Hitler's peace feelers to Britain after the defeat of France 1940
YMC
if so what were (would) have been the terms?
David H Thornley
> Did Hitler attempt to offer peace to Britain after the defeat of France? And
> if so what were (would) have been the terms?
>
orated on terms to give Britain, which would basically allow Britain
limited self-government and darn little else. (Numerous British
politicians, including Churchill, were to be removed from power, all
Jews turned over, removal of British naval threat, that sort of
thing.)
This has been described as some sort of peace feeler by some later
historians, but apparently the British had no idea it was supposed
to be such a thing.
So, (a) no, (b), awfully harsh for a country Germany had no realistic
ability to overrun.
--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion, ask.
da...@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-
L2008
news:4862f46f$0$17509$afc3...@news.optusnet.com.au...
> Did Hitler attempt to offer peace to Britain after the defeat of France?
> And if so what were (would) have been the terms?
Numerous times through various ways. Hitler could not be seen to back down
in his eyes. Rudolph Hess even parachuted in to make peace.
War with the UK was not a part of his plan. He wanted Germany to control
the Continent, with conquered countries still ruling themselves, and the
British to rule the rest via the Empire. This view was to counter the rapid
economic growth of the USA. If the economic power of the USA declined,
Hitler would have been quite happy to keep it as it was.
Terms? The status quo and probably a peace pact. Germany knew the Brits
would not accept any interference from them in their own affairs. Operation
Sealion was a ruse to get the UK to the peace table. The Brits were not
having it and saw it for what it was as the Germans didn't have a cat in
hells chance of a successful landing in the UK. During the so-called Battle
of Britain, the RN had a mass of ships at Gibraltar ready for offensive
operations against the Italians. Also 55 tanks were sent to North Africa
too. That is how seriously the UK took any invasion attempt. The RN
continued the blockade of Germany.
Michele
news:iZqdnfEFt9PWE_7V...@posted.visi...
> YMC wrote:
>> Did Hitler attempt to offer peace to Britain after the defeat of France?
>> And
>> if so what were (would) have been the terms?
>>
> The closest thing appears to have been a Reichstag speech, in which he
> orated on terms to give Britain, which would basically allow Britain
> limited self-government and darn little else. (Numerous British
> politicians, including Churchill, were to be removed from power, all
> Jews turned over, removal of British naval threat, that sort of
> thing.)
>
> This has been described as some sort of peace feeler by some later
> historians, but apparently the British had no idea it was supposed
> to be such a thing.
>
> So, (a) no,
I'm not sure this is so clear cut. People were talking with the Swedes, in
particular Dahlerus, and with other neutrals, and by "people" I don't mean
just the Germans; but, for instance, Rab Butler, close to Halifax, met with
a Swedish diplomat in London on June 22.
It is however to be pointed out that these overtures never went beyond the
"might we talk?" stage, and of course those originating on the British side
petered out as Churchill achieved and consolidated his position. On the
German side, these approaches never were defined enough to be considered as
a serious proposal.
(b), awfully harsh for a country Germany had no realistic
> ability to overrun.
Then there is that, yes. Considered the way it was used, it is fair to
classify it mainly as a propaganda attempt to separate the British
population from its government.
YMC
news:iZqdnfEFt9PWE_7V...@posted.visi...
> So, (a) no, (b), awfully harsh for a country Germany had no realistic
> ability to overrun.
Well, at the same time Britain had no realistic ability to defeat Germany at
this stage (June 1940). And as for Hitler's offer maybe it was like an
initial market bazaar offer. Wouldn't a more tempting offer - of an end to
hostilities, Britain remains the same, can keep its empire, we won't touch
you if you won't touch us - have made a more favorable impression? Just
speculating.
Don Phillipson
news:g404md$tgs$1...@registered.motzarella.org...
> . . . Hitler could not be seen to back down
> in his eyes. Rudolph Hess even parachuted in to make peace.
This is not a reasonable description of Hess's adventure, e.g.
1. Hess was not in a position personally to bypass or override
Hitler. So if Hess believed he could make peace, regardless of
what Hitler wanted, he was out of touch with real power in
Germany.
