Ardennes Offensive
carl.marley
winter of 1944.
Thank You
Carl Marley
--
Martin Rapier
<91as3s$ggeo$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu>...
> Could anyone tell me what role British Forces played in the ardennes in
the
> winter of 1944.
<IRONY MODE>
Montgomery of course stabilised the situation with his masterful command of
the troops on the northern edge of the Bulge, tidying up the battlefield
and preventing unnecessary losses amongst the US troops whose commanders
who were determined to fight for every inch of ground.
</IRONY MODE>
Seriously, considerable elements of XXX Corps were diverted south east,
including both armoured & infantry divisions & army level tank brigades. In
the event only very minor elements of Guards Armoured Div actually saw
combat, mainly in the obliteration of 2nd Panzer Division at Celles,
although the bulk of the action was undertaken by 2nd US Armoured Div (a
curious coincidence). Approx 1,200 casualties were suffered by British
forces during the Bulge, but their role was mainly as a large reserve on
the north bank of the Meuse. The Bulge did lead to the postponement of the
planned attack on the Reichswald in December 1944, and in the event XXX
Corps did not make the attack until February (?) 1945.
The US Army official history & Charles MacDonalds 'Battle of the Bulge'
cover it in more detail.
Cheers
Martin.
--
John Lansford
>Could anyone tell me what role British Forces played in the ardennes in the
>winter of 1944.
The British occupied blocking positions along the Marne River and to
the north of the German penetration, and delivered counterattacks at
the extreme western end of the German advance. When they began their
retreat, the British applied pressure from the north and west.
John Lansford
The unofficial I-26 Construction Webpage:
http://users.vnet.net/lansford/a10/
--
AndersonTDI
Meuse
between Namur and Liege to first block a German crossing and later to
participate in the counterattack. Units participating included:
30 Corps HQ
43 "Wessex" Division
51 "Highland" Division
53 "Welsh" Division
Guards Armoured Division
6 Airborne Division
33, 34, and 6 Guards Tank Brigades
29 Armoured Brigade of 11 Armoured Division
3, 4 and 5 AGRA
80, 101 and 106 AAA Brigades
The first combat was between elements of 29 Armoured Brigade (which
had been in
reserve converting to Comets and which had hurriedly redrawn their old
Shermans
from depot) and elements of 2nd Panzer Division (the coincidence of US
2nd
Armored Division and the German 2nd Panzer Division had first occured
during
the Normandy Breakout, they met repeatedly and with vehemence on
numerous
occasions :)). At that time (24 December) 11 Armoured Division was
scattered in
a cordon defense along the river and 43 and 51 Divisions were still en
route.
In Janauary 6 Airborne Division flew in from England, along with the
US 17th
Airborne Division.
However, most of the British forces were in held in reserve until
after 2
January and played only a small (but important) role in stopping the
German
advance.
Total British casualties in the Bulge were:
16-23 Dec 9 KIA, 15 WIA, 9 MIA
24 Dec-1 Jan 9 KIA, 26 WIA, 11 MIA
2-16 Jan 204 KIA, 936 WIA, 243 MIA
Danny Egan
With respect, I think you may mean the Meuse near Celles. There was a British
Armored Brigade (27th?) taking up blocking positions there, close by the US 2nd
Armored Div.
Barry Denton
<m.ra...@sheffield.ac.uk> wrote:
><IRONY MODE>
>Montgomery of course stabilised the situation with his masterful command of
>the troops on the northern edge of the Bulge, tidying up the battlefield
>and preventing unnecessary losses amongst the US troops whose commanders
>who were determined to fight for every inch of ground.
></IRONY MODE>
Not quite as ironic as you might think. The Bruce Clark/ Hasbrouck
versus Ridgeway issue demonstrates that. Whilst I sympathize with the
general thrust of your remarks there is no doubt that Montgomery saved
the 7th Armored from major losses and possibly even destruction. So he
does deserve some credit.
