What Happened with Von Paulus after Stalingrad ?
Pepe
I´m Looking for information about Von Paulus.
What happened with him after his withdraw in Stalingrad?
Rich Rostrom
"Pepe" <pe...@usa.net> wrote:
> I´m Looking for information about Von Paulus.
>
> What happened with him after his withdraw in Stalingrad?
Feldmarschal Friedrich Paulus (not "von Paulus", he was no
aristocrat) did not withdraw from Stalingrad. On January 31, 1943
he surrendered to Soviet forces with his HQ troops. (Other pockets
of Germans in Stalingrad held out for two more days.)
Hitler was enraged by Paulus' surrender. It was the first time a
German field marshal had been captured - ever. When Hitler promoted
Paulus to field marshal, it was with the expectation that Paulus
would die in battle to sustain this record.
Paulus and some other captured officers formed a "National Committee
for Free Germany" under Soviet control; and Paulus made radio to
Germany urging surrender to the Allies.
At Nuremburg, Paulus testified for the prosecution; in 1953 he
settled in East Germany; he died in 1957.
--
Rich Rostrom | You could have hit him over the head with it and he
| wouldn't have minded. He never did mind being hit
R-Rostrom@ | with small things like guns and axe handles.
bgu.edu | - Ellis Parker Butler, "That Pup of Murchison's"
kl...@cableol.co.uk
On 13 Mar 1997 04:15:57 GMT, "Pepe" <pe...@usa.net> wrote:
>I´m Looking for information about Von Paulus.
>
>What happened with him after his withdraw in Stalingrad?
>
I know after his surrender that there were long talks with him by
German anti-nazi dissidents (communist exiles)-Wilhelm Pieck and
Walter Ulbricht in a POW camp outside Moscow. This was late June 1943.
They wanted him to join the 'Free Germany' movement, which wanted
POW's to influence Whermacht troops to confince them that the nazi
cause was futile, and to overethrow Hitler.
In fact Ulbricht was in Stalingrad-on the Russian side-with a
megaphone trying to get German troops to surrender. With only 90,000
being captured-out of some 300,000, this was not very succesfull.
Field Marshall Paulus (I do not think he had 'von' in his name),
however, eventaully joined the 'Free Germany' movement and put his
signature to it in summer of 1944. This was after the major defeats in
the Russian offensive of 1944, with Army group centre being surrounded
and defeated. Their resistance was hardly the same as the resistance
in Stalingrad, which made Paulus more pessismistic (as well as
countless other Officers and Generals who also signed-some 50 officers
alone from the remnants of AG centre).
Thats all I know of him in his captivity period.
Regards,
Kevin.
Charles T Watkins
On 3-13-97 "Pepe" <pe...@usa.net> wrote:
> I'm looking for information about Von Paulus.
> What happened with him after his withdraw in Stalingrad?
Well, as it turns out, von Paulus was forbidden by Hitler to withdraw his
troops from Stalingrad. Von Paulus knew that would be the only way he
could save the 6th Army, and part of the 4th Panzer Army. In December
1942 Field Marshall Erich von Manstein launched an offensive, called
Operation Winter Storm, which was an attempt to break the Russian ring (
the name of the Russian operation to trap the 6th Army was called
Operation Ring) that surrounded von Paulus's forces. Von Manstein's
plan to save von Paulus's trapped forces failed. A subsequent air lift
operation by Goering's Luftwaffe also failed.
When Hitler realized that von Manstein had failed to save von Paulus and
the 6th Army, Hitler promoted von Paulus to the rank of Field Marshall.
This was on January 30, 1943. Hitler knew that no Field Marshall had
ever surrendered his forces before in the history of the German Army.
Many historians are of the opinion that Hitler really wanted von Paulus
to commit suicide, rather than surrender Stalingrad. Other historians
believe that Hitler promoted von Paulus because he had shown bravery by
refusing to surrender. In any event, instead of committing suicide, von
Paulus surrendered the following day, January 31. When Hilter heard that
news, he went into a tirade that lasted for days.
