Pacific Fleet moved to PH from San Diego ... Why???
dbja...@toronto.cbc.ca
In the late 30's, as I understand it, FDR ordered the US Pacific Fleet
moved TO Pearl Harbor, FROM San Diego ... against the wishes of the
Navy brass ... and one admiral even resigned over it.
Who was that admiral?
What became of him?
What were his reasons for opposing the move to PH? ... too exposed?
Was this admiral's stand noticed in the press and Congress (and in
Japan) at the time? I'll bet it was noticed by the British.
Seems to me this forgotten admiral was the quite the prophet and a man
of some courage in sacrificing his career in defence of his ideas.
Why isn't he remembered in much the same way that Billy Mitchell is
honored by air power enthusiasts?
Anyway, who was he?
Thanks
Dan
--------------------------------
Dan Bjarnason
National TV News / Canadian Broadcasting Corp
Toronto, Canada
Moderator for Soc.history.war.world-war-ii
Appeals to: ww2...@acpub.duke.edu
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Sam Stokes
> In the late 30's, as I understand it, FDR ordered the US Pacific Fleet
> moved TO Pearl Harbor, FROM San Diego ... against the wishes of the
> Navy brass ... and one admiral even resigned over it.
>
> Who was that admiral?
The Admiral was James O. Richardson. The fleet was moved to Pearl Harbor
in May 1940.
> What became of him?
He was fired by Roosevelt. Kimmel was his replacement. Kimmel was
not to happy about having the fleet forward based either, but he saw what
happened to Richardson and kept quiet.
There is a book, "Treadmill to Pearl Harbor" published by the U.S. Navy
about Richardson. Also check
http://metalab.unc.edu/pha/pha/congress/part_4html#159c
for more info.
>
> What were his reasons for opposing the move to PH? ... too exposed?
Inadequate facilities, thought that the Japanese could see that PH was a weak
base, lack of logistics, etc. and therefore no deterrent.
>
> Was this admiral's stand noticed in the press and Congress (and in
> Japan) at the time? I'll bet it was noticed by the British.
Don't know.
Keith B. Rosenberg
> In the late 30's, as I understand it, FDR ordered the US Pacific Fleet
> moved TO Pearl Harbor, FROM San Diego ... against the wishes of the
> Navy brass ... and one admiral even resigned over it.
The U.S. realised that the Japanese might be positiioning themselves
for war and the fleet was moved from San Diego to deter them in
Southeast Asia.
> Who was that admiral?
The Admiral was James O. Richardson and he did not resign.
He was relieved from command one year early, apparently
at the request of the President. He was relieved not because
he was right, but because he was too critical of the decisions
made by the civilian government.
> What became of him?
I do not know, but it was better than what Kimmel got.
> What were his reasons for opposing the move to PH? ... too exposed?
He did not know what the fleet could have done if the
Japanese made a move in Southeast Asia. They did not
expect the Japanese to start a war with the U.S.
> Was this admiral's stand noticed in the press and Congress (and in
> Japan) at the time? I'll bet it was noticed by the British.
He was not noticed much at all. The U.S. was still in isolationist
denial about the war. And the British were more interested in
the Asiatic fleet anyway since it was closer to them.
> Seems to me this forgotten admiral was the quite the prophet and a man
> of some courage in sacrificing his career in defence of his ideas.
> Why isn't he remembered in much the same way that Billy Mitchell is
> honored by air power enthusiasts?
He is remembered in several books. He is not famous however
since the prophecy was not his. Actually many many people
knew that a carrier attack on PH was possible. They thought
that the Japanese had the tactical ability to do it. They even
thought that the Japanese could do it.
What nobody thought was that the Japanese WOULD do it.
Admiral Pye, commander of the battleships said; "The
Japanese will not go to war with the United States. We are
too big, too powerful, and too strong".
Any real prophecy was in the Martin-Bellinger report that Admiral
Kimmel asked for. The report dated 31 March 1941 was signed by
General Martin of the Army and Admiral Bellinger of the Navy.
