Hitler thought, with the invasion of the Poland to outbreak a local or total war?
Mailand
outbreak a worldwide war. He was convinced that England and France
would not have declared a war to Germany, but only sent formal
protests.
Ciao - Mailand
Rich Rostrom
> Hitler, probably, did not think with the invasion of the Poland to
> outbreak a worldwide war.
That's not clear either way.
On the one hand, he had received
unambiguous declarations from
Britain and France that if Germany
invaded Poland, they would declare
war. They had made no similar
declarations for Austria. They
had agreed formally to the
dismemberment of Czechoslovakia
at Munich. They had not made any
pledges regarding the rump of
Czechoslovakia, which Germany
later occupied.
So the situation with Poland was
clearly different.
On the other hand, Hitler had
seen the Allies back down in
each of these cases, and he knew
that both popular and elite
opinion in both France and Britain
was very fearful of war. So he had
substantial reason to think the
Allies would back down again.
Instead, Britain and French issued
ultimatums to Germany: stop your
attack on Poland or we declare war.
It is recorded that when the news
of the ultimatums was delivered to
Hitler, he seemed somewhat taken
aback. He turned to Ribbentrop, who
was present, and snapped, "Well,
now what?" as if this was an
unexpected contingency, for which
there was no plan.
(I may not recall correctly: this
incident may have happened when
Britain actually declared war.)
William Black
He was wrong...
--
William Black
"Any number under six"
The answer given by Englishman Richard Peeke when asked by the Duke of
Medina Sidonia how many Spanish sword and buckler men he could beat
single handed with a quarterstaff.
Michele
news:b583e497-c233-4537...@g7g2000yqa.googlegroups.com...
We know that this is what he said to his generals. This may have been
because he believed it, or in order to assuage the generals' (and
admirals'!) worries.
In any case, even if he thought the likelihood of having several countries
fighting against Germany at once was low, he was willing to accept the risk.
He knew France was an ally of Poland; and even more significantly, he knew
Britain had become an ally of Poland just after he had gobbled up the
remnants of Czechoslovakia. Yet he decided to go ahead. If the Western
powers bluffed, so much the better, but if not, he was willing to go to war
anyway.
This is brinksmanship. It had worked before, so Hitler was confident it
would work again. The problem is that brinksman politicians are acclaimed
successful geniuses - as long as they manage to step back from the brink.
Just like men playing Russian roulette are brave lucky men - as long as the
chamber turns out to be empty.
Note in any case that a much larger war would have taken place anyway.
Poland was nothing more than a stepping stone in Hitler's long-term plans.
Even without a French and British involvement, soon he would be invading the
Soviet Union, and it is virtually certain that more countries, other than
Germany and the SU, would be involved. When they run out of luck, brinksman
politicians are idiots and Russian roulette players are dead idiots. Hitler
managed to be both, and unlike the single player, he was playing with the
entire Germany's brains, not just this own.
Additionally, Germany would soon be allied with Japan, which was already
carrying out another "local" war (assuming "local" can describe a land war
over China). And it was already allied with Italy, which had no way nor
interest to pick on the SU, but was in the mood to pick a fight elsewhere,
very possibly giving the French and British another way in, should they
avoid the Polish casus belli. See the Greek blunder.
In short, Hitler had been able, until then, to pick his own fights, to
divide opponents and potential opponents, and to overcome one target at a
time. But both his overall choices and an obvious power-balance dynamics
(when one bully is too strong, other players gang up against him) made it
very unlikely that he could continue that way. Even if we assume that he
managed to carry that out once more with Poland, that only means the overall
war begins later, not that it never begins.
Don Phillipson
>
> > Hitler, probably, did not think with the invasion of the Poland to
> > outbreak a worldwide war.
"Rich Rostrom" <rrostrom.2...@rcn.com> wrote in message
news:8c4e375e-868d-49f5...@k17g2000yqh.googlegroups.com...
> That's not clear either way.
> . . .
> On the other hand, Hitler had
> seen the Allies back down in
> each of these cases, and he knew
> that both popular and elite
> opinion in both France and Britain
> was very fearful of war. So he had
> substantial reason to think the
> Allies would back down again.
"Substantial" seems the wrong word here, because
no substance or thing reinforced Hitler's expectation
the Allies would again back down. We know:
1. He expected this (that he could occupy Poland
jointly with the USSR without war with UK or France).
2. He was wrong: both the UK and France did what
they publicly announced (months earlier in 1939)
they would do.
Hitler's expectation of Allied weakness was obviously
strong enough for him to ignore the UK ultimatum
(promising peace if Germany withdrew troops from Poland)
but seems to have been an intuition. No historian has ever
found its "substance."
--
Don Phillipson
Carlsbad Springs
(Ottawa, Canada)
Mailand
Hitler could think that after the dismemberment of the Czechoslovakia
without any action by England and France, also for Poland the road was
opened. In this case he could later attack Russia opening only one
military front.
Ciao - Mailand
Michele
>
> Hitler could think that after the dismemberment of the Czechoslovakia
> without any action by England and France, also for Poland the road was
> opened. In this case he could later attack Russia opening only one
> military front.
Hitler could think anything and maybe he did. That doesn't mean he had
reason to, nor that he wasn't unaware of the risk of, indeed, action by
France and Britain.
As to your example above, please note that Britain was not bound to "action"
in the case of Czechoslovakia. This country was not an ally of Britain.
Poland was, and most remarkably it had become that just after Hitler had
reneged his Munich commitment and dismembered the remains of Czechoslovakia.
Don Phillipson
news:b7b70a35-42dd-4996...@v25g2000yqk.googlegroups.com...
> Hitler could think that after the dismemberment of the Czechoslovakia
> without any action by England and France, also for Poland the road was
> opened. In this case he could later attack Russia opening only one
> military front.
This post overlooks:
1. Hitler called the Sudetenland (Czech frontier districts) his
"last territorial demand in Europe." Some months later he
annexed Bohemia (thus destroying the Czech republic).
This prompted both the UK and France to announce (early
1939) publicly they would go to war to prevent any change
to east European frontiers without the democratic consent
of the people involved.
2. Details of the Nazi-Soviet Pact were kept secret but it
was believed to concern Poland. For this reason PM
Chamberlain wrote personally to Hitler (Aug. 1939)
assuring him Britain and France stood by their earlier
announcement, i.e. would oppose with war any change.
These events seem to destroy any supposed basis for
Hitler to believe Germany would be allowed a free hand.
Alan
> These events seem to destroy any supposed basis for
> Hitler to believe Germany would be allowed a free hand.
I agree, to any sane, rational, reasonable man, the invasion of Poland
by Germany would mean a declaration of war on Germany by England and
France. But sane, rational and reasonable are not words usually used
to describe Hitler.
Alan