Where was Patton during Market Garden ?
Musicman59
Craig
Bill Shatzer
> Were there ever plans to use him in the offensive?
Patton's Third Army was out of gas and out of supplies on the Moselle,
better than 200 kilometers from Arnhem.
Except possibly for spoiling or diversionary attacks on its immediate
front, there's no way the Third Army could have participated in Market
Garden.
Michael Emrys
> Were there ever plans to use him in the offensive?
How? It was a wholly British show except for the two US airborne
divisions, and Patton was no paratrooper.
Michael
Rich Rostrom
> Musicman59 wrote:
> > Were there ever plans to use him in the offensive?
>
> Patton's Third Army was out of gas and out of supplies on the Moselle,
> better than 200 kilometers from Arnhem.
The location is correct, but the condition
is wrong. By late September, supply had
caught up with Third Army's front, and
Third Army was fighting vigorously. XII Corps
took Nancy on 15 September, and was some
15 km east of the Moselle by 17 September,
when MARKET-GARDEN began.
XX Corps started attacking around Metz
(which is on the Moselle further north)
on September 4. Metz of course held out
until November.
This is not to say that Third Army was not
_short_ of fuel and supplies, but they were
not _out_ of either.
Alex Potter
> How? It was a wholly British show except for the two US airborne
> divisions, and Patton was no paratrooper.
Don't forget the Poles.
--
Regards
Alex
Don Phillipson
> Were there ever plans to use him in the offensive?
> > How? It was a wholly British show except for the two US airborne
> > divisions, and Patton was no paratrooper.
"Alex Potter" <spa...@ap-consulting.co.uk> wrote in message
news:pan.2009.04...@ap-consulting.co.uk...
> Don't forget the Poles.
This obscures the point -- that the Polish division was
already under the command of Montgomery's Army
Group while Patton commanded a different Army
(under Bradley so that Patton ranked formally below
Montgomery in the pyramid under SHAEF.) Market
Garden was proposed, planned and executed by
Montgomery's command, borrowing US paratroops
with Bradley's agreement.
1. Montgomery's command asked for no more
outside assistance than the paratroops (whose
commander Gavin had yet to see action, and was
anxious to do so.)
2. Assigning unasked help by the commander of
another army in another sector would have been
a spectacular breach of army etiquette (and would
possibly have proked Patton to mutiny besides.)
It was as unthinkable as any other crazy idea of
the time (and there were a few . . . )
--
Don Phillipson
Carlsbad Springs
(Ottawa, Canada)
Alex Potter
> This obscures the point -- that the Polish division was already under
> the command of Montgomery's Army Group while Patton commanded a
> different Army
That was not my intention, and I'm sorry that you felt it did.
I was responding to the previous poster's assertion that it was a "wholly
British" show, excepting the American divisions.
I am conversant with the facts of Market Garden, and did not want the
Polish contribution to be glossed-over.
Michael Emrys
> Michael Emrys wrote in <jyF_QB.A....@sol01.ashbva.gweep.ca> :
>
>> How? It was a wholly British show except for the two US airborne
>> divisions, and Patton was no paratrooper.
>
> Don't forget the Poles.
I didn't. They were subordinated to the British Army at the time and
effectively part of it, else I should have mentioned them.
Michael
The Horny Goat
wrote:
Not to mention the political repercussions if Patton WERE to be in
command of Garden and failed to be able to relieve First Airborne at
Arnhem. (Or for that matter if one of the American divisions had been
at Arnhem and XXX Corps fails to get there)
What I've read suggests 82 Abn had better anti-tank weapons than First
Airborne and thus WOULD have defended Arnhem for longer but again, the
political consequences of British troops failing to relieve American
paratroopers would have been incalculable.
Stephen Graham
> What I've read suggests 82 Abn had better anti-tank weapons than First
> Airborne and thus WOULD have defended Arnhem for longer but again, the
> political consequences of British troops failing to relieve American
> paratroopers would have been incalculable.
By TO&E the British Airborne divisions had more anti-tank assets than
the US divisions. 1st Airborne was actually above organization by three
batteries of anti-tank guns for the Arnhem drop, and had four batteries
of 17-pounders.
Whatever you read was wrong.
David H Thornley
> Montgomery in the pyramid under SHAEF.) Market
> Garden was proposed, planned and executed by
> Montgomery's command, borrowing US paratroops
> with Bradley's agreement.
