US Army using 25 pounder?
Sydney Guy
Medium Field Artillery" by Peter Chamberlain & Terry Gander, published
1975 by MacDonald & Janes. In the entry on the British 25-pounder
field gun, they have a photo of US gunners manning a 25 pdr. The
caption identifies them as "the American 70th Field Artillery
Battalion, near Schoneseiffen Germany in February 1945". Does anyone
know why this particular unit was using British guns rather than the
US 105mm?
How widespread was the practice of US troops using non-American
equipment? My understanding was that the US services in that era were
particularly afflicted by the NIH syndrome ("Not Invented Here" -
can't be any good), not to mention that the other Allies didn't really
have surplus production to hand over to the US.
--
Christopher Morton
wrote:
>How widespread was the practice of US troops using non-American
>equipment? My understanding was that the US services in that era were
You can drive past American Legion posts, town squares and the like
all across the US and see examples the 57mm antitank gun, the American
version of the British 6pdr. During WWI, the French 75mm field gun
was the backbone of US artillery.
--
What's the difference between a pacifist and a flagellant?
The flagellent only wants to punish himself.
--
Sydney Guy
news:<9vt8b4$dvq$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu>...
> On 19 Dec 2001 18:07:20 GMT, sydney...@yahoo.com.au (Sydney Guy)
> wrote:
>
> >How widespread was the practice of US troops using non-American
> >equipment? My understanding was that the US services in that era were
>
> You can drive past American Legion posts, town squares and the like
> all across the US and see examples the 57mm antitank gun, the American
> version of the British 6pdr. During WWI, the French 75mm field gun
> was the backbone of US artillery.
Yes, I was aware of the 57mm AT gun and the French 75 in WW1. In fact,
the US Army in WW1 was almost totally equipped with French-designed
artillery guns - 75mm gun, 155mm howitzer & 155mm GPF gun. I believe
that the reason for this was that in 1917 the only modern artillery in
production in the US was orders placed by the British & French Govts
with US industry. The fastest way for the US Army to equip itself was
to take over the production from the existing production lines, which
also gave a useful standardisation of ammunition with at least one of
their allies. For similar reasons the .303 P14 rifle being
manufactured in the US for Britain was rechambered to 30-06 and issued
to the US Army as the M1917 Enfield.
With the 57mm, the US Army realised after the fall of France that
their 37mm AT was already obsolete and they didn't have a successor to
replace it. By adopting the British 6-pounder design for immediate US
production, their designers could concentrate on the gun after that
and hopefully get ahead of the competition instead of being behind.
Undoubtedly the correct decision, and given that the British didn't
put the 6-pounder into production until late 1941 it's possible that
the US forces may have had them before the British.
However, these examples were all either adopted in WW1 or in WW2 were
the exceptions to the rule. One example of American NIH behaviour in
WW2 was quoted by MacArthur's head of special operations Allison Ind
in his book "Allied Intelligence Bureau". The AIB was formed to
control all the behind-the-lines operations such as Australian
Coastwatchers and the Filipino guerrillas. AIB started issuing the
ATR4A, an Australian-designed manpack radio that ran on dry batteries
and was a vast improvement on the previous radio sets that required
lead-acid batteries, a generator set and a dozen human carriers to
move around - a major disadvantage when being pursued by Japanese
patrols. However, Australian industry couldn't make enough to meet
demand so the blueprints were sent off to the US for "exact
reproduction". Ind (himself a US Army officer) commented that:
"When we received the "improved" set it was a fine piece of equipment,
but required a jeep and trailer and a made road to move it around".
(This quote is from memory, as I don't have Ind's book handy)
However, the reason for my original post was to find out:
- why this particular unit was using the 25pdr and whether others did
also
- what the US gunners thought about the 25 pdr vs the US 105mm
Duwop
> wrote:
>
> >How widespread was the practice of US troops using non-American
> >equipment? My understanding was that the US services in that era were
>
> You can drive past American Legion posts, town squares and the like
> all across the US and see examples the 57mm antitank gun, the American
> version of the British 6pdr. During WWI, the French 75mm field gun
> was the backbone of US artillery.
Don't forget Bofors guns, sonar, radar, Merlin airplane engines ,
probably quite a few gun tube designs and I know I'm overlooking some
other obvious examples.
Simplifying the supply chain is why Army's standardize, not NIH.
But I suppose to an Aussie, the US did not use very many foreign
designed weapons in comparison to their own forces. ;)
(As compared to WWI, where US troops seemed to be outfitted from the
ground up with European armaments and even clothing)
Dale
--
David Thornley
Sydney Guy <sydney...@yahoo.com.au> wrote:
>Yes, I was aware of the 57mm AT gun and the French 75 in WW1. In fact,
>the US Army in WW1 was almost totally equipped with French-designed
>artillery guns - 75mm gun, 155mm howitzer & 155mm GPF gun. I believe
>that the reason for this was that in 1917 the only modern artillery in
>production in the US was orders placed by the British & French Govts
>with US industry.
There was also the desire to get the most US soldiers into Europe
at the expense of bringing equipment, so even if the US had its own
artillery it probably would not have brought it.
>With the 57mm, the US Army realised after the fall of France that
>their 37mm AT was already obsolete and they didn't have a successor to
>replace it.
The realization came later (the 37mm would have been quite useful
in 1940), and required another realization, that anti-tank guns
would still be necessary. As far as I can tell, the idea was to
go to self-propelled guns as the next step after the 37mm, but
that didn't work in practice. Note that the gun after the 57mm,
the 3", was a quick improvisation involving an obsolescent AA
gun and parts of a 105mm howitzer carriage (and it turned out better
than it sounds from that description). I don't think the US had
a gun in the 57mm range that could make an improvisation like that,
which is probably why the British design was adopted.
The only other artillery adaptations I can think of are the Bofors
40mm AA gun and Oerlkon 20mm, primarily used by the Navy, and the
adaption of what would have been the 4.7" gun to use British
4.5" ammo.
One thing to consider is that US equipment was usually quite
good, with some notable exceptions, and tended to agree with US
doctrine. US tanks fit well into the US doctrine of the time,
and possible other tanks didn't. The US didn't produce the
17pdr, but after the 76mm proved disappointing moved towards
the 90mm. I have no explanation for the continued use of the
BAR rather than copying the Bren with US ammo or something like
that.
Most of the adoption I can think of was either Navy or Army Air
Force. The Army Ground Forces seem to be the most wedded to US
designs.
>However, these examples were all either adopted in WW1 or in WW2 were
>the exceptions to the rule. One example of American NIH behaviour in
>WW2 was quoted by MacArthur's head of special operations Allison Ind
>in his book "Allied Intelligence Bureau".
Yup, the fact that US equipment was usually good, and usually available
in sufficient quantity if other people's were, meant that there were
problems in adopting other designs.
>However, the reason for my original post was to find out:
>- why this particular unit was using the 25pdr and whether others did
>also
I have a reference to a US unit going into North Africa with 25pdrs,
for ammunition commonality, and one with a good deal of German equipment,
to use captured ammo. I don't know of one that used the 25pdrs that
late in the war.
>- what the US gunners thought about the 25 pdr vs the US 105mm
>
Dunno. I can tell you what Ian Hogg thought about it, but he's
British. (Specifically, that he thought the longer range of the 25pdr
nicely balanced the heavier shell of the 105mm, but the 25pdr was
much easier to manhandle.)
--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion, ask.
da...@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-
--
Red Lion
least 5 American FA Battalions that were issued British guns just prior
to and after Normandy. These units were OPCONed to the British and they
were given the British guns to help in the Ammunition Logistics. The
trucks were still American designed/produced. One of the Battalions was
intended to be a "glider" unit and it used to train in "lowering" the
trucks so they could get into gliders. Fortunately they never came in
on a glider, but one of the Battery Executive Officers (and a well liked
Officer) was killed when he was riding in one of the trucks used for
training in Nov-Dec 44. The truck just fell apart while it was towing a
trailer on a flat road, when they inspected the truck they found
several key pins that had been lost while they were training for
gliders. There was a massive inspection of trucks that day.
Sydney Guy
>
> (In WW1) There was also the desire to get the most US soldiers into Europe
> at the expense of bringing equipment, so even if the US had its own
> artillery it probably would not have brought it.
But if the British and French were so short of gun-making capacity
that they had had to place orders with Bethlehem Steel and other US
firms, what makes you think they had a surplus to hand over to the
AEF? Some may have been supplied out of French battle reserves, but
I'll bet that the French only did that against the promise of rapid
resupply from the US Army's orders.
I think the reality is that in 1917 US industry simply wasn't
mobilised for war other than those firms with British and French
contracts. Nor in 1917 did the US Army have new designs ready to place
into production as it did in WW2 with its 105mm & 155mm howitzers,
155mm gun etc etc. Even if they had done the designs pre-1914, war
experience had demolished so many pre-war artillery preconceptions
that they probably would have had to be extensively redesigned - as
the British did with their 18-pounder which went through 5 marks of
carriage as they strove to get more and more range.
Also, the WW1 AEF was mobilised and re-equipped very rapidly in the
circumstances. The popular conception is that when it entered WW2 the
US sent off its troops all fully equipped with M1 Garands, 105mm
howitzers etc in profusion. In reality most of the divisions raised in
1941 and early 1942 were still largely equipped with WW1 leftovers eg
the US 1st Marine Div landed in Guadalcanal with Springfields and the
US 32nd & 41st National Guard Divisions that were sent to Australia in
early 1942 were armed with Springfields and half their artillery park
were M1897 75s. I believe the 32nd were still using Springfields at
Buna in December 1942. Nor were early-war US divisions particularly
powerful in firepower. The Aust Official History notes that the 32nd &
41st Divs were smaller and had half the artillery of an Australian
militia (ie home defence) division of that time. Since the Australian
AIF (ie expeditionary force) divisions were more heavily armed again
(and had first priority for new equipment), this suggests that
early-war US divisions were not well-armed at all.
>
> The realization came later (the 37mm would have been quite useful
> in 1940), and required another realization, that anti-tank guns
> would still be necessary. As far as I can tell, the idea was to
> go to self-propelled guns as the next step after the 37mm, but
> that didn't work in practice. Note that the gun after the 57mm,
> the 3", was a quick improvisation involving an obsolescent AA
> gun and parts of a 105mm howitzer carriage (and it turned out better
> than it sounds from that description). I don't think the US had
> a gun in the 57mm range that could make an improvisation like that,
> which is probably why the British design was adopted.
>
Since the US 37mm was a close copy of the German 37mm PAK 36, it would
have been (barely) adequate in 1940, as was the PAK 36, but only if
fired at close range. Both the British and Germans realised that their
guns would soon be outclassed by heavier tank armour.
I'm currently reading Terry Gander's new book "Anti-Tank Weapons" and
he tells a somewhat different story about the 3-inch than Hogg does.
According to Gander (p. 84) a 3-inch field gun was recommended by the
Westervelt Board to replace the 75mm gun and complement the 105mm
howitzer they also recommended. By December 1941, the 105mm was in
production but no work had been done on its 3in partner. The 3in was
quickly cobbled together by grafting the obsolete WW1-era AA gun
barrel to the breech and carriage of the 105, and issued to the troops
in place of the 75. Gander says it was then overtaken by a change in
artillery policy that put all the emphasis on 105mm howitzers, but
that to get something into the hands of the troops production was
continued in the short-term. Then in North Africa its AT potential was
noted and it was kept in production as an AT gun.
If correct, this would explain a number of puzzling features:
- using a howitzer carriage is less than optimal for an AT gun as they
are inevitably too high and too heavy for the AT role (a problem with
the 25pdr too).
- Also why adopt a howitzer breech when you already have a design for
a semi-auto breech in the 57mm that enables a higher ROF?
OTOH if the 3in was intended as a partner piece to the 105 it makes
perfect sense, simplifying spare parts logistics and being common
practice (eg US 4.5" gun/155mm how & Brit 4.5"gun/5.5" how).
>
> >However, the reason for my original post was to find out:
> >- why this particular unit was using the 25pdr and whether others did
> >also
>
> I have a reference to a US unit going into North Africa with 25pdrs,
> for ammunition commonality, and one with a good deal of German equipment,
> to use captured ammo. I don't know of one that used the 25pdrs that
> late in the war.
Well the photo is definitely of US troops firing the 25 pdr - in US
helmets and battledress with a US army truck behind it - and the
background scenery is consistent with NW Europe in winter, rather than
say Italy. Also since he is quite specific about the unit, place and
date I expect it is correct. My own thought was that the US unit was
for some reason attached to a British/Canadian division or corps and
was using the 25 pdr to simplify logistics. OTOH, the Brits also used
the SP 105mm "Priest", so I wouldn't have thought it was that much of
a problem.
>
> >- what the US gunners thought about the 25 pdr vs the US 105mm
> >
> Dunno. I can tell you what Ian Hogg thought about it, but he's
> British. (Specifically, that he thought the longer range of the 25pdr
> nicely balanced the heavier shell of the 105mm, but the 25pdr was
> much easier to manhandle.)
I’ve read a quote by a German who was at the first Alamein
battle (the one where Auchinleck took command personally and stopped
Rommel in his tracks) who ruefully describes how unpleasant it was to
be under 25pdr artillery fire and be unable to hit back because they
were outranged. I’m sure Marines who were at Khe Sanh know
exactly how he felt. The 25pdr outranged both the US and German 105s.
In an attempt to increase the leFH18 105’s range, the Germans
resorted to using saboted ammunition firing an 88mm shell – the
shell would therefore have been almost identical to the British 25pdr
(87.6mm).
The firing platform on the 25 pdr, (which design dates from 1918, BTW)
enabled it to be swung rapidly through 360 degrees, a definite
advantage if threatened by tanks. Anybody got any opinions on the 105
in the direct-fire role?
BTW, I came across the following site apparently written by a retired
NZ Gunner:
http://www.riv.co.nz/rnza/hist/25pr.htm
He says:
“.. the 25-pr shell is more lethal than the American 105-mm M1
shell still currently in use. Some say it is 1.5 times as
lethal.”
No indication why this might be so, but presumably it is better shell
design.
--
Dennis Coslett
1942, I
believe because of a shortage of American equivalents at the time.
They
were used, IIRC, only for a short while. I'm pretty sure there's one
on
display at the Minnesota Military Museum at Camp Ripley, MN (the
34th's
personnel being drawn in part from Minnesota.)
Incidentally, another example of America using foreign military
equipment
during WWII was the use of the Spitfire V by certain groups of the
Army Air
Force in the Meditarranean (sp?), and possibly over England. Again,
these
Spitfires were replace and returned to England as soon as enough
American
fighters were available.
No idea why an American unit might have used 25-pounders in 1944, or
what
American troops thought of them.
Sydney Guy <sydney...@yahoo.com.au> wrote in message
news:9vql0o$2qck$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu...
Dan Stevlingson
> My understanding was that the US services in that era were
> particularly afflicted by the NIH syndrome ("Not Invented Here" -
> can't be any good)
You've been misinformed. The US government has been quite
willing to buy foreign equipment and adopt foreign technology
since the American Civil War.
> Yes, I was aware of the 57mm AT gun and the French 75 in WW1.
> In fact, the US Army in WW1 was almost totally equipped with
> French-designed artillery guns - 75mm gun, 155mm howitzer &
> 155mm GPF gun. However, these examples were all either adopted
> in WW1 or in WW2 were the exceptions to the rule.
Vast numbers of anti-aircraft guns used by the US military
in WWII were of European design, such as Swedish 40mm
Bofors and Swiss 20mm Oerlikon.
The mainstay of WWII US Army artillery, the 105mm howitzer,
was essentially an improved version of a German type.
The US 81mm mortar was based on a WWI British design by
Sir F.W.S. Stokes. The improved WWII version of the 81mm
and the 60mm were designed by E.W. Brandt, a Frenchman.
The standard US combat helmet used from 1917-1942 was
copied from the British pattern.
As you mentioned, the US Army used thousands of British
designed 57mm (6-pounder) guns during WWII.
And of course during WWI the US Army adopted artillery pieces
of various calibre from the French, many of which soldiered
on well into WWII. They also bought large quantities of French
Chauchat machine rifles which proved to be unreliable.
The US Navy's 70-ft and 77-ft PT boats (manufactured by Elco)
was a British design by Hubert Scott-Paine, former owner of
Supermarine. After trials this boat was chosen over the Royal
Navy's Vosper MTB which was rejected as being slower and
less manueverable than Scott-Paine's 70-footer. Experience
with this boat guided Elco in designing their own modified
and much improved 80-ft PT, the most common type used by
the US Navy during WWII.
The British-made Spitfire was often flown by American pilots
until replaced by Thunderbolts and Mustangs.
P-51B/D/H Mustangs used the British-designed Merlin engine
and the British K-14 gyroscopic gun sight.
WWII US Night Fighter aircraft used some sensors that were
based on the fruits of British radar research.
British flying gear was sometimes worn by USAAF aircrew
and US paratroops used assorted equipment of British origin.
US Navy experiments with gas turbines resulted from a Swiss
and British report forwarded to them in the 1930s. The British
Proteus gas turbine powered several types of US patrol craft.
German scientists obviously had a global influence on post-
WWII aircraft, jet engines, rockets, missles, guns, ammunition,
optical and sighting gear, gas turbines, diesels, etc. The USA
was and still is one of the primary benificiaries.
During the Vietnam war the US Navy used the Nasty class
80-ft PTF, a fast boat designed by a Norwegian firm. It was
powered by twin Napier Deltic-Diesels from the UK.
The US Marine Corps has used the British Harrier jump jet
since the 1970s.
The US Army and the German Army attempted a joint tank
program called MBT-70 which dissolved over cost overruns
and cooperative disagreements. The US Army later designed
their M1 Abrams tank around the 120mm smoothbore gun
system engineered by Rheinmetall of Germany.
The British-designed L7 105mm gun was adopted for the
US M60 tank. It was also fitted to the first batch of M1 Abrams
tanks, until the Germans sorted out some minor technical
troubles with the standard 120mm gun.
The Chobham composite armor plating used on the Abrams
tank was based on British research from the 1960s, although
this has been supplanted to some extent by depleted uranium
armor protection.
The US kevlar helmet and M60 machine gun were inspired
by WWII German types, at least in outward appearance if
not in functionality.
Since 1984, the US Army's squad automatic weapon (SAW)
has been the Belgian-designed FN Minimi.
The standard US Army pistol is the Italian Beretta 9mm,
although some of the rank and file are not satisfied with
this weapon and prefer the old M1911 Colt .45.
The Avro-Lycoming turbines that powered US helicopters
in Vietnam were designed by an Austrian/Swiss scientist
who was involved in the Me 262 jet engine program.
Finally, during the American Civil War (1861-65) millions
of arms were imported from Europe. Great Britain supplied
some 900,000 Enfield rifles for example. Some years later
the US Army adopted the Norwegian Krag Jorgensen M1892
bolt-action rifle. This was standard issue until replaced by
Springfield M1903, which was inspired somewhat by the
German Mauser bolt-action rifles of that era.
> One example of American NIH behaviour <snip>
Well, that makes one.
--
Emmanuel Gustin
> The only other artillery adaptations I can think of are the Bofors
> 40mm AA gun and Oerlikon 20mm, primarily used by the Navy,
Also the Hispano 20mm, of French origin, used by
the Air Force and the Navy. Despite considerable
difficulties and delays to make American-produced
guns work well.
As for as aircraft are concerned, the USAAF used
at least the Spitfire, Mosquito and Beaufighter,
but never on a large scale. Britain could not
afford to produce much armament for its allies,
unlike the USA.
Technology transfers were far more considerable
-- radar, gunsights, gun turrets, jet engines,
nuclear technology, codebreaking, etc. -- but
always on the basis of the design of an American
equivalent, to simplify production by the American
industry.
Emmanuel Gustin
Dan Stevlingson
> Since the US 37mm was a close copy of the German 37mm
> PAK 36, it would have been (barely) adequate in 1940
> Both the British and Germans realised that their guns
> would soon be outclassed by heavier tank armour.
This is not supported by the facts.
The Germans invaded the Soviet Union A YEAR LATER with the
37mm as their standard towed anti-tank gun. They thought it
was adequate at the time, until the shots started bouncing
off Russian tanks with alarming consistency. The gun then
acquired the nickname of "the door-knocker" or something to
that effect.
The Germans generally preferred tanks that were lightly armed
and protected until the experience in Russia and North Africa
changed their minds. This is one reason why the British Army
was still using 2-pounder guns in 1942.
--
--
Emmanuel Gustin
> You've been misinformed. The US government has been quite
> willing to buy foreign equipment and adopt foreign technology
> since the American Civil War.
Adopt foreign technology, yes; buy foreign equipment, no.
Apart from the obvious advantages of producing your
own material, instead of being dependent on foreign
deliveries, there has always been a very strong
protectionist tendency ("Buy American") in the
American military. And after all, these are tax
dollars being spent.
That aside, the foreign technology was usually
re-engineered, not copied. Apart from being
a matter of pride, this was simply necessary,
because the American industry could not make
equipment directly from e.g. British drawings.
Also, some British equipment was, if not improvised,
then at least designed for small-scale production
by a specialised workforce.
Hence American Merlin engines were subtly different
from British Merlins. American AI radars were based
on British radars, but entirely redesigned. The same
applied for H2X and H2S. American gun turrets included
Boulton-Paul and Frazer-Nash technology, but were not
copies of it. In some cases lessons were learnt from
the enemy: American self-sealing tanks owed more to
the superior German designs (from which the British
provided examples, fallen into their hands during
the Battle of Britain) than to the British designs of
the same.
Overall the US military was quick to learn, especially
in areas where they had a lot of catching-up to do
(after the very, very low investment in research of
the 1920s and 1930s) but always used foreign concepts
in an Americanised form, reworked for mass production.
Emmanuel Gustin
--
Don Phillipson
news:3c2a1951...@news.pacific.net.au...
> Technology transfers were far more considerable
> -- radar, gunsights, gun turrets, jet engines,
> nuclear technology, codebreaking, etc. -- but
> always on the basis of the design of an American
> equivalent, to simplify production by the American
> industry.
Industrial standards played an important role
here because up to WW2 many industrial standards
(from the technical character of radio tubes to the
thickness of steel plate, copper wiring) were different
between the USA and Britain by enough to make
a practical difference. British nuts did not fit US
bolts and so on.
For whatever obvious historical reasons (mainly
lack of any Canadian industrial standardization
before the 1920s) large parts of Canadian manufacturing
still used British standards in 1939: and in wartime
adopted US standards (so as to use materials from
US sources and supply munitions to the US government.)
--
Donald Phillipson
dphil...@trytel.com
Carlsbad Springs (Ottawa, Canada)
613 822 0734
Dan Stevlingson
>>US government has been quite willing to buy foreign
>>equipment and adopt foreign
> Adopt foreign technology, yes; buy foreign equipment, no.
Compared to WHO?
And let's not forget that much of the foreign technology
they adopted was not provided free of charge, so I didn't
see your point. Whether an item was modified or simplified
for mass production is irrelevant.
--
Emmanuel Gustin
> Compared to WHO?
Almost anyone, really. Especially during the first year
of WWII, when the Europeans nations were more willing
to buy than the Americans were willing (or able) to sell.
Reports from these days make interesting reading.
American aircraft were inferior to the best British,
French of German products and expensive (back then
American workers earned higher wages than their
counterparts). Deliveries were slow (because the
US industry had not yet geared up) and politically
difficult because of the isolationism.
But reports are also full of enthusiasm about the
large, highly modern factories in the USA. These
had no real equivalent in France or Britain. The
French had second thoughts; in the canteens they
could only get "hygienic beverages" instead of
decent claret...
Emmanuel Gustin
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk
hal90...@mailANDnews.com (Dan Stevlingson) wrote:
> The Germans invaded the Soviet Union A YEAR LATER with the
> 37mm as their standard towed anti-tank gun.
Design of the 5cm Pak 38 started in 1937. The first guns reached the
troops in April 1940. Design of the 7.5cm Pak 40 started in 1939 with
first troop issues in late 1941. It is quite understandable that the
Germans continued to use the 37mm gun. Like the British Germany
suffered from production problems and the existence of 15,000 or so
certainly provided an incentive to use them for as long as possible.
In fact some guns were still in service in 1945 though they had been
issued with the Stielgranite hollow charge projectile ( effectively an
oversized rifle grenade).
Design of the US 37mm AT gun started in 1937 with the gun being
standardised in October 1938. The 57 mm M1 was built using plans
obtained from Britain. This gun was standardised in May 1941. In June
1943 design work on fitting the 76mm tank gun onto a wheeled carriage
began. This work was still in progress when the war ended.
The 3 in M5 was standardised in December 1941 with troop issue in
late 1942. However there were considerable problems with ammunition
until early 1944. Development of an 90mm AT gun began in early 1943
with no weapons reaching the troops during WW2. By the way design work
on the 17pdr started in November 1940.
Ken Young
ken...@cix.co.uk
Maternity is a matter of fact
Paternity is a matter of opinion
Dan Stevlingson
> Especially during the first year of WWII, when the Europeans
> nations were more willing to buy than the Americans <snip>
Eh...the USA remained neutral until December 1941, so this
argument is pointless. Try to remain in context please.
>> Compared to WHO?
> Almost anyone, really.
Such as?
>Reports from these days make interesting reading. American
>aircraft were inferior to the best British, French of German
>products
Not for long. :-)
Reports also indicate that the combat record of the Spitfire
was basically a joke before the arrival of USAAF Thunderbolts,
Lightnings and Mustangs in 1943.
RAF fighters had German fighters severely outnumbered yet
they inflicted a puny number of losses on Me 109s and Fw 190s.
The loss ratio was greatly in favor of the Jagdwaffe from May
1940-May 1943.
As USAAF Spitfire units like the 4th Fighter Group converted
to the P-47 Thunderbolt, they saw their kills (and kill ratio)
multiply dramatically after a dismal record using Spitfires.
--
thor...@visi.com
Dan Stevlingson <hal90...@mailANDnews.com> wrote:
>Emmanue...@skynet.be (Emmanuel Gustin) wrote:
>
>>Reports from these days make interesting reading. American
>>aircraft were inferior to the best British, French of German
>>products
>
>Not for long. :-)
>
probably the best around, having in general been designed later
than their British or German counterparts.
US aircraft were only inferior to the French for a short part of
the war, of course, and the best French aircraft were a considerable
minority during the Battle of France. The most numerous French
fighter was the M.S. 406, not the excellent De 510.
>RAF fighters had German fighters severely outnumbered yet
>they inflicted a puny number of losses on Me 109s and Fw 190s.
>The loss ratio was greatly in favor of the Jagdwaffe from May
>1940-May 1943.
>
This was largely due to the use of Spitfires in the sweeps over
France, which essentially meant that the Germans engaged them
when and only when they wanted. The loss ratio says nothing about
the quality of the machine, but does say much about how they were
used.
>As USAAF Spitfire units like the 4th Fighter Group converted
>to the P-47 Thunderbolt, they saw their kills (and kill ratio)
>multiply dramatically after a dismal record using Spitfires.
>
We will note that the USAAF was using Spitfires, since that was
the best fighter they could get (if you don't care about range,
anyway). The Thunderbolts were indeed good fighters, but started
taking over in 1943 or so.
Since the US had pretty much the best planes for maybe two years
of a six-year war, I'd say that the original statement was well
justified.
David Thornley
Dan Stevlingson <hal90...@mailANDnews.com> wrote:
>Emmanue...@skynet.be (Emmanuel Gustin) wrote:
>
>>aircraft were inferior to the best British, French of German
>>products
>
>Not for long. :-)
>
probably the best around, having in general been designed later
than their British or German counterparts.
US aircraft were only inferior to the French for a short part of
the war, of course, and the best French aircraft were a considerable
minority during the Battle of France. The most numerous French
fighter was the M.S. 406, not the excellent De 510.
>RAF fighters had German fighters severely outnumbered yet
>they inflicted a puny number of losses on Me 109s and Fw 190s.
>The loss ratio was greatly in favor of the Jagdwaffe from May
>1940-May 1943.
>
This was largely due to the use of Spitfires in the sweeps over
France, which essentially meant that the Germans engaged them
when and only when they wanted. The loss ratio says nothing about
the quality of the machine, but does say much about how they were
used.
>As USAAF Spitfire units like the 4th Fighter Group converted
>to the P-47 Thunderbolt, they saw their kills (and kill ratio)
>multiply dramatically after a dismal record using Spitfires.
>
We will note that the USAAF was using Spitfires, since that was
the best fighter they could get (if you don't care about range,
anyway). The Thunderbolts were indeed good fighters, but started
taking over in 1943 or so.
Since the US had pretty much the best planes for maybe two years
of a six-year war, I'd say that the original statement was well
justified.
--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion, ask.
da...@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-
--
Dan Stevlingson
> In June 1943 design work on fitting the 76mm tank gun onto
> a wheeled carriage began. This work was still in progress when
> the war ended.
