Von Paulus disobeys an order
Malcom "Mal" Reynolds
disobeys orders and withdraws as many
troops as he can from Stalingrad?
I'd imagine a public execution for him.
But if a significant portion of the
troops successfully withdraw how does
that affect future battles.
Rich Rostrom
bug...@invalid.invalid> wrote:
> What are the effects if Von Paulus...
The commander of Sixth Army was
Friedrich Paulus. Not _von_ Paulus;
like Rommel, Guderian, and Model,
he had no aristocratic background.
> disobeys orders and withdraws as many
> troops as he can from Stalingrad?
Sixth Army was in no condition to
break out of the Stalingrad pocket
and march over 100 km to the nearest
Axis position. During von Manstein's
attempted relief drive, there was
a window when Sixth Army might have
been able to link up.
However, it is unlikely that more
than a fraction of the forces
at Stalingrad could have been
evacuated.
It would have been a foot march
by exhausted and starving men
through the depths of the Russian
winter.
Louis C
> disobeys orders and withdraws as many
> troops as he can from Stalingrad?
When?
An immediate breakout as soon as the encirclement is complete - Nov 19
- means losing most of the heavy equipment (no prime movers, no
horses) and taking a fair amount of casualties. Infantry marching out
in the open without support from its own artillery, and with dwindling
armored support (fuel resupply being a problem) is going to lose a lot
of men. Paulus would be called a traitor and a coward by absolutely
everyone and executed. All the other generals would point to episodes
like Demyansk and Rzhev in which German troops had been encircled but
eventually managed to restore the situation. So this would be a case
of Paulus being deemed a coward for decades until maybe one
revisionist historian looking at logistics and strength returns would
argue his case...
Of course, given conflicting German hierarchies and a military
tradition of subordinates interpreting orders as they saw fit, the
odds are great that if Paulus had dared openly brave Hitler's explicit
order and order a general evacuation (leaving the wounded to the
tender mercies of the Soviets, etc) then he would have been
immediately declared a case of "broken nerves" and replaced by someone
with "a stronger backbone".
If Paulus broke out at the time of Manstein's relief attempt, then the
casualties would be just as horrific - practically no running vehicles
by that point - but some of the harder-boiled troops would probably
have made it, in conditions akin to Hube's running withdrawal in
Ukraine a year later. The plus side would have been less German
casualties: better to accept a 90% loss rate than the historical 100%
one. On the other hand, the evacuation would be no meaningful addition
to German combat power in the short term (some of the troops might
survive the way to Manstein's troops, but would certainly not be in a
condition to keep on fighting once there) while letting the Soviets
occupy Stalingrad early. This means the masses of Soviet infantry that
were historically tied up assaulting the city (and taking serious
casualties in the process) would now be free to move westward. More
importantly, Stalingrad itself was a major rail & communication hub so
the Soviets would be able to repair and use it sooner than
historically. This means Manstein would probably still be able to
prevent the Soviets from capturing Rostov early and encircling a whole
army group, but it would be a harder fight, and ditto with the later
famed "back hand blow".
The Wehrmacht was going to lose the bulk of the army, what it could
save was a small core of grizzled veterans. Certainly useful to have,
but probably far too few to prove decisive. These men would die later,
that's all.
LC
SolomonW
>> What are the effects if Von Paulus
>> disobeys orders and withdraws as many
>> troops as he can from Stalingrad?
>
> When?
Paulus only hope once the encirclement occurred would be in early December.
>
> An immediate breakout as soon as the encirclement is complete - Nov 19
> - means losing most of the heavy equipment (no prime movers, no
I doubt the heavy equipment loss was so important to the Germans. They had
about 100 tanks and about 2000 artillery guns.
> horses) and taking a fair amount of casualties. Infantry marching out
> in the open without support from its own artillery,
I am not sure at that stage the Soviet artillery was in position.
> and with dwindling
> armored support (fuel resupply being a problem)
Indeed.
The Germans on Paulus side had very little in tanks and as you say oil is
going to be a problem.
However Paulus had at that stage about 250,000 men and 10,000 trucks
together with Manstein they probably outnumbered the Russian forces of
about 150,000 men. The Germans might have pulled it off.
> is going to lose a lot of men.
The big problem was the cold weather, I would mored losses to frost bite
then anything else.
> Paulus would be called a traitor and a coward by absolutely
> everyone and executed.
Why it was unclear whether Manstein operation was a breakout or a relief
operation. Paulus could also have argued in December that he was ordered by
Manstein.
Also Hitler at that stage was not into shooting generals like Stalin.
> If Paulus broke out at the time of Manstein's relief attempt, then the
> casualties would be just as horrific
This I doubt. As it was the Germans lost 100%.
John Anderton
Badly. As Rich has mentioned, not many of the troops in the Stalingrad
pocket are going to make it back to the Axis lines but that's not the
worst of it.
The Soviets wanted to make absolutely certain that Sixth Army wouldn't
be able to break out so they put a lot of divisions around it. If
Sixth Army tried to break out it's men would be hunted down on the
steppes and those Soviet forces would be free to push on towards
Rostov and there wasn't a whole lot of Axis forces available to stop
them.
There *were* a lot of Axis forces in the Caucasus though and once
Rostov falls they would be cut off too. They would have taken serious
losses extricating themselves.
The sacrifice of Sixth Army saved a lot of men in Army Group A.
All of the above assumes your original question refers to withdrawing
men *after* Sixth Army was surrounded. There is a view that Paulus was
badly negligent in not withdrawing enough troops from the frontline to
act as a "fire brigade" in the days *before* the Soviet offensive
struck. He received reports that an attack was about to occur but
seems to have decided that, since Sixth Army wasn't responsible for
the threatened sectors, he didn't need to worry about it.
There were enough mobile troops available to Paulus to have a decent
chance of stopping the encirclement if they were in the right place on
19th Nov, i.e. in reserve behind the frontline rather than slogging
through the streets of Stalingrad.
