Did Churchill Deliberately Provoke the Blitz?
RDOPF
PROPOSITION:
Faced with the imminent defeat of the RAF and all that meant in terms
of a German invasion, Churchill made one of the most difficult decisions
in history. He intentionally provoked Hitler into bombing London. The
focus of the German air assault was thereby diverted away from RAF
targets. The city was forced to endure the Blitz but the RAF survived,
the invasion was averted and the nation was saved.
In support of this proposition, I offer the following:
1. Due to Enigma, Churchill was aware that Hitler had declared that
Germany must have air superiority as a pre-condition to invasion.
2. By most accounts, the concentrated German air attacks on British
airfields and installations had by late August, 1940, brought the
Luftwaffe within a week or two of an air victory.
3. Following Dunkirk, England was woefully unprepared to defend
itself against a concerted German invasion.
4. The German air assault had been focused primarily upon military
targets. Indeed, Hitler had expressly forbidden the bombing of London. In
response to the accidential bombing of London by a single German bomber,
Churchill ordered the RAF on August 26th to conduct a massed bombing of
Berlin.
5. When the first bombing of Berlin failed to provoke Hitler,
Churchill ordered repeated air strikes on Berlin and it was only after
approximately six (6) successive strikes on Berlin that Hitler exploded
and ordered the Luftwaffe to retaliate by bombing London (Sept. 7th).
6. Churchill knew the mind and character of Hitler better than any
other leader on the world scene. He must have certainly known that
bombing Berlin would provoke Hitler to order the bombing of London.
Indeed, after the first strike on Berlin, Churchill waived off requests to
bomb other German targets and was adamant that Berlin itself should remain
the primary and repeated target.
7. In contemporary terminology, Chuchill deliberately initiated a
calculated escalation of the conflict, thereby placing in greater peril
the civilian population. To what end?
8. By deliberately provoking Hitler into bombing London, Churchill
succeeded in diverting and/or diluting the assault upon the RAF to the
extent that it survived, thereby depriving the Germans of the all critical
air supremacy.
I request analysis and comment (critical or supportive) of this
proposition. I am also especially interested in any previous articles or
discussions of this proposition.
Thanks for your thoughts and comments.
Robert Dopf
Matt Bradley
RDOPF <rd...@aol.com> wrote in article
<5g6l2k$e...@nntp1.u.washington.edu>...
> PROPOSITION:
>
> Faced with the imminent defeat of the RAF and all that meant in
terms
> of a German invasion, Churchill made one of the most difficult decisions
> in history. He intentionally provoked Hitler into bombing London.
Right-away this strikes me as one of those horror-myths that lurk
everywhere (i.e. FDR knew about the Pearl Harbor attack and did nothing so
the US would go to war). It just doesn't jive. I read your support for
your propostion, but you offered no "real" evidence. Evidence is
everything.
> 5. When the first bombing of Berlin failed to provoke Hitler,
> Churchill ordered repeated air strikes on Berlin and it was only after
> approximately six (6) successive strikes on Berlin that Hitler exploded
> and ordered the Luftwaffe to retaliate by bombing London (Sept. 7th).
"Failed" to provoke Hitler? What DIDN'T provoke this lunatic. The story
my college WW2 professor told was that Goring assured Hitler and everyone
else that not one bomb would every touch Berlin or "my name is Mir (shit)".
When the first bombing of Berlin came Hitler and everyone else was waiting
in the bombing shelter when Goring entered, whereupon Hitler was to have
said something of the like of "Ahh, everyone welcome Reichmarshal Mir...".
Hitler was furious, and subsequent retalitions took place, its war.
>
> 6. Churchill knew the mind and character of Hitler better than any
> other leader on the world scene. He must have certainly known that
> bombing Berlin would provoke Hitler to order the bombing of London.
> Indeed, after the first strike on Berlin, Churchill waived off requests
to
> bomb other German targets and was adamant that Berlin itself should
remain
> the primary and repeated target.
I totally agree that Churchill knew Hitler's mind better than anyone. He
repeatedly screamed to the world of Hitler's imperialistic intentions, and
his out-right lies to the world, that Germany merely needed Lebensraum
("living space"). One could easily say he waved off other targets in favor
of Berlin because he was just so pissed off that the Almighty London had
been targets, who cares if was an accident. But consider this in
combination, the German people were being lead to believe they were
invicable by Hitler. A little bombing of German households, and maybe they
would realize just in what danger they were really in -- a demoralizer.
william reed
RDOPF wrote:
>
> PROPOSITION:
>
> targets. Indeed, Hitler had expressly forbidden the bombing of London.
> response to the accidential bombing of London by a single German bomber,
> Churchill ordered the RAF on August 26th to conduct a massed bombing of
> Berlin.
The first raid in the "Greater London" area was on 8/15/40 with over 80
casulties.
The single bomber incident occurred on the night of 8/22. Bombs were
dropped on Wealdstone, Greater London.
Per "The Narrow Margin", Wood & Dempster; "Due to bad navigation",
German bombers
dropped their loads on Central London. Fires in London were at London
Wall, Islington, Tottenham, Finsbury, Millwall, Stepney, Eastham,
Leyton, Coulsdon, and Bethnal Green. Given the bomb capacity of the
time, this indicates that a significant number of aircraft actually
bombed. (Not the act of "a single German bomber")
The "Massed bombing raid" by the RAF on Berlin totalled approximately 50
Hampden & Wellingtons. One (1) bomb fell in the city limits and
destroyed a summer house. Two people were injured.
Absent ULTRA intelligence to the contrary, it would appear to be a
planned attack.
