Norden Bombsight Accuracy
Pat
the 8th Airforce during 1944 while using the Norden Bombsight? Postings to
this News Group refer to bombing "military" as opposed to "civilian" targets
from 25,000 feet.
I wonder if such a destinction was actually possible using the equipment of
that period. Does anyone know what accuracy could be expected when aiming a
load of bombs from a heavy bomber flying at 25,000 feet under ideal
conditions?
Patrick
B17 GUY
It was possible in theory for a small contingent of A/C to bomb with some
accuracy a fairly small target given good conditions and a good bomb sight such
as the Norden when operated by a good and well trained bomb aimer (Brit term)
However the reality of the thing was that the heavy bombers had to fly in
massed formations to survive the conditions were flat out lousey from prop wash
to cold to poor weather conditions and the crews were adeqately but not well
trained in the sense that they spent years mastering their craft. The typical
8th AF mission was a bunch of kids with fewer than a thousand total hours in
the air flying a a mass formation being shot at from the ground and the air and
dropping bombs on the signal from the lead aircraft. The results were less than
accurate in terms of seperation civilian and military targets and a 1000 foot
radius was considered good bombing ( I know since I have copies of the original
photos and staff evaluations for a number of the missions) The policy was not
saturation bombing unlike the British but the fact was that conditions
prevailed against making that a reality.
polo
> How accurate was the high altitude daylight bombing that was carried out by
> the 8th Airforce during 1944 while using the Norden Bombsight? Postings to
> this News Group refer to bombing "military" as opposed to "civilian" targets
> from 25,000 feet.
The RAF were able to bomb targets without doing a lot of damage outside
the bounds of the target. They bomber the Renault, Rhone, Michelin and
Phillips [Holland] plants while doing minimal damage to civilians. There
are many photos showing the bomb patterns, most inside the target bounds.
> I wonder if such a destinction was actually possible using the equipment of
> that period.
Many ciyies in Germany were bombed with the express purpose of killing the
civilian factory workers, believing that that was as effective as bombing
factories.
ArtKramr
>From: "Pat" <t...@humboldt1.com>
>How accurate was the high altitude daylight bombing that was carried out by
>the 8th Airforce during 1944 while using the Norden Bombsight? Postings to
>this News Group refer to bombing "military" as opposed to "civilian" targets
>from 25,000 feet.
>I wonder if such a destinction was actually possible using the equipment of
>that period. Does anyone know what accuracy could be expected when aiming a
>load of bombs from a heavy bomber flying at 25,000 feet under ideal
>conditions?
The accuracy of the Norden Bombsight vaied with drift angle and wind
conditons from altitude to suface of the earth. There was a built in error
called Range component of Cross Trail error (RCCTE). It was zero at zero
drift angle and increased as the drift angle increased. If we are dropping
through layers of air currents that vary greatly from one altitude to
another with a shear wind along the way , it will effect accuracy geatly.
But you said ideal conditons.. Before I respond to that, let me say that
ideal conditons rarely if ever existed. But if we approach the target from
a zero drift angle, and we have a consistant wind direction and velocity
from dropping altitude to the ground, the norden was extremely accurate.
But as I said before, that condition rarely if ever existed. The accuracy
problem was far less a function of bombsigth accuracy than dropping
conditons, flack, visibility, navigator error, bombardier and pilot
inexperience and length of bomb run. It was rarely the sights fault if
there was a gross error in the bomb run.
Arthur
Bombardier Navigator
B-26 Marauder
344th Bomb Group 494th Bomb Squadron
9th Tactical Air Force
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
ArtKramr
>From b17...@aol.com (B17 GU
What you say has very limited truth. In fact, Allied bombing wreacked
destruction all over Germany destrying its abilit y to supply fuel to its
planes tanks and trucks and grinding the German war effort to a halt. Please
don't tell me that fighter construction acutally increased. The fact is that
our bombers were diverted from attacking fighter factories to destoy fuel
supplies so the fighters that were produced had no fuel and never flew. It was
a deleiberate strategy that worked beautifully and assured the destruction of
the German was effort. And this helped Russia in their battle against the
Germans since the German lack of fuel do to Allied bombing hampered all German
military operations. The limited data you have is too small a sample to draw
any conslusions from.
Arthur
nightjar
polo wrote in message <6ujmhq$3...@dgs.dgsys.com>...
>
>The RAF were able to bomb targets without doing a lot of damage outside
>the bounds of the target.
While this is true, the Norden bombsight that was the subject of the
original question, was an American design, although fitted to some RAF
aircraft in the latter part of the war and, thanks to espionage between
the wars, to some German aircraft. For very high precision bombing, the
RAF would more likely use a radar based targetting system like Oboe, Gee
or, later in the war, H2S.
Norden himself, while trying to get the US Government to adopt his
bombsight, claimed that it could place a bomb in a pickle barrel. RAF
personnel who knew of this claim were amazed at how large American pickle
barrels had to be.
Nightjar
George Hardy
>
>How accurate was the high altitude daylight bombing that was
>carried out by the 8th Airforce during 1944 while using the
Although I have posted this information before, I think it will
answer your question. The Bikini bomb test. The a-bomb dropped
from 10,000 feet. Weather perfect. All wind and other information
at hand. No flak. Picked crew. Missed the ground-zero by 2,000
feet.
>From my target shooting experience I know that one can expect a
doubling of the distance to increase inaccuracy by a factor of
about 3. (Some factors are linear; others vary as the square of
the distance.) From 25,000 feet, a miss of about a mile.
GFH
***************************************************************
http://www.ankerstein.org/
The Anchor Stone Building Set (Anker-Steinbaukasten) Home Page
See what makes me tick.
***************************************************************
ArtKramr
>rom: George Hardy <geo...@ankerstein.org>
>>How accurate was the high altitude daylight bombing that was
>>carried out by the 8th Airforce during 1944 while using the
>>Norden Bombsight? 25-6
>
>Although I have posted this information before, I think it will
>answer your question. The Bikini bomb test. The a-bomb dropped
>from 10,000 feet. Weather perfect. All wind and other information
>at hand. No flak. Picked crew. Missed the ground-zero by 2,000
>feet.
>
>>From my target shooting experience I know that one can expect a
>doubling of the distance to increase inaccuracy by a factor of
>about 3. (Some factors are linear; others vary as the square of
>the distance.) From 25,000 feet, a miss of about a mile.
>
>GFH
>
>
In that test you quote so mindlessly they hadn't pinned down the ballisitic
coefficent of the A Bomb at that time. With proper ballistic data resulted in a
zero error in the drops at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. I assume you were not a
bombardier or a bomb technician nor a ballistics expert in heavy bomb
technology, and you never flew a mission nor have you any practical experience
to apply to the subject. No offense intended but it is important that
lurkers understand where you are coming from.
Arthur Kramer
Bombardier Navigator
Ian Clark
>What you say has very limited truth. In fact, Allied bombing wreacked
>destruction all over Germany destrying its abilit y to supply fuel to its
>planes tanks and trucks and grinding the German war effort to a halt.
I thought B17 Guy answered the question - how accurate was the Norden bomb
sight in practice - very well indeed. You seem to have thought he was
answering the question "How effective was the total Allied strategic bombing
effort?".
Gareth Rowlands
A few months ago, I bumped into a character who claimed to own a Norden
Bombsight and it's carry case 'complete with suicide capsule' (!)
He explained that Bomb-aimers who were familiar with the Norden had to
make a promise at the end of their training course to commit suicide
rather than be captured by the enemy.
Now this sounds a little far-fetched to me ... can anyone comment ?
Cheers !
Gareth.
ArtKramr
>From: gar...@lightfox.demon.co.uk
>A few months ago, I bumped into a character who claimed to own a Norden
>Bombsight and it's carry case 'complete with suicide capsule' (!)
>
>He explained that Bomb-aimers who were familiar with the Norden had to
>make a promise at the end of their training course to commit suicide
>rather than be captured by the enemy.
>
>Now this sounds a little far-fetched to me ... can anyone comment ?
>
>Cheers !
>
>Gareth.
>
>--
It's total and absolute nonsense!
Arthur Kramer
Bombardier 344th BG 9th Air Force
>
In solemn salute to those thousands of our comrades -great, brave men that they
were- for whom there will be no homecoming, ever.
Ernie Pyle
George Hardy
(ArtKramr) says:
>>From: George Hardy <geo...@ankerstein.org>
>
>>The Bikini bomb test. The a-bomb dropped from 10,000 feet.
>>Weather perfect. All wind and other information at hand.
>>No flak. Picked crew. Missed the ground-zero by 2,000
>>feet. 28-1
>In that test you quote so mindlessly they hadn't pinned down
>the ballisitic coefficent of the A Bomb at that time. With
>proper ballistic data resulted in a zero error in the drops at
>Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
The Bikini tests were conducted after WWII. Hiroshima and
Nagasaki were bombed during WWII. The USA must have lost
their data. Yes, both Hiroshima and Nagasaki were hit.
Neither was a small target.
Endymion
> >In that test you quote so mindlessly they hadn't pinned down
> >the ballisitic coefficent of the A Bomb at that time. With
> >proper ballistic data resulted in a zero error in the drops at
> >Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
>
> The Bikini tests were conducted after WWII. Hiroshima and
> Nagasaki were bombed during WWII. The USA must have lost
> their data.
Different bomb designs.
> Yes, both Hiroshima and Nagasaki were hit.
> Neither was a small target.
By all accounts, the Hiroshima bomb detonated directly above the
distinctive t-shaped bridge which was the aiming point. I'm not familiar
with the details of the Nagasaki bomb.
--
Endymion Bruce.Tuc...@lexis-nexis.com
Defensor Vini et Tabaci et Vitae Nimii
"Here lies one whose name was writ in water."
George Hardy
Rudolstadt. They manufactured explosive and filled torpedoes,
among other items. A large plant, with about 4,000 workers,
including (for a time) Francois Mitterand.
Bombed between April 15-18, 1945 (I could look up the exact date,
if anyone cares). First time. Missed by about a mile. Destroyed
a pottery factory in Volksted.
Jukka O. Kauppinen
> falling on German soil with bombsights in them. Even if the sight were damaged
> on landing the Germans could have rebuilt them and analysed them. What I have> always wondered is why the Germans didnt attempt to build their own version of> the design if it were that good?
Because from what I've read Germans already had a perfectly good
and working bombsight that was on par with Norden's accuracy.
On the other hand, German's were not waging such bomber
campaigns in later part of the war like USAAF and RAF.
Also the German bombers operated in lower altitudes.
Reading about the Junkers Ju 88 bombers the Finnish Air Force
operated in World War 2 against the Soviets, the writer
was a bombardier and repeatedly mentioned how you
"could not miss your target if you kept it in middle of
the sight".
The bombers though bombed in long, shallow dives,
not exactly dive but more like glide bombing.
So that makes a big difference in the requirements for
that particular bombsight compared to the high altitude
level bombing by the allied.
jok
--
Jukka O. Kauppinen jukka.k...@mikrobitti.fi ICQ: 1848 793
Journalist Mail: MikroBitti, Jukka O. Kauppinen,
MikroBitti Kornetintie 8, 00380 HELSINKI, FINLAND
Tel/fax +358-17-824 225 or fax +358-9-120 5747
GSM +358-40-730 0036
http://mikrobitti.fi/~jukkak
http://www.mikrobitti.fi
The best-selling computer magazine in Scandinavia
ArtKramr
>From: "Donald J. Borja"
>- analogy) and toss it out the plane. Any remainding parts were to be
>smashed with a hammer...the hammer was kept close and was part of the
>bombadier's equipment. Or so it was told by local history buffs. Any
>Bomber guys out there care to help me out??
Our only instructions were to place shots from our 45 through the sight at
prescribed positions and angles. No suicide. No throwing the sight overboard.
And the Germans did eventually have a sight of similiar design.
Arthur
(bombardier)
344th Bomb Group, 494th Bomb Squadron, 9th Air Force
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
"In solemn salute to those thousands of our comrades -great, brave men that
Martin Rapier
{snip}
>Flight crews were instructed to destroy and pitch the bombsite in the
>event the plane was shot down. Classes were taught on how to quickly take
>apart the bombsite (the thing looked like a "Star Wars" type of binoculars
>- analogy) and toss it out the plane. Any remainding parts were to be
>smashed with a hammer...the hammer was kept close and was part of the
>bombadier's equipment. Or so it was told by local history buffs. Any
>Bomber guys out there care to help me out??
In not familiar with USAAF pratice, but RAF Bomber crews were supposed to
destroy their H2S (ground spotting radar) sets if the plane was shot down - I
think they were even fitted internal demolition charges?? They didn't want the
Germans to find out about centimetric radar.
