Eisenhower's Lieutenants
WILLIAM KRIS HUBBLE
officers
in the ETO and MTO. How about some discussion where you may agree or
disagree with his rankings.
This memo was found in Vol.4 of The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower
and is
included verbatim.
The order of the listing hereon is based primarily upon my conclusions
as to
value of servcies each officer has rendered in this war and only
secondarily
upon my opinion as to his qualifications for future usefulness.
Position
occupied and opportunity have inescapably played a certain part in
determining my priorities but where, for example, a Corps C.G. has
performed
magnificently as opposed to only good performance by an Army
Commander, then
the former is rated higher.
Name Present Position
Outstanding Characteristics
or Qualifications
1&2 (Bradley) AG Commander
Quiet
but magnetic leader; able,
( )
rounded field commander;
( )equal
determined and resourceful;
( )
modest
(Spaatz ) Air Commander
Experienced and able air
commander; loyal and
cooperative; modest and
selfless. Always reliable.
3 Smith Chief of Staff
Outstanding as C/S of
Superior Hqs. Firm, loyal,
Highly intelligent.
4 Patton Army Commander
Dashing fighter, shrewd,
courageous.
5 Clark AG Commander
Clever, shrewd, capable;
splendid organizer.
6 Truscott Army Commander
Experienced, balanced
fighter; energetic; inspires
confidence.
7 Doolittle Air Force Commander
Dashing, learns rapidly,
enthusiastic.
8 Gerow Corps Commander
Good fighter, balanced,
calm, excellent planner,
always optimistic, selfless,
a leader.
9 Collins Corps Commander
Particularly fine C.G. in a
battle; energetic, always
optimistic, a leader.
10 Patch Army Commander
Cool fighter, balanced,
energetic.
11 Hodges Army Commander
Sound, able, experienced.
12 Simpson Army Commander
Clear thinker, energetic,
balanced.
13 Eaker Air Commander, Med
Cooperative, firm,
experienced.
14 Bull G-3, SHAEF
(Div C.G. for 10 days)
Good judgment, careful,
energetic.
15 Cannon Air Force Commander
Particularly experienced
in ground support; an
outstanding officer.
16 Ridgway Corps Commander )
Magnetic; courageous;
) balanced corps
17
) commanders; both
) fighters.
18 Walker Corps Commander
Top flight Corps C.G.,
fighter, cool.
19 Lee Com Zone Commander
A commander rather
than a supply type;
extremely loyal,
energetic, tireless.
Places too much value
on "Engineer" label.
20 Gruenther Chief of Staff to Clark.
Brainy; energetic; loyal.
21 Vandenberg Air Force Commander
Studious but active:
cooperative; good
judgment.
22 Haislip Corps Commander
Fine Corps C.G., fighter,
cool.
23 Quesada Air Tactical Commander
A
dashing, cooperative
leader.
24 Devers AG Commander
Enthusiastic but often
inaccurate in statements
and evaluations; loyal and
energetic.
NOTE: The proper position of this officer is not yet fully
determined in
my own mind. The over-all results he and his organization produce are
generally good, sometimes outstanding. But he has not, so far,
produced
among the seniors ofthe American organization here that feeling of
trust and
confidence that is so necessary to continued success.
25 Eddy Corps Commander
Excellent fighter;
experienced.
26 Rooks G-3 Med
(Div C.G. for 1 month)
Sound planner; good
judgment; loyal.
27 Crawford G-4 SHAEF
Experienced in larger
phases of supply
organization; loyal and
energetic.
28 Larkin C.G. SOS in Africa
Able, experienced,
C.G. SOLOC, France
energetic.
29 Weyland Air Tactical Commander
Excellent leader,
experienced in air-
ground operations.
30 Norstad Air Operations Officer
Sound, able, sensible,
loyal, tireless.
31 Allen, L. Chief of Staff, AG
Fine C/S; cool, loyal,
calm.
32 McLain Corps Commander
Shrewd, courageous,
experienced.
33 Littlejohn Quartermaster, ETO
Best QM I know.
34 Anderson, Fred Air, Deputy to Spaatz
Brainy, cooperative,
experienced.
35 Huebner Division Commander
Outstanding divisional
36 Harmon, E.
leaders; experienced
37 Van Fleet, J. A.
fighters. (All now
commanding Corps or
soon to be so assigned.
38 Nugent Air Tactical Commander
Young, cooperative,
experienced in ground-
air operations;
energetic.
casitaman
> The order of the listing hereon is based primarily upon my conclusions
> as to value of servcies each officer has rendered in this war
> Experienced and able air commander; loyal and
> cooperative; modest and selfless. Always reliable.
That's nice. That's damning Spaatz with faint praise.