Barry
Dan Stevlingson
>Whilst I sympathize with the general thrust of your remarks there is
>no doubt that Montgomery saved the 7th Armored from major losses
>and possibly even destruction.
This seems to be a postwar stance of the British media, but not
necessarily Montgomery's own staff. They would likely roll their
eyes back as in the American camp.
US commanders were hoping Montgomery would do more than just
give himself a pat on the back for asking US divisions to retreat. Anyone
can do that. Even Monty. Why not send more reinforcements instead
of lip service?
> So he does deserve some credit.
For what?
--
Sent via Deja.com
http://www.deja.com/
Barry Denton
wrote:
>Barry Denton wrote:
>
>>Whilst I sympathize with the general thrust of your remarks there is
>>no doubt that Montgomery saved the 7th Armored from major losses
>>and possibly even destruction.
>
>This seems to be a postwar stance of the British media, but not
>necessarily Montgomery's own staff. They would likely roll their
>eyes back as in the American camp.
I must confess that I hadn't realized that Bruce Clark and Robert
Hasbrouck worked for the British media. In my ignorance I had thought
that they were two Brigadiers in the US Army.
And just how would Montgomery have been able to re-inforce St. Vith
in time to save 7th Armored? Logistics alone would have precluded
that to say nothing of a minor difficulty with the oncoming Germans.
The only organized force available to him at that time was XXX Corps
who would have had to make some 80+ miles, the last twenty over poor
roads packed with retreating units.
In one thread we have Montgomery being accused of amassing huge,
unwarranted, butchers bills now we have him assailed for over-riding
Ridgeways 'stand fast' order. No doubt if he had confirmed this order
we would now be reading from people such as yourself that he
sacrificed an American armored division unnecessarily
The majority of people who post in this group do not seem to be
prepared to accept that Montgomery could do anything right at any time
and appear happy to dismiss even authoritative historians such as
D'Este and Weighley if they dare to say anything that might be
construed as favourable to Montgomery.
>
>US commanders were hoping Montgomery would do more than just
>give himself a pat on the back for asking US divisions to retreat. Anyone
>can do that. Even Monty. Why not send more reinforcements instead
>of lip service?
>
>> So he does deserve some credit.
>
>For what?
If you had read my post, and that to which I responded, just a little
more carefully you would have seen that I was not trying to justify
his overall performance in the Ardennes but merely pointing out that
in this one specific case he saved major components of a US armored
division from isolation and likely destruction. The commander of the
division, 7th Armored, and the commander of CCB gave credit to
Montgomery for a sensible decision: why do you find it so hard to do
the same?
Martin Rapier
<91lo6k$6om$1...@beast.TCNJ.EDU>...
{snip}
> >Whilst I sympathize with the general thrust of your remarks there is
> >no doubt that Montgomery saved the 7th Armored from major losses
> >and possibly even destruction.
>
> This seems to be a postwar stance of the British media, but not
> necessarily Montgomery's own staff. They would likely roll their
> eyes back as in the American camp.
Oh dear, irony & the Internet just don't mix, even when clearly marked.
The only point I was making was that the British contribution, small though
it was, consisted of two elements.
a) some ground units of XXX Corps along the Meuse of which sufficient
elements saw combat to suffer 1000+ casualties
b) Montgomery being assigned command of the northern sector whilst Bradley
took the south.
Personally I'm not sure why Bradleys HQ couldn't control the whole front,
but any useful debate about Montgomerys contribution to commanding the
northern sector of the Bulge will generally sadly be lost in the usual
Monty was great/rubbish debate. As usual he talked up his contribution, and
as usual other parties talked him down, although presumably a 'WW1 General'
would have simply stood and fought rather than indulging in any of this
retreating nonsense.