General Chumilov, the Russian general who took von Paulus's surrender,
was dumbfounded and couldn't believe the Russians had actually captured a
Field Marshall. Von Paulus was even asked for his military ID card to
prove his identity, and to prove that he was indeed the commander of the
German 6th Army.
Von Paulus remained a POW in Russia for the remainder of the war. He was
very bitter, and felt that he had been betrayed by Hitler for Hitler's
refusal to allow him to withdraw his forces. In mid-1944 he began giving
broadcasts urging German soldiers to give up the fight. In time, the
Germans considered von Paulus a traitor. Besides the anti-war
broadcasts, von Paulus testified against German fascism on behalf of the
Russian prosecutors at the Neurenberg War Trials in 1946.
Von Paulus was not released from custody until 1953. Due to his
broadcasts and testimony at Neurenberg, he settled in the
soviet-controlled zone of Germany, where he remained until his death In
1957.
Tim Watkins
"Flying is the second greatest thrill known to man - landing is the
first"!
Dragan Antulov
"Pepe" <pe...@usa.net> wrote:
>I4m Looking for information about Von Paulus.
>What happened with him after his withdraw in Stalingrad?
He didn't withdrew. He surrendered, together with the remains of his
6th Army, on January 31st 1943.
During his capture, Hitler offered Stalin's son Yakov, German POW, to
be exchanged for Von Paulus. Stalin refused which resulted in Yakov
dying in concentration camp.
During the rest of his capture, Von Paulus joined something called
"Free Germany" comittee. Whether it was the result of his genuine
disgust with Hitler or the effort to escape the destiny of his less
fortunate subordinates in Siberia is debatable. However, the Soviets
weren't too happy about him and they released him in 1953. Von Paulus
died in East Germany on February 11th 1957.
Dragan Antulov
E-mail: dragan....@st.tel.hr
dragan....@altbbs.fido.hr
Fido: 2:381/100
Peter Habala
Charles T Watkins (wb6...@juno.com) wrote:
: Well, as it turns out, von Paulus was forbidden by Hitler to withdraw his
: troops from Stalingrad. Von Paulus knew that would be the only way he
: could save the 6th Army, and part of the 4th Panzer Army.
Not true I am afraid. I don't care what Paulus said after the war or after
the Stalingrad, but when the Russian breakthrough happened, it was Paulus
who refused to withdraw, even before the Hitler's order. There are
numerous proofs for it, Paulus' own reports and also memoirs of people
that talked to Paulus during the first stage of the siege.
The reason why Paulus did not want to break out is logical and people
usually overlook it, happy to put blame on Hitler (this especially applies
to surviving German generals, who reinvented history in their memoirs
quite a lot). When Russians broke through the lines and started the
surrounding moves, Paulus' army was sitting in Stalingrad, deployed to
take the city, so even if it wanted, it could not break out for several
days anyway. Moreover, because they were fighting in the city, great
proportion of the 6th army transport was withdrawn. So even if Paulus
decided to simply run for it, he would be unable to take out war material,
would lose his injured and his whole army would turn into a gang of
individual soldiers trying to get out.
Faced with the choice of destroying his army as an organized unit for the
sake of saving men (how many is debatable) or staying in place, deploy his
forces and hope in linking with the remaining forces, Paulus (and Hitler
and also other generals, who quickly forgot about their decisions when
remembering those days later) decided to stay. Of course we know in
hindsight that eventually Germany lost more, but how were they to know?
Later, when the attempt to relief failed, it became clear that a break-out
was the only option, but by then it was late. Note also that even then
Paulus did not change his opinion. Any excuses about him just following
orders are bogus, he did not follow them when he surrendered.
Bye, pH.
Drazen Kramaric
Peter Habala wrote:
much good stuff snipped
> Faced with the choice of destroying his army as an organized unit for the
> sake of saving men (how many is debatable) or staying in place, deploy his
> forces and hope in linking with the remaining forces, Paulus (and Hitler
> and also other generals, who quickly forgot about their decisions when
> remembering those days later) decided to stay. Of course we know in
> hindsight that eventually Germany lost more, but how were they to know?