In Feb 1944 America's senior airman Gen "Tooey" Spaatz said at a
meeting that "he feared the Allied air forces might be batting their head
against a stone wall in the Overlord operation...the proposed cross-Channel
operation is highly dangerous and the outcome extremly uncertain. A failure
of
Overlord will have repercussions which may well undo all the effects
of the stragegic bombing effort to date. If I were directing the overall
strageic operations , I would go to Norway, where we have a much greater
chance
of ground force sucess, and where I believe Sweden would come in with us.
Why undertake a highly dubious operation in a hurry when there is a surer
way to do it?"
Ref: http://www.kcl.ac.uk/lhcma/info/lec94.htm
In 1964 President Eisenhower wrote to Bomber Harris: "No historian will ever
know the depth of my obligation to you."
On 1 Mar 1944 the Soviet Union awarded the Order of Suverov - First Degree
to Bomber Harris. Not to Gen Spaatz or any other Anglo-American commander.
Spaatz hardly inspired confidence in Winston Churchill. "Churchill thought
the outspoken Spaatz a stupid and dangerous man and had little faith in him
as a replacement for Tedder. ...'..it will be a question of finding someone
good to sustain him.' ' I am relived Spaatz is to command no more than the
American long range bombers.'
"Decision in Normandy" by Carlos D'Este. If ones reads the authours notes on
Harris and Spaatz, Harris comes out the obvious superior.
casitaman
> The order of the listing hereon is based primarily upon my conclusions
> as to value of servcies each officer has rendered in this war
> Experienced and able air commander; loyal and
> cooperative; modest and selfless. Always reliable.
That's nice. That's damning Spaatz with faint praise.
WalterM140
Did I miss something or was Spaatz the only one on the list besides Bradley
that received 5 stars?
Walt
--
casita
> Did I miss something or was Spaatz the only one on the list besides
Bradley
> that received 5 stars?
Air power was critical to Gen Eisenhower. Gen Spaatz was his senior
American
airman.
Ike wanted French railroads bombed. The British were concerned about
french
"Collateral Damage" and Gen Spaatz wanted his Oil Targets. Ike was
ready to
call it quits. The rail yards were taken out and Normandy was isolated
like
an island. French civilian deaths were kept to a minimum. everyone was
pleased, except the Germans. You can thank Bomber Command for that.
http://www.afa.org/magazine/0100ike.html
It has also been pointed out that Gen Spaatz was slow to grasp the
importance of fighter escort for day bombing.
It is also a fact that in 1945 Gen Spaatz firebombed the centre of
Berlin,
which "were largely indistinguishable from the area attacks of Bomber
Command."
http://www.spaatz.org/gen/spaatzbio.html
Andrew Clark
"casita" <cas...@home.com> wrote
> The rail yards were taken out and Normandy was isolated
> like an island.
Normandy was not "isolated" by Allied air power. The movement of
German reserves and supplies from northern France was delayed and
slightly diminished by Allied airpower, but no more.
Of far more operational significance to the early campaign in
Normandy was German preconceptions about the likelihood of a Pas
du Calais attack, Fortitude's exacerbation of those
preconceptions, the Army's cumbersome command structure, the
absence of key commanders on D-Day and lastly but not least
Hitler's own impact on decision-making.
Lawrence Dillard
"WILLIAM KRIS HUBBLE" <KRIS...@prodigy.net> wrote in message
news:3b42c69d...@news.pacific.net.au...
> On Feb 1, 1945, Eisenhower wrote a memo ranking many of the senior
> officers
> in the ETO and MTO. How about some discussion where you may agree or
> disagree with his rankings.
>
> The order of the listing hereon is based primarily upon my conclusions
> as to
> value of servcies each officer has rendered in this war and only
> secondarily
> upon my opinion as to his qualifications for future usefulness.
> Position
> occupied and opportunity have inescapably played a certain part in
> determining my priorities but where, for example, a Corps C.G. has
> performed
> magnificently as opposed to only good performance by an Army
> Commander, then
> the former is rated higher.
>
> 4 Patton Army Commander
> Dashing fighter, shrewd, courageous. energetic.
This ranking of Patton reflects, IMO, certain political considerations and
constraints. Gen Patton had disgraced himself with the slapping incidents in
Sicily. Yet he was considered virtually indispensable for operations in nw
Europe because he was the only known quantity among US commanders in terms
of mechanized/armored operations, and his leadership undoubtedly would be
needed.
Hence Patton was simultaneously an asset and an embarrassment. Perhaps as a
consequence, Ike negelected to acknowledge Patton's accomplishments, all of
which greatly aided Ike's crusade, until the very end of hostilities. In
the meantime, beginning in N Africa (even before the Sicily embarrassment),
Ike had kept Patton under wraps, holdiing him away from combat in N Africa
until such could no longer be avoided. A debacle had occurred in the
Kasserine, revealing several shortcomings in the US command; Patton was
finally brought in to revive four wavering US divisions and to plan for
successful battles which eventuated shortly around El Guettar. Then without
receiving a deserved promotion to three stars, Patton was ordered to return
to work on the Sicily invasion.