Tank Destroyer Command did not want a towed 76mm once the
3-inch gun was available in quantity. Although lower in weight
the 76mm fired the same projectile with same performance. In
fact, TD Command did not want towed guns at all. They lobbied
hard for more self-propelled mounts. Besides the S-P carriage,
what they wanted most was improved ammunition for existing
guns. And there were several ways to do this.
> Development of an 90mm AT gun began in early 1943 with no
> weapons reaching the troops during WW2.
The 90mm AT gun reached the TD troops mounted on an M-36
self-propelled carriage, since that is what they preferred. :-)
> The 3 in M5 was standardised in December 1941 with troop issue
> in late 1942. However there were considerable problems with
> ammunition until early 1944.
Of course Chamberlain, Ellis and Hogg neglected to mention
the British had considerable problems with their own ammo.
They neglected to mention the 17-pound shot was less accurate
than the US 76mm shot. They claimed that the US 90mm gun
was supposedly inaccurate, but did not provide any evidence
or reason to believe that the 17-pounder gun fared better.
They neglected to mention that the 17-pound APCBC tended
to break up against sloped armor, like the American APCBC's.
They neglected to mention that WWII tungsten cored shots,
although specially hardened, were not much better against
sloped armor even though they looked great on paper... In
practice the high velocity of the APDS and HVAP was unable
to compensate for the small size and low weight of the cores.
Finally, they neglected to mention that the British Army did
not develop a specially hardened solid shot like the US types
(which did not break up) and were THE most effective round
against sloped armor or hits between 30 and 60 degrees angle
of impact. In other words, the best AT ammunition available.
> design work on the 17pdr started in November 1940.
Yes but Britain had been at war for a year. The USA was still
neutral, and would be for another year. Had Pearl Harbor not
been attacked then the USA may have remained neutral. So
why should they develop new weapons at the same pace?
> Like the British Germany suffered from production problems
> and the existence of 15,000 or so certainly provided an incentive
> to use them for as long as possible.
I agree, but German intelligence on Soviet tanks was either
poor, misunderstood, or both, in 1941. German troops were
forced to learn the truth the hard way, and their Army would
have rushed production of bigger AT guns had they realized
what was waiting for them.
--
Geoffrey Sinclair
>Emmanue...@skynet.be (Emmanuel Gustin) wrote:
>
>> Especially during the first year of WWII, when the Europeans
>> nations were more willing to buy than the Americans <snip>
>
>Eh...the USA remained neutral until December 1941, so this
>argument is pointless. Try to remain in context please.
No, it is not pointless, it is about the US's preference for
home built armaments.
>>> Compared to WHO?
>
>> Almost anyone, really.
>
>Such as?
British, Germans, French?
>>Reports from these days make interesting reading. American
>>aircraft were inferior to the best British, French of German
>>products
>
>Not for long. :-)
In terms of WWII it was not until 1943 that the US fighter
designs were considered combat worthy and better than
the European designs.
>Reports also indicate that the combat record of the Spitfire
>was basically a joke before the arrival of USAAF Thunderbolts,
>Lightnings and Mustangs in 1943.
So the claim is the Spitfire could not shoot anything down
until the USAAF turned up? How do the USAAF fighters
make a difference to Spitfire combats?
>RAF fighters had German fighters severely outnumbered yet
>they inflicted a puny number of losses on Me 109s and Fw 190s.
>The loss ratio was greatly in favor of the Jagdwaffe from May
>1940-May 1943.
The loss ratio was very much in favour of the Luftwaffe in 1941,
perhaps 3 to 1 or better in air to air combat, the ratio halved in
1942 and moved into RAF favour in 1943.
In terms of fighter strengths and sorties it looks like the Luftwaffe
fought outnumbered in the west for most if not all of the war from
mid 1941 onwards.
>As USAAF Spitfire units like the 4th Fighter Group converted
>to the P-47 Thunderbolt, they saw their kills (and kill ratio)
>multiply dramatically after a dismal record using Spitfires.
The early P-47 missions also had dismal records, since they
were adopting the fighter sweep tactics the RAF used in 1941.
The sweeps were ignored unless the tactical situation was good,
and there was much more on offer elsewhere anyway.
Meanwhile the RAF was quite happy to escort the growing
USAAF day bomber force, a force that could not be ignored by
the Luftwaffe. Add the widespread introduction of the Spitfire IX
and Typhoon and the RAF was able to meet the interceptors
on better terms than before.
According to the USAAF statistical digest the USAAF fighters
were awarded 37 kill claims in first 6 months of 1943 and lost
27 aircraft in air to air combat plus 3 to other causes. Given
the accuracy of kill claims, the USAAF was on the losing end
of the exchange. It was running into the same problems the
RAF had in 1941, inexperienced units, inferior equipment
(Spitfire V and P-47s with all the inevitable problems when first
used in combat), and inferior tactics. The Bf109 and Fw190's
could avoid them.
The USAAF fighters started doing escort missions from early
May 1943 on, and in May and June lost 17 aircraft to Luftwaffe
fighters and 3 to other causes, while claiming 26 kills.
Air War Europa by Eric Hammel notes 39 USAAF fighter kill
claims for September 1943 (the Statistical Digest says 38),
he notes the USAAF fighter sweeps on 4th September (95
sorties) saw nothing whereas the Spitfires escorting a B-26
strike claimed 19 kills. On September 22 some 395 USAAF
fighter sweep sorties resulted in 2 kill claims, but on September
27, the P-47 escort was awarded 21 kills.
The USAAF stepped up the pace and forced the Luftwaffe to
commit more fighter units to the defence, but often in aircraft
like the Bf110, increasing the performance edge the debugged
P-47 and P-51s had, as well as the improved P-38s.
The figures for the final 6 months of 1943 are USAAF fighter losses
134 to enemy aircraft, 1 to flak and 13 to other causes, versus
414 kill claims. Assuming half the kill claims are valid about 2
USAAF fighters for each 3 Luftwaffe fighters shot down. The
USAAF was able to keep this pace up, then increase it and so
forced the Luftwaffe to fight even as the kill ratio kept moving
further and further in the USAAF favour.
I do not think the 8th AF heavy bombers destroyed 3,381 enemy
aircraft in 1943, the statistical digest has them losing 700 to
enemy aircraft, 228 to flak and 108 to other causes while on
operations in return for the kill claims.
You force the enemy air force to fight by hurting important targets
using a viable bomber force. Without it the enemy can use the
advantages of fighting over friendly territory to near ensure it wins
the kill ratio. Having bombers around automatically shifts the
fighter
versus fighter contest in your favour as enemy fighters try for the
bombers, not the escorts.
The USAAF had all the components, the bombers and the fighters
with the necessary range, once the tactics were sorted out the
result was devastating for the Luftwaffe day fighter force. Comparing
the combats of 1941 to those of 1943 or later must take into account
the changed requirements on the defenders, in 1941, pick off enemy
aircraft with minimal losses, the main effort is in the east, from
1943
onwards it was stop the bombers.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.
mike
> US aircraft were only inferior to the French for a short part of
> the war, of course, and the best French aircraft were a considerable
> minority during the Battle of France. The most numerous French
> fighter was the M.S. 406, not the excellent De 510.
>From what I recall, the 510 didn't do too well in China, little
better than the P-26,worse than the Hawk 75. The French
had fairly good luck with thier Hawk 75s during the BoF.
You mean the 520?
yeah, the M.S.406 wasn't nearly liked as well by the
Finns as the Buffalo or Hawk75. Don't think the French
cared much for it either.
Peashooter would be the only inferior one of the crop of
the early US fighters to the French efforts, IMHO.
**
mike
**
--
Emmanuel Gustin
news:3c4401b2...@news.pacific.net.au...
> Eh...the USA remained neutral until December 1941, so this
> argument is pointless. Try to remain in context please.
Neutral or not, the USA was very hastily re-arming after years
of neglect; so the argument isn't so pointless at all. Of course
Britain wasn't able to sell much equipment to the USA at this
time; nor was it later. (USAAF requests to exchange Mustangs
for Mosquitos were denied, for example.) The fact is that the
USA was and is a major exporter of weapons, but only very
rarely imports equipment.
> Such as?
Well, in the relevant period --- say 1930 to 1945, to stay on
topic --- France, Britain, Belgium, Japan, the USSR, the
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Norway, Argentina, China,
Thailand... All these nations, and many others, imported
American combat aircraft. During the 1930s many American
aircraft manufacturers survived by exporting, and the run-
up to WWII was of course an enormous business opportunity
for them.
Imports during the interbellum remained limited to a handful
of Fokker aircraft, and even these were soon built in the USA.
> Not for long. :-)
For quite some time. The majority of US fighters in the war
zones were P-39s and P-40s until well into 1943; these were
by no means competitive.
> Reports also indicate that the combat record of the Spitfire
> was basically a joke before the arrival of USAAF Thunderbolts,
> Lightnings and Mustangs in 1943.
If you stretch this from May 1940 to May 1943, it is complete
and utter nonsense. How do you imagine that the RAF won
the Battle of Britain? With stoneslings?
In the period immediately after the BoB, Germans indeed won
a tactical victory over the RAF, which used very poor tactics
in its attempt to continue its victory on the other side of the
channel. But that doesn't change the fact that during this period,
and before US intervention became effective, the Luftwaffe
lost air superiority in the region; that is, as far as RAF fighters
could fly. This had a very large impact on the outcome of the
war, because the Luftwaffe was forced to begin its campaign
on the Eastern front with a completely insufficient strength.
--
Emmanuel Gustin <gus...@NoSpam.uia.ac.be>
Fighter Guns Page: http://www.geocities.com/CapeCanaveral/Hangar/8217/
(Delete NoSpam. from my address. If you can't reach me, your host
may be on our spam filter list. Check http://www.uia.ac.be/cc/spam.html.)
--
Dan Stevlingson
>>> there has always been a very strong protectionist tendency
>>> ("Buy American") in the American military.
>> Compared to WHO?
> British, Germans, French?
Prove it.
--List all types of WWII foreign weapons and quantities
purchased by the British, prior to September 1939. Other
than the Bren gun, a Czech design licensed and modified
by the Brits.
--List all types of WWII foreign weapons and quantities
purchased by the French, prior to September 1939.
--List all types of WWII foreign weapons and quantities
purchased by the Germans, prior to September 1939.
--
--
Dan Stevlingson
<snip>
Geoffrey, why don't you try reading some material that was
written by RAF pilots who actually flew Spitfires in combat.
Their observations are different than yours.
> In terms of WWII it was not until 1943 that the US fighter
> designs were considered combat worthy and better than
> the European designs.
The facts speak louder than your opinions, and the facts
also proves the Spitfire was hardly more "combat ready"
than the P-38 Lightning:
--According to Alan Deere, the Spitfire had a poor cockpit
heating system and the problem with frosted canopies and
windscreens was "never solved".
--There were problems with guns jamming at high altitude
according to Sandy Johnstone of 602 Squadron. They tried
to keep the guns warm by firing them occasionally but this
only wasted ammunition.
--The Spitfire had well known carburetor troubles which
caused the Merlin engine to cut out at the worst times. Less
well known is that this problem was still manifesting itself
in 1943.
--Reliability. Or should I say, lack of it. The British Merlin
engines had a very short life compared to the US Allison
engines which tended to last about three times longer than
the Merlin according to personnel from RAF Mustang units.
This subject is usually avoided by British aviation writers.
Based on the problems with feezing temperatures and engines
cutting out in a chase, Spitfire pilots would have had a difficult
time coping with long range escort missions at 30,000 ft, even
if the fuel load permitted.
The main differences between the Spitfire and P-38 is that
the British committed a great many more Spitfires to the
ETO, and that P-38s easily outranged the Spitfire.
>> Reports also indicate that the combat record of the Spitfire
>> was basically a joke before the arrival of USAAF Thunderbolts,
>> Lightnings and Mustangs in 1943.
> The early P-47 missions also had dismal records, since they
But only for a few months while experienced pilots got used
to their new mounts and new pilots got used to flying combat.
This is different than the Spitfire's record which was dismal
for about three years.
> were adopting the fighter sweep tactics the RAF used in 1941.
Again, the observations of British combat pilots are in direct
conflict with yours. The facts indicate that the merits of the
fighter sweep is only one factor of many.
RAF Fighter Command was embarrassed by the Jagdwaffe
for other reasons...Merlin engine problems, gun troubles,
complaints by RAF pilots over flawed squadron formations,
and Douglas Bader's clumsy, Big Wing concept that was
condemned by Johnnie Johnson, Alan Deere and others.
Yet you Geoffrey Sinclair, who never flew Spitfires in combat,
wants to reduce all of their published problems to one: "it was
the fighter sweeps" which is preposterous.
> sweeps were ignored unless the tactical situation was good,
> and there was much more on offer elsewhere anyway.
Even if we move into the realm of hypothetical scenarios
where "fighter sweeps" becomes the only factor in this
comparison, your position is still untenable because you
didn't bother to offer any data to support it.
Such as number of fighter sweeps flown by the USAAF as
compared to the RAF from 1940-45.
--
--
Dan Stevlingson
> >RAF fighters had German fighters severely outnumbered yet
> >they inflicted a puny number of losses on Me 109s and Fw 190s.
> >The loss ratio was greatly in favor of the Jagdwaffe from May
> >1940-May 1943.
> This was largely due to the use of Spitfires in the sweeps over
> France, which essentially meant that the Germans engaged them
> when and only when they wanted.
US fighter groups also flew sweeps on a regular basis, which meant
that the Germans engaged them when and only when they wanted.
The American fighters faced hundreds of more flak guns. Yet they did
not get their butts kicked like the RAF did.
> The loss ratio says nothing about the quality of the machine, but
> does say much about how they were used.
The poor tactics used by RAF Fighter Command was only one of
the causal factors in the Jagdwaffe dominating them so easily
before the arrival of the USAAF Thunderbolts and Mustangs.
The loss ratio also says a lot about the lack of quality in the
Spitfire.
The Merlin engine had poor performance above 20,000 ft, at least
until the 60 series was available in quantity in 1943. Even then, the
P-47s turbo-supercharged radial was much better at high altitude.
> We will note that the USAAF was using Spitfires, since that was
> the best fighter they could get
Mainly because the P-38s was prioritized for other theatres, the
South Pacific, the Mediterranean, and the frosty Aleutians.
We will also note that USAAF fighter groups did not form in England
until mid-1942. At that time, only the 4th Group was active (except
for
the 31st Group which flew a few missions before transferring to the
Med). Of course the P-38s were prioritized for other theatres.
> Since the US had pretty much the best planes for maybe two
> years of a six-year war, I'd say that the original statement was
> well justified.
This is not supported by the facts.
The Spitfire was no better against the Germans than the P-38. The
major difference is that there were - a lot more - Spitfires available
in the ETO. The RAF tried to overwhelm the Jagdwaffe with sheer
numbers of Spitfires, but that did not work because Geman fighters
were dominating them anyhow. The numbers don't lie.
And I would like to see some hard evidence that RAF Fighter
Command made a significant turnaround after 1943. So far,
none has been forthcoming.
--
--
Dan Stevlingson
<snip>
Geoffrey, why don't you try reading some material that was
written by RAF pilots who actually flew Spitfires in combat.
Their observations are different than yours.
> In terms of WWII it was not until 1943 that the US fighter
> designs were considered combat worthy and better than
> the European designs.
The facts speak louder than your opinions, and the facts
>> Reports also indicate that the combat record of the Spitfire
>> was basically a joke before the arrival of USAAF Thunderbolts,
>> Lightnings and Mustangs in 1943.
> The early P-47 missions also had dismal records, since they
But only for a few months while experienced pilots got used
to their new mounts and new pilots got used to flying combat.
This is different than the Spitfire's record which was dismal
for about three years.
> were adopting the fighter sweep tactics the RAF used in 1941.
Again, the observations of British combat pilots are in direct
conflict with yours. The facts indicate that the merits of the
fighter sweep is only one factor of many.
RAF Fighter Command was embarrassed by the Jagdwaffe
for other reasons...Merlin engine problems, gun troubles,
complaints by RAF pilots over flawed squadron formations,
and Douglas Bader's clumsy, Big Wing concept that was
condemned by Johnnie Johnson, Alan Deere and others.
Yet you Geoffrey Sinclair, who never flew Spitfires in combat,
wants to reduce all of their published problems to one: "it was
the fighter sweeps" which is preposterous.
> sweeps were ignored unless the tactical situation was good,
> and there was much more on offer elsewhere anyway.
Even if we move into the realm of hypothetical scenarios
Dan Stevlingson
Dan Stevlingson
> "Dan Stevlingson" <hal90...@mailANDnews.com> wrote:
> > Reports also indicate that the combat record of the Spitfire
> > was basically a joke before the arrival of USAAF Thunderbolts,
> > Lightnings and Mustangs in 1943.
>
> If you stretch this from May 1940 to May 1943, it is complete
> and utter nonsense.
I'm afraid it isn't.
> do you imagine that the RAF won the Battle of Britain?
> With stoneslings?
I'm not sure what you mean by this because you were comparing
front line fighters. Even during the BoB, the RAF lost more
single-engine fighters than the Germans did.
That RAF fighters shot down more multi-engine aircraft gave
them a false sense of security. Their flawed air-to-air combat
tactics and training were not quite so noticable when engaging
bombers or fighting the Jagdwaffe defensively, and with the
sometime assistance of GCI radar.
--
Emmanuel Gustin
news:<a0q96t$g90$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu>...
> The Merlin engine had poor performance above 20,000 ft, at least
> until the 60 series was available in quantity in 1943. Even then, the
> P-47s turbo-supercharged radial was much better at high altitude.
A turbocharger would normally give better performance
than a mechanical supercharger at high altitude. That
doesn't change the fact that the Spitfire Mk.IX with
a Merlin 61 was at most altitudes the equal of the
Fw 190A, which the P-47D was NOT until the introduction
of water injection and paddle-bladed propellers.
The P-47 had a powerful engine, but it was also
a very heavy aircraft, and the early combat models
were at a disadvantage at low and medium altitudes.
Much of this discussion is comparing apples and oranges.
Spitfires had their disadvantages, especially their short
range and their inability to carry much of a bombload. But
until the end of the war the latest Spitfire model could
always could out-turn American and German fighters, and
out-climb most American fighters. The Spitfire was fast,
had excellent handling and the highest limiting Mach number
of any WWII fighter, jets included. The Spitfire was not
very suitable as fighter-bomber or escort fighter, but
for most of the war it was the best interceptor and the
best reconnaissance aircraft. The Spitfire could even
be developed in a more than acceptable carrier-based
fighter, although this was a case of need prevailing
on common sense.
> Mainly because the P-38s was prioritized for other
> theatres, the South Pacific, the Mediterranean, and
> the frosty Aleutians.
Maybe. I know there are a lot of P-38 fans out there, but
I am still of the opinion that (1) the P-38 offered too
few advantages (and some disadvantages) over properly
designed single-engined fighters to justify its high cost,
and (2) the design didn't reach maturity anyway until
the engine installation and aileron circuits were reworked.
These factors, and the initial tactical errors, contributed
to the gradual of the P-38 from the ETO. The P-38 did well
in the Pacific, were its range was a big advantage and
--- it should be added --- the opposition technically
inferior to that encountered in Europe.
That aside, operating P-38s in the Aleutians must have
been pure hell for the pilots; the P-38 wasn't known
for its good cockpit heating systems...
Emmanuel Gustin
Geoffrey Sinclair
Dan Stevlingson wrote in message
<3c34eeb...@news.pacific.net.au>...
>Geoffrey Sinclair wrote:
Actually Emmanuel Gustin wrote the first sentence.
>>>> there has always been a very strong protectionist tendency
>>>> ("Buy American") in the American military.
>
>>> Compared to WHO?
>
>> British, Germans, French?
>
>Prove it.
Fascinating, someone who has such a strong opinion on
a topic grounded in reality usually has the data to back it
up, not demands everyone else provide the data.
The list below is as comprehensive as I can make it, given
problems with current library hours.
>--List all types of WWII foreign weapons and quantities
> purchased by the British, prior to September 1939. Other
> than the Bren gun, a Czech design licensed and modified
> by the Brits.
Browning 0.303 inch machine gun, Hispano 20 mm cannon,
negotiations for the browning 50 cal and I think the order was
placed in 1939, hundreds of thousands made. 250 Lockheed
A-28 Hudson.
Bofors 40 mm in 1937.
April 1940, 475 Bell P-39, May 1940 320 North American P-51.
>--List all types of WWII foreign weapons and quantities
> purchased by the French, prior to September 1939.
F4F (81), P-36 (1,000), A-20 (105), P-40 (185),
Flower class corvettes,
British Radar.
P-39 (200) October 1939.
>--List all types of WWII foreign weapons and quantities
> purchased by the Germans, prior to September 1939.
Czech 35(t) tank plus putting into production the 38(t).
Czech 76.5 mm, 100 mm and 105mm artillery, MG FF
cannon, from Oerlikon
Things like the mass use of the Soviet 76.2 mm during
the war.
Now we await Dan's list of WWII foreign weapons and
quantities purchased by the USA, prior to September 1939.
It is of course a very arbitrary date, who knew war was going
to break out in that month? Still it would be good manners
when demanding information like Dan does to at least give
a similar list of the US purchases, to back his claims.
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk
hal90...@mailANDnews.com (Dan Stevlingson) wrote:
> . Other
> than the Bren gun, a Czech design licensed and modified
> by the Brits.
No British designed machine gun has been used by the British armed
forces. The Vickers was a modified Maxim. The Vickers-Berthier
originated as a French design. The Browning was US. The Besa was an
unmodified Brno design.
The Lanchester sub machine gun adopted by the RN was a direct copy of
the German MP 28.
There was also the Bofors, Oierklon and Hispano-Susa cannons. British
motor torpedo boats had Italian engines, later replaced by American
engines.
> -List all types of WWII foreign weapons and quantities
> purchased by the French, prior to September 1939.
Give me strength have you no idea of British and French fighter
purchases?
Geoffrey Sinclair
Dan Stevlingson wrote in message
<3c35eeb...@news.pacific.net.au>...
>Geoffrey Sinclair wrote:
>
><snip>
>
>Geoffrey, why don't you try reading some material that was
>written by RAF pilots who actually flew Spitfires in combat.
>Their observations are different than yours.
I note no Spitfire combat performance claims are given,
just a list of problems the aircraft had, with the implication
that cockpit and gun heating problems and some engine
problems made the aircraft non combat worthy, especially
on a mission no air force flew very often, it at all, escort at
30,000 feet in unpressurised fighters. The RAF used Spitfire
VIIs for high altitude work.
>> In terms of WWII it was not until 1943 that the US fighter
>> designs were considered combat worthy and better than
>> the European designs.
>
>The facts speak louder than your opinions, and the facts
>also proves the Spitfire was hardly more "combat ready"
>than the P-38 Lightning:
I presume people have evaluated the P-38 performance
over Tunisia in 1942? It's problems in fighter versus fighter
combat meant a shift was made towards putting more into
fighter bomber versions. I note apart from the list of Spitfire
problems no P-38 data in the ETO or MTO is given. I note
the request to send Spitfire IXs to Tunisia.
I note my facts were snipped and opinion was given in reply.
>--According to Alan Deere, the Spitfire had a poor cockpit
> heating system and the problem with frosted canopies and
> windscreens was "never solved".
Yes, misting was a problem, usually in a rapid descent.
>--There were problems with guns jamming at high altitude
> according to Sandy Johnstone of 602 Squadron. They tried
> to keep the guns warm by firing them occasionally but this
> only wasted ammunition.
Inadequate gun heating problems was the major reason
the Spitfire did not go to the RAF standard 4 20 mm cannon
armament during the war.
> --The Spitfire had well known carburetor troubles which
> caused the Merlin engine to cut out at the worst times. Less
> well known is that this problem was still manifesting itself
> in 1943.
We have been over this before and I recall the dispute as
to how much of a problem this was. Any 1943 problems
would have also affected the P-51.
>--Reliability. Or should I say, lack of it. The British Merlin
> engines had a very short life compared to the US Allison
> engines which tended to last about three times longer than
> the Merlin according to personnel from RAF Mustang units.
> This subject is usually avoided by British aviation writers.
By 1942 I believe the statistics for the Merlin were 1 engine
failure per 1,000 hours of flying, up from 1 per 500 hours in
the first 6 months of Hurricane service pre war. Roger Freeman
in Mighty 8th War Diary claims half the P-38 losses in the winter
of 1943/44 were to engine failure. (By the way remember the
Me262 engines had a lifetime of 20 hours)
I note the above says nothing about the P-38 problems nor
relative combat performances, nor the problem the P-38
shared with most twins, larger, easier to spot, and not
as manoeuvrable. The usual trade offs you have.
I note the gratuitous insult to British aviation writers thrown in.
>Based on the problems with feezing temperatures and engines
>cutting out in a chase, Spitfire pilots would have had a difficult
>time coping with long range escort missions at 30,000 ft, even
>if the fuel load permitted.
Except all types had problems with long range escort missions
at 30,000 feet, you really needed cabin pressurisation to fly at
that height for any length of time, plus things like the P-51 gun
heating shows the problem occurs in other types. Why not add
the Spitfire would have trouble lifting a 10 ton bomb as well?
>The main differences between the Spitfire and P-38 is that
>the British committed a great many more Spitfires to the
>ETO, and that P-38s easily outranged the Spitfire.
There are other differences, the USAAF was not forced to
commit the P-38C against the Fw190, the P-38 was a
very different concept, twin engined , weighing close to
twice a Spitfire IX.
>>> Reports also indicate that the combat record of the Spitfire
>>> was basically a joke before the arrival of USAAF Thunderbolts,
>>> Lightnings and Mustangs in 1943.
An uncreditted snip here, my words, then dan's
"So the claim is the Spitfire could not shoot anything down
until the USAAF turned up? How do the USAAF fighters
make a difference to Spitfire combats?"
>RAF fighters had German fighters severely outnumbered yet
>they inflicted a puny number of losses on Me 109s and Fw 190s.
>The loss ratio was greatly in favor of the Jagdwaffe from May
>1940-May 1943.
The loss ratio was very much in favour of the Luftwaffe in 1941,
perhaps 3 to 1 or better in air to air combat, the ratio halved in
1942 and moved into RAF favour in 1943.
In terms of fighter strengths and sorties it looks like the Luftwaffe
fought outnumbered in the west for most if not all of the war from
mid 1941 onwards.
>As USAAF Spitfire units like the 4th Fighter Group converted
>to the P-47 Thunderbolt, they saw their kills (and kill ratio)
>multiply dramatically after a dismal record using Spitfires.
End of Dan's snip.
I note pre 1943 includes the Battle of Britain, I assume Dan
has read Eagle in Flames and now knows his table of Bf109
losses is actually a percentage breakdown of loss by sub type,
unlike last time this topic came up.
>> The early P-47 missions also had dismal records, since they
>
>But only for a few months while experienced pilots got used
>to their new mounts and new pilots got used to flying combat.
>This is different than the Spitfire's record which was dismal
>for about three years.
I suppose at some stage the fact that fighter command was
more than Spitfires will be brought up? Like the 32 squadrons
of Hurricanes to 43 squadrons of Spitfires in October 1941?
Or the 12 Squadrons of Hurricanes still in service in January
1943?
Simply I note yet again, the Spitfire aircraft is blamed, no
longer the tactics, or the tactical situation just the aircraft. Not
even the quality of the opposition.
>> were adopting the fighter sweep tactics the RAF used in 1941.
>
>Again, the observations of British combat pilots are in direct
>conflict with yours.
Can anyone see RAF fighter pilot comments about RAF
fighter sweeps, let alone USAAF sweeps?
>The facts indicate that the merits of the
>fighter sweep is only one factor of many.
That the Spitfire had problems, like all other flying machines
is hardly a relevation, all types had their good and bad points.
I note the "observations of British combat pilots", given do not
say anything about fighter sweep tactics or the mix of escort
to sweep sorties, or the reality an RAF day bomber strike on
France in 1941 could be 6 bombers in the middle of hundreds
of fighters. The pilots are talking about problems with misty
windscreens (noted as early as 1938), gun heating, and size
of formations, Dan adds merlin problems, nothing at all about
the value of sweep versus escort of a viable bomber force. He
also extends their comments to USAAF operations.
>RAF Fighter Command was embarrassed by the Jagdwaffe
>for other reasons...Merlin engine problems, gun troubles,
>complaints by RAF pilots over flawed squadron formations,
Fw190 engine problems, weak Bf109F armament, tail flutter,
presumably these can be put down to being embarrassed by
Fighter Command? The weaker Bf109F armament helped
increase performance.
Should I bring forth the various USAAF fighter pilots' complaints,
there were some you know, inevitable given the size of the
organisation and the stakes.
>and Douglas Bader's clumsy, Big Wing concept that was
>condemned by Johnnie Johnson, Alan Deere and others.
But presumably supported by people like Bader and
Leigh-Mallory? I am well aware the RAF had problems,
I am well aware the USAAF had problems, I can focus
on the problems and present a one sided case of how
did air force "X" ever get off the ground. I am well aware
Johnson preferred around a 24 aircraft formation as
maximum, something the RAF moved to.