The problem with ULTRA at that time was it's limited staff and the
random nature of the traffic intercepted. Landline signals which
covered most of the traffic were not accessable; only radio
transmisions. A further reservation on it's accuracy at the time
existed. Both the Poles and the French were aware that ENIGMA had been
compromised. Both were captive states. The Poles could be judged
unlikely to have informed the Germans. However, the recent Mers El
Kebir activity could have influenced the French to aide the Germans. In
August 1940 ULTRA was of untested reliability which had potentially been
compromised.
> Indeed, after the first strike on Berlin, Churchill waived off requests to
> bomb other German targets and was adamant that Berlin itself should remain
> the primary and repeated target.
>
Th RAF raided cities in Germany other than Berlin each night;
8/27-Raids on Hannover; Leipzig;Leuna; Nordhausen in Germany
8/28-Various targets in Germany;
8/29-Bottrop,Essen, Mannheim, Soest;
8/30-Various cities in Germany
8/31-77 aircraft(total) to Berlin, Cologne, & Benelux airfields
My personal opinion is that Churchill did not actively seek the "London
Bltz";
While he may have been capable of it (he was a politician), the
circumstances would
indicate a normal reaction to a perceived escalation by the Germans.
M.Rapier
In article <5g795e$s...@nina.pagesz.net>, mbra...@ionet.net says...
>RDOPF <rd...@aol.com> wrote in article
><5g6l2k$e...@nntp1.u.washington.edu>...
>> PROPOSITION:
>> Faced with the imminent defeat of the RAF and all that meant in terms
>> of a German invasion, Churchill made one of the most difficult decisions
>> in history. He intentionally provoked Hitler into bombing London.
> Right-away this strikes me as one of those horror-myths that lurk
>everywhere (i.e. FDR knew about the Pearl Harbor attack and did nothing so
>the US would go to war). It just doesn't jive. I read your support for
>your propostion, but you offered no "real" evidence. Evidence is
>everything.
Yes, entirely correct. This is the sort of thing sensationalist authors use to
sell books.
{snip snip snip}
>> Indeed, after the first strike on Berlin, Churchill waived off requests to
>> bomb other German targets and was adamant that Berlin itself should remain
>> the primary and repeated target.
{snip}
>been targets, who cares if was an accident. But consider this in
>combination, the German people were being lead to believe they were
>invicable by Hitler. A little bombing of German households, and maybe they
>would realize just in what danger they were really in -- a demoralizer.
Unfortunately the instrument to effect this strategy was somewhat lacking. The
accuracy of the RAF was utterly lamentable in 1940 and 41. The RAF tried to
mount attacks on various pinpoint targets and merely succeeded in scattering
bombs the length and breadth of Germany. A few bombs may have landed on
Berlin, but with 1940 era bombers it was an awfully long way to Berlin and the
planes around then - Whitleys, Hampdens, Wellingtons etc were just not up to
it.
On one occasion the night bombers were directed to attack German airfields,
one of the crews returned to base very pleased with themselves at having
dropped a stick right across the main runway of one their targets having
attacked at only 1000 feet, only to discover that they'd bombed a fighter
command airfield by the Thames Estuary by mistake. Luckily the RAF bombs of
the time were so ineffective it didn't do any significant damage.
In any case, the Blitz referred to the night bombing campaign, by which time
the Germans had already lost the Battle of Britain as their daylight bombing
campaign had been defeated. They were trying to provide fighter escorts of
three or four to one ratio to their bombers for daylight attacks as the
concentration of the RAF on shooting down bombers led the Luftwaffe High
command to tie their fighters ever more closely to bomber escort. The number
of serviceable Luftwaffe fighters determined the number of daylight bomber
sorties they could mount, but increasing bomber losses (rather than fighter
losses) meant they allocated more and more fighters to each bomber sortie.
So, did Churchill provoke the Blitz? Highly unlikely. Did Churchill want to
strike back at Nazi Germany by any means possible? Yes, certainly. Bomb the
bu**ers back into the Stone Age. Which was why over 30% of Britains total war
output went into building strategic bombers, well, that and having an
obsessive character like Bomber Harris running the offensive, supervised by a
weak Air Ministry.
Cheers.
Martin.
--
Martin Rapier, Database Administrator
Corporate Information & Computing Services.
University of Sheffield
-----------------------
To Infinity and Beyond.
Kenneth L. Sobel
In article <5g795e$s...@nina.pagesz.net>, From "Matt Bradley"
<mbra...@ionet.net>, the following was written:
> "Failed" to provoke Hitler? What DIDN'T provoke this lunatic. The
> story my college WW2 professor told was that Goring assured Hitler and
> everyone else that not one bomb would every touch Berlin or "my name
> is Mir (shit)". When the first bombing of Berlin came Hitler and
> everyone else was waiting in the bombing shelter when Goring entered,
> whereupon Hitler was to have said something of the like of "Ahh,
> everyone welcome Reichmarshal Mir...". Hitler was furious, and
> subsequent retalitions took place, its war.>.
The German word for "shit" is something like "scheisse," not "mir." What
goering said was that if any bomb hit Berlin "my name is Meyer," the
point being that Meyer is recognizable as a Jewish name.
Best regards,
Ken Sobel
--
Kenneth L. Sobel 72262...@compuserve.com
03/14/97 11:00
[ Standard Disclaimer ]
vipe...@aol.com
> What goering said was that if any bomb hit Berlin "my name is Meyer," t=
he
point being that Meyer is recognizable as a Jewish name.>
What G=F6ring had in mind, was Meier, of course, an old German name deriv=
ed from an old high German word meaning "administrator, steward".
