ignore the book's conclusions about
>
>> In his book Hitler's U-boat War Clay Blair advocates the loss of
>> merchant shipping off the US coast in 1942 was not the fault of
>> the USN or Admiral King, indeed they were the competent ones,
>> everyone else let them down.
>
> And you don't agree, and see a lot of special pleading by Blair
convoys, followed by pleading the USN did not have the
resources for even lightly protected coastal convoys until
May 1942.
story, from the regular Orders of Battle. They do not count
reserves, do not count planes en route, though in the 8th AF
case they may include the assembly ships as they were on
group strength.
I looked up the OOB and strength figures for the combat
units. I did not add reserves.
For example, the 8th Air force heavy bomber units as of
6 June 1944, group, aircraft type, strength, location.
91 B-17 48 Bassingbourn
92 B-17 61 Podington
303 B-17 58 Molesworth
305 B-17 39 Chelveston
306 B-17 57 Thurleigh
351 B-17 55 Polebrook
379 B-17 60 Kimbolton
381 B-17 62 Ridgewell
384 B-17 53 Grafton Underwood
398 B-17 68 Nuthampstead
401 B-17 57 Deenethorpe
457 B-17 61 Glatton
44 B-24 55 Shipdham
93 B-24 58 Hardwick
389 B-24 57 Hethel
392 B-24 66 Wendling
445 B-24 69 Tibenham
446 B-24 72 Bungay
448 B-24 71 Seething
453 B-24 71 Old Buckenham
458 B-24 57 Horsham St Faith
466 B-24 72 Attlebridge
467 B-24 65 Rackheath
489 B-24 65 Halesworth
491 B-24 75 Metfield
492 B-24 65 North Pickenham
34 B-24 71 Mendelsham
94 B-17 53 Bury St Edmunds
95 B-17 65 Horham
96 B-17 41 Snetterton Heath
100 B-17 61 Thorpe Abbots
385 B-17 65 Great Ashfield
388 B-17 55 Knettishall
390 B-17 61 Framlingham
447 B-17 64 Rattlesden
452 B-17 55 Deopham Green
486 B-24 64 Sudbury
487 B-24 58 Lavenham
490 B-24 54 Eye
493 B-24 61 Debach
Total 2,424 aircraft in 40 groups.
On 13 June there were 2,496 heavy bombers on group strength,
on 20 June 2,419, on 27 June 2,161, average for the month
using these four dates, 2,375.
For the month 22,713 effective bomber sorties from 28,925 airborne.
The 8th Air Force did at least weekly strength reports, I do not have
all of them, I have ranging between 1 and 5 per month.
Coastal Command strengths are monthly.
Yes the sorties figures look very low, that is the result, apart
from the aircraft themselves there needs to be crews ready
to go. After an all day sortie how much rest do you think
a crew needed before going again? The 8th Air Force
noted it could use 2 crews per heavy bomber.
Then add weather, there were plenty of no fly days.
> I can't believe only two sorties/month for PBYs in
> 1942, for instance. Dan Gallery in _U-505_ discussed
> the difficulties of operating PBYs from Iceland. I
> don't recall how many sorties per day he needed to
> mount to maintain a continuous patrol over a convoy
> to the south... Call it N. He stated that each plane,
> after a day's run, would spend the next day being
> checked out and maintained. So 2 X N.
>
> Every plane needed a full three-day engine tear-down
> and rebuild once a month; another 10%.
>
> Spares for accidents and breakdowns: another 20%
>
> So 2.64 N planes required - then x 2 again for
> training, etc. (Though he offered to make to with
> only 50% reserves.) He calculated that he should
> have had 26 planes - but he only had 12.
from Iceland, before/after which aircraft from Britain/Canada
etc. would take over, so he needed 26 aircraft on hand to
cover a convoy for how many days? What does he say
about the sortie totals generated by his escort carrier?
Does he mention the number of available crews?
There were gaps between convoys.
I agree the numbers look low, I also understand the real
problems in maintenance, the availability of spare parts,
and multi person crews, the entire crew has to be ready.
I also have reports from 10 squadron RAAF that indicate
they flew more than 3 sorties per Sunderland per month
on a number of occasions.
At the same time I am using the official combat sortie
totals and combat unit strengths. If these have omitted
combat sorties I would be surprised.
We know the problems the allies had in building enough
aircraft and training crews in the 1940 to 1943 period,
add spare parts production and providing those spare
parts to units along with the heavier maintenance
facilities. Particularly US aircraft in England, and aircraft
in Iceland and Gibraltar in general.
The combat units did need training sorties. According to
the USAAF in the European Theatre its combat aircraft
did 4,289,376 hours flying combat out of 5,946,310 hours
total flying, or about 2.5 hours combat to 1 hour training,
for the heavy bombers it was 2.2 hours combat to 1 hour
training. Or to put it another way for 1942 the heavy bomber
flying time was 47% combat, in 1943 54%. In 1944 with
on average better trained crews arriving and a higher
operational tempo it was 73% of hours on combat.
All air forces assumed a squadron would rarely put up all its
aircraft. The RAF for much of the war broke squadron strength
into two, with some of the strength called I.R., the initial reserve.
Sunderland squadrons had nine aircraft, in theory 6 serviceable,
2 in reserve, 1 in maintenance.
For the period 1 April 1942 to 10 May 1945, when Bomber
Command recorded strength, serviceable, crews and aircraft
available with crew on a daily basis, so 1,136 days, the averages
were,
1,308.5 aircraft on strength, 989.29 serviceable, 1180.7 crews
939.71 aircraft with crews. So around 71.8% of strength was
available on average. For 1 April to 31 December 1942 it
was 62.4%
In April 1942 there were just over 4,000 sorties generated from
an average strength of 713.9 aircraft, 389.5 aircraft with crews.
