Battle and Massacre in Vecors, July 1944
Arie Biemond
TV station "Arte" dedicated to this battle and the bloody aftermath.
It was a very moving and IMO well made program.
It was a sad story totally unknown to me (and probable many posters in
this NG) and I could not give it a proper place and perspective.
Perhaps Louis can and will tell us more about it, and give us the
reasons and the final statistics of this episode on the war in France.
Thanking in advance,
Arie Biemond
Middelburg Nl.
W. Lydecker
There was a political struggle brewing at the time in France.
Chris Manteuffel
appears twice I apologize.
Arie Biemond <a.bi...@wxs.nl> wrote in message
news:<3ef8c003...@news.pacific.net.au>...
> Perhaps Louis can and will tell us more about it, and give us the
> reasons and the final statistics of this episode on the war in France.
I've never seen more then a passing mention to the uprising. The best
treatment I've seen of the brutality with which the SS put down the
rebellion is in _Between Silk and Cyanide_ by Leo Marks, (who was a
cryptographer for SOE during the war). He mentions that one of his
decoders had to be reassigned after she finished a message describing
the slaughter and read the things that were in the message.
As for the battle, I can only seem to find books in French on the
subject in my searches. Sadly, I am monolingual, so I can't help you
there. I read the SOE Official History a couple of years ago and my
recollection was that they glossed over Vercors as well, with a couple
of comments about how horrible the SS troops were. They said that the
cause was overeagerness. If anyone does know of a good source in
English, I'd be very interested.
Chris Manteuffel
Birk
> It was a sad story totally unknown to me (and probable many posters in
> this NG) and I could not give it a proper place and perspective.
The Times Atlas of the Second World War edited by John Keegan contains
a very short desciption and a map of the operations and uses the case
to put the resistance in Western Europe into perspective: 'In June
1944 the mountainous redoubt of the Vercors plateau south-east
France, long a safe rallying point for French resisters, declared
itself free from German rule. Anticipating substantial Allied
air-drops of supplies, and only a brief period of armed resistance
prior to Allied landings in Provence (Operation Anvil) and Normandy
(Operation Overlord), the French conducted a vigorous defence of the
plateau, exploiting the crevassed terrain to their advantage. But the
next month its maquis forces were faced by determined German
counter-insurgency operations. As was to be witnessed again in Warsaw
in August, over-conficence and a misconception of Allied plans led to
precipitate action, compounded by an incorrect assessment of German
determination to contest the issue. In the ensuing clashes the
inadequately armed maquis proved to be no match for more numerous,
well-equipped and trained troops, supported by artillery, tanks and
aircraft, culminating in an airborne (glider) attack following which
most of the defenders were massacred.'[1995 edition, p.95].
Yours sincerely
Hans Birk
--
cliff kennedy
published in 1980 by Pan Books Limited. Not sure if it's still in print.
Cliff Kennedy
Arie Biemond wrote in message <3ef8c003...@news.pacific.net.au>...
>Yesterday I saw a part of a TV program from the French/German(?)
>TV station "Arte" dedicated to this battle and the bloody aftermath.
>It was a very moving and IMO well made program.
>
>It was a sad story totally unknown to me (and probable many posters in
>this NG) and I could not give it a proper place and perspective.
>
>
--
Louis Capdeboscq
> reasons and the final statistics of this episode on the war in France.
You give undue credit to my knowledge of the French resistance !
I don't have the final statistics handy, although Google might help you.
If it's really important, I can probably dig them up from somewhere...
For a summary of what happened: the Vercors is a small sparcely
populated mountain near the Alpes. Although not very high, it is
difficult to access. The first recorded idea of using it as a Troyan
Horse for parachuted commandos was in March 1941, by resistance members
Pierre Dalloz and Jean Prevost.
After the Germans had occupied Vichy France (within which Vercors was),
Dalloz took up his idea again with another resister, who was a contact
of Jean Moulin. Moulin had been De Gaulle's envoy who tried to
coordinate (and preferably unify) resistance movements - he was
subsequently captured by the Germans with the usual consequences.
Meanwhile, the first Vercors maquis appeared in the neighborhood.
In January 1943, Jean Moulin accepted Dalloz' plan. Meanwhile, lots of
young men joined the maquis to escape the STO. At this stage "joining
the maquis" usually didn't mean active resistance, like killing soldiers
and blowing things up. It mostly meant staying out of sight of the
Germans so as not to work in Germany. In February 1943, the General
Delestraint approved of that plan which will become "Plan Montagnard"
(Mountainer Plan), subsequently approved by De Gaulle and the Allies.