Peter Richter
Bayerische Verm=F6genstreuhand Inc
N.B.: We sell mutual funds with 17% interest, 200 % return on investmen=
t within 4 years and tax-free in Germany!
Dirk Lorek
rd...@aol.com (RDOPF) wrote:
>PROPOSITION:
> Faced with the imminent defeat of the RAF and all that meant in terms
>of a German invasion, Churchill made one of the most difficult decisions
>in history. He intentionally provoked Hitler into bombing London. The
>focus of the German air assault was thereby diverted away from RAF
>targets. The city was forced to endure the Blitz but the RAF survived,
>the invasion was averted and the nation was saved.
COUNTER PROPOSITION:
The Battle of Britain could not have been won by the Luftwaffe, thus
Sealion was impossible and the 'Battle of the Few' is a British
propaganda myth. London was targeted mainly for military reasons and
RAF losses became more severe in the London attacks than during the 11
Group airfield raids.
> In support of this proposition, I offer the following:
>
> 1. Due to Enigma, Churchill was aware that Hitler had declared that
>Germany must have air superiority as a pre-condition to invasion.
No Ultra was necessary here, just common sense.
> 2. By most accounts, the concentrated German air attacks on British
>airfields and installations had by late August, 1940, brought the
>Luftwaffe within a week or two of an air victory.
> 3. Following Dunkirk, England was woefully unprepared to defend
>itself against a concerted German invasion.
The probable air victory would have been over 11 Group only. There
were still Nos 10, 12 and 13 fighter Groups left, plus the whole
Bomber Command, the Fleet Air Arm and Coastal Command. Between 11 July
and 4 Sept, the RAF had lost 396 aircraft and had produced 1418 new
fighters. During the whole battle the RAF had lost 415 of 1 500
pilots. Until Sept the Luftwaffe had lost 973 aircraft while only
producing 557 new fighters.
The British Army and No 11 Group were in a bad shape, but the Royal
Navy together with the rest of the RAF was still very capable to
shatter the German invasion forces. And the time was running out for
the Germans, autumn and its storms were arising.
> 4. The German air assault had been focused primarily upon military
>targets. Indeed, Hitler had expressly forbidden the bombing of London. In
>response to the accidential bombing of London by a single German bomber,
>Churchill ordered the RAF on August 26th to conduct a massed bombing of
>Berlin.
> 5. When the first bombing of Berlin failed to provoke Hitler,
>Churchill ordered repeated air strikes on Berlin and it was only after
>approximately six (6) successive strikes on Berlin that Hitler exploded
>and ordered the Luftwaffe to retaliate by bombing London (Sept. 7th).
Bombs fell on the London district Addington already on 18 June and on
18 Aug on Croyden. The bombing on 24/25 Aug was done by several
bombers and killed 9 people in the districts St. Giles and
Cripplegate. The British response on 25/26 Aug wasn't 'massive', it
consisted of 83 medium bombers, destroying a wooden summer-house in a
garden in a Berlin suburb and 2 Germans were slightly injured. Until
31 Aug (when Hitler ordered retaliatory strikes against London) Berlin
had only be attacked one more time, on 28/29 Aug, no damage was
caused.
> 6. Churchill knew the mind and character of Hitler better than any
>other leader on the world scene. He must have certainly known that
>bombing Berlin would provoke Hitler to order the bombing of London.
Luftwaffe General Deichmann stated after the war that military reasons
for the change were predominant, although allowing that there were
also political implications, as 'the chief aim was to make Great
Britain ripe for peace negotiations'. He added that Luftflotte 2
believed the mass attacks to be necessary 'if a decisive victory was
to be won'. On 3 Sept Kesselring stated in a meeting with Göring and
Sperrle: 'We have no possibility to destroy the British fighters on
the ground. We have to force their last reserves into a decisive
battle. They will only do this in their defense of their capital.'
Göring (but not Sperrle) shared his opinions. According to Luftwaffe
intelligence the RAF had only about 300 fighters left.
Indeed, in less than a month, 5 Sept - 2 Oct, the RAF lost more
aircraft than in the 'pre-London' months together (446 vs 396, so much
for the 'relieving' London raids) but the Luftwaffe realized also that
the RAF still had substantial reserves. And Luftwaffe losses were
rising too, of course.
>Indeed, after the first strike on Berlin, Churchill waived off requests to
>bomb other German targets and was adamant that Berlin itself should remain
>the primary and repeated target.
Between 25/26 Aug and 30 Sept, the RAF bombed Berlin 8 times. Bomber
Command's primary objective during this period were the barges in the
Channel ports which were attacked 32 times. By 21 Sept, roughly 12.5%
of the 1 865 transports and barges which the German Navy had succeeded
in gathering together had been sunk. Beside Berlin, German cities
attacked during this period included Hannover, Leipzig, Leuna,
Nordhausen, Bottrop, Essen, Mannheim, Soest, Cologne, Magdeburg,
Stettin, Hamburg, Bremen, Emden, Hamm, Kiel and Dortmund. Also Italian
cities like Turin, Milan and San Giovanni were raided and several
attempts were made to set the German Black Forest on fire.
> 7. In contemporary terminology, Chuchill deliberately initiated a
>calculated escalation of the conflict, thereby placing in greater peril
>the civilian population. To what end?
> 8. By deliberately provoking Hitler into bombing London, Churchill
>succeeded in diverting and/or diluting the assault upon the RAF to the
>extent that it survived, thereby depriving the Germans of the all critical
>air supremacy.