June 1943, 6,000 sorties, 1,079.6 average aircraft strength,
772.9 aircraft with crews.
The June 1944 maximum effort, 17,853 sorties, average strength
1,666.5 aircraft, 1,350.2 aircraft with crews.
Now one of the problems Coastal Command had was its need
for crews trained in over water navigation and long flight times,
add radar operators. It also had the problem of plenty of
different types in service and what that meant in terms of
matching an aircraft with an available crew.
So of 34 squadrons on 1 January 1941 it had Ansons, Battles,
Beauforts, Beaufighters, Blenheims, Hudsons, Lerwicks, Londons,
Stranraers, Sunderlands, Wellingtons and Whitleys. Total 510
aircraft 386 serviceable.
Remembering it was anti shipping as well as trade protection.
The 38 squadrons as of 1 January 1942, Beaufighters, Blenheims,
Catalinas, Hudsons, Hurricanes (Iceland), Liberators, Northrop
(Norwegian), Sunderlands, Wellingtons and Whitleys. Total 552
aircraft, 370 serviceable
The 41 squadrons as of 1 January 1943, Beaufighters, Catalinas,
Fortresses, Halifaxes, Hampdens, Hudsons, Liberators, Northrop
(Norwegian), Sunderlands, Wellingtons and Whitleys. Total 721
aircraft, 345 serviceable.
Even ignoring the anti shipping units think of the anti submarine
crew training requirements.
>> The Germans were reading RN and merchant ship codes,
>> Enigma would have revealed this.
>
> Not directly. In July 1941-Jan 1942, when the British
> were reading most naval Enigma, the Admiralty did not
> realize the Germans were reading BAMS. Some analysts
> suggested this, but were dismissed. IIRC, the Admiralty
> was finally persuaded only in 1943 by Rodger Winn of
> the Tracking Room, and only after a long campaing by him.
agreed about how the 1940/41 breaks did not easily reveal
the German successes. And the point Blair keeps ignoring
the lone wolf tactics used in the western Atlantic minimised
the need for radio traffic.
>> Now if the allies halved the around 10 month
>> blackout period to 5 months that would be end July 1942...
>
> Which would be nice - but the break into TRITON couldn't
> happen until the capture of key Enigma and other German
> coding material (the additional Enigma wheels and the Short
> Signal Book). That was a matter of luck (and extraordinary
> courage). I don't think the USN could have done anything to
> hasten it.
because of the capture, the 4 rotor bombes were being
made.
Rich Rostrom
Sep 2, 2016, 1:27:28 PM9/2/16
to
"Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinc...@froggy.com.au> wrote:
Thank you for an extremely informative response, which
I have saved.
> As for strengths they are aircraft in combat units, end of
> story, from the regular Orders of Battle. They do not count
> reserves, do not count planes en route, though in the 8th AF
> case they may include the assembly ships as they were on
> group strength.
>
> I looked up the OOB and strength figures for the combat
> units. I did not add reserves.
OK. And of course these are planes on 8AF strength, not
planes elsewhere. Still, less than 1 sortie/month in 1942;
ISTM that has to be connected to 8AF just starting up
operations. Then the very high rates in 1945 might be
connected to the perception that the war was ending, and
so training and organization activities were pretty much
discontinued.
> For example, the 8th Air force heavy bomber units as of
> 6 June 1944, group, aircraft type, strength, location.
> 401 B-17 57 Deenethorpe
My late father joined 401 Group about two weeks later.
He flew 30 missions in the next four months.
> Yes the sorties figures look very low, that is the result, apart
> from the aircraft themselves there needs to be crews ready
> to go. After an all day sortie how much rest do you think
> a crew needed before going again? The 8th Air Force
> noted it could use 2 crews per heavy bomber.
>
> Then add weather, there were plenty of no fly days.
True, but no fly days for weather would "overlap" with
rest days for crew and maintenance days for planes.
> > I can't believe only two sorties/month for PBYs in
> > 1942, for instance. Dan Gallery in _U-505_ discussed
> > the difficulties of operating PBYs from Iceland....
> So the convoy requires cover for a given number of days
> from Iceland...so he needed 26 aircraft on hand to
was to have one PBY over "the convoy lane" 24/7.
> What does he say about the sortie totals generated by
> his escort carrier?
Nothing. He did write about how on GUADALCANAL's first
cruise, they lost many aircraft to accidents and breakdowns,
till finally there were only five left. Four were parked
on the foredeck when the fifth came in to land. It came in
too fast, missed the arrester cables, bounced over the
barriers, and wrecked all the parked aircraft, ending the
cruise.
> Does he mention the number of available crews?
No.
> There were gaps between convoys.
And times when more than one convoy was passing, i.e.
one eastbound and one westbound.
On top of that - he ran extra training exercises, such as
"TIRPITZ drill". (If TIRPITZ had tried to break out past
Iceland as BISMARCK did, Gallery had an attack plan for
all the Allied airpower in Iceland, including B-17s and
fighters. When an Allied battleship called, he'd stage
a 'dry run' with that ship as target.)
> In 1944 with on average better trained crews arriving and a higher
> operational tempo it was 73% of hours on combat.
Perhaps also by that time, airfields and ground operation
procedures had been optimized, and many more of the ground
personnel were experienced. (Unlike air crews, they did not
rotate out after a "quota" of missions.)