Charles MacDonalds 'The Battle of the Bulge' & the US Army History
(available on the web from the US Army Center for Military History, though
it is approx 700 pages long) have a fair amount to say about Montgomerys
role & the internal debates between the US commanders about the
adviseability or otherwise following particular courses of action, and I
for one am quite content to let other people make their own minds up rather
than rehashing this tedious debate over and over again.
Honestly what with this, the endless BC vs USAAF thread, a somewhat surreal
thread wrt Goodwood developing & it appearing that only 'people who have
handled rifles' are qualified to make any comment (I have BTW), I'm getting
rather sick of the entire ng. Possibly time to retire to sci.mil.mod.
Cheers
Martin.
--
Michael Emrys
> From: "Martin Rapier" <m.ra...@sheffield.ac.uk>
> Organization: University of Sheffield, UK
> Newsgroups: soc.history.war.world-war-ii
> Date: 19 Dec 2000 16:53:36 GMT
> Subject: Re: Ardennes Offensive
>
> Personally I'm not sure why Bradleys HQ couldn't control the whole front...
I've read (but don't recall where) that the Germans discovered and cut the
telex cable to the northern part of the front early in the offensive. Take
it for what it's worth.
Michael
AndersonTDI
wrote:
>there is
>>no doubt that Montgomery saved the 7th Armored from major losses
>>and possibly even destruction.
>
>This seems to be a postwar stance of the British media, but not
>necessarily Montgomery's own staff.
Sorry Dan, although I am no great Monty fan, Barry Denton was right on
the mark
with this one. Matt Ridgway's papers at USAMHI in Carlisle PA clearly
show that
he intended to attempt to hold the Vielsalm bulge with the remnants of
the 7th
AD, CCB/9th AD, 112th IR, and 424th IR, after the loss of St.Vith and
was only
forestalled by the direct intervention of Monty. Bob Hasbrouck and
Bruce Clarke
both were profuse in their praise for Monty's decision, which they
felt was the
only way that the remnants weren't bagged by the Germans. I can
personally
assert that Bruce Clark held that view probably up to the day of his
death, I
interviewed him on that and related subjects a few months before his
death.
Dan Stevlingson
> If you had read my post, you would have seen that I was not
> trying to justify his overall performance
I knew what you meant the first time. You were discussing
the US 7th Armored Division at St. Vith, yes?
> [Montgomery] assailed for over-riding Ridgeways 'stand fast' order.
I think we both know it was Hasbrouck's idea for withdrawl of
7th Armored, not that of Montgomery. Ridgway gave a stand fast
order because he was expecting to get reinforcements post haste.
Unlike Hasbrouck or Montgomery, Ridgway was comfortable
with operating while surrounded and scattered about. So he
thought Hasbrouck was being overly pessimistic. Reports of
firefights raging in front of battalion command posts did not
impress Ridgway since that was just another day at the office
in the paratroops. And besides 7th Armored managed to hold
off the better part of a German Corps for a week, so Ridgway's
POV deserves as much consideration as that of Hasbrouck.
>The majority of people who post in this group do not seem to be
>prepared to accept that Montgomery could do anything right
Some people on this group, including myself, have given
Montgomery mostly favorable reviews. It is a minority of
people who make obtuse blanket statements which are of
little use to anyone. Give it a rest please.
> only organized force available to him was XXX Corps
Are you sure? The Germans were not capable of sustained
attack elsewhere on the front since their supplies were
concentrated in the vicinity Ardennes. The 21st Army Group
could hold the rest of their front with minimal personnel.
Montgomery admitted that his scheme for 30 Corps units
along a 60-mile stretch of the Muese was questionable. He
confessed that his notion of the attack route the Germans
would use was, "unpleasantly vague".
> And just how would Montgomery have been able to re-inforce
> St. Vith in time to save 7th Armored?
It is possible that he could not, even with the best of efforts.
However the 7th Armored Division was holding out in St. Vith
a week after the German offensive began. That may have been
enough time for Montgomery to send help.