General Le Ray is appointed in charge of the military organisation.
Please note the context: this is more or less the Casablanca conference,
when the Allies are fighting over strategy and De Gaulle is striving to
assert his leadership over everything French. As the Free French were a
very small force compared to the "armistice army" in North Africa whose
cadres were anything but gaullist, he used the French resistance as his
power base. As such, he had to appear both as the leader of a federation
of resistance movements (several such organisations appeared until the
liberation, as the resistance was difficult to unite and the Germans,
who kept capturing resistance leaders, weren't very helpful), which also
had to be non-communist. Hence the emphasis on military control, as part
of the Allied war effort. The emphasis also masked a divergence in
policies: the communists wanted immediate guerilla action so as to
provoke German reprisals and a radicalisation, the army wanted to build
up forces which would do nothing until D-Day by which time they would
come out in the open and assist the Allies. Vercors therefore was
supposed to be a hidden rebel base. However, Darth Vader stepped in:
possibly because of massive Allied paradrops starting in November '43,
the Germans (and French militia) destroyed the Malleval camp.
During the first six months of 1944, Axis forces staged numerous raids
against Vercors, with occasional clashes. In June 1944, with D-Day, all
the French maquis received the order to mobilize, and volunteers from
the area climbed up into Vercors so as to help the maquisards. Plan
Montagnard was activated, and the mountain range secured. Total numbers
were about 4,000. On June 13, Axis forces attacked and pushed the
resisters back, temporarily climbing into Vercors two days later.
July 21st, 1944 is the big paradrop + ground assault against Vercors
which must have been what the Arte program was about. A week later, the
Vercors is conquered. Plan Montagnard didn't work.
The conclusion is that, as I wrote in reply to Andrew Clark in another
thread, resistance forces had very little staying power against regular
troops. Granted, the Vercors operation was pretty large (from memory, I
think there were 15,000 troops committed) but that's only a
division-sized force, including a lot of second-rate troops.
Louis
--
Remove "e" from address to reply
Arie Biemond
Louis Capdeboscq wrote:
>>Perhaps Louis can and will tell us more about it, and give us the
>>reasons and the final statistics of this episode on the war in France.
>
>
> You give undue credit to my knowledge of the French resistance !
I would like to thank all posters, that have reacted to my question and
specially Louis for his background information that has given me more
perspective in this incident.
I have tried Google too, but the result was IMO rather poor.
Regards,
Arie Biemond.
--
W.G.J. Marchee
> I would like to thank all posters, that have reacted to my question and
> specially Louis for his background information that has given me more
> perspective in this incident.
>
> I have tried Google too, but the result was IMO rather poor.
Hello all,
Interesting conversation. I read a couple of French books on the
Vercors and the Germans really hacked all to pieces. Did you know that
a couple of month earlier the same happened to the Maquis of the
Plateau de la Glieres, also in eatern France near the Alps?
In my view the selfishness of De Gaulle and the bad understanding
between him and the other allies is also to blame for these disasters.
William Marchee
The Hague, Holland
--
W. Lydecker
The right wing didn't want living communist "heroes" in post war France.
The resistance was swarming with such folk.
Louis Capdeboscq
...except that the people who were wiped out in the Vercors massacre
were part of the undercover ARMY resistance.
The one which was not communist.
So if you're thinking that it was a clever move to kill communists, then
unless you subscribe to the Nazi German definition of "communists" (i.e.
anyone who opposed Germany) this is dead wrong.
Louis
--
Remove "e" from address to reply
--
Drazen Kramaric
<loui...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>The conclusion is that, as I wrote in reply to Andrew Clark in another
>thread, resistance forces had very little staying power against regular
>troops. Granted, the Vercors operation was pretty large (from memory, I
>think there were 15,000 troops committed) but that's only a
>division-sized force, including a lot of second-rate troops.
I wonder why did French decide to take a stand, instead of slip
through German lines and go elsewhere.
Yugoslav partisans realised the futility of frontal combat and
blockading Axis occupied towns as early as Spring 1942. Thereafter,
whenever Axis launched an offensive aimed at destroying partisan
brigades and divisions, partisans acted according to the directive
that "whenever some territory is lost, it must be compensated by
liberation of new territory, preferably larger".
For 1943 and 1944, partisans were taking stand only as delaying
tactics and seeked the way to break through Axis encirclements.
Drax
Michael Emrys
drazen.NEVOLI...@zg.htnet.hr wrote on 8/5/03 5:12 AM:
> I wonder why did French decide to take a stand, instead of slip through German
> lines and go elsewhere.