> In April 1942 ...713.9 aircraft, 389.5 aircraft with crews.
>
> June 1943, 1,079.6 average aircraft..., 772.9 aircraft with crews.
>
> The June 1944 maximum effort...
I note that the 8AF sortie rate also surged by 40% that month.
> ... 17,853 sorties, average strength > 1,666.5 aircraft, 1,350.2
> aircraft with crews.
Hmmm... You noted above that "The 8th Air Force noted it could
use 2 crews per heavy bomber." But here's Bomber Command with
0.55, 0.72, 0.62 crews per plane?
> [Coastal Command] also had the problem of plenty of
> different types in service ... on 1 January 1941
> it had [12 different makes]...
That would certainly generate a lot of friction and overhead.
> as of 1 January 1942 ... [10 different makes]...
>
> as of 1 January 1943, ... [11 different makes]...
What a mess. Especially with old beaters like Hampdens
and Whitleys still flying.
> I would put it more that the break happened when it did
> because of the capture...
I think we agree there.
Thank you for an extremely informative response, which
I have saved.
> As for strengths they are aircraft in combat units, end of
> story, from the regular Orders of Battle. They do not count
> reserves, do not count planes en route, though in the 8th AF
> case they may include the assembly ships as they were on
> group strength.
>
> I looked up the OOB and strength figures for the combat
> units. I did not add reserves.
planes elsewhere. Still, less than 1 sortie/month in 1942;
ISTM that has to be connected to 8AF just starting up
operations. Then the very high rates in 1945 might be
connected to the perception that the war was ending, and
so training and organization activities were pretty much
discontinued.
> For example, the 8th Air force heavy bomber units as of
> 6 June 1944, group, aircraft type, strength, location.
My late father joined 401 Group about two weeks later.
He flew 30 missions in the next four months.
> Yes the sorties figures look very low, that is the result, apart
> from the aircraft themselves there needs to be crews ready
> to go. After an all day sortie how much rest do you think
> a crew needed before going again? The 8th Air Force
> noted it could use 2 crews per heavy bomber.
>
> Then add weather, there were plenty of no fly days.
rest days for crew and maintenance days for planes.
> > I can't believe only two sorties/month for PBYs in
> > 1942, for instance. Dan Gallery in _U-505_ discussed
> So the convoy requires cover for a given number of days
> cover a convoy for how many days?
He did not go into that at all. IIRC, his requirement
was to have one PBY over "the convoy lane" 24/7.
> What does he say about the sortie totals generated by
> his escort carrier?
cruise, they lost many aircraft to accidents and breakdowns,
till finally there were only five left. Four were parked
on the foredeck when the fifth came in to land. It came in
too fast, missed the arrester cables, bounced over the
barriers, and wrecked all the parked aircraft, ending the
cruise.
> Does he mention the number of available crews?
> There were gaps between convoys.
one eastbound and one westbound.
On top of that - he ran extra training exercises, such as
"TIRPITZ drill". (If TIRPITZ had tried to break out past
Iceland as BISMARCK did, Gallery had an attack plan for
all the Allied airpower in Iceland, including B-17s and
fighters. When an Allied battleship called, he'd stage
a 'dry run' with that ship as target.)
> In 1944 with on average better trained crews arriving and a higher
> operational tempo it was 73% of hours on combat.
procedures had been optimized, and many more of the ground
personnel were experienced. (Unlike air crews, they did not
rotate out after a "quota" of missions.)
> In April 1942 ...713.9 aircraft, 389.5 aircraft with crews.
>
> June 1943, 1,079.6 average aircraft..., 772.9 aircraft with crews.
>
> The June 1944 maximum effort...
I note that the 8AF sortie rate also surged by 40% that month.
> ... 17,853 sorties, average strength > 1,666.5 aircraft, 1,350.2
> aircraft with crews.
Hmmm... You noted above that "The 8th Air Force noted it could
use 2 crews per heavy bomber." But here's Bomber Command with
0.55, 0.72, 0.62 crews per plane?
> [Coastal Command] also had the problem of plenty of
> different types in service ... on 1 January 1941
> it had [12 different makes]...
That would certainly generate a lot of friction and overhead.
> as of 1 January 1942 ... [10 different makes]...
>
> as of 1 January 1943, ... [11 different makes]...
What a mess. Especially with old beaters like Hampdens
and Whitleys still flying.
> I would put it more that the break happened when it did
I think we agree there.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Sep 4, 2016, 11:53:47 AM9/4/16
to
"Rich Rostrom" <rros...@comcast.net> wrote in message
news:rrostrom-C0D867...@news.eternal-september.org...
> "Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinc...@froggy.com.au> wrote:
>> As for strengths they are aircraft in combat units, end of
>> story, from the regular Orders of Battle. They do not count
>> reserves, do not count planes en route, though in the 8th AF
>> case they may include the assembly ships as they were on
>> group strength.
>>
>> I looked up the OOB and strength figures for the combat
>> units. I did not add reserves.
>
> OK. And of course these are planes on 8AF strength, not
> planes elsewhere.
It is the combat units. The 8th Air Force had aircraft in other units
>> As for strengths they are aircraft in combat units, end of
>> story, from the regular Orders of Battle. They do not count
>> reserves, do not count planes en route, though in the 8th AF
>> case they may include the assembly ships as they were on
>> group strength.
>>
>> I looked up the OOB and strength figures for the combat
>> units. I did not add reserves.
>
> OK. And of course these are planes on 8AF strength, not
> planes elsewhere.
and various non combat units.