I can quote the problems with P-47 engines, radios, rudder
lock on bubble canopy models, P-51 gun heating and other
problems, the whole P-38 in ETO saga and make it look like
the USAAF was sending up death traps. Similar for any
other air force.
I can note the comments about the overload an early model
P-38 put on the pilot, and the problems found fighting the
Luftwaffe over Tunisia.
I can quote the comments of USAAF pilots taken away from
P-39/40s and given Spitfires (which caused a major blow
up at the time).
I can also quote some stinging quality control memos written
about just about any type.
I can quote the testimonials from pilots to the point where
people will wonder why a given type did not win the war in
an afternoon.
I can note that in 1943 9,205 out of 17,626 fighters accepted
by the USAAF were P-39s or P-40s, 52%, down from 71% in
1942 and 84% in 1941, and thereby show how the USA
continued to churn out fighters in 1943 that were not front line
in 1941. All I have to do is ignore Hurricanes continuing in
production until 1944 and similar for other types to make a
stupid claim about US aircraft.
What I cannot do is trash the historical record the way Dan is
trying to do.
Your weapon is made by the lowest bidder, incoming fire has
right of way and tactics go a long way to negating the weak
areas of your armament and increasing it's strength.
One thing that I sometimes do as a what if is erase a classic
WWII aircraft from history and see if it would have been given
an airworthiness certificate if presented today. Let alone at
the weights used, the RAF never flew it's post war Mosquito
sorties at wartime maximum weights.
>Yet you Geoffrey Sinclair, who never flew Spitfires in combat,
>wants to reduce all of their published problems to one: "it was
>the fighter sweeps" which is preposterous.
So the obvious reply is
Yet you Dan Stevlingson, who never flew Spitfires in combat,
wants to reduce all of their published problems to one: "they
could not fight until the USAAF turned up" which is preposterous.
Silly isn't it?
Spitfires did fight in 1941 over France and in 1942 over France,
Malta and the Western Desert. The combat record over Malta
is given in Christopher Shores, Malta, The Spitfire Year.
Furthermore I have consistently said there were other factors,
like the difference in pilot experience, the problems of fighting
over enemy territory, minimal need for the Luftwaffe to engage
and the on average better performance of the Luftwaffe aircraft.
By keeping the force small the Luftwaffe could and did keep
it near elite, latest equipment, above average pilot quality, no
twin engined day fighters until 1943.
>> sweeps were ignored unless the tactical situation was good,
>> and there was much more on offer elsewhere anyway.
>
>Even if we move into the realm of hypothetical scenarios
>where "fighter sweeps" becomes the only factor in this
>comparison, your position is still untenable because you
>didn't bother to offer any data to support it.
Actually I did and I note none of the data I supplied made the
reply, none at all. Which makes it seem rather pointless to
post any such data. Fighter command launched 6,873 sorties
over France Jan-Jun 1941, and Bomber Command some 954,
but many of the Bomber Command sorties were unescorted
anti shipping or cloud cover raids. In the second half of 1941
the totals were 20,495 fighter, 1,406 bomber. The figures for
1942 are 43,339 fighter and 1,794 bomber plus 1,081 US
fighter and 1,455 bomber. And again some to many of the
RAF bomber sorties were number 2 group anti shipping and
unescorted strikes. The 1943 figures against France/Western
Europe (excluding Germany) were RAF 80,384 fighter and
fighter bomber, 10,168 bomber, USAAF 14,690 bomber
12,749 fighter. Plus a further 10,981 USAAF bomber sorties
to Germany escorted by 10,759 fighter sorties, but the fighter
sorties did not start until October 1943.
So the fighter to bomber sortie ratios are first half of 1941 10
to 1, second half, 14.5 to one (and in fact higher due to the
reasons given above), 1942 7.5 to 1 (again higher due to anti
shipping etc. which were still from Bomber Command), 1943
3.7 to 1, and this would be lower if you remove the RAF fighter
bomber sorties, as the Typhoons came into service, 13 squadrons,
climbing to 20 by the end of the year, and Spitfires began to carry
bombs. What is interesting is the way the kill ratio in favour of the
RAF fighters goes up as the ratio of fighter to bomber sorties falls,
again not the whole reason by a decent margin, but a driving force.
The RAF knew from 1939 not to let day bomber formations out
unescorted. In 1941 many RAF fighters had only 8 0.303 inch
machine guns to strafe with, in 1943 they came with 4 20 mm
cannon and 2,000 pounds of bombs as maximum.
All data from Eagle in Flames, E R Hooton
When you add the way many of the 1943 RAF fighter sorties were
carrying bombs (therefore being more destructive) and you see the
trend and why the Luftwaffe was forced to fight.
It took the USAAF to provide a viable day bomber force. It took
until 1943 for the RAF to have a viable fighter bomber force, with
rockets and bombs. The need prior to that date was for fighters
to match the Fw190 which kept the Spitfire as pure air superiority
and the problem was compounded by the major problems with the
Typhoon. Since a Hurricane was in trouble even without bombs
attached flying over France from 1941 onwards, if intercepted.
>Such as number of fighter sweeps flown by the USAAF as
>compared to the RAF from 1940-45.
The USAAF gave up the fighter sweep idea in 1943, they
used fighter bomber tactics from then on, once there were
enough fighters in early 1944, tactics including shooting
up Luftwaffe airfields in Germany on days the bombers did
not fly. According to the USAAF statistical digest the USAAF
lost 1 fighter to flak in 1943, 1,611 in 1944, the fighters
dropped 24 tons of bombs in 1943, 51,594 tons in 1944,
only 193 tons of which was dropped before April 1943. Given
the original idea of the self defending bomber formation the
USAAF found itself very short of fighters in the ETO in 1943
and the first half of 1944. The way 9th AF fighters were sent
on escort missions rather than invasion support or training.
The RAF had the sweep idea as a major percentage of
operations from 1941 to 1942, mainly because they could
not put a large number of fighter bombers or day bombers
into operation. Wrong tactics, green pilots, generally inferior
performing aircraft and no need for the Luftwaffe to engage
gave a predictable result. By 1943 the fighter sweep was
on the way out, replaced by escort and fighter bomber missions.
Support for my conclusions comes from Eric Hammel, in Air
War Europa as a start, which is a day by day diary of USAAF
operations over Europe and Africa. See also Williamson Murray
in his book Luftwaffe when he quotes a June 1943 Luftflotte 3
document reporting its fighters were suffering heavy casualties
intercepting US bomber formations accompanied by "hundreds"
of fighters.
In 1944 the allied fighter performance benefited from the new
gyroscopic gunsights and g-suits, nothing to do with the aircraft
design.
The extra range the US fighter designs had was a major advantage,
it meant more of the German war machine could be threatened.
Spitfires could only fly over a small amount of Europe from the UK,
smaller still in 1941 compared with May 1944, it enabled the
Germans to more easily decrease the effects of the RAF sorties.
You can drive a short way by night to avoid airstrikes, but not so
easy as the distance goes up. You can keep your main aircraft
infrastructure out of range but still be able to fight more easily
as another example if the enemy aircraft is short ranged.
If you wanted to fly a twin engined fighter then the P-38 was
probably the best around, it is also interesting to note how
the Coastal Command anti shipping squadrons were willing
to take their Mosquito VIs in against Fw190s. But the reality
was the contemporary single engined designs usually had the
performance edge.
There is no ideal aircraft, only the best for a given mission.
David Thornley
Dan Stevlingson <hal90...@mailANDnews.com> wrote:
>"Emmanuel Gustin" <Emmanue...@skynet.be> wrote in message
>news:<a0q8ue$mne$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu>...
>> "Dan Stevlingson" <hal90...@mailANDnews.com> wrote:
>
>> do you imagine that the RAF won the Battle of Britain?
>> With stoneslings?
>
>I'm not sure what you mean by this because you were comparing
>front line fighters. Even during the BoB, the RAF lost more
>single-engine fighters than the Germans did.
>
decisively than it did while still having an unfavorable
single-engine-fighter loss ratio.
>That RAF fighters shot down more multi-engine aircraft gave
>them a false sense of security.
Not to mention defeated the German air offensive.
Tactically, German fighters attempted to engage and shoot down
British fighters, while British fighters attempted to engage
and shoot down German bombers, dealing with German fighters
by necessity rather than choice. Since virtually all of the German
109 effort was directed against Hurricanes and Spitfires, while
a large amount of Hurricane and Spitfire effort was devoted against
Ju 88s and He 111s and Do 17s, given equal success one would
expect the Germans to shoot down more Hurricanes and Spitfires
than the British shot down 109s.
Their flawed air-to-air combat
>tactics and training were not quite so noticable when engaging
>bombers or fighting the Jagdwaffe defensively, and with the
>sometime assistance of GCI radar.
>
If RAF tactics and training were not up to Luftwaffe standards,
then the Spitfire would certainly be better as a combat aircraft
than it looked from the loss ratios.
Basically, the Spitfire was a competitive fighter right through
the war. Its main failings were range and payload. It was
superior in combat to the early Thunderbolt. It was definitely
better than the P-40, the P-39, and the P-38 without the bugs
worked out, and hence better than any US fighter in squadron
service until sometime in 1943.
Emmanuel Gustin
> Prove it.
Do you imagine that we have nothing else to do besides
compiling lists for you?
But for example: The French placed orders for 100 Hawk
75 fighters in 1938; 215 Martin 167 Maryland bombers
in February and March 1939; 100 Douglas DB-7 bombers
in February; and 100 Hawk 81 fighters in May 1939.
They also had the SB2U dive-bomber in service when
war broke out, and had placed orders for SBCs and
F4Fs. Probably other types as well.
That most of the aircraft ordered by the French were
too late to contribute to the outcome of the battle
for France was purely the fault of the US Congress,
which banned their delivery at the outbreak of war.
Or as a French historian bitterly put it, "America
encouraged France and Britain to destroy Hitlerism,
and then retracted itself in neutrality, refusing
any help." (Not that it would have made much difference
for the French if these aircraft HAD been delivered
in time.)
Other types exported to European nations before
the outbreak of war in 1939 certainly included
the Douglas 8A, the Seversky P-35, the Martin B-10,
the Consolidated PBY and the Brewster F2A.
Emmanuel Gustin
--
Geoffrey Sinclair
>
><snip>
>
>Geoffrey, why don't you try reading some material that was
>written by RAF pilots who actually flew Spitfires in combat.
>Their observations are different than yours.
I note no Spitfire combat performance claims are given,
just a list of problems the aircraft had, with the implication
that cockpit and gun heating problems and some engine
problems made the aircraft non combat worthy, especially
on a mission no air force flew very often, it at all, escort at
30,000 feet in unpressurised fighters. The RAF used Spitfire
VIIs for high altitude work.
>> In terms of WWII it was not until 1943 that the US fighter
>> designs were considered combat worthy and better than
>> the European designs.
>
>The facts speak louder than your opinions, and the facts
>also proves the Spitfire was hardly more "combat ready"
>than the P-38 Lightning:
I presume people have evaluated the P-38 performance
over Tunisia in 1942? It's problems in fighter versus fighter
combat meant a shift was made towards putting more into
fighter bomber versions. I note apart from the list of Spitfire
problems no P-38 data in the ETO or MTO is given. I note
the request to send Spitfire IXs to Tunisia.
I note my facts were snipped and opinion was given in reply.
>--According to Alan Deere, the Spitfire had a poor cockpit
> heating system and the problem with frosted canopies and
> windscreens was "never solved".
Yes, misting was a problem, usually in a rapid descent.
>--There were problems with guns jamming at high altitude
> according to Sandy Johnstone of 602 Squadron. They tried
> to keep the guns warm by firing them occasionally but this
> only wasted ammunition.
Inadequate gun heating problems was the major reason
the Spitfire did not go to the RAF standard 4 20 mm cannon
armament during the war.
> --The Spitfire had well known carburetor troubles which
> caused the Merlin engine to cut out at the worst times. Less
> well known is that this problem was still manifesting itself
> in 1943.
We have been over this before and I recall the dispute as
to how much of a problem this was. Any 1943 problems
would have also affected the P-51.
>--Reliability. Or should I say, lack of it. The British Merlin
> engines had a very short life compared to the US Allison
> engines which tended to last about three times longer than
> the Merlin according to personnel from RAF Mustang units.
> This subject is usually avoided by British aviation writers.
By 1942 I believe the statistics for the Merlin were 1 engine
failure per 1,000 hours of flying, up from 1 per 500 hours in
the first 6 months of Hurricane service pre war. Roger Freeman
in Mighty 8th War Diary claims half the P-38 losses in the winter
of 1943/44 were to engine failure. (By the way remember the
Me262 engines had a lifetime of 20 hours)
I note the above says nothing about the P-38 problems nor
relative combat performances, nor the problem the P-38
shared with most twins, larger, easier to spot, and not
as maneuverable. The usual trade offs you have.
I note the gratuitous insult to British aviation writers thrown in.
>Based on the problems with feezing temperatures and engines
>cutting out in a chase, Spitfire pilots would have had a difficult
>time coping with long range escort missions at 30,000 ft, even
>if the fuel load permitted.
Except all types had problems with long range escort missions
at 30,000 feet, you really needed cabin pressurisation to fly at
that height for any length of time, plus things like the P-51 gun
heating shows the problem occurrs in other types. Why not add
the Spitfire would have trouble lifting a 10 ton bomb as well?
>The main differences between the Spitfire and P-38 is that
>the British committed a great many more Spitfires to the
>ETO, and that P-38s easily outranged the Spitfire.
There are other differences, the USAAF was not forced to
commit the P-38C against the Fw190, the P-38 was a
very different concept, twin engined , weighing close to
twice a Spitfire IX.
>>> Reports also indicate that the combat record of the Spitfire
>>> was basically a joke before the arrival of USAAF Thunderbolts,
>>> Lightnings and Mustangs in 1943.
An uncreditted snip here, my words, then dan's
"So the claim is the Spitfire could not shoot anything down
until the USAAF turned up? How do the USAAF fighters
make a difference to Spitfire combats?"
>RAF fighters had German fighters severely outnumbered yet
>they inflicted a puny number of losses on Me 109s and Fw 190s.
>The loss ratio was greatly in favor of the Jagdwaffe from May
>1940-May 1943.
The loss ratio was very much in favour of the Luftwaffe in 1941,
perhaps 3 to 1 or better in air to air combat, the ratio halved in
1942 and moved into RAF favour in 1943.
In terms of fighter strengths and sorties it looks like the Luftwaffe
fought outnumbered in the west for most if not all of the war from
mid 1941 onwards.
>As USAAF Spitfire units like the 4th Fighter Group converted
>to the P-47 Thunderbolt, they saw their kills (and kill ratio)
>multiply dramatically after a dismal record using Spitfires.
End of Dan's snip.
I note pre 1943 includes the Battle of Britain, I assume Dan
has read Eagle in Flames and now knows his table of Bf109
losses is actually a percentage breakdown of loss by sub type,
unlike last time this topic came up.
>> The early P-47 missions also had dismal records, since they
>
>But only for a few months while experienced pilots got used
>to their new mounts and new pilots got used to flying combat.
>This is different than the Spitfire's record which was dismal
>for about three years.
I suppose at some stage the fact that fighter command was
more than Spitfires will be brought up? Like the 32 squadrons
of Hurricanes to 43 squadrons of Spitfires in October 1941?
Or the 12 Squadrons of Hurricanes still in service in January
1943?
Simply I note yet again, the Spitfire aircraft is blamed, no
longer the tactics, or the tactical situation just the aircraft. Not
even the quality of the opposition.
>> were adopting the fighter sweep tactics the RAF used in 1941.
>
>Again, the observations of British combat pilots are in direct
>conflict with yours.
Can anyone see RAF fighter pilot comments about RAF
fighter sweeps, let alone USAAF sweeps?
>The facts indicate that the merits of the
>fighter sweep is only one factor of many.
That the Spitfire had problems, like all other flying machines
is hardly a relevation, all types had their good and bad points.
I note the "observations of British combat pilots", given do not
say anything about fighter sweep tactics or the mix of escort
to sweep sorties, or the reality an RAF day bomber strike on
France in 1941 could be 6 bombers in the middle of hundreds
of fighters. The pilots are talking about problems with misty
windscreens (noted as early as 1938), gun heating, and size
of formations, Dan adds merlin problems, nothing at all about
the value of sweep versus escort of a viable bomber force. He
also extends their comments to USAAF operations.
>RAF Fighter Command was embarrassed by the Jagdwaffe
>for other reasons...Merlin engine problems, gun troubles,
>complaints by RAF pilots over flawed squadron formations,
Fw190 engine problems, weak Bf109F armament, tail flutter,
presumably these can be put down to being embarassed by
Fighter Command? The weaker Bf109F armament helped
increase performance.
Should I bring forth the various USAAF fighter pilots' complaints,
there were some you know, inevitable given the size of the
organisation and the stakes.
>and Douglas Bader's clumsy, Big Wing concept that was
>condemned by Johnnie Johnson, Alan Deere and others.
But presumably supported by people like Bader and
>Yet you Geoffrey Sinclair, who never flew Spitfires in combat,
>wants to reduce all of their published problems to one: "it was
>the fighter sweeps" which is preposterous.
So the obvious reply is
Yet you Dan Stevlingson, who never flew Spitfires in combat,
wants to reduce all of their published problems to one: "they
could not fight until the USAAF turned up" which is preposterous.
Silly isn't it?
Spifires did fight in 1941 over France and in 1942 over France,
Malta and the Western Desert. The combat record over Malta
is given in Christopher Shores, Malta, The Spitfire Year.
Furthermore I have consistently said there were other factors,
like the difference in pilot experience, the problems of fighting
over enemy territory, minimal need for the Luftwaffe to engage
and the on average better performance of the Luftwaffe aircraft.
By keeping the force small the Luftwaffe could and did keep
it near elite, latest equipment, above average pilot quality, no
twin engined day fighters until 1943.
>> sweeps were ignored unless the tactical situation was good,
>> and there was much more on offer elsewhere anyway.
>
>Even if we move into the realm of hypothetical scenarios
>where "fighter sweeps" becomes the only factor in this
>comparison, your position is still untenable because you
>didn't bother to offer any data to support it.
Actually I did and I note none of the data I supplied made the
and the problem was compunded by the major problems with the
Typhoon. Since a Hurricane was in trouble even without bombs
attached flying over France from 1941 onwards, if intercepted.
>Such as number of fighter sweeps flown by the USAAF as
>compared to the RAF from 1940-45.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.
--
David Thornley
mike <mara...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>thor...@visi.com (David Thornley) wrote in message news:<a0j431$19eu$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu>...
>
>> US aircraft were only inferior to the French for a short part of
>> the war, of course, and the best French aircraft were a considerable
>> minority during the Battle of France. The most numerous French
>> fighter was the M.S. 406, not the excellent De 510.
>
>>From what I recall, the 510 didn't do too well in China, little
>better than the P-26,worse than the Hawk 75. The French
>had fairly good luck with thier Hawk 75s during the BoF.
>You mean the 520?
>
quality, very close. Had it been available in larger quantities,
and had the French not had that maintenance problem, and had the
French had better doctrine for fighter use, the Germans would have
had very serious problems.
> yeah, the M.S.406 wasn't nearly liked as well by the
>Finns as the Buffalo or Hawk75. Don't think the French
>cared much for it either.
>
Nope, but it was the fighter available in the largest numbers.
>Peashooter would be the only inferior one of the crop of
>the early US fighters to the French efforts, IMHO.
>
Not to the 520.
Looking at the projected performance figures for French aircraft
soon to come into service, even discounting them some, it looks
like the French Air Force was going to be in good shape in
1941. Combine that with the likely reform of aircraft procurement
and figuring out how to maintain the things, and the Germans would
have been in real trouble had they not defeated France in 1940.
Given no German conquest of France, I rather thing France's best
fighters would have been better than the best US fighters until
the paddle-bladed Thunderbolt.
Bill Shatzer
On 3 Jan 2002, David Thornley wrote:
-snips-
> Looking at the projected performance figures for French aircraft
> soon to come into service, even discounting them some, it looks
> like the French Air Force was going to be in good shape in
> 1941. Combine that with the likely reform of aircraft procurement
> and figuring out how to maintain the things, and the Germans would
> have been in real trouble had they not defeated France in 1940.
Don't place too much weight on the raw aircraft performance numbers.
After all, by all accounts, the French tanks were both technically
superior and more numerous than the German armor. None the less, the
French army was throughly defeated in the spring of '40.
Raw aircraft performance numbers are only one factor in assessing the
effectiveness of an air force - and, perhaps, one of the least important
ones. Pilot (air crew) training and experience is more important
as is developing and implimenting effective strategic and tactical
doctrines. The French displayed no great talent at either.
Logistics and trained ground personnel are other important factors which
the French often fell short. The best fighter in the world is of no use
if its sitting on the runway because of lack of fuel or ammunition or
because supply lacks a vital part.
Cheers and all,
--
Dan Stevlingson
> Now we await Dan's list of WWII foreign weapons and
> quantities purchased by the USA, prior to September 1939.
In the case of the USA, prior to December 1941 is correct.
And I see that you diluted your argument by padding it with
post-September 1939 procurement by the Brits, Germans,
and French. Not what I asked for, but I guess we have to
play along since a straight answer was too much to ask.
>> List all types of WWII foreign weapons and quantities
>> purchased by the British, prior to September 1939.
> Browning 0.303 inch machine gun, Hispano 20 mm cannon,
> negotiations for the browning 50 cal Bofors 40 mm
Is that all?
The USA used the British-designed M1917 Enfield .303 rifle,
20mm Oerlikon, 20mm Hispano, 40 mm Bofors, French
designed 60mm and 81mm mortars, Boys anti-tank rifle,
British Mills Bomb, British Gammon grenade, British-designed
Babbitt rifle-grenade (replaced by the French-design VB rifle-
grenade). Nearly all of the field artillery guns in the WWII-era
US arsenal were of French or German design.
> 250 Lockheed A-28 Hudson. April 1940, 475 Bell P-39,
> May 1940 320 North American P-51.
About 600 Spitfires went into USAAF service on reverse lend
lease, in fighter and photo recon groups. The 25th Bomb Group
used PR Mosquitos for weather recon. Four squadrons of USAAF
nightfighters were equipped with the Beaufighter and one of them
re-equipped with NF Mosquitos in late 1944. The USAAF placed
an order for about 200 de Havilland Tiger Moth trainers (PT-24)
although the shipment was apparently taken over by the RCAF.
>> List all types of WWII foreign weapons and quantities
>> purchased by the French, prior to September 1939.
> British Radar
Same for USA.
> Flower class corvettes
I've already mentioned the British-designed 70 ft and 77 ft
PT boats used by US Navy. I'm pretty sure that some of the
US naval guns besides Bofors and Oerlikon were of foreign
design. I'll have to look into it some more.
>> List all types of WWII foreign weapons and quantities
>> purchased by the Germans, prior to September 1939.
> Czech 35(t) tank plus putting into production the 38(t).
> Czech 76.5 mm, 100 mm and 105mm artillery
Before or after the Germans occupied the country?
> mass use of the Soviet 76.2 mm during the war.
When did the Germans pay for these? The US Army equipped
some artillery units with captured guns but it was difficult to get
a steady supply of compatible shells.
> someone who has such a strong opinion on a topic grounded
> in reality usually has the data to back it up, not demands everyone
> else provide the data.
Everyone else did not imply "America has a protectionist tendency
but Britain, Germany and France does not". You and Mr. Gustin
have to answer for this, not everyone else.
I asked you to cough up the alleged data that suggests America has
a stronger protectionist tendency than Britain, Germany and France.
I asked you to list all types of WWII foreign weapons purchased
by these countries prior to September 1939. The meagre list you
cobbled up hardly answers the challenge.
> September 1939. It is of course a very arbitrary date
There's nothing arbitrary about it. Naturally the British, Germans
and French bought or captured more foreign equipment after
they were committed to WWII. Since they were in the war for
two years longer than the United States, they should have used
more foreign equipment by default.
The most important fact is that the British, Germans and French
used more foreign weapons during WWII because European
manufacturing capability and mass production methods were
outdated by US standards. Unfortunately, national pride now
compels Europeans to save face for this deficiency by claiming
they bought lots of foreign stuff during WWII because they were
anti-protectionists, rather than being merely desperate because
their own war production systems were hopelessly inadaquete.
--
--
David Thornley
>news:<a0q8ue$mne$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu>...
>> "Dan Stevlingson" <hal90...@mailANDnews.com> wrote:
>
>> do you imagine that the RAF won the Battle of Britain?
>> With stoneslings?
>
>I'm not sure what you mean by this because you were comparing
>front line fighters. Even during the BoB, the RAF lost more
>single-engine fighters than the Germans did.
>
decisively than it did while still having an unfavorable
single-engine-fighter loss ratio.
>That RAF fighters shot down more multi-engine aircraft gave
>them a false sense of security.
Not to mention defeated the German air offensive.
Tactically, German fighters attempted to engage and shoot down
British fighters, while British fighters attempted to engage
and shoot down German bombers, dealing with German fighters
by necessity rather than choice. Since virtually all of the German
109 effort was directed against Hurricanes and Spitfires, while
a large amount of Hurricane and Spitfire effort was devoted against
Ju 88s and He 111s and Do 17s, given equal success one would
expect the Germans to shoot down more Hurricanes and Spitfires
than the British shot down 109s.
Their flawed air-to-air combat
>tactics and training were not quite so noticable when engaging
>bombers or fighting the Jagdwaffe defensively, and with the
>sometime assistance of GCI radar.
>
If RAF tactics and training were not up to Luftwaffe standards,
then the Spitfire would certainly be better as a combat aircraft
than it looked from the loss ratios.
Basically, the Spitfire was a competitive fighter right through
the war. Its main failings were range and payload. It was
superior in combat to the early Thunderbolt. It was definitely
better than the P-40, the P-39, and the P-38 without the bugs
worked out, and hence better than any US fighter in squadron
service until sometime in 1943.
--
Geoffrey Sinclair
Dan Stevlingson wrote in message
<3c35eeb...@news.pacific.net.au>...
>Geoffrey Sinclair wrote:
>
><snip>
>
>Geoffrey, why don't you try reading some material that was
>written by RAF pilots who actually flew Spitfires in combat.
>Their observations are different than yours.
I note no Spitfire combat performance claims are given,
just a list of problems the aircraft had, with the implication
that cockpit and gun heating problems and some engine
problems made the aircraft non combat worthy, especially
on a mission no air force flew very often, it at all, escort at
30,000 feet in unpressurised fighters. The RAF used Spitfire
VIIs for high altitude work.
>> In terms of WWII it was not until 1943 that the US fighter
>> designs were considered combat worthy and better than
>> the European designs.
>
>The facts speak louder than your opinions, and the facts
>also proves the Spitfire was hardly more "combat ready"
>than the P-38 Lightning:
I presume people have evaluated the P-38 performance
over Tunisia in 1942? It's problems in fighter versus fighter
combat meant a shift was made towards putting more into
fighter bomber versions. I note apart from the list of Spitfire
problems no P-38 data in the ETO or MTO is given. I note
the request to send Spitfire IXs to Tunisia.
I note my facts were snipped and opinion was given in reply.
>--According to Alan Deere, the Spitfire had a poor cockpit
> heating system and the problem with frosted canopies and
> windscreens was "never solved".
Yes, misting was a problem, usually in a rapid descent.
>--There were problems with guns jamming at high altitude
> according to Sandy Johnstone of 602 Squadron. They tried
> to keep the guns warm by firing them occasionally but this
> only wasted ammunition.
Inadequate gun heating problems was the major reason
the Spitfire did not go to the RAF standard 4 20 mm cannon
armament during the war.
> --The Spitfire had well known carburetor troubles which
> caused the Merlin engine to cut out at the worst times. Less
> well known is that this problem was still manifesting itself
> in 1943.
We have been over this before and I recall the dispute as
to how much of a problem this was. Any 1943 problems
would have also affected the P-51.
>--Reliability. Or should I say, lack of it. The British Merlin
> engines had a very short life compared to the US Allison
> engines which tended to last about three times longer than
> the Merlin according to personnel from RAF Mustang units.
> This subject is usually avoided by British aviation writers.
By 1942 I believe the statistics for the Merlin were 1 engine
failure per 1,000 hours of flying, up from 1 per 500 hours in
the first 6 months of Hurricane service pre war. Roger Freeman
in Mighty 8th War Diary claims half the P-38 losses in the winter
of 1943/44 were to engine failure. (By the way remember the
Me262 engines had a lifetime of 20 hours)
I note the above says nothing about the P-38 problems nor
relative combat performances, nor the problem the P-38
shared with most twins, larger, easier to spot, and not
as manoeuvrable. The usual trade offs you have.
I note the gratuitous insult to British aviation writers thrown in.
>Based on the problems with feezing temperatures and engines
>cutting out in a chase, Spitfire pilots would have had a difficult
>time coping with long range escort missions at 30,000 ft, even
>if the fuel load permitted.