Hitler's decision was also based on Mansteins's belief that he could
break the siege with enough strength and Goering's claim that Luftwaffe
could supply 6th Army.
However, what Hitler and OKW failed to do is to shorten the frontline in
Caucausus and give Manstein some real force (5th SS Viking Divn and
others) to break Soviet siege. Instead, Manstein had to wait for
reinforcements to come from France?!!
There is also a question of Soviet losses during Stalingrad campaign.
everybody keeps talking about 300000 trapped Germans and Rumanians but
failed to say anything about Soviet losses. In fact they were enormous.
Some recent Russian study shows about 900000 Soviet casualties during
campaign.
German losses were huge, but with sacrifice of 6th Army, Germans were
able to pull their Army Group from Caucausus and stabilize the front.
Germany lost its chance for victory at Stalingrad, but war was lost at
Kursk.
Drax
Georg Schwarz
"Pepe" <pe...@usa.net> writes:
>I=B4m Looking for information about Von Paulus.
>What happened with him after his withdraw in Stalingrad?
after his surrender you mean? He got a POW of the Soviets and stayed in
captivity in Russia until sometimes in the 50s. In the final months of th=
e
war he joined the "National Committee for a Free Germany", an Anti-Hitler
committee of German POWs supported by the Soviet Union (BTW, there was
also the inverse thing, a "National Commettee for a Free Russia" made up
of Russian POWs in Germany). In the Nuremberg Trial he was employed as a
witness for the Soviets. In the 50s he eventually returned to Dresden
where he was welcomed by the communist government. I think he held some
lectures about warfare at a Dresden military academy and had some press
conferences where he condemned the integration of West Germany into NATO.
He died in the late 50s, IIRC.
--=20
Georg Schwarz (sch...@physik.tu-berlin.de, ku...@cs.tu-berlin.de, PGP 2.=
6ui)
Institut f=FCr Theoretische Physik +49 30 314-24254 FAX -21130 IRC ku=
roi
Technische Universit=E4t Berlin http://home.pages.de/~schwarz/
efr...@msuvx2.memphis.edu
In article <5g7v1t$1...@nntp1.u.washington.edu>, "Pepe" <pe...@usa.net> writes:
> I4m Looking for information about Von Paulus.
There was no Von Paulus. The fellow's name was
Friedrich Paulus. He was not an aristo. (It's
a common mistake-- even Gordon Craig calls him
"Von Paulus" in _Germany 1866-1945_.)
> What happened with him after his withdraw in Stalingrad?
What withdraw(al)? He was captured and turned by the
Soviets; made a few broadcasts critical of the Nazis;
released in the late 40s, died in East Germany in 1955.
(All from memory, but correct in general I think.)
Ed Frank
Tim K.
I've been confused by the way the whole battle for Stalingrad was
conducted. In most every other battle for a large city, the city was
first surrounded to keep reinforcements out of the city. But not
Stalingrad. It didn't make sense to keep poring troops into the city
when reinforcements easily entered the city from the east.
JeanLuc200
Drax:
You mention "German losses were huge, but with sacrifice of 6th Army...
stabilize front. Germany lost its chance for victory at Stalingrad, but
war was lost at Kursk". Which are good points, but overlook the fact that
it was not just the German 6th Armee which was lost as a result of the
Battle of/for Stalingrad: please remember that along with the 6th, 4th
Panzer to all intents and purposes ceased to exist; 3rd and 4th Rumanian
were destroyed along with the 8th Italian Army and the Hungarian 2nd Army;
while the German 2nd Armee was also seriously mauled, and 1st Panzer Armee
and the 17th Armee barely escaped destruction pulling out of the Caucasus;
and the 11th Armee with its fine component units where scattered to the
winds by Hitler's capriciousness. Which left all of 6 army's (18th, 16th,
9th, 4th Armee's, and the 2nd and 3rd Panzer Armees) reasonably intact on
the entire Eastern Front (excluding Finland), and all of them were
understrength and all of them had their hands full contending with Soviet
offensives.