> Still, less than 1 sortie/month in 1942;
> ISTM that has to be connected to 8AF just starting up
> operations. Then the very high rates in 1945 might be
> connected to the perception that the war was ending, and
> so training and organization activities were pretty much
> discontinued.
"The 8th Air
Force had real problems in maintaining early operations, was continually
expanding until June 1944 then managed 2 crews per heavy bomber in
the second half of 1944"
September 1944 onwards the German front line was
about the German border, France and Belgium were not
friendly territory.
Have you noticed you are deleting the information, then
either asking for it again or coming up with conclusions
that do not fit?
>> For example, the 8th Air force heavy bomber units as of
>> 6 June 1944, group, aircraft type, strength, location.
>
>> 401 B-17 57 Deenethorpe
>
> My late father joined 401 Group about two weeks later.
>
> He flew 30 missions in the next four months.
sorties per month.
>> Yes the sorties figures look very low, that is the result, apart
>> from the aircraft themselves there needs to be crews ready
>> to go. After an all day sortie how much rest do you think
>> a crew needed before going again? The 8th Air Force
>> noted it could use 2 crews per heavy bomber.
>>
>> Then add weather, there were plenty of no fly days.
>
> True, but no fly days for weather would "overlap" with
> rest days for crew and maintenance days for planes.
that accurate, in particular predicting weather over
Germany. Plenty of missions were scrubbed.
>> > I can't believe only two sorties/month for PBYs in
>> > 1942, for instance. Dan Gallery in _U-505_ discussed
>> > the difficulties of operating PBYs from Iceland....
>
>> So the convoy requires cover for a given number of days
>> from Iceland...so he needed 26 aircraft on hand to
>> cover a convoy for how many days?
>
> He did not go into that at all. IIRC, his requirement
> was to have one PBY over "the convoy lane" 24/7.
12 hour sorties. Does he mention loiter time where the
convoy was?
>> What does he say about the sortie totals generated by
>> his escort carrier?
>
> Nothing.
>> There were gaps between convoys.
>
> And times when more than one convoy was passing, i.e.
> one eastbound and one westbound.
> On top of that - he ran extra training exercises, such as
> "TIRPITZ drill". (If TIRPITZ had tried to break out past
> Iceland as BISMARCK did, Gallery had an attack plan for
> all the Allied airpower in Iceland, including B-17s and
> fighters. When an Allied battleship called, he'd stage
> a 'dry run' with that ship as target.)
like very few Coastal Command ones.
>> In 1944 with on average better trained crews arriving and a higher
>> operational tempo it was 73% of hours on combat.
>
> Perhaps also by that time, airfields and ground operation
> procedures had been optimized, and many more of the ground
> personnel were experienced. (Unlike air crews, they did not
> rotate out after a "quota" of missions.)
damage on average in returning aircraft, the lower fighter
attacks and German ammunition problems versus the
increase in flak guns.
>> In April 1942 ...713.9 aircraft, 389.5 aircraft with crews.
>>
>> June 1943, 1,079.6 average aircraft..., 772.9 aircraft with crews.
>>
>> The June 1944 maximum effort...
>
> I note that the 8AF sortie rate also surged by 40% that month.
>
>> ... 17,853 sorties, average strength
>> 1,666.5 aircraft, 1,350.2
>> aircraft with crews.
>
> Hmmm... You noted above that "The 8th Air Force noted it could
> use 2 crews per heavy bomber." But here's Bomber Command with
> 0.55, 0.72, 0.62 crews per plane?
To repeat,
For the period 1 April 1942 to 10 May 1945, when Bomber
Command recorded strength, serviceable, crews and aircraft
available with crew on a daily basis, so 1,136 days, the averages
were,
1,308.5 aircraft on strength, 989.29 serviceable, 1180.7 crews
939.71 aircraft with crews. So around 71.8% of strength was
available on average. For 1 April to 31 December 1942 it
was 62.4%
aircraft with crews. Yes the RAF system enabled more aircraft
than crews, the US system managed the opposite.
Averages for
April 1942 487.4 crews for 428.4 serviceable aircraft.
June 1943 888.2 crews for 833 serviceable aircraft.
June 1944 1,658.1 crews for 1,370.5 serviceable aircraft.
>> [Coastal Command] also had the problem of plenty of
>> different types in service ... on 1 January 1941
>> it had [12 different makes]...
>
> That would certainly generate a lot of friction and overhead.
>
>> as of 1 January 1942 ... [10 different makes]...
>>
>> as of 1 January 1943, ... [11 different makes]...
>
> What a mess. Especially with old beaters like Hampdens
> and Whitleys still flying.
system for those types which could be used by Coastal
Command, to me it is the exclusive to Coastal Command
types that cause the problems then add the number of types.
Rich Rostrom
Sep 5, 2016, 12:48:49 AM9/5/16
to
"Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinc...@froggy.com.au> wrote:
> The two crews per bomber are a big part. Then add from
> September 1944 onwards the German front line was
> about the German border, France and Belgium were not
> friendly territory.
ITYM - "*now* friendly territory". ???
> The two crews per bomber are a big part. Then add from
> September 1944 onwards the German front line was
> about the German border, France and Belgium were not
> friendly territory.
> Have you noticed you are deleting the information, then
> either asking for it again or coming up with conclusions
> that do not fit?
perhaps a habit from when bandwidth was much smaller.
Even now, quoting hundreds of lines for a 2-3 line
response seems gauche.
> > He did not go into that at all. IIRC, his requirement
> > was to have one PBY over "the convoy lane" 24/7.