Could it be that the French, not having the years of battle experience of
the Yugoslav Partisans, simply lacked the tactical savvy to do that or even
recognize that it was a good idea? Or was there some other reason; some lack
of mobility or command/control? Or maybe they just couldn't find a big
enough hole in the encirclement?
Michael
Louis Capdeboscq
> I wonder why did French decide to take a stand, instead of slip
> through German lines and go elsewhere.
Slipping through German lines was not an option, because the noose was
relatively tight. The French were surprised by the German reaction -
they had expected that "good" German forces would be sent against the
Allied landings instead of crushing a relatively unimportant uprising.
Another problem was the lack of an "elsewhere" to go. Compared to
Yugoslavia (or some Belo-Russian forests), the French countryside was
considerably more developped, open terrain and lacked good hiding
places. Barring the mountains (on the Italian & Spanish borders) which
were fairly inaccessible, all hiding places for relatively large maquis
like the one in Vercors was were isolated.
Basically, I don't think that a large partisan force could have survived
in France.
As to why the French decided to mke a stand, i.e. abandon clandestine
activity, that was the strategy of the French army (i.e. De Gaulle's)
resistance movement, in full agreement with the Allied commanders: lie
low until D-Day, then start military activities in the German rear.
Politically, it was considered important not to let the communists
control the battleground. Psychologically, this was the moment for which
people had been waiting for years - during which they had seen numerous
friends die without ever seeing it. Militarily, it was part of the
Allied strategy (as I noted) and resulted from an overestimation of the
Allied advance after D-Day and an underestimation of the German reaction.
No-one expected the Germans to contain the landings in Normandy for two
months, after all...
Louis
--
Remove "e" from address to reply
--
Rich Rostrom
>No-one expected the Germans to contain the landings in Normandy for two
>months, after all...
????
In _Crusade in Europe_, the "OVERLORD Forecast" map between
pages 224 and 225 shows the D+60 line as running from the
from the mouth of the Seine south to near Tours, then west
along the Loire to the sea.
This is well beyond the actual D+60 line, but still
'contained', and still about 500 km from Vercors.
--
Never consume legumes before transacting whatsoever | Rich Rostrom
even in the outermost courtyard of a descendant of |
Timur the Terrible. | rrostrom@dummy
--- Avram Davidson, _Dr. Bhumbo Singh_ | 21stcentury.net
--
Andrew Clark
"Rich Rostrom" <rrostrom.2...@rcn.com> wrote
> In _Crusade in Europe_, the "OVERLORD Forecast"
> map between pages 224 and 225
This is another example of the unpleasant degree of
post-facto self-justification in "Crusade in Europe" (and
yes, most military memoirs are the same).
The "phase-lines" map in question had nothing to do with
*operational* planning or forecasting; it was solely and
simply a guide for *logistic* purposes. In other words, the
logisticians needed some basis on which to make their
calculations about delivery routes, stockpiles etc, and this
was the best guesstimate that the staff at 21 AAG HQ could
generate. It was most assuredly not part of the operational
planning in the sense that the military campaign was
expected to, or was aiming to, take the indicated territory
by the indicated dates.
Montgomery's opponents circulated the map within US
government circles (and showed it to US military
correspondents) during the Normandy campaign as a means of
discrediting his command.
--
Drazen Kramaric
wrote:
>Slipping through German lines was not an option, because the noose was
>relatively tight.
It was a mistake of French commander to wait for too long.
Nonetheless, Yugoslav partisans often found themselves in encirclement
(most notably operations Weiss and Schwartz in 1943), but they always
tried to breakthrough. Sometimes (Operation Schwartz) they took 50%
losses, but Tito and Supreme HQ got out.
>The French were surprised by the German reaction - they had expected that
>"good" German forces would be sent against the Allied landings instead of crushing
>a relatively unimportant uprising.
French inexperience showed. German forces in Yugoslavia were not up to
the requirements of Eastern Front (most notable example of 7th SS
division that was feared by partisans, but got a bloody nose against
Soviets), but partisans learnt in early 1942 not to underestimate even
7xxth German divisions.
>Another problem was the lack of an "elsewhere" to go. Compared to
>Yugoslavia (or some Belo-Russian forests), the French countryside was
>considerably more developped, open terrain and lacked good hiding
>places. Barring the mountains (on the Italian & Spanish borders) which
>were fairly inaccessible, all hiding places for relatively large maquis
>like the one in Vercors was were isolated.
It should have been expected from French to know the terrain and have
escape routes available. German antipartisan forces couldn't have been
everywhere and once their movement towards partisan concentration was
discovered, partisans should move and play such game throughout the
summer.