Cheers,
John
David H Thornley
> What are the effects if Von Paulus
> disobeys orders and withdraws as many
> troops as he can from Stalingrad?
>
of a siege over a strained communications line, meaning that
it had pretty much sacrificed mobility. Sixth Army did launch
a counterstroke to the encirclement, but it was pitifully weak.
A breakout attempt would be even less impressive, except for
men marching on their feet.
Any attempt to break out would have been by infantry on foot,
with few weapons heavier than they could carry. That means
very poor defense against the Soviet armored forces.
I don't know what the physical condition of the men was at
the time of the breakout, but it went down during the battle.
One of the reasons so few of the prisoners survived is that they
were in very bad shape when they surrendered. Marching a long
way in winter with inadequate food is quite dangerous.
Few men would have reached German lines, and since they'd be much
easier to deal with outside the city it would increase available
Soviet forces without increasing the German.
--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion, ask.
da...@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-
Louis C
> > When?
>
> Paulus only hope once the encirclement occurred would be in early December.
So you say.
Others have declared an immediate breakout would have had better
prospects. I'm not sure either way, so I discussed both possibilities.
> > An immediate breakout as soon as the encirclement is complete - Nov 19
> > - means losing most of the heavy equipment (no prime movers, no
>
> I doubt the heavy equipment loss was so important to the Germans. They had
> about 100 tanks and about 2000 artillery guns.
The problem isn't the equipment loss per se, but the fact that leaving
it all behind (for lack of transport) will mean the infantry will be
poorly supplied and unsupported, not to mention the effect on morale.
> > horses) and taking a fair amount of casualties. Infantry marching out
> > in the open without support from its own artillery,
>
> I am not sure at that stage the Soviet artillery was in position.
The area west of Stalingrad was encircled by mobile Soviet forces.
That means a few guns, tanks and armored cars. Infantry walking out
with whatever it could carry (including food etc) would have a serious
problem dealing with them.
That's why I mentioned the problem as being (German) infantry in the
open without support from ITS OWN (i.e. German again) artillery. Like
all armies, the Germans needed artillery to provide the bulk of the
combat power for their infantry.
> However Paulus had at that stage about 250,000 men and 10,000 trucks
> together with Manstein they probably outnumbered the Russian forces of
> about 150,000 men. The Germans might have pulled it off.
250,000 men, including wounded and those only fit enough to hold their
positions in their trenches, don't pack much combat power when they're
not dug in (as they historically were) or supported by heavy weapons
(ditto). Add a day or so of debilitating cold, walking across the
steppe, and many of them would simply die of exposure or be run down
by Soviet forces. Manstein packed a more serious punch, but he was
facing organized forces as well.
As I wrote, a few men might have made it through to Manstein's force,
certainly less than half of the original force, probably far less. In
exchange, the Germans gain the use of the Stalingrad transport hub and
the rail line heading westward for their own logistics.
> > is going to lose a lot of men.
>
> The big problem was the cold weather, I would mored losses to frost bite
> then anything else.
So they were going to lose a lot of men, glad to see you agreeing.
> > Paulus would be called a traitor and a coward by absolutely
> > everyone and executed.
>
> Why it was unclear whether Manstein operation was a breakout or a relief
> operation. Paulus could also have argued in December that he was ordered by
> Manstein.
No, he couldn't, because he wasn't. If he had, Manstein wouldn't have
stood up to Hitler's wrath over the issue - he never stood up to the
Fuehrer anyway.
> Also Hitler at that stage was not into shooting generals like Stalin.
And even if he had been, one could argue that Paulus' duty was to his
men and not to his own life and career. I was pointing that out to
show it wasn't an easy decision to take, and that he would likely have
been overruled anyway.
> > If Paulus broke out at the time of Manstein's relief attempt, then the
> > casualties would be just as horrific
>
> This I doubt. As it was the Germans lost 100%.
Creative editing isn't going to make your point look better. My
sentence referred to "just as horrific" as an earlier (late Nov)
breakout attempt.
If you can't be bothered to actually read a post, don't bother
replying to it.
LC
SolomonW
> There is a view that Paulus was
> badly negligent in not withdrawing enough troops from the frontline to
> act as a "fire brigade" in the days *before* the Soviet offensive
> struck.
The German plan was to drive the Russians out of Stalingrad, use the Volga
River as a defensive line and pull troops into the rear to do this. The
problem was the Russians were holding in Stalingrad and the Germans lacked
time to prepare for an assault in the rear.
Probably, the best would have been for Paulus not too gone into Stalingrad
at all. Even before Stalingrad, the Germans were experiencing major supply
issues.
ThePro
> Probably, the best would have been for Paulus not too gone into Stalingrad
> at all.
Yes, but the **strategic choice** of OKW for 1942 was the Caucasus
region to cut the Red Army's oil supply. And leaving Stalingrad behind
would be a nice base to launch an attack to cut-off the forces in this
area.
Pierrot Robert
Chicoutimi, Canada
Tero P. Mustalahti
> On Sat, 19 Dec 2009 10:59:25 -0500, John Anderton wrote:
>
>> There is a view that Paulus was
>> badly negligent in not withdrawing enough troops from the frontline to
>> act as a "fire brigade" in the days *before* the Soviet offensive
>> struck.
>
> The German plan was to drive the Russians out of Stalingrad, use the Volga
> River as a defensive line and pull troops into the rear to do this. The
> problem was the Russians were holding in Stalingrad and the Germans lacked
> time to prepare for an assault in the rear.
That was the German overall plan for Stalingrad, but that's not what
John was talking about. Many historians argue that Paulus should have
taken heed of the intelligence reports suggesting an imminent Soviet
counter-offensive. According to them he should have taken mobile forces
out of Stalingrad and created an ad hoc combat group ("fire brigade"),
which would have been sent to deal with any possible Soviet
breakthroughs to the rear of the 6th Army, regardless of the official
borders of responsibility between armies.