>
> Right and that took 26 PBY when the RAF was talking about
> 12 hour sorties. Does he mention loiter time where the
> convoy was?
> > If TIRPITZ had tried to break out past Iceland...
> > Gallery had an attack plan for all the Allied
> > airpower in Iceland, including B-17s and fighters.
>
> > airpower in Iceland, including B-17s and fighters.
>
> There were no US B-17 units on Iceland. And it looks
> like very few Coastal Command ones.
I distinctly remember "B-17s commence high-level
> like very few Coastal Command ones.
attack" as one line in his final summary of the attack
plan. In Iceland, Gallery worked most closely with the
British - as he put it, "we joined the RAF for the
duration". So it seems quite possible that CC B-17s
were included.
> > Hmmm... You noted above that "The 8th Air Force noted it could
> > use 2 crews per heavy bomber." But here's Bomber Command with
> > 0.55, 0.72, 0.62 crews per plane?
>
> Again you have effectively deleted the answer to your question.
>
> To repeat,
>
> For the period 1 April 1942 to 10 May 1945, when
> Bomber Command recorded strength, serviceable, crews
> and aircraft available with crew on a daily basis,
> so 1,136 days, the averages were,
>
> 1,308.5 aircraft on strength, 989.29 serviceable, 1180.7 crews
> 939.71 aircraft with crews. So around 71.8% of strength was
> available on average. For 1 April to 31 December 1942 it
> was 62.4%
>
> Note the average number of crews versus the average number of
> aircraft with crews. Yes the RAF system enabled more aircraft
> than crews, the US system managed the opposite.
were extras in both aircraft and crews. More total aircraft
than crews, but more crews than serviceable aircraft.
But relatively fewer crews / aircraft than the USAF, which
(_if_ I understand this information) sought to "saturate"
the crew side of the equation, to get the maximum use of
the aircraft.
A vast amount of information has been put up here, and
it's difficult to assimilate so much in one go. My failing,
not the author's.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Sep 5, 2016, 1:07:35 PM9/5/16
to
"Rich Rostrom" <rros...@comcast.net> wrote in message
news:rrostrom-894539...@news.eternal-september.org...
> "Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinc...@froggy.com.au> wrote:
>
>> The two crews per bomber are a big part. Then add from
>> September 1944 onwards the German front line was
>> about the German border, France and Belgium were not
>> friendly territory.
>
> ITYM - "*now* friendly territory". ???
For the Germans or alternatively were friendly for the allies.
>
>> The two crews per bomber are a big part. Then add from
>> September 1944 onwards the German front line was
>> about the German border, France and Belgium were not
>> friendly territory.
>
> ITYM - "*now* friendly territory". ???
>> Have you noticed you are deleting the information, then
>> either asking for it again or coming up with conclusions
>> that do not fit?
>
> I try to edit quotations to the minimum; this is
> perhaps a habit from when bandwidth was much smaller.
> Even now, quoting hundreds of lines for a 2-3 line
> response seems gauche.
>> > If TIRPITZ had tried to break out past Iceland...
>> > Gallery had an attack plan for all the Allied
>> > airpower in Iceland, including B-17s and fighters.
>>
>> There were no US B-17 units on Iceland. And it looks
>> like very few Coastal Command ones.
>
> I distinctly remember "B-17s commence high-level
> attack" as one line in his final summary of the attack
> plan. In Iceland, Gallery worked most closely with the
> British - as he put it, "we joined the RAF for the
> duration". So it seems quite possible that CC B-17s
> were included.
59 Dec-42 to Apr-43 in England, Coastal Command
90 May-41 to Feb-42 in England and Middle East, Bomber Command
206 Jul-42 to Mar-44 in England,Coastal Command
214 Jan-44 to Jul-45 England, Bomber Command
220 Dec-41 to Apr-45 England, Coastal Command
(Detachments to Iceland recorded Jul-42 to Feb-43)
223 Apr-45 to Jul-45, England, Bomber Command
251 Mar-45 to Oct-45 Iceland, Coastal Command
517 Sep-43 to Nov-43, England, USAAF aircraft attached to unit.
519 Oct-44 to Sep-45, England, Coastal Command Reconnaissance
521 Dec-44 to Feb-46, England, Coastal Command Reconnaissance
(Both 519 and 521 had various other types on strength)
The Bomber Command units post 1942 were countermeasures.
Without the maintenance facilities Iceland was not going to
do many B-17 operations.
Simply put the RAF had squadrons, but not all at once of B-24,
Catalina and Sunderlands in Iceland counting the longer range
aircraft, for lengthy periods, not so B-17. The weather and
servicing requirements meant aircraft numbers were usually
kept low.
> I see that. I also see what I missed before - that there
> were extras in both aircraft and crews. More total aircraft
> than crews, but more crews than serviceable aircraft.
> But relatively fewer crews / aircraft than the USAF, which
> (_if_ I understand this information) sought to "saturate"
> the crew side of the equation, to get the maximum use of
> the aircraft.
crews as of later in 1944, by which time they had a good
flow of aircraft and spare parts along with a fully working
maintenance system.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Sep 9, 2016, 12:20:29 PM9/9/16
to
"Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinc...@froggy.com.au> wrote in message
news:icGdnWyo6anrSVvK...@westnet.com.au...
Theater By Timothy Warnock
The United States lacked ships, aircraft, equipment, trained personnel
and a master plan to counter any serious submarine offensive.
USCG transferred to USN control in November 1941, Admiral King
became CinC US Fleet in December 1941, Chief of Naval Operations
in March 1942
After Pearl Harbor the USN turned its naval districts into sea frontiers,
the Eastern was from Canada to North Florida, the Gulf from North
Florida to Guatemala.