I think it was only a matter of time when the Luftwaffe had started
its attacks against London, Berlin or not. And it were the Luftwaffe
bombings of London that escalated the conflict. While Churchill must
have been aware that retaliatory strikes were highly probable, given
the state of the RAF and Royal Navy it is IMHO highly doubtful that he
ordered the (comparable few) Berlin raids in order to save Britain
from invasion.
Dirk
_____________________________________________________________________
Witze aus dem 3. Reich 48: Ein NS-Funktionär trifft auf der Strasse
einen Ungarn und sagt zu ihm: 'Finden Sie es nicht komisch, dass das
ungarische Staatsoberhaupt Horthy ein Admiral ist, obwohl ihr Ungarn
weder Zugang zum Meer noch eine Flotte habt?' 'Vielleicht ist es
komisch', erwiedert der Ungar, 'aber ihr habt doch auch einen
Justizminister.'
!! My email adress has been altered. Sorry for any inconvenience !!
Chris Manteuffel
"Matt Bradley" <mbra...@ionet.net> wrote:
>else that not one bomb would every touch Berlin or "my name is Mir (shit)".
My German dictionary says mir is a reflexive personal pronoun, for I, as
in "Mir tut der Bauch weh"(My stomach hurts). When I heard the story it
was "Meyer", a which was supposedly a Jewish name. Goering is said to have
said when he first saw a fighter over Berlin that the war is lost. After
that, the bombings could be done with almost impunity.
> Hitler was furious, and subsequent retalitions took place, its war.
> A little bombing of German households, and maybe they
>would realize just in what danger they were really in -- a demoralizer.
The Doolitle raid was for the same reason. To demorilize the enemy, and
make them realize that war goes two ways, and you can hit them. And you
might just change their minds a little, ala Midway and the Blitz.
Chris Manteuffel
Dirk Lorek
72262...@compuserve.com (Kenneth L. Sobel) wrote:
>The German word for "shit" is something like "scheisse," not "mir." What
It's Scheisse, quite correct.
>goering said was that if any bomb hit Berlin "my name is Meyer," the
>point being that Meyer is recognizable as a Jewish name.
Meyer is not a recognizable Jewish name. It's one of the most common
German names (spelled differently, Meier, Maier, Mayer, Meyer). To
have Meyer as your last name is a little bit embarrassing because it's
making you a member of a gray mass, having a distinct last name (like
Lorek, :-) is far more fancy. 'If... then you can call me Meier' is a
common expression still today.
Dirk
_______________________________________________________________________
Witze aus dem 3. Reich 49: Curchill begr=FCsst Hess mit den Worten:
'Also Sie sind der Verr=FCckte?' 'Nein', wehrt Hess bescheiden ab, 'ich
bin nur der Stellvertreter.'=20
!! My email adress has been altered. Sorry for any inconvenience !!
!! The correct adress is DiL...@pobox.com !! =
=20
Donald Phillipson
RDOPF (rd...@aol.com) writes:
> Faced with the imminent defeat of the RAF and all that meant in terms
> of a German invasion, Churchill made one of the most difficult decisions
> in history. He intentionally provoked Hitler into bombing London. The
> focus of the German air assault was thereby diverted away from RAF
> targets. The city was forced to endure the Blitz but the RAF survived,
> the invasion was averted and the nation was saved.
>
> In support of this proposition, I offer the following:
>
> 1. Due to Enigma, Churchill was aware that Hitler had declared that
> Germany must have air superiority as a pre-condition to invasion.
Enigma (decipherment) was not needed for this: campaigns in Poland,
Holland and France provided ample proof.
> 2. By most accounts, the concentrated German air attacks on British
> airfields and installations had by late August, 1940, brought the
> Luftwaffe within a week or two of an air victory.
>
> 3. Following Dunkirk, England was woefully unprepared to defend
> itself against a concerted German invasion.
The British knew this (both points) -- but the Germans did not.
> 4. The German air assault had been focused primarily upon military
> targets. Indeed, Hitler had expressly forbidden the bombing of London. In
> response to the accidential bombing of London by a single German bomber,
> Churchill ordered the RAF on August 26th to conduct a massed bombing of
> Berlin.
This should be easy to prove. Such an order should be in the Air
Ministry files in the Public Record Office. (Since so many historians
have gone through the files without finding it, I doubt that there is
any such order. No oral order is recorded in the copious material on
Churchill's dealing with the air marshals.)
The London Docks and the Woolwich Arsenal, the Lufwaffe's first targets
in London, count as "military targets" not civilian.
> 5. When the first bombing of Berlin failed to provoke Hitler,
> Churchill ordered repeated air strikes on Berlin and it was only after
> approximately six (6) successive strikes on Berlin that Hitler exploded
> and ordered the Luftwaffe to retaliate by bombing London (Sept. 7th).
Official history is that Goering ordered night bombing of London because
day bombing of anything meant unacceptable casualties and at night
the Luftwaffe could not hit targets the size of airfields (main Battle
of Britain targets; i.e. the Germans knew as well as the British
that command of the air was prerequisite for successful invasion,
cf. point no. 1.)
> 6. Churchill . . . must have certainly known that
> bombing Berlin would provoke Hitler to order the bombing of London.
Most historians judge (after checking all the evidence) their
subjects "must have known" ABC or XYZ. But they draw a clear
line between what the evidence shows and what people "must have known"
from the big picture. Even if it is true that Churchill must have
known how Hitler would react to bombing of Berlin, this is not an
item of proof.