KUN Account
> planned attack on the Reichswald in December 1944, and in the event XXX
> Corps did not make the attack until February (?) 1945.
Indeed, February 1945: Operation Veritable
--
Lawrence Dillard
assigning
the US soldiers on the northern side of the Nazi penetration to FM
Montgomery at the outset of the Ardennes battle was a false one. That
is,
at no time did the Germans actually make it impossible for Bradley,
no
mattter where he chose to locate himself, to communicate with his
forces on
the north side of the penetration. More than enough redundancy in
communications facilities was still available to allow Bradley and Gen
Hodges to communicate with one another effectively. In the event,
even at
the greatest extent of the German penetration, communications were
never
broken.
However, Ike had multiple rationales for agreeing to do so. First, Ike
wanted to bring home to Bradley how angry he was and disappointed that
the
latter, despite more than one firm warning about the Germans massing
opposite the northern portion of his front, was nonetheless taken by
surprise and had clearly not taken the necessary steps to meet such a
thrust, although he'd claimed he'd done so. Gen Bradley was left to
command
the "rump" of 12 AG, most essentially Patton's 3rd Army. Patton had
been
assigned by Ike to handle the US riposte from the south against the
Bulge.
Second, Ike hoped that by delegating the UAS forces north of the
breakthrough to the temporary command of FM Montgomery, Monty might
feel
inclined to commit a portion of 21 AG to the battle and thus hasten
the
German defeat. In particular, Ike envisioned that once the German
spearhead
had been halted, a co-ordinated counterattack by Patton/Bradley from
the
south and by Hodges/21 AG from the north would mean a speedy end to
the
affair.
According to Mac Donald, "A Time For Trumpets", FM Montgomery elected
to use
21 AG forces in a backup role, apparently believing that the Germans
had at
least a chance of making a clean breakthrough of the US forces. If
that
occurred, 21 AG would stop that penetration short of even an attempt
at the
crossing of the Meuse. It proved unnecessary for more than relatively
small
numbers of Commonwealth soldiers to participate in battle until after
Jan 3,
1945, when FM Montgomery launched a counterattack which was intended
to
complement one launched by Gen Bradley Jan 1.
FM Montgomery entered the Ardennes battle under certain impressions,
which
he found later were not warranted. Rather than finding an
organization in
disarray, he found such men as Hodges and Collins were embarrassed by
the
apparent initial success of the German counteroffensive and filled
with
desire to recoup. Monty's military intuition counseled that first the
forces should regroup to strong defensive positions from which they
could
beat down the German offensive, and create reserves, prior to going
over to
an offensive of ther own. However, when he learned that the US
commanders
were of a more aggressive set of mind, he yielded gracefully, for the
most
part, to their desires. MacDonald summarizes these developments on pp
612-613 of "Trumpets".
Whereas initially Montgomery was of the opinion that Hodges was tired
and
discouraged, he soon enough learned that that was not so. Hodges
strongly
objected to giving up the Elsenborn Ridge; normally, Monty was loath
to heed
subordinate commanders, but in this case did so; Hodges held the ridge
position.
When Hodges strongly objected to swiftly evacuating St Vith, and its
rich
road net, Monty listened; only later, when the situation was clearly
beyond
redemption, did Montgomery authorize withdrawal.
Montgomery wanted to pull back from a crosroads position at Manhay,
again
for reasons of creating a stronger defense position and creating a
reserve.
Again, Hodges believed otherwise, and Monty heeded him.
Whereas Montgomery wanted Collins' forces readied for an attack, the
Germans
obviated that idea by attacking Collins; in that event, Montgomery
authorized Collins to withdraw as necessary, confident of Collins'
combat
savvy. Collins elected, instead of withdrawing, to mount his own
attack,
which halted the Germans short of the Meuse.