Thus, out of a total of 16 Army's on the Eastern Front at the time of Fall
Blau, 10 were either destroyed, mauled beyond recognition, or disbanded.
Thats almost 63% of the entire force affected in some form or manner. Not
to mention the irreplaceable losses of cadre manpower due to the large
number of prisoners and the wounded that had to be abandoned to their
deaths during the retreats/routs, which normally would have returned to
service after a while. Also the trained specialists of the rear-echelon
units of 6th, 2nd, 4th Panzer, and the Allied units were irreplaceable in
a timely fashion, due to these units becoming embroiled in combat... it
took a lot longer to train support service manpower than the average
landser, and thats assuming the caliber of manpower required, vis-a-vis
education, etc., was even available, which they weren't.
Additionally, all of the mineral wealth of the Caucasus, Don Basin, and
the Volga was lost to the Germans as a result of this battle. In the Don
Bas desperately needed Ammunition Factories were just coming on line for
the Germans, which also had to be abandoned... compounding the ammo
shortages that the soldiers had to live with everyday till the end of the
war!!!
Kursk indeed was Germany's last hope for a stalemate; but Stalingrad
sounded the death knell of the German Armed Forces, and condemned them to
a final defeat that was inescapable!
All the best,
JC
JeanLuc200
Peter:
Good points re Paulus... he is just as responsible for the destruction of
the 6th & assigned portions of 4th Panzer Armee's as Goering and Hitler
(though Hitler did admit privately that he was responsible... albeit only
for a moment).
Many tend to forget that Paulus burned out the 6th Armee way before
November 19th, with his mindless attempts at bludgeoning Stalingrad to
surrender!!! It was simply a hollow shell of its former self by the time
of the Soviet offensive. He was also the one responsible for blowing the
link-up with Hoth (if memory serves) and 4th Panzer west of Stalingrad
which would have bagged a significant part of the future defenders of
Stalingrad. His lists of egregious errors is endless, unfortunately
resulting in the deaths of uncounted numbers on both sides.
Additionally, Paulus was not a "von" as he was not a member of the
aristocracy.
Regarding, Paulus settling in the East as a "choice" is not true: private
sources indicate that the Soviets liked to play games with Paulus...
forcing him to stay in the East, not being able to see his wife and son
(son's?); and as his health began to fail the Soviets would toy with him
by announcing his immediate repatriation to the West, taking him to the
border crossings, and just at the moment that he could see his wife, they
would wisk him away. They only needed to do this a few times before it
finally killed him.
Too much said already about this man.
All the best,
JC
Barry Liimakka
Charles T Watkins <wb6...@juno.com> wrote in article
<5gk337$l...@portal.gmu.edu>...
>
> On 3-13-97 "Pepe" <pe...@usa.net> wrote:
>
> > I'm looking for information about Von Paulus.
> > What happened with him after his withdraw in Stalingrad?
>
>
> Von Paulus remained a POW in Russia for the remainder of the war. He was
> very bitter, and felt that he had been betrayed by Hitler for Hitler's
> refusal to allow him to withdraw his forces. In mid-1944 he began giving
> broadcasts urging German soldiers to give up the fight. In time, the
> Germans considered von Paulus a traitor. Besides the anti-war
> broadcasts, von Paulus testified against German fascism on behalf of the
> Russian prosecutors at the Neurenberg War Trials in 1946.
>
> Von Paulus was not released from custody until 1953. Due to his
> broadcasts and testimony at Neurenberg, he settled in the
> soviet-controlled zone of Germany, where he remained until his death In
> 1957.