That document is the one usually cited by students of the Pearl
Harbor disaster. The report was not actually written by Martin
and Bellinger personally, but theirs was the responsibility for seeing
that it was written.
And neither Kimmel or Richardson was responsible for the air
defense of the Pearl Harbor area. By written agreement the
Army was responsible for the actual aerial defense of the fleet
whenever it was in the harbor. The Navy's only real responsibility
was for long range patrol (and long range patrols would not have
worked the way the Japanese planned the attack) and anti-
aircraft defenses on the ships.
********************************************************************
enor...@ix.netcom.com (Keith B. Rosenberg) (EN][)
For it's Tommy this, an' Tommy that, an' "Chuck him out, the brute!"
But it's "Saviour of 'is country" when the guns begin to shoot;
********************************************************************
history.war....@unforgettable.com
assuming that the same political circumstances existed 7 Dec 1941?
Larry W. Jewell
>
> In the late 30's, as I understand it, FDR ordered the US Pacific Fleet
> moved TO Pearl Harbor, FROM San Diego ... against the wishes of the
> Navy brass ... and one admiral even resigned over it.
The move was for deterrence, FDR hoped to make the Japanese think
a little before continuing their aggressive course in Asia.
> Who was that admiral?
His name was Richardson.
> What became of him?
He retired and wrote a book.
> What were his reasons for opposing the move to PH? ... too exposed?
No, his objection was mainly that the facilities at Pearl were to
limited to maintain the fleet. He never was very worried about an attack
on the islands, _before_ 1941. Afterwards, of course, he was the
original "I told you so" guy. His warnings were retro-fitted to his
earlier objections to make him seem a prophet.
> Was this admiral's stand noticed in the press and Congress (and in
> Japan) at the time? I'll bet it was noticed by the British.
It was noticed, and didn't do our efforts in the Pacific much good.
Japan was comforted to know that we couldn't maintain that effort
for long. Very helpful.
> Seems to me this forgotten admiral was the quite the prophet and a man
> of some courage in sacrificing his career in defence of his ideas.
> Why isn't he remembered in much the same way that Billy Mitchell is
> honored by air power enthusiasts?
Because he really didn't have anything to say about the attack in
his tantrum over the fleet forward deployment. He's not even at
blip on the screen as far as such things go.
World War II Resources Page: http://metalab.unc.edu/pha
Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings: http://metalab.unc.edu/pha/pha
Myths of Pearl Harbor: http://metalab.unc.edu/pha/myths
Larry J
"Dedicated to combatting 'history by sound bite'."
--
Larry W. Jewell, P...@GTE.NET; Pearl Harbor Working Group Webmaster.
WWII Primary Source Documents: http://metalab.unc.edu/pha
"Sunday's horoscope is note worthy because of its strange, sudden
and wholly unpredictable and inexplicable occurrences, affecting
all phases of life."
Your Horoscope" L.A. Evening Herald Express, Sat, 12/06/41
Jeff Joyce
Admiral Claude Bloch, was ordered to "temporarily" transfer to Hawaii
elements of the Pacific Fleet, including two heavy cruiser divisions, two
destroyer squadrons and an aircraft carrier. This was the first move to
relocate the Pacific Fleet from San Diego to Pearl Harbor. Bloch became
Commander of the 14th Naval District in Hawaii and was replaced as CINCUS by
Admiral James Richardson. In April 1940 the Pacific Fleet started annual
war games in Hawaiian waters ("Fleet Problem 21"). In May 1940 Richardson
received orders from Admiral Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations, to
prepare to remain indefinitely in Hawaii. According to Stark the order
originated from FDR, who wanted the Pacific Fleet concentrated in Hawaii as
a demonstration to Japan. Richardson felt keeping the Pacific Fleet in
Hawaii was hurting readiness and training, as well as putting a strain on
his men since their families were still in San Diego. Pearl Harbor did not
have the facilities to support the entire Pacific Fleet at the time.