However, this did not prevent the Germans salvaging some sets fairly quickly
from downed planes. IRL crews of planes in the process of being shot down
often have other things on their minds than smashing up bits of kit. Similar
considerations apply to the disposal of cipher books from ships/U-Boats.
Cheers
Martin
--
Martin Rapier, Database Administrator
Corporate Information & Computing Services.
University of Sheffield Tel 0114 222 1137
The opinions expressed here may be those of my employer, or they may not.
http://rhino.shef.ac.uk:3001/mr-home/
Endymion
> Anyway, I do know this:
> event the plane was shot down. Classes were taught on how to quickly
take
> apart the bombsite (the thing looked like a "Star Wars" type of
binoculars
> - analogy) and toss it out the plane. Any remainding parts were to be
> smashed with a hammer...the hammer was kept close and was part of the
> bombadier's equipment. Or so it was told by local history buffs. Any
> Bomber guys out there care to help me out??
I don't doubt that this was the instruction, but given how dangerous it
already was to bail out of a burning or out-of-control bomber, and the fear
and chaos that would be the scene inside the plane, I can't imagine too
many bombardiers stuck around for more than a whack or two with the hammer.
Personally I expect in that situation I'd have more urgent matters on my
mind, like getting out of the plane alive with a parachute that wasn't
burning and, if I could even think of anything more, helping crewmates who
might or might not be shot to pieces or too scared and confused to get
themselves out.
--
Bruce.Tuc...@lexis-nexis.com
Millsbomb
>
>Many ciyies in Germany were bombed with the express purpose of killing the
>civilian factory workers, believing that that was as effective as bombing
>factories.
Hello,
As far as I am concerned it was ' tit for tat' , terror bombing was
the German idea started in Spain and carried out in British cities. Who
dropped the terror 'butterfly' bombs to kill children, explosive charges in
Incedniary Bombs to kill firemen trying to fight the fires and dropped large
mines by parachute to explode after the 'all clear' had sounded when civilians
left the shelters. On the Airfield that I was guarding as a soldier in 1940,
the aircrew used to throw the fire extinguishers out as well, anything to kill
Germans. They used to ask us, if we had anything they could drop.
Bob.
When first under fire an' your wishful to duck,
Don't look nor take 'eed at the man that is struck,
Be thankful your livin', an trust to your luck
And march to your front like a soldier.
ArtKramr
>From: George Hardy <geo...@ankerstein.org>
>An example of American bombing.
>
>Rudolstadt. They manufactured explosive and filled torpedoes,
>among other items. A large plant, with about 4,000 workers,
>including (for a time) Francois Mitterand.
>
>Bombed between April 15-18, 1945 (I could look up the exact date,
>if anyone cares). First time. Missed by about a mile. Destroyed
>a pottery factory in Volksted.
>
>GFH
>
An example of American bombing. Nagasaki. One bomb hit dead center and
destroyed the entire city. Am I correct in assuming you weren't a WW II
bombardier? Or maybe you went to bomb school and washed out then were
reassigned as a bombsight techniciant? Is that possible?
Arthur
ArtKramr
>>Many ciyies in Germany were bombed with the express purpose of killing the
>>civilian factory workers, believing that that was as effective as bombing
>>factories.
>
I flew 50 missions over Germany hitting cities in the Rhine Valley such as
Cologne and Koblenz and we always targeted specific military targets in the
cities we hit. In Cologne we were after the marshalling yards on the West bank
of the Rhine. In Koblenz we hit the communications centers. We also bombed
bridges over rivers as well as Autobahn bridges. We also hit supply dumps, oil
storage farms and ordnance installations.We never once bombed a city with the
aim of killing civilians. Never once. We always were after speciifc military
targets. It is a waste of a misson to bomb nothing but civilians when there
were so many valuiable military taget to be be hit. Only someone with
noKnowledge of bombing techniques and the importance of military targets would
make such an uninformed claim.
Arthur Kramer
Boombardier- Navigator
John....@newsguy.com
the Norden bombsight. The Norden Bombsigh plans were stolen in 1937. "A
unit of General George S. Patton, Jr.'s rampaging Third Army stumbled upon
a factory the Germans tried to hide in the Tyrolean Alps, and captured its
super-secret product, called Luftwaffenzielgeraet EZ 42.
It was thought to be one of those ingenious electronic gadgets in whose
invention the Germans supposedly excelled and its captors rushed it in
triumph to the technical intelligence team that followed the Third Army.
It turned out to the Norden bombsight."*
The Luftwaffe had already installed its own bombsight, the "Lothfe" and
did not want to replace it with the Norden which was harder to
manufacture, requiring a lot of time and precision tools. The Germans felt
that the Ju-88 Stuka dive bomber was a lot more accurate in ground support
tactical deployment, which Hitler and the Wehrmacht appreciated.
Nevertheless, the Germans did manufacture the Norden Bombsight to some
extent. See the reference below!
*Farago,Ladislas. "The Game of the Foxes",David Mckay company, Inc, New York,
1971. Pages 42-57.
See Also: The Nation: "High-tech secrets" Aug 31, 1985 (editorial by David
Kahn)
p-133.
In article <6usd7q$6...@dgs.dgsys.com>, mcz...@aol.comspec.org says...
>>A few months ago, I bumped into a character who claimed to own a Norden
>>Bombsight and it's carry case 'complete with suicide capsule' (!)
>>He explained that Bomb-aimers who were familiar with the Norden had to
>>make a promise at the end of their training course to commit suicide
>>rather than be captured by the enemy.
>>Now this sounds a little far-fetched to me ... can anyone comment ?
>Seems a little far-fetched to me as well considering how many planes were
Emmanuel Gustin
>In not familiar with USAAF pratice, but RAF Bomber crews were supposed to
>destroy their H2S (ground spotting radar) sets if the plane was shot down -
I
>think they were even fitted internal demolition charges??
Yes. Unlike the USAAF (the Germans had good information about
the Norden even before the war broke out), the RAF had a very
valuable secret to keep. Unfortunately, the cavity magnetron proved
almost impossible to destroy, being made of solid brass. After some
experiments during which British experts made reconstructions rather
quickly, H2S went to war with a demolition charge strong enough
to disable the radar, but not enough to destroy the magnetron. In the
end the gamble paid off: The war was almost over before the
Germans could make copies of the British centimetric radar
operational. Only a few "Berlin" radars were ever installed.
Reportedly, "Berlin" had a much better demolition charge than H2S...
Emmanuel Gustin
HiF...@mayanspring.com
> What I have
> always wondered is why the Germans didnt attempt to build their own
> version of the design if it were that good?
What where they going to put it in?
--
(Spam protection enabled. Remove mayan and replace with mind in my
address)
Patterson, Dallas
>
> An example of American bombing...>SNIP<...Missed by about a mile.
>snip<
Dear George,
Don't be so contemptuous and misleading. Most people are completely
unacquainted with the challenges confronting a bombardier.
The Norden bombsight is no better than the bombardier using it and the
platform supporting it, and the environment in which it must be used. You
make it sound as though the Norden bombsight was a joke because one of
many such bombardments landed a mile away from the intended target. Such
is hardly the case.
Dropping your bombs on a target one mile away from your intended target
is a very easy error to make in World War II. The potential causes for
such an error include the following.
Battle Interference. A lead bombardier was sometimes sufficiently
distracted from his task by flak casualties, fighter casualties, battle
damage to the aircraft, and other battle events to materially contribute
to the misidentification of the target. Severe air turbulence from flak
bursts, enemy fighter aircraft wakes, and friendly bomber wakes in the
formations often made it difficult to stablilize the aircraft and
bombsight enough for the bombadier to get an accurate reading for the
drop. Some pilots didn't hold the bomber steady enough on the runup from
the IP to the target for the bombardier to make an accurate sighting in
his bombsight. The slightest motion on the part of the pilot to evade a
flak burst or enemy fighter swung the target entirely out of the sight
picture.
Camouflage. Cities, harbors, airfields, and factories were often
successfully camouflaged to cause a bombadier to misidentify a dummy
target in the vicinity of the intended target.
Weather. Undercasts and bad weather were one of the most prevalent causes
of misidentifications of targets. Weather over Continental Europe was
usually so marginal, many strikes could not see or strike their primary
targets for weeks at a time. When strikes were made, they often had to be
made under the most marginal conditions of visibility. This too often
resulted in tragic mistakes of misidentification. Also, the high altitude
heavy bombers, in particular, sometimes encountered undetected high speed
winds at the altitudes below them which misdirected the bomb drops by
very wide margins. Heavy air turbulence resulting from high altitude
winds and formation flying contributed to an inability to get a fully
satisfactory target sighting.
Navigation. The Luftwaffe and the RAF learned that it was very difficult
to find the right city, much less a factory, when the weather conditions
didn't cooperate. The lack of reliable combat navigational aids in World
War II made navigation in marginal weather conditions and at night
difficult to impossible in many cases. Navigation in the typical 8/10
cloud coverage and frequent cumulonimbus and stratus formations over
Germany made it very easy to misidentify the terrain and target. In the
absence of present day satellite and inertial guidance systems, such
navigation is still a daunting task.
Groundspeed. The heavy bombers often dropped their bomb loads onto
targets that were located three, four, and five miles beneath them.
Without significant winds, it takes only some fifteen seconds or less on
the bomb release to miss your intended target by a distance of a mile.
However, tail winds can add to your airspeed and produce a groundspeed a
couple of hundred miles of an hour faster than if there were no tailwind.
Consequently, and bomb release error of only a few seconds can result in
a one mile error. Bombing into a headwind can help produce a more
accurate drop in a few instances, but the decreased groundspeed would
also result in much greater flak casualties due to the increased time of
exposure to the air defenses. Unpredictable crosswinds also contributed
to a significant margin of error. High speed winds beneath the bomber can
increase or decrease the groundspeed of a gravity bomb by more than one
hundred miles an hour.
The multiplicity of problems became so acute, the USAAF had to refrain
from bombing anywhere near to the Swiss border. Bombing strikes were
too often being misdirected across the border into Switzerland, even
though the intended targets were many miles across the border in Germany.
Even when senior Swiss air force officers flew with the American bombers
as observers, they too were unable to prevent the mistakes caused by the
combination of weather, navigation errors, target misidentifications, and
unpredictable high speed winds. The best intentions and efforts by the
American and Swiss officers went awry.
So, don't misreport the events. Whatever their faults may be, bomber
pilots in all of the air forces had great difficulties at times with
navigation and target identification. It was a very difficult task to
perform consistently under adverse weather and combat conditions. The
navigational and gravity bomb technologies of the WWII period simply
didn't permit the bombardiers to use their bombsights to their practical
limits of accuracy in all cases. The Norden bombsight was accurate enough
in most circumstances to exceed the reliability of the other systems, the
Mark 1 eyeball, navigation, etc., used to strike an intended target.
Dallas Patterson
n...@fidalgo.net
George Hardy
<n...@fidalgo.net> says:
>Don't be so contemptuous and misleading. Most people are completely
>unacquainted with the challenges confronting a bombardier. 2-3
>
>The Norden bombsight is no better than the bombardier using it....
>Dropping your bombs on a target one mile away from your intended target
>is a very easy error to make in World War II. The potential causes for
>such an error include the following.
>
>Battle Interference.
>
>Camouflage.
>
>Weather.
>
>Navigation.
>
>Groundspeed.
>
>The multiplicity of problems became so acute, the USAAF had to refrain
>from bombing anywhere near to the Swiss border.
>
>So, don't misreport the events.
I don't think I am misrepresenting the facts. Instead, I think we are
in general agreement. Your post supports what I have been saying.
Accurate bombing was a myth. A miss by a mile was not unusual. Even with
the Norden, hitting a target was darn hard to do. The "Swiss border"
fact that you mention is proof that the Allied command knew quite well
that the bombing was only area bombing.
Again, I appreciate that veterans who spent their time bombing have
to assuage their conscience by believing that their targets were not
women and children, but military targets. In fact, late in the
war, bombing targets were changed from cities (read civilians) to
railroad yards. Read Kesselring. He shifted flak from protecting
cities to new assignments as a result of the change. Again, proof
that the Germans, at least, detected the shift.
Again, to review: The Allied air campaign cost about 100,000 Allied
airmen; killed about 800,000 German civilians.
HCALTMANN
Arthur Kramer, Bombardier- Navigator,
344th Bomb Group, 494th Bomb Squadron,
>I flew 50 missions over Germany ... we >always targeted specific military
targets in the
>installations. ... We never once bombed a >city with the aim of killing
civilians.
I believe you, Art. The 9th Airforce was tactical, wasn't it?
It was the Mighty Eighth that did the strategic bombing that apparently
also included at least one undefended city, Dresden, toward the end of the war.