>
if memory serves the airborne divisions were in the First
Allied Airborne Army, directly under Eisenhower. Montgomery
was not involved in the airborne planning (and if he had
I suspect it would have been better done).
--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion, ask.
da...@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-
The Horny Goat
wrote:
>On 2009-04-03 11:33:47 -0700, Alex Potter <spa...@ap-consulting.co.uk> said:
Stupid question perhaps, but were British 17th Airborne and 1st
Canadian Airborne Brigade (both of whom had been involved in Normandy)
available for service at the time?
>From my reading they were not as capable as the two American divisions
at least so far as anti-tank weapons is concerned; was it simply a
matter of airlifting enough troops or were they just plain not ready?
As a Canadian I tend to be somewhat chauvinistic about our troops, but
I have to say that the failure to secure the Antwerp approaches hurt
the Allied cause at least as much as the failure of Market-Garden.
Logistically the Allies are SO much better off shipping supplies
through Antwerp rather than Cherbourg and lesser ports that it's not
funny. (I accept the thesis advanced by General Rohmer that the
failure at Falaise was predominantly British and Montgomery
specifically)
I suspect 1 Cdn Abn Bde wasn't ready in time for Market-Garden but
have not found a reference - certainly not in Cornelius Ryan's book
that's for sure!
Stephen Graham
> Stupid question perhaps, but were British 17th Airborne and 1st
> Canadian Airborne Brigade (both of whom had been involved in Normandy)
> available for service at the time?
The US 17th Airborne Division was in the UK at the time, having arrived
on 25 August 1944. The British 6th Airborne Division, which included 1st
Canadian Parachute Battalion, had just been withdrawn from combat.
Neither were considered for use in Market-Garden due to lift restrictions.
Musicman59
To clarify - I did not expect Patton's Army to participate, but rather
did the powers that be consider asking Patton for his input on Market
Garden? I'm sure he would have a few colorful metaphors to offer....
Craig
Bill Shatzer
> Stupid question perhaps, but were British 17th Airborne and 1st
> Canadian Airborne Brigade (both of whom had been involved in Normandy)
> available for service at the time?
Was there ever a Canadian Airborne -Brigade-?
I'm aware only of the 1st Canadian Parachute -Battalion- which was part
of the (British) 6th Airborne Division.
SFAIK, the Canadian Airborne forces never reached Brigade strength.
Stephen Graham
> Was there ever a Canadian Airborne -Brigade-?
>
> I'm aware only of the 1st Canadian Parachute -Battalion- which was part
> of the (British) 6th Airborne Division.
>
> SFAIK, the Canadian Airborne forces never reached Brigade strength.
That's correct. Only the 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion served in
World War Two. The name 2d Canadian Parachute Battalion was used for
deception purposes to refer to the Canadian contingent of the 1st
Special Service Force.
David H Thornley
>
> To clarify - I did not expect Patton's Army to participate, but rather
> did the powers that be consider asking Patton for his input on Market
> Garden? I'm sure he would have a few colorful metaphors to offer....
>
they were not part of, and Patton was considered by his superiors to be
excellent at doing things and not so good at planning them.
I don't know what he would have done about the armored drive, but I
don't know that he would have felt able to say "No, this just isn't
going to work."
John Anderton
I've seen a few similar comments(82nd more powerful than 1st Abn +
Poles) in the past and they usually boil down to a misunderstanding
about transport allocations.
The US divisions were allocated more transport assets than 1st
Airborne and therefore managed to get troops and equipment on the
ground faster than the Brits did.
Some people therefore assume that if 82nd has dropped on Arnhem, they
would have done better without realising that the transport was
allocated along geographical/mission lines and therefore 82nd dropping
on Arnhem would have less troops on the ground in the early stages
than 82nd dropping on Nijimegen.
It's possible that Horny Goat's source just added up the 82nd AT
assets on the ground at a certain point in time and found they were
greater than 1st Airborne's at that point in time.
(I haven't got the books to hand to check but I assume (17 pdrs aside)
that both divisions used exactly the same AT gun (6 pdr/57mm M1) ?)
Cheers,
John
John Anderton
wrote:
>To clarify - I did not expect Patton's Army to participate, but rather
>did the powers that be consider asking Patton for his input on Market
>Garden?
No, there was no reason they would. Patton was commanding an Army in
contact with the enemy, as far as his superiors were concerned, that
was where his focus should be, not on some plan being put together by
an allied Army Group commander hundreds of miles away.