2. If Hitler had approved Hess's flight as an envoy, he (apparently)
changed his mind within the first 24 hours and repudiated the "mission."
(I cannot think of any likely third alternative that the facts support.)
> War with the UK was not a part of his plan. He wanted Germany to control
> the Continent, with conquered countries still ruling themselves, and the
> British to rule the rest via the Empire. This view was to counter the
rapid
> economic growth of the USA. If the economic power of the USA declined,
> Hitler would have been quite happy to keep it as it was.
1. Historians reached consensus long ago that Hitler had no
overall plan for any purpose, but was an able opportunist, i.e.
seized whatever opportunities seemed likely, successfully in the
early years of his reign.
2. Whether or not we agree with #1 as a general summary, we can
easily agree we should not mistake what XYZ wanted for XYZ's
personal plan. (E.g. Churchill wanted India to remain "the jewel in
the crown" of empire, but had no plan for this, and made no attempt
to achieve it.)
3. Specifically, it appears Hitler had no plan to resist the economic
power of the USA. Even some of his advisers complained that he
made no attempt to assess US economic power, and later historians
agree on this point. (This is what we should expect if Hitler was
truly an opportunist rather than a planner.)
--
Don Phillipson
Carlsbad Springs
(Ottawa, Canada)
William Black
> "David H Thornley" <da...@thornley.net> wrote in message
> news:iZqdnfEFt9PWE_7V...@posted.visi...
>> So, (a) no, (b), awfully harsh for a country Germany had no realistic
>> ability to overrun.
>
> Well, at the same time Britain had no realistic ability to defeat Germany
> at this stage (June 1940).
In February 1940 they thought they might have a chance of victory.
By June 1940 they thought they knew how to do it.
On the 17th of May 1941 they became certain that they would win.
--
William Black
I've seen things you people wouldn't believe.
Barbeques on fire by the chalets past the castle headland
I watched the gift shops glitter in the darkness off the Newborough gate
All these moments will be lost in time, like icecream on the beach
Time for tea.
David H Thornley
> Numerous times through various ways.
Got sources for those attempts? Descriptions?
Hitler could not be seen to back
> down in his eyes. Rudolph Hess even parachuted in to make peace.
>
Hess was mentally unstable, and I know of no evidence that he did so
with Hitler's authorization. I do know of evidence that he didn't.
> War with the UK was not a part of his plan.
At what time, and which plan? While he didn't seem to start out
WWII wanting to fight Britain, he had a pretty strong sense of
revenge.
He wanted Germany to
> control the Continent, with conquered countries still ruling themselves,
> and the British to rule the rest via the Empire.
Well, that was at least the public position at one point.
This view was to
> counter the rapid economic growth of the USA.
Something you have not provided any support for. Your postings do
not count, and if it's in Tooze I'd want at least the chapter reference.
If the economic power of
> the USA declined, Hitler would have been quite happy to keep it as it was.
>
Keep what as it was? Hitler wanted conquests in the East, and the
humiliation of France. I believe you'll find that in the first part
of Tooze, actually.
> Terms? The status quo and probably a peace pact.
You're just guessing here. Nobody knows for sure, since there was
absolutely no serious movement towards peace, and I trust your
guesses less than most.
Germany knew the Brits
> would not accept any interference from them in their own affairs.
Sure about that? The Reichstag speech may just have been political
posturing, but then again, maybe not. Got any actual evidence to
support your claim?
> Operation Sealion was a ruse to get the UK to the peace table.
Pure speculation on your part, against all the evidence I've seen,
and I've read a bit about this operation. Got any support for
this?
The
> Brits were not having it and saw it for what it was as the Germans
> didn't have a cat in hells chance of a successful landing in the UK.
The British knew what sort of chance the Germans had. That doesn't
mean it was a ruse. The reason the Germans had no chance was that
the British were ready and waiting.
> During the so-called Battle of Britain, the RN had a mass of ships at
> Gibraltar ready for offensive operations against the Italians.
Yup.
Do you know what the German Navy was, operationally, at that point?
The single battleship the Brits kept in Portsmouth was quite able to
handle everything the Germans had on the surface, and the four
flotillas of destroyers were also. I'm not counting Home Fleet,
which had additional powerful ships.