>Basically, I don't think that a large partisan force could have survived
>in France.
Are there any forrests in France? I mean, Yugoslav managed to smuggle
entire brigades (approx 1000 recruits) from Vojvodina (flat like
Hungary) over Slavonia to Bosnia
>
>As to why the French decided to mke a stand, i.e. abandon clandestine
>activity, that was the strategy of the French army (i.e. De Gaulle's)
>resistance movement, in full agreement with the Allied commanders: lie
>low until D-Day, then start military activities in the German rear.
Sounds reasonable. But obviously, French were inexperience and did
exactly what partisans did in Serbia in 1941, stood at fixed positions
waving their flag until Germans annihilated them.
Drax
--
Louis Capdeboscq
>>Slipping through German lines was not an option, because the noose was
>>relatively tight.
>
> It was a mistake of French commander to wait for too long.
No, in that particular case, the mistake was to make an open stand in
Vercors.
Once the Vercors maquis went "public", so to speak, there was the risk
of a German reaction.
If the Germans reacted in strength - as they did - the game was up.
> Nonetheless, Yugoslav partisans often found themselves in encirclement
> (most notably operations Weiss and Schwartz in 1943), but they always
> tried to breakthrough.
Again, the difference in my opinion is terrain.
Yugoslavia was less developped than France, partisans operated in more
rugged country, and faced less Axis troops.
As a result, Yugoslav partisans became more numerous and they could
fight a war with local Axis troops without being annihilated.
By contrast, I don't see how a partisan buildup on a scale similar to
the Yugoslav one could have taken place in France, which means that - as
you noted - the French partisan leaders were mostly inexperienced in
partisan warfare when they did attempt to wage it, in conditions which
would have probably taxed even Yugoslav partisans.
> It should have been expected from French to know the terrain and have
> escape routes available.
You miss the point.
There were practically escape routes because there was nowhere to escape to.
From a partisan point of view, think of the Vercors as an oasis in the
desert. You can hide and live in it, but it's not a big area so the
enemy will aim straight for it and from a practical point of view
there's no "outside".
> German antipartisan forces couldn't have been
> everywhere and once their movement towards partisan concentration was
> discovered, partisans should move and play such game throughout the
> summer.
Once a partisan force appeared it couldn't really move and play games.
What it could do was to disappear back into the woodwork, inviting
various reprisals (Oradour...) in the process. That was done, but wasn't
particularly effective. It did delay the movement of various German
units, but it couldn't amount to military resistance.
>>Basically, I don't think that a large partisan force could have survived
>>in France.
>
> Are there any forrests in France? I mean, Yugoslav managed to smuggle
> entire brigades (approx 1000 recruits) from Vojvodina (flat like
> Hungary) over Slavonia to Bosnia
There are forests in France, but there are not enough large "wild"
areas. Most of the forests aren't that large, and those that are are
either in unimportant places (where lots of people hid from STO but
couldn't move out from for military activities) or not too far from
large cities which means garrisons are available for manhunts.
Generally speaking, in WWII terms the ratio of German troops per
partisan-friendly area was higher in France than in Yugoslavia.
Leaving aside a discussion of the respective merits of French and
Yugoslav resistance movements, I really don't think that a significant
partisan movement could have developped in France. If Tito had been
teleported to France in 1943-44 with a crash French language course for
all his partisans, I think he would have been run down.
Max von Weber
(Drazen Kramaric) wrote:
>On 7 Aug 2003 16:45:28 GMT, Louis Capdeboscq <loui...@yahoo.com>
>wrote:
>
>
>>Slipping through German lines was not an option, because the noose was
>>relatively tight.
A book called "The heroes of Vercors" gives some interesting
background on the personalities of the Resistance leaders. It is very
clear to see that from the beginning there were severe fights and
discussions among the military leader of the group and the
administrative leader.
The military leader comes out as being very arrogant, an ex-hussar
from the aristocratic French cavalry, whereas the administrative head
of the Resistance, an ex-mayor, was far more cautious.
While the book does not attribute any blame, it is easy to read
between the lines that this hussar captain, while unbelievably
courageous personally, took personal risks that are not justifiable in
a guerrila war.
Che Guevara, in his book "Guerrilla Warfare", (La guerra de
guerrillas), repeats ad nausea that guerrillas(or Maquis) should never
engage superior forces, only smaller groups where the guerrila
dominates by sheer numbers.
Ivan Bajlo
news:bk4o91$1ifo$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu...
> No, in that particular case, the mistake was to make an open stand in
> Vercors.