Except all types had problems with long range escort missions
at 30,000 feet, you really needed cabin pressurisation to fly at
that height for any length of time, plus things like the P-51 gun
heating shows the problem occurs in other types. Why not add
the Spitfire would have trouble lifting a 10 ton bomb as well?
>The main differences between the Spitfire and P-38 is that
>the British committed a great many more Spitfires to the
>ETO, and that P-38s easily outranged the Spitfire.
There are other differences, the USAAF was not forced to
commit the P-38C against the Fw190, the P-38 was a
very different concept, twin engined , weighing close to
twice a Spitfire IX.
>>> Reports also indicate that the combat record of the Spitfire
>>> was basically a joke before the arrival of USAAF Thunderbolts,
>>> Lightnings and Mustangs in 1943.
An uncreditted snip here, my words, then dan's
"So the claim is the Spitfire could not shoot anything down
until the USAAF turned up? How do the USAAF fighters
make a difference to Spitfire combats?"
>RAF fighters had German fighters severely outnumbered yet
>they inflicted a puny number of losses on Me 109s and Fw 190s.
>The loss ratio was greatly in favor of the Jagdwaffe from May
>1940-May 1943.
The loss ratio was very much in favour of the Luftwaffe in 1941,
perhaps 3 to 1 or better in air to air combat, the ratio halved in
1942 and moved into RAF favour in 1943.
In terms of fighter strengths and sorties it looks like the Luftwaffe
fought outnumbered in the west for most if not all of the war from
mid 1941 onwards.
>As USAAF Spitfire units like the 4th Fighter Group converted
>to the P-47 Thunderbolt, they saw their kills (and kill ratio)
>multiply dramatically after a dismal record using Spitfires.
End of Dan's snip.
I note pre 1943 includes the Battle of Britain, I assume Dan
has read Eagle in Flames and now knows his table of Bf109
losses is actually a percentage breakdown of loss by sub type,
unlike last time this topic came up.
>> The early P-47 missions also had dismal records, since they
>
>But only for a few months while experienced pilots got used
>to their new mounts and new pilots got used to flying combat.
>This is different than the Spitfire's record which was dismal
>for about three years.
I suppose at some stage the fact that fighter command was
more than Spitfires will be brought up? Like the 32 squadrons
of Hurricanes to 43 squadrons of Spitfires in October 1941?
Or the 12 Squadrons of Hurricanes still in service in January
1943?
Simply I note yet again, the Spitfire aircraft is blamed, no
longer the tactics, or the tactical situation just the aircraft. Not
even the quality of the opposition.
>> were adopting the fighter sweep tactics the RAF used in 1941.
>
>Again, the observations of British combat pilots are in direct
>conflict with yours.
Can anyone see RAF fighter pilot comments about RAF
fighter sweeps, let alone USAAF sweeps?
>The facts indicate that the merits of the
>fighter sweep is only one factor of many.
That the Spitfire had problems, like all other flying machines
is hardly a relevation, all types had their good and bad points.
I note the "observations of British combat pilots", given do not
say anything about fighter sweep tactics or the mix of escort
to sweep sorties, or the reality an RAF day bomber strike on
France in 1941 could be 6 bombers in the middle of hundreds
of fighters. The pilots are talking about problems with misty
windscreens (noted as early as 1938), gun heating, and size
of formations, Dan adds merlin problems, nothing at all about
the value of sweep versus escort of a viable bomber force. He
also extends their comments to USAAF operations.
>RAF Fighter Command was embarrassed by the Jagdwaffe
>for other reasons...Merlin engine problems, gun troubles,
>complaints by RAF pilots over flawed squadron formations,
Fw190 engine problems, weak Bf109F armament, tail flutter,
presumably these can be put down to being embarrassed by
Fighter Command? The weaker Bf109F armament helped
increase performance.
Should I bring forth the various USAAF fighter pilots' complaints,
there were some you know, inevitable given the size of the
organisation and the stakes.
>and Douglas Bader's clumsy, Big Wing concept that was
>condemned by Johnnie Johnson, Alan Deere and others.
But presumably supported by people like Bader and
>Yet you Geoffrey Sinclair, who never flew Spitfires in combat,
>wants to reduce all of their published problems to one: "it was
>the fighter sweeps" which is preposterous.
So the obvious reply is
Yet you Dan Stevlingson, who never flew Spitfires in combat,
wants to reduce all of their published problems to one: "they
could not fight until the USAAF turned up" which is preposterous.
Silly isn't it?
Spitfires did fight in 1941 over France and in 1942 over France,
Malta and the Western Desert. The combat record over Malta
is given in Christopher Shores, Malta, The Spitfire Year.
Furthermore I have consistently said there were other factors,
like the difference in pilot experience, the problems of fighting
over enemy territory, minimal need for the Luftwaffe to engage
and the on average better performance of the Luftwaffe aircraft.
By keeping the force small the Luftwaffe could and did keep
it near elite, latest equipment, above average pilot quality, no
twin engined day fighters until 1943.
>> sweeps were ignored unless the tactical situation was good,
>> and there was much more on offer elsewhere anyway.
>
>Even if we move into the realm of hypothetical scenarios
>where "fighter sweeps" becomes the only factor in this
>comparison, your position is still untenable because you
>didn't bother to offer any data to support it.
Actually I did and I note none of the data I supplied made the
and the problem was compounded by the major problems with the
Typhoon. Since a Hurricane was in trouble even without bombs
attached flying over France from 1941 onwards, if intercepted.
>Such as number of fighter sweeps flown by the USAAF as
>compared to the RAF from 1940-45.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Lawrence Dillard
"Emmanuel Gustin" <Emmanue...@skynet.be> wrote in message
news:a0q8ue$mne$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu...
> news:3c4401b2...@news.pacific.net.au...
Of course
> Britain wasn't able to sell much equipment to the USA at this
> time; nor was it later. (USAAF requests to exchange Mustangs
> for Mosquitos were denied, for example.)
In fact, Britain had the Mossies in the quantity the US desired but simply
did not want to relinquish control over them (and who can blame them?),
believing that they could utilize the a/c to better purpose than the US
services would.
The fact is that the
> USA was and is a major exporter of weapons, but only very
> rarely imports equipment.
It is useful to recall the shattered state of the US economy resulting from
the Great economic Depression of the 1930's, and to recall the isolationist
tendencies of many a faction within the US at the time WWII began. To begin
with the US had little enough money available for militrary procurement,
whether the items were made internally or were imported. "Deficit
financing" was used instead. Then FDR wisely staked out a position for the
US as the "Arsenal of Democracy" once the battle lines had been drawn, at
which point, presumably, Allied nations' military production could not
encompass exports of such products to the US, as all such would presumably
be needed by the originating nations. But the US could produce war materiel
to Allied specifications, including artillery shells, a/c engines, aircraft,
destroyer escorts, radars, etc.
The US produced a version of the British "Merlin" liquid-cooled a/c engine
for use in its own version of the Mustang, which was originally built to
British specifications, as well as for use in British bombers. The "liberty
ships" of WWII fame were a slightly-modified British design, produced in
numbers in US shipyards, which also built quite a few frigates for the RN
and the RCN.
During the Korean conflict, the US contracted with Canada to build F-86
Sabrejets which were utilized in Korean air battles.
> > Such as?
>snip
During the 1930s many American
> aircraft manufacturers survived by exporting, and the run-
> up to WWII was of course an enormous business opportunity
> for them.
They survived by a combination of domestic sales and exports; many a nascent
US aviation firm closed its doors during the 1930's. One, Lockheed, had
exactly one airliner (the last of a contract for a Japanese airline) on its
assembly line, and no other orders in prospect, at the time the British
Purchasing Commission paid a visit to California, a visit which culminated
in an order for as many as 250 Venturas if Lockheed could in fact produce
them (they did, ahead of schedule). The Ventura contract not only was a
"business opportunity", but was also a saving grace.
>
> Imports during the interbellum remained limited to a handful
> of Fokker aircraft, and even these were soon built in the USA.
snip
These Fokker a/c were commercial a/c, not warplanes. They proved not to be
significantly better than indigenously-produced a/c and were soon surpassed
in performance by domestically-designed airliners. Hence it quickly no
longer made sense to import a/c which offered no performance advantages over
domestically-manufactured a/c.
> For quite some time. The majority of US fighters in the war
> zones were P-39s and P-40s until well into 1943; these were
> by no means competitive.
With respect, I must disagree. The P-40 while not considered "first line" by
the British for operations in Europe, was found to be suiitable for workiin
N Africa, and versions of the P-40 remained in service with the RAF well
into 1944. Competently flown, the P-40 could achieve parity with Axis a/c
despite weighing about a ton (2,000 lb) more than their adversaries and
despite not having superchargers.
The British tested non-supercharged P-39s in GB before transshipping them to
the USSR, and found that up to its critical altitude, the P-39 was a good
match for the current Bf-109 and was just bested by the current Spitfire.
In fact, the highest-scoring Allied pilots in operations against the Axis
were two Soviet pilots who gained the majority of their victories in P-389s
(Pokryshkin (sp) and Kozhedub (sp)).
Against the IJN in the Pacific, meanwhile, the USN had available the F4
Wildcat, which achieved a variable record against the Zero-Sen; the Zero
proved superior in agility, was slightly faster, and was more numerous at
the time, while the Wildcat was more rugged and had an edge in firepower.
>SNIP
>
> In the period immediately after the BoB, Germans indeed won
> a tactical victory over the RAF, which used very poor tactics
> in its attempt to continue its victory on the other side of the
> channel.
The Germans made do in the west with no more than about two wings ("wing" is
not precisely the correct description of the forces) of fighter a/c, due to
commitments to Operation Barbarossa. The British desired to keep up the
pressure on the Germans by means of Bomber command night operations as well
as by means of fighter sweeps against tactical targets. However, most
British light and medium bombers were committed to the Med; hence British
daylight operations in Europe had perforce to be conducted with the only
available a/c--short-range fighters--which gave the Germans the opportunity
to choose whether and when to engage, and the opportunity to use both their
radar and ground observer networks to much the same advantage as GB had done
in the BoB. Combined with the efficiency of low-level FLAK, British aerial
operations were generally less successful against the Germans in daylight
than the British found desireable. But Britian had to carry on regardless,
so as to keep up the pressure on the Germans.
But that doesn't change the fact that during this period,
> and before US intervention became effective, the Luftwaffe
> lost air superiority in the region; that is, as far as RAF fighters
> could fly.
True, the Germans failed to achieve air superiority; as a practical matter,
however, they achieved air parity with their opponents in the west--neither
side could destroy the other--on an economical investment in terms of
numbers of a/c and pilots. The primary focus of German air operations as of
June, 1941, became the USSR, where the Luftwaffe initially dominated the
skies even without the two "wings" left in the west to "hold the line".
This had a very large impact on the outcome of the
> war, because the Luftwaffe was forced to begin its campaign
> on the Eastern front with a completely insufficient strength.
In fact, Germany began war operations without sufficient numbers of a/c to
acomplish her goals, and through the entire conflict never managed to
achieve the right mix of fighters, bombers, patrol and scouting a/c in the
right numbers.
>
--
David Thornley
Dan Stevlingson <hal90...@mailANDnews.com> wrote:
>Geoffrey Sinclair wrote:
>
>> Now we await Dan's list of WWII foreign weapons and
>> quantities purchased by the USA, prior to September 1939.
>
>In the case of the USA, prior to December 1941 is correct.
>
>
>The USA used the British-designed M1917 Enfield .303 rifle,
Not used operationally, AFAIK (which means somebody probably
used it somewhere).
>20mm Oerlikon, 20mm Hispano, 40 mm Bofors, French
>designed 60mm and 81mm mortars,
I think we need to distinguish here between production, detailed
design, and general design.
Boys anti-tank rifle,
Not in really large quantities; the official counterpart was the
..50-caliber machine gun.
>British Mills Bomb, British Gammon grenade,
In what quantities?
British-designed
>Babbitt rifle-grenade (replaced by the French-design VB rifle-
>grenade). Nearly all of the field artillery guns in the WWII-era
>US arsenal were of French or German design.
>
Again, design. It's been suggested that the British didn't use
any British-designed machine guns.
>> 250 Lockheed A-28 Hudson. April 1940, 475 Bell P-39,
>> May 1940 320 North American P-51.
>
>About 600 Spitfires went into USAAF service on reverse lend
>lease, in fighter and photo recon groups. The 25th Bomb Group
>used PR Mosquitos for weather recon. Four squadrons of USAAF
>nightfighters were equipped with the Beaufighter and one of them
>re-equipped with NF Mosquitos in late 1944. The USAAF placed
>an order for about 200 de Havilland Tiger Moth trainers (PT-24)
>although the shipment was apparently taken over by the RCAF.
>
In other words, fairly even there.
>>> List all types of WWII foreign weapons and quantities
>>> purchased by the French, prior to September 1939.
>
>> British Radar
>
>Same for USA.
>
Lots of this stuff was back-and-forth design. There was no point
to keeping research separate.
>> Flower class corvettes
>
>I've already mentioned the British-designed 70 ft and 77 ft
>PT boats used by US Navy.
Design, again. You might want to consider the USN frigates.
About 100 of them were made, basically to a British design that
the USN didn't really like.
I'm pretty sure that some of the
>US naval guns besides Bofors and Oerlikon were of foreign
>design. I'll have to look into it some more.
>
Look into it; I think USN guns bigger than 40mm tended to be
US design, although, like everything else, influenced by
centuries of multinational design and development.
>> mass use of the Soviet 76.2 mm during the war.
>
>When did the Germans pay for these? The US Army equipped
>some artillery units with captured guns but it was difficult to get
>a steady supply of compatible shells.
>
The Germans didn't pay for them, but apparently captured so many
that they decided to issue them on a large scale.
>The most important fact is that the British, Germans and French
>used more foreign weapons during WWII because European
>manufacturing capability and mass production methods were
>outdated by US standards.
There is another important fact relating to the US: The US was
not prepared to go to war, and weapons of all sorts were in very
short supply at first. Many things, foreign and domestic, were
pressed into service for lack of anything better, and then replaced
later. If the US had been pressed to commit armed forces faster,
then the situation would have been much worse. The US didn't
have more than a dozen divisions in war zones for well over a
year after Pearl Harbor. The British had gotten ten into France
within nine months of the start of the war.
Nor should it be forgotten that the US-British agreements were
to emphasize US production at the expense of US Army deployment.
The British fielded larger armed forces as a percentage of
population than the US did. The US Army, in particular, was not
large considering US population (although it was one of the
largest of the war).
--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion, ask.
da...@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-
--
Dan Stevlingson
> But for example: The French placed orders for 100 Hawk
> 75 fighters in 1938; 215 Martin 167 Maryland bombers
> in February and March 1939; 100 Douglas DB-7 bombers
> in February; and 100 Hawk 81 fighters in May 1939.
> They also had the SB2U dive-bomber in service when
> war broke out, and had placed orders for SBCs and F4Fs.
So what? USAAF used Spitfires, Beaufighters and Mosquitos.
You'll have to do better than this small list of equipment. What
about field artillery, anti-tank artillery, anti-aircraft artillery, naval
artillery, grenades, mortars, mines, etc. etc.
BTW, I forgot to add to my last post the British 57mm anti-tank
gun, which was a standard weapon of US ground forces.
> Do you imagine that we have nothing else to do besides
> compiling lists for you?
I expect you to validate your assumptions about US vs. European
"protectionism" and use of foreign weapons. When can we expect
a valid explanation?
--
--
Geoffrey Sinclair
>Geoffrey Sinclair wrote:
>
>> Now we await Dan's list of WWII foreign weapons and
>> quantities purchased by the USA, prior to September 1939.
>
>In the case of the USA, prior to December 1941 is correct.
Ah right, now we find out how far the goalposts move. The
world was at war during 1940 and 1941 and the British
were feeding the US lots of information and technology,
as the US geared up Lend Lease, but we are supposed
to compare this to 1939.
>And I see that you diluted your argument by padding it with
>post-September 1939 procurement by the Brits, Germans,
>and French. Not what I asked for, but I guess we have to
>play along since a straight answer was too much to ask.
The above statement is really funny when you look at the list
below, I marked clearly what was pre and post September
1939, it was a straight answer.
>>> List all types of WWII foreign weapons and quantities
>>> purchased by the British, prior to September 1939.
>
>> Browning 0.303 inch machine gun, Hispano 20 mm cannon,
>> negotiations for the browning 50 cal Bofors 40 mm
>
>Is that all?
No it was not all, it was from the references I had to hand.
I understand the British looked at the Oerlikon and used
it, but no numbers.
>The USA used the British-designed M1917 Enfield .303 rifle,
>20mm Oerlikon, 20mm Hispano, 40 mm Bofors, French
>designed 60mm and 81mm mortars, Boys anti-tank rifle,
Reference to Boys anti-tank rifles in a US raider battalion in 1943,
nothing else..
>British Mills Bomb, British Gammon grenade, British-designed
>Babbitt rifle-grenade (replaced by the French-design VB rifle-
>grenade). Nearly all of the field artillery guns in the WWII-era
>US arsenal were of French or German design.
75 mm howitzer, US design from 1922.
Some 75 mm French weapons from WWI still in use
as training weapons.
105 mm howitzer M! in 1920, US design.
105 mm howitzer M3 in 1941, US design
4.5 inch field gun, US design in 1941 (calibre chose for
compatibility with British)
155mm howitzer M1917, M1918 french, some left from
WWI and used for training.
155 mm howitzer M1 1941, US design.
155 mm heavy artillery US design, again similar calibre French
WWI guns were in service, in this case as improvised shore
artillery in the Philippines
8 inch gun 1944, US design.
Dan obviously has a more generous interpretation of
foreign design than Ian Hogg. There were some leftovers
from WWI but the US artillery park in WWII was US. So
I am very sceptical of other claims I note the M1917 rifle
was another WWI relic, when the requirement was for
WWII era weapons in September 1939. The US used the
M1 and model 1903, which was a US adaptation of the
German Mauser, plus the carbine and BAR.
Given his claims about the artillery and the use of post
1941 US air purchases below I remain skeptical of the
small arms claims. I note Dan demands numbers but
does not supply them himself.
>> 250 Lockheed A-28 Hudson. April 1940, 475 Bell P-39,
>> May 1940 320 North American P-51.
>
>About 600 Spitfires went into USAAF service on reverse lend
>lease, in fighter and photo recon groups. The 25th Bomb Group
>used PR Mosquitos for weather recon. Four squadrons of USAAF
>nightfighters were equipped with the Beaufighter and one of them
>re-equipped with NF Mosquitos in late 1944. The USAAF placed
>an order for about 200 de Havilland Tiger Moth trainers (PT-24)
>although the shipment was apparently taken over by the RCAF.
I think the above list is very instructive, how many of the
aircraft were ordered pre December 1941? I did not
include things like the North American trainer aircraft
bought by the British.
It seems Dan is missing any USAAF use of foreign aircraft
pre December 1941, so he simply gives a list of types
used until the end of the war, September 1945. He wants
pre war purchases, he gives for comparison US wartime
purchases or lend lease.
>>> List all types of WWII foreign weapons and quantities
>>> purchased by the French, prior to September 1939.
>
>> British Radar
>
>Same for USA.
You can establish the US had British radar designs in service
or on order pre December 1941? My understanding is the US
had basic radar designs and spent 1941 absorbing the new
input from the British to produce radars later in the war, the
new valves for example. The French took the British radar
system the US took the technology and incorporated it into
home grown designs. If we are going down to the component
level or fundamental physics then no country can claim it is
producing home grown weapons.
>> Flower class corvettes
>
>I've already mentioned the British-designed 70 ft and 77 ft
>PT boats used by US Navy. I'm pretty sure that some of the
>US naval guns besides Bofors and Oerlikon were of foreign
>design. I'll have to look into it some more.
And how many of these were ordered pre war? The Higgins
design was by them, the Elco was a reworked British design
80 feet instead of 70 feet. Pre war British MTBs were using
Italian engines. The US design used US engines and weapons,
increasing the length 15% is a reasonably large redesign.
>>> List all types of WWII foreign weapons and quantities
>>> purchased by the Germans, prior to September 1939.
>
>> Czech 35(t) tank plus putting into production the 38(t).
>> Czech 76.5 mm, 100 mm and 105mm artillery
>
>Before or after the Germans occupied the country?
After obviously, the decision to produce the 38(t) instead
of putting a German design into production instead is
illustrative.
>> mass use of the Soviet 76.2 mm during the war.
>
>When did the Germans pay for these? The US Army equipped
>some artillery units with captured guns but it was difficult to get
>a steady supply of compatible shells.
I believe the Germans manufactured the ammunition.
>> someone who has such a strong opinion on a topic grounded
>> in reality usually has the data to back it up, not demands everyone
>> else provide the data.
>
>Everyone else did not imply "America has a protectionist tendency
>but Britain, Germany and France does not". You and Mr. Gustin
>have to answer for this, not everyone else.
Everyone else is not into making such massive generalisations
of flimsy or non existant evidence, only Dan has to answer for
this in the current case.
>I asked you to cough up the alleged data that suggests America has
>a stronger protectionist tendency than Britain, Germany and France.
>I asked you to list all types of WWII foreign weapons purchased
>by these countries prior to September 1939. The meagre list you
>cobbled up hardly answers the challenge.
Ah yes, the comforting thought when you can be judge and
jury, the benevolent rules of evidence when you can change
things like the dates afterwards.
I note the need for editorial "meagre" "cobbled", instead of
valid comparisons.
>> September 1939. It is of course a very arbitrary date
>
>There's nothing arbitrary about it.
I will take that back, not arbitrary, just ignored.
>Naturally the British, Germans
>and French bought or captured more foreign equipment after
>they were committed to WWII.
Huh? So why then are their pre war purchases being
ignored and compared to the US wartime purchases?
>Since they were in the war for
>two years longer than the United States, they should have used
>more foreign equipment by default.
Right, so the US used the least amount of foreign equipment
in WWI because it did not join until 1917?
Countries used foreign equipment for a variety of reasons,
they preferred local manufacture, licenced manufacture of
a foreign design and foreign manufacture in that order
mainly because of control issues and the cost over a
long war.
The reality is the rest of the world used US WWII designs
so much because of a combination of lend lease, good
designs and US productivity, both the "natural" advantage
of being outside the range of axis attack and the basic
advantage of being overall more capable of mass
production.
>The most important fact is that the British, Germans and French
>used more foreign weapons during WWII because European
>manufacturing capability and mass production methods were
>outdated by US standards.
This seems to be Dan's conclusion, data retrofitted as
appropriate. It is well known the British and German plants
were not as productive per worker as the US plants. A
combination of organisation (both deliberate and less
efficient compared with the US) and necessity. Since their
plants were within bombing range the large Willow Run type
plants were considered too vulnerable. The reactions of
Ford executives to aircraft industry standards is a good
illustration of far how the aircraft makers were from
understanding the requirements for mass production.
>Unfortunately, national pride now
>compels Europeans to save face for this deficiency by claiming
>they bought lots of foreign stuff during WWII because they were
>anti-protectionists, rather than being merely desperate because
>their own war production systems were hopelessly inadaquete.
"desperate" "hopelessly inadequate", major editorial time. I like
the anti protectionists line, I await a discussion on farm subsidies.
Powers tried to source their weapons from their own
resources for obvious reasons. You need to trust
another country if they are making the equipment for
you. I really like the idea the world ignored lend lease
as a reason to buy US. I really like the idea the French
were secretly manufacturing weapons for their military
during German occupation, waiting for 1944.
The US offered very cheap weapons, the French plants
were under occupation, the British within bomber range,
(and coping with the knock out of the French and their
economy) but we are expected to believe it was all about
"National Pride" and "Saving Face". The US plants were
more efficient, shipbuilding especially, but the rest of the
world did have manufacturing bases and were not
"hopelessly inadequate".
Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.
--
mike
> Not to the 520.
>
> Looking at the projected performance figures for French aircraft
> soon to come into service, even discounting them some, it looks
> like the French Air Force was going to be in good shape in
> 1941. Combine that with the likely reform of aircraft procurement
> and figuring out how to maintain the things, and the Germans would
> have been in real trouble had they not defeated France in 1940.
>
> Given no German conquest of France, I rather thing France's best
> fighters would have been better than the best US fighters until
> the paddle-bladed Thunderbolt.
I'm really not seeing the De 520 or the Bloch 152 as
really being any better than the P-39 or P-40.
Seems to be right in line with performance of those, and
other Allied craft like the HurricaneII, LaGG-3 or Yak-1
All fairly close in loaded weight, HP, top Speed and Climb
rates, and not being able to compete with the Me109 that well.
The French craft, turned over to the Romanians, didn't
seem to be better than those Soviet or L-L types.
Am I missing something?
**
mike
**
David Thornley
Bill Shatzer <bsha...@OregonVOS.net> wrote:
>
>On 3 Jan 2002, David Thornley wrote:
>
>> Looking at the projected performance figures for French aircraft
>> soon to come into service, even discounting them some, it looks
>> like the French Air Force was going to be in good shape in
>> 1941. Combine that with the likely reform of aircraft procurement
>> and figuring out how to maintain the things, and the Germans would
>> have been in real trouble had they not defeated France in 1940.
>
>Don't place too much weight on the raw aircraft performance numbers.
>
>After all, by all accounts, the French tanks were both technically
>superior and more numerous than the German armor. None the less, the
>French army was throughly defeated in the spring of '40.
>
tank vs. tank fighting, at least not that made a great difference,
partly because German armor was technically superior in ways that
don't show up in the "glamor stats".
Since the "glamor stats" were the things I was looking at for the
next generation of French aircraft, it is true that these by
themselves would not necessarily have been effective. The theoretical
performance of a fleet of hangar queens is not necessarily
important, and the quality of the pilot is also very important.
The less obvious factors, such as experience in maintaining
high-performance low-wing fighters, and the reform of the aircraft
procurement system I think Reynaud would have pushed through
given time, would have been more important in improving quality.
That being said, the MB 155 and such aircraft could have been a
nasty surprise to the Luftwaffe.
Dan Stevlingson
> But for example: The French placed orders for 100 Hawk
> 75 fighters in 1938; 215 Martin 167 Maryland bombers
> in February and March 1939; 100 Douglas DB-7 bombers
> in February; and 100 Hawk 81 fighters in May 1939.
> They also had the SB2U dive-bomber in service when
> war broke out, and had placed orders for SBCs and F4Fs.
So what? USAAF used Spitfires, Beaufighters and Mosquitos.
You'll have to do better than this small list of equipment. What
about field artillery, anti-tank artillery, anti-aircraft artillery,
naval
artillery, grenades, mortars, mines, etc. etc.
BTW, I forgot to add to my last post the British 57mm anti-tank
gun, which was a standard weapon of US ground forces.
> Do you imagine that we have nothing else to do besides
> compiling lists for you?
I expect you to validate your assumptions about US vs. European
"protectionism" and use of foreign weapons. When can we can
Lawrence Dillard
> hal90...@mailANdnews.com (Dan Stevlingson) wrote in message
> news:<a0q96t$g90$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu>...
>
> A turbocharger would normally give better performance
> than a mechanical supercharger at high altitude. That
> doesn't change the fact that the Spitfire Mk.IX with
> a Merlin 61 was at most altitudes the equal of the
> Fw 190A, which the P-47D was NOT until the introduction
> of water injection and paddle-bladed propellers.
Not so.
> The P-47 had a powerful engine, but it was also
> a very heavy aircraft, and the early combat models
> were at a disadvantage at low and medium altitudes.
True to the extent that the P-47's performance was optimized in light
of
British experience in the BoB, during which the altitudes of combats
seemed
to range ever higher, for best performance at higher altitudes. The
P-47 was
not at its best at low and medium altitudes.
>
> Much of this discussion is comparing apples and oranges.
> Spitfires had their disadvantages, especially their short
> range and their inability to carry much of a bombload.
The Spit also proved difficult to modify to accept the follow-on
Griffon
engines. That was a shame, because in theory the engine endowed the
Spit
with unparalleled performance at altitude. However, the additional
weight of
the Griffon led to handling difficulties which were not satisfactorily
resolved during war time.
But
> until the end of the war the latest Spitfire model could
> always could out-turn American and German fighters, and
> out-climb most American fighters.
But even in the latter stages of the conflict, range was of paramount
importance for Allied a/c, as the Allies were at that juncture taking
the
battle to the Axis. An excellent a/c incapable of engaging the enemy
due to
limited range was not truly useful.
The Spitfire was fast,
> had excellent handling and the highest limiting Mach number
> of any WWII fighter, jets included.
But that high limiting mach no. could only be achieved in a steep,
prolonged dive, hardly a useful attribute for a fighter a/c.
Furthermore,
its structure was such that it could not accept much in the way of
FLAK
damage and still operate effectively.
snip
>
> > Mainly because the P-38s was prioritized for other
> > theatres, the South Pacific, the Mediterranean, and
> > the frosty Aleutians.