In other words, the British kept *plenty* of naval force at home,
all they needed with a good deal to spare.
Also 55
> tanks were sent to North Africa too.
Assuming they did so, that's maybe two weeks of production.
If you read Churchill's memoirs, he says that he was prepared
to defeat tens of thousands of Germans if they invaded,
presumably even if they arrived with weapons and not half-dead
from seasickness.
In other words, the British kept plenty of force at home, all they
needed.
That is how seriously the UK took
> any invasion attempt.
Right. Keep overwhelming force at home, and send forces over and
above that to a potential combat theater. Makes sense to me.
The RN continued the blockade of Germany.
>
And what were the Germans supposed to do about that? Sortie with two
or three heavy cruisers, and blast their way through Home Fleet or
the Channel defenses?
At that point in the war, Bismarck was not yet available, Scharnhorst
and Gneisenau under repair from the Norway operation, two of six
heavy cruisers sunk, two of six light cruisers sunk (and only five
of those could be considered modern warships), a large number of their
destroyers sunk at Narvik. I don't know what the repair status on
the rest of the ships was, but it wasn't real good.
So, with the navy whittled to almost nothing, and the army incapable
of crossing with enough force to win, the only threats were the U-boats
and the air force. The Brits were therefore sparing about sending
the RAF overseas (I don't know of any significant deployment of
Spitfires outside the UK until the second half of 1942), and kept
building escort vessels.
mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net
> War with the UK was not a part of his plan.
So, he wasn't good with plans?
Couldn't think through the consequences of his actions?
Mike
Rich Rostrom
>At that point in the war, Bismarck was not yet available, Scharnhorst
>and Gneisenau under repair from the Norway operation, two of six
>heavy cruisers sunk, two of six light cruisers sunk (and only five
>of those could be considered modern warships)...
While EMDEN was an obsolete design, with guns
in single mounts including four beam mountings,
it was similar to a lot of British cruisers - the
C, D, and E classes, of which 22 were in service.
>I don't know what the repair status on
>the rest of the ships was, but it wasn't real good.
ADMIRAL SCHEER and LUTZOW were both in dockyard.
Destroyer Z.7 was in dockyard too, I'm told.
GRAF SPEE, of course, was sunk.
--
| People say "There's a Stradivarius for sale for a |
| million," and you say "Oh, really? What's wrong |
| with it?" - Yitzhak Perlman |
Cubdriver
<nospamher...@gmail.com> wrote:
>Well, at the same time Britain had no realistic ability to defeat Germany at
>this stage (June 1940). And as for Hitler's offer maybe it was like an
>initial market bazaar offer. Wouldn't a more tempting offer - of an end to
>hostilities, Britain remains the same, can keep its empire, we won't touch
>you if you won't touch us - have made a more favorable impression? Just
>speculating.
June 1940 is early days. Hitler still thought Britain could be
defeated by the Luftwaffe or if necessary by invasion. A year later,
he might well have settled for something along that line.
Of course, he wouldn't have honored the agreement any more than he
honored the non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union.
Blue skies! -- Dan Ford
Claire Chennault and His American Volunteers, 1941-1942
new from HarperCollins www.FlyingTigersBook.com
Robert Sveinson
>> Numerous times through various ways.
"After Dunkirk, when practically all channels of
reliable information about Britain dried up, the myth
of a widespread movement to oust Churchill and the
Government coupled with rumours of general unrest
and panic obsessed Hitler and his associates. More fuel
was added to this fire by the ever watchful British secret
service, which deliberately allowed certain elements to
continue sending messages of the right type through
neutral embassies and via Dublin.
On June 19th and 23rd the German foreign Office
noted that according to Swedish sources certain
authoritative circles in London were prepared to come
to terms. The naval staff war diary on July 21st recorded
that there seemed to be a strong group in England who
wished to know armistice terms. Winston Churchill's
pugnacity damped German hopes but they still looked
for a change of heart. This was clearly shown in Hitler's
speech to the Reichstag on July 19th in which he
launched once again 'an appeal for reason'. He followed
it up with a shower of speech reprints from Luftwaffe
aircraft at the beginning of August which served only
to give as much amusement to English householders as
doubtless had the RAF 'bombflet' raids to the
German hausfrau in 1939."