> 7. In contemporary terminology, Chuchill deliberately initiated a
> calculated escalation of the conflict, thereby placing in greater peril
> the civilian population. To what end?
Prewar planning estimated more civilian casualties in the first year
of any bombing campaign than actually occurred in Britain in all
1939-45. Secondly, the naval war started at the maximum possible
level (U-boat sinkings of the passenger liner Athenia and the
carrier Royal Oak). After a long delay Sept. 1939-May 1940 the
army war began by the complete defeat of the combined British
and French armies, and the "miracle" of Dunkirk when the British
evacuated most of their men (leaving behind all their tanks, artillery
and transport.)
How could this sort of war possibly escalate?
As a former navy minister, Churchill "must have known" U-boats could both
starve the population by 1941 or 1942 and prevent import from North
America of the weapons without which the British army could not fight.
Orthodox theory is that the RAF bombed as hard as it could in 1941
(to very little effect, and with huge casualties) largely for
propaganda, to keep Britons believing in ultimate victory and to
keep Americans supplying weapons. This is supported by both first-
hand testimony and documents. Without either first-hand testimony
or documents, I don't think Dopf's thesis will get far.
--
| Donald Phillipson, 4180 Boundary Road, Carlsbad Springs, |
| Ontario, Canada, K0A 1K0, tel. 613 822 0734 |
WallSt612
Just a little nit-picking:
I believe Goring's quote was if Berlin is bombed than my name is
mire(spelling?) which means "mud".
Bruce
Charles K. Scott
In article <5g6l2k$e...@nntp1.u.washington.edu>
rd...@aol.com (RDOPF) writes:
> PROPOSITION:
>
> Faced with the imminent defeat of the RAF and all that meant in terms
> of a German invasion, Churchill made one of the most difficult decisions
> in history. He intentionally provoked Hitler into bombing London. The
> focus of the German air assault was thereby diverted away from RAF
> In support of this proposition, I offer the following:
> 1. Due to Enigma, Churchill was aware that Hitler had declared that
> Germany must have air superiority as a pre-condition to invasion.
Churchill did not need Enigma to know this, any invasion requires air
superiority to succeed.
>
> 2. By most accounts, the concentrated German air attacks on British
> airfields and installations had by late August, 1940, brought the
> Luftwaffe within a week or two of an air victory.
And how did the Germans know this? If they did not know how effective
their attacks were, why do you supposed they felt they needed to change
the point of attack? In actuallity, the German command had no idea
what the objective of the Battle of Britain was because the no one was
positive air superiority could be achieved and held. They kept
switching targets and actually striking some fields from the target
list as being "destroyed" when in fact they were not.
>
> 3. Following Dunkirk, England was woefully unprepared to defend
> itself against a concerted German invasion.
Again, how did the Germans know this? They must have been aware of the
vast discarded pile of war materials left in Dunkirk but couldn't know
if this meant the Army was helpless.
Corky Scott
Duncan Gregson
Here I go cross-threading again...hehe
Charles K. Scott wrote:
>
> In article <5g6l2k$e...@nntp1.u.washington.edu>
> rd...@aol.com (RDOPF) writes:
>
> > PROPOSITION:
> >
> > Faced with the imminent defeat of the RAF and all that meant in terms
> > of a German invasion, Churchill made one of the most difficult decisions
> > in history. He intentionally provoked Hitler into bombing London. The
> > focus of the German air assault was thereby diverted away from RAF
>
> > In support of this proposition, I offer the following:
>
> > 1. Due to Enigma, Churchill was aware that Hitler had declared that
> > Germany must have air superiority as a pre-condition to invasion.
> > 2. By most accounts, the concentrated German air attacks on British
> > airfields and installations had by late August, 1940, brought the
> > Luftwaffe within a week or two of an air victory.
>
> And how did the Germans know this? If they did not know how effective
> their attacks were, why do you supposed they felt they needed to change the point of attack?
>>snip<<
> > 3. Following Dunkirk, England was woefully unprepared to defend
> > itself against a concerted German invasion.
>
> Corky Scott
Charles is absolutely correct on all points he has mentioned. I just
wish I could have been ablt to respond to the original post. So forgive
me for cross trafficing.
I am not sure what Corky was getting at with his hypothesis that
Churchill 'provoked' Germany to start bombing London. From what he has
listed above I can see no evidence that Churchill provoked Hitler in any
way to change the target to London. Most people are aware that the whole
change in plan was due to a mistake made by german bombers that
accidentaly bombed London when returning from a failed mission. In
response, the RAF bombed Berlin. Hitler saw this as a provocation, and
deemed that London would be reduced to rubble for the treachery of the
British. As so often happens in war, mistakes are made that can
completely alter their course. This was one of them.
Now if you were to tell me that Churchill had the RAF bomb London
under the guise of being German, and then use it as an excuse to bomb
Berlin. Well that would be a case for 'provoking' Hitler...of course it
would also be a case for me being committed, hehe. Take care!
Duncan
Glen Hallick
M.Rapier wrote:
>
> In article <5g795e$s...@nina.pagesz.net>, mbra...@ionet.net says...
> >RDOPF <rd...@aol.com> wrote in article
> ><5g6l2k$e...@nntp1.u.washington.edu>...
> >> PROPOSITION:
>
> >> Faced with the imminent defeat of the RAF and all that meant in terms
> >> of a German invasion, Churchill made one of the most difficult decisions
> >> in history. He intentionally provoked Hitler into bombing London.