USN convoy escort duty training started in 1937, but only few officers
were qualified in 1941. USN lacked aircraft, the pre war plans were
for the USAAF to support the USN but the doctrine of bombing meant
there was no equipment or trained USAAF anti submarine personnel.
Initially the USAAF considered its anti submarine role to be temporary
and was reluctant to fly patrols.
IJN submarines operated off the US west coast in December 1941,
as of 28 November 1941 the USAAF ordered support for the USN
and soon discovered how different each organisation was when it
came to the problem. The USAAF did the long range patrols, up
to 600 miles out into the Pacific and patrols continued until February 1943.
U-boats sank 171 ships off US east cost to end June 1942. "US military
leaders until May 1942 undertook little effective action to find and attack
submarines whose positions were known through distress signals from
torpedoed ships or to redirect shipping away from waters where attacks
had taken place."
USAAF used fighters and observation for short range patrols, medium
bombers for medium range patrols and B-17 for long range, patrols started
on 8 December 1941. I Bomber Command commanded the bombers but
only 6 bomber aircraft per day available on average until March, the USAAF
usually had less than 10 aircraft per day on patrol. Most patrols were done
by the Civil Air Patrol starting 8 March 1942, it ended up with 21 stations,
the civil aircraft helped push patrol time to 8,000 hours in March which
about equalled January+February.
USAAF aircraft originally flew unarmed or with bombs, no radars fitted
before March 1942, the early level of ship recognition is illustrated by the
dropping of 4 bombs on a USN destroyer identified as a U-boat.
British advice was much sought, a joint USN/USAAF Control and
Information Center was set up in New York on 31 December 1941. No
ULTRA information was available and what information the British sent
the USN tended to file or take too long to pass on.
British coaching was necessary across the board, along with better
equipment and training. In Q2/1942 the USAAF aircraft attacked 54
submarines and damaged 7, in Q3/1943 it was 24 attacks, 8 damaged,
1 sunk.
Despite the British example the USN and USAAF failed to closely
co-operate, multiple headquarters had overlapping responsibilities. The
USAAF proposed an AAF anti submarine command which was rejected
by the USN as such work was traditionally a Navy responsibility and would
place USN aircraft under the USAAF. Instead the USAAF I Bomber
Command was placed under Eastern Sea Frontier command on 26 March
1942. The USAAF concluded the USN was hampering attempts to come
up with a single anti submarine command headquarters.
The USN command allocated aircraft to sea sectors and usually disallowed
transfers so when the submarine threat moved aircraft transfers proved
difficult and usually too late.
The USAAF decided the USN was defensive, "as it built up its forces until
it could institute a coastal convoy system", so all or nothing when it came
to
escorted convoys.
When the first convoys were sailed the USN asked for USAAF convoy
patrols, while the USAAF wanted long range non convoy sorties. The USN
managed to obtain the convoy protection sorties which were "probably the
best use of scarce resources".
Gulf Sea Frontier, 5 ships sunk January to April 1942, in May it was 41
ships,
of 219,867 GRT sunk, 55% tankers. By end June 61 ships sunk. When the
Gulf Sea Frontier was set up the USAAF contributed 14 observation aircraft
and two worn out B-18. In May a squadron of A-29 and another of B-25 were
added and the Gulf Task Force created to control them with sea frontier
co-operation.
Losses in the Caribbean began on 16 February 1942 and by end June 141
ships had been sunk, then another 173 by end August. In December 1941
the USAAF shipped 80 fighters, 9 heavy bombers and 4 radar sets to
Panama. Initially patrols were against the threat of IJN carrier raids, in
April
it was U-boats, P-39 and A-17 were used, they "occasionally" attacked
friendly ships and submarines, fortunately without damaging them.
USAAF Caribbean forces in February 1942 had about 40 B-18, 7 A-20
and 7 fighters, the overall size did not really change, instead it became
radar equipped anti submarine aircraft. Essentially the conclusion is
radar equipped aircraft were very much better than non equipped.
On 15 October 1942 the USAAF formed its Antisubmarine Command,
despite I Bomber Command being used for anti submarine work its
primary mission had remained long range bombing. In January 1943
the anti submarine command had 19 mostly B-24 squadrons, then 25
squadrons in September. Gradually patrols extended their reach out
into the mid and south Atlantic.
In October 1941 the USAAF allocated 4 Newfoundland based B-17 for anti
submarine work, in July 1942 the 421st Bombardment Squadron replaced the
detachment, it was later renamed the 20th Antisubmarine Squadron. Fuel
shortages forced great circle convoy routes in late 1942 and early 1943,
redeployment of U-boats to the mid Atlantic began in June 1942 and the
attacks became effective in July and August. For August and September
43 ships sunk from 7 convoys attacked out of 21 located out of 65 that
sailed.
The early 1943 Casablanca conference confirmed use of VLR B-24. The
British immediately began such patrols from Ireland and Iceland, the USAAF
sent part of a squadron to Newfoundland in March, it began patrols on 3
April,
by end April there were 3 USAAF B-24 squadrons but no USN aircraft to
cover the western stretches of the mid Atlantic.
The USAAF set up the 1st Sea-Search Attack Group on 17 June 1942, it
help develop and test radar altimeters, magnetic anomaly detectors,
sonobuoys, better depth charges, long range navigation (LORAN system)
and microwave radar. The altimeter was standard USAAF anti submarine
equipment by 1943.