I can certainly see the logic, since the Germans should have been aware
of the dismal equipment situation of their allies, especially the
serious shortage of modern anti-tank weapons (or indeed even obsolescent
anti-tank weapons). It should have been clear that the Romanians and
Italians could not hope to do more than delay a serious Soviet armored
offensive a little. Apparently Paulus still believed that they could
delay the Soviets enough for him to organize a counter-attack, which
proved to be a fatal miscalculation.
Tero P. Mustalahti
SolomonW
>
> So you say.
I am not alone General Yeremenko felt on the 12 December that Germans in
Stalingrad could have escaped
> Others have declared an immediate breakout would have had better
> prospects. I'm not sure either way, so I discussed both possibilities.
On the 23rd of November, the German line is cut. Small scale German counter
attacks have failed. Paulus has to organise his men for a mass breakout. In
addition, Paulus is in no position to do most of the distance. He needs
outside help. Assuming he does try then he needs people on the West of the
Soviet lines prepared for his troops. It cannot be immediate.
<snip>
> The problem isn't the equipment loss per se, but the fact that leaving
> it all behind (for lack of transport) will mean the infantry will be
> poorly supplied and unsupported, not to mention the effect on morale.
Not entirely Paulus estimated that his tanks could do about 20 of the 30
miles required.
Still German morale surprisingly remained high throughout the whole siege
despite already being poorly supplied and unsupported.
<snip>
> The area west of Stalingrad was encircled by mobile Soviet forces.
> That means a few guns, tanks and armored cars. Infantry walking out
> with whatever it could carry (including food etc) would have a serious
> problem dealing with them.
Partly this would be compensated by the German air superiority
<snip>
> As I wrote, a few men might have made it through to Manstein's force,
> certainly less than half of the original force, probably far less.
I think either most or none. Say the German army in Stalingrad moves West.
However, the Germans are only going about 30 miles, so they might be able
to pull it off however the Soviets everywhere greatly outnumber them, and
they would immediately spring into action. The retreat could become a riot
and if so, all the German forces could be entirely lost.
Furthermore, at Korsun which I think was more difficult almost 2/3 escaped.
Although I will say that many that got away were frost bitten wrecks
useless for any more fighting.
> In exchange, the Germans gain the use of the Stalingrad transport hub and
> the rail line heading westward for their own logistics.
(a)
Indeed. Later Hitler stated that the time taken and diversion of troops
required by the Soviets to take Stalingrad, saved the German army.
<snip>
> No, he couldn't, because he wasn't. If he had, Manstein wouldn't have
> stood up to Hitler's wrath over the issue - he never stood up to the
> Fuehrer anyway.
Well, Manstein did tell Paulus to break out. It is only on the 22nd
December that Hitler talks of holding Stalingrad and Hitler is probably
right as by the 22nd those troops in Stalingrad are doomed.
>> Also Hitler at that stage was not into shooting generals like Stalin.
> And even if he had been, one could argue that Paulus' duty was to his
> men and not to his own life and career.
Indeed.
<snip>
> Creative editing isn't going to make your point look better. My
> sentence referred to "just as horrific" as an earlier (late Nov)
> breakout attempt.
> If you can't be bothered to actually read a post, don't bother
> replying to it.
This is more my argument with the moderation process used in this group
than creative writing. It does result in excessive cutting and pasting. I
think we should allow three lines of quotes to one in rebuttal because this
problem happens a lot here.
Louis C
> Many historians argue that Paulus should have
> taken heed of the intelligence reports suggesting an imminent Soviet
> counter-offensive.
For the record, I don't think Paulus was a good commander. Still, from
his point of view and without the benefit of hindsight:
1. An imminent Soviet attack didn't automatically translate to
imminent danger. The average result of a Soviet attack was a ton of
casualties, most of them Soviet ones, for very little gain. Paulus
knew his flanks weren't very strongly held, but the Soviets were
supposed to be down to their last reserves as well.
2. Even if the threat of a Soviet winter offensive was real, the best
defense would still be to eliminate the Stalingrad defenders - who
were by then holding on to a mere strip along the river bank - and
redeploy the vast combat power of 6th Army to deal with it. Certainly
a better solution than pulling out troops - which might not be
necessary (or might not even be sufficient) to deal with the Soviet
attack while jeopardizing the clearing of the Stalingrad defenders.
My point here is that the decision wasn't necessarily obvious to
someone in Paulus's shoes at the time, and since Paulus was no
operational genius he chose what turned out to be a suboptimal course
of action.
LC
Louis C
> >> Paulus only hope once the encirclement occurred would be in early December.
>
> > So you say.
>
> I am not alone General Yeremenko felt on the 12 December that Germans in
> Stalingrad could have escaped
You mean he wrote this was their "only hope" and they couldn't have
attempted to escape earlier or later?
> On the 23rd of November, the German line is cut. Small scale German counter
> attacks have failed. Paulus has to organise his men for a mass breakout.
Paulus could have started organizing his men at least two days before,
when it became clear that the city would be encircled. Paulus knew the
dismal state of his army's logistics.
It's a tradeoff: the distance is greater, but his army is still
relatively fresh and the Soviets thin on the ground and disorganized.
If he waits, his army will grow weaker and he will fight dug-in Soviet
troops, a tougher proposition.
> > The problem isn't the equipment loss per se, but the fact that leaving
> > it all behind (for lack of transport) will mean the infantry will be
> > poorly supplied and unsupported, not to mention the effect on morale.
>
> Not entirely Paulus estimated that his tanks could do about 20 of the 30
> miles required.
The tanks and running vehicles will keep up with the infantry until
they break down or are destroyed, which might well happen before a
breakout. The artillery, ammunition and fuel resupply trains won't.