>
> Maybe. I know there are a lot of P-38 fans out there, but
> I am still of the opinion that (1) the P-38 offered too
> few advantages (and some disadvantages) over properly
> designed single-engined fighters to justify its high cost,
I dunno. The P-38 was designed to utilize in-line liquid-cooled
engines at a
time when European interceptor/fighter designers had embraced such
engines,
while US engine a/c engine manufacturers had generally settled upon
radials.
The only such liquid-cooled engine readily available was the Allison,
which
was then, and remained, behind on the development curve compared to
the
Merlin/Griffon, for example. In order to achieve the performance
desired by
the USAAC, Lockheed designed a single-place but twin-engine a/c which
outperformed all other US liquid-cooled-engine-powered designs until
the
onset of the Merlin-powered Mustangs. However, both Lockheed and the
USAAC
lacked sufficient personel and money tom properly develop the a.c
before it
had to be used in combat. In war, the underdeveloped P-38 was tasked
with
both fighter-bomber and escort responsibilities because it alone had
the
appropriate range capability, but was never available in sufficient
numbers
to give the best accounting of itself in either role.
> and (2) the design didn't reach maturity anyway until
> the engine installation and aileron circuits were reworked.
> These factors, and the initial tactical errors, contributed
> to the gradual of the P-38 from the ETO.
True enough. The engine and its installation needed a lot of work,
and the
powered airlerons helped greatly; however, the P-38 did some of its
best
work (N Africa, the Yamamoto intercept) even before this modification
was
introduced, and also before the anti-tuck/anti-compressibility dive
flaps
became available.
The P-38 did well
> in the Pacific, were its range was a big advantage and
> --- it should be added --- the opposition technically
> inferior to that encountered in Europe.
> snip
Dan Stevlingson
> I presume people have evaluated the P-38 performance
> over Tunisia in 1942? It's problems in fighter versus fighter
> combat meant a shift was made towards putting more into
> fighter bomber versions.
Sorry, but this is false. A shortage of fighter bombers like the
P-47 is what caused some P-38 Groups to form into fighter-
bomber units. Like the Spitfire, the P-51 was unsuitable as a
ground attack platform and the P-40 was nearly obsolete.
> I note the request to send Spitfire IXs to Tunisia.
I note the request to send more P-38s to Tunisia as well. They
needed all the front line fighters they could get their hands on.
Several theatres were competing for deployment of available
P-38s, the Med, South Pacific, Aleutians, China/Burma/India
and the ETO.
> > --The Spitfire had well known carburetor troubles which
> > caused the Merlin engine to cut out at the worst times. Less
> > well known is that this problem was still manifesting itself
> > in 1943.
>> We have been over this before and I recall the dispute as
>> to how much of a problem this was.
I recall that dispute vividly. It was based on hope not facts.
>>--Reliability. Or should I say, lack of it.
> By 1942 I believe the statistics for the Merlin were 1 engine
> failure per 1,000 hours of flying, up from 1 per 500 hours in
> the first 6 months of Hurricane service pre war.
But only if the engines were changed often.
> Roger Freeman in Mighty 8th War Diary claims half the P-38
> losses in the winter of 1943/44 were to engine failure.
Roger Freeman (another British writer) is wrong. The Allison
engine was sound compared to its competition. Local training
conditions, i.e. the pilots' ability to operate twin engines and
Lockheed's turbocharger/intercooler systems properly seems
to have been the culprit. In the ETO, but not elsewhere.
This is supported by the fact that the MTO 15th Air Force
P-38s flew the same missions, for the same duration, at
the same altitudes, and yet they did not have any chronic
problems with engines/turbochargers/intercoolers, etc.
Someone else implied that the fuel quality in England was
substandard compared to what P-38s used in the MTO. I'm
not sure if this is really true, or even significant compared
to differences in pilot training and ability.
Meanwhile the Allison engine itself, while not perfect, was
still far more reliable than the Merlin. As I said earlier, RAF
Mustang units reported that Allison engines lasted about
three times longer.
>>Even if we move into the realm of hypothetical scenarios
>>where "fighter sweeps" becomes the only factor in this
>>comparison, your position is still untenable because you
>>didn't bother to offer any data to support it. Such as
>>the number of fighter sweeps flown by the USAAF compared
>>to the RAF from 1940-45.
> Actually I did and I note none of the data I supplied made the
> reply, none at all. Which makes it seem rather pointless to
> post any such data. Fighter command launched 6,873 sorties
<snip the rest of useful but irrelevant statistics re:sorties>
Geoffrey, I asked you to tell us how many SWEEPS were flown
by Allied fighters. Not the total SORTIES. Please try again unless
you wish to believe that every fighter sortie was a sweep.
As for the rest of your message, I snipped it because I don't
understand what you were trying to prove. Of course all of
the fighters on both sides had development problems, but
the end results--despite these problems--varied widely.
The total number of RAF fighters vs. the Germans and the
results of same is more enlightening to me than the total
number of sorties flown.
--
Dan Stevlingson
> I think we need to distinguish here between production,
> detailed design, and general design.
Yes, but if one wants to purchase weapons outright instead of
making a license agreement, the designer has to be in a position
to fill the order -- and manufacture the quantities required.
Otherwise your distinction is academic.
--
Dan Stevlingson
> Much of this discussion is comparing apples and oranges.
> until the end of the war the latest Spitfire model could
> always could out-turn American and German fighters
For some reason the Spitfire camp usually resorts to
this special pleading about turning capability.
A) The record shows that until 1943, Me 109s and
Fw 190s dominated the Spitfires anyhow regardless
of any negligible differences in turning radius.
B) Every fighter pilot worth his wings has written
that most air-to-air combats did not develop into
turning fights. Because that was a good way to lose
speed and get killed by an enemy pilot approaching
from another direction. When turning in air combat,
there was also a secondary hazard of getting hit by
stray gunfire from friendly planes.
C)The Spitfire gained a little ground on German
interceptors after a higher pressure, two-stage
supercharger was installed on the Merlin engine.
This made more difference than a tiny advantage
in turning circles.
> The Spitfire was fast
Most American fighters were faster and flew farther
into the enemy's backyard, which the Spitfire units
could only dream about until the ground war moved
to the German border.
--
Emmanuel Gustin
news:3c3b2d3...@news.pacific.net.au...
> > doesn't change the fact that the Spitfire Mk.IX with
> > a Merlin 61 was at most altitudes the equal of the
> > Fw 190A, which the P-47D was NOT until the introduction
> > of water injection and paddle-bladed propellers.
>
> Not so.
The results of tests conduction with a captured Fw 190 in
the spring of 1943 are well known: The earlier P-47s could
compete with Fw 190As at altitudes over 15,000 ft and if
the speed was kept above 250 mph. But in general the Fw 190
had better acceleration than the P-47, and could out-climb and
out-manoeuvre it. The P-47s advantages were superior
horizontal speed at altitudes above 15,000 ft, and higher dive
speed. That is, assuming that the dive was prolonged enough
to allow the P-47s to catch up with the Fw 190, which had
better initial acceleration. This restricted the Thunderbolts
to boom-and-zoom tactics.
Tests with a P-47D equipped with water injection and a paddle-
bladed propeller, twelve months later, revealed an important
improvement; the P-47D then offered higher performance by
most standards (although the initial acceleration of the German
fighter was still better) and could out-manoeuvre the Fw 190 if
speed was kept high (which requires a lot of engine power).
> The Spit also proved difficult to modify to accept the follow-on
> Griffon engines. That was a shame, because in theory the engine
> endowed the Spit with unparalleled performance at altitude.
In fact the first Griffon-engined Spitfire, the Mk.XII, offered
unrivalled performance at medium and low altitude; it had a
single-stage supercharger. The later Mk.XIV had a Griffon
with a two-stage supercharger, and was a fine high-altitude
fighter.
The handling difficulties should not be exaggerated ---
the handling of the Mk.XII was actually considered better than
that of earlier models, and Jeffrey Quill felt that the Mk.XIV,
although less than perfect, was quite acceptable; the tactical
trials report noticed marked changes of longitudinal trim at
different power settings, but nevertheless rated the Mk.XIV
as 'easy to fly, but should be handled with care when taxying
and taking off.' The Mk.XIV was a very effective fighter.
The really withering criticism was reserved for the Mk.21,
and the marked deteriorationg of handling was not due to the
engine, but caused by unwise changes to the control surfaces
and control links. The result was an over-controlled and
unstable aircraft; relatively minor changes cured it. Of course
the larger tail fin of the last Spitfires was still very useful
to counter the torque of the Griffon and five-bladed propeller.
> > until the end of the war the latest Spitfire model could
> > always could out-turn American and German fighters, and
> > out-climb most American fighters.
>
> But even in the latter stages of the conflict, range was of paramount
> importance for Allied a/c, as the Allies were at that juncture taking
> the battle to the Axis. An excellent a/c incapable of engaging the
> enemy due to limited range was not truly useful.
The limited range was a handicap, but there was still a need for
tactical aircraft. Medium bombers also needed escort, interceptors
were required to defend Britain against V-1s and (more important
than it may seem) prevent any German reconnaissance of or attacks
on the invasion preparations.
> But that high limiting mach no. could only be achieved in a steep,
> prolonged dive, hardly a useful attribute for a fighter a/c.
It was, however, linked to satisfactory high-speed handling;
especially at altitude. Fighters with a thick wing section and
a low limiting Mach were of limited usefulness at the end of
the war (Typhoon, Welkin) because they ran into compressibility
problems far too soon.
--
Emmanuel Gustin <gus...@NoSpam.uia.ac.be>
(Delete NoSpam. from my address. If you can't reach me, your host
may be on our spam filter list. Check
http://www.uia.ac.be/cc/spam.html.)
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk
(David Thornley) wrote:
> Not used operationally, AFAIK (which means somebody probably
> used it somewhere).
Practically all the P17 rifles in storage were sent to the UK. They
were issued along with P14 rifles to the Home Guard. The only reason
it was made in the first place was that the P14 was in production in
the US during WW1 due to British orders. It took very minor changes to
rechamber the P14 to 30.06 for US use.
> The Germans didn't pay for them, but apparently captured so many
> that they decided to issue them on a large scale.
They captured enough of them to make worth setting up an ammunition
production line for them. The various models were issued as field guns
and AT weapons.
David Thornley
Dan Stevlingson <hal90...@mailAndnews.com> wrote:
>
>Sorry, but this is false. A shortage of fighter bombers like the
>P-47 is what caused some P-38 Groups to form into fighter-
>bomber units. Like the Spitfire, the P-51 was unsuitable as a
>ground attack platform and the P-40 was nearly obsolete.
>
than the Spit; in fact, all late war Western Allied fighters
were much better than the Spitfire as fighter-bombers, having
the ability to carry more ordnance.
>The total number of RAF fighters vs. the Germans and the
>results of same is more enlightening to me than the total
>number of sorties flown.
>
Not a nitpick: This is very heavily dependent on what sort
of sorties are flown.
For a long time, Fighter Command was launching very expensive
fighter sweeps over France, which the Germans would usually
avoid, and sometimes engage at an advantage. This sort of
thing went away with the development of the USAAF strategic
bombing offensive, which started hitting French targets
in the second half of 1942 and German targets about mid-1943.
What these bombings did was increased the cost to the Germans
of avoiding the Allied fighters, and therefore induced them
to engage on more occasions, when the engagements more favored
the Allies. This was going to improve the kill ratio a lot
even with absolutely no change in aircraft.
Therefore, comparing the period before the Thunderbolt, marked
primarily by pointless fighter sweeps, with the period using
the Thunderbolt, marked primarily by escort missions, is almost
meaningless.
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk
sydney...@yahoo.com.au (Sydney Guy) wrote:
> what makes you think they had a surplus to hand over to the
> AEF?
I suggest you check out the orders for guns and when they were
placed. For example in 1914 prior to war breaking out the French had
made no provisions for producing replacement 75s. The issued guns plus
the mobilisation reserve were expected to be adequate for the duration
of any war. Similar situations existed with all combatants. There was
also a shell shortage that was made more pronounced by the need for HE
as the primary shell instead of shrapnel. This led to severe shortages
in 1915 and 1916 but by 1917 new production facilities were coming on
line.
To bring this back to WW2. During the twenties and thirties the US
started a replacement program for field and heavy artillery. A series
of prototypes in various sizes were made and tested and guns
standardised. Actual production was delayed by lack of funds but the
designs were ready.
Ken Young
ken...@cix.co.uk
Maternity is a matter of fact
Paternity is a matter of opinion
--
thor...@visi.com
>P-47 is what caused some P-38 Groups to form into fighter-
>bomber units. Like the Spitfire, the P-51 was unsuitable as a
>ground attack platform and the P-40 was nearly obsolete.
>
than the Spit; in fact, all late war Western Allied fighters
were much better than the Spitfire as fighter-bombers, having
the ability to carry more ordnance.
>The total number of RAF fighters vs. the Germans and the
>results of same is more enlightening to me than the total
>number of sorties flown.
>
Not a nitpick: This is very heavily dependent on what sort
of sorties are flown.
For a long time, Fighter Command was launching very expensive
fighter sweeps over France, which the Germans would usually
avoid, and sometimes engage at an advantage. This sort of
thing went away with the development of the USAAF strategic
bombing offensive, which started hitting French targets
in the second half of 1942 and German targets about mid-1943.
What these bombings did was increased the cost to the Germans
of avoiding the Allied fighters, and therefore induced them
to engage on more occasions, when the engagements more favored
the Allies. This was going to improve the kill ratio a lot
even with absolutely no change in aircraft.
Therefore, comparing the period before the Thunderbolt, marked
primarily by pointless fighter sweeps, with the period using
the Thunderbolt, marked primarily by escort missions, is almost
meaningless.
--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion, ask.
da...@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-
--
Emmanuel Gustin
news:3c3b2d3...@news.pacific.net.au...
> > doesn't change the fact that the Spitfire Mk.IX with
> > a Merlin 61 was at most altitudes the equal of the
> > Fw 190A, which the P-47D was NOT until the introduction
> > of water injection and paddle-bladed propellers.
>
> Not so.
The results of tests conduction with a captured Fw 190 in
the spring of 1943 are well known: The earlier P-47s could
compete with Fw 190As at altitudes over 15,000 ft and if
the speed was kept above 250 mph. But in general the Fw 190
had better acceleration than the P-47, and could out-climb and
out-manoeuvre it. The P-47s advantages were superior
horizontal speed at altitudes above 15,000 ft, and higher dive
speed. That is, assuming that the dive was prolonged enough
to allow the P-47s to catch up with the Fw 190, which had
better initial acceleration. This restricted the Thunderbolts
to boom-and-zoom tactics.
Tests with a P-47D equipped with water injection and a paddle-
bladed propeller, twelve months later, revealed an important
improvement; the P-47D then offered higher performance by
most standards (although the initial acceleration of the German
fighter was still better) and could out-manoeuvre the Fw 190 if
speed was kept high (which requires a lot of engine power).
> The Spit also proved difficult to modify to accept the follow-on
> Griffon engines. That was a shame, because in theory the engine
> endowed the Spit with unparalleled performance at altitude.
In fact the first Griffon-engined Spitfire, the Mk.XII, offered
unrivalled performance at medium and low altitude; it had a
single-stage supercharger. The later Mk.XIV had a Griffon
with a two-stage supercharger, and was a fine high-altitude
fighter.
The handling difficulties should not be exaggerated ---
the handling of the Mk.XII was actually considered better than
that of earlier models, and Jeffrey Quill felt that the Mk.XIV,
although less than perfect, was quite acceptable; the tactical
trials report noticed marked changes of longitudinal trim at
different power settings, but nevertheless rated the Mk.XIV
as 'easy to fly, but should be handled with care when taxying
and taking off.' The Mk.XIV was a very effective fighter.
The really withering criticism was reserved for the Mk.21,
and the marked deteriorationg of handling was not due to the
engine, but caused by unwise changes to the control surfaces
and control links. The result was an over-controlled and
unstable aircraft; relatively minor changes cured it. Of course
the larger tail fin of the last Spitfires was still very useful
to counter the torque of the Griffon and five-bladed propeller.
> > until the end of the war the latest Spitfire model could
> > always could out-turn American and German fighters, and
> > out-climb most American fighters.
>
> But even in the latter stages of the conflict, range was of paramount
> importance for Allied a/c, as the Allies were at that juncture taking
> the battle to the Axis. An excellent a/c incapable of engaging the
> enemy due to limited range was not truly useful.
The limited range was a handicap, but there was still a need for
tactical aircraft. Medium bombers also needed escort, interceptors
were required to defend Britain against V-1s and (more important
than it may seem) prevent any German reconnaissance of or attacks
on the invasion preparations.
> But that high limiting mach no. could only be achieved in a steep,
> prolonged dive, hardly a useful attribute for a fighter a/c.
It was, however, linked to satisfactory high-speed handling;
especially at altitude. Fighters with a thick wing section and
a low limiting Mach were of limited usefulness at the end of
the war (Typhoon, Welkin) because they ran into compressibility
problems far too soon.
--
Emmanuel Gustin <gus...@NoSpam.uia.ac.be>
(Delete NoSpam. from my address. If you can't reach me, your host
may be on our spam filter list. Check http://www.uia.ac.be/cc/spam.html.)
--
Geoffrey Sinclair
>"Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinc...@froggy.com.au> wrote
>
>> I presume people have evaluated the P-38 performance
>> over Tunisia in 1942? It's problems in fighter versus fighter
>> combat meant a shift was made towards putting more into
>> fighter bomber versions.
>
>Sorry, but this is false. A shortage of fighter bombers like the
>P-47 is what caused some P-38 Groups to form into fighter-
>bomber units. Like the Spitfire, the P-51 was unsuitable as a
>ground attack platform and the P-40 was nearly obsolete.
The USAAF was using the A-36 idea, the early fighter
bomber version of the P-51, complete with dive brakes.
Why the unsuitable as a ground attack platform comment,
so black and white, all those P-51s dropping bombs in
1944 and 1945. The P-47 was the better ground attack
due to firepower and airframe strength and radial engine.
For unsuitable designs the Spitfires and P-51s did plenty
of ground attack. But the RAF preferred the Typhoon to
the Sptifire, partly due to the difference in altitude
performance, why this need to absolutely condemn or
absolutely praise?
I stand by what I said, the P-38 had problems in fighter
versus fighter combat in 1942 in Tunisia, it did not have
the performance advantages versus the Bf109 or Fw190
compared with the Zero. It needed work to overcome
the problems of being a larger and heavier aircraft. The
result was a fighter that did not perform as well as the
USAAF wanted and hence the diversion towards the
fighter bomber and droop snoot ideas.
>> I note the request to send Spitfire IXs to Tunisia.
>
>I note the request to send more P-38s to Tunisia as well. They
>needed all the front line fighters they could get their hands on.
>Several theatres were competing for deployment of available
>P-38s, the Med, South Pacific, Aleutians, China/Burma/India
>and the ETO.
As was the UK for Spitfires. In late 1942 only the P-38
and the Spitfire VIII or IX had the potential to hold their
own against Lutwaffe fighters. Not surprisingly the initial
deployment of the P-38 found problems, one of which
was pilot work overload.
>> > --The Spitfire had well known carburetor troubles which
>> > caused the Merlin engine to cut out at the worst times. Less
>> > well known is that this problem was still manifesting itself
>> > in 1943.
>
>>> We have been over this before and I recall the dispute as
>>> to how much of a problem this was.
>
>I recall that dispute vividly. It was based on hope not facts.
Ah yes, but who was doing the hoping?
>>>--Reliability. Or should I say, lack of it.
>
>> By 1942 I believe the statistics for the Merlin were 1 engine
>> failure per 1,000 hours of flying, up from 1 per 500 hours in
>> the first 6 months of Hurricane service pre war.
>
>But only if the engines were changed often.
Fine, post the engine failure per flying hours for the Allison.
>> Roger Freeman in Mighty 8th War Diary claims half the P-38
>> losses in the winter of 1943/44 were to engine failure.
>
>Roger Freeman (another British writer) is wrong.
Hey this is great, can I simply go (another American writer)
and ignore their research?
>The Allison
>engine was sound compared to its competition. Local training
>conditions, i.e. the pilots' ability to operate twin engines and
>Lockheed's turbocharger/intercooler systems properly seems
>to have been the culprit. In the ETO, but not elsewhere.
So let us undertand this, when it comes to the Allison the
failures have nothing to do with the engine and everything
to do with pilots etc., but for the merlin it is all to do with
the engine alone.
>This is supported by the fact that the MTO 15th Air Force
>P-38s flew the same missions, for the same duration, at
>the same altitudes, and yet they did not have any chronic
>problems with engines/turbochargers/intercoolers, etc.
>Someone else implied that the fuel quality in England was
>substandard compared to what P-38s used in the MTO. I'm
>not sure if this is really true, or even significant compared
>to differences in pilot training and ability.
Yes it was a complex series of problems that took a while
to work out. I note however the Merlin 61, in the Westland
Welkin proved very troublesome surprising everyone
given the performance in Spitfires. It can be the combination.
>Meanwhile the Allison engine itself, while not perfect, was
>still far more reliable than the Merlin. As I said earlier, RAF
>Mustang units reported that Allison engines lasted about
>three times longer.
So since you keep demanding detailed statistics from anyone
who disagrees with you post the engine failure statistics and
not from an American writer, using your nationality rules.
>>>Even if we move into the realm of hypothetical scenarios
>>>where "fighter sweeps" becomes the only factor in this
>>>comparison, your position is still untenable because you
>>>didn't bother to offer any data to support it. Such as
>>>the number of fighter sweeps flown by the USAAF compared
>>>to the RAF from 1940-45.
>
>> Actually I did and I note none of the data I supplied made the
>> reply, none at all. Which makes it seem rather pointless to
>> post any such data. Fighter command launched 6,873 sorties
>
><snip the rest of useful but irrelevant statistics re:sorties>
>
>Geoffrey, I asked you to tell us how many SWEEPS were flown
>by Allied fighters. Not the total SORTIES. Please try again unless
>you wish to believe that every fighter sortie was a sweep.
I posted the totals for the year and made it clear not every sortie
was a sweep, to highlight the trend away from sweeps, every
bomber formation had its escort. Also if there are 5 sweeps
with 12 sorties per sweep and one with 200 sorties quoting
number of sweeps is by definition misleading.
So before I go and obtain the day to day figures from the
Fighter Command War Diaries and decide whether 6
bombers inside 100 to 200 fighters (Beehives) is a fighter
sweep or not, please post detailed statistics that show,
a) how much of a problem in combat was the Spitfire gun heating
problem, numbers not anecdotes, plus the same for P-51s
b) how much of a problem was engine surge in combat, numbers
not anecdotes, plus the same for P-51s
c) engine failures per flying hour for the Aliison engine, numbers
not anecdotes.
d) number of "long range escort missions at 30,000 ft," flown
by any air force since that is the apparent standard to judge
the Spitfire
Since that is the standard demanded of others.
>As for the rest of your message, I snipped it because I don't
>understand what you were trying to prove. Of course all of
>the fighters on both sides had development problems, but
>the end results--despite these problems--varied widely.
My message was clear,
"What I cannot do is trash the historical record the way Dan is
trying to do." I can post bad stories about any famous design,
problems that were never fixed, I can only conclude that Dan
uses such stories as hard incontrovertable evidence of total
unsuitability, not the reality of the trade off between good and
bad points in any design.
Posting stories of the bad points in one design as an attempt
to discredit it alone, is not history. Deeming the RAF was all
Spitfire is also wrong. Ignoring rebuttal of really foolish claims like
">RAF Fighter Command was embarrassed by the Jagdwaffe
>for other reasons...Merlin engine problems, gun troubles,
>complaints by RAF pilots over flawed squadron formations,
and the obvious reply,
Fw190 engine problems, weak Bf109F armament, tail flutter,
presumably these can be put down to being embarrassed by
Fighter Command? The weaker Bf109F armament helped
increase performance."
I mean after all on this scale you could claim if the RAF
offensive over France in 1941 had resulted in the cancellation
of the Fw190 (due to the embarrassment of engine failures
caused by the RAF) what a great bonus for the allies. Silly
isnt it?
I posted the year end totals to show the shift from pure or
near pure fighter operations to escort and fighter bomber
missions happened over the course of 1941, 42, and 43,
try addressing them, noting how bombers were not sent
out without escort over France. Also noting how the RAF
built up a fighter bomber force for 1943, something the
USAAF would do in 1944, and how this all made the
interception of the incoming aircraft more important.
>The total number of RAF fighters vs. the Germans and the
>results of same is more enlightening to me than the total
>number of sorties flown.
Hopefully not like last time, all RAF day and night fighters
in theatre (including the defenders of Belfast and Scapa
Flow) for the RAF side, and in the USAAF case only the
fighters that actually were involved in a combat, not even
the total escort size.
>From my post, edited out,
So the fighter to bomber sortie ratios are first half of 1941 10
to 1, second half, 14.5 to one (and in fact higher due to the
reasons given above), 1942 7.5 to 1 (again higher due to anti
shipping etc. which were still from Bomber Command), 1943
3.7 to 1, and this would be lower if you remove the RAF fighter
bomber sorties, as the Typhoons came into service, 13 squadrons,
climbing to 20 by the end of the year, and Spitfires began to carry
bombs. What is interesting is the way the kill ratio in favour of the
RAF fighters goes up as the ratio of fighter to bomber sorties falls,
again not the whole reason by a decent margin, but a driving force.
The RAF knew from 1939 not to let day bomber formations out
unescorted. In 1941 many RAF fighters had only 8 0.303 inch
machine guns to strafe with, in 1943 they came with 4 20 mm
cannon and 2,000 pounds of bombs as maximum.
When you add the way many of the 1943 RAF fighter sorties were
carrying bombs (therefore being more destructive) and you see the
trend and why the Luftwaffe was forced to fight."
I think that is quite clear.
Dan Stevlingson
>>> British Radar
>
>>Same for USA.
>
> Lots of this stuff was back-and-forth design. There was no point
> to keeping research separate.
True. The US was leading the field of Air Intercept Radar until
the late 1930s, and then retook the lead again during the war.
The British built the first resonant cavity magnetron with the
technical data passed to Bell Labs in 1940.
The US SCR-540 radar was a copy of the British AI Mk.IV but
late-war British radars carried by Nightfighter RAF Mosquitos
were produced from the superior Amercian sets. The British
AI Mk.X was based on the US SCR-720B and the AI Mk.XV was
developed from the US AN/APS 4.
The Royal Navy acquired Nightfighter Hellcats with AN/APS 6.
--
--
Dan Stevlingson
> For a long time, Fighter Command was launching very expensive
> fighter sweeps over France, which the Germans would usually
> avoid, and sometimes engage at an advantage.
The basic RAF Fighter Command mission types were:
--FREELANCE - Fighter sweep or fighter patrol
--RHUBARB - Low level strafing sweep. Usually in bad weather
by a few aircraft.
--JACKPOT - Airdrome strafing in predetermined area
--RAMROD - Bomber escort mission
--CIRCUS - Large bomber escort mission
--RODEO - Bomber escort using bombers as bait to lure enemy fighters
--CHATTANOOGA - Railway strafing attack
--ROADSTEAD - Attack on enemy shipping and port targets
Then there were:
--shipping convoy patrols
--air sea rescue escorts
--photo recon escorts
--dive bombing
--fighter-bombing
--armed reconnaissance of ground targets
And probably a few others that I can't recall offhand. Now that
you have this information, HOW MANY fighter sorties were
SWEEPS as opposed to other mission types, 1940-43?
> This sort of thing went away with the development of the USAAF
> strategic bombing offensive
In fact sweeps did not go away with the USAAF strategic bombing
offensive. To prove it, I have copies of the mission logs of 4th FG,
355th FG, 56th FG which says that they were flying sweeps until
the end of the war. Air and ground sweeps for German fighters
were referred to by several names. Fighter Sweep, Freelance
Sweep, Freelance Support, Area Patrol, Area Support, or simply
Strafing Mission against enemy aerodrome, were all variations
of sweeps against German fighters.
Secondly, there is not a shred of evidence to prove the Germans
were physically unable to avoid USAAF Thunderbolts, whose
range limitation was similar to Spitfires until mid-1944. Until then,
the P-47s could not fly much deeper into Germany than Spitfires,
so I don't know what you're carrying on about.
The Germans tried to and often did avoid the P-47s by looking
for gaps in the top cover--or they simply waited until the P-47s
turned for home before they jumped the USAAF bombers.
> Therefore, comparing the period before the Thunderbolt, marked
> primarily by pointless fighter sweeps, with the period using
> the Thunderbolt, marked primarily by escort missions, is almost
> meaningless.
In your view, when did these so-called periods for USAAF P-47s
begin and end? I need to know this for future reference.
--
--
Dan Stevlingson
> Fighter Command was launching very expensive fighter sweeps
> over France, which the Germans would usually avoid, and
> sometimes engage at an advantage.
How often is "usually"? Post the statistics of all those times the
Germans deliberately avoided sweeps--as opposed to the times
the Spitfires couldn't catch them--and those times the Germans
engaged at an advantage.
You will need German sources to prove your point and this
should be interesting since the Geman pilots claimed that
they were usually at a disadvantage.