Ref: The Narrow Margin by Derek Wood and Derek Dempster.
L2008
news:S_WdnZWQu7M82_nV...@posted.visi...
> L2008 wrote:
>> Numerous times through various ways.
>
> Got sources for those attempts? Descriptions?
>
> Hitler could not be seen to back
>> down in his eyes. Rudolph Hess even parachuted in to make peace.
>>
> Hess was mentally unstable,
He wasn't. There is a good book on this point.
>> War with the UK was not a part of his plan.
>
> At what time, and which plan? While
> he didn't seem to start out WWII wanting
> to fight Britain, he had a pretty strong sense of
> revenge.
He couldn't understand why a fellow Aryan race, of which he admired, wanted
to fight him and not see the world as he did. Hitler wanted USA business
out of Europe, but the UK were for free trade - the UK owned large sections
of USA industry.
Revenge was for the bombings of the cities - why he bombed London and not
concentrating on strategic cities like Liverpool.
>> He wanted Germany to control the Continent,
>> with conquered countries still ruling themselves,
>> and the British to rule the rest via the Empire.
>
> Well, that was at least the public position at one point.
>
>> This view was to counter the rapid
>> economic growth of the USA.
>
> Something you have not provided
> any support for. Your postings do
> not count, and if it's in Tooze I'd want
> at least the chapter reference.
I gave it in one post.
>> If the economic power of
>> the USA declined, Hitler would have
>> been quite happy to keep it as it was.
>>
> Keep what as it was?
Him in control of the Continent and UK of its Empire in tight trade and
peace pact.
>> Terms? The status quo and probably a peace pact.
>
> You're just guessing here. Nobody knows
> for sure, since there was absolutely no
> serious movement towards peace, and I trust your
> guesses less than most.
The Germans did make about 5 approaches for peace with the UK.
>> Germany knew the Brits
>> would not accept any interference
>> from them in their own affairs.
The British would not. It is their nature.
>> Operation Sealion was a ruse
>> to get the UK to the peace table.
>
> Pure speculation on your part,
> against all the evidence I've seen,
> and I've read a bit about this operation.
If anyone thinks that operation was a serious attempt at an invasion they
are in cloud cuckoo land. Even German generals never took it seriously. An
invasion in concrete barges and no navy to speak of? Get real.
>> The Brits were not having it and
>> saw it for what it was as the Germans
>> didn't have a cat in hells chance of
>> a successful landing in the UK.
>
> The British knew what sort of chance
> the Germans had. That doesn't
> mean it was a ruse.
It was a clear ruse to opush the UK to the peace table.
> The reason the Germans had no chance was that
> the British were ready and waiting.
Which they knew all along. They knew the UK a large industry working 24/7
too. and the largest navy in the world to their virtually none.
>> During the so-called Battle of Britain,
>> the RN had a mass of ships at
>> Gibraltar ready for offensive operations
>> against the Italians.
>
> Yup.
The Brits were shivering in their boots at the Germans at the Germans
invading. Churchill wanted them to make an attempt to give them a bloody
nose.
> Do you know what the German Navy was, operationally, at that point?
> The single battleship the Brits kept in Portsmouth was quite able to
> handle everything the Germans had on the surface, and the four
> flotillas of destroyers were also. I'm not counting Home Fleet,
> which had additional powerful ships.
>
> In other words, the British kept *plenty* of naval force at home,
> all they needed with a good deal to spare.
>
>> Also 55 tanks were sent to North Africa too.
>
> Assuming they did so,
They did.
> that's maybe two weeks of production.
If an invasion is imminent and you think they may have a chance, you do not
send 55 tanks away. The Brits knew the Germans had no chance at all, and
saw it for what it was - a ruse.
>> The RN continued the blockade of Germany.
>
> And what were the Germans supposed to
> do about that?
Not much as their navy was too small.
> At that point in the war, Bismarck was
> not yet available,
The RN blockade was successful all through WW2.
A C Brennan
recorded the following:
<L2008>
>> Brits were not having it and saw it for what it was as the Germans
>> didn't have a cat in hells chance of a successful landing in the UK.