The early USAAF radars were the copies of the British sets the Germans
had detectors for, the first microwave radars, hand built, were delivered in
June 1942, as of February 1943 a skilled operator could identify surfaced
submarines at 40 miles range. The radars proved notoriously unreliable
and difficult to maintain. Initial microwave sets were in B-18, 90 fitted
by
end June 1942. First B-24 fittings in September 1942.
The USAAF kept wanting offensive patrols, but their lack of success was
a problem, convoy escort "came close to being as resented as the routine
patrols" for a lack of action. The reality was convoy escort was
"absolutely
essential to prevent enemy submarines from attacking convoys."
The USAAF wanted patrolling aircraft to locate a submarine so ships and
aircraft could be homed in to conduct a "killer hunt" (Yes not Hunter
Killer,
that was USN). Given the resources required and the lack of intelligence
it is not surprising such tactics were not regularly used until around mid
1943.
On 6 October 1943 the USAAF officially exited anti submarine operations.
As of 24 August 1943 USAAF anti submarine aircraft were 187 B-24,
80 B-25, 12 B-17 and 7 B-34, most with microwave radar.
So in summary the USAAF was initially untrained reluctant to do the work,
and always wanted non convoy protection sorties. It then established an
anti submarine command of properly trained and equipped personnel.
Differences with the USN in terms of command structures and tactics
were never fully resolved.
news:icGdnWyo6anrSVvK...@westnet.com.au...
> In his book Hitler's U-boat War Clay Blair advocates the loss of
> merchant shipping off the US coast in 1942 was not the fault of
> the USN or Admiral King, indeed they were the competent ones,
> everyone else let them down.
>
> The first two chapters of the U-boat war against the Americas
> read to me more like an attack on those who disagree with the
> conclusion, rather than a history of the actual U-boat operations.
>
> The photographs of the major players tend to have simple biographic,
> captions, the two main exceptions are FDR "failed to properly prepare
> the USN for the U-Boat threat in the Atlantic" and Admiral Andrews,
> commander of the Eastern Sea Frontier, described as able.
>
> In summary, according to Blair, most historians, particularly British, are
> astray in accusing US as dumb or inept or criminally neglectful. They
> use biased sources and in particular distort Admiral King's position,
> distortions which have been allowed to stand for all too long. Instead
> King had an unusually firm grip on the U-boat menace, was doing his
> utmost to improve things, urging all to prepare for US coastal convoys.
> "The British contempt for Admiral King and America's alleged inability
> to cope with or its indifference to the U-boat threat", the inability was
> quite clear in the tonnage sunk. The question is why and for Blair the
> answer is every non USN/USCG player on the allied side. Admiral
> King's attitude to the British is never mentioned.
The USAAF view. From The Battle Against the U-Boat in the American
> merchant shipping off the US coast in 1942 was not the fault of
> the USN or Admiral King, indeed they were the competent ones,
> everyone else let them down.
>
> The first two chapters of the U-boat war against the Americas
> read to me more like an attack on those who disagree with the
> conclusion, rather than a history of the actual U-boat operations.
>
> The photographs of the major players tend to have simple biographic,
> captions, the two main exceptions are FDR "failed to properly prepare
> the USN for the U-Boat threat in the Atlantic" and Admiral Andrews,
> commander of the Eastern Sea Frontier, described as able.
>
> In summary, according to Blair, most historians, particularly British, are
> astray in accusing US as dumb or inept or criminally neglectful. They
> use biased sources and in particular distort Admiral King's position,
> distortions which have been allowed to stand for all too long. Instead
> King had an unusually firm grip on the U-boat menace, was doing his
> utmost to improve things, urging all to prepare for US coastal convoys.
> "The British contempt for Admiral King and America's alleged inability
> to cope with or its indifference to the U-boat threat", the inability was
> quite clear in the tonnage sunk. The question is why and for Blair the
> answer is every non USN/USCG player on the allied side. Admiral
> King's attitude to the British is never mentioned.
Theater By Timothy Warnock
The United States lacked ships, aircraft, equipment, trained personnel
and a master plan to counter any serious submarine offensive.
USCG transferred to USN control in November 1941, Admiral King
became CinC US Fleet in December 1941, Chief of Naval Operations
in March 1942
After Pearl Harbor the USN turned its naval districts into sea frontiers,
the Eastern was from Canada to North Florida, the Gulf from North
Florida to Guatemala.
USN convoy escort duty training started in 1937, but only few officers
were qualified in 1941. USN lacked aircraft, the pre war plans were
for the USAAF to support the USN but the doctrine of bombing meant
there was no equipment or trained USAAF anti submarine personnel.
Initially the USAAF considered its anti submarine role to be temporary
and was reluctant to fly patrols.
IJN submarines operated off the US west coast in December 1941,
as of 28 November 1941 the USAAF ordered support for the USN
and soon discovered how different each organisation was when it
came to the problem. The USAAF did the long range patrols, up
to 600 miles out into the Pacific and patrols continued until February 1943.
U-boats sank 171 ships off US east cost to end June 1942. "US military
leaders until May 1942 undertook little effective action to find and attack
submarines whose positions were known through distress signals from
torpedoed ships or to redirect shipping away from waters where attacks
had taken place."
USAAF used fighters and observation for short range patrols, medium
bombers for medium range patrols and B-17 for long range, patrols started
on 8 December 1941. I Bomber Command commanded the bombers but
only 6 bomber aircraft per day available on average until March, the USAAF
usually had less than 10 aircraft per day on patrol. Most patrols were done
by the Civil Air Patrol starting 8 March 1942, it ended up with 21 stations,
the civil aircraft helped push patrol time to 8,000 hours in March which
about equalled January+February.