Gen Ridgway became embroiled with a couple of subordinate commanders
during
this time. Ridgway, until this time solely a paratrooper commander,
had now
been placed in command of mixed forces, and was quickly growing into
the
job, and liking it. However, the general could be a stickler for
protocol,
and this trait probably led to a brouhahah with Gen Clark, who, in
essence,
told Gen Ridgway where to get off, reminding him that Gen Patton liked
the
way he soldiered and would welcome him back at any time, and if
Ridgway
wanted to relieve him, he could go right ahead; he (Clark) would
leave, with
pleasure. This time it was Ridgway's turn to gracefully conceed.
(Some
years after the war, Montgomery served as Ridgway's deputy at NATO.
Their
relatonship was rocky, as both men were described as proud to the
point of
arrrogance and only too eager to stand on formalities).
Thanks for the post.
SNIP
David Thornley
Michael Emrys <em...@olypen.com> wrote:
>
>I've read (but don't recall where) that the Germans discovered and cut the
>telex cable to the northern part of the front early in the offensive. Take
>it for what it's worth.
>
link with First and Ninth Armies consisted of one shaky radio
connection, which depended on a relay station that appeared to be
in the German path of advance. I don't know how relocating Bradley
north of the Ardennes and maybe putting Patton directly under
Eisenhower
would have worked. Bradley had a pretty large headquarters, and
moving it and getting it working again during a battle was likely
a bad idea.
--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion,
ask.
da...@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-
Barry Denton
wrote:
>
>Unlike Hasbrouck or Montgomery, Ridgway was comfortable
>with operating while surrounded and scattered about. So he
>thought Hasbrouck was being overly pessimistic. Reports of
>firefights raging in front of battalion command posts did not
>impress Ridgway since that was just another day at the office
>in the paratroops. And besides 7th Armored managed to hold
>off the better part of a German Corps for a week, so Ridgway's
>POV deserves as much consideration as that of Hasbrouck.
Whilst Ridgeway, and the remainder of the airborne generals were, of
course, happy to operate surrounded the position of an armoured
division is somewhat different, requiring a regular supply of POL, as
well as tank ammunition if they are to function effectively.
And, of course, it was Hasbrouck's idea: I was just pointing out that
Ridgeway, left to his own devices, would have needlessly sacrificed
major elements of 7AD. Montgomery (and Hasbrouck, if you will)
prevented him from doing so. For that, if for nothing else in the
Ardennes, Montgomery should be accorded some credit.
You seem to be implying that if 7AD had maintained their position, as
Ridgeway wished, that they would somehow have survived as an organized
formation. It is not clear how, though. Most disinterested, as well as
those more closely involved, observers appear agreed that Ridgeway's
order was flawed as neither he, nor apparently anyone else, had any
idea as to how 7AD and the other units were supposed to be relieved.
Your original post asked what Montgomery had done to deserve the
credit in this particular instance: I have responded. Widening the
debate, as you are now trying to do, does not change that material
fact.
Lawrence Dillard
the rest of their lives "...Robert Hasbrouk, Bruce Clark, William Hoge,
Dwight Rosenbaum, Alexander Reid, Gustin Nelson, and many another commander
who had fought in the salient beyond the Salm River would be grateful to
Field Marshall Montgomery for getting them out of what they saw as a
deathtrap for their commands."
Yet, MacDonald concluded, "...to the credit of Matthew B Ridgway, he had
gone to the scene himself and for all his preconceptions to the contrary,
had determined that withdrawal was imperative."
When Ridgway met with Hoge, a man he considered imperturbable and
clear-sighted, he tried a little reverse-psycholgy, telling Hoge in a
meeting somewhere near Commanster, that he had no intention of leaving him
and his command to be slowly annihilated. "We're going to get you out of
here," he told Hoge. In reply, Hoge said, "How can you?" Ridgway replied,
in perhaps delayed appreciation of the desperate character of the situation,
"We can and we will." And with that began a tortuous withdrawal which,
ironically aided by freezing weather, eventually was quite successful.
St. Vith was to have been taken on the first day of the Ardennes battle.