Despite trips to Washington in July and October 1940 Richardson was unable
to persuade FDR to move the Pacific Fleet back to San Diego. There were
rumors at the time that Richardson would be replaced due to his opposition
to FDR's decision, but it wasn't until Jan 41 that Richardson was relieved
of his command and replaced by Admiral Husband Kimmel. Richardson spent
World War II serving on several Navy committees in Washington DC and never
returned to sea duty.
Jeff
dbja...@toronto.cbc.ca wrote in message
<370cf89f...@news.curie.dialix.com.au>...
>
>In the late 30's, as I understand it, FDR ordered the US Pacific Fleet
moved TO Pearl Harbor, FROM San Diego ... against the wishes of the Navy
brass ... and one admiral even resigned over it...
BobG
history.war....@unforgettable.com wrote:
>What would Japan have done if the fleet had never moved to Pearl,
>assuming that the same political circumstances existed 7 Dec 1941?
My guess is that there would have been a very successful invasion of
Hawaii and Pearl Harbor would have been renamed Nagasaki Harbor.
BobG
Evolution is a fact. The theory of evolution explains the fact of evolution.
history.war....@unforgettable.com
>Hawaii and Pearl Harbor would have been renamed Nagasaki Harbor.
How? It has previously been discussed that the Japanese fleet was at the
end of its supply line just attacking Pearl Harbor. It has previously
been discussed as to why no invasion of West Coast--the same reason. It
has previously been discussed that Japanese fleet could not attack San
Diego because of the same reason.
If the thinking of the Japanese was that a big strike against the U.S.
would cause the U.S. to stay out of war by making some kind of terms,
then the loss of Pearl Harbor as this linchpin target would undermine
this plan. In addition it would be easier for the U.S. to mount attacks
from San Diego than for the Japanese to support any position in Hawaii.
My contention is that with the economic embargo of Japan and Japan's war
plans, some kind of attack on the U.S. was necessary. Not being able to
knock the fleet out of action at Pearl Harbor, they would need a new
target. I'm thinking that they might have chosen to disable the Panama
Canal so as to disrupt U.S. economy and military movements. The only
other plan would be to somehow assmble a fleet of submarines and attack
the fleet in Pearl Harbor.
George Hardy
history.war....@unforgettable.com says:
>My contention is that with the economic embargo of Japan and
>Japan's war plans, some kind of attack on the U.S. was necessary.
OK. Now you get to the basic question. Why attack the USA at all?
The economic boycott? How does attacking the USA help? It is
some sort of revenge? Pique?
The only reason I can see is the necessity to pass the Philippines
to get to Indonesian oil. Bypassing the Philippines are not an
option. It would leave their flank open to attack. And an attack
on the Philippines was an attack on the USA. So, it was decided to
make as good an attack on the USA as possible. That was Pearl
Harbor.
GFH
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BobG
>My guess is that there would have been a very successful invasion of
>Hawaii and Pearl Harbor would have been renamed Nagasaki Harbor.
I'd like to rescind this statement. Japan was after the fleet at
Pearl Harbor and attacking Hawaii without destroying our fleet
wouldn't have made very much sense.
Tim Watkins
> What would Japan have done if the fleet had never moved to Pearl,
> assuming that the same political circumstances existed 7 Dec 1941?
I believe the Japanese go ahead and attack the Americans even though the
Pacific fleet is not in Hawaiian waters. The Japanese invasion of China
and the sinking of the Panay in December 1937 had worsened relations
between the U.S. and Japan. Thus the war with Japan is imminent, as on
26 July 1939 FDR gave notice of abrogation of the 1911 Treaty of Commerce
with Japan, which lapsed on 26 January 1940. The abrogation of this
treaty meant that the U.S. was serious about the implementation of the
embargo of aircraft, aircraft spare parts, av gas, oil, scrap iron, and
raw steel. When Japan signed the Tri Partite Pact with Germany and Italy
in 1940 and the U.S. had gotten into a shooting war in the Atlantic in
1941 (Reuben James, Greer Incident, etc.), it was a given that Japan and
the U.S. would be at war in the Pacific. And when the Americans froze
all Japanese assets in the U.S. on 26 July 1941 the possibility of war
with Japan was sealed. As FDR was determined that Japan was going to
fire the first shot and so be the "heavy" in the history books, where do
the Japanese hit U.S. forces?