USAAF aircraft originally flew unarmed or with bombs, no radars fitted
before March 1942, the early level of ship recognition is illustrated by the
dropping of 4 bombs on a USN destroyer identified as a U-boat.
British advice was much sought, a joint USN/USAAF Control and
Information Center was set up in New York on 31 December 1941. No
ULTRA information was available and what information the British sent
the USN tended to file or take too long to pass on.
British coaching was necessary across the board, along with better
equipment and training. In Q2/1942 the USAAF aircraft attacked 54
submarines and damaged 7, in Q3/1943 it was 24 attacks, 8 damaged,
1 sunk.
Despite the British example the USN and USAAF failed to closely
co-operate, multiple headquarters had overlapping responsibilities. The
USAAF proposed an AAF anti submarine command which was rejected
by the USN as such work was traditionally a Navy responsibility and would
place USN aircraft under the USAAF. Instead the USAAF I Bomber
Command was placed under Eastern Sea Frontier command on 26 March
1942. The USAAF concluded the USN was hampering attempts to come
up with a single anti submarine command headquarters.
The USN command allocated aircraft to sea sectors and usually disallowed
transfers so when the submarine threat moved aircraft transfers proved
difficult and usually too late.
The USAAF decided the USN was defensive, "as it built up its forces until
it could institute a coastal convoy system", so all or nothing when it came
to
escorted convoys.
When the first convoys were sailed the USN asked for USAAF convoy
patrols, while the USAAF wanted long range non convoy sorties. The USN
managed to obtain the convoy protection sorties which were "probably the
best use of scarce resources".
Gulf Sea Frontier, 5 ships sunk January to April 1942, in May it was 41
ships,
of 219,867 GRT sunk, 55% tankers. By end June 61 ships sunk. When the
Gulf Sea Frontier was set up the USAAF contributed 14 observation aircraft
and two worn out B-18. In May a squadron of A-29 and another of B-25 were
added and the Gulf Task Force created to control them with sea frontier
co-operation.
Losses in the Caribbean began on 16 February 1942 and by end June 141
ships had been sunk, then another 173 by end August. In December 1941
the USAAF shipped 80 fighters, 9 heavy bombers and 4 radar sets to
Panama. Initially patrols were against the threat of IJN carrier raids, in
April
it was U-boats, P-39 and A-17 were used, they "occasionally" attacked
friendly ships and submarines, fortunately without damaging them.
USAAF Caribbean forces in February 1942 had about 40 B-18, 7 A-20
and 7 fighters, the overall size did not really change, instead it became
radar equipped anti submarine aircraft. Essentially the conclusion is
radar equipped aircraft were very much better than non equipped.
On 15 October 1942 the USAAF formed its Antisubmarine Command,
despite I Bomber Command being used for anti submarine work its
primary mission had remained long range bombing. In January 1943
the anti submarine command had 19 mostly B-24 squadrons, then 25
squadrons in September. Gradually patrols extended their reach out
into the mid and south Atlantic.
In October 1941 the USAAF allocated 4 Newfoundland based B-17 for anti
submarine work, in July 1942 the 421st Bombardment Squadron replaced the
detachment, it was later renamed the 20th Antisubmarine Squadron. Fuel
shortages forced great circle convoy routes in late 1942 and early 1943,
redeployment of U-boats to the mid Atlantic began in June 1942 and the
attacks became effective in July and August. For August and September
43 ships sunk from 7 convoys attacked out of 21 located out of 65 that
sailed.
The early 1943 Casablanca conference confirmed use of VLR B-24. The
British immediately began such patrols from Ireland and Iceland, the USAAF
sent part of a squadron to Newfoundland in March, it began patrols on 3
April,
by end April there were 3 USAAF B-24 squadrons but no USN aircraft to
cover the western stretches of the mid Atlantic.
The USAAF set up the 1st Sea-Search Attack Group on 17 June 1942, it
help develop and test radar altimeters, magnetic anomaly detectors,
sonobuoys, better depth charges, long range navigation (LORAN system)
and microwave radar. The altimeter was standard USAAF anti submarine
equipment by 1943.
The early USAAF radars were the copies of the British sets the Germans
had detectors for, the first microwave radars, hand built, were delivered in
June 1942, as of February 1943 a skilled operator could identify surfaced
submarines at 40 miles range. The radars proved notoriously unreliable
and difficult to maintain. Initial microwave sets were in B-18, 90 fitted
by
end June 1942. First B-24 fittings in September 1942.
The USAAF kept wanting offensive patrols, but their lack of success was
a problem, convoy escort "came close to being as resented as the routine
patrols" for a lack of action. The reality was convoy escort was
"absolutely
essential to prevent enemy submarines from attacking convoys."
The USAAF wanted patrolling aircraft to locate a submarine so ships and
aircraft could be homed in to conduct a "killer hunt" (Yes not Hunter
Killer,
that was USN). Given the resources required and the lack of intelligence
it is not surprising such tactics were not regularly used until around mid
1943.
On 6 October 1943 the USAAF officially exited anti submarine operations.
As of 24 August 1943 USAAF anti submarine aircraft were 187 B-24,
80 B-25, 12 B-17 and 7 B-34, most with microwave radar.
So in summary the USAAF was initially untrained reluctant to do the work,
and always wanted non convoy protection sorties. It then established an
anti submarine command of properly trained and equipped personnel.
Differences with the USN in terms of command structures and tactics
were never fully resolved.
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