>
> > Right-away this strikes me as one of those horror-myths that lurk
> >everywhere (i.e. FDR knew about the Pearl Harbor attack and did nothing so
> >the US would go to war). It just doesn't jive. I read your support for
> >your propostion, but you offered no "real" evidence. Evidence is
> >everything.
>
> Yes, entirely correct. This is the sort of thing sensationalist authors use to
> sell books.
>
I would not be too quick to say that Churchill did not provoke the Blitz.
Just last night I was watching the "Battle of Britain" program from the
"The War Years" series. In it they stated that Chruchill lured the Germans
into concentrating their air attacks on bombing London and other cities to
relive the fighter squadrons of the RAF.
Naturally of course the RAF fighters would still be combating the
Luftwaffe's bombers and fighters, but the air fields would not be under
air attack.
> {snip snip snip}
>
> >> Indeed, after the first strike on Berlin, Churchill waived off requests to
> >> bomb other German targets and was adamant that Berlin itself should remain
> >> the primary and repeated target.
>
> {snip}
> >been targets, who cares if was an accident. But consider this in
> >combination, the German people were being lead to believe they were
> >invicable by Hitler. A little bombing of German households, and maybe they
> >would realize just in what danger they were really in -- a demoralizer.
>
> Unfortunately the instrument to effect this strategy was somewhat lacking. The
> accuracy of the RAF was utterly lamentable in 1940 and 41. The RAF tried to
> mount attacks on various pinpoint targets and merely succeeded in scattering
> bombs the length and breadth of Germany. A few bombs may have landed on
> Berlin, but with 1940 era bombers it was an awfully long way to Berlin and the
> planes around then - Whitleys, Hampdens, Wellingtons etc were just not up to
> it.
Bomber Command of the RAF was not the powerful force in 1940 as it was
later in the war. Still the Bomber Command did raid Berlin, causing little
phsyical damage to the city. However the psychological damage was
tremendous, luring Hitler to order the Luftwaffe to bomb British cities
rather than air fields.
snip.
> So, did Churchill provoke the Blitz? Highly unlikely.
I tend to disagree. I think Chruchill tricked the Germans into changing
their strategy and it worked.
> Did Churchill want to
> strike back at Nazi Germany by any means possible? Yes, certainly. Bomb the
> bu**ers back into the Stone Age. Which was why over 30% of Britains total war
> output went into building strategic bombers, well, that and having an
> obsessive character like Bomber Harris running the offensive, supervised by a
> weak Air Ministry.
By no means was the RAF capable of a lengthy bombing campaign in 1940.
This was not the aim of Bomber Command until they had built up their
strength. In fact the first raid over Berlin by the RAF was their largest
at that time: 81 bombers.
We can agree that Fighter Command is give the Luftwaffe a big surprise.
Goering calculated 5 days to wipe out the RAF, when in fact it was still a
force over two months after the Battle of Britain began.
The bombing of London, according to "the War Years", was an accident. The
bombers were greatly off course and dropped their bombs on the wrong
target. Churchill suckered Hitler into changing the Luftwaffe's tactics.
Thus the RAF was able to overcome the Luftwaffe in 1940.
Glen Hallick
Charles K. Scott
In article <5h2e9d$2...@gap.cco.caltech.edu>
Glen Hallick <ghal...@mb.sympatico.ca> writes:
> > So, did Churchill provoke the Blitz? Highly unlikely.
>
> I tend to disagree. I think Chruchill tricked the Germans into changing
> their strategy and it worked.
> We can agree that Fighter Command is give the Luftwaffe a big surprise.
> Goering calculated 5 days to wipe out the RAF, when in fact it was still a
> force over two months after the Battle of Britain began.
>
> The bombing of London, according to "the War Years", was an accident. The
> bombers were greatly off course and dropped their bombs on the wrong
> target. Churchill suckered Hitler into changing the Luftwaffe's tactics.
> Thus the RAF was able to overcome the Luftwaffe in 1940.
>
> Glen Hallick
You are ascribing to Churchill powers of prescience. In reality no one
knew what was going to happen from one moment to the next. Arthur
Harris thought that by bombing city centers he could demoralize Germany
into surrendering, he was wrong. Hitler thought no one would go to war
over the likes of Poland, just like they refused to go to war over his
previous provocations, he was wrong.
At the beginning of the Battle of Britain, The British knew what was at
stake. They knew that they must keep Fighter Command as a viable
fighting force or the Germans would achieve air superiority and would
invade. Churchill had no idea of the day to day tactics the Germans
would try and could not possibly know that what would happen if Bomber
Command attacked Germany. Are you trying to say he staked the entire
outcome of the Battle of Britain on the gamble that if he attacked
Berlin then Hitler would attack London and that this would change the
course of the battle?
This is a bit much. I suspect that in reality the British just fought
back with whatever they could manage and took whatever gifts the
Germans gave them. There's a saying regarding the Germans' conduct of
the war that goes; The Germans didn't make any little mistakes, they
only made BIG ones. In other words, tactically, and close to the point
of the fight they fought almost flawlessly but at the strategic level
they bumbled incredibly. Lack of full time military procurement and
manufacturing until 1944 was but one huge mistake. Foregoing
development of fighters and other aircraft because they did not think
they were needed was another. And, of course, attacking Russia.
In the Battle of Britain, the Germans really did not know how to go
about destroying Fighter Command which is why they switched targets so
often. They did not know how effective their attacks were or weren't
and therefore ticked targets off as being destroyed when in fact they
came back to full service sometimes just a few hours after the attacks.