>
> Tim Watkins
Tim,
A very interesting post. I never knew where Von Paulus ended up after the
war. Do you recall the specific source that you read this in? I'd be
interested in reading more.
best wishes
Barry
Ron Bereznicki
Yes, you are quite, right. It doesn't make sense to pour in troops into a
city without surrounding it first, so as to ensure that no enemy
reinforcements can enter. However, in order to understand this dilemma, we
must look at Hitler and his Intelligence sources. When Hitler launched his
attack in the summer of 1942, his Intelligence sources told him that the
Russians had used up all of their reserves. Thus, Hitler felt confident
enough to strip the Sixth Army of some of its armour and then send them
into the Caucasus. When the Sixth Army reached Stalingrad, Hitler felt
confident enough to pour the troops in. He probably said to himself, "Nah,
the Russkies can't do anything bad to us, so let's rub their faces in it."
Unfortunately, the Russians did have reserves, in fact, lots of them.
In conclusion, it was Hitler and his Intelligence sources that were
responsible for the Stalingrad debacle.
Yours truly,
Ron Bereznicki
--
Read about the deportations to Siberia in 1940, the loss of farmland, and the formation of the Second Polish Corps. Come visit my web page: My Dad's story: A veteran's Experiences.
Url is http://www.accessweb.com/users/rbereznicki/index.html-ssi
Charles T Watkins
Dan,
Yes, saw numerous references in my material to Manstein's memoirs "Lost
Victories", and Manstein's direct order on December 19, 1942, to Paulus
to break out of the Stalingrad pocket. William L. Shirer used his
material quite a bit. I have also seen where Shirer noted that
Manstein's directive had "certain reservations" and Paulus, who was still
under orders from Hitler not to break out, must have been greatly
confused by the order.
By the way, a couple of points I need to correct. In my posting of
3-21-95, I stated that Paulus was a Prussian; I am now told that he was a
Hessian and, since he was not from the Junkers family of aristocrats, he
did not warrant the "von" in his last name. Just needed to clear that
up.
Tim Watkins
"Flying is the second greatest thrill known to man - landing is the
first".
Peter Habala
: Victories", and Manstein's direct order on December 19, 1942, to Paulus
: to break out of the Stalingrad pocket. William L. Shirer used his
: material quite a bit.
Yes, many people used Manstein's memoirs quite a bit, the problem is that
Her Manstein somehow forgot what he was doing during the war when he was
writing memoirs after the war. In many cases his memoirs are in direct
contradiction with what he wrote during the war. However, it is much
easier to just read his memoir then to dig in archives, so Manstein's
fairy-tales are quite well-established.
This especially applies to Stalingrad. The German dude who wrote World at
War (Gerhard Weinberg?) wrote a paper on exactly this topic, very well
researched, but since I don't have my library on me, I can't provide
references. I seem to recall that this paper is mentioned in World at
War, if you are interested in looking it up.
As Weinberg wrote: "Hitler blamed his generals for the loses. After the
war they got their revenges when writing their memoirs." Based on the
memoirs I have read I have to agree with this.
If my memory serves me right, a Luftwaffe officer from the Stalingrad area
flew into the pocket quite early on and explained to Paulus personally
that supplying by air is out of question. Paulus refused to move.
And I am sorry, "Hitler ordered" does not strip him from responsibility.
Again, memoirs of German generals are very eloquent on "military honour"
and "order folowing", however the fact is that they disobeyed Hitler's
orders as early as in summer 1941 (Guderian). And Paulus himself did not
commit suicide, thus going directly against Hitler's personal wishes.
Sorry, but Paulus shares responsibility for the Stalingrad disaster.
And when talking about "I did it because I swore", all German generals
betrayed their word when they swore their personal alliances to Hitler,
because already before that they swore their alliance to the German
republic. Does it sound like a funny argument? Well, why does not it sound
funny when they say "I behaved like an idiot and murderer because
sometimes in the early 30's I made a personal commitment to a man"?
In your answer you also forgot to address the problem of missing
transport. Manstein almost got to Paulus, because he had fuel and he had
mobility. By mid-December, Paulus lacked both. Again, my library is away
and I don't remember which autor was smart enough to look at the facts, so
I can't post references. Perhaps Paulus could have broken through towards
Manstein with a small attack force, but the bulk of his army would have to
walk accros the plains and Russians would most likely slaughter them, this
is an opinion which it seems was spread among the German generals _at the
time_.