There was a saying here amongst veteran partisans "We won because we could
run faster." ;-)
How much were underground hideouts developed? Several partisan hospital
survived entire war that way despite German troops constantly marching over
them. I'm not aware of anything on the Viet Cong scale was attempted in
Yugoslavia.
> Once the Vercors maquis went "public", so to speak, there was the risk
> of a German reaction.
>
> If the Germans reacted in strength - as they did - the game was up.
How much coordinated partisan movement was in France?
Standard practice in Yugoslavia during large offensive launched by Germans
was for all other partisans units in the country to immediately start
attacking anything they could which usually forced Germans to stop there
offensive close to victory and divert force to other region to prevent
partisans from overrunning rear areas.
> Yugoslavia was less developped than France, partisans operated in more
> rugged country, and faced less Axis troops.
Also large number of Axis troops in Yugoslavia were Italians and local
collaboration forces of dubious quality.
What was position of Vichy? Could partisan retreat safely to Vichy territory
during 1941/42?
> As a result, Yugoslav partisans became more numerous and they could
> fight a war with local Axis troops without being annihilated.
Early uprisings own there success mostly to German failure to pacify the
area because of invasion of Soviet Union, many Yugoslav solider returned
home with there weapons and were never disarmed, many villages in Serbia
didn't see a German solider before 1942 when they started to purchase food.
Probably biggest aid to partisan movement was Ustasha regime who's actions
created large base for future recruits both Serbs and Croats.
> By contrast, I don't see how a partisan buildup on a scale similar to
> the Yugoslav one could have taken place in France, which means that - as
> you noted - the French partisan leaders were mostly inexperienced in
> partisan warfare when they did attempt to wage it, in conditions which
> would have probably taxed even Yugoslav partisans.
Partisan leaders weren't to experience either when they started, uprisings
in Serbia and Montenegro in 1941 were quickly crushed since partisans tried
to make a stand expecting Russians to arrive by Christmas and both Serbia
and Montenegro remained peaceful until 1944.
In Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia, partisans developed more slowly but also
better organized.
> From a partisan point of view, think of the Vercors as an oasis in the
> desert. You can hide and live in it, but it's not a big area so the
> enemy will aim straight for it and from a practical point of view
> there's no "outside".
Yep, bad choice of terrain, Vojvodina is similar with Fruska gora mountain
separating it from Syrmia but entire terrain is flat and agricultural, most
of Vojvodina and Srijem partisan fought in Bosnia.
> Once a partisan force appeared it couldn't really move and play games.
> What it could do was to disappear back into the woodwork, inviting
> various reprisals (Oradour...) in the process. That was done, but wasn't
> particularly effective. It did delay the movement of various German
> units, but it couldn't amount to military resistance.
Hole idea of guerilla war is to constantly be on the run it is not important
how many enemy solider you kill but how many are out there chasing you since
they are not being used on the front line.
> Generally speaking, in WWII terms the ratio of German troops per
> partisan-friendly area was higher in France than in Yugoslavia.
German present rapidly increased during 1943 but probably in France too.
> Leaving aside a discussion of the respective merits of French and
> Yugoslav resistance movements, I really don't think that a significant
> partisan movement could have developped in France. If Tito had been
> teleported to France in 1943-44 with a crash French language course for
> all his partisans, I think he would have been run down.
He would run that is for sure, that is what he did until 1944 when Russians
arrived. ;-)
--
World War II in Yugoslavia
http://www.vojska.net/ww2/
--
Louis Capdeboscq
> "Louis Capdeboscq" wrote in message
>>Once the Vercors maquis went "public", so to speak, there was the risk
>>of a German reaction.
>>
>>If the Germans reacted in strength - as they did - the game was up.
>
> How much coordinated partisan movement was in France?
Not much.
Coordination was good enough for attacks to take place at the same time
(more or less) after D-Day, but it took the BBC to get loose coordination.
The French resistance movement had also been badly hurt immediately
before D-Day. People tend to forget how successful the Gestapo could be.
Also, for the strategy which you described, i.e. if the Germans attack
somewhere, other resistance organisations attack elsewhere, to work, the
German offensive must take a long time to be successful. In that case,
the Germans could crush a given maquis before other resistance groups
even heard of it.
> What was position of Vichy? Could partisan retreat safely to Vichy territory
> during 1941/42?
Mostly yes, but partisan activity was much smaller in 1941/42. By
1943/44 there no longer was a Vichy state.
> Yep, bad choice of terrain,
My basic point was that there were no good picks for partisan terrain.
> German present rapidly increased during 1943 but probably in France too.
58 divisions in France and the Low Countries by the time of D-Day, not
counting police and rear-area forces.