For the British bomber force, it was the declared strategy to bomb the
homes of civilian workers. Toward the end of the war, that also included the
city of my birth, Ulm, which was and is the home of at least two military
industrial targets: Kaesbohrer and Magirus. Neither of these was severely
damaged, but the center of the city was absolutely wiped out.
I hope we are still friends -- Heinz.
HCAl...@aol.com (Heinz Altmann)
Holger Schaefer
>
> It is a waste of a misson to bomb nothing but civilians when there
> were so many valuiable military taget to be be hit.
What a remarkable statement. Apparently, the RAF's Bomber Command wasted
thousands of missions, as they primarily bombed cities at night, where
there can hit nothing unless it's as big as a city. IIRC, the 8th AF,
too, participated in attacks on cities, eg Hamburg and Dresden.
--
Fachhochschule Harz Economics Dept.
Holger Schaefer, Dipl. oec. Research Associate
mailto:hsch...@fh-harz.de Phone: +3943-659-210
http://www2.fh-harz.de/~hschaefer
George Hardy
>I flew 50 missions over Germany hitting cities in the Rhine
>Valley such as Cologne and Koblenz and we always targeted
>specific military targets in the cities we hit. 2-2
I appreciate that virtually all American and British veterans
take the position you do. I know a number of them. One of my
cousins was a B-17 pilot, crash landed in Scotland (after 23
missions) due to the shot-up condition of the plane. Yes, their
conscience requires this self deception. But, any reading,
especially Bomber Harris, WSC and LeMay will inform them exactly
what they did, what their assigned task was. Visit Wuertzburg
and see the bombing dioramas -- before and after. "Dehousing"
is WSC's term, not mine.
ArtKramr
>From: hcal...@aol.com (HCALTMANN)
>.. we >always targeted specific military
>targets in the
>>installations. ... We never once bombed a >city with the aim of killing
>civilians.
>
> I believe you, Art. The 9th Airforce was tactical, wasn't it?
> It was the Mighty Eighth that did the strategic bombing that apparently
>also included at least one undefended city, Dresden, toward the end of the
>war.
>
> For the British bomber force, it was the declared strategy to bomb the
>homes of civilian workers. Toward the end of the war, that also included the
>city of my birth, Ulm, which was and is the home of at least two military
>industrial targets: Kaesbohrer and Magirus. Neither of these was severely
>damaged, but the center of the city was absolutely wiped out.
> I hope we are still friends -- Heinz.
>
I can only relate my own personal experiences. I can't speak for other air
forces and other missions flown by other crews.
Arthur
344th Bomb Group, 494th Bomb Squadron, 9th Air Force
ArtKramr
>From: Holger Schaefer <hsch...@fh-harz.de>
>What a remarkable statement. Apparently, the RAF's Bomber Command wasted
>thousands of missions, as they primarily bombed cities at night, where
>there can hit nothing unless it's as big as a city. IIRC, the 8th AF,
>too, participated in attacks on cities, eg Hamburg and Dresden.
>
>--
>Fachhochschule Harz
I can't speak for the RAF. I was in the USAAC and will only relate my personal
experiences.
Patterson, Dallas W.
>
>SNIP<
> I don't think I am misrepresenting the facts. Instead, I think we are
> in general agreement. Your post supports what I have been saying.
> Accurate bombing was a myth. A miss by a mile was not unusual. Even with
> the Norden, hitting a target was darn hard to do. The "Swiss border"
> fact that you mention is proof that the Allied command knew quite well
> that the bombing was only area bombing.
I never said or implied that accurate bombing was a myth. Quite the contrary.
The Norden bombsight and the American daylight precision bombing doctrine
proved to be accurate enough to thoroughly smash with reasonable accuracy
most of their desired targets. Exceptional conditions and exceptional errors
did result in equally exceptional misses. Such errors were easy to make in
WWII, but they were, nonetheless, the exception to the general rule. Once a
target was correctly identified at the aiming point, the bombardier equipped
with his Norden bombsight could usually hit his precision target.
The problems with accidental drops on Swiss border areas represents the
extreme exceptions. The circumstances in those incidents generally prove the
exception rather than the general rule. The German targets involved in these
incidents were located relatively close (minutes or seconds of flying
time) from the the Swiss border and the Alps Mountains. The conditions of
cloud cover, weather, and similarity of terrain features in the mountain
regions and their foothills provided peculiar opportunities for target
misidentification and wind interference not found at most targets.
> Again, I appreciate that veterans who spent their time bombing have
> to assuage their conscience by believing that their targets were not
> women and children, but military targets.
Obviously, you neither appreciate nor understand what you're talking about
with such an utterly nonsensical and contemptuous statement. Every aircrew
knew full well that all types of human beings were underneath the bombs they
were dropping on German targets. Men, women, children, Allied POWs, civilian
slaves, and Allied civilians were all known to be present within a target
area at various times. The job was a grim task of not allowing the German
Armed Forces to conduct military operations in a Total War of aggression and
the genocide of the Final Solution behind a shield of humanity.
The laws of warfare had an established procedure for placing Germany's
non-combatant civilian population and institutions in areas where air
bombardment was prohibited, but Germany never availed itself of this
opportunity. Instead, Germany, with Hitler as its leader, deliberately chose
to attempt to destroy its Allied enemies with unrestricted aerial bombardment
while leaving the German civilian population, Allied POWs, and Allied slaves
exposed to the horrors of war.
This German and NAZI lack of respect for civilian casualties continued into
the last days of the war on the ground as well as in the air. The German
people have no one but themselves to blame for bringing this destruction down
upon their own heads and the heads of the Allied civilians and POWs they
exposed to combat. If the Allies accepted horrendous casualties among their
own civilian populations and the enemy populations, they did so to prevent
the far greater death toll that would occur if Germany succeeded in using
those populations as a shield to win the war in Europe. Germany had nothing
to lose but what it did lose, Great Britain and the other Allies had far more
to lose. Germany's plans for the British civilian population after a
successful Sea Lion invasion amounted to an extermination of the British
people.
>SNIP<
> Again, to review: The Allied air campaign cost about 100,000 Allied
> airmen; killed about 800,000 German civilians.
The German people succeeded in killing tens of millions of people in its
insane bids for conquest. They suceeded in murdering tens of millions more
civilians in concentration camps, deadly labor camps, and extermination
programs. While doing so, they managed to convert civilians into soap, human
skin lamp shades, and human skin hand gloves. While doing so, they
demonstrated no willingness to discontinue their own totally indiscriminate
air bombardments of the Allied civilian populations. Germany had plans to
exterminate hundreds of millions of more civilians, which the Allied
campaigns prevented. If it had cost the Allies 800,000 Allied POW deaths in
the target areas, the Allies would not have hesitated to pay that sacrificial
price to keep Germany from killing another tens or hundreds of millions more
people, Allied or Axis, combatant or non-combatant.
Germany could have refrained from bombing the Allied cities. They did not do
so. Germany could have de-militarized its cities and protected their
poulations. They deliberately chose not to do so. Despite your empty denials,
Germany's cities were indeed legitimate military targets. The only obstacle
to an Allied campaign of unrestricted aerial bombardment was the Allies' own
moral responsibility. When the Allies weighed the hundreds of thousands of
casualties from the air bombardments against the tens of millions of
casualties from Germany's unrestricted warfare and exterminations, the Allies
were morally compelled to save the millions at the cost of the thousands.
Nevertheless, the Allies did attempt to avoid certain types of civilian
targets for humane and cultural reasons. Consequently your constant apologies
for the German aggressors and constant defamations of the Allied defenders is
viewed as morally repugnant in the most extreme terms.
The Norden bombsight proved to be satisfactory for its purpose. Allied
bombing, precision and area, saved ten to a hundred times more civilian and
military lives than they sacrificed, Allied and German. The Allied air
bombardment campaign as a whole was morally justified and legally correct. In
hindsight, we can debate and regret some individual Allied choices, but the
Allied air campaigns were well justified by the unprecedented Axis
barbarisms.
Dallas Patterson
n...@fidalgo.net
E.F.Schelby
>ArtKramr wrote:
>>
>> It is a waste of a misson to bomb nothing but civilians
>Apparently, the RAF's Bomber Command wasted >thousands of missions,
>as they primarily bombed cities at night
The RAF flew some 390,000 sorties, and 70 percent of these were area
attacks.
In SAOG (The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, Vol.1,99 -
1961) the policy of the British government is described as follows:
"In some ways, area bombing was a three-year period
of deceit practiced upon the British public and
world opinion. It was felt to be necessary that the
exact nature of R.A.F. bombing should not be
revealed...the impression was usually given that
industry was the main target and that any bombing
of workers' housing areas was an unavoidable
necessity. Charges of 'indiscriminate' bombing
were consistently denied. The conceit lay in the
concealment of the fact that the areas being most
heavily bombed were nearly always either city
centers or densely populated residential areas,
which rarely contained any industry."
Winston Churchill said in 1942: "The German cities...will be
subjected to an ordeal the like of which has never been experienced
by any country in continuity, severity, and magnitude."
(Source: Martin Middlebrook and Chris Everett_The Bomber Command
War Diaries_. London: Viking, 1985).
Regards,
ES
polo
>
>
> I never said or implied that accurate bombing was a myth. Quite the contrary.
> The Norden bombsight and the American daylight precision bombing doctrine
> proved to be accurate enough to thoroughly smash with reasonable accuracy
> most of their desired targets.
With the USAAF bombers covering a large horizontal area, and all bomb
aimers
dropping their bombs when they see the bombs leaving the lead aircraft,
what target were they trying to bomb that could be a precision target??
If you claim Hamburg, Schweinfurt, Berlin etc as being precision targets
I would agree with you.
> Exceptional conditions and exceptional errors
> did result in equally exceptional misses. Such errors were easy to make in
> WWII, but they were, nonetheless, the exception to the general rule. Once a
> target was correctly identified at the aiming point, the bombardier equipped
> with his Norden bombsight could usually hit his precision target.
What target was this precision target?? With bombers covering many acre,
or
square miles I would expect that when the bombs hit the ground
they would fall in the same area as occupied by the bombers.
polo
>
> >
> In that test you quote so mindlessly they hadn't pinned down the ballisitic
> coefficent of the A Bomb at that time. With proper ballistic data resulted in a
> zero error in the drops at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Well Art!! The Bikini test was after WWII. So how could testing and
adjusting the ballistics of the A-Bomb
help eliminate the inaccuracies when bombing
Hiroshima, and Nagasaki.
> Arthur Kramer
> Bombardier Navigator
>
> 344th Bomb Group 494th Bomb Squadron
> 9th Tactical Air Force
ArtKramr
>ArtKramr wrote:
>>
>> >
>> In that test you quote so mindlessly they hadn't pinned down the
>ballisitic
>> coefficent of the A Bomb at that time. With proper ballistic data resulted
>in a
>> zero error in the drops at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
>
>
>Well Art!! The Bikini test was after WWII. So how could testing and
>adjusting the ballistics of the A-Bomb
>help eliminate the inaccuracies when bombing
>Hiroshima, and Nagasaki.
>
>
Different bomb of a different design and ballistic coeffcient.
Arthur
344th Bomb Group, 494th Bomb Squadron, 9th Air Force
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
"In solemn salute to those thousands of our comrades -great, brave men that
Rob Davis
> The RAF were able to bomb targets without doing a lot of damage outside
> the bounds of the target. They bomber the Renault, Rhone, Michelin and
> Phillips [Holland] plants while doing minimal damage to civilians. There
> are many photos showing the bomb patterns, most inside the target bounds.
But this was carried out by specialist aircrew and is not
indicative of general accuracy.
> > Does anyone know what accuracy could be expected when aiming a
> > load of bombs from a heavy bomber flying at 25,000 feet under ideal
> > conditions?
This was rather higher than average RAF "heavy" operating
altitude, which was 18,000-22,000 feet. Errors of under 75 yards
could be achieved by expert crews under ideal conditions. 100
yards was regarded as pretty damn good.
Rob Davis MSc MIAP
Anstey, Leicester UK. 0976 379489
abuse@localhost, postmaster@localhost
Endymion
> With the USAAF bombers covering a large horizontal area, and all bomb
> aimers
> dropping their bombs when they see the bombs leaving the lead aircraft,
> what target were they trying to bomb that could be a precision target??
The fact that they took this scattershot approach doesn't mean the target
itself wasn't a precision target; one could liken this to a hunter shooting
at an individual bird with a shotgun - the bird itself is the target even
if the result of the hunter's tactic is to fill the air with lead and hope
that sufficient hits fall on the actual target to kill it. The object is to
hit the actual target; "hits" on the area around it are essentially
irrelevant, but the weapon itself is inaccurate enough that it is
inevitable that many of the pellets will fly wide.