I am really sorry I can't provide references.
Bye, pH.
efr...@msuvx2.memphis.edu
hab...@fireant.ma.utexas.edu (Peter Habala) writes:
> Yes, many people used Manstein's memoirs quite a bit, the problem is that
> Her Manstein somehow forgot what he was doing during the war when he was
> writing memoirs after the war.
All very true. (Selective memory syndrome.)
> This especially applies to Stalingrad. The German dude who wrote World at
> War (Gerhard Weinberg?) wrote a paper on exactly this topic
Weinberg was born in Germany but was a refugee.
Educated in the UK, then higher educated in
the US. A US Army veteran (occupation of
Japan?). He is now an American citizen,
and I'm glad of it. (World at Arms, isn't it?)
Ed Frank
Rich Rostrom
wb6...@juno.com (Charles T Watkins) wrote:
> ... Manstein's direct order on December 19, 1942, to Paulus
> to break out of the Stalingrad pocket... Paulus...
> must have been greatly confused by the order.
Paulus was not confused by this order, as it was never issued.
Gerhard Weinberg, writing in the Journal of Military History,
cites Manfred Kehrig's "major study of the Stalingrad battle"
as proving "this order is a postwar invention."
David Joseph Greenbaum
Peter Habala wrote:
> Faced with the choice of destroying his army as an organized unit for the
> sake of saving men (how many is debatable) or staying in place, deploy his
> forces and hope in linking with the remaining forces, Paulus (and Hitler
> and also other generals, who quickly forgot about their decisions when
> remembering those days later) decided to stay. Of course we know in
> hindsight that eventually Germany lost more, but how were they to know?
The histpry of the planning and implementation of Plan Blue is important
in knowing exactly how and why Paulus (no *von*, his was not a noble family)
remained in Stalingrad during the November-January Soviet encirclement
operations. The Germans continued to have the worst intelligence
possible regarding Soviet reserves, believing, through the linkup of the
Stalingrad and the Don Front. Operational goals during Blau dictated the
capture of Stalingrad (Tsaritsyn) and the destruction of the North
Caucusus Front. Even while the Soviet pincers closed on Sovetskii and
Kalich, during the third week of November, the Germans still believed the
Soviets were having their last gasp. According to Reinhard Gehlen, OKH
Intelligence chief during the war, the Soviets possessed less then six
hundred thousand effectives in the Don and the Caucasus theaters. For
Operation Little Saturn alone, Vatutin and Chuikov had at their disposal
more than a million men and nearly 900 tanks. They also possessed more
than thirty thousand artillery pieces.
Drazen Kramaric (etk...@neptun.design.etk.ericsson.se) inscribed in
fleeting electrons:
: However, what Hitler and OKW failed to do is to shorten the frontline in
: Caucausus and give Manstein some real force (5th SS Viking Divn and
: others) to break Soviet siege. Instead, Manstein had to wait for
: reinforcements to come from France?!!
5th SS Wiking and the rest of the Army Group A were slogging through the
mountains of Transcaucasia, near four hundred miles from the Soviet
breakthroughs (completely unexpected) and two hundred miles in front of
their railheads at Rostov. The Soviet North Caucasus Front was still
fighting north of Groznii and in the mountains along the Black Sea coast,
and the Germans were fagged out and overextended following their summer
advances. The reserves left to Manstein, including the 57th Panzer
Corps, were small and had been drawn off of the front earlier in the
season for replenishment and maintenance. This had barely begun when
Operation Neptune encircled Stalingrad. Manstein was never to recieve
the reinforcements he needed to relieve Stalingrad, not while Operational
Detachment Hollidt and the rest of the Rumanian and Italian Armies were
recoiling one hundred miles west from the Southwestern front's 1st Tank
Corps, Third Guards Army, and the Fifth Tank Corps. Manstein would have
been absorbed, cut off, and annihilated had he recieved the
reinforcements necessary to break through 2nd Guards Army to Sixth Army
and Paulus.