> Still German morale surprisingly remained high throughout the whole siege
> despite already being poorly supplied and unsupported.
A good point. I don't think German troops were going to surrender,
they hated the Soviets too much and the war really was too savage, so
despair wasn't really an option.
Still, marching out in the open is bad for morale so people would let
themselves fall back and eventually die.
> > The area west of Stalingrad was encircled by mobile Soviet forces.
> > That means a few guns, tanks and armored cars. Infantry walking out
> > with whatever it could carry (including food etc) would have a serious
> > problem dealing with them.
>
> Partly this would be compensated by the German air superiority
The Luftwaffe was suffering from the same problem as the rest of the
Wehrmacht, namely inadequate logistics and the need to redeploy its
own logistical tail as airfields were being overrun.
So "partly" has to be understood to mean "to a very small extent".
> Furthermore, at Korsun which I think was more difficult almost 2/3 escaped.
> Although I will say that many that got away were frost bitten wrecks
> useless for any more fighting.
That's the example I had in mind as well. However, Hube's army was in
a better initial shape than 6th Army, in particular it was more mobile
and with enough fuel to remain mobile for a while. Even then, it was
mostly destroyed as an effective fighting force, all Germany gained
from the successful evacuation was those troops who returned to duty
in the following months. 6th Army was holding on to something
important, on top of tying up larger numbers of Soviet troops.
> Well, Manstein did tell Paulus to break out. It is only on the 22nd
> December that Hitler talks of holding Stalingrad and Hitler is probably
> right as by the 22nd those troops in Stalingrad are doomed.
Technically you're right about Manstein: he told Paulus he believed a
breakout was probably the best solution. But he didn't order him to
break out, and Hitler had explicitely ordered Paulus not to break out,
which Manstein knew. In other words, my opinion is that Manstein
refused to shoulder the responsibility of a direct breakout order, and
the underlying message of "no breakout order" wasn't lost on Paulus.
Nor of this absolves the latter of blame - he could have attempted to
break out on his own initiative - but Manstein is far from snow-white
either. And Hitler hadn't waited for 22nd December to order Paulus to
remain in Stalingrad.
LC
Thomas Schneider
Louis C schrieb:
> For the record, I don't think Paulus was a good commander.
Could you elaborate this please?
I never really studied that part of the war, but from what I think to
remember, up to Stalingrad Paulus was some kind of shooting star within
the Wehrmacht generals, and he steadily advanced within the ranks and
that was perceived as justified.
And what you write about the Battle of Stalingrad doesn't look like the
starting point of critics either. I will look it up myself if I can get
a hand on my books, but this will take a few days at least...
I know Paulus is heavily criticised by some people, but that is largely
based on his decision not to surrender earlier.
Thomas
Malcom "Mal" Reynolds
<c082beeb-6a33-4f7e-9b69-589dce971c92@m3
8g2000yqd.googlegroups.com>,
Louis C <loui...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> Technically you're right about Manstein: he told Paulus he believed a
> breakout was probably the best solution. But he didn't order him to
> break out, and Hitler had explicitely ordered Paulus not to break out,
> which Manstein knew. In other words, my opinion is that Manstein
> refused to shoulder the responsibility of a direct breakout order, and
> the underlying message of "no breakout order" wasn't lost on Paulus.
>
> Nor of this absolves the latter of blame - he could have attempted to
> break out on his own initiative - but Manstein is far from snow-white
> either. And Hitler hadn't waited for 22nd December to order Paulus to
> remain in Stalingrad.
>
>
> LC
OKay, I'll change some of my original
question.
Paulus, realizing that he is encircled,
no hope of help on the way and surrender
forbidden, why not just gather the
troops and make what would amount to a
banzai charge on the remaining soviet
positions?
I know it's not the style of western
military, but the situation was so
hopeless, he had to know that his army
was gone
Louis C
> I never really studied that part of the war, but from what I think to
> remember, up to Stalingrad Paulus was some kind of shooting star within
> the Wehrmacht generals, and he steadily advanced within the ranks and
> that was perceived as justified.
Paulus was a brilliant staff officer, but he wasn't a good commander.
If you look at his career, you'll find it consisted mainly of staff
jobs, very little combat service commanding anything other than a
company. When he served as Guderian's chief of staff, the latter
reportedly voiced doubts about Paulus' ability to make command
decisions (though these doubts may well have only emerged
retrospectively, in post-war testimonies, I haven't researched the
matter extensively).
Paulus was intelligent and hard-working, but that wouldn't necessarily
make him a great commander. One of my favorite examples is French
general Gamelin, who was also a very intelligent and hard-working
individual, though he's (in my opinion correctly) generally regarded
as a terrible commander.
His handling of the Stalingrad battle lacked focus, his various
"offensives" were so many isolated frontal attacks, he never tried to
build from one of them. He didn't attempt to cut off the Soviets by
advancing from along the river banks, preferring to advance toward the
river in each case. Of course, there were sound logistical reasons for
that (as well as making it easier to coordinate fire support) but from
a command point of view that was wasteful. He was being penny-wise and
pound-foolish, very much on the pattern of a good manager being set
that kind of difficult task. He would have done well commanding an
Allied army, but at the head of a German one he was out of his depth.
See also his indecisiveness after Stalingrad had been surrounded.
> And what you write about the Battle of Stalingrad doesn't look like the
> starting point of critics either. I will look it up myself if I can get
> a hand on my books, but this will take a few days at least...
I'd need to refresh my memory as well, so take your time.
> I know Paulus is heavily criticised by some people, but that is largely
> based on his decision not to surrender earlier.
To clarify, I'm blaming him for 2 things:
1/ mishandling the battle for Stalingrad (this is not claiming the
Germans necessarily would have won it, just that in my opinion Paulus
didn't do such a good job)
2/ failing to act decisively once his force had been encircled, in
particular not trying to breakout toward Manstein.