> If you claim Hamburg, Schweinfurt, Berlin etc as being precision targets
> I would agree with you.
In fact, 8th AF raids didn't target "Hamburg, Schweinfurt, Berlin etc." but
specific installations within those cities - usually a specific factory or
a transportation choke point such as a bridge or railyard. Most of these
targets were larger than a single building but considerably smaller than
just anywhere in the city.
Are you trying to suggest that US bombers simply flew over the city center
of Schweinfurt and let fly with all the ordnance, hoping something vital
might be hit by blind chance? That's a good description of night bombing
methods but nothing like what the USAAF was trying to accomplish.
> What target was this precision target?? With bombers covering many acre,
> or square miles
The number of bombers dropping together wouldn't cover square miles, not
flying in a tight combat box. We're not talking about 300 planes all
dropping together; IIRC the drop was by group, which would mean a few dozen
planes.
> I would expect that when the bombs hit the ground
> they would fall in the same area as occupied by the bombers.
Actually somewhat larger, but I suppose it was felt that this variation was
less than what you'd get if you let all the rookie bombardiers fresh out of
training try and drop individually, and that the lead bombardier would be
reasonably close to the target more often than not..
--
ArtKramr
>From: "Patterson, Dallas W." <n...@fidalgo.net>
>The Norden bombsight proved to be satisfactory for its purpose. Allied
>bombing, precision and area, saved ten to a hundred times more civilian and
>military lives than they sacrificed, Allied and German. The Allied air
>bombardment campaign as a whole was morally justified and legally correct. In
>
>hindsight, we can debate and regret some individual Allied choices, but the
>Allied air campaigns were well justified by the unprecedented Axis
>barbarisms.
>
>Dallas Patterson
>n...@fidalgo.net
>
Excellant summation of the Norden's performance and the results that were
attained. Well thought out and a good rebuff of those who lack the experience
to obtain a balanced view.
Arthur Kramer
Bombardier
polo
>
>
> While this is true, the Norden bombsight that was the subject of the
> original question, was an American design, although fitted to some RAF
> aircraft in the latter part of the war and,
The RAF had their own bomb sights and did not need the Nordsen.
For the last half of the war their sights were second to none
and could be set up in a very few minutes, and the bomber
did not have to be flown straight and level for setting the sight,
or dropping the bombs.
The RAF used their "Course-Setting Bombsight" which required a lot of
time
to set up.
They switched to the Mk XIV Bombsight. Evasive action on the approach to
the target
did not hinder its set up or accuracy.
> thanks to espionage between
> the wars, to some German aircraft. For very high precision bombing, the
> RAF would more likely use a radar based targetting system like Oboe, Gee
> or, later in the war, H2S.
Oboe and Gee were "line of sight" radio receivers and that limited
the targets available. H2S on the other hand was self contained.
After the D-Day landings Gee stations were set up in Europe.
>
> Norden himself, while trying to get the US Government to adopt his
> bombsight, claimed that it could place a bomb in a pickle barrel. RAF
> personnel who knew of this claim were amazed at how large American pickle
> barrels had to be.
>
> Nightjar
Mike McFadden
Nagasaki was a radar drop until the clouds parted and he saw the target and
dropped, he hit the industrial area but due to hills the blast was contained
and did not do as much damage as expected.
Mike
Pat
Rob Davis wrote in message <6vb3bv$1gfe$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu>...
>Remove MAPSON if replying via email
>
>> > load of bombs from a heavy bomber flying at 25,000 feet under ideal
>> > conditions?
>
>This was rather higher than average RAF "heavy" operating
>altitude, which was 18,000-22,000 feet. Errors of under 75 yards
>could be achieved by expert crews under ideal conditions. 100
>yards was regarded as pretty damn good.
>
>Rob Davis MSc MIAP
>Anstey, Leicester UK. 0976 379489
>abuse@localhost, postmaster@localhost
>
Rob,
That is an interesting comment concerning bombing accuracy. Another posting
to this thread had stated that a 1,000 foot radius from the aiming point
was considered good. What is the source of your information that supports
the 100 yard distance?
I have been told by airmen who were there that the B-17 and B-24 heavy
bombers of the USAAF
often flew much higher than their assigned bombing altitude. If assigned to
fly at 20,000 feet, they often flew at 25,000 feet and higher if possible,
to avoid AA fire. My original question on this subject was an attempt to
find out the diameter of the "pickle barrel" (assuming ideal or perfect
conditions)
that the Norden bombsight was supposed to be capable of hitting.
Pat
ArtKramr
>From: George Hardy <geo...@ankerstein.org
>I don't think I am misrepresenting the facts. Instead, I think we are
>in general agreement. Your post supports what I have been saying.
>Accurate bombing was a myth. A miss by a mile was not unusual. Even with
>the Norden, hitting a target was darn hard to do.
I would say that "acccurate bombing was a myth" is an overstatement. Some
bombing was innacurate. Most was accurate. And the bombing campaign resulted in
chocking off fuel supplies (bombing Ploesti etc.) and bringing German planes,
tanks and trucks to a halt ending the war.
George Hardy
<hsch...@fh-harz.de> says:
>
>ArtKramr wrote:
>>
>> It is a waste of a misson to bomb nothing but civilians when
>
>What a remarkable statement. Apparently, the RAF's Bomber Command
>>wasted thousands of missions,
Have some sympathy. The man flew 50 missions. Probably 25%+ of
his compatriots died doing the same. He has to believe that he
was doing more than bombing civilians. He probably was told that
he was bombing important military targets. That the bombs generally
missed and hit only civilian housing was OK with the military
planners; it was exactly what they had scheduled. God only knows what
those who bombed Dresden were told. Some lie, for sure.
Patterson, Dallas
>
>SNIP<
> I appreciate that virtually all American and British veterans
> self deception.
Art Kramer and your cousin risked death, mutilation, and other gruesome
horrors in an effort to save the lives of millions of innocent people they
did not know from the inhuman barbarisms inflicted by the German people you
so vigorously defend. While the German civilians you mischaracterize as
innocents regularly and barbarously employed Allied civilians and POWs in
daily life as domestic and industrial slaves, Art Kramer and your cousin
risked their own selves to halt such barbarisms. In my opinion and that of
many others, it appears you are the person who has the faulty conscience,
not Art Kramer, not your cousin, not Winston Churchill, nor the many other
brave souls who risked everything to stop the crimes of the people of the
Third Reich.
Hitler and the German people attempted to win a war of aggression and
genocide with the use of unrestricted air bombardment upon the Allied
peoples, and they failed. Allied bomber pilots replied in kind as necessary
in a defense to the aggression of the German nation and people. The German
people who supported that aggression demonstrated a faulty conscience. The
Allied aircrews who opposed that evil aggression did so to the best of their
abilities in a good conscience.
The only deception I see here is your own dissemination of disinformation
about WWII and your contempt for people who have demonstrated a far greater
capacity for conscience, compassion, and self-sacrifice than you. If you
insist upon making derogatory comments about the conscience of Allied
aircrews, then we can open a thread regarding German versus Allied morality.
Meanwhile, I suggest that you confine your comments to the thread's
discussion of the Norden Bombsight Accuracy.
Dallas Patterson
n...@fidalgo.net
Jim Erickson
>The RAF had their own bomb sights and did not need the Nordsen.
>For the last half of the war their sights were second to none
>and could be set up in a very few minutes, and the bomber
>did not have to be flown straight and level for setting the sight,
>or dropping the bombs.
>The RAF used their "Course-Setting Bombsight" which required a lot of
>time to set up.
>They switched to the Mk XIV Bombsight. Evasive action on the approach to
>the target did not hinder its set up or accuracy.
The most accurate methods used by the RAF for night bombing were
developed by 617 squadron. They used the "stabilized automatic bomb
sight" or SABS, not the Mk XIV. Like the Norden, the SABS required a
long straight run in to the target for accurate bombing. The Mk XIV was
certainly good enough for area bombing but I've never seen a reputable
source claim that the Mk XIV was as good as the Norden. Perhaps you
could provide some documentation for your claim?
Jim Erickson
BTW, the Oct 7 NY Times carried the obituary of Joe McCarthy the
American pilot who participated in the Dambusters Raid and later served
as flight leader in 617 Squadron. The World mourns the passing of
another honorable man.
George Hardy
says:
>>This was rather higher than average RAF "heavy" operating
>>altitude, which was 18,000-22,000 feet. Errors of under 75 yards
>>could be achieved by expert crews under ideal conditions. 100
>>yards was regarded as pretty damn good. 6-1
>That is an interesting comment concerning bombing accuracy. Another
>posting to this thread had stated that a 1,000 foot radius from the
>aiming point was considered good. What is the source of your information
that supports
>the 100 yard distance?
The only official study (that I know about) by the RAF showed that
only 20% of the bombs hit within 6 miles of the target. That study,
I believe, was done early in the war and resulted in a switch to
a 'just hit the city' policy.
George Hardy
(ArtKramr) says:
>And the bombing campaign resulted in chocking off fuel supplies
>(bombing Ploesti etc.) and bringing German planes, tanks and
>trucks to a halt ending the war. 6-2
I would suggest that the loss of Hungarian and Rumanian oil and
the loss of the synfuel plants in Poland and Silesia was the
reason *far* more than the bombing.
DanWalsh
>God only knows what
>those who bombed Dresden were told. Some lie, for sure.
I did some research on Dresden. It seems the British had completely embraced
an ends-justifies-the-means mindset. The real reasons for the massacre were
twofold: 1) to flood the main roadways throughout the region with fleeing
refugees, thereby stalling the German troop movements heading toward Stalin 2)
To give the Allies a 'bigger stick' at the Yalta conference, lest comrade
Stalin claim he won the war in the East singlehandedly.
In other words, they knew they were bombing the smitherenes out of an
essentially civilian city. What the pilots were told is another thing,
especially the Americans, who had always despised the British tactics of 'area
bombing.' They were told Dresden was a major communication center that housed
many munitions factories. It just wasn't so. Germany was a whupped pup by
then, the war a foregone conclusion. Stephen Ambrose, author of D-Day and
Citizen Soldiers, said the bombing of Dresden was a terrible disgrace for the
Allies.
Dan Walsh
Holger Schaefer
>
> He probably was told that
> he was bombing important military targets. That the bombs generally
> missed and hit only civilian housing was OK with the military
> those who bombed Dresden were told. Some lie, for sure.
Well, I wouldn't blame the Allies for violation of humanity by bombing
German cities. After all, Germany started the war and was the first to
try to destroy cities by air power (whether this was unsuccessful due to
lacking resources is a different matter). War isn't particulary nice and
unfortunately, civilian casualties were very high, even without bombing.
Nevertheless, trying to justify the bombing by claiming that there were
military targets in the cities destroyed is ridiculous. If the American
bomb targeting device was so wonderful, why do they had to bury entire
cities in rubble just to hit the railyards or a factory? Americans
participated in missions deliberately designed to destroy _cities_, not
targets of military value within those cities. The bombing might have
been justified, given the threat to freedom and humanity the German
forces were these times. But I fail to understand why Americans are
unable to admit that they _intended_ to hit cities (and, consequently,
predominantly civilians).
Louis Capdeboscq
> he was bombing important military targets.
Every account I've read from Bomber Command crews states that each time
they bombed was pointed out to them as a major industrial center. They were
not told that they'd be bombing civilians just for the sake of it. So he
very "probably" was told that, yes.
Jim Erickson
>American pilot who participated in the Dambusters Raid and later served
>as flight leader in 617 Squadron. The World mourns the passing of
>another honorable man.
A correction--the obit was carried in the Oct. 5 NY Times. I hadn't
flipped my calendar over to October.
Jim Erickson
Rob Davis
> That is an interesting comment concerning bombing accuracy. Another posting
> to this thread had stated that a 1,000 foot radius from the aiming point
> was considered good. What is the source of your information that supports
> the 100 yard distance?
THE DAM BUSTERS by Paul Brickhill:-
First results were only fair, average errors being about 180
yards, but the crews soon started to get the hang of it.
"Talking Bomb" [S/Ldr Richardson, a sighting expert and designer
of the Stabilised Automatic Bomb Sight] himself was very accurate
with the SABS and before long a couple of crews could emulate
him. [Micky] Martin's was one. Within three weeks, [Bob] Hay
set an example with an average of 64 yards. Some of the others,
however, were still well over a hundred yards and Cochrane [the
Air Officer Commanding] drove over to look into it, got "Talking
Bomb" to give him an hour's instruction on the SABS and took off
a bomb-aimer in "P-Popsie" to try it. On the ground one or two
people indulged in a little introductory lip-smacking. Martin
flew sedately and when Cochrane had called his last "bombs gone"
brough thim straight back. "Talking Bomb" met them with the
results and an expression of great respect. Cochrane had
achieved the extraordinary average of 38 yards. For a moment the
AOC's face loosened into a faint grin but he froze it off and
said crisply "Well, if I can do it, you people ought to be able
to."