: There is also a question of Soviet losses during Stalingrad campaign.
: everybody keeps talking about 300000 trapped Germans and Rumanians but
: failed to say anything about Soviet losses. In fact they were enormous.
: Some recent Russian study shows about 900000 Soviet casualties during
: campaign.
David Glantz, working from the Arcive of the Red Army, calls Soviet
losses between 19 November and 2 February on the Neptune, Saturn and
Little Saturn operations at four hundred and eighty five thousand (485,000)
of which little more than 150,000 were unreturned casualties. So Soviet
losses were about half that of the Germans during that operation.
: German losses were huge, but with sacrifice of 6th Army, Germans were
: able to pull their Army Group from Caucausus and stabilize the front.
Common error described the loss of the 6th Army as "sacrifice". It was
not. It was blind, terrible waste. Sixth Army was contained after the
linkup by little more than the elements which had opposed it during the
fall. It was bereft of supply and robbed of armor support, and the air
fleets that Manstein had relied on during the summer and fall had been
removed to Germany. Sixth Army could not break out due to lack of
supplies and arms, and could not move due to lack of transport. The
Germans only managed to evacuate the Caucasus through luck.
Dave G.
--
"Unless a man feels he has a good memory, he should never
venture to lie."
- Montaigne
funkraum
>kl...@cableol.co.uk (kl...@cableol.co.uk) wrote:
>>On 13 Mar 1997 04:15:57 GMT, "Pepe" <pe...@usa.net> wrote:
>Field Marshall Paulus (I do not think he had 'von' in his name),
Correct.
Further, Paulus was then produced by the Soviets at the Nuremberg
trials as their surprise star witness.
funkraum
>hab...@fireant.ma.utexas.edu (Peter Habala) wrote:
[...]
>Yes, many people used Manstein's memoirs quite a bit, the problem is that
>Her Manstein somehow forgot what he was doing during the war when he was
>writing memoirs after the war. In many cases his memoirs are in direct
>contradiction with what he wrote during the war.However, it is much
>easier to just read his memoir then to dig in archives, so Manstein's
>fairy-tales are quite well-established.
[...]
What did von Manstein write during the war and in which archives
is it to be found ?
Off on another tangent,
"Stalingrad, Memories and Reassesments" provided quite a useful
angle on the whole affaire. I havn't had time to go through and
analyse and cross-reference but there were some interesting
eye-witnees reports, useful references and a different viewpoint,
which seemed to be:
'They all had an absolute duty to prevent the disaster of
Stalingrad, regardless of orders, responsibilities or any other
factor.'
Tim Watkins
On 3-25-97 Peter Habala <hab...@fireant.ma.utexas.edu> wrote:
> ...the problem is that Her Manstein somehow forgot
> what he was doing during the war when he was writing
> memoirs after the war. In many cases his memoirs
> are in direct contradiction with what he wrote during the war.
What are the contradictions? Did some of the "contradictions" come out
of his testimony at the Neurenberg Trials in 1946? Even though Manstein
was not on trial for war crimes, could he possibly have been worried that
he might be charged with crimes arising out of the treatment of Russian
POW's? Did he have counsel at Neurenberg, and was he instructed to give
careful, 'tailored' answers to prosecutor's questions? Hitler's
"Commissar Order" of March 1941 instructed that all German officers "will
have to rid themselves of obsolete ideologies", and "the commissars
(those Russians opposed to National Socialism) will be liquidated". Both
Manstein and Paulus obeyed Hitler's order, as Hitler had declared "I
insist absolutely that my orders be executed without contradiction".
And, as we all know, in many cases there was no Geneva Convention
observed concerning the treatment of Russian POW's. We also know that
partisans were summarily shot out of hand with few exceptions.
At Neurenberg Manstein testified that he was torn between his "soldierly
conceptions" and his "duty to obey", and added "actually, I ought to have
obeyed (the Commissar Order), but I said to myself that as a soldier I
could not possibly cooperate in a thing like that...that I would not
carry out such an order, which was against the honor of a soldier".