Once his army was clearly doomed, he was right to delay the surrender
for as long as he could, in my opinion. Even though that was tough on
his men, the operational task set to his army was to take as long as
possible to be destroyed. It did pretty well in that regard. But
that's just my opinion.
LC
Louis C
> Paulus, realizing that he is encircled,
> no hope of help on the way and surrender
> forbidden, why not just gather the
> troops and make what would amount to a
> banzai charge on the remaining soviet
> positions?
Paulus realized quickly enough that he was encircled. So what? German
forces had been encircled before, and they'd generally managed to
restore the situation.
Paulus emphatically didn't realize no hope of help was on the way,
quite to the contrary he was told help was coming. He remembered that
Hitler had been proved right against the opinion of his generals
regarding the no-retreat order in the winter of 1941/42, he remembered
that the pockets of Rzhev and Demyansk had been ordered to hold on and
eventually rescued by relieving German forces, he had no sight of the
big picture because Hitler expressly discouraged it. So when receive
assurances that things were going to be made good, he had no reason to
decide "no hope of help on the way".
A banzai charge was utterly alien to western military culture,
including the German one. Remember, banzai assumes you're going to
die. The German view was that the Soviets would be doing most of the
dying, they were the racial and military inferios after all. Further
note that the German experience until then had reinforced the
(justified) feeling of superiority over Soviet troops. It took time
before Paulus and his staff realized 6th Army was doomed, and by then
it was, well, doomed.
At this point, the troops were physically unable to attack, and far
more effective dying in their holes than hobbling out in the open to
be cut down by Soviet fire.
> I know it's not the style of western
> military, but the situation was so
> hopeless, he had to know that his army
> was gone
Once he realized his army was gone, his decision was to hold in place
for as long as he could, tying down Soviet reserves and taking as many
Soviet troops with him as he could. In that respect, I believe he did
a fairly good job.
LC
SolomonW
> ccording to them he should have taken mobile forces
> out of Stalingrad and created an ad hoc combat group ("fire brigade"),
> which would have been sent to deal with any possible Soviet
> breakthroughs to the rear of the 6th Army, regardless of the official
> borders of responsibility between armies.
Paulus did not have that much in mobile forces. When the Russian surrounded
him all he had was about 100 tanks and 1000 trucks with enough oil to get
them about 20 miles and 2000 artillery pieces.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Uranus
The Russian forces comprised
1,143,500 personnel
894 tanks.
13,451 artillery pieces
1,500 aircraft
Paulus troops in total even if you add the Italians and Romanians are
probably not enough to hold the Russians.
Jim
Although far short of what was needed, supplies were coming in, and
seriously wounded were getting out. That's at least a little hope of
survival.
But if we can assume that 6th Army could be supplied by air, they
probably could have cleared the West Bank. Then you have a
well-supplied army in a fairly good defensive position. Why would they
want to leave? In Berlin much less experienced German troops against
much better prepared and supplied Soviet troops inflicted massive
casualties before they were defeated.
Holding out until Spring and holding down a huge Soviet force, what then?
Jim
Michele
news:NpmdnSv2MMixcK3W...@mchsi.com...
> What's missing is Goering's promise to supply 6th Army from the air.
> Although far short of what was needed, supplies were coming in, and
> seriously wounded were getting out. That's at least a little hope of
> survival.
That's no hope, it's a delusion.
>
> But if we can assume that 6th Army could be supplied by air,
No, we can't. Look at the figures. Compare the tonnage required by a whole
army and what was being sent in.
John Anderton
wrote:
>Please read Louis C response first
>
>> ccording to them he should have taken mobile forces
>> out of Stalingrad and created an ad hoc combat group ("fire brigade"),
>> which would have been sent to deal with any possible Soviet
>> breakthroughs to the rear of the 6th Army, regardless of the official
>> borders of responsibility between armies.
>
>Paulus did not have that much in mobile forces. When the Russian surrounded
>him all he had was about 100 tanks and 1000 trucks with enough oil to get
>them about 20 miles and 2000 artillery pieces.
That estimate seems to underplay Paulus' strength. 48th Pz Corps had
about 100 tanks spread over 3 divisions (22nd Pz, 1st Rom Pz and 14th
Pz) but Paulus also had 24th and 16th Pz in Stalingrad itself along
with 3rd, 60th and 29th motorized . I don't know how many tanks those
latter two panzer divisions had on 19th Nov but even at less than half
strength they would double the tank count to 200.
>
>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Uranus
>
>The Russian forces comprised
>1,143,500 personnel
>894 tanks.
>13,451 artillery pieces
>1,500 aircraft
>
>Paulus troops in total even if you add the Italians and Romanians are
>probably not enough to hold the Russians.
If you add in 4th Pz Army things look rather better.
This page : http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Stalingrad gives
the strength of those formations at the time of encirclement as :
1,011,000 men
10,250 artillery pieces
675 tanks
732 (402 operational) aircraft
I wouldn't guarantee those figures are 100% accurate but they sound
about right.
Cheers,
John
Thomas Schneider
> Paulus, realizing that he is encircled,
> no hope of help on the way and surrender
> forbidden, why not just gather the
> troops and make what would amount to a
> banzai charge on the remaining soviet
> positions?
A banzai charge would have looke like this:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0rE6usMz3pM&feature=related
I think we all can see it would have made little difference.
Thomas
Thomas Schneider
Louis C schrieb:
> Paulus was a brilliant staff officer, but he wasn't a good commander.
>
> If you look at his career, you'll find it consisted mainly of staff
> jobs, very little combat service commanding anything other than a
> company. When he served as Guderian's chief of staff, the latter
> reportedly voiced doubts about Paulus' ability to make command
> decisions (though these doubts may well have only emerged
> retrospectively, in post-war testimonies, I haven't researched the
> matter extensively).