Someone muttered in the background "If we all could, we'd all be
AOCs" and that time Cochrane had to laugh.
After he went, Hay said darkly to the other bomb-aimers, "Well
you're going to have to pull your fingers out now." He turned to
Martin : "Hell, Mick, why didn't you kick the rudder when he was
going to bomb?"
ArtKramr
>From: Holger Schaefer <hsch...@fh-harz.de>
>Nevertheless, trying to justify the bombing by claiming that there were
>military targets in the cities destroyed is ridiculous. If the American
>bomb targeting device was so wonderful, why do they had to bury entire
>cities in rubble just to hit the railyards or a factory? Americans
>participated in missions deliberately designed to destroy _cities_, not
>targets of military value within those cities. The bombing might have
>been justified, given the threat to freedom and humanity the German
>forces were these times. But I fail to understand why Americans are
>unable to admit that they _intended_ to hit cities (and, consequently,
>predominantly civilians).
Allow me to point out a few facts. FActories need labor. The main
concentrationsof labot is in cities. Therefore most factories are in cities. In
order to attack enemy manufacturing we have to attack them where they are...in
cities. Of course Germnay could have placed the factories far from cities.
Their failure to do that makes the bombing of cities something forced by
German misplanning. Unless we say that Hitler cared nothing about his
civilian population.
Arthur
George Hardy
>Stephen Ambrose, author of D-Day and Citizen Soldiers, said
>the bombing of Dresden was a terrible disgrace for the
>Allies. 7-1
Ambrose has not held a consistent position on bombing, the
a-bomb or any specific target. One can find Ambrose quotes
to support almost any position regarding Allied bombing. I
think his position has been drifting lately towards 'it was
all OK'.
Patterson, Dallas
>
> In article <19981002233711...@ng44.aol.com>, artk...@aol.com
> (ArtKramr) says:
>
> >And the bombing campaign resulted in chocking off fuel supplies
> >(bombing Ploesti etc.) and bringing German planes, tanks and
> >trucks to a halt ending the war. 6-2
>
> I would suggest that the loss of Hungarian and Rumanian oil and
> the loss of the synfuel plants in Poland and Silesia was the
> reason *far* more than the bombing.
Evidently, your personal opinion is contradicted by the opinions of the
German leadership which support Art Kramer's statemnts.
Generalmajor Albrecht von Massow, A.O.C. Training, [Luftwaffe] said, "The
attack on German oil production opened in 1944 was the largest factor of
all in reducing Germany's war potential."
General Jahn, Commander in Lombardy said, "The attacks on the German
transport system, coordinated with the serious losses in the fuel
industry, had a paralyzing effect not only on the industries attacked but
on all other industries as well."
General Feldmarschall Karl Gerd von Rundstedt, CinC West, said, "Three
factors defeated us in the West where I was in command...Second, the lack
of motor fuel--oil and gas--so that the Panzers and even the remaining
Luftwaffe were unable to move...Our production was also greatly
interfered with by the loss of Silesia and bombardments of Saxony, as
well as the loss of oil reserves in Romania."
Generaleutnant Karl Jacob Veith, A.O.C. Flak Training, said, "The Allied
breakthrough would have been utterly impossible without strategic as well
as tactical bombing. The destruction of the oil industry and the
simultaneous dislocation of the German communication system were
decisive."
General Wolff, SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General of the Waffen SS said,
"The ever increasing disruption of plant and transport facilities
resulted in a supply situation which became more and more unsatisfactory.
The front died of slow starvation."
Generaloberst von Vietinghoff, Supreme Commander Southwest (Italy), said,
"Insofar as it is possible to judge from Italy, it is recognized that
Allied air attacks [on the aircraft and fuel industries] were extremely
successful. This is especially true with reference to attacks on the fuel
industry, which by the end of the war proved to be the decisive factor."
Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering said, "Allied selection of targets was
good, particularly in regard to oil. As soon as we started to repair an
oil installation, you always bombed it again before we could produce one
ton."
Reference
Gurney, Gene, Major. The War in the Air: A Pictorial History of World War
II Air Forces in Combat. New York: Bonanza Books; 1962. Pp. 229-235.
Dallas Patterson
n...@fidalgo.net
Jim Erickson
>> to this thread had stated that a 1,000 foot radius from the aiming point
>> was considered good. What is the source of your information that supports
>> the 100 yard distance?
>THE DAM BUSTERS by Paul Brickhill:-
>First results were only fair, average errors being about 180
>yards, but the crews soon started to get the hang of it.
>"Talking Bomb" [S/Ldr Richardson, a sighting expert and designer
>of the Stabilised Automatic Bomb Sight] himself was very accurate
>with the SABS and before long a couple of crews could emulate
>him. [Micky] Martin's was one. Within three weeks, [Bob] Hay
>set an example with an average of 64 yards.
Not to knock 617's outstanding performance one should keep in mind that:
a) This was practice over a bombing range--not operational flying; b)
there is a good chance that the tests were done well below operational
height with the results mathematically adjusted to simulate bombing from
higher altitude. Although I don't know for sure that b) applies here,
from what I've read it was a common practice, at least over the
Wainfleet practice area.
Jim Erickson
Jukka O. Kauppinen
> try to destroy cities by air power (whether this was unsuccessful due to
> lacking resources is a different matter). War isn't particulary nice and
Wrong. Soviet Union.
Winter War 1939-1940 against Finland saw widespread bombing
of Finnish cities and towns with no military value,
purely terror bombing. This continued till february 1940
when the SU airpower was more moved into tactical role
assisting the renewed ground offensive.
Germany's single city bombing of Warsaw in 1939 was
one single operation, against Soviet Union's terror bombing
campaign lasting about 2 months.
jok
--
Jukka O. Kauppinen jukka.k...@mikrobitti.fi ICQ: 1848 793
Journalist Mail: MikroBitti, Jukka O. Kauppinen,
MikroBitti Kornetintie 8, 00380 HELSINKI, FINLAND
Tel/fax +358-17-824 225 or fax +358-9-120 5747
GSM +358-40-730 0036
http://mikrobitti.fi/~jukkak
http://www.mikrobitti.fi
The best-selling computer magazine in Scandinavia
Holger Schaefer
>
> Allow me to point out a few facts. FActories need labor. The main
> concentrationsof labot is in cities. Therefore most factories are in cities. In
> order to attack enemy manufacturing we have to attack them where they are...in
> cities. Of course Germnay could have placed the factories far from cities.
> Their failure to do that makes the bombing of cities something forced by
> German misplanning. Unless we say that Hitler cared nothing about his
> civilian population.
I didn't mean the casualties that happened when bombs dropped to destroy
factories mistakenly hit civilian housing. This sort of failure happened
all the time and I won't blame anyone for that. I mean the participation
of the USAF (or was it USAAF?) in missions *designed* to destroy cities.
The British clearly stated that they intended to destroy cities and
civilians, to cripple labour force and 'breaking the will to fight' of
the German people. This strategy was an utter failure, but nobody knew
better, as it was the first time that there was an air force large
enough to wipe out cities.
You should take a look at photos of German cities at the end of the war.
Most major cities were destroyed to 80% and more - no matter if there
were factories located nearby or not. My hometown's inner city was
almost completely destroyed, although the next factory was about 3 km
away and the railroad station 2 km. Were your aiming devices really that
inaccurate?
Please note that I don't want to reproach you or the American airforce.
On the contrary, the Allied efforts made sure that I can live in peace
and freedom now. Again, the bombing of civilians might have been
justified - I don't want to make a judgement. But given the results, the
claim 'we bombed only targets of military value' is not very convincing.
Thomas Buell
: >From: Holger Schaefer <hsch...@fh-harz.de>
(...)
Mr Kramer,
I beg to differ in a few points, but first let me make a few statements to
prevent anybody gets me wrong:
I'm not blaming the German bombing casualties on either you personally or
the Americans or the Allied as a whole. In fact I think today we are
lucky that people like you risked their life to fight Germany in WW2.
(Otherwise, for one, I doubt I would have grown up and lived in peace and
democracy, as the generations before could not.)
My family suffered severe losses during WW2 and more so from the air raids
on Hamburg than from actual combat. Despite that I've never heard any
statements like Mr Hardy's from anybody I know. Seems that they neither
rose up against the government, as Douhetism proposed, nor did they go
mad at the Allies, as German propaganda intended. A good read with respect
to this is H.E.Nossack's "Der Untergang", written in November 1943. The
author, banned from publishing '33-'45, describes his experiences during and
after the Hamburg raids.
: Allow me to point out a few facts. FActories need labor. The main
: concentrationsof labot is in cities. Therefore most factories are in cities. In
: order to attack enemy manufacturing we have to attack them where they are...in
: cities. Of course Germnay could have placed the factories far from cities.
: Their failure to do that makes the bombing of cities something forced by
: German misplanning. Unless we say that Hitler cared nothing about his
: civilian population.
I'm not very familiar with the town of Dresden. But the
industrial areas in Hamburg are located not that near the living quarters.
I guess the river Elbe, the Alster lakes and the characteristic churches
in the center of the city would also have helped navigating, the weather was
AFAIK fine (at least for the first wave).
Yet most devastation and the firestorm occurred in districts which
were/are workers' residential areas (e.g. Hamm, Horn) which are located miles
from the big railyards, main industry, Elbe bridges or the harbour and the
shipyards (even wrong side of the river).
My only source at hand says there were 558 factories destroyed as opposed
to 31,467 dead registered by the police, but I've also heard greater numbers.
Furthermore 277,300 resdential buildings were destroyed leaving 900,000
people homeless.
I beg you pardon, but to me this doesn't look very much like no civilians
had been deliberately targeted. (Makes 500 houses destroyed for every
factory.) Also the code name of the operation, "Gomorrha", is not
exactly meaningless.
I am well aware that the RAF did the night attacks and the USAAF those
in daylight and that the USAAF did "precision bombing" whatever that
meant by then. Maybe they accounted for the factories. Perhaps someone more
informed can supply more details about the specific targets.
NB, I don't say Germany did do any better even though to a smaller
scale in city bombing - for technical reasons. In contemporary German
newsreels featuring air raids on London nobody seems to mention military
targets.
regards,
Thomas
--
*SPAM BLOCK: To reply remove spare l from last name*
casita
guard.
Jim Erickson wrote in message <6vilkc$119s$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu>...
Joe Chelena
>> German cities. After all, Germany started the war and was the first to
>> try to destroy cities by air power (whether this was unsuccessful due to
>> lacking resources is a different matter). War isn't particulary nice and
>Germany's single city bombing of Warsaw in 1939 was
>one single operation, against Soviet Union's terror bombing
>campaign lasting about 2 months.
Wrong. Tell that to the Spanish in Guernica and other places, who were
bombed by Germany's Condor Legion during Spanish Civil War.
Jukka O. Kauppinen
Of course, but this discussion was about WW2 and the
bombings happening there. We could of course talk about
the bombing of Chinese cities by Japs, but its like the
Spanish cicil war is out of contex in this thread.
Still, German forces bombing in Spain was still quite
minor. Soviets were the first to do it in really major
scale.
Joe Chelena
>> >> German cities. After all, Germany started the war and was the first to
>> >> try to destroy cities by air power (whether this was unsuccessful due to
>> >> lacking resources is a different matter). War isn't particulary nice and
>> Wrong. Tell that to the Spanish in Guernica and other places, who were
>> bombed by Germany's Condor Legion during Spanish Civil War.
>Of course, but this discussion was about WW2 and the
>bombings happening there. We could of course talk about
>the bombing of Chinese cities by Japs, but its like the
>Spanish cicil war is out of contex in this thread.
>Still, German forces bombing in Spain was still quite
>minor. Soviets were the first to do it in really major
>scale.
And in a like vain, the Russo Finish war is not part of WWII. It was a war
between the USSR and Finland. To put it another way, both were practice
for the coming big show.
---------------------------------------
The last time we mixed religion and politics people were burned at the stake.
Gavin Bailey
>The most accurate methods used by the RAF for night bombing were
>developed by 617 squadron. They used the "stabilized automatic bomb
>sight" or SABS, not the Mk XIV. Like the Norden, the SABS required a
>long straight run in to the target for accurate bombing. The Mk XIV was
>certainly good enough for area bombing but I've never seen a reputable
>source claim that the Mk XIV was as good as the Norden. Perhaps you
>could provide some documentation for your claim?