The only people who might theoretically have asked for his input were
Montgomery or Eisenhower. Montgomery wasn't going to do that unless
Satan was skating on his favourite lava pool and I doubt Eisenhower
saw any need to royally upset one of his Army Group commanders by
asking a more junior officer to make comments that were absolutely
certain to be negative (for political rather than practical reasons)
> I'm sure he would have a few colorful metaphors to offer....
Like what ? The plan, in itself, was right up Patton's street, a
narrow thrust deep into the enemy's rear.
He would have (and, he did) bitched like crazy that the resources for
Market Garden would be better spent on getting 3rd Army to Berlin but
his plan for doing that also involved a narrow thrust (and might have
run into the same problems as Market Garden).
If Patton (or a Patton-like General) had been involved in Market
Garden it could have ended in a number of ground divisions getting
over the Rhine at Arnhem. Whether they would have been in a position
to turn East and move into Germany or been cut off and wiped out after
they ran out of fuel and ammunition is a matter of conjecture.
Market Garden's main problems were transport and logistics, things
that Patton was not all that good at (Any General who tolerates (or
encourages, depending on who you believe) his troops stealing fuel
destined for other commands, reduces overall supply by allowing troops
to take fuel needed by supply trucks to get back to the depots,
lies[1] about his fuel levels to get more fuel and runs his Army out
of fuel in an attempt to blackmail his superiors into giving him even
more deserves more criticism than Patton got, IMO.)
Cheers,
John
[1] Or is "economical with the truth", to use the modern term. When
asked for his fuel status he omitted captured fuel from his returns,
making it look like he had less than he did.
Joe Osman
of his African command early to help with the planning for Sicily.
Joe
Stephen Graham
> It's possible that Horny Goat's source just added up the 82nd AT
> assets on the ground at a certain point in time and found they were
> greater than 1st Airborne's at that point in time.
The oddity is that the 82d actually had fewer AT assets on the ground
throughout. US Airborne divisions had a lower allocation overall, as I
mentioned. But while more troops were landed for the 82d on the 1st day,
they only included one AT battery of eight guns. Meanwhile, the
British landed 32 guns on the 1st day. The second day saw another eight
guns landed in the US zone and 28 in the British.
The US glider infantry in the 82d zone came in very late, D+6 if I'm
correct.
> (I haven't got the books to hand to check but I assume (17 pdrs aside)
> that both divisions used exactly the same AT gun (6 pdr/57mm M1) ?)
That's my understanding.
JJR
> > (I haven't got the books to hand to check but I assume (17 pdrs aside)
> > that both divisions used exactly the same AT gun (6 pdr/57mm M1) ?)
>
> That's my understanding.
Still it looks loke in urban warfare around Arnhem bridge the PIAT's/bazookas would be of much better use.
--
pzdr,
Jedrzej
"Win with ability, not with numbers"
- Field Marshal Prince Aleksandr V. Suvorov
Michael Emrys
> Still it looks loke in urban warfare around Arnhem bridge the
> PIAT's/bazookas would be of much better use.
But in defending the DZ the 6 pdr and 17 pdr would be more useful, and
as far as the planners knew, defending the DZ was a critical part of
the operation.
Michael
a425couple
> Bill Shatzer <ww...@NOcornell.edu> wrote:
>> Patton's Third Army was out of gas and out of supplies on the Moselle,
>> better than 200 kilometers from Arnhem.
> Garden? I'm sure he would have a few colorful metaphors to offer....
That reminds me of one of Patton's metaphors.
At the club recently, I decided to give just a bit
of return friendly grief to a friend born and raised
in France (but served in US Army).
I read to him a passage out of Charles Sasser's
"Patton's Panthers, The African-American 761st Tank Bn."
Patton and hes troops were slogging it out in the fall rains
down by Nice, and Patton wrote to the US Sec. of State,
"I hope that in the final settlement of the war you insist
that the Germans retain Lorraine, because I can imagine
no greater burden than to be the owner of this nasty
country where it rains every day and where the whole
wealth of the people consists in assorted manure piles."
(We note, Patton was not in line to be considered
ambassador to France, , , . Friend said Lorraine
is not that bad.)
Or, in his pre combat pep talk with the 761st,
"There is one thing you men will be able to say when
you go home. You may all thank God that 30 years
from now when you are sitting with your grandson on
your knees and he asks, 'Grandfather, what did you
do in WWII?", you won't have to say, 'I shoveled
shit in Mississippi.' "