But it fell into German hands only at the end of the sixth day, Dec. 21,
accordiing to MacDonald, who termed it "...a critical, crushing delay...."
FM Montgomery had ordered the withdrawal. Gen Ridway, armed with
preconceptions, had gone forward, determined to find reason not to fall
back, and initially calling for dispositions described by Gen Bruce Clark as
"Custer's Last Stand." But his on-the-site inspection revealed to him that
withdrawal was clearly indicated.
Thanks for the post.
"Dan Stevlingson" <hal90...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:91lo6k$6om$1...@beast.TCNJ.EDU...
--
Dan Stevlingson
>Whilst Ridgeway, and the remainder of the airborne generals
>were, of course, happy to operate surrounded the position
>of an armoured division is somewhat different
Excuse me? The US armored units in Bastogne were surrounded,
supplied, and held the town last time I checked.
As I understand it many of the armored troops in Bastogne
felt much the same as Hasbrouck did at St Vith. They were
very anxious about being surrounded and they too wanted to
leave for more secure digs. But they stayed and did what
they had to along with the paratroops and glider-riders.
Possibly Hasbrouck's situation was worse than in Bastogne.
This is difficult to determine without making a detailed
comparison. If you have one please continue.
>requiring a regular supply of POL, as well as tank ammunition
>if they are to function effectively.
Were you aware that supplies had been air dropped to Bastogne?
>You seem to be implying that if 7AD had maintained their position,
>as Ridgeway wished, that they would somehow have survived as an
>organized formation. It is not clear how, though.
We'll never know for sure.
> as neither he, nor apparently anyone else, had any idea
> as to how 7AD and the other units were supposed to be
> relieved.
According to who?
> Widening the debate, as you are now trying to do
I wasn't widening the debate. I pointed out the plain and
simple fact that Montgomery had no business taking credit
for a plan that was clearly made by someone else. There
was no legitimate reason for him to do that.
Barry Denton
<hal90...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>I wasn't widening the debate. I pointed out the plain and
>simple fact that Montgomery had no business taking credit
>for a plan that was clearly made by someone else. There
>was no legitimate reason for him to do that.
Despite all your attempts at dissembling the fact remains that
Hasbrouck wanted out, Ridgeway said 'No' and Montgomery over-rode
Ridgeway. If he hadn't the overwhelming likelihood is that major
elements of 7th Armored Division would have been destroyed. It is the
command decision for which Montgomery deserves credit.
>Possibly Hasbrouck's situation was worse than in Bastogne.
>This is difficult to determine without making a detailed
>comparison. If you have one please continue.
>Were you aware that supplies had been air dropped to Bastogne?
I was, however, highly entertained by your proposal to air drop POL
and ammunition, and other supplies to 7AD They were in a heavily
wooded area with only one poor road for lateral communication and the
prevailing weather was so poor that even fighters were grounded for
another two days.
If you can see a parallel between these circumstances and the dropping
of supplies into Bastogne three days later then it is, perhaps, no
wonder, that you have some difficulty in comprehending the reasons for
ordering their withdrawal. Personally I am happy to agree with those
on the spot at Regimental, Divisional, Army and Army Group commands,
together with every reputable historian since. Still I now understand
that Ridgeway and Stevlingson stand alone on the other side of the
argument. For the sake of 7AD it is perhaps fortunate that the
majority view prevailed that day.
Dan Stevlingson
> Despite all your attempts at dissembling the fact remains that
> Hasbrouck wanted out, Ridgeway said 'No'
Hmm. Well now it seems that Ridgway changed his mind and actually
agreed with Hasbrouck anyway, despite your attempts to ignore it.
> It is the command decision for which Montgomery deserves credit.
I give him credit for agreeing with the decision of an American
officer. This is much more accurate than Monty's convoluted
postwar version of the story.
>> Possibly Hasbrouck's situation was worse than in Bastogne.