You are right that Paulus had little experience in leading troops if I
may say so. However, after he took over 6th Army in January 42 his
troops did rather well in a number of battles I read, but that was maybe
due to the lower-ranked officers in his army.
I am sure some of his bad reputation is based on the outcome of the
battle of Stalingrad with hindsight, but that doesn't make him a good
commander either.
> His handling of the Stalingrad battle lacked focus, his various
> "offensives" were so many isolated frontal attacks, he never tried to
> build from one of them. He didn't attempt to cut off the Soviets by
> advancing from along the river banks, preferring to advance toward the
> river in each case. Of course, there were sound logistical reasons for
> that (as well as making it easier to coordinate fire support) but from
> a command point of view that was wasteful. He was being penny-wise and
> pound-foolish, very much on the pattern of a good manager being set
> that kind of difficult task. He would have done well commanding an
> Allied army, but at the head of a German one he was out of his depth.
> See also his indecisiveness after Stalingrad had been surrounded.
I know little about city fighting tactics, so I can't join a discussion
on that topic. But according to wikipedia (the only source I have at the
moment, yes it is a poor source) Paulus and his whole army knew little
about it too, as it was a rather new aspect in WW2 till that point. So
it was unavoidable that serious mistakes were made while they learned it
the hard way. But to me it looks like 6th army did not follow a
well-thought plan. Surely you can blame Paulus for that.
> To clarify, I'm blaming him for 2 things:
> 1/ mishandling the battle for Stalingrad (this is not claiming the
> Germans necessarily would have won it, just that in my opinion Paulus
> didn't do such a good job)
I agree with you that the battle of Stalingrad could have been handled
better by Paulus as it actually was. Right now I am pretty sure that 6th
army could have taken all of the city. But I think the outcome would
not have been much different: 6th army would be encircled no matter what
would happen in the city, and 6th army finally be destroyed. But that is
only an uneducated guess.
> 2/ failing to act decisively once his force had been encircled, in
> particular not trying to breakout toward Manstein.
Well, Paulus had his orders, and the most possible outcome of a breakout
attempt is unclear. I see it is discussed elsewhere in this topic.
> Once his army was clearly doomed, he was right to delay the surrender
> for as long as he could, in my opinion. Even though that was tough on
> his men, the operational task set to his army was to take as long as
> possible to be destroyed. It did pretty well in that regard. But
> that's just my opinion.
The discussion of that topic usually follows that line: Paulus' army was
doomed, and he would have saved the life of his men had he only
surrendered earlier. It is usually focused more on an ethical point of
view than a military one. But I think we both agree about that issue anyway.
When I read your comment about Paulus, I first thought I have missed a
huge blunder of him, but that was probably not the case. I hope I could
make myself clear, I just got told today how bad my English is...
Thomas
Thomas Schneider
[...]
What I forgot to add about Paulus: Aparently he actively oposed some of
Hitlers orders like the Commisar Order. He protected General von
Seydlitz-Kurzbach when he ordered troops for an outbreak move. Whatever
his military shortcomings were, that gives him some plus points.
Thomas
Malcom "Mal" Reynolds
<504b1dc8-de3e-46ef-bb07-56b3dc94ee15@c3
> Once he realized his army was gone, his decision was to hold in place
> for as long as he could, tying down Soviet reserves and taking as many
> Soviet troops with him as he could. In that respect, I believe he did
> a fairly good job.
Okay. So when it becomes apparent that
the goal of capturing Stalingrad is
impossible and then realizes that
withdrawing is an impossibility all that
is left for him to do is tie down Soviet
reserves and kill as many Soviet Troops
as possible....
Why not keep fighting until they were
killed/captured as opposed to
surrendering? I believe the Waffen SS
were known for fighting to this point.
Wouldn't such a "sacrifice" be good
fodder for the GErman Propaganda Machine?
David H Thornley
> "Jim" <ac...@yahoxxx.com> ha scritto nel messaggio
> news:NpmdnSv2MMixcK3W...@mchsi.com...
>> What's missing is Goering's promise to supply 6th Army from the air.
>
>
could have sent the supplies he claimed he could, Sixth Army would
have been in a lot better shape.
At least for a while.
>> But if we can assume that 6th Army could be supplied by air,
>
> No, we can't. Look at the figures. Compare the tonnage required by a whole
> army and what was being sent in.
>
What's relevant to the topic of a quick breakout is what people thought
the Luftwaffe could do. Hitler appeared to have believed Goering.
What the Luftwaffe could actually do was very relevant to a later
breakout, since it was very soon clear that the Luftwaffe could come
nowhere near supplying an army.
Louis C
> Why not keep fighting until they were
> killed/captured as opposed to
> surrendering?
Look at the state they were in when they surrendered, in my opinion
they held on for long enough.
Over the period when Stalingrad really would have had a critical
impact on operations, 6th Army held on to it.
> I believe the Waffen SS
> were known for fighting to this point.
The Allies captured Waffen SS prisoners.
> Wouldn't such a "sacrifice" be good
> fodder for the GErman Propaganda Machine?
Hitler certainly thought so, he never forgave Paulus for surviving the
disaster.
LC
Louis C
> You are right that Paulus had little experience in leading troops if I
> may say so. However, after he took over 6th Army in January 42 his
> troops did rather well in a number of battles I read, but that was maybe
> due to the lower-ranked officers in his army.
Don't get me wrong. Paulus wasn't incompetent, what I'm arguing is he
wasn't the kind of person who would make the right decision in a
crisis. He was a logical man, German leadership called for something
different. German military culture, exacerbated under the Third Reich,
called for people who would occasionally disobey orders and ignore
logic. That was the attitude which brought Germany some of its
greatest successes (someone like Paulus would never have taken the
absolutely insane risks that gave Rommel his greatest victories in
Africa) as well of course as its eventual defeat.