Off the top of my head, Francis Mason's book on the Lancaster claims
that 9 Sqn (part of Tirpitz missions with 617 Sqn in 1944) used the Mk
XIV Bombsight, and achieved hits. The Mk XIV sight is covered in more
detail in an appendix in Gordon Musgrove's "Pathfinder Force", but I'm
currently seperated from my copy.
Gavin Bailey
--
Fochinell
"Ancient Scots warcry" painted on the side of a Spitfire Mk XIV in 1944
- presumably without Air Ministry approval.
Klaus Petrat
>Allow me to point out a few facts. FActories need labor. The main
>concentrationsof labot is in cities. Therefore most factories are in cities. In
>order to attack enemy manufacturing we have to attack them where they are...in
>cities.
May I suggest to have a look to a map let's say of Nuremberg? Like a
lot of german towns Nuremberg is very old, a bit more then 1000 years.
It had (and still has) a medieval defence wall around it's city. So
there was never room for large factories. Inside the walls were mainly
work shops, especially in Nuremberg for pencils and such things. The
modern heavy indutries with their needs for large room were (and still
are) outside, let's say 5 km to the south, since nobody wanted to
destroy a medieval town.
The main air attacks were directed against the city. This area was
nearly flattened while the industry area was only damaged, but
production went on, mainly tanks and electric equipment, until the end
of the war.
Laborers were never a real problem for the heavy industries, since a
lot of prisoners were available. And prisoners never had their camps
inside a crowded town. So from my point of view (the false side of
bombs) the attacks were simply terror mainly against old men, women
and children.
I'm sure that bomber crews were told about important targets inside
the cities. Only as prisoners they had the possibility to the check
reality.
> Of course Germnay could have placed the factories far from cities.
See above. Factories were mainly outside. Main targets until the
middle of 1944 were NOT the large manufacturing areas.
>Their failure to do that makes the bombing of cities something forced by
>German misplanning. Unless we say that Hitler cared nothing about his
>civilian population.
I'm sorry but german industry did not start with Hitler, it startet in
parallel with England or USA at 1800, and at that time there wasn't
any planning for air attacks.
Best regards
Klaus Petrat
Patterson, Dallas
>
> On 8 Oct 1998 08:08:40 -0700, artk...@aol.com (ArtKramr) wrote:
>
> >Allow me to point out a few facts. FActories need labor. The main
> >concentrationsof labot is in cities. Therefore most factories are in cities. In
> >order to attack enemy manufacturing we have to attack them where they are...in
> >cities.
>
>
> The main air attacks were directed against the city. This area was
> nearly flattened while the industry area was only damaged, but
> production went on, mainly tanks and electric equipment, until the end
> of the war.
> Best regards
> Klaus Petrat
These criticisms are taking Art Kramer's comment out of its intended context. Art
was pointing out that the Norden Bombsight was used in American bombers that
struck factories, and these factories were located in the cities and not in the
rural areas like the underground factories of the Harz Mountains. It is true that
factories were generally located in the suburbs of German cities, and they were
generally not located within the old urban centers. Nonetheless, Art Kramer's
comment was not distinguishing between the older walled city center and the newer
suburban communities of the metropolitan community. He was speaking in context of
the metropolitan community (a city) versus the rural locations beyond the urban
areas. Art's comment simply observed that the factories had come to be located in
the urban (mostly suburban) areas where lower cost skilled labor was located,
rather than the lightly populated rural areas in which some essential factories
were subsequently dispersed in the late stages of the war.
The American daylight air bombardment raids against such precision targets as the
factories caused collateral damage and casualties as stray bombs impacted outside
their intended target area. Since these intended factory targets were usually
found within an urban area, typically a surburban community on the outskirts of
the older parent city center, the stray bombs often impacted within a civilian
urban community. Consequently, the daylight precision bombing of military targets
inevitably resulted in the bombing of urban areas, i.e. surburban cities.
Such an observation in no way denies the fact of Allied area bombing of German
cities and their old urban centers on other occassions. Such Allied area bombing
undisputably occurred. However, that particular subject is not the topic to which
Art Kramer was responding. Art Kramer and I were responding to the topic of the
Norden bombsight and its accuracy with respect to air strikes upon daylight
precision targets. We were explaining why some bombs in an attack upon a precision
target, like a factory, would cause collateral damage and casualties outside the
target area. Discussing the Allied air bombardment of area targets in the urban
centers are discussed in other discussion threads. The area target bombing raids
did not require the accuracy of the Norden bombsight, and such air raids are
outside the scope of this topic and Art's comment.
Dallas Patterson
n...@fidalgo.net
Rob Davis
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Remove MAPSON if replying via email
> a) This was practice over a bombing range--not operational flying; b)
That is a valid point. But, remember that the SABS required a
lengthy run-up to the AP, a practice deemed likely to inflict
unsustainable losses by Main Force. It was only the foresight of
Cochrane which believed that a small force of specialists could
use the SABS effectively.
> there is a good chance that the tests were done well below operational
> height with the results mathematically adjusted to simulate bombing from
I did wonder at this, because Brickhill does not quote altitudes.
It should also be borne in mind that whilst a "regular" bomb load
could well be dropped from 22,000 feet, a Tallboy wasn't
draggable that high - and even less high in the case of the Grand
Slam.
However the beauty of the weapon was that a very near miss did
more damage than a direct hit. Brickhill _does_ make this clear.
Vinicio Giannini
> Allow me to point out a few facts. FActories need labor. The main
> concentrationsof labot is in cities. Therefore most factories are in cities. In
> order to attack enemy manufacturing we have to attack them where they are...in> cities. Of course Germnay could have placed the factories far from cities.
> Their failure to do that makes the bombing of cities something forced by
> German misplanning. Unless we say that Hitler cared nothing about his
> civilian population.
In jan-may 1944 the destination of RAF bomber over Germany target
assigned 53% of the missions over urban zones, 14% over oil plant and
15% over communications and transport. The americans always contested
to Harrys this hateful politic, but he substained that the quickest way
to win the war was to weaken the morale of population.Today we can say
that he was wrong, the better politic could have been the american.
When I say that in 1945 Dresden bombing more than 150,000 civilian were
killed, I don't mean workers, fireman or peasant. I mean a lot of
women and children that were escaping from the east where Red Army was
advancing. The Allied knew it. It has been the worst and useless
bombing action of the war because there were no a single military
target; the only target were the central neighborood, while the
transport system and factories were not bombed.
For the british sir Arthur Harris is a hero.
casita
Berlin raids night after night were simply following a ribbon down a map.
Shortly after Coventry, an airman was offerred the chance to pick his
"Target for tonight". Figured he would pick the Happy Valley IE: Ruhr.
Instead opted for a less heavily defended target. Although I have read/heard
that aircrew from ocuppied countries werent so interested in the stragegic
importance of their targets as opposed to how many Germans per acre lived
there. Ce Le Guerre I guess.
Jim Erickson wrote in message <6vg01
casita
even claimed that in Memphis Belle. I remember when the Bombardier insisted
they take a second run on target to avoid possibly hitting a school.
George Hardy wrote
Cunninghams
were an elite group -- the best of the best -- and no ordinary squadron
could hope to emulate their success. 617 was used throughout the war to
destroy "impossible targets" -- targets that had usually been bombed for
months without result.
Incidentally, bombing practice was from actual operational heights, because
they were usually testing new types of very expensive bombs, that could only
be tested once or twice. On one occasion, some smart ass put the movie
camera to record the test right on the target spot, figuring that there was
no way an aircraft could hit the target with a single bomb from 22,000 ft.
All that was left of the camera was a stinking, smoking crater about 100
yards across.
G. Malcolm Cunningham
Not to knock 617's outstanding performance one should keep in mind that:
>a) This was practice over a bombing range--not operational flying; b)
>there is a good chance that the tests were done well below operational
>height with the results mathematically adjusted to simulate bombing from
Jim Erickson
G. Malcolm Cunningham wrote:
>617's performance was just as outstanding on combat missions, albeit they
>were an elite group -- the best of the best -- and no ordinary squadron
>could hope to emulate their success. 617 was used throughout the war to
>destroy "impossible targets" -- targets that had usually been bombed for
>months without result.
Quite right, but they didn't always hit the target. The tragic raid on
the Dortmund-Ems Canal comes to mind, as does the raid on the French
Viaduct in which Mickey Martin's Bomb Aimer Bob Hay was killed.
>Incidentally, bombing practice was from actual operational heights, because
>they were usually testing new types of very expensive bombs, that could only
>be tested once or twice. On one occasion, some smart ass put the movie
>camera to record the test right on the target spot, figuring that there was
>no way an aircraft could hit the target with a single bomb from 22,000 ft.
>All that was left of the camera was a stinking, smoking crater about 100
>yards across.
You are probably right that practice drops of the rare and expensive
Tallboys and Grand Slams were done from alititude. However, 617 did not
always practice from operational heights since they most often bombed
with conventional ordnance. There is a story reported in Tom Bennett's
"617 Squadron" about a practice run (at ~4,000 ft IIRC) that was aborted
when D. Shannon's aileron cable snapped. The original argument dealt
with the famous incident when Cochrane took a Lanc up and dropped the
bombs right on the target. I speculated that this might have been done
from lower altitude as there was no special type of bomb involved, but
that was just a guess.
Jim Erickson
Dirk Lorek
>G. Malcolm Cunningham wrote:
>
>>617's performance was just as outstanding on combat missions, albeit they
>>were an elite group -- the best of the best -- and no ordinary squadron
>>could hope to emulate their success. 617 was used throughout the war to
>>destroy "impossible targets" -- targets that had usually been bombed for
>>months without result.
>
>Quite right, but they didn't always hit the target. The tragic raid on
>the Dortmund-Ems Canal comes to mind, as does the raid on the French
>Viaduct in which Mickey Martin's Bomb Aimer Bob Hay was killed.
Well, who can demand that they hit everytime. But I respond to the
claim that No 617 Sqn was 'the best of the best' in regard to bombing
accuracy. 617's speciality was accuracy *and* super heavy bombs. In
regard to accuracy, there were others: What about No 8 Group, the
pathfinders? Or Ralph Cochrane's No 5 Group which could bomb very
accurately using the 'time-and-distance run' (a kind of dead
reckoning). Also Oboe was used by this Group. Eventually 3 squadrons
became so good at accuracy, that they could act as pathfinders, either
for the rest of the Group, or even for others like in the Dresden
raid.
Another 'high-accuracy' Group was No 3 once it had been equipped with
GH. This Group contributed highly to the destruction of the German POL
system.
Dirk
_______________________________________________________________________
What am I, Life ? A thing of watery salt, held in cohesion by unresting
cells, which work they know not why, which never halt, myself unwitting
where their Master dwells. - John Masefield -
nightjar
Cunninghams wrote in message <71rbsn$i...@dgs.dgsys.com>...
>....On one occasion, some smart ass put the movie
>camera to record the test right on the target spot, figuring that there
was
>no way an aircraft could hit the target with a single bomb from 22,000
ft.
I recall watching some bomb runs at a coastal range in the 1960s. The
target was a large chequered board on a barge moored out to sea while we
were standing on cliffs. The aircraft were expected to get as close as
possible to the barge without actually hitting it.
One ground attack aircraft came in below us and his bomb wouldn't have
worried anyone standing within a few hundred yards of the target.
Next one was a Vulcan bomber. These were rather large aircraft, but it was
only just visible and then only because were were told exactly where to
look for it. The Vulcan managed to wet the target with the splash.
Colin Bignell
polo
> camera to record the test right on the target spot, figuring that there was
> no way an aircraft could hit the target with a single bomb from 22,000 ft.
> yards across.
>
>
> Not to knock 617's outstanding performance one should keep in mind that:
> >a) This was practice over a bombing range--not operational flying; b)
> >there is a good chance that the tests were done well below operational
> >height with the results mathematically adjusted to simulate bombing from
> >higher altitude. Although I don't know for sure that b) applies here,
> >from what I've read it was a common practice, at least over the
> >Wainfleet practice area.
> >
> >Jim Erickson
> >
617 Squadron hit the Tirpitz from their operational height, with
more than 1 bomb. As each a/c carried only 1 bomb that is
a testement to the skill of all the bomb aimers.
They also hit the Antheor Viaduct from operational height at
night, once again with each aircraft carrying 1 bomb.
617 also from operational height, and at night dropped their single
bombs onto and into the Saumur tunnel, blocking the road for tanks
coming to Normandy from the south.
617 plastered various factories [Renault, Michelin, and the German
military depot at Mailly le Camp in daylight] with very few if any bombs
landing out side the target area.