The Japanese probably would have hit the Philippines first, as Clark
Field and the Cavite naval base would have been American military targets
of opportunity (as they turned out to be anyway). Perhaps the Japanese
would have hoped the attack in the Philippines would lure the Pacific
fleet out of San Diego and into an ambush, as the Americans did with the
IJN at Midway. The Japanese would have invaded the Philippines anyway,
as they needed the raw materials from that area. Thus MacArthur is still
going to lose the Philippines as FDR and the Joint Chiefs are still in
the "Europe First" mode.
The question therefore, as I see it, is the American fleet responding to
the South Pacific area in response to the attack on the Philippines going
to lose any of the carriers? And what about the BB's? Pearl Harbor, as
we all know, defined the role of the carrier in relation to the BB's
early on in the war when the Japanese were unsuccessful in catching the
carriers at Pearl. If the carriers are hit by the Japanese off Samoa (or
wherever the Japanese set up the ambush), what role do the BB's play
between late December 1941 through to the point where the production of
the fleet and jeep carriers are in sufficient numbers to counter the IJN
in the Pacific?
Tim Watkins
"Whether you think you can, or whether you think you can't, you're
right!"
- Henry Ford
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Lawrence Dillard
dbja...@toronto.cbc.ca wrote in message
<370cf89f...@news.curie.dialix.com.au>...
>
>In the late 30's, as I understand it, FDR ordered the US Pacific Fleet
>moved TO Pearl Harbor, FROM San Diego ... against the wishes of the
by FDR in the wake of an audience with FDR, blunty stated that those in the
profesional ranks of the USN had doubts about the wisdom of the civilian
leadership in basing the US fleet at Pearl Harbor.
This was the wrong thing to say to FDR. FDR had strong personal feelings
abot the USN and also was qu9ite convinced of his own perspicacity when it
came to military as well as political developments.
FDR told Richardson that he *knew* thatthe basing of the fleet at PH was
having a deterrent effect on the Japanese. Richardson, upon hearing this,
was astounded. As a naval professional, he *knew* that such simply could not
be true.
Richardson was correct, in this instance. Richardson knew that the fleet,
as constituted, did not have the necesary tankers and other support ships
for mounting an advance across the pacific, which had been envisioned in
pre-war US contingency plans in case war came.
>From intelligence sources, Richardson knew that the Japanese, operating from
their consulate, had scouted the USN's PH force structure and had taken
note of its offensive deficiencies.
Richardson was also aware that at the time, the primary USN preocupation was
with the Atlantic Ocean, and that detachments of forces were progressively
weakening PH as a bastion or fortress.
Consequently, he understood something Roosevelt would not: the US fleet at
PH was neither a threat to the flank of a Japanese attack in the western
Pacific, nor a deterrent to their planning or activities, because it lacked
the proper force structure for the former and lacked the strength for the
latter.
The Japanese had decided in July, 1940, to move south. This, of course,
meant going to war, and by Nov. 15, 1940, the IJN had issued a comprehensive
order for mobilization.
Their intial planning for dealing with US intervention called for submarine
and night destroyer attacks to attrit the USN as it steamed across the
Pacific in relief of the Philippines, prior to a climactic great surface
battle which the undiminished IJN would trounce the USN. Such planning was
in response to Japanese observation of USN maneuvers in the Pacific for many
years.
Two flies, however, entered the ointment, however.
On the US side, the introduction of the promising B-17 long-range bomber
caused US strategists to entertain the notion of a forward defense; instead
of writing off the Philippines initially in case war came, now the
Philippines would be massively reinforced, led by stationing of B-17s there.
Any Japanese attack would thereafter not be a formal walkover, it was
thought.
On the Japanese side, an air-minded admiral, Yamamoto Isoroku, became C-in-C
of the Combined Fleet. Beginning in March and April of 1940, he began
bruiting about an alternative proposal for conduct of operations: strike PH
at the outset of hostilities. By December, 1940, in the wake of the British
strike aganst the Italian fleet anchored in Taranto harbor, he was convinced
that his strategy was better than the traditional approach, and used his
prestige and threats to resign in order to get his way on the matter.