>
> The British knew what sort of chance the Germans had. That doesn't mean
> it was a ruse. The reason the Germans had no chance was that the
> British were ready and waiting.
According to Guderian (in "Panzer Leader", and by pretty much any
historian to follow), Sea Lion (Zee Lowe?) could succeed only with
complete air superiority over and at least naval equality in the
Channel. Hence the "Battle of Britain," hard fought and clearly won by
Great Britain. Naval equality was a pipe dream, but a pipe smoked only
if the Luftwaffe could attain a decisive victory. Given the failure of
the prerequisite, there is really no point in debating the advanced study.
I don't believe it was a ruse. It was simply an overly ambitious plan.
narrl...@hotmail.com
> If anyone thinks that operation was a serious attempt at an invasion they
> are in cloud cuckoo land.
I've argued the impossibilty of a successful Sea Lion here many times,
but that doesn't mean that the attempt to prepare for the operation
wasn't serious, and that the Brits could afford to assume it was a
ruse.
Narr
Rich Rostrom
>According to Guderian (in "Panzer Leader", and by pretty much any
>historian to follow), Sea Lion (Zee Lowe?) could succeed only with
>complete air superiority over and at least naval equality in the
>Channel. Hence the "Battle of Britain," hard fought and clearly won by
>Great Britain.
Over at soc.history.what-if, Michele Armellini
has been detailing a scenario in which the Germans
do rather better in the BoB. One General Wever
is not killed in Spain, leading to improvements
in Luftwaffe training and production; Kesselring
is overall commander of the engaged Luftflotten;
the Germans hit the radar stations pretty hard,
and are not diverted to terror-bombing London.
All plausible improvements for the Germans -
but not enough to give the Germans what they
needed: complete destruction of the RAF, so
that not only would there be no air interference
with the invasion, German air attacks on British
warships threatening the invasion would be
unopposed.
Even with all these breaks, Michele found that
a plausible narrative only gave the Germans
a limited benefit. Fighter Command would still
have about 400 planes, and Bomber Command would
be almost untouched, while the German losses
be reduced by maybe 200 planes.
The Battle of Britain was won by the RAF in the
sense that the Luftwaffe failed to destroy the
RAF, and eventually called off its attacks.
In terms of losses it was more of a draw than
a decisive win for either side - but the Germans
couldn't use anything less than complete victory.
A C Brennan
the following:
> If anyone thinks that operation was a serious attempt at an invasion
> they are in cloud cuckoo land. Even German generals never took it
> seriously. An invasion in concrete barges and no navy to speak of? Get
> real.
Well, if I chose to ignore the wealth of data to the contrary, I could
easily believe that Sea Lion was only a half-hearted trick.
Unfortunately for that point of view, the Luftwaffe lost quite a bit of
strength and prestige by failing to defeat the RAF during the Battle of
Britain. Quite an expensive investment merely to support a political
feint.
Ignoring the Battle of Britain (now there's a leap of faith), there is
still sufficient history to support the belief that the invasion of
Britain was a war plan that was very close to being implemented. It is
interesting to contemplate that if the Luftwaffe had not suffered such a
decisive defeat, that the invasion may have actually commenced.
David H Thornley
> "David H Thornley" <da...@thornley.net> wrote in message
> news:S_WdnZWQu7M82_nV...@posted.visi...
>> Got sources for those attempts? Descriptions?
>>
I note that there is no reply to this. Apparently, they never took
place, except in your imagination.
>> Hess was mentally unstable,
>
> He wasn't. There is a good book on this point.
>
Which good book? Shall I go around digging up books that say he
was?
Did you ever see a picture of the Nuremburg defendants? Hess
stands out in them, looking rather crazy.
> He couldn't understand why a fellow Aryan race, of which he admired,
> wanted to fight him and not see the world as he did.
Probably correct.
> Revenge was for the bombings of the cities - why he bombed London and
> not concentrating on strategic cities like Liverpool.
>
Revenge was for anything and everything. Hitler was a vengeful person.
>> Something you have not provided
>> any support for. Your postings do
>
> I gave it in one post.
>
Which one? I'm not going to go through all of your past posts,
particularly since in most of the cases you have provided adequate
references for them to be evaluated you misstated or misunderstood
the writers.