During the practiice bombing over the target ranges they flew at
"operational altitude, and the hits were measured from the center of
the trget to the crater, and that was the claim for accuracy. The
hits were not adjusted in any way.
Jim Erickson
> Not to knock 617's outstanding performance one should keep in mind that:
> >a) This was practice over a bombing range--not operational flying; b)
> >there is a good chance that the tests were done well below operational
> >height with the results mathematically adjusted to simulate bombing from
> >higher altitude. Although I don't know for sure that b) applies here,
> >from what I've read it was a common practice, at least over the
> >Wainfleet practice area.
> >
> >Jim Erickson
>During the practiice bombing over the target ranges they flew at
>"operational altitude, and the hits were measured from the center of
>the trget to the crater, and that was the claim for accuracy. The
>hits were not adjusted in any way.
Honestly Polo, the next time you want to correct me you should either:
(1) get it right; or (2) provide a source so we can find out why you
didn't. To head-off your applying standard number (2) let's read what
Leonard Cheshire had to say to a new member of 617 sqn in March 1944.
"No new crew is allowed to operate until they have carried out at least
three six-bomb practice exercises at Wainfleet. The results are
computed to a height of 15,000 feet, no matter what the actual height of
a particular exercise. Four of these eighteen bombs have to be within
50 yards of the target. The bombing leader maintains an overall Bombing
Error ladder in his office by crews. Crews move up and down the ladder
as their bombing results are assessed. Thus, a good exercise this week
could be marred, or wiped out, by a carelessly dropped bomb in an
exercise the following week. A crews' position on the ladder is
determined by the average error of ALL their Wainfleet exercises, right
from the time they join the squadron, and position on the ladder can
make the difference in being called to operate and not, and also what
bomb-load or duty they are allocated on an operation. Consequently,
there is a great competition to stay in the top area of the bombing
ladder and bombing exercises at Wainfleet get the same careful attention
as bombing on an actual target."
Source: Chapter 4 of "617 SQUADRON--The Dambusters at War" by Tom
Bennett.
>617 plastered various factories [Renault, Michelin, and the German
>military depot at Mailly le Camp in daylight] with very few if any bombs
>landing out side the target area.
I'm surprised that you would cite Mailly le Camp as one of 617s
successes. It was a night raid to a FRENCH target that cost 42 out of
362 Lancasters! The main reason for the high loss was that it took 617
squadron too long to mark the target and to assess whether the marking
was good enough. Consequently the night fighters caught the bombers
milling about waiting to bomb and the slaughter ensued. Yes they
plastered the target--but so did the Americans at Schweinfurt. I know
that you have repeatedly termed the US raids on Schweinfurt as terrible
failures because of the high losses so why not apply the same standard
to the RAF losses over this short range French target?
In keeping with my first point above I'm not going to cite a reference,
instead I've applied my first standard. Maybe you'll be inspired to do
a bit of research to try to show that I'm wrong.
Jim Erickson
ArtKramr
>From: Jim Erickson <jw...@columbia.edu>
>"No new crew is allowed to operate until they have carried out at least
>three six-bomb practice exercises at Wainfleet. The results are
>computed to a height of 15,000 feet, no matter what the actual height of
>a particular exercise. Four of these eighteen bombs have to be within
>50 yards of the target.
In the USAAC we called it CE....circle of error.
Arthur Kramer
344th Bomb Group,9th Air Force
England France Belgium Holland Germany
Jim Erickson
>Arthur Kramer
Art,
I've wondered about how common practice bombing was once you got to
Europe. The RAF's 617 sqn was a special unit of volunteers dedicated to
developing and carrying out new marking and bombing techniques so it
makes sense that they would have devoted a lot of time to practice.
What about "regular" squadrons? Did they have the time to carry out
practice drops or did the pace of operations leave no time for such
things? I know you can't speak for the RAF, but what about the 344th
and other USAAC units? If so, maybe you could give us a few details
about how this was carried out and what the CE rating meant for a
bombardier and crew.
Jim Erickson
Rick Beach
ArtKramr wrote:
> >a particular exercise. Four of these eighteen bombs have to be within
> >50 yards of the target.
>
> In the USAAC we called it CE....circle of error.
CEP - Circular Error Probable - is somewhat different than the
description above. Circular Error Probable (CEP) is the value of the
radius of a circle, centered at the actual position that contains 50% of
the events. In the above example the Circular Error would be some number
larger than 50 yards since you would need to account for the strikes of
the next 5 closest bombs from the total of eighteen.
I've always wondered why Circular Error was chosen to describe the
accuracy instead of some more informative value like Root Mean Square. A
one RMS figure would contain about 65% of the events and a two RMS value
would account for 95% of the events. The Circular Error value gives zero
information about how far off the other 50% were. The RMS value OTOH by
simple multiplication can encompass all the data giving a much better
understanding of the performance.
The Circular Error is of course the smaller of these numbers and looks
better even though it isn't as descriptive. Some GPS manufacturers today
quote CE because it makes the equipment look better to say 25m CE than
to say 100m 2xRMS but for the user the second figure is more important.
Rick
Donald Phillipson
> I've wondered about how common practice bombing was once you got to
> Europe. The RAF's 617 sqn was a special unit of volunteers dedicated to
> developing and carrying out new marking and bombing techniques so it
> makes sense that they would have devoted a lot of time to practice.
> What about "regular" squadrons? Did they have the time to carry out
> practice drops or did the pace of operations leave no time for such
RAF experience concerning accuracy is described in the
(several) books of Martin Middlebrook and Max Hastings.
--
| Donald Phillipson, 4180 Boundary Road, Carlsbad Springs, |
| Ontario, Canada, K0A 1K0, tel. 613 822 0734 |
ArtKramr
>CEP - Circular Error Probable - is somewhat different than the
>description above. Circular Error Probable (CEP) is the value of the
>radius of a circle, centered at the actual position that contains 50% of
>the events. In the above example the Circular Error would be some number
>larger than 50 yards since you would need to account for the strikes of
>the next 5 closest bombs from the total of eighteen.
>
> I've always wondered why Circular Error was chosen to describe the
>accuracy instead of some more informative value like Root Mean Square. A
>one RMS figure would contain about 65% of the events and a two RMS value
>would account for 95% of the events. The Circular Error value gives zero
>information about how far off the other 50% were. The RMS value OTOH by
>simple multiplication can encompass all the data giving a much better
>understanding of the performance.
>
> The Circular Error is of course the smaller of these numbers and looks
>better even though it isn't as descriptive. Some GPS manufacturers today
>quote CE because it makes the equipment look better to say 25m CE than
>to say 100m 2xRMS but for the user the second figure is more important.
>
>Rick
>
>
>
>
Actually, once in combat, we had three categories for bombing accuracy; the
first was "good". That meant that a very large percentage (I ferget the number)
hit the target. The second was "poor". That meant that a small percentage hit
the target but a greater number missed. The third was "gross" or gross error
which means that none of the bombs hit the target. In all the missons I flew,
we had only one "gross" and a few "poor" Most were "good". By examining strike
photos we could do a careful analysis, even to determing who was out of
formation and by how much.
Christopher Morton
>Actually, once in combat, we had three categories for bombing accuracy; the
Was there ANY work done on more accurate bombs that you saw?
I've seen repeated references to the innate inaccuracy of the bombs
used during WWII, but other than AZON and RAZON, I've never heard of
any work done to improve that, that didn't involve winged glide bombs
or missiles.
---
Having a bad day? It takes 42 muscles to frown, but only 4 to pull the
trigger of a decent sniper rifle.
Dr. John D. Taylor
Jim Erickson
I've wondered about whether or not US combat crews practiced bombing
after arriving in Europe. Did you have time to practice or did the pace
of combat prevent that? Perhaps you could fill us in on the standard
practice methods for bombing (Stateside or overseas), and what the CE
value meant in terms of a Bombardier's and crews' responsibilites.
Jim Erickson
ArtKramr
>I've wondered about how common practice bombing was once you got to
>Europe.
Once we got to Europe we did no practice bombing. It was all for real. Our
mission schedule was so intense that there was no time for practice.
Besides, we didn't need it. We got all the parctice we needed on real
missions.
ArtKramr
>>Actually, once in combat, we had three categories for bombing accuracy; the
>
>Was there ANY work done on more accurate bombs that you saw?
>
>I've seen repeated references to the innate inaccuracy of the bombs
>used during WWII, but other than AZON and RAZON, I've never heard of
>any work done to improve that, that didn't involve winged glide bombs
>or missiles.
>
Actaully we had very little problem with wild bombs. If abomb was of weight or
had a bent fin, it would fall outside the pattern. The greatest problem to
accuracy was weather, visibility and winds aloft. Bomb accuracy was the least
of our problems.
Jim Erickson
>>Europe.
>Once we got to Europe we did no practice bombing. It was all for real. Our
>mission schedule was so intense that there was no time for practice.
>Besides, we didn't need it. We got all the parctice we needed on real
>missions.
>Arthur Kramer
Art,
I'm curious about how the lead bombardiers were picked? Was there one
guy who was clearly better than the others that earned this assignment.
If so, did his crew become the lead crew or did they transfer the best
bombardier to another crew? I'm assuming that most planes in the
squadron dropped their bombs when the lead bombardier did, but perhaps
I'm mistaken.
Jim Erickson
polo
>
>
> I'm surprised that you would cite Mailly le Camp as one of 617s
> successes. It was a night raid to a FRENCH target that cost 42 out of
> 362 Lancasters! The main reason for the high loss was that it took 617
> squadron too long to mark the target and to assess whether the marking
> was good enough.
My suggestion that Mailly was a success was because of the damage done
to the military barracks and sheds, in spite of the losses. The
accuracy at Mailly was as good and as successful as other accurate
raids on various targets.
> Consequently the night fighters caught the bombers
> milling about waiting to bomb and the slaughter ensued. Yes they
> plastered the target--but so did the Americans at Schweinfurt. I know
> that you have repeatedly termed the US raids on Schweinfurt as terrible
> failures because of the high losses so why not apply the same standard
> to the RAF losses over this short range French target?
To call Schweinfurt a success or failure [which I never have] should be
based on the damage to the target. The fact that losses were high does
not alter the success or failure of the raid, unless you are saying
that it was not a failure because of the high losses, and ignoring the
damage on the target.
> In keeping with my first point above I'm not going to cite a reference,
> instead I've applied my first standard. Maybe you'll be inspired to do
> a bit of research to try to show that I'm wrong.
Alright:
Dambuster Operation:
617 Squadron successfully attacked the Ruhr dams from 60 feet,
estroying
2 dams and losing 9 Lancasters each with 7 aircrew. Eleven aircraft
returned. This was a success because 2 out of the 3 dams were
destroyed.
It was not more or less successful because of the high losses.
617 [Dambusters] Squadron successfully attacked the Dortmund Ems canal
from 200/300 feet, also taking many losses.
617 Squadron marked for Mailly le Camp for 2000/3000 feet and enough damage
was done to call the raid a success.
617 Squadron and 9 Squadron and 1 Lancaster from 463 Sq. attacked the
Tirpitz in a Norwegian fjord and
made two hits and three near misses, using 12,000 lb Tallboys.
The attack once more was a success, the Tirpitz rolled over and sank.
Seeing as you have a very narrow definition of "OPERATIONAL ALTITUDE"
can you point out which ONE if any of the above operations took place
at OPERATIONAL ALTITUDE, and which 3 or 4 were not at operational
altitude.
In March of 1944 the first 2 dummy Tallboys were ready and were
dropped over the range from 20,000 ft.exceeded the speed of sound and
sank 80 feet into the ground. The first LIVE bomb was then dropped and
the scientists wanted to hotograph the bomb from the ground and one of
the RAF observers suggested that he camera be placed at the center of
the target, as it would not be hit. The bomb came down hit the camera
and destroyed it. The first raid using tallboys was against the SAUMUR
Tunnel which was blocked stopping Panzers coming from the south of
France to Normandy.
A.V.M. Cochrane in Sept. 1943 decreed that because the tall boys were
not plentiful practise must be started. To be effective the tallboys
had to be dropped from at least 20,000 feet. To be allowed to drop the
tallboy the crew must achieve a bombing error of less than 100 yards.
After practise and instrument calibration the Squadron achieved an
average bombing error of 10 yards from 20,000 ft operational altitude.
Actual hits were measured, without arithmetic correction.
ArtKramr
>>I've wondered about how common practice bombing was once you got to
>>>Europe.
>
>>Once we got to Europe we did no practice bombing. It was all for real. Our
>>mission schedule was so intense that there was no time for practice.
>>Besides, we didn't need it. We got all the parctice we needed on real
>>missions.
>I'm curious about how the lead bombardiers were picked? Was there one
>guy who was clearly better than the others that earned this assignment.