Faced with the possibility of swinging from a sturdy rope at Neurenberg
as generals Keitel and Jodl had, I also would have 'tailored' my answers
at Neurenberg. I also would have kept in mind that there was no statute
of limitations on many of the chargeable war crimes defined at
Neurenberg.
Or was Manstein worried about what other Germans were saying behind his
back after the war? Why would he fake the existence of the text of the
December 19 directive to Paulus, for Paulus to break out of the
Stalingrad pocket?
> ...a Luftwaffe officer from the Stalingrad area flew into
> the pocket quite early on and explained to Paulus
> personally that supplying by air is out of question.
Paulus personally knew early on, by the evening of November 22, that he
was going to need 750 tons of supplies to be flown in daily by the
Luftwaffe in order to hold out. He also knew that there was a serious
shortage of transport planes and, even if they could muster up enough
planes, they could not all get through the Russian fighter defenses and
AA batteries, and fly through the snow blizzards and land on ice. And,
Paulus also knew that the best the Luftwaffe could do is supply him with
an average of 100 tons of supplies per day.
After Operation Ring had encircled the German forces, a Luftwaffe officer
flew into the pocket and personally met with General Paulus. The officer
was carrying a personal appeal from General Beck for Paulus to join the
collaborators in their attempt to overthrow Hitler. Paulus, still
allegiant to Hitler, refused to join the plotters.
> Paulus refused to move.
If you are given a direct order by your Supreme Commander to hold on to a
city, and you receive information that help is on the way in the form of
a strong drive, do you disobey that order if there is a chance that your
army can be saved?
> Again, memoirs of German generals are very eloquent
> on "military honour" and "order folowing"...
> And when talking about "I did it because I swore", all
> German generals betrayed their word when they swore
> their personal alliances to Hitler, because already before
> that they swore their alliance to the German republic.
All officers of the Wehrmacht, Luftwaffe, and the Kriegsmarine were
required to swear an oath of allegiance to Hitler, oaths to the "German
republic" notwithstanding (why would the swearing of an oath to the
"German republic" negate the validity of the oath of allegiance to
Hitler?).
The military oath starts off, "Ich schwoere bei Gott, diesen HEILIGEN
Eid"..."I swear before God, this HOLY oath (capital letters mine)..., and
ends "bedingungslos treu und gehorsam sein werde"..."(I) will be
unconditionally loyal and obediant" (to the Fuehrer).
Pretty heavy stuff to a German officer, especially the new officer corps.
The German phrase "es ist mein HEILIGER Ernst" translates, "I am deadly
serious". That pretty well sums it up.
Speaking of "German republic", was Germany a republic after Hitler took
power in 1933? I seem to recall that the Weimar Republic died in the
same year.
> Manstein almost got to Paulus, because he had fuel and
> he had mobility. By mid-December, Paulus lacked both.
It is reported that on December 21 Paulus had enough fuel for tanks and
transport vehicles to go 15 or 20 miles. Whether Manstein could have
gotten to Paulus with more fuel (Manstein was some reported 30 miles away
from the 6th Army), or Paulus could have received one or two more air
drops of petrol and fuel oil from the Luftwaffe, and attempted a drive to
Manstein, is only to speculate. We'll never know.
In his memoirs entitled "Lost Victories", Manstein stated that "this was
our one and only chance of saving the Sixth Army".
Tim Watkins
My sources previously listed (see thread).
"We shall not capitulate - no, never, we may be destroyed, but if we are,
we shall drag a world with us - a world in flames".
- Adolf Hitler, 1932
Dana Ciul
Please, please! I just subscribed to this group today, and missed the
answer to the original subject question. I know that 6th Army commanders
were put up in housing around Moscow for the duration of the war (from
Mellinthins' tome).
Also where was Manstein in 1945 after Hitler stupidly (but patently in
character) fired him in 44?
Best,
dc