[British-German peace terms]
>>
>> You're just guessing here. Nobody knows
>> for sure, since there was absolutely no
>> serious movement towards peace, and I trust your
>> guesses less than most.
>
> The Germans did make about 5 approaches for peace with the UK.
>
Name them.
Specify what terms the Germans were asking for in each of them.
>>> Operation Sealion was a ruse
>
> If anyone thinks that operation was a serious attempt at an invasion
> they are in cloud cuckoo land.
Or, alternately, they know something about it.
Even German generals never took it
> seriously. An invasion in concrete barges and no navy to speak of? Get
> real.
>
I am getting real. Not all German planners were. Hitler, for example,
was not always realistic.
Both the Army and Navy were doing the best they could to make up plans.
They had no hope for the invasion, but orders were orders.
> It was a clear ruse to opush the UK to the peace table.
>
Do you have any sort of evidence for this, or is it proof
by blatant assertion?
>> The reason the Germans had no chance was that
>> the British were ready and waiting.
>
> Which they knew all along. They knew the UK a large industry working
> 24/7 too. and the largest navy in the world to their virtually none.
>
Many Germans knew that. They weren't the ones making the go/no-go
decision.
Hitler was the one who committed Germany to trying Sea Lion. Is it
your argument that Hitler was always rational and did things based
on a firm grasp of reality?
>> In other words, the British kept *plenty* of naval force at home,
>> all they needed with a good deal to spare.
>>
>>> Also 55 tanks were sent to North Africa too.
>>
>> that's maybe two weeks of production.
>
> If an invasion is imminent and you think they may have a chance, you do
> not send 55 tanks away.
Precisely.
Read British accounts of the time. Churchill wrote that, the more
people knew, the less they feared. The Germans didn't have a chance,
and that's why Churchill felt he could release a few dozen tanks.
He had plenty more where they came from.
In short, the British were quite serious about being prepared for
invasion. They did quite a few things to prepare. With those
preparation, they were quite confident of winning decisively if
Germany tried to invade. They kept what they considered overwhelming
land and naval forces available.
If they thought it a ruse, why the extensive work on beach
defenses? Why organize the Army to be prepared to concentrate on
and destroy any German beachhead? Why keep significant naval forces
in the English Channel?
L2008
news:2ae50f71-6b06-48c7...@e53g2000hsa.googlegroups.com...
The Brits conclude two things:
1. It was a ruse (which it was)
2. The Germans are mad.
L2008
news:d4KdnTxZftVjOPjV...@comcast.com...
> On this day in history, Fri, 27 Jun 2008 11:09:22 -0400, L2008 recorded
> the following:
>
>
>> If anyone thinks that operation was a serious attempt at an invasion
>> they are in cloud cuckoo land. Even German generals never took it
>> seriously. An invasion in concrete barges and no navy to speak of? Get
>> real.
>
> Well, if I chose to ignore the wealth of data to the contrary, I could
> easily believe that Sea Lion was only a half-hearted trick.
> Unfortunately for that point of view, the Luftwaffe lost quite a bit of
> strength and prestige by failing to defeat the RAF during the Battle of
> Britain. Quite an expensive investment merely to support a political
> feint.
Goering thought his force invincible and wanted to lock horns - a sort of
game. Recall the Germans had no firm plans to invade the USSR at this
stage. If they did the air force would not be locked into a battle and all
kept for Barbarossa.
> Ignoring the Battle of Britain (now there's a leap of faith), there is
> still sufficient history to support the belief that the invasion of
> Britain was a war plan that was very close to being implemented. It is
> interesting to contemplate that if the Luftwaffe had not suffered such a
> decisive defeat, that the invasion may have actually commenced.
Raeder said he could not guarantee putting down an invasion force, even with
air superiority, when the RN was still there. Jodl take of his men going
through a British mincing machine.
The Germans were gamblers and it paid off attacking France, but were they
that stupid to do such a thing? Send all their forces all at once?
The British knew they would slaughter them if they tried. Did the Germans
think they could do it with such inadequate equipment and little navy to
speak of? When talking of peace as well? Nah!
L2008
news:rrostrom.21stcentury-...@news.isp.giganews.com...