>If so, did his crew become the lead crew or did they transfer the best
>bombardier to another crew? I'm assuming that most planes in the
>squadron dropped their bombs when the lead bombardier did, but perhaps
>I'm mistaken.
Lead bombardiers were chosen on experience and record. Sometimes that meant
the entire crew would fly lead, but sometimes it meant that the bombardier
would be transferred to the lead plane, especially when our CO flew lead and he
would pick a favorite bombardier to fly with him. Our crew regularly flew
deputy lead ready to assume the lead position should anything happen to the
lead plane. On several occassions I flew with the lead plane but without my
regular crew, and on other occasions my pilot was picked to take the lead with
another crew. But the vast majority of missons we flew together as a crew all
the time.
polo
> I'm curious about how the lead bombardiers were picked? Was there one
> guy who was clearly better than the others that earned this assignment.
> If so, did his crew become the lead crew or did they transfer the best
> bombardier to another crew? I'm assuming that most planes in the
> squadron dropped their bombs when the lead bombardier did, but perhaps
> I'm mistaken.
Was this for precision bombing, or carpet bombing?????
Jim Erickson
> In March of 1944 the first 2 dummy Tallboys were ready and were
>dropped over the range from 20,000 ft.exceeded the speed of sound and
Who dropped these bombs? Does anyone know if 617 dropped (m)any
Tallboy's in practice?
>A.V.M. Cochrane in Sept. 1943 decreed that because the tall boys were
>not plentiful practise must be started. To be effective the tallboys
>had to be dropped from at least 20,000 feet. To be allowed to drop the
>tallboy the crew must achieve a bombing error of less than 100 yards.
>After practise and instrument calibration the Squadron achieved an
>average bombing error of 10 yards from 20,000 ft operational altitude.
>Actual hits were measured, without arithmetic correction.
Perhaps you could provide a reference for your claims about the methods
used for practice with Tallboys? I hope it's not Brickhill. His book
is interesting to read and he tells a good story, but it was written a
long time ago, in ignorance of numerous facts and details.
BTW, you might be interested to know that 617 dropped its Tallboys on
the Tirpitz from ~16,000 feet. I guess they didn't have to be dropped
from over 20,000 feet; which is a good thing, since a fully laden
Lancaster would have had considerable trouble achieving that altitude.
A final point with regard to 617. You've focused on the high profile
raids with Tallboys and Grandslams, but 617 didn't just drop Tallboys.
The vast majority of their raids were carried out with "conventional"
ordnance. I know the Samaur tunnel and Tirpitz et al. get most of the
attention, but 617s most important contribution was to develop accurate
marking methods for 5 Group.
Jim Erickson
Jim Erickson
>To call Schweinfurt a success or failure [which I never have] should be
>based on the damage to the target. The fact that losses were high does
>not alter the success or failure of the raid, unless you are saying
>that it was not a failure because of the high losses, and ignoring the
>damage on the target.
I apologize for putting words in your mouth about Schweinfurt.
Losses are an important part of the assessment as to whether a raid was
successful or not. Sometimes the target was so important that enormous
losses were acceptable, sometimes the target did not justify the loss of
trained aircrew and expensive bombers. Simply because a target was
plastered does not make a raid a success. It's also important to put the
raid in its strategic context. If the losses were such that the bomber
offensive could no longer be maintained, the raid was a failure in the
larger strategic context. To take a few (mostly well known) examples:
Mailly le Camp--the losses were too high for the kind of tactical
target. I've never seen any description of the raid that would suggest
otherwise.
Schweinfurt--I think this was a success as far as the single raid, but a
failure strategically. The failure was two-fold. First, the losses
were the final straw that ended unescorted deep penetration raids into
Germany. Second, to be effective strategically, the US had to knock out
enough ball bearing production to affect the war effort. This could
only be done by attacking the entire ball bearing industry and the
losses on the 2nd raid (and in the weeks before) precluded the US from
attacking the industry with sufficient force to have a real strategic
effect.
The RAF offensive against Berlin--Overall a failure for the RAF, as the
COST WAS TOO HIGH IN RELATION TO THE DAMAGE achieved. Individually
there were a few very successful raids (serious damage w/o crippling
losses) and a number of toss-ups and a few catastrophes. This is a
fascinating and complex topic. If you're interested in it you really
should read Middlebrooks' the Berlin Raids.
And a few you brought up:
>Dambuster Operation:
>617 Squadron successfully attacked the Ruhr dams from 60 feet,
>destroying 2 dams and losing 9 Lancasters each with 7 aircrew. Eleven aircraft
>returned. This was a success because 2 out of the 3 dams were
>destroyed. It was not more or less successful because of the high losses.
I think that the raid was a success because of the real morale lift in
gave Bomber Command, as opposed to effect on the German war effort.
Yes, two dams were destroyed, but the Eder dam was completely irrelevant
to the German war effort, and the one that was not destroyed --the
Sorpe--was strategically the most important of the three. (I know this
goes against what's in Brickhill's ancient book but all the later
research on the raid comes to the conclusion that it was of little
strategic value.) Apart from the failure to breach the Sorpe, the other
reason why the raid had little long term effect was that the RAF allowed
the Germans to rebuild the Mohne dam in time for the next wet season.
Had they prevented repairs they would have had a more long lasting
impact. It's interesting to note that Barnes Wallis pressed the RAF to
bomb the breached Mohne dam for this very reason. Unfortunately he was
ignored--another example of Bomber Command and Harris's inability to
capitalize on and reinforce their successes.
>617 [Dambusters] Squadron successfully attacked the Dortmund Ems canal
>from 200/300 feet, also taking many losses.
Actually these attacks were a complete failure since they did not breach
the canal and cost more than half the attacking force. It was after this
raid that Mick Martin took over command of 617. IIRC there were only
three of the original crews left after this attack, Gibson's having died
with the new CO.
>617 Squadron and 9 Squadron and 1 Lancaster from 463 Sq. attacked the
>Tirpitz in a Norwegian fjord and made two hits and three near misses,
>using 12,000 lb Tallboys. The attack once more was a success, the Tirpitz
>rolled over and sank.
A nice piece of bombing for sure. (You should keep in mind, however,
that there were two unsuccessful raids by 617 in the weeks before.)
Nonetheless it was of little significance to the war effort as the
Tirpitz was an irrelevancy by mid-1944. If the RAF had sunk the ship in
1942 or even 1943 it would have been an important strategic achievement;
as it was it has been dismissed, crudely, but not unjustifiably, as a
nice "parlor trick".
Jim Erickson
ArtKramr
>From: Jim Erickson
>Losses are an important part of the assessment as to whether a raid was
>successful or not. Sometimes the target was so important that enormous
>losses were acceptable, sometimes the target did not justify the loss of
>trained aircrew and expensive bombers. Simply because a target was
>plastered does not make a raid a success. It's also important to put the
>raid in its strategic context. If the losses were such that the bomber
>offensive could no longer be maintained, the raid was a failure in the
>larger strategic context. To take a few (mostly well known) examples:
>
But we must tell the whole story such as " the target was destroyed but losses
were unacceptably high". Just saying the mission was a falure leads some to
assume the bombers missed the target, which isn't true. To just say that losses
werecvery high, is only part of the story. We must have results plus losses to
make decision concering success or failure of missions. Also, was the target
rebiult by the enemy. And if so how long did it take and should we hit it again
depending on its strategic importance.
Rob Davis
> Losses are an important part of the assessment as to whether a raid was
> successful or not. Sometimes the target was so important that enormous
Agreed. Taking the Dams as an example, the loss of 8 (not 9 as
per the previous quote) from 19 was dreadful, and the results
less than expected. But the sucess was measured just as much in
terms of propaganda. "Success creating success" as the saying
goes. Lots of positive publicity at a time when there was little
else to shout about. Plus, encouraging people to volunteer for
aircrew, and so on, what you might call indirect benefit.
> The RAF offensive against Berlin--Overall a failure for the RAF, as the
> COST WAS TOO HIGH IN RELATION TO THE DAMAGE achieved. Individually
Again I agree. The earlier Battle of the Ruhr was successful,
but the Battle of Berlin was two giants just slugging each other
to a bloodied standstill. Neither side could claim victory.
> goes against what's in Brickhill's ancient book but all the later
Agreed yet again. Brickhill is fine on general points and his
books are must-haves; but he is often mistaken, or plain wrong,
on the fine details (viz, the wrong "Ross" in THE DAM BUSTERS).
In his defence, I must state that much of his writing occurred
when full details were still classified.
> the Germans to rebuild the Mohne dam in time for the next wet season.
I never understood why this should have been allowed and no
specialist has ever given me a satisfactory explanation. Even if
a full scale Main Force operation was not feasible, an occasional
dump of a few cookies would have knocked down the scaffolding,
killed the workers, smashed equipment etc and delayed the rebuild
no end.
Perhaps High Wycombe rcognised that the strategic results of the
Dams Raid were less than anticipated - and ignored the target
after this.
> three of the original crews left after this attack, Gibson's having died
> with the new CO.
Picky point, but F/Lt R Trevor-Roper (rear gunner to Gibson on
the Dams) died with 97 Sqdn on Nuremburg, 30/31-3-44; and F/Sgt
Pulford, (flight engineer on Dams) died with 617 Sqdn's S/Ldr
Bill Suggitt in a crash in January 1944. Gibson in ENEMY COAST
AHEAD states that his crew died with Holden, but he must have
known that this was not the case, as he died _after_ both
Holden's, Trevor-Roper's and Pulford's deaths.
I'll post details of the various crews if you haven't the info
already.
> A nice piece of bombing for sure. (You should keep in mind, however,
[snip]
> as it was it has been dismissed, crudely, but not unjustifiably, as a
> nice "parlor trick".
Again I agree, a well stated argument. What we would do without
the magic of 20/20 hindsight, I just don't know!
Rob Davis MSc MIAP
Anstey, Leicester UK. 0976 379489
Jim Erickson
>were unacceptably high". Just saying the mission was a falure leads some to
>assume the bombers missed the target, which isn't true. To just say that losses
>werecvery high, is only part of the story. We must have results plus losses to
>make decision concering success or failure of missions. Also, was the target
>rebiult by the enemy. And if so how long did it take and should we hit it again
>depending on its strategic importance.
>Arthur Kramer
>344th Bomb Group,9th Air Force
>England France Belgium Holland Germany
You are quite right, of course. Most missions must have had some aspect
of success and some of failure and too often it's the failure that gets
emphasized. There are a lot of reasons why we tend to focus on the
tragedies and failures, but to properly assess them we've got to
consider what went right as well. I suspect that one reason for the
over emphasis of losses and defeat is that its the easiest thing to
measure. Losses are painfully evident, but damage, and especially
strategic impact, can be very difficult to assess, even with the benefit
of historical hindsight.
Jim Erickson
michael rumney
At the outbreak of the war advocates of heavy bombers had the upper hand.
They'd convinced themselves and most politicians that bombing would win
the war. 'The bomber will always get through.' They'd invested so much
time, money and emotional energy in it that the consequences of admitting
that bombing might not win the war were too awful to contemplate. They'd
believed that bombing would so demoralize the enemy population it would
force its government to sue for peace. When this didn't happen they said
it was because they simply hadn't bombed enough. This was true of both
sides. How it is that Hitler didn't fire Goering and Churchill didn't fire
Harris is a mystery to me.
ArtKramr
>From: Jim Erickson
>You are quite right, of course. Most missions must have had some aspect
>of success and some of failure and too often it's the failure that gets
>emphasized. There are a lot of reasons why we tend to focus on the
>tragedies and failures, but to properly assess them we've got to
>consider what went right as well. I suspect that one reason for the
>over emphasis of losses and defeat is that its the easiest thing to
>measure. Losses are painfully evident, but damage, and especially
>strategic impact, can be very difficult to assess, even with the benefit
>of historical hindsight.
>
>Jim Erickson
Jim, The failure of a mission has nothing to do with the accuracy o fthe
bombsight. The Norden Bombsight was exremely accurate with a small error that
was a function of the cross trail angles and was zero at zero drift and
increased as drift angles increased . But if a mission failed due to flak, or
fighters, or heavy losses or to weather all these have zero to do with the
accuracy of the bombsight. The title of this thread in no way is related to
the contents of this thread. Under ideal conditons, the Norden could indeed put
a bomb in a pickle barrel from 10,000 feet. But ideal conditions were rarely if
ever met. But you can't blame the Norden for that.
ArtKramr
Very interesting. But you understand that your message has nothing to do with
the inherent accuracy of the Norden Bombsight.
Your message has everything to do with the psychodynamics of populations to
bombing and the emotional commitments of officers to their plans and
projections. The inherent accuracy of the Norden is another matter.