Meanwhile, as opposed to your opinion, the facts are that:
The P-47 had better engine performance at high altitude than
any of its competitors which means they could get well above
German interceptors if they desired. When the Germans tried
to escape to lower altitudes, the P-47s dive and zoom tactics
proved to be an effective countermeasure.
Much has been made of improved acceleration with paddle
blades and water injection, but you'll note that the 4th Fighter
Group never had these features on their P-47s. Yet they did
have a much better record than they did flying Spitfires.
The P-47 was just as manueverable as the P-51B, which
was reported by the 4th FG (with disappointment) after mock
dogfights with paddle-bladed Thunderbolts of the Wolfpack.
The range of the Spitfire and the P-47 was similar until some
point in 1944.
The Germans had four basic choices for bomber interception.
They could try to find gaps in the Allied escort.They could wait
for Allied fighters to turn home before they attacked bombers.
They could try to fight through the escort. Or they could just
stay home. I challenge you to provide any statistics or hard
data that proves the Germans deliberately avoided contact
with Spitfires in 1941-42 more often than they deliberately
avoided contact with Thunderbolts in 1943-44.
The fact that the P-47s had more success does not reinforce
your assumptions.
--
--
Dan Stevlingson
>>> British Radar
>
>>Same for USA.
>
> Lots of this stuff was back-and-forth design. There was no point
> to keeping research separate.
True. The US was leading the field of Air Intercept Radar until
Dan Stevlingson
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk wrote:
David Thornley wrote:
>> Not used operationally, AFAIK (which means somebody probably
>> used it somewhere).
> Practically all the P17 rifles in storage were sent to the UK. They
> were issued along with P14 rifles to the Home Guard.
I'm afraid you're both mistaken. Some 2,500,000 M1917 Enfield rifles
were made in three US factories from 1917-1919, and widely issued
to US troops during WWI.
A small portion (numbering in thousands, not millions) were sent to
the UK during WWII. Most had a red band painted on to indicate
30.06 chambering. Thousands more were sold or gifted to the
Phillipines and China.
> only reason it was made in the first place was that the P14 was
> in production in the US during WW1 due to British orders.
I think not ! Due to shortage of the M1903 Springfield rifle, the
majority of American troops who served in Europe during WWI
were in fact issued with the British-designed M1917 Enfield.
During WWII, the Enfield was used primarily as a training rifle by
the US Army. However, they were issued to US combat units in
North Africa, such as field artillery and mortar crewmen. A grenade
launcher was also developed and apparently some were sent to
the UK. Most Enfields were in poor condition from years of neglect
between the wars, and others needed a major overhaul. During
WWII, about 150,000 replacement barrels were manufactured
for seriously worn out M1917 Enfields.
Data from Bruce Canfield, US Infantry Weapons of World War II.
--
Dan Stevlingson
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk wrote:
David Thornley wrote:
>> Not used operationally, AFAIK (which means somebody probably
>> used it somewhere).
> Practically all the P17 rifles in storage were sent to the UK. They
> were issued along with P14 rifles to the Home Guard.
I'm afraid you're both mistaken. Some 2,500,000 M1917 Enfield rifles
were made in three US factories from 1917-1919, and widely issued
to US troops during WWI.
A small portion (numbering in thousands, not millions) were sent to
the UK during WWII. Most had a red band painted on to indicate 30.06
chambering. Thousands more were sold or gifted to the Phillipines
and China.
> The only reason it was made in the first place was that the P14 was
> in production in the US during WW1 due to British orders.
I think not ! Due to shortage of the M1903 Springfield rifle, the
Dan Stevlingson
>> The Spit also proved difficult to modify to accept the follow-on
>> Griffon engines.
> the handling of the Mk.XII was actually considered better
> than that of earlier models
This view is not supported by Tom Neil, former commander of
41 Squadron. He mentioned that because of the higher torque
Griffon engine, the rudder needed constant retrimming and
this was annoying because it was more difficult to hold the
guns on target. As he put it, this was one of the least attractive
characteristics of the Spitfire Mk.XII.
He also asserted the Mk.XII felt noticeably heavier, with higher
stall and landing speeds than the Merlin powered Spitfires.
On the positive side, Neil said that the Mk.XII was pleasant
to fly overall and pretty fast at low level, but hardly the best
handling Spitfire. From what I've read, the Spitfire Mk.I had
the best handling qualities of the breed because it was lower
in weight than the later types. The metal aelirons fitted to
later Spitfires lightened the controls at high speed and the
Mk.IX configuration seems to have had the pilots' vote for
the best compromise in weight, power, speed, handling.
> In fact the first Griffon-engined Spitfire, the Mk.XII, offered
> unrivalled performance at medium and low altitude
The Mustang Mk.II with the Allison 81 was faster at all heights
and had much better endurance to both locate and chase down
those Fw 190s. This was the main purpose of Spitfire Mk.XII,
which entered combat with 41 Squadron the same month that
the Mustang Mk.II was approved for production in the USA.
The squared-off wingtips of the Spitfire Mk.XII turned out to
be a mixed blessing. On one hand, roll rate was improved
at low altitude but as with the Mustang, the clipped wing
Spitfires were often attacked in error by RAF Typhoon pilots
according to Mr. Neil.
--
Dan Stevlingson
> Fighter Command was launching very expensive fighter sweeps
> over France, which the Germans would usually avoid, and
> sometimes engage at an advantage.
How often is "usually"? Post the statistics of all those times the
Corey C. Jordan
wrote:
>I stand by what I said, the P-38 had problems in fighter
>versus fighter combat in 1942 in Tunisia, it did not have
>the performance advantages versus the Bf109 or Fw190
>compared with the Zero. It needed work to overcome
>the problems of being a larger and heavier aircraft. The
>result was a fighter that did not perform as well as the
>USAAF wanted and hence the diversion towards the
>fighter bomber and droop snoot ideas.
Perhaps, you could elaborate upon the problems encountered
by P-38 Groups in North Africa. My understanding is that the P-38
had several critical advantages over the Luftwaffe fighters. In terms
performance, the older P-38F fighters gave up nothing to their
German and Italian opposition. They had enough speed, superior
low-speed handling and turn radius, not to mention a substantially
greater combat radius. This latter advantage was of great significance
as it allowed the P-38 the ability to roam over a huge area, which the
Luftwaffe did not appreciate. Steinhoff mentioned on several occasions
the effect this had on Luftwaffe operations and morale. Indeed, the
fact that heavy and medium bombers were being escorted to and
from distant targets provided the Luftwaffe a view of events to come,
both in the MTO and ETO. It is ironic that the Doolittle realized that
escorts were necessary long before the 8th AF brass were willing to
accept this reality.
In November of 1942, the P-38 was the best fighter operating over
North Africa. Better Lightnings were soon to arrive as well.
[snip]
>As was the UK for Spitfires. In late 1942 only the P-38
>and the Spitfire VIII or IX had the potential to hold their
>own against Lutwaffe fighters. Not surprisingly the initial
>deployment of the P-38 found problems, one of which
>was pilot work overload.
This is often over-estimated. Any pilot who flew the early P-38s
(before the P-38J-25-LO and P-38L) will admit that the workload
was high under certain circumstances. However, once the pilot
got his props into fine pitch, it required no more workload than
a single-engine fighter. Most pilots will tell you that the workload
was at its highest during cruise, not in combat.
As to trouble with the Allisons: Not much in North Africa, nor later
in Italy. The serious woes were localized to the 8th AF, and there
where a surprisingly large number of reasons for engine blow-ups.
Freeman's claim of P-38s lost to engine failure (with the 8th AF)
are not far off the mark.
My regards,
C.C. Jordan
http://www.worldwar2aviation.com
http://www.cradleofaviation.org
--
Christopher Morton
Stevlingson) wrote:
>between the wars, and others needed a major overhaul. During
>WWII, about 150,000 replacement barrels were manufactured
>for seriously worn out M1917 Enfields.
Quite a few of the guns whose barrels were replaced, ended up with
cracked receivers from the barrels not being stress relieved with a
mill cut in front of the front receiver ring before the barrels were
unscrewed. The Eddystone made guns were more susceptible to this.
I've got an Eddystone that I used briefly as a 1000 yard target gun.
It was remarkably accurate with the right handloads. P-14s were used
as sniper rifles. A purpose built M1917 sniper rifle was designed but
never fielded.
Notwithstanding their quirks, the P-14 and M1917 were decent guns.
Better than the comparable Mauser '98s.
--
What's the difference between a pacifist and a flagellant?
The flagellent only wants to punish himself.
Dan Stevlingson
>> About 600 Spitfires went into USAAF service on reverse lend
>> lease, in fighter and photo recon groups. The 25th Bomb Group
>> used PR Mosquitos for weather recon. Four squadrons of USAAF
>> nightfighters were equipped with the Beaufighter and one of them
>> re-equipped with NF Mosquitos in late 1944. The USAAF placed
>> an order for about 200 de Havilland Tiger Moth trainers (PT-24)
>> although the shipment was apparently taken over by the RCAF.
> In other words, fairly even there.
Let's not forget the USAAF used hundreds of British Horsa gliders.
About 300 were delivered before the Operation Overlord, with
replacements being supplied for Market-Garden and Varsity.
>> British Mills Bomb, British Gammon grenade,
> In what quantities?
Mills Bombs were purchased and copied between the wars
and I'm not sure of the numbers. But US Airborne troops used
thousands of British Gammon grenades and Hawkins mines.
Nearly all of the pathfinder signalling gear used by American
paratroops was of British design, including EUREKA/REBECCA
transmitter/receivers, BUPS radar beacon, hollophane lights,
luminous marker panels and of course, the infernal crickets.
For navigation on D-Day the IX Troop Carrier Command used
the British GEE system which was based on radio triangulation.
As an aside, British firms received contracts to make web gear
harnesses, canvas bags, pouches, gun scabbards, etc.
> Boys anti-tank rifle, Not in really large quantities
US Rangers and US Marine Raiders used the Boys .55 caliber
in small numbers. It was was usually produced in Great Britain
at BSA and Enfield, although US shipments were reputedly
manufactured by Inglis of Canada.
> the official counterpart was the .50-caliber machine gun.
The Boys AT rifle was eventually replaced by the bazooka.
--
Dan Stevlingson
> The USAAF was using the A-36 idea, the early fighter
> bomber version of the P-51, complete with dive brakes.
> Why the unsuitable as a ground attack platform comment
You mean besides the fact that they stopped building
the A-36 after a short production run? Besides the
fact that few P-51 fighter-bomber groups were formed?
> For unsuitable designs the Spitfires and P-51s did
> plenty of ground attack.
And plenty were shot down by ground fire. This mistake
was repeated in Korea, and as one Mustang ground attack
pilot watched the losses mount, he said, "I would have
bought my own P-47 at that point".
>>I recall that dispute [contested that the Merlin and
>>Griffon engines were not cutting out from carburetor
>>problems late as March 1943]it was based on hope not facts.
>
> Ah yes, but who was doing the hoping?
You obviously, since you didn't offer anything but opinion
to contest it.
> Hey this is great, can I simply go another American writer)
> and ignore their research?
If you have a good reason.
> So since you keep demanding detailed statistics from anyone
> who disagrees with you post the engine failure statistics and
> not from an American writer, using your nationality rules.
I ignore the declarations of Stephen Ambrose and Seymour Hersh
all the time and with good reason. They are American writers
so you may want to rethink your remark about nationality rules.
>>Geoffrey, I asked you to tell us how many SWEEPS were flown
>>by Allied fighters. Not the total SORTIES.
> So before I go and obtain the day to day figures please
> post detailed statistics that show
Man, what a lame answer from someone who lives by (or in
this case, dies by) statistics. Once again, countering
with demands instead of answering the question.
> Deeming the RAF was all Spitfire is also wrong.
I never said that. But the Spitfire was considered by
the British to be the premiere RAF interceptor from
1940 to 1945.
> Ignoring rebuttal of really foolish claims like
>>RAF Fighter Command was embarrassed by the Jagdwaffe
>>for other reasons...Merlin engine problems, gun troubles,
>>complaints by RAF pilots over flawed squadron formations,
Those are the reasons given by RAF pilots who flew
Spitfires in combat. I'm sorry that you consider the
opinions of Sandy Johnstone, Johnnie Johnson, Alan
Deere, Paddy Barthropp and Tom Neil to be foolish.
I'm sure your rebuttal would have carried a lot of
weight with them, what with all your hundreds of
hours flying Spitfires. :-)
--
Dan Stevlingson
>>I've already mentioned the British-designed 70 ft and 77 ft
>>PT boats used by US Navy.
>
> You might want to consider the USN frigates. About 100 of
> them were made, basically to a British design that the USN
> didn't really like.
Yes, the British River-class Frigate. Compared to the Destroyer
Escorts, crew habitability was questioned since the River-class
was considerably warmer which was deplored in the tropics.
Maneuverability was hampered by a much wider turning circle.
On the bright side, the River Frigate had greater range.
US yards built them as PG 111-210 with hulls later re-numbered
PF 3-102. The US Navy called them Tacoma-class Frigates and
about sixty were eventually transferred to the Royal Navy and the
Soviets, by the end of the war.
Prior to this, the US Navy obtained ten British-built Corvettes
(PG-62-71) under reverse lend-lease. The Hyde Park agreement
of February 1942 allocated forty-eight Canadian-built escorts to
the United States: Fifteen Flower-class Corvettes, ten River-class
Frigates (PG 101-110) with two retained as the prototypes for
US shipyards, Fifteen Algerine-class minesweepers (AM 325-
339), none of which actually entered US service; and eight
Fairmile-type subchasers (SC 1466-1473).
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk
hal90...@mailANDnews.com (Dan Stevlingson) wrote:
> I think not ! Due to shortage of the M1903 Springfield rifle, the
> majority of American troops
That is the point I was trying to make. Production lines for the P14
existed in the US prior to their entry into WW1. This was because of a
shortage of the SMLE and the fact that the original design for the P14
was optimised for ease of production. The US rifle shortage led to the
P14 being rechambered to 30.06 as the P17.
However during WW2 the just about the entire existing US stock of the
P17 over a million rifles, were supplied to Britain where they were
issued to the Home Guard, along with British stocks of the P14. The
P14 was considered inferior as a combat weapon to the SMLE and the
Rifle No 4 Mk 1 and by 1917 use in British service was largely
confined to snipers.
See Infantry Weapons of WW2 by Hogg.
Dan Stevlingson
> The USAAF was using the A-36 idea, the early fighter
> bomber version of the P-51, complete with dive brakes.
> Why the unsuitable as a ground attack platform comment
You mean besides the fact that they stopped building
the A-36 after a short production run? Besides the
fact that few P-51 fighter-bomber groups were formed?
> For unsuitable designs the Spitfires and P-51s did
> plenty of ground attack.
And plenty were shot down by ground fire. This mistake
was repeated in Korea, and as one Mustang ground attack
pilot watched the losses mount, he said, "I would have
bought my own P-47 at that point".
>>> We have been over this before and I recall the dispute as
>>> to how much of a problem this was.
>>I recall that dispute [contested that the Merlin and
>>Griffon engines were not cutting out from carburetor
>>problems late as March 1943]it was based on hope not facts.
>
> Ah yes, but who was doing the hoping?
You obviously, since you didn't offer anything but opinion
to contest it.
> Hey this is great, can I simply go another American writer)
> and ignore their research?
If you have a good reason.
> So since you keep demanding detailed statistics from anyone
> who disagrees with you post the engine failure statistics and
> not from an American writer, using your nationality rules.
I ignore the declarations of Stephen Ambrose and Seymour Hersh
all the time and with good reason. They are American writers
so you may want to rethink your remark about nationality rules.
> ><snip the rest of useful but irrelevant statistics re:sorties>
>>
>>Geoffrey, I asked you to tell us how many SWEEPS were flown
>>by Allied fighters. Not the total SORTIES. Please try again unless
>>you wish to believe that every fighter sortie was a sweep.
> So before I go and obtain the day to day figures please
> post detailed statistics that show
Man, what a lame answer from someone who lives by (or in
this case, dies by) statistics. Once again, countering
with demands instead of answering the question.
> Deeming the RAF was all Spitfire is also wrong.
I never said that. But the Spitfire was considered by
the British to be the premiere RAF interceptor from
1940 to 1945.
> Ignoring rebuttal of really foolish claims like
>>RAF Fighter Command was embarrassed by the Jagdwaffe
>>for other reasons...Merlin engine problems, gun troubles,
>>complaints by RAF pilots over flawed squadron formations,
Those are the reasons given by RAF pilots who flew
Spitfires in combat. I'm sorry that you consider the
opinions of Sandy Johnstone, Johnnie Johnson, Alan
Deere, Paddy Barthropp and Tom Neil to be foolish.
I'm sure your rebuttal would have carried a lot of
weight with them, what with all your hundreds of
hours flying Spitfires. :-)
--
--
Geoffrey Sinclair
>"Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinc...@froggy.com.au> wrote:
I note less than 20 lines of my near 120 line post, and again,
none of the data make the reply.
> > The USAAF was using the A-36 idea, the early fighter
> > bomber version of the P-51, complete with dive brakes.
> > Why the unsuitable as a ground attack platform comment
>
>You mean besides the fact that they stopped building
>the A-36 after a short production run? Besides the
>fact that few P-51 fighter-bomber groups were formed?
>
> > For unsuitable designs the Spitfires and P-51s did
> > plenty of ground attack.
>
>And plenty were shot down by ground fire. This mistake
>was repeated in Korea, and as one Mustang ground attack
>pilot watched the losses mount, he said, "I would have
>bought my own P-47 at that point".
So by definition since plenty of P-47s were lost to ground
fire it was unsuitable as well. Things like a loud engine
gave troops on the ground more warning, the P-38 was
disliked by the Germans because it was much quieter than
the P-47. The P-38 fighter bomber version began manufacture
in 1942, before the P-47 went into action.
The USAAF tried the A-36 idea, 2 groups versus 9
fighter groups in North Africa and came to the conclusion
fighter bombers were a better solution, the losses in
accuracy were compensated by more suvivability in air
to air combat and the need for fewer types of aircraft.
And the P-51 did do ground strikes, remember the 9th AF
was scheduled to receive P-51s in 1943/4 and the exchange
of groups. The fact it was overall so good and needed in
air to air combat is the major reason it was not used as
extensively as a fighter bomber in WWII.
Again, why this need to absolutely condemn or absolutely praise?
> >>I recall that dispute [contested that the Merlin and
> >>Griffon engines were not cutting out from carburetor
> >>problems late as March 1943]it was based on hope not facts.
> >
> > Ah yes, but who was doing the hoping?
>
>You obviously, since you didn't offer anything but opinion
>to contest it.
I do not recall entering the debate, rather watching from the
sidelines and noting the claims and the credibility of the data
to support the conclusions.
> > Hey this is great, can I simply go another American writer)
> > and ignore their research?
>
>If you have a good reason.
But I should always note the nationality of the writer and imply
some sort of national biases in their writing, correct? Just
as Dan does.
> > So since you keep demanding detailed statistics from anyone
> > who disagrees with you post the engine failure statistics and
> > not from an American writer, using your nationality rules.
>
>I ignore the declarations of Stephen Ambrose and Seymour Hersh
>all the time and with good reason. They are American writers
>so you may want to rethink your remark about nationality rules.
Dan, you were the one who chose to identify writers by nationality,
not by content, if you want to retract the statements, like Freeman's
nationality, that need not have been brought into the debate then go
ahead. Instead of announcing now there are American writers
you disagree with, instead of answering the question.
> >>Geoffrey, I asked you to tell us how many SWEEPS were flown
> >>by Allied fighters. Not the total SORTIES.
>
> > So before I go and obtain the day to day figures please
> > post detailed statistics that show
>
>Man, what a lame answer from someone who lives by (or in
>this case, dies by) statistics. Once again, countering
>with demands instead of answering the question.
No, I am well aware of the debating tactic of someone who is
confronted by the metaphorical equivalent of a big tree and sits
there demanding every leaf is counted before they will consider
whether the tree exists.
Under Dan's rules I have to provide detailed breakdowns, not
the overall totals he keeps ignoring, even though they show the
clear trend, but Dan will not provide such figures to back his
own case. I note no figures on the engine failure per flying hours
for the Allison
By the way the statistics have not died, since they have not
been rebutted, just ignored. Also they cope with the situation
where the RAF flew around 6 bombers in the middle of 100
to 200 fighters, is that a bomber strike or a fighter sweep?
> > Deeming the RAF was all Spitfire is also wrong.
>
>I never said that. But the Spitfire was considered by
>the British to be the premiere RAF interceptor from
>1940 to 1945.
Really, then why the comments about Battle of Britain fighter
loss rates for a start?
> > Ignoring rebuttal of really foolish claims like
>
> >>RAF Fighter Command was embarrassed by the Jagdwaffe
> >>for other reasons...Merlin engine problems, gun troubles,
> >>complaints by RAF pilots over flawed squadron formations,
>
>Those are the reasons given by RAF pilots who flew
>Spitfires in combat. I'm sorry that you consider the
>opinions of Sandy Johnstone, Johnnie Johnson, Alan
>Deere, Paddy Barthropp and Tom Neil to be foolish.
>I'm sure your rebuttal would have carried a lot of
>weight with them, what with all your hundreds of
>hours flying Spitfires. :-)
Well congratulations Dan, thanks for making it clear you consider
your opinions totally unsupported. I mean you have the hundreds
of hours in WWII fighters didn't you? You were there? You have
the pilots claiming they were embarrassed by the Jagdwaffe, not
the RAF pilots, they are reporting the inevitable imperfections
of the aircraft they flew. It is Dan that draws conclusions he now
claims cannot be allowed, due to a lack of experience on his part.
Dan is the one claiming conclusions about the combat effectiveness
of the Spitfire, not the RAF pilots.
As I said in another post, which Dan cut out again, it is easy to
trash any of the designs used in WWII, just quote the reports of
their inevitable problems.
I note the attempt to hide behind the words of RAF fighter pilots,
not defend the "embarrassed" claim, I note how my reply to the
absurd claim is deleted, not answered for the obvious reason it
cannot be answered using Dan's "logic" system.
"and the obvious reply,
Fw190 engine problems, weak Bf109F armament, tail flutter,
presumably these can be put down to being embarrassed by
Fighter Command? The weaker Bf109F armament helped
increase performance.
I mean after all on this scale you could claim if the RAF
offensive over France in 1941 had resulted in the cancellation
of the Fw190 (due to the embarrassment of engine failures
caused by the RAF) what a great bonus for the allies. Silly
isnt it?"
Also given the engine problems of the P-38 and P-47, plus
cockpit heating on the P-38 and gun heating on the P-51
we can also claim the Jagdwaffe embarrassed the USAAF
correct, same logic, if your fighter is imperfect it is because
of the other side.
To complete Dan's logic system
"I'm sorry that you consider the opinions of Sandy Johnstone,
Johnnie Johnson, Alan Deere, Paddy Barthropp and Tom Neil
to be foolish. I'm sure your **conclusions** would have carried
a lot of weight with them, what with all your hundreds of hours
flying Spitfires. :-)"
By the way if we are going to use the logic system that the
RAF lost more fighters than the Luftwaffe in the Battle of
Britain as a measure of fighter performance remember the
RAF lost fewer Spitfires than the Luftwaffe Bf109s. Using
this silly logic system leads to the conclusion the Spitfire
was the better aircraft by a margin of 118 to 177 in
August 1940 and 130 to 187 in September, the RAF
figures are "combat", the Luftwaffe figures do not include
a further 67 lost on operations, not due to enemy action.
If you want to prove even more how little you have learnt you
can continue the false logic trail and claim the large number
of operational losses show how Fighter Command embarrassed
the Jagdwaffe.
Putting in some of the bits Dan did not answer
I posted the year end totals to show the shift from pure or
near pure fighter operations to escort and fighter bomber
missions happened over the course of 1941, 42, and 43,
try addressing them, noting how bombers were not sent
out without escort over France. Also noting how the RAF
built up a fighter bomber force for 1943, something the
USAAF would do in 1944, and how this all made the
interception of the incoming aircraft more important.
">Meanwhile the Allison engine itself, while not perfect, was
>still far more reliable than the Merlin. As I said earlier, RAF
>Mustang units reported that Allison engines lasted about
>three times longer.
So since you keep demanding detailed statistics from anyone
who disagrees with you post the engine failure statistics and
not from an American writer, using your nationality rules."
>From my posts, twice edited out,
So the fighter to bomber sortie ratios are first half of 1941 10
to 1, second half, 14.5 to one (and in fact higher due to the
reasons given above), 1942 7.5 to 1 (again higher due to anti
shipping etc. which were still from Bomber Command), 1943
3.7 to 1, and this would be lower if you remove the RAF fighter
bomber sorties, as the Typhoons came into service, 13 squadrons,
climbing to 20 by the end of the year, and Spitfires began to carry
bombs. What is interesting is the way the kill ratio in favour of the
RAF fighters goes up as the ratio of fighter to bomber sorties falls,
again not the whole reason by a decent margin, but a driving force.
The RAF knew from 1939 not to let day bomber formations out
unescorted. In 1941 many RAF fighters had only 8 0.303 inch
machine guns to strafe with, in 1943 they came with 4 20 mm
cannon and 2,000 pounds of bombs as maximum.
When you add the way many of the 1943 RAF fighter sorties were
carrying bombs (therefore being more destructive) and you see the
trend and why the Luftwaffe was forced to fight."
Geoffrey Sinclair
Robert Sveinson
Geoffrey Sinclair wrote:
> >Dan Stevlingson <hal90...@mailANDnews.com> wrote:
>
>
> In terms of WWII it was not until 1943 that the US fighter
> designs were considered combat worthy and better than
> the European designs.
Adolph Galland on the P-47: not a problem for the FW-190.
" " " P-38: no better than the Bf-110, a
fighter
that needed a fighter escort!
" " " Mosquito: until the ME-262 became
available
the LW had nothing to catch/intercept
the FASTEST
Allied aircraft!
> >Reports also indicate that the combat record of the Spitfire
> >was basically a joke before the arrival of USAAF Thunderbolts,
> >Lightnings and Mustangs in 1943.
>
> So the claim is the Spitfire could not shoot anything down
> until the USAAF turned up? How do the USAAF fighters
> make a difference to Spitfire combats?
It was not difficult to make huge claims of victories by the P-47
P-38 Take for example the usaaf raid on Lille after which they
claimed 102 LW a/c shot down!
Actual German losses 2.
On a raid on Kassel-Bettenhausen and Aschersleben
the LW claimed 35 usaaf a/c destroyed for an
actual usaaf loss of 24 and the usaaf claimed 47
FW-190s, and Bf-109s for an actual loss of 7!
It is an indisputable fact that the usaaf claimed larger
numbers of LW a/c than did the RAF. Looks like the RAF
claims were a lot closer to the actual LW losses than
were the usaaf claims!!
Like Galland said that if the usaaf claims truly reflected the
LW losses the war would have ended in late 1943 to
early 1944!!!
--
Geoffrey Sinclair
>
>Adolph Galland on the P-47: not a problem for the FW-190.
> " " " P-38: no better than the Bf-110, a fighter
> that needed a fighter escort!
> " " " Mosquito: until the ME-262 became available
> the LW had nothing to catch/intercept the FASTEST
> Allied aircraft!
Ah yes, another one quote wonder, I see the insult the American
aircraft industry AI has been turned on again.
(snip)
>It was not difficult to make huge claims of victories by the P-47
>P-38 Take for example the usaaf raid on Lille after which they
>claimed 102 LW a/c shot down! Actual German losses 2.
No it is not an AI it is an AS, Artificial Stupidity. Robert loves
his Lille mission quote it is a catch all put down for the USAAF,
problem is the USAAF fighters on that mission made no kill
claims, it was all bomber gunner overclaims.
>From my posting of June 2000
Raid on Lille 9 October 1942. From Craven and Cate, initial
bomber gunner claims 56 destroyed 26 probables 20 damaged,
revised (no date when) to 21 destroyed 21 probables 15 damaged,
Air War Europa by Eric Hammel gives the claims as 25 Destroyed
and 28 probables. The USAAF fighter escort made no kill claims,
4 bombers were lost plus a fifth written off. Craven and Cate
researched the German archives for that date. Luftwaffe units
operating in the west lost 11 aircraft that day with a further 11 with
more than 60% damage (which I believe was the write off damage
level). That is 22 aircraft from all causes of all types for all units. At
this stage about 40% of the Luftwaffe aircraft losses were non
combat related. After looking at the Luftwaffe fighter loss statements
Craven and Cate conclude one (1) was the most likely number of fighters
shot down by the bombers.
By the way at this stage the escort was the Spitfires of the 4th
fighter group and the P-38s of the 1st fighter group, they made
no kill claims.
>On a raid on Kassel-Bettenhausen and Aschersleben
>the LW claimed 35 usaaf a/c destroyed for an
>actual usaaf loss of 24 and the usaaf claimed 47
>FW-190s, and Bf-109s for an actual loss of 7!
