Possibilty of Himmler planning a coup?
brandon
internal security and foreign intelligence branches. Himmler was also
secretly in touch with the Allies trying to bargain for a favorable
ending of the war for the Nazis. In one of Hitlers comments following
Himmlers appointment to the Vistula front by the end of the war, he
acknowledges Himmler ability to provide manpower and resources form his
pool in that critical period. It could mean that Himmler was hoarding
sufficient resources even Hitler had no idea of. Also the Goebbels
diaries reveal that both Goebbels and Himmler had mutually voiced
reservations (although guardedly) on Hitlers approach to the war
precluding any negotiations with the Allies which indicates an element
of dissatisfaction. In these circumstances, if the war had dragged on a
couple of months more, what are the chances of Himmler pulling of a
coup against Hitler using the tremendous resources at his command?
Since he was in control of the intelligence services, Hitler would
never know what was brewing until the last minute.
Rhino
news:1164352620.0...@l39g2000cwd.googlegroups.com...
This doesn't seem completely unrealistic to me. According to a book I read -
whose title escapes me but which describes the last day of WW II for many
people, ordinary and famous - Himmler's last day tends to support this
theory.
He approached a British POW camp on the last day of the war, disguised as a
captain, revealed himself as Himmler, and asked to speak to the officer in
charge. He proposed himself as someone the Allies could deal with in a
united effort to stop the Russians from sweeping over all of Europe. The man
who took his surrender was either a non-com or very junior officer who,
understandably, didn't feel it was his place to deal with such a matter, so
he locked up Himmler in a cell of some kind and sought guidance from his
superiors. But apparently this man was also unable to hide his contempt for
Himmler and, while awaiting the arrival of superior officers, Himmler
apparently decided his plan was not going to work out after all and took a
cyanide capsule.
Now, whether this means that Himmler had an organization that he could
command effectively in an effort to repel the Soviets is another matter. I
have no idea whether such an effort was realistic at that point in time
considering the state of the German forces and communications
infrastructure. Perhaps Himmler was simply hoping to fool the Allies into
thinking that he had more influence than he did and was merely bluffing.
--
Rhino
Don Phillipson
news:1164352620.0...@l39g2000cwd.googlegroups.com...
> if the war had dragged on a
> couple of months more, what are the chances of Himmler pulling of a
> coup against Hitler using the tremendous resources at his command?
When allied victory was certain, any coup by any
figure in the German government would be worth
attempting only if the plotter were sure the Allies
would treat him better than Hitler or any other
government figure. Himmler attempted to sound
out the Allies via Swedish intermediaries in April
1945 (possibly earlier via Allen Dulles in Switzerland)
and was rebuffed, e.g. Churchill notified Stalin he
had rejected Himmler's offer (22 April 1945) to surrender
the western front he commanded from Luebeck.
I.e. Himmler's tremendous resources might
have facilitated any coup, but when Germany had
actually begun to collapse there was no point in
his making the attempt.
--
Don Phillipson
Carlsbad Springs
(Ottawa, Canada)
Andrew Clark
(space snip)
> In these circumstances, if the war had dragged on a
> couple of months more, what are the chances of Himmler pulling of a
> coup against Hitler using the tremendous resources at his command?
Himmler was far too personally indecisive and torn in his loyalties to have
pulled off a successful coup, whatever his theoretical powers. He appears to
have been emotionally dependent on the person of Hitler.
And you should beware of thinking of the SS, or any part of the Nazi state,
as monolithic or systematic. It was a frenzied and ever-shifting pile of
conflicting loyalties and chains of command.
brandon
> Himmler was far too personally indecisive and torn in his loyalties to have
> pulled off a successful coup, whatever his theoretical powers. He appears to
> have been emotionally dependent on the person of Hitler.
>
> And you should beware of thinking of the SS, or any part of the Nazi state,
> as monolithic or systematic. It was a frenzied and ever-shifting pile of
> conflicting loyalties and chains of command.
My other question is: how did Hitler monitor the activities/loyalties
of the SS, and of people like Himmler ? Was there a higher secret
service under Hitler's direct control and not accountable to Himmler?
Don Phillipson
> My other question is: how did Hitler monitor the activities/loyalties
> of the SS, and of people like Himmler ? Was there a higher secret
> service under Hitler's direct control and not accountable to Himmler?
No, Hitler had no personal security organization.
Opposed by temperament to formal organization
and institutions, he was influenced instead by
"loyalty" i.e. personal gossip, say witnesses like
Speer. Thus Hitler was transfixed when (very late
in the war) people told him "Loyal Heinrich" was
secretly trying to negotiate with the Allies.
Andrew Clark
> My other question is: how did Hitler monitor the activities/loyalties
> of the SS, and of people like Himmler ? Was there a higher secret
> service under Hitler's direct control and not accountable to Himmler?
All parts of the Nazi machine spied on each other: Hitler believed in divide
and rule.
Although Himmler as Head of German Police (a state post, not connected with
his SS role) controlled both the uniformed police and the secret state
police, the NSDAP's own domestic counter-espionage and domestic unrest
departments, part of the SD, had police powers but was not under SS control
and reported separately to Hitler through Bormann.
And although Goering was mostly squeezed out of the police business before
WW2, he nevertheless remained throughout the war in charge of the department
that tapped German domestic and state telephones and telegraphs, giving him
control over an invaluable source of intelligence.
The Party regional leaders, the Gauleiters, each had his own network of
agents and informers - a man or woman in every block, allegedly - which
reported back to local Nazi Party offices independently of the SS and SD.
And so on.