Paulus seems to have been a very competent manager, so in a
straightforward operation - attacking eastward - he led his army
competently. When confronted with a difficult, unexpected situation,
he didn't do as well.
> I am sure some of his bad reputation is based on the outcome of the
> battle of Stalingrad with hindsight, but that doesn't make him a good
> commander either.
That's quite possible. Overall, he was winning the battle of
Stalingrad, and if Uranus hadn't succeeded he would be considered a
great general instead of being the first German commander to lose an
army in WWII. I tend to think he didn't do that great a job at
Stalingrad, but certainly there were many other German commanders who
wouldn't have done better because they had the same approach e.g. von
Kluge.
> I know little about city fighting tactics, so I can't join a discussion
> on that topic.
I'm far from an expert on the topic either, but my point wasn't about
tactics. German tactics were doing ok, I'm blaming Paulus for not
having a better plan instead. It's also possible that he had good
reasons to fight the way he did and I'm simply not aware of these
reasons.
> But to me it looks like 6th army did not follow a
> well-thought plan. Surely you can blame Paulus for that.
That's what I'm doing.
> Right now I am pretty sure that 6th
> army could have taken all of the city. But I think the outcome would
> not have been much different: 6th army would be encircled no matter what
> would happen in the city, and 6th army finally be destroyed. But that is
> only an uneducated guess.
The Germans couldn't supply vast amounts of troops in Stalingrad,
their logistics couldn't cope with the strain. Even before the Soviet
offensive, the German supply situation was considered very bad.
So if the Germans capture the city before the Soviet attack, the odds
are that they would redeploy most of their combat power outside of the
city, leaving a mere holding force there (ideal ground to give to
light infantry forces like the Romanians). They would then be in a
much better position to deal with the Soviet offensive, if and when it
came. So I think capturing Stalingrad earlier could make a significant
difference to the course of the subsequent campaign.
> > 2/ failing to act decisively once his force had been encircled, in
> > particular not trying to breakout toward Manstein.
>
> Well, Paulus had his orders, and the most possible outcome of a breakout
> attempt is unclear. I see it is discussed elsewhere in this topic.
He certainly had his orders, but in that case it seems to me this
wasn't a case of Paulus making a hard decision but one of Paulus not
deciding anything. I also agree that breaking out was certainly no
guaranteed success, in fact I've been arguing 6th Army probably
couldn't be saved that way.
> When I read your comment about Paulus, I first thought I have missed a
> huge blunder of him, but that was probably not the case. I hope I could
> make myself clear, I just got told today how bad my English is...
Rereading what I wrote yesterday made me cringe, so I won't blame
anyone for bad grammar. Your English was quite good enough for me.
LC
Alex Potter
> Depending on how much you believe Goering,
That would be Herr Meyer(sp?), then.
--
Regards
Alex
SolomonW
> This page : http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Stalingrad gives
> the strength of those formations at the time of encirclement as :
> 1,011,000 men
Paulus did not have in Stalingrad over a million troops. That would need to
include Romanians, Italians, and Hungarians who would be in the rear. Most
of these would have been lost already before or during Operation Uranus
SolomonW
> the Luftwaffe could do. Hitler appeared to have believed Goering.
What choice did Hitler have at that time? Allow a breakout that might fail,
or if it worked to give him maybe half the army. In any case, he has a
front falling to pieces. Conversely leave the army there which will sell
itself at a big price, giving him time to stabilize the front. Maybe Hitler
realized that the army was lost and what Hitler wanted to do was sell it as
dearly as possible.
Michele
news:G_ydnThLKPpjEKzW...@posted.visi...
> Michele wrote:
>> "Jim" <ac...@yahoxxx.com> ha scritto nel messaggio
>> news:NpmdnSv2MMixcK3W...@mchsi.com...
>>> What's missing is Goering's promise to supply 6th Army from the air.
>>
>> That's no hope, it's a delusion.
>>
> Depending on how much you believe Goering, I guess. If Goering
> could have sent the supplies he claimed he could, Sixth Army would
> have been in a lot better shape.
Exactly. If you prefer, I'll call it a hope that's going to be shattered by
reality.
Alex Potter
> Meier
Thanks.
--
Regards
Alex
John Anderton
wrote:
>On Tue, 22 Dec 2009 13:09:42 -0500, John Anderton wrote:
>
>> This page : http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Stalingrad gives
>> the strength of those formations at the time of encirclement as :
>
>> 1,011,000 men
>
>Paulus did not have in Stalingrad over a million troops.
Neither I nor the page I linked to said otherwise. If you check what I
quoted in my earlier post you'll find that it's clear that when I
wrote "those formations" I was referring to 6th Army, the Italians,
the Rumanians and 4th Pz Army. (I missed the Hungarians and, come to
that, the Croats)
>That would need to
>include Romanians, Italians, and Hungarians who would be in the rear.
*Some* of them would be in the rear but most of them were holding
front line positions when Operation Uranus kicked off.
>Most
>of these would have been lost already before or during Operation Uranus
Not according to the page I linked to. It gives the figure of
1,011,000 men as at the start of Operation Uranus,
Cheers,
John
j...@cix.compulink.co.uk
(SolomonW) wrote:
> Not entirely Paulus estimated that his tanks could do about 20 of the
> 30 miles required.
The initial pocket was pretty big, about thirty miles across. The
western edge of that was some distance from German lines. So all the
troops in Stalingrad, at the eastern edge, are going to have to cross
the pocket's width as extra distance. This is going to take a few days,
especially since it's a fighting retreat through snow on foot.
Where were the tanks positioned when the pocket closed? If they're on
the eastern edge, 20 miles doesn't get them across the pocket.
--
John Dallman, j...@cix.co.uk, HTML mail is treated as probable spam.
Haydn
> [Paulus]... should have taken mobile forces out of Stalingrad and created
> an ad hoc combat group ("fire brigade"), which would have been sent to
> deal with any possible Soviet breakthroughs to the rear of the 6th Army...