Presuming this is the 28 July 1943 raid the USAAF fighters
made claims for 9 kills. USAAF losses were 22 B-17s and
one P-47 shot down, 3 B-17s written off, first use of rockets
by Luftwaffe.
>It is an indisputable fact that the usaaf claimed larger
>numbers of LW a/c than did the RAF. Looks like the RAF
>claims were a lot closer to the actual LW losses than
>were the usaaf claims!!
The RAF fighters overclaimed Luftwaffe losses by around
4 to 1 in 1941, 2 to 1 in the Battle of Britian and were almost
exactly correct in early 1943. The USAAF went through the
same pattern and tightened up as the war went on. I can quote
figures from the RAF 1941 battles versus the late 1944 USAAF
battles and make exactly the same claim with regards the RAF,
that they did more overclaiming.
>Like Galland said that if the usaaf claims truly reflected the
>LW losses the war would have ended in late 1943 to
>early 1944!!!
Since he was talking about the early bomber gunner claims
allowed then he is accurate. What is amusing to those who
have seen Roberts posts in the part is his reclassification
of the B-17 as a fighter.
David Thornley
Robert Sveinson <rsve...@nb.sympatico.ca> wrote:
>
>
>Adolph Galland on the P-47: not a problem for the FW-190.
> " " " P-38: no better than the Bf-110, a
>fighter
> that needed a fighter escort!
> " " " Mosquito: until the ME-262 became
>available
> the LW had nothing to catch/intercept
>the FASTEST
> Allied aircraft!
>
aircraft, we know he was inaccurate, and we needn't give much
credence to one man's unsupported opinions.
>It was not difficult to make huge claims of victories by the P-47
>P-38 Take for example the usaaf raid on Lille after which they
>claimed 102 LW a/c shot down!
>Actual German losses 2.
>
How many P-38s and P-47s were there?
(Not to mention your penchant for picking the extreme cases.
In general, B-17s and German fighters went down in about a
2:1 ratio.)
>It is an indisputable fact that the usaaf claimed larger
>numbers of LW a/c than did the RAF. Looks like the RAF
>claims were a lot closer to the actual LW losses than
>were the usaaf claims!!
>
There is a difference here that you are completely ignoring.
A fighter pilot will fire at aircraft in front of him, and so his
gun cameras can generally record the impact. There is usually
only one fighter attacking an enemy fighter at any one time
(two at a time would be in grave risk of a midair collision),
and it's usually clear who attacked with what apparent effect.
Given all of this, fighter pilots frequently overclaim by a factor
of two.
A bomber gunner will fire at aircraft all over, and has no gun
camera. There usually will be several people firing at the
same aircraft at a time, and there is no possibility of moving
the aircraft to follow what happens to any aircraft hit.
Not to mention that bomber fire was less likely to kill quickly.
Therefore, if you allow bomber gunners to claim at all, you have
to expect to have these gunners overclaim by a lot.
Since the USAAF was the primary air force using day bombers with
lots of defensive guns, one would expect the USAAF to overclaim
a lot.
>Like Galland said that if the usaaf claims truly reflected the
>LW losses the war would have ended in late 1943 to
>early 1944!!!
>
Whereas the Germans in fact won the war?
Doubtless he could make a similar claim about any nationality.
The Luftwaffe took a great many losses in the Soviet Union,
for example, and if we assume overclaiming by a factor of two
that would probably grind the Luftwaffe down to nothing.
Robert Sveinson
Dan Stevlingson wrote:
True. The US was leading the field of Air Intercept Radar until
> the late 1930s,
Considering the poor radar available to the US forces
it is surprising that the americans were able to make
one small enough and light enough to be carried in a bi-plane!!!!
>
>
> The US SCR-540 radar was a copy of the British AI Mk.IV but
> late-war British radars carried by Nightfighter RAF Mosquitos
> were produced from the superior Amercian sets.
More GI JOE reference books!!!!
Dan Stevlingson
> Adolph Galland on the P-47: not a problem for the FW-190
Adolf Galland said the Spitfire was no match for the Fw 190...
>> The US SCR-540 radar was a copy of the British AI Mk.IV but
>> late-war British radars carried by Nightfighter RAF Mosquitos
>> were produced from the superior Amercian sets. The British
>> AI Mk.X was based on the US SCR-720B and the AI Mk.XV was
>> developed from the US AN/APS 4.
> More GI JOE reference books!!!!
I used a British reference source. Try this:
--NIGHTFIGHTER: Battle for the Night Skies, by Ken Delve.
Sorry you're disappointed that the best RAF Nightfighter
Mosquitos carried the AI Mk.X set which was a copy of an
American radar.
You might be interested to know that an RAF Beaufighter
testing the prototype AI Mk.IX radar was shot down
in error by a trigger-happy Canadian Spitfire pilot
in December 1942. Unfortunately The Beaufighter pilot
and the scientist on board were killed. Meanwhile
another RAF plane (dropping chaff for the Beaufighter)
was also shot up and seriously damaged by the same
Spitfires. All in all, a serious setback to the RAF
Nightfighter radar program--thanks to the RCAF.
Try these if still in denial:
--NIGHT INTRUDER: A Personal Account of the Radar War
between the RAF and Luftwaffe Night Fighter Forces,
by Jeremy Howard-Williams.
--MOSQUITO, by Bill Sweetman.
> It was not difficult to make huge claims of victories by the
> P-47 P-38 Take for example the usaaf raid on Lille after
> which they claimed 102 LW a/c shot down!
No claims were made by USAAF fighters on this mission.
However there is evidence that Johnnie Johnson's RCAF
Spitfire Wing sometimes overclaimed victories at 18 to 1
in 1944. His own score was obviously inflated.
At least USAAF bomber gunners had a legitimate excuse:
No automatic gun cameras, unlike the Spitfire pilots who
have no such excuse for wildly overestimated pilot claims.
RAF overclaiming was about 10 to 1 from June to Dec 1941,
what with many German fighters lost to flak and mechanical
failures on combat missions.
--
--
Robert Warinner
: The RAF fighters overclaimed Luftwaffe losses by around
: 4 to 1 in 1941, 2 to 1 in the Battle of Britian and were almost
: exactly correct in early 1943. The USAAF went through the
: same pattern and tightened up as the war went on. I can quote
: figures from the RAF 1941 battles versus the late 1944 USAAF
: battles and make exactly the same claim with regards the RAF,
: that they did more overclaiming.
Another point of similarity between the RAF experience and USAAF
experience is that during the Battle of Britain the RAF did not cross
check aggregate RAF claims against daily counts of crashed German
aircraft on British soil. Even a cursory comparison of the figures
would have revealed a significant difference between them.
Armchair historians may deride the phenomena of overclaiming and the
tacit acceptance of it, or even encouragement of it, by the chain of
command. But issues like morale are impossible to quantify with such
precision. If the USAAF was aware that bomber gunners overclaimed and
awarded decorations based on it, it should be at least acknowledged
that they other goals besides precision and accuracy in mind.
Andrew Warinner
wari...@xnet.com
http://home.xnet.com/~warinner
Urban Legend Zeitgeist: http://www.urbanlegends.com/ulz/
--
Robert Sveinson
Lawrence Dillard wrote:
> "Emmanuel Gustin" <Emmanue...@skynet.be> wrote in message
> news:a0q8ue$mne$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu...
> > "Dan Stevlingson" <hal90...@mailANDnews.com> wrote in message
> > news:3c4401b2...@news.pacific.net.au...
> >SNIP
> Of course
> > Britain wasn't able to sell much equipment to the USA at this
> > time; nor was it later. (USAAF requests to exchange Mustangs
> > for Mosquitos were denied, for example.)
>
> In fact, Britain had the Mossies in the quantity the US desired but simply
> did not want to relinquish control over them (and who can blame them?),
> believing that they could utilize the a/c to better purpose than the US
> services would.
Sadly there weren't enough Mosquitos to fulfill the requests.
April 1943 the US Navy asked for 150 Mosquitos.
USAAF requested 235 Mosquitos for delivery before the end of 1943.
There was a marked reluctance to divert Mosquitos destined for
the RAF.
Then occurred the Arnold-Courtney Agreement because of which
Britain agreed to supply Mosquitos, 120 to begin with!!
The total number of Mosquitos sent to other than USAAF
are noted in a table, but the number sent to the USAAF
takes up a whole chapter, in which Number requested
number delivered number of requested that were cancelled
and replaced by further orders.
I have the number of Mosquitos supplied to Haiti, and Dominica.
Mosquitos and Spitfires supplied to the USAAF was called reverse lend
lease, and at the end of the war the survivors were returned
to Britain!!
> But the US could produce war materiel
> to Allied specifications, including artillery shells, a/c engines, aircraft,
> destroyer escorts, radars, etc.
Before the US entered the war, and because of a clause in their
Neutrality Act the US could not export war material. As a result
the British bought bombers [ Boeing ] , and they were flown by US pilots
to Pembina North Dakota and landed and taxied right up to
the Can. US border, and walked away. RCAF personnel,
equiped with horses and tractors would walk over the border pulling
a rope with them which they attached to the bombers, and
pulled them into Canada, started up and flown away!!
Strange but true!! The terms of the Neutrality Act were
observed and Britain got bombers!!
>
>
> The US produced a version of the British "Merlin" liquid-cooled a/c engine
> for use in its own version of the Mustang, which was originally built to
> British specifications, as well as for use in British bombers.
Packard Merlins were used in Canadian built Mosquitos and Lancasters
and IIRC some British a/c as well.
>
> During the Korean conflict, the US contracted with Canada to build F-86
> Sabrejets which were utilized in Korean air battles.
I don't know whether Canadair built F-86s for the USAF, but they
built under liscence all the F-86s in the RCAF!!!
One interesting side bar to these Sabres is that Jacquie Cochrane
an aviation pioneer set a world record using a Canadair Sabre, and
it survives today in Winnipeg at the WC Air Museum.
--
Robert Sveinson
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk wrote:
> Give me strength have you no idea of British and French fighter
> purchases?
And the North American Yale,
--
Dan Stevlingson
> I note less than 20 lines of my near 120 line post, and
> again, none of the data make the reply.
Which data? You didn't answer the question I asked despite
a verbose response of 120 lines.
I don't see why you insist on obfuscating the original
discussion about P-38s, P-47s and Spitfires by padding
your messages with circular arguments about the A-36.
As a fighter-bomber this airplane was preferable to a
Spitfire, but ultimately it was deemed unsatisfactory
compared to the P-38 and especially the P-47.
>> a lame answer from someone who lives by (or in this
>> case, dies by) statistics. Once again, countering with
>> demands instead of answering the question.
>
> No, I am well aware of the debating tactic of someone
> who is confronted by the metaphorical equivalent of a
> big tree and sits there demanding every leaf is counted
> before they will consider whether the tree exists.
Hmm. The problem is that you like to -start- arguments
based mainly on statistics more than anyone else I know.
As such it is only reasonable that you should be prepared
to -finish- arguments with statistics without complaining
about it... or responding to a question with a question
instead of a direct answer.
Don't get me wrong, I find that most of the WWII data you
post on Usenet is helpful but right now you're waffling.
--
Geoffrey Sinclair
This time 6 lines of my post survive out of my over 120 line post,
and again none of the data make the reply.
>"Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinc...@froggy.com.au> wrote:
>
>> I note less than 20 lines of my near 120 line post, and
>> again, none of the data make the reply.
>
>Which data? You didn't answer the question I asked despite
>a verbose response of 120 lines.
Ah yes, the man who does not want sortie totals but wants the
number of sweeps, in other words I am expected to go through
5 years days of RAF operations and nearly 3 years of USAAF
operations and count the number of times a formation was
classified as going on a sweep? Like over France in 1940
before and after the French armistice. The book 12 days
in May comes to the conclusion the RAF actually shot down
299 Luftwaffe aircraft versus 499 kill claims and lost slightly
over 100 Hurricanes in combat, in the first 12 days of the
German offensive. I presume the single flight formation the
RAF often used counts as a fighter sweep as well? How
about the standing patrols over the embarkation points
and Normandy in 1944?
Dan's request,
"Such as number of fighter sweeps flown by the USAAF as
compared to the RAF from 1940-45."
When the RAF flew around 6 bombers in the middle of 100
to 200 fighters, is that a bomber strike or a fighter sweep?
I asked the question before and no answer was given.
I note when David Thornley generally supported the idea of
the RAF doing mainly fighter sweeps which the Luftwaffe
usually avoided he was asked by Dan.
"How often is "usually"? Post the statistics of all those times the
Germans deliberately avoided sweeps--as opposed to the times
the Spitfires couldn't catch them--and those times the Germans
engaged at an advantage.
You will need German sources to prove your point and this
should be interesting since the Geman pilots claimed that
they were usually at a disadvantage."
So we are lead to belive by Dan
A) the Germans have records of fights they deliberately avoided
B) these records are available.
C) they are accurate.
or D) Dan does not want to change his opinion and so asks the
impossible to cover up the fact.
I have little doubt that if I was to spend the two or so weeks
collating "the number of fighter sweeps" Dan would want sorties,
per sweep or something similar. Instead I relied on authors who
have studied the statistics, and posted the yearly sortie totals to
illustrate my point. The Luftwaffe in 1941 could avoid fighting
over France if it wanted to but not in 1943, mainly because of
the major increase in the number of bomber sorties and the
appearance of a viable fighter bomber force, the Typhoon
could take care of itself much better than the Hurricane.
The USAAF flew fighter sweeps with around the same results
as the RAF sweeps, they were ignored unless the Luftwaffe
thought it had an edge or the allied fighters were lucky. It
was the appearance of escorted bombers doing real damage
to their targets that pushed the Luftwaffe into fighting and doing
so with the similar sorts of concerns as the RAF in 1940. Only
shooting down large numbers of bombers would stop the raids,
but the escorts could not be ingored either, unless you wanted
to had the initiative to the other side.
By the way under the one quote proves all rule R V Jones reports
on a meeting he had with fighter command, they wanted to know
how the Luftwaffe was so good at picking the missions with
bombers while ignoring the sweeps, could radar detect bombs
for example. Jones finally asked since bombers did not have
the speed of fighters what speed were the missions flown at?
The one line answer "Christ!". The RAF then adjusted fighter
sweep speeds.
>I don't see why you insist on obfuscating the original
>discussion about P-38s, P-47s and Spitfires by padding
>your messages with circular arguments about the A-36.
>As a fighter-bomber this airplane was preferable to a
>Spitfire, but ultimately it was deemed unsatisfactory
>compared to the P-38 and especially the P-47.
I do not see why Dan chooses to simply obfuscate his initial
claim about fighter bombers, all the allied aircraft flew fighter
bomber missions, the P-51 the least because of its air to
air performance and range.
Again the P-47 was the most survivable of the fighter bombers
because of the radial engine, and airframe strength, but the P-38
was apparently more disliked because it was much quieter.
>>> a lame answer from someone who lives by (or in this
>>> case, dies by) statistics. Once again, countering with
>>> demands instead of answering the question.
>>
>> No, I am well aware of the debating tactic of someone
>> who is confronted by the metaphorical equivalent of a
>> big tree and sits there demanding every leaf is counted
>> before they will consider whether the tree exists.
>
>Hmm. The problem is that you like to -start- arguments
>based mainly on statistics more than anyone else I know.
>As such it is only reasonable that you should be prepared
>to -finish- arguments with statistics without complaining
>about it... or responding to a question with a question
>instead of a direct answer.
I have posted the "reasonable" statistics, they have been
ignored, I have asked questions, they have been ignored.
Under Dan's rules I have to provide detailed breakdowns, not
the overall totals he keeps ignoring, even though they show the
clear trend, but Dan will not provide such figures to back his
own case. I note no figures on the engine failure per flying hours
for the Allison.
>Don't get me wrong, I find that most of the WWII data you
>post on Usenet is helpful but right now you're waffling.
No, I am not waffling, I am making a rational choice about what
to spend my time doing, if the end of year totals are not considered
enough, along with the comments of the people who have compiled
and examined them then nothing I can do will change that. I have
many things to do, wasting time is not one of them. When I see
someone using single quotes of "I have a sore throat" and turning
them into "You have terminal cancer" and when challenged
complain that people are contradicting the words of the original
quote I know there is not much point in presenting data. When I
see the data removed, when I see my replies gutted it is another
strong clue, when I see authors identified by nationality I can see
real problems.
What follows is the data I posted and Dan ignored, From December
"The early P-47 missions also had dismal records, since they
were adopting the fighter sweep tactics the RAF used in 1941.
The sweeps were ignored unless the tactical situation was good,
and there was much more on offer elsewhere anyway.
Meanwhile the RAF was quite happy to escort the growing
USAAF day bomber force, a force that could not be ignored by
the Luftwaffe. Add the widespread introduction of the Spitfire IX
and Typhoon and the RAF was able to meet the interceptors
on better terms than before.
According to the USAAF statistical digest the USAAF fighters
were awarded 37 kill claims in first 6 months of 1943 and lost
27 aircraft in air to air combat plus 3 to other causes. Given
the accuracy of kill claims, the USAAF was on the losing end
of the exchange. It was running into the same problems the
RAF had in 1941, inexperienced units, inferior equipment
(Spitfire V and P-47s with all the inevitable problems when first
used in combat), and inferior tactics. The Bf109 and Fw190's
could avoid them.
The USAAF fighters started doing escort missions from early
May 1943 on, and in May and June lost 17 aircraft to Luftwaffe
fighters and 3 to other causes, while claiming 26 kills.
Air War Europa by Eric Hammel notes 39 USAAF fighter kill
claims for September 1943 (the Statistical Digest says 38),
he notes the USAAF fighter sweeps on 4th September (95
sorties) saw nothing whereas the Spitfires escorting a B-26
strike claimed 19 kills. On September 22 some 395 USAAF
fighter sweep sorties resulted in 2 kill claims, but on September
27, the P-47 escort was awarded 21 kills.
The USAAF stepped up the pace and forced the Luftwaffe to
commit more fighter units to the defence, but often in aircraft
like the Bf110, increasing the performance edge the debugged
P-47 and P-51s had, as well as the improved P-38s.
The figures for the final 6 months of 1943 are USAAF fighter losses
134 to enemy aircraft, 1 to flak and 13 to other causes, versus
414 kill claims. Assuming half the kill claims are valid about 2
USAAF fighters for each 3 Luftwaffe fighters shot down. The
USAAF was able to keep this pace up, then increase it and so
forced the Luftwaffe to fight even as the kill ratio kept moving
further and further in the USAAF favour.
I do not think the 8th AF heavy bombers destroyed 3,381 enemy
aircraft in 1943, the statistical digest has them losing 700 to
enemy aircraft, 228 to flak and 108 to other causes while on
operations in return for the kill claims.
You force the enemy air force to fight by hurting important targets
using a viable bomber force. Without it the enemy can use the
advantages of fighting over friendly territory to near ensure it wins
the kill ratio. Having bombers around automatically shifts the fighter
versus fighter contest in your favour as enemy fighters try for the
bombers, not the escorts.
The USAAF had all the components, the bombers and the fighters
with the necessary range, once the tactics were sorted out the
result was devastating for the Luftwaffe day fighter force. Comparing
the combats of 1941 to those of 1943 or later must take into account
the changed requirements on the defenders, in 1941, pick off enemy
aircraft with minimal losses, the main effort is in the east, from 1943
onwards it was stop the bombers."
>From early January
"The early P-47 missions also had dismal records, since they
were adopting the fighter sweep tactics the RAF used in 1941.
The sweeps were ignored unless the tactical situation was good,
and there was much more on offer elsewhere anyway.
Meanwhile the RAF was quite happy to escort the growing
USAAF day bomber force, a force that could not be ignored by
the Luftwaffe. Add the widespread introduction of the Spitfire IX
and Typhoon and the RAF was able to meet the interceptors
on better terms than before.
According to the USAAF statistical digest the USAAF fighters
were awarded 37 kill claims in first 6 months of 1943 and lost
27 aircraft in air to air combat plus 3 to other causes. Given
the accuracy of kill claims, the USAAF was on the losing end
of the exchange. It was running into the same problems the
RAF had in 1941, inexperienced units, inferior equipment
(Spitfire V and P-47s with all the inevitable problems when first
used in combat), and inferior tactics. The Bf109 and Fw190's
could avoid them.
The USAAF fighters started doing escort missions from early
May 1943 on, and in May and June lost 17 aircraft to Luftwaffe
fighters and 3 to other causes, while claiming 26 kills.
Air War Europa by Eric Hammel notes 39 USAAF fighter kill
claims for September 1943 (the Statistical Digest says 38),
he notes the USAAF fighter sweeps on 4th September (95
sorties) saw nothing whereas the Spitfires escorting a B-26
strike claimed 19 kills. On September 22 some 395 USAAF
fighter sweep sorties resulted in 2 kill claims, but on September
27, the P-47 escort was awarded 21 kills.
The USAAF stepped up the pace and forced the Luftwaffe to
commit more fighter units to the defence, but often in aircraft
like the Bf110, increasing the performance edge the debugged
P-47 and P-51s had, as well as the improved P-38s.
The figures for the final 6 months of 1943 are USAAF fighter losses
134 to enemy aircraft, 1 to flak and 13 to other causes, versus
414 kill claims. Assuming half the kill claims are valid about 2
USAAF fighters for each 3 Luftwaffe fighters shot down. The
USAAF was able to keep this pace up, then increase it and so
forced the Luftwaffe to fight even as the kill ratio kept moving
further and further in the USAAF favour.
I do not think the 8th AF heavy bombers destroyed 3,381 enemy
aircraft in 1943, the statistical digest has them losing 700 to
enemy aircraft, 228 to flak and 108 to other causes while on
operations in return for the kill claims.
You force the enemy air force to fight by hurting important targets
using a viable bomber force. Without it the enemy can use the
advantages of fighting over friendly territory to near ensure it wins
the kill ratio. Having bombers around automatically shifts the fighter
versus fighter contest in your favour as enemy fighters try for the
bombers, not the escorts.
The USAAF had all the components, the bombers and the fighters
with the necessary range, once the tactics were sorted out the
result was devastating for the Luftwaffe day fighter force. Comparing
the combats of 1941 to those of 1943 or later must take into account
the changed requirements on the defenders, in 1941, pick off enemy
aircraft with minimal losses, the main effort is in the east, from 1943
onwards it was stop the bombers.
Actually I did and I note none of the data I supplied made the
reply, none at all. Which makes it seem rather pointless to
post any such data. Fighter command launched 6,873 sorties
over France Jan-Jun 1941, and Bomber Command some 954,
but many of the Bomber Command sorties were unescorted
anti shipping or cloud cover raids. In the second half of 1941
the totals were 20,495 fighter, 1,406 bomber. The figures for
1942 are 43,339 fighter and 1,794 bomber plus 1,081 US
fighter and 1,455 bomber. And again some to many of the
RAF bomber sorties were number 2 group anti shipping and
unescorted strikes. The 1943 figures against France/Western
Europe (excluding Germany) were RAF 80,384 fighter and
fighter bomber, 10,168 bomber, USAAF 14,690 bomber
12,749 fighter. Plus a further 10,981 USAAF bomber sorties
to Germany escorted by 10,759 fighter sorties, but the fighter
sorties did not start until October 1943.
So the fighter to bomber sortie ratios are first half of 1941 10
to 1, second half, 14.5 to one (and in fact higher due to the
reasons given above), 1942 7.5 to 1 (again higher due to anti
shipping etc. which were still from Bomber Command), 1943
3.7 to 1, and this would be lower if you remove the RAF fighter
bomber sorties, as the Typhoons came into service, 13 squadrons,
climbing to 20 by the end of the year, and Spitfires began to carry
bombs. What is interesting is the way the kill ratio in favour of the
RAF fighters goes up as the ratio of fighter to bomber sorties falls,
again not the whole reason by a decent margin, but a driving force.
The RAF knew from 1939 not to let day bomber formations out
unescorted. In 1941 many RAF fighters had only 8 0.303 inch
machine guns to strafe with, in 1943 they came with 4 20 mm
cannon and 2,000 pounds of bombs as maximum.
All data from Eagle in Flames, E R Hooton
When you add the way many of the 1943 RAF fighter sorties were
carrying bombs (therefore being more destructive) and you see the
trend and why the Luftwaffe was forced to fight.
It took the USAAF to provide a viable day bomber force. It took
until 1943 for the RAF to have a viable fighter bomber force, with
rockets and bombs. The need prior to that date was for fighters
to match the Fw190 which kept the Spitfire as pure air superiority
and the problem was compounded by the major problems with the
Typhoon. Since a Hurricane was in trouble even without bombs
attached flying over France from 1941 onwards, if intercepted.
The USAAF gave up the fighter sweep idea in 1943, they
used fighter bomber tactics from then on, once there were
enough fighters in early 1944, tactics including shooting
up Luftwaffe airfields in Germany on days the bombers did
not fly. According to the USAAF statistical digest the USAAF
lost 1 fighter to flak in 1943, 1,611 in 1944, the fighters
dropped 24 tons of bombs in 1943, 51,594 tons in 1944,
only 193 tons of which was dropped before April 1943. Given
the original idea of the self defending bomber formation the
USAAF found itself very short of fighters in the ETO in 1943
and the first half of 1944. The way 9th AF fighters were sent
on escort missions rather than invasion support or training.
The RAF had the sweep idea as a major percentage of
operations from 1941 to 1942, mainly because they could
not put a large number of fighter bombers or day bombers
into operation. Wrong tactics, green pilots, generally inferior
performing aircraft and no need for the Luftwaffe to engage
gave a predictable result. By 1943 the fighter sweep was
on the way out, replaced by escort and fighter bomber missions.
Support for my conclusions comes from Eric Hammel, in Air
War Europa as a start, which is a day by day diary of USAAF
operations over Europe and Africa. See also Williamson Murray
in his book Luftwaffe when he quotes a June 1943 Luftflotte 3
document reporting its fighters were suffering heavy casualties
intercepting US bomber formations accompanied by "hundreds"
of fighters.
In 1944 the allied fighter performance benefited from the new
gyroscopic gunsights and g-suits, nothing to do with the aircraft
design.
The extra range the US fighter designs had was a major advantage,
it meant more of the German war machine could be threatened.
Spitfires could only fly over a small amount of Europe from the UK,
smaller still in 1941 compared with May 1944, it enabled the
Germans to more easily decrease the effects of the RAF sorties.
You can drive a short way by night to avoid airstrikes, but not so
easy as the distance goes up. You can keep your main aircraft
infrastructure out of range but still be able to fight more easily
as another example if the enemy aircraft is short ranged.
If you wanted to fly a twin engined fighter then the P-38 was
probably the best around, it is also interesting to note how
the Coastal Command anti shipping squadrons were willing
to take their Mosquito VIs in against Fw190s. But the reality
was the contemporary single engined designs usually had the
performance edge.
There is no ideal aircraft, only the best for a given mission."
Dan Stevlingson
> This time 6 lines of my post survive out of my over 120 line post,
> and again none of the data make the reply. I have posted the
> "reasonable" statistics, they have been ignored
Of course they were ignored. And they will be ignored in the future.
Because your statistics are not relevant to your poorly supported
rants
that fighter sweeps were useless... that most RAF fighter missions
were sweeps from 1940-43... and that sweeps were the main reason
for the poor record of RAF Fighter Command vs. Me 109s and Fw 190s
from 1940-43, even when the Jagdwaffe were vastly outnumbered.
Yours are completely unreasonable assumptions since the USAAF
4th Fighter Group had some of its best days in WWII flying sweeps
of German fighters, i.e. Freelance, Rhubarb, Jackpot type missions
if we used the quaint terminology of the RAF. The day by day results
for the 4th Fighter Group are found in 'Escort to Berlin' by Garry
Fry
& Jeff Ethell. For starters, look at the returns from April 1944
which,
by themselves, shoots down in flames your hypothesis that sweeps
must have been useless because of the RAF's ongoing failures.
> Ah yes, the man who does not want sortie totals but wants the
> number of sweeps, in other words I am expected to go through
> 5 years days of RAF operations and nearly 3 years of USAAF
> operations and count the number of times a formation was
> classified as going on a sweep?
Exactly. You are expected to do this if you have any hope at all
of supporting your above theories, and this is the third time I have
asked. So I reprise, here are the basic Allied fighter missions, to
get Mr. Sinclair started:
RAMROD - Bomber escort mission
CIRCUS - Large bomber escort mission
RODEO - Bomber escort using bombers as bait to lure enemy fighters
FREELANCE - Fighter sweep or fighter patrol
RHUBARB - Low level strafing sweep. Usually in bad weather by a few
aircraft.
JACKPOT - Airdrome strafing in predetermined area. (similar to
Rhubarb)
CHATTANOOGA - Railway strafing attack
ROADSTEAD - Attack on enemy shipping and port targets
Then there were shipping convoy patrols, air sea rescue escorts,
tac recon, photo recon escort, dive bombings, fighter-bombings,
armed reconnaissance of ground targets, and a few other missions
that I cannot recall offhand. USAAF fighter groups based in England
tended to use RAF terminology, but gradually added their own:
RAMROD SUPPORT - Escort bombers for part of the mission to target.