Goering assumed Fighter Command was on it's last legs and these last
few fighters had to be drawn into battle so he ordered the attack on
London. He assumed the British would sacrifice their last fighters to
defend their capital, just as later the Allies would assume the same
thing when they attacked Berlin. The problem was the Messerschmitts
were very close to fuel starvation by the time they arrived over London
and could not stick around to fight so the bombers were pretty exposed
and suffered shocking losses.
That Churchill somehow knew what would happen if the thrust of the
German air attacks was switched from their current thrust (airfields)
to London, and that this would break the back of the Germans in this
fight would make him the equivalent of a tactical superman. And he
wasn't.
Corky Scott
Glen Hallick
Charles K. Scott wrote:
>
> In article <5h2e9d$2...@gap.cco.caltech.edu>
> Glen Hallick <ghal...@mb.sympatico.ca> writes:
>
> > > So, did Churchill provoke the Blitz? Highly unlikely.
> >
> > I tend to disagree. I think Chruchill tricked the Germans into changing
> > their strategy and it worked.
> > We can agree that Fighter Command is give the Luftwaffe a big surprise.
> > Goering calculated 5 days to wipe out the RAF, when in fact it was still a
> > force over two months after the Battle of Britain began.
> >
> > The bombing of London, according to "the War Years", was an accident. The
> > bombers were greatly off course and dropped their bombs on the wrong
> > target. Churchill suckered Hitler into changing the Luftwaffe's tactics.
> > Thus the RAF was able to overcome the Luftwaffe in 1940.
> >
> > Glen Hallick
>
> You are ascribing to Churchill powers of prescience. In reality no one
> knew what was going to happen from one moment to the next. Arthur
> Harris thought that by bombing city centers he could demoralize Germany
> into surrendering, he was wrong.
Harris subscribed to the aerial warfare theories of an Italian who's name
I can't readily recall. However the evidence is clear well before Harris
came up with his bombing idea that it was wrong, wrong, wrong.
> Hitler thought no one would go to war
> over the likes of Poland, just like they refused to go to war over his
> previous provocations, he was wrong.
I have heard this one so many times and people keep getting it wrong.
Hilter new full well that by invading Poland it meant certain war with
France and Britain. The point that he gambled and unfortunately won on
was that the western Allies would be uninterested in attacking Germany
with a massive offensive in order to relief the Polish front.
The French did "invade" Germany in the fall of 1939, but only up to the
fortifications of the Siegfried Line. Some 10 miles into Germany. Shortly
there after the French pulled out.
>
> At the beginning of the Battle of Britain, The British knew what was at
> stake. They knew that they must keep Fighter Command as a viable
> fighting force or the Germans would achieve air superiority and would
> invade. Churchill had no idea of the day to day tactics the Germans
> would try and could not possibly know that what would happen if Bomber
> Command attacked Germany. Are you trying to say he staked the entire
> outcome of the Battle of Britain on the gamble that if he attacked
> Berlin then Hitler would attack London and that this would change the
> course of the battle?
No of course not. I never said such a thing. Please re-read what I said
and then re-assess your reply.
In fact I will go as far to remind you of what I said. The Luftwaffe
mistakenly bombed London. That is a fact. Churchill seized the moment by
ordering the RAF to bomb Berlin. This to is a fact. The RAF raid
humiliated the likes of Hitler and Goering, who then ordered a sustained
attack on London. Thus the pressure on Fighter Command was lessened.
Now ask your why is that so hard to understand?
>
> This is a bit much. I suspect that in reality the British just fought
> back with whatever they could manage and took whatever gifts the
> Germans gave them.
Which is the very point I tried to put accross and yet you refute it
above and now support it here. Interesting.
> There's a saying regarding the Germans' conduct of
> the war that goes; The Germans didn't make any little mistakes, they
> only made BIG ones.
Ja, ja, ja. Well my friend a certain bomber crew of the Luftwaffe DID
accidentally bomb London in the summer of 1940 when Hitler had explicite
orders that the city be unharmed.
Realizing that the RAF could not inflict much damage on Berlin, Churchill
still ordered the raid. It was a great boost to British moral and it
suckered the Germans into concentrating their air attack on Britian on
bombing the big cities rather than wiping out the RAF.
> In other words, tactically, and close to the point
> of the fight they fought almost flawlessly but at the strategic level
> they bumbled incredibly. Lack of full time military procurement and
> manufacturing until 1944 was but one huge mistake.
That's 1942, not 1944. However realize that the Germans began arming for
the war in the 1930's. With such a huge force by 1939 there was little
need then for 24 hour production of war materials. Remember the German
doctrine was quick actions, not prolonged battles.
> Foregoing
> development of fighters and other aircraft because they did not think
> they were needed was another. And, of course, attacking Russia.
Huh? You have lost me there my friend. The Me-109 was one of the most
advanced fighters in the war, even in 1945. Granted the Germans did
develope the FW-190 and the Me-262, but let's remember their developement
began before the war started.
A good example of the Germans making a mistake was their decision not to
develope a fleet of heavy bombers like the He-177.
>
> In the Battle of Britain, the Germans really did not know how to go
> about destroying Fighter Command which is why they switched targets so
> often.
HUH?! The German destruction (attempted) of the RAF was simple, bomb the
airfields thus destroying their aircraft and facilities. Also the fighter
sweeps were very effective. Let's rememeber "The Few" were on the verge
of defeat and most of the Luftwaffe knew that. However Goreing and Hilter
changed tactics because of their humiliation of Berlin being bombed.
> They did not know how effective their attacks were or weren't
> and therefore ticked targets off as being destroyed when in fact they
> came back to full service sometimes just a few hours after the attacks.