I doubt a "fire brigade", a Sperrverband or whatever even large sized
kampfgruppe like that would have sufficed. As Louis rightly wonders in his
post.
> I can certainly see the logic, since the Germans should have been aware of
> the dismal equipment situation of their allies, especially the serious
> shortage of modern anti-tank weapons (or indeed even obsolescent anti-tank
> weapons).
They were of course aware of that. When asked by the Italians - but I think
the same applied to Hungarians and Romanians alike - for more support, the
Germans issued the following standard reply: 1) after the capture of
Stalingrad they would redeploy their firepower-heavy units out of the city
area and to the neighboring allied armies' sectors, thus substantially
reinforcing them and providing the heavy core they were lacking. At the same
time the allied armies' deployment lines would be reorganized and shortened,
so as to remove one of their intrinsic weaknesses - exceeding length per
unit frontage sector. 2) in any case, and despite their best will to help,
the Germans were not in the position to divert a higher percent of their war
industry output to fill their allies' gaps.
In the meantime the German liaison officers attached to the allied armies
worked hard to, among other things, straighten out and standardize the
allies' tactical procedures after German concepts, and rectify what seemed
to them blatant tactical and organizational errors. With mixed results.
Interestingly enough, in at least one documented case, during the Soviet
breakthrough offensive an Italian commander ordered a German antitank unit
to position itself right behind the back of the Italians holding the line
and open up on Soviet tanks as soon as they were spotted. Meanwhile the
Italians would fire on a softer target, Soviet infantry. The German liaison
officer concurred, rating that order as sensible. Instead, the AT unit
commander refused to comply - probably fearing to see his guns stripped of
infantry covering and left in the lurch by stampeding Italians running from
the T-34s - and placed his guns far to the rear of the front unit.
As a result, Italian strongpoints were softened up by tank fire - as the
tanks had been left free to get close enough to the Italian line,
unmolested - then the Soviet infantry advanced without taking heavy
casualties, since the Italian defenders were pinned down, and assaulted
their posts. The German guns opened fire only when the tanks were on and
past the Italian line, knocking a number of tanks out but only after the
line had crumbled. Finally they had to limber and scoot away lest the
Soviets caught them, too.
>It should have been clear that the Romanians and Italians could not hope to
>do more than delay a serious Soviet armored offensive a little.
In fact, the Germans (like the Italian intelligence) were expecting (not
that it would take a genius to expect it) a Soviet thrust at their allies.
But a moderate one. One they could hopefully deal with.
And as a matter of fact, the Soviet push on the Italians opened up with a
battering drip of small scale infantry attacks without many tanks. All of
those small attacks were beaten back, apparently vindicating the German
forecast. It was the size and power of the main thrust, a few days later,
that came as a shock.
Haydn
narrl...@hotmail.com
+shwwwi200...@nospam.firedrake.org> wrote:
> Greek loan-word (it's only in Bayern because one of the rulers
> particularly liked classical Greek culture).
>
> R
This makes me wonder why the Grosse Brockhaus has an entry for "Y" and
calls it the 25th letter, and what to make of all the "MayXX" and
"MeyXX" names and places (German/Austrian names and places) it lists.
Narr
Rich Rostrom
>
Or where Maybach diesel engines were built,
or how Heydrich, Geyr von Schweppenburg,
Bayerlein, Walter Nowotny, Hans von Dohnanyi,
Fritz Thyssen, Robert Ley, or Willy Messerschmitt
spelled their names.
David H Thornley
>
> Exactly. If you prefer, I'll call it a hope that's going to be shattered by
> reality.
>
miracles of the will, or refused to accept that anything was impossible,
could believe Goering's statement and hope. For a while.
Michele
news:d2b67caa-e2a4-4a6e...@v13g2000yqk.googlegroups.com...
I see your point, but please note that not being "standard" does not equate
with being unknown or not used. Please also note how at least Nowotny and
Dohnanyi are clearly family names of foreign origin, and some of the others
might also be. I also opened one of my German dictionaries, and one of my
English ones. The list of words beginning by Y is way shorter in German, and
each and every one of them is of foreign origin.
As to "Meier" or "Meyer", both spellings were used.
SolomonW
>>include Romanians, Italians, and Hungarians who would be in the rear.
> *Some* of them would be in the rear but most of them were holding
> front line positions when Operation Uranus kicked off.
According to the wikipedia, these units were extended over very large
sections of front.
I believe it as the Axis front for Stalingrad was 480 km and several
hundred kilometers deep plus the other problem is that most of these troops
were poorly armed and with low moral.
In comparison the Red Army had 1,100,000 personnel, 804 tanks, 13,400
artillery pieces and over 1,000 aircraft just for the offensive. They had
plenty of other troops in the region.
>>Most
>>of these would have been lost already before or during Operation Uranus
> Not according to the page I linked to. It gives the figure of
> 1,011,000 men as at the start of Operation Uranus,
This is a problem with this thread, everyone is talking about different
dates.
After Uranus, Paulas has about 250,000
Haydn
> Paulus did not have in Stalingrad over a million troops. That would need
> to
> include Romanians, Italians, and Hungarians who would be in the rear. Most
> of these would have been lost already before or during Operation Uranus
I don't think so.
Little Saturn, the Soviet offensive against the Italian 8th Army, started
officially on December 16, 1942, about a month after Uranus (the bagging of
6th Army around Stalingrad). By that time, the Italians, the Hungarians, and
part of the Romanians were there holding the line, far from lost.
The Hungarians weren't broken through until as late as mid-January 1943.
Haydn
SolomonW
> the eastern edge, 20 miles doesn't get them across the pocket.
Some sources say that Paulus had 150 tanks, I presume that already included
in the 100 tanks is this problem. However I agree with you Paulus stated
that he could not do a breakout unless he got more fuel.