In doing so, Ike had to admit that his concept of interallied cooperation
had been somewhat flawed. Ike had had to concede to Patton that US forces
must fight as integral units, rather than being placed at the disposal of
Allied commanders and spread about in mutually-unsupportable penny-packets.
And it was due primarily to Patton's badgering that Ike at length concluded
that the US forces for the Sicily operation would go forth under the
designation of 7th Army.
Gen Patton had hurt Ike's feelings (although Ike would never admit this) on
several occasions in N Africa by disputing Ike's assessments of his
abilities as a planner, indiscretely reminding Ike of his success at
Operation TORCH in rebuttal, and by frequently squashing with apt criticism
many a "brainstorm" Ike had had about proposed operations there. Ike even
wrote Patton a letter chastising him for being so quick to spot the flaws in
(IMO addle-pated) ideas for operations; whereas Patton believed he was
merely loyally indicating the tactical or logistic impracticability of such
plans, based on his own experiences and study of the terrain and the enemy.
Except for FDR's and Gen Marshall's expressed support for Gen Patton, Ike
might have used the slapping incidents to send Patton home.
In nw Europe, Ike and Gen Bradley were both nervous about and distrustful of
Patton, perhaps because both realized that Patton was far better than either
at seeing the nw European battlefield in totality, and was less risk-averse
than either. In both France (in both August and October) Ike brought Patton
to a standstill, prevented him from taking Paris, (going to the extent of
re-assigning French forces from him to Gen Hodges, and directing the thrust
of 3d Army away from that city), and later in Germany restrained him for
less than admirable reasons.
Ike and Bradley clearly were jealous of Patton's ability to garner headlines
(which are essentially meaningless in war) and often sought to minimize his
impact on the press by preventing him from attacking in timely fashion, when
3d Army was ready to go forward, ordering him, for example, to wait until
other, less-ready formations were at length prepared, "so we can all jump
off together", thus smothering Patton's army's achievements amongst the
activities of the others and assuring that other units got some publicity.
Ike once jokingly remarked to Patton that whenever he got a promotion (prior
to Kasserine and prior to the Ardennes), he got attacked. Patton, again
indiscreetly, replied approximately, "And whenever you do, I bail you out."
In any event. I think is is arguable that Gen Eisenhower's rating Gen
Bradley ahead of Gen Patton, even if Bradley was an AG commander and Patton
but an army commander, was not clearly justified.
--
pump...@home.com
>
>
>"WILLIAM KRIS HUBBLE" <KRIS...@prodigy.net> wrote in message
>news:3b42c69d...@news.pacific.net.au...
>> On Feb 1, 1945, Eisenhower wrote a memo ranking many of the senior
>> officers
>> in the ETO and MTO. How about some discussion where you may agree or
>> disagree with his rankings.
>>SNIP
>> Dashing fighter, shrewd, courageous. energetic.
>
>This ranking of Patton reflects, IMO, certain political considerations and
>constraints. Gen Patton had disgraced himself with the slapping incidents in
>Sicily.
In the somewhat rarefied air inhabited by senior commanders, purely
military
considerations begin to blur into political considerations. Clauswitz
remarked
upon this when he said (poorly translated), "war is politics carried
out by
other means." Patton's outspoken nature worked against him at the most
senior
levels of command. Inter-Allied harmony was one of the most important
war
fighting assets of the Allies. Patton's feuds with Montgomery
certainly did
little to help US/UK relationships, but the US/UK relationship was
strong enough
to withstand them. Patton's antipathy for the USSR did little to
foster
closeness in a more delicate relationship with an ally. The slapping
incident
was a political liability in a purely US context.
IMHO, Patton's rating reflects both his great talents and his great
liabilities.
His talents allowed him to rise to such a level as Army Group
commander. His
liabilities were his lack of political sense that hampered his ability
to
perform at the highest levels. Patton is said to admire Julius Ceasar.
Julius
Ceasar was not just a military genius, he was a political genius (that
Ides of
March thing aside). For the military commanders in history whom we
would all
rank among the greats, I think we could all agree that they had
political as
well as military acumen. Patton's lack of political sense, IMHO, (and
Ike's
also, it would seem), leaves him out of the rank of top miltary
commanders.
>Hence Patton was simultaneously an asset and an embarrassment.
I agree wholeheartedly.
WILLIAM KRIS HUBBLE
unknown among U.S. Generals in WWII. Almost every army group and army
commander (as well as many corps and division commanders) have an
autobiography or biography about him, except Devers. I can't recall
any
major screw-ups he made as an army group commander that would deserve
such a
ranking (#24) as Eisenhower gave him . He was more a Marshall man
than an
Eisenhower man. I think he deserves at least a
little better than he has received.