Again, huh?
One of the few advantages the British had in the Battle of Britain was
the "home field advantage". RAF Pilots and aircraft were far easier
retreived.
>
> Goering assumed Fighter Command was on it's last legs and these last
> few fighters had to be drawn into battle so he ordered the attack on
> London. He assumed the British would sacrifice their last fighters to
> defend their capital, just as later the Allies would assume the same
> thing when they attacked Berlin. The problem was the Messerschmitts
> were very close to fuel starvation by the time they arrived over London
> and could not stick around to fight so the bombers were pretty exposed
> and suffered shocking losses.
Well you made one excellent point, the Luftwaffe fighters lacking fuel
when over Britain.
I would say Goering's assumption of Fighter Command was his justification
to switch tactics, SPURRED on by Churchill's decision to have Berlin
bombed.
> That Churchill somehow knew what would happen if the thrust of the
> German air attacks was switched from their current thrust (airfields)
> to London, and that this would break the back of the Germans in this
> fight would make him the equivalent of a tactical superman. And he
> wasn't.
I never said that Churchill knew what would happen by bombing Berlin. I
really hate when a person willfully refuses to understand what has been
blatantly stated.
I said that Churchill gambled.
It paid off. He got lucky. It worked. Bingo. Jackpot. Alright. Cha-ching.
Bloody marvellous.
You have been wrongly assuming that I said that old Winston knew what
would happen. I'd say you have made a mistake in your assessment much the
same way that fat pig Goering did in 1940.
Please re-read my post. You will see where you have gone wrong.
Thanks!
Glen Hallick
John Phillips
On 17 Mar 1997 18:43:52 GMT, Charles...@Dartmouth.EDU (Charles K.
Scott) wrote:
>
>In article <5g6l2k$e...@nntp1.u.washington.edu>
>rd...@aol.com (RDOPF) writes:
>
>> PROPOSITION:
>>
>>
>> 3. Following Dunkirk, England was woefully unprepared to defend
>> itself against a concerted German invasion.
>
>Again, how did the Germans know this? They must have been aware of the
>vast discarded pile of war materials left in Dunkirk but couldn't know
>if this meant the Army was helpless.
>
>Corky Scott
>
>
If you read Churchill's accounts, he prayed that the Germans would
attempt an invasion. They did not have the resources to land and
support the force which would have been necessary. The RAF and the
British Navy would have decimated such an attempt. The huge scale of
the allied force which was necessary to invade Europe in 1944 is an
example.
Regards,
John Phillips
NYPA
Buffalo-Niagara Falls
My comments express only
my personal opinions
Charles K. Scott
In article <5hm9mf$2...@nntp1.u.washington.edu>
Glen Hallick <ghal...@mb.sympatico.ca> writes:
> Realizing that the RAF could not inflict much damage on Berlin, Churchill
> still ordered the raid. It was a great boost to British moral and it
> suckered the Germans into concentrating their air attack on Britian on
> bombing the big cities rather than wiping out the RAF.
I just don't think that things are that cut and dried. For one thing,
it wasn't just one bomber that mistakenly bombed London it was several
and it wasn't just one raid on Berlin either, it was several and Hitler
didn't automatically whip into a frenzy with the first bomb on Berlin.
Before Hitler made his speech, Goering and his subordinates met to
decide the future course of the battle. Goering was of the opinion
that the British were almost finished. Kesselring, if I recall
correctly, agreed although Stumpf did not and recommended continued
attacks on the airfields. Goering, decided to attack London though and
issued the orders. Shortly after that Hitler made his "raze your
cities" speech seconding that decision.
Besides, the bombing attacks on Berlin hardly warrent the name. The
British pilots could barely find it and could only manage to drop a few
bombs. Most fell so many miles from Berlin that the German high
command wasn't sure what target they were intending to hit.
It wasn't understood until long after the war, and only then by
historians, that the Battle of Britain could actually be broken up into
different phases. The phases actually overlapped and not every
historian agrees with this type of division. For those who fought it,
or commanded it, things happened one day at a time or one night at a
time and they could only react to them or prepare as best they could
for the next day. Churchill was of course privy to all intelligence
and so had a broader view than the point commander but he couldn't
possibly have predicted what kind of reaction an attack on Berlin would
do because the Germans themselves were not sure how to go about
destroying Fighter Command.
I just have a hard time imagining Churchill sitting down and saying
"hmmmm, Dowding tells me things are tough at the airfields, how can I
make the Germans stop attacking them . . . I know, I'll sucker him into
bombing London by attacking Berlin! That will relieve the airfields .
. . that's it. Here here, secretary, GET ME BOMBER COMMAND ON THE
PHONE." And this from a guy who didn't even know how Fighter Command
functioned, much less the Germans.
Corky Scott
Drazen Kramaric
Glen Hallick wrote:
> A good example of the Germans making a mistake was their decision not to
> develope a fleet of heavy bombers like the He-177.
Good point. I think that decision to disregard the necessity for
strategic bombers came after death of Luftwaffe Chief of staff Gen.
Walter Wever.
Also, after success of Ju-87 in Spain the ill fated decision that all
Luftwaffe bombers had to be capable for diving showed that it is
impossible to dive with four propellers. Therefore, constructors of
He-177 connected engines in pairs, each pair was driving one prop.
There were many teething problems with He-177, many of planes were lost
after fire. Later it was discovered that fuel tube was passing very
nearly to the hot parts and got flamed.
When everthing was corrected, Germans hadn't enough fuel to send the
entire KampfGeschwader to mission.
Drax