The US became aware of Japan's preparations for an advance South, and
although warned time and again that the Japanese had Pearl Harbor on their
minds as the instrument of initiating hostilities in the event of war,
concentrated its attention on the Western Pacific. Probably, the knowledge
that the Japanese had assessed the placement of the fleet at PH as not being
a real threat to their ambitions caused Washington not to be overly
concerned about the likelihood of a surprise attack there.
Japan started the war before US plans for redeployment forward were
finished. Roosevelt had not prognosticated accurately, as the PH deployment
of the fleet was not in fact a deterrent to the Japanese. Instead, the fleet
became a sitting and inviting target for a navy which felt its advance to
the South threatened by its placement there, in spite of it clearly being no
threat.
Richardson was no loudmouth, and although hurt by his early relief, behaved
in a restrained and professional manner. But perhaps he was lucky not to
have been in command at PH. His treatment in its aftermath might have been
no better than Kimmel's.
Thanks for your post.
Tim Watkins
> What would Japan have done if the fleet had never moved to Pearl,
> assuming that the same political circumstances existed 7 Dec 1941?
I believe the Japanese go ahead and attack the Americans even though the
Pacific fleet is not in Hawaiian waters. The Japanese invasion of China
and the sinking of the Panay in December of 1937 had worsened relations
between the U.S. and Japan. Thus war with Japan looms as a real
possibility, as on 26 July 1939 FDR gave notice of abrogation of the 1911
Treaty of Commerce with Japan, which lapsed on 26 January 1940. The
abrogation of this treaty meant that the U.S. was serious about the
implementation of the embargo of aircraft, aircraft engines and spare
parts, av gas, oil, scrap iron, and raw steel. When Japan signed the Tri
Partite Pact with Germany and Italy in 1940 and the U.S. had gotten into
a shooting war in the Atlantic with Germany in 1941 (Reuben James, Greer
Incident, etc.), it was a given that Japan and the U.S. would be at war
in the Pacific. And when the Americans froze all Japanese assets in the
U.S. on 26 July 1941 the possibility of war with Japan was sealed. As
FDR was determined that Japan was going to fire the first shot and so be
the "heavy" in the history books, where do the Japanese hit U.S. forces?
The Japanese probably would have hit the Philippines first, as Clark
Field and the Cavite naval base would have been American military targets
of opportunity (as they turned out to be anyway). Perhaps the Japanese
would have hoped the attack in the Philippines would lure the Pacific
fleet out of San Diego and into an ambush, as the Americans did with the
IJN at Midway. The Japanese would have invaded the Philippines anyway,
as they needed the raw materials from that area. Thus MacArthur is still
going to lose the Philippines as FDR and the Joint Chiefs are still in
the "Europe First" mode.
The question therefore, as I see it, is the American fleet responding to
the South Pacific area in response to the attack on the Philippines going
to lose any of the carriers? And what about the BB's? Pearl Harbor, as
we all know, defined the role of the carrier in relation to the BB's
early on in the war when the Japanese were unsuccessful in catching the
carriers at Pearl. If the carriers are hit by the Japanese off Samoa (or
wherever the Japanese set up the ambush), what role to the BB's play
between late December 1941through to the point where the production of
Drazen Kramaric
wrote:
>The only reason I can see is the necessity to pass the Philippines
>to get to Indonesian oil. Bypassing the Philippines are not an
>option. It would leave their flank open to attack.
Attack by what? Given the miniscule US Asiatic fleet and insufficient
anti-shipping air force, Japanese could easily ignore US forces at
Philippines and captured Ducth East Indies with ease. The bulk of
Imperial Navy could stay in readyiness in case US Pacific Fleet would
have sortied from Pearl Harbor. Both navies prepared themselves for
just such a conflict and both navies were aware of inherent advantage
Japanese navy would enjoyed.
Not to mention that I can't imagine senator from Oklahoma voting for
war to retrieve Celebes for Dutch.
Drax
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