Battle of the Bulge - Operation Wacht am Rhein - 1. German
Lawrence Dillard
>
> "Will E. Coyote ©" <will....@tiscali.be> wrote in message
> news:3e0190e1...@news.pacific.net.au...
>
> > 1. German preparation.
>
> > In October 1944, the Germans and Soviets were at a standstill on the
East=
> > ern front. Adolf Hitler calculated that, after the Soviets' major
advance
> in
> > the summer, the Soviets would maintain their positions at least until
> February.
> > In Italy, Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring, leading the Wehrmacht
at
> > the Southern front, was dug in on a short and solid line. Allied forces
> had a
> > firm hold on the western borders of Germany.
>
well, a tenuous hold, at best. October, 1944 is sometimes referred to as the
time of the Allied "October Pause", which in turn was part of a larger,
approximately three-month period, roughly from late August through almost
mid-November, during which the fortunes of the western Allies turned.
Allied manpower (especially infantry) resources, munitions and POL reaching
the front lines had petered out at about the end of July, following the
breakout in Normandy and the immediately-following pursuit stage.
Operation MARKET-GARDEN had floundered in mid-to-late September; the
neglected process of capturing the approaches to the port city of Antwerp
was proving to be a lengthy and costly one. There ensued an enforced pause
in Allied progress, and all along the front, near-stalemate.
Further Allied operations foundered on the rocks of a combination of
insufficient re-supply, a slowly-recognized German resurgence, awful terrain
and the worst autumn weather in almost 40 years. Taking the last stretch of
territory abutting the German border was proving to be an irksome task, from
north to south, with harsh fighting in Lorraine and the Saar, the Vosges,
the Ardennes, and in the outer Ruhr, at high cost and for little gain,
savage battles of attrition conducted at many places virtually in a sea of
mud. True, the Allies were generally hurting the Germans more than they were
being hurt, but own losses were hard to stomach.
Even as logistics shortfalls, manpower shortfalls and poor weather
overarched the situation on the Allied side of the hill, the Allied top
commander, Gen Eisenhower, endured an agonizing re-appraisal of the conduct
of the campaign. Gen Eisenhower's three Army Group commanders (Devers,
Bradley, Montgomery) each had his own vision of what to do next and each had
a distinct, divergent direction he believed was best to pursue; each had
been making plans for realizing his individual vision and each did his best
to convince Gen Eisenhower that his plans were best.
> >
> > German war production was at normal levels, despite the heavy bombing by
> > the Allies. However, according to Albert Speer, Hitler's armaments
> minister,
> > if the situation did not improve very quickly, Germany soon would find
it
> imposs-> ible to continue the fight.
With respect, I do not believe this is accurate. In fact, both German war
production and distribution to the fighting forces were being powerfully
interdicted at this tme by Allied strategic and tactical bombing. This was
a time of shortages and make do for Hitler and company.
> >
> > The Allies had landed at Normandy, France, on June 6, 1944, and were on
> their
> > way to Germany. On July 31, the Fuhrer decided Germany would launch a
> powerful counteroffensive, which he believed could change the course of
the
> war.
> >
> > On August 19, Hitler told a few close aides the offensive would have to
be
> > launched in November. This time of year was particularly favorable to
the
> > kind of operation he planned, he said, because the weather was most
> > unfavorable, particularly to aviation. Considering the superiority the
Allies
> > enjoyed in the air, the chance of success could depend on clouds to
> > shield Hitler's forces on the ground.
> >
> > On September 2, Hitler informed Josef Goebbels of his desire to combine
2=
> > 5 new divisions to form the 6th SS Panzer Army. It would be a force of
> > younger soldiers, many already tested in battle against the Russians in
> the east. Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstadt was made commander in chief
> > of the western offensive.
>
Shortly thereafter, on Sept. 4, Japanese ambassador Oshima met with Hitler
and von Ribbentrop, where he learned that Hitler hoped to open a large-scale
offensive in the West at some point after the beginning of November and
would be helped in the meantime by the rainy weather, which he expected
would hamper the Allies in the use of one of their trump cards, tactical
airpower. Oshima promptly reported his meeting in detail in top-secret
"PURPLE" diplomatic cipher, which had, in an operation known as "Magic"
been, unknown to the Axis, thoroughly compromised by Allied cryptographers.
Hence this information was available to top-level Allied decision-makers,
and to Gen Eisenhower by about Sept. 8. By force of Allied depredations,
shortages and late deliveries, the start-date had to be pushed back, from
Nov 25 to Dec 10, then Dec 15, then finally Dec 16.
>
> >
> > On September 16, a conference was held at the Wolf's Lair, the Fuhrer's
> > headquarters close to Rastenburg, East Prussia. Hitler proposed
attacking
> > through the Belgian Ardennes, the hilly forest land through which the
Ge-
> > man army poured into France four years earlier. In the greatest secrecy,
> > General Alfred Jodl, chief of the OKW (OberKommando der Wehrmacht) put
his
> > staff to work to prepare several alternatives to meet Hitler's
> objectives. About
> > 30 armored divisions, of which 12 independent brigades were envisaged.
On
> >October 4, general Gerdt von Rundstedt and marechal Walter Model, who
were
> to play key roles in the operation, still were unaware of the Fuhrer's
idea.
>
FM von Runstedt was brought into the picture only in late October (October
22?).
The actual striking force consisted of three armies of 12 panzer and 16
infantry
divisions.
>
> >
> > At the beginning of October 1944, preparations were made to maximize the
> > effect of the first days of the offensive. Bridges were reinforced, and
> supply >depots were built on the east side of the Rhine.
>
Although Operation Wacht Am Rhine or Operation Herbstnebel was cloaked in
elaborate security at the top levels of Hitler's war machine, certain
necessary preliminaries such as the above had to take place if the offensive
were to take place, and many were noticed by Allied photo-intelligence.
Furthermore, the armies tasked with carrying out the assault had to
establish communications links. Once they went on the air, they were
detected by Allied wireless listening watches. Although no operational
traffic was transmitted, the existence and tuning-up of communications nets
suitable for three separate armies was detected, and the locations of the
central transmitters as well as the transmitters subordinate to each were
identified in good time prior to the beginning of the operation.
However, the importance of this invaluable information went unappreciated at
the
highest levels of Allied intel interpretation, for the most part.
> >
> > On October 9, Jodl announced to Hitler that 31 divisions were available,
> > of which 10 were armored divisions. Wilhelm Keitel announced he could
> > make available the 17 million liters of fuel and 50 trainloads of
> ammunition
> > necessary to the success of the offensive.
> >
> > On October 11, Hitler's concept was accepted. The objective: to take
> Antwerp.
> > Jodl came up with a full plan of the operation in 10 days.
> >
> > On October 22, Jodl gave the details of the operation to General der
> > Kavellerie Siegfried Westphal and to General Krebs. The code name of the
> >operation was "Wacht am Rhein" (Watch on the Rhine).
Gen Model of Army Group B immediately remarked, upon being informed of the
plan, that it "...hasn't a damned leg to stand on."
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