CLOSE SUPPORT/ TARGET SUPPORT - Escort over or near target.
WITHDRAWL SUPPORT - Rendezvous with bombers on return trip.
TARGET WITHDRAWL SUPPORT - Self explanatory.
The general category of STRAFING MISSION was often used instead
of Rhubarb, Jackpot, Chattanoga, Roadstead, etc. FIGHTER SWEEP,
FREELANCE SWEEP, FREELANCE SUPPORT, AREA SUPPORT
and AREA PATROL all seem to have been variations on the same
type of mission.
> I note when David Thornley generally supported the idea of
> the RAF doing mainly fighter sweeps which the Luftwaffe
> usually avoided he was asked by Dan. "How often is 'usually'?
> Post the statistics of all those times the Germans deliberately
> avoided sweeps--as opposed to the times the Spitfires couldn't
> catch them--and those times the Germans engaged at an
> advantage.You will need German sources to prove your point
> and this should be interesting since the Geman pilots claimed
> that they were usually at a disadvantage."
Indeed. Thank you for highlighting the fact that these legitimate
questions were also, carefully avoided.
If you are ignoring them because proving a point is supposedly
too time consuming for your taste -- that is your own personal
problem. The onus is on you and it's not my fault that you've
painted yourself into a corner.
> So we are lead to belive by Dan
> A) the Germans have records of fights they deliberately avoided
> B) these records are available.
> C) they are accurate.
Which means that you should have looked into it first Geoffrey.
Before you made sweeping statements. No pun intended. ;-)
--
David Thornley
Dan Stevlingson <hal90...@mailANdnews.com> wrote:
>
>Of course they were ignored. And they will be ignored in the future.
>Because your statistics are not relevant to your poorly supported
>rants
>that fighter sweeps were useless... that most RAF fighter missions
>were sweeps from 1940-43... and that sweeps were the main reason
>for the poor record of RAF Fighter Command vs. Me 109s and Fw 190s
>from 1940-43, even when the Jagdwaffe were vastly outnumbered.
>
- Fighter sweeps without other activity are generally expensive and
unproductive, given serious opposition
- There were relatively few RAF bomber missions over the Continent
in that period
- Therefore, RAF operations over the Continent in that time period
were likely to be expensive and unproductive
>Yours are completely unreasonable assumptions since the USAAF
>4th Fighter Group had some of its best days in WWII flying sweeps
>of German fighters, i.e. Freelance, Rhubarb, Jackpot type missions
>if we used the quaint terminology of the RAF. The day by day results
>for the 4th Fighter Group are found in 'Escort to Berlin' by Garry
>Fry
>& Jeff Ethell. For starters, look at the returns from April 1944
Which was a very different tactical situation. This was in
conjunction with large bombing missions, which the Germans thought
they had to intercept. This meant that German fighters had to
take off and form up to attack the bomber formations, and were
not primarily worried about the fighters.
This is closer to the Battle of Britain situation, in which the
fighter loss ratio clearly favored the Germans, than to the
plain fighter sweeps. The use of "fighter sweep" for both is
probably unfortunate; this might better be called "distant escort"
or some such.
>which,
>by themselves, shoots down in flames your hypothesis that sweeps
>must have been useless because of the RAF's ongoing failures.
>
No, that's turning our reasoning on its head. We aren't concluding
that sweeps by themselves are useless because the RAF wasn't
successful, although that's certainly a conforming instance.
We're concluding that the tactical situation of a plain fighter
sweep is bad for the sweeping party.
>If you are ignoring them because proving a point is supposedly
>too time consuming for your taste -- that is your own personal
>problem. The onus is on you and it's not my fault that you've
>painted yourself into a corner.
>
Really? So far you've failed to point out where US sweeps
without a large daylight bombing campaign going on were any more
successful than RAF. You'd get similar results if you compared
the usefulness of US artillery fired in support of an infantry
or armor attack with the usefulness of British artillery fired
without any sort of assault going on.
thor...@visi.com
>Because your statistics are not relevant to your poorly supported
>rants
>that fighter sweeps were useless... that most RAF fighter missions
>were sweeps from 1940-43... and that sweeps were the main reason
>for the poor record of RAF Fighter Command vs. Me 109s and Fw 190s
>from 1940-43, even when the Jagdwaffe were vastly outnumbered.
>
- Fighter sweeps without other activity are generally expensive and
unproductive, given serious opposition
- There were relatively few RAF bomber missions over the Continent
in that period
- Therefore, RAF operations over the Continent in that time period
were likely to be expensive and unproductive
>Yours are completely unreasonable assumptions since the USAAF
>4th Fighter Group had some of its best days in WWII flying sweeps
>of German fighters, i.e. Freelance, Rhubarb, Jackpot type missions
>if we used the quaint terminology of the RAF. The day by day results
>for the 4th Fighter Group are found in 'Escort to Berlin' by Garry
>Fry
>& Jeff Ethell. For starters, look at the returns from April 1944
Which was a very different tactical situation. This was in
conjunction with large bombing missions, which the Germans thought
they had to intercept. This meant that German fighters had to
take off and form up to attack the bomber formations, and were
not primarily worried about the fighters.
This is closer to the Battle of Britain situation, in which the
fighter loss ratio clearly favored the Germans, than to the
plain fighter sweeps. The use of "fighter sweep" for both is
probably unfortunate; this might better be called "distant escort"
or some such.
>which,
>by themselves, shoots down in flames your hypothesis that sweeps
>must have been useless because of the RAF's ongoing failures.
>
No, that's turning our reasoning on its head. We aren't concluding
that sweeps by themselves are useless because the RAF wasn't
successful, although that's certainly a conforming instance.
We're concluding that the tactical situation of a plain fighter
sweep is bad for the sweeping party.
>If you are ignoring them because proving a point is supposedly
>too time consuming for your taste -- that is your own personal
>problem. The onus is on you and it's not my fault that you've
>painted yourself into a corner.
>
Geoffrey Sinclair
>"Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinc...@froggy.com.au> wrote:
>
>> This time 6 lines of my post survive out of my over 120 line post,
>> and again none of the data make the reply. I have posted the
>> "reasonable" statistics, they have been ignored
>
>Of course they were ignored. And they will be ignored in the future.
Oh good, this sounds like an improvement, open admission is a start,
I see this time only 22 of my lines made the post and none of the data
and none of the questions answered.
>Because your statistics are not relevant to your poorly supported
>rants that fighter sweeps were useless... that most RAF fighter missions
>were sweeps from 1940-43... and that sweeps were the main reason
>for the poor record of RAF Fighter Command vs. Me 109s and Fw 190s
>from 1940-43, even when the Jagdwaffe were vastly outnumbered.
I like the editorial, "rant", not proposition and "poorly" but the
data
is edited out of replies. I also note the need to rewrite my case.
My proposition is fighter sweeps were very poor as a tactic
since they were relatively easy to figure out and ignore, but in 1941
they were about the only option available to the RAF, as this
changed, as the RAF acquired a fighter bomber force (first fighter
bomber mission October 1941), and a day bomber force (with
mainly USAAF markings), the effectiveness of the air offensive
increased and with it improved fighter versus fighter kill ratios.
In 1941 the RAF faced an enemy force with on average better
experience, better aircraft, home ground advantage and had no
effective method to force the Luftwaffe to fight. The RAF could
not do enough damage. A Luftwaffe committed to the east, and
running out of aircraft in late 1941, adopted quite sensible tactics,
hit when the situation looked good, otherwise ignore the RAF.
I also remember Dan's use of numbers from the last time he pushed
his line, every RAF day and night fighter in existance, even those
guarding Northern Ireland and Scapa flow, versus the Luftwaffe in
France, but for the USAAF it was only the USAAF fighters that
engaged in combat, not even the total number on escort.
The Jagdwaffe was outnumbered in the west from mid 1941
onwards., dramatically so under Dans rules.
And I have stated before it looks like in early 1943 the RAF started
to shoot down more than it lost in fighter versus fighter combat
over France.
That most RAF operations were sweeps or at best vastly outnumbered
bombers can be seen by the ratio of fighter to bomber sorties, 15 to
1 in late 1941, 8 to 1 in 1942 and 4 to 1 in 1943, when finally large
numbers of fighter bomber sorties began to be flown. Spitfires did
not carry bombs before 1943. I believe the slogan not one pound for
air to ground is appropriate.
>Yours are completely unreasonable assumptions since the USAAF
>4th Fighter Group had some of its best days in WWII flying sweeps
>of German fighters, i.e. Freelance, Rhubarb, Jackpot type missions
>if we used the quaint terminology of the RAF.
Why the "quaint" language editorial? Since the USAAF used the same
language?
>The day by day results
>for the 4th Fighter Group are found in 'Escort to Berlin' by Garry
>Fry & Jeff Ethell. For starters, look at the returns from April 1944
>which, by themselves, shoots down in flames your hypothesis that
>sweeps must have been useless because of the RAF's ongoing failures.
Ah I see the redefinition going on, the RAF called a fighter sweep a
medium to high altitude formation looking for trouble. Dan wants
to include the airfield strafing attacks done by the USAAF as a sweep.
I begin to see the situation quite clearly. Dan has different
defintions
of sweep he also has different defintions of 1941, 1942 and 1943.
Since he uses 1944 data. Since the 4th was around in 1942 and
flew Spitfires then P-47s from March 1943 and Dan has the "Escort
to Berlin" book then he can presumably give a summary of the 4ths
activities for 1943 by mission by month and we can see what the
figures tell us. Instead of using 1944 results and apply them to
earlier in the war.
From Air Force Combat Units of WWII
"Constituted as 4th Fighter Group on 22 Aug 1942. Activated in
England on 12 Sep 1942. Former members of RAF Eagle Squadrons
formed the nucleus of the group, which served in combat from Oct 1942
to Apr 1945 and destroyed more enemy planes in the air and on the
ground than any other fighter group of Eighth AF. Operated first with
Spitfires but changed to P-47's in Mar 1943 and to P-51's in Apr 1944.
On numerous occasions escorted bombers that attacked factories,
submarine pens, V-weapon sites, and other targets in France, the Low
Countries, or Germany. Went out sometimes with a small force of
bombers to draw up the enemy's fighters so they could be destroyed in
aerial combat. At other times attacked the enemy's air power by
strafing
and dive-bombing airfields."
Not a lot of sweeps, medium to high level missions where you come
home with the ammunition if no enemy aircraft rise to the challenge.
>> Ah yes, the man who does not want sortie totals but wants the
>> number of sweeps, in other words I am expected to go through
>> 5 years days of RAF operations and nearly 3 years of USAAF
>> operations and count the number of times a formation was
>> classified as going on a sweep?
>
>Exactly. You are expected to do this if you have any hope at all
>of supporting your above theories, and this is the third time I have
>asked.
No I am not expected to do this to support my above theories, I
know the effort is wasted because Dan will ignore any data I
present. Given his attempts in the past in using data as opposed
to his one quote proves all approach.
>So I reprise, here are the basic Allied fighter missions, to
>get Mr. Sinclair started:
And for about the 4th time,
When the RAF flew around 6 bombers in the middle of 100
to 200 fighters, is that a bomber strike or a fighter sweep?
I asked the question before and no answer was given.
And for the second time,
"Like over France in 1940
before and after the French armistice. The book 12 days
in May comes to the conclusion the RAF actually shot down
299 Luftwaffe aircraft versus 499 kill claims and lost slightly
over 100 Hurricanes in combat, in the first 12 days of the
German offensive. I presume the single flight formation the
RAF often used counts as a fighter sweep as well? How
about the standing patrols over the embarkation points
and Normandy in 1944?"
For the first time,
Also what are the standing patrols over the Luftwaffe jet fighter
bases to be called? Sweeps? I am after Dan's defintion, not
the Air forces. Since I know any data I present will automatically
be either ignored or further details will be requested.
So what was the figure for engine failures per hundred flying hours
for Allison engines? Since Dan considers this important when
evaluating the Merlin.
>RAMROD - Bomber escort mission
>CIRCUS - Large bomber escort mission
In 1941 this meant 20 or more fighters per bomber.
>RODEO - Bomber escort using bombers as bait to lure enemy fighters
>FREELANCE - Fighter sweep or fighter patrol
>RHUBARB - Low level strafing sweep. Usually in bad weather by a few
>aircraft.
>JACKPOT - Airdrome strafing in predetermined area. (similar to
>Rhubarb)
Not done before 1944 on anything but an ad hoc basis.
>CHATTANOOGA - Railway strafing attack
As far as I know close to zero railway attacks until mid 1944,
danger to French civilians ruling them out.
>ROADSTEAD - Attack on enemy shipping and port targets
Yes, and these tended to attract strong opposition, compared
with the other missions in 1941 and 1942 at least.
>Then there were shipping convoy patrols, air sea rescue escorts,
>tac recon, photo recon escort, dive bombings, fighter-bombings,
>armed reconnaissance of ground targets, and a few other missions
>that I cannot recall offhand.
Yes and in 1941 the RAF had Rhubarbs with cannon and machine
guns no bombs before October. Circuses with bombers being
outnumbered 20 or more to 1, and fighter sweeps which did nothing
if no enemy was encountered as opposed to the USAAF (at least)
injuction in 1944, do not bring ammunition home.
>USAAF fighter groups based in England
>tended to use RAF terminology, but gradually added their own:
>
>RAMROD SUPPORT - Escort bombers for part of the mission to target.
>CLOSE SUPPORT/ TARGET SUPPORT - Escort over or near target.
>WITHDRAWL SUPPORT - Rendezvous with bombers on return trip.
>TARGET WITHDRAWL SUPPORT - Self explanatory.
>The general category of STRAFING MISSION was often used instead
>of Rhubarb, Jackpot, Chattanoga, Roadstead, etc. FIGHTER SWEEP,
>FREELANCE SWEEP, FREELANCE SUPPORT, AREA SUPPORT
>and AREA PATROL all seem to have been variations on the same
>type of mission.
So which definitions are classifed by Dan as a sweep? I note he
has decided to prove he has a list of mission codes but does not
supply which missions he considers the same as the RAF sweeps
over France in 1941/42 and the USAAF tactics in early 1943.
Remember the P-47 was told to stay high to maximise advantages,
so in early 1943 they flew medium level missions over France, no
drop tanks so a restricted range, no going down and looking for
trouble, 1 fighter lost to flak in 1943 1,611 in 1944. The same as
the RAF tactics in 1941/42. The USAAF figured out it was wrong
and did operations like 5 April 1944, strafing attacks on German
airfields, all fighters no bombers, 96 aircraft on the ground 12 in
the air. Showing the great advantage of range, the ability to
patrol or stay in an area or continue to look for trouble.
>> I note when David Thornley generally supported the idea of
>> the RAF doing mainly fighter sweeps which the Luftwaffe
>> usually avoided he was asked by Dan. "How often is 'usually'?
>> Post the statistics of all those times the Germans deliberately
>> avoided sweeps--as opposed to the times the Spitfires couldn't
>> catch them--and those times the Germans engaged at an
>> advantage.You will need German sources to prove your point
>> and this should be interesting since the Geman pilots claimed
>> that they were usually at a disadvantage."
>
>Indeed. Thank you for highlighting the fact that these legitimate
>questions were also, carefully avoided.
No they were not carefully avoided, they were pointed out as
absurd, and obviously meant as a way to shut down an
uncomfortable opinion.
>If you are ignoring them because proving a point is supposedly
>too time consuming for your taste -- that is your own personal
>problem. The onus is on you and it's not my fault that you've
>painted yourself into a corner.
If I am the one painting myself into a corner why is Dan doing the
heavy editing of the posts? Why is Dan ignoring the questions,
and trying to make out his request is "reasonable" after deleting
any objections to it?
">
>> So we are lead to belive by Dan
>> A) the Germans have records of fights they deliberately avoided
>> B) these records are available.
>> C) they are accurate.
My text that was edited out,
See I have my *one* quote that proves all *too*.
>Which means that you should have looked into it first Geoffrey.
>Before you made sweeping statements. No pun intended. ;-)
Oh I did look into it, and I see Dan has chosen to redefine missions,
I know what a fighter sweep was, and it was not attacking airfields,
not going down into the landing circles of airbases that were probably
operating aircraft to see if there were any in the air.
Under Dan's rules I have to provide detailed breakdowns, not
the overall totals he keeps ignoring, even though they show the
clear trend, but Dan will not provide such figures to back his
own case. I note no figures on the engine failure per flying hours
for the Allison.
What follows is the data I posted and Dan ignored, From December
Dan Stevlingson
...more rubbish about fighter sweeps.
> This meant that German fighters had to take off and form up
> to attack the bomber formations, and were not primarily worried
> about the fighters.
If the Germans were concerned only with stopping strategic bombers
then obviously the Germans would not have moved so many fighter
units to France and low countries in the summer of 1944.
The truth is that the Luftwaffe had many priorities at any given time,
and German fighter pilots were not myopic neanderthals.
>- Therefore, RAF operations over the Continent in that time period
> were likely to be expensive and unproductive
RAF operations over the continent were expensive and unproductive
because of the poor RAF formation tactics at squadron and wing level.
And because the Spitfire was inadequate until the Merlin engine was
upgraded with a two-stage supercharger. All of this has been admitted
in writing by some of the best known RAF flyers.
Not one of the RAF fighter pilots I mentioned earlier claimed that
fighter sweeps was the only factor (or the main factor) in causing
an overall majority of RAF fighter losses, or lack of success.
>> Because your statistics are not relevant to your poorly supported
>> rants that fighter sweeps were useless... that most RAF fighter
>> missions were sweeps from 1940-43... and that sweeps were the
>> main reason for the poor record of RAF Fighter Command vs.
>> Me 109s and Fw 190s from 1940-43 even when the Jagdwaffe was
>> vastly outnumbered.
>- There were relatively few RAF bomber missions over the Continent
> in that period
How many RAF bomber missions over the continent in that period?
And you forgot about USAAF bomber missions since the Spitfires
provided escort for them in 1942-43.
> Fighter sweeps without other activity are generally expensive and
> unproductive
Once again, you need to show us many fighter sweeps were flown
by the RAF in 1941, 1942, 1943. The RAF did not build all those
clipped wing Spitfires to fly offensive fighter sweeps.
The clipped wing Spitfires were intended to counter the low flying
German day fighters which were quite active over the UK until 1944.
The clipped wing Spitfires were ultimately a failure, not because
they were sent on sweeps, but because their speed (and range)
was inadequate for interception of low level intruders. And they
were often misused as medium bomber escorts.
In other words, "the aircraft" was deficient for these tasks. It
would
be silly to blame "the missions" for which they were used -- as I
noted, were not fighter sweeps. Meanwhile the standard Spitfire
was too slow at high altitude until two-stage supercharged engines
was available in quantity, 1943.
> given serious opposition
There wasn't much serious opposition to RAF fighters after the BoB.
JG 26 was the only Geschwader that continuously operated within
range of Spitfire bases until the 1944 invasion period.
> Really? So far you've failed to point out where US sweeps without a
> large daylight bombing campaign going on were any more successful
> than RAF.
...From January 1944. That's when 8th Air Force escort fighters were
often allowed to operate far away from bombers and bomb targets
(free hunt). The 9th Air Force fighters were sometimes assigned free
ranging patrols and escorts, ground attack was not their only mission.
>> Yours are completely unreasonable assumptions since the USAAF
>> 4th Fighter Group had some of its best days in WWII flying sweeps
>> of German fighters, i.e. Freelance, Rhubarb, Jackpot type missions
> Which was a very different tactical situation. This was in conjunction
> with large bombing missions, which the Germans thought they had to
> intercept.
How many hundreds of miles away from the bomb targets must the
fighters be flying before they are considered to be, "not in
conjunction
with large bombing missions"?
I repeat, fighter sweeps had no bearing on the performance of the
Spitfire which was lacking in many respects. As Roger Freeman
pointed out, it was very easy to escape a Spitfire by simply diving
away from it. That tactic did not work well against Thunderbolt or
the Mustang, and this was a critical advantage because turning
fights rarely developed in air-to-air combat.
--
thor...@visi.com
Dan Stevlingson <hal90...@mailANDnews.com> wrote:
>David Thornley wrote:
>
>> This meant that German fighters had to take off and form up
>> to attack the bomber formations, and were not primarily worried
>> about the fighters.
>
>If the Germans were concerned only with stopping strategic bombers
>then obviously the Germans would not have moved so many fighter
>units to France and low countries in the summer of 1944.
>
very effective at times.
>RAF operations over the continent were expensive and unproductive
>because of the poor RAF formation tactics at squadron and wing level.
>And because the Spitfire was inadequate until the Merlin engine was
>upgraded with a two-stage supercharger. All of this has been admitted
>in writing by some of the best known RAF flyers.
>
I never said otherwise. What I said, and what I still say, is that
RAF loss ratios over France in 1941 are not directly comparable to
USAAF loss ratios over Germany in 1944. The tactical situation
was extremely different.
>>- There were relatively few RAF bomber missions over the Continent
>> in that period
>
>How many RAF bomber missions over the continent in that period?
>And you forgot about USAAF bomber missions since the Spitfires
>provided escort for them in 1942-43.
>
Excuse me, daytime bomber missions. Since we are talking about
day fighters, I assumed we could ignore the nighttime activities
of Bomber Command. This leaves relatively little RAF bombing
activity. 2 Group really didn't have all that many sorties,
which means few bombing missions of significant size. The USAAF
sorties are much more significant.
>> Fighter sweeps without other activity are generally expensive and
>> unproductive
>
>Once again, you need to show us many fighter sweeps were flown
>by the RAF in 1941, 1942, 1943. The RAF did not build all those
>clipped wing Spitfires to fly offensive fighter sweeps.
>
If they built them as interceptors that failed to intercept, why
would that affect loss ratios?
>...From January 1944. That's when 8th Air Force escort fighters were
>often allowed to operate far away from bombers and bomb targets
>(free hunt). The 9th Air Force fighters were sometimes assigned free
>ranging patrols and escorts, ground attack was not their only mission.
>
Right. One German tactic was to form up to make coordinated attacks
on bomber formations, in an attempt to overwhelm the defenses locally.
Free-ranging Mustangs and Lightnings found that it was profitable to
attack these formations, that being one of the other missions. If
there had been no bombing missions, there would have been no
formations
of German bomber destroyers to catch while sweeping.
>How many hundreds of miles away from the bomb targets must the
>fighters be flying before they are considered to be, "not in
>conjunction
>with large bombing missions"?
>
Depends on the situation, really. How far away were the Germans
launching intercepting fighters from? USAAF bombing attacks would
provoke German bomber destroyers which could be preyed on by US
fighter sweeps.
>I repeat, fighter sweeps had no bearing on the performance of the
>Spitfire which was lacking in many respects. As Roger Freeman
>pointed out,
I repeat, loss ratios in 1941 and 1944 are completely inadequate
to base any such conclusion on. Discussions about the specific
failings of the aircraft are better for that, but the failings of
other aircraft have to be considered. Wartime combat aircraft
are not normally made to the same safety specs as peacetime
airliners, and all combat aircraft had their strengths and
weaknesses.
This means that evaluating the different aircraft isn't a simple
thing to do, and that simple answers are very likely to be
simplistic.
Tero P. Mustalahti
Robert Warinner <wari...@xnet.com> writes:
> Armchair historians may deride the phenomena of overclaiming and the
> tacit acceptance of it, or even encouragement of it, by the chain of
> command.
Meta-note: 'armchair historian' is a rather amusing expression, since
history is mostly studied in libraries, museums and archives reading
books, diaries, reports and such. Eyewitness interviews are of course
possible with recent history, but studying history is still mostly a
sitting job. In most cases a professional historian would then be, if
not an armchair historian, at least a chair historian ;-)
Tero P. Mustalahti
--
David Thornley
Dan Stevlingson <hal90...@mailANDnews.com> wrote:
>David Thornley wrote:
>
>> to attack the bomber formations, and were not primarily worried
>> about the fighters.
>
>If the Germans were concerned only with stopping strategic bombers
>then obviously the Germans would not have moved so many fighter
>units to France and low countries in the summer of 1944.
>
very effective at times.
>RAF operations over the continent were expensive and unproductive
>because of the poor RAF formation tactics at squadron and wing level.
>And because the Spitfire was inadequate until the Merlin engine was
>upgraded with a two-stage supercharger. All of this has been admitted
>in writing by some of the best known RAF flyers.
>
I never said otherwise. What I said, and what I still say, is that
RAF loss ratios over France in 1941 are not directly comparable to
USAAF loss ratios over Germany in 1944. The tactical situation
was extremely different.
>>- There were relatively few RAF bomber missions over the Continent
>> in that period
>
>How many RAF bomber missions over the continent in that period?
>And you forgot about USAAF bomber missions since the Spitfires
>provided escort for them in 1942-43.
>
Excuse me, daytime bomber missions. Since we are talking about
day fighters, I assumed we could ignore the nighttime activities
of Bomber Command. This leaves relatively little RAF bombing
activity. 2 Group really didn't have all that many sorties,
which means few bombing missions of significant size. The USAAF
sorties are much more significant.
>> Fighter sweeps without other activity are generally expensive and
>> unproductive
>
>Once again, you need to show us many fighter sweeps were flown
>by the RAF in 1941, 1942, 1943. The RAF did not build all those
>clipped wing Spitfires to fly offensive fighter sweeps.
>
If they built them as interceptors that failed to intercept, why
would that affect loss ratios?
>...From January 1944. That's when 8th Air Force escort fighters were
>often allowed to operate far away from bombers and bomb targets
>(free hunt). The 9th Air Force fighters were sometimes assigned free
>ranging patrols and escorts, ground attack was not their only mission.
>
Right. One German tactic was to form up to make coordinated attacks
on bomber formations, in an attempt to overwhelm the defenses locally.
Free-ranging Mustangs and Lightnings found that it was profitable to
attack these formations, that being one of the other missions. If
there had been no bombing missions, there would have been no formations
of German bomber destroyers to catch while sweeping.
>How many hundreds of miles away from the bomb targets must the
>fighters be flying before they are considered to be, "not in
>conjunction
>with large bombing missions"?
>
Depends on the situation, really. How far away were the Germans
launching intercepting fighters from? USAAF bombing attacks would
provoke German bomber destroyers which could be preyed on by US
fighter sweeps.
>I repeat, fighter sweeps had no bearing on the performance of the
>Spitfire which was lacking in many respects. As Roger Freeman
>pointed out,
I repeat, loss ratios in 1941 and 1944 are completely inadequate
to base any such conclusion on. Discussions about the specific
failings of the aircraft are better for that, but the failings of
other aircraft have to be considered. Wartime combat aircraft
are not normally made to the same safety specs as peacetime
airliners, and all combat aircraft had their strengths and
weaknesses.
This means that evaluating the different aircraft isn't a simple
thing to do, and that simple answers are very likely to be
simplistic.
--
Robert Warinner
: Meta-note: 'armchair historian' is a rather amusing expression, since
: history is mostly studied in libraries, museums and archives reading
: books, diaries, reports and such. Eyewitness interviews are of course
: possible with recent history, but studying history is still mostly a
: sitting job. In most cases a professional historian would then be, if
: not an armchair historian, at least a chair historian ;-)
Real historians don't use armchairs.
I was shooting for an expression something like 'armchair quarterback'
which may be too much of a parochial expression to travel well.
To amplify my original point, a fact like 'USAAF bomber gunners (or
RAF fighters, or Luftwaffe figthers) overclaimed by <n>%' is not the
end of historical inquiry, it's the beginning. While the fact can be
employed in the national dick-waving debates that often take place in
this group, it could serve as a useful starting point for further
investigations.
I find questions like 'How did higher commands use fighter claims in
intelligence and operational planning?' or 'How did higher commands
view figher and bomber claims in maintenance of service and public
morale?' as much more interesting.
David Thornley
>To amplify my original point, a fact like 'USAAF bomber gunners (or
>RAF fighters, or Luftwaffe figthers) overclaimed by <n>%' is not the
>end of historical inquiry, it's the beginning. While the fact can be
>employed in the national dick-waving debates that often take place in
>this group, it could serve as a useful starting point for further
>investigations.
>
Certainly. One thing I have learned very well here is that, no
matter what your point of view, you can find some raw numbers and/or
an Albert Speer quote to back you up.
>I find questions like 'How did higher commands use fighter claims in
>intelligence and operational planning?' or 'How did higher commands
>view figher and bomber claims in maintenance of service and public
>morale?' as much more interesting.
>
Those are indeed interesting. It seems that the Japanese tended to
believe their claims in the Pacific, and planned on that basis.
I'm not so sure about other nationalities.
I also really, really doubt that the USAAF paid all that much
attention to claims by bomber gunners, except for recognition and
morale. After all, it wasn't the purpose of the Fortresses and
Liberators to shoot down fighters, it was to go in safety to
German industrial targets and destroy the German economy by
bombing. (Everybody had an exaggerated idea of the results of
strategic bombing at this time.) I would think that planning
would take place more on the overoptimistic assessment of bombing
results, and the losses of the bombers.