> I now understand that Ridgeway and Stevlingson stand alone
We stand alone? I don't think so sport, since I never said
Hasbrouck was definitely wrong and Ridgway apparently changed
his mind about the situation at St Vith.
> I was, however, highly entertained by your proposal to
> air drop POL and ammunition, and other supplies to
That's good. Because the terrain, weather and roads around
St Vith were not much different than at Bastogne. It might be
legitimate to complain about the woods and the roadnet, but
both were more of a detriment to the attacker than defender.
7th Armored was in trouble mainly because they were widely
dispersed after suffering heavy casualties.
AndersonTDI
stepped in
earlier.
The two situations at St. Vith and Bastogne are curious mirrors of
each other
(and thanks for making me think on this). As Dan said the terrain and
road net
is similar, however I think the crucial difference is the forces
available and
the tactical position.
At St.Vith the forces that BG Hasbrouck had available included the
424th
Infantry which had suffered severe losses while attempting to hold its
positions on the right of the 106th Division, the 112th Infantry which
had also
suffered severe losses while holding its positions astride the Our
River, and
the 7th Armored Division, which had had one reinforced armored
infantry
battalion and a tank battalion mauled attempting to hold St. Vith. In
effect it
was approximately one-half of an infantry division and two-thirds of
an armored
division, to hold a front of some 25 miles where neither flank was
secure (and
elements of the 2nd SS, 116th PzD, and 560th VGD were already deep in
the rear
of the right flank). Elements of the 1st and 9th SS Panzer, FBB, and
18th VGD
were assaulting from the front and working around the left flank.
At Bastogne, a four-regiment infantry division, reinforced by the
remnants of
two combat commands (possibly equivalent to one full-strength combat
command)
occupied what became a perimeter of some 25 miles (later reduced to
about 16
miles) with no threatened flanks (at least after the decision was made
to
conduct an all around defense). The perimeter was never attacked by a
force
stronger than a reinforced VGD (26th). Although elements of the 2nd
and Lehr
passed to the north and south only a regimental KG of Lehr was left at
Bastogne. Later, elements of 15th PGD reinforced the Germans but it
was too
little and too late. The main attempt and main strength of the German
Army
directed at Bastogne did not occur until after the relief.
Logistically, the situation in St. Vith was also somewhat more
problematic. The
divisional trains of the 106th evacuated that town while those of the
7th AD
were unable to approach closer than La Roche where they were later
forced to
withdraw under threat of German attack. Fuel and ammunition were in a
critical
state by the testimony of the front line units and, as was pointed
out, the
weather did nor permit aerial resupply until *after* the withdrawal
had been
executed.
At Bastogne, fuel and ammunition were a problem, but careful
conservation and
the lack of real German strength allowed the defenders to hold out
until the
weather allowed resupply. (Food was less of a problem since an VIII
Corps
Quartermaster depot was in the town, however the major bulk item was
panckae
mix, which I have been told the defenders became heartily sick of.)
All in all it appears that Montgomery should be acknowledged for
accepting the
views of his subordinates and authorizing the withdrawal. At the same
time I
(and Hasbrouck, Clark, et al) may have been too harsh in judging
Ridgway.
However, it does appear that, short of Hoges recommendation, he might
well have
pushed to hold the position.
Merry Christmas to all!
Barry Denton
<hal90...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>That's good. Because the terrain, weather and roads around
>St Vith were not much different than at Bastogne. It might be
>legitimate to complain about the woods and the roadnet, but
>both were more of a detriment to the attacker than defender.
>7th Armored was in trouble mainly because they were widely
>dispersed after suffering heavy casualties.
Only one minor problem with that argument: they weren't in St Vith but
in wooded territory a few miles away.The US had been forced out of St.
Vith the previous day! So your plan to supply them with an airdrop
out of an overcast sky in which no planes would fly for a further two
days and into dense wooded territory seems more ambitious by the
minute!