> All plausible improvements for the Germans -
> but not enough to give the Germans what they
> needed: complete destruction of the RAF, so
> that not only would there be no air interference
> with the invasion, German air attacks on British
> warships threatening the invasion would be
> unopposed.
The RAF was large with a large bomber force, which the Germans could not
knock out. Any invasion at any point would be met at the beaches by all
types of aircraft. These could be based out of Me range. Also fighters
would still be produced at all times. There would always be top line
fighters around.
> The Battle of Britain was won by the RAF in the
> sense that the Luftwaffe failed to destroy the
> RAF, and eventually called off its attacks.
The BofB was rather one sided. It was to gain air superiority over southern
England. It was not a decisive battle not matter what the outcome. The
Germans were prevented from invading by the massive RN just being there.
David H Thornley
> The Brits conclude two things:
>
> 1. It was a ruse (which it was)
>
> 2. The Germans are mad.
>
You are unable to support anything you say, and have substituted
repetition for argument.
L2008
>>>> Operation Sealion was a ruse
>>
>> If anyone thinks that operation was a serious attempt at an invasion
>> they are in cloud cuckoo land.
>
> Or, alternately, they know something about it.
>
>> Even German generals never took it
>> seriously. An invasion in concrete barges and no navy to speak of? Get
>> real.
>>
> I am getting real. Not all German planners were. Hitler, for example,
> was not always realistic.
He tended to go on plans his generals proposed - the one for France. None
of them thought this was a winner.
> Both the Army and Navy were doing the best they could to make up plans.
> They had no hope for the invasion, but orders were orders.
It was still a ruse by Hitler.
>> It was a clear ruse to opush the UK to the peace table.
>>
> Do you have any sort of evidence for this, or is it proof
> by blatant assertion?
Observing facts at the time.
> Hitler was the one who committed Germany to trying Sea Lion. Is it
> your argument that Hitler was always rational and did things based
> on a firm grasp of reality?
It is? Mmmm
> In short, the British were quite serious about being prepared for
> invasion.
They have to be in case they were stupid enough to try.
> If they thought it a ruse, why the extensive work on beach
> defenses?
In case they were stupid enough to try.
> Why organize the Army to be prepared
> to concentrate on and destroy any German
> beachhead? Why keep significant naval forces
> in the English Channel?
Why keep half in Gib preparing for offensive operations against Italy?
David H Thornley
> "David H Thornley" <da...@thornley.net> wrote in message
> news:MMGdnTH6a5wSJvjV...@posted.visi...
>
>> was not always realistic.
>
> He tended to go on plans his generals proposed - the one for France.
> None of them thought this was a winner.
>
not something I'd think a general would have come up with. The
later ones started to show more flexibility.
Now, if you want to see him overriding his best military advisors,
take a look at German rearmament. Hitler forced that. The generals
overall thought it should go slower, so Hitler forced the pace.
Hitler was never all that reluctant to assume he knew better than
the top commanders, even early in WWII. Even earlier than that.
Overriding generals was significantly less frequent before 1943,
but it did happen.
>>> It was a clear ruse to opush the UK to the peace table.
>>>
>> Do you have any sort of evidence for this, or is it proof
>> by blatant assertion?
>
> Observing facts at the time.
>
That is a very interesting statement.
Obviously, somebody who would have been able to observe German
intentions would have had to be old enough, in 1940, to actually
deal with Hitler and the top commanders - say, 40.
Therefore, by your statement, you'd have to be something like 108
years old.
Otherwise, you were either not observing facts, or not at the
time. Probably both, actually.
However, if you mean you weren't there at the time, you're observing
the wrong facts. The facts you are looking at seem to indicate
(correctly) that the Germans didn't have a chance. That says nothing
about Sealion being a ruse or not.
You can look at what the top commanders were saying. Hitler was
very definite about preparing for an invasion, and I believe that
holds for his conversations in private.
You can look at what they were doing, which among other things
meant stripping the Rhine of river barges, and messing up the
German economy for months. The Germans were not naive enough
to think that they had to use real, unsuitable, equipment at
great cost just to run a ruse. Heck, the Brits were expecting
an invasion on their eastern shores, not having seen a landing
craft buildup in France. That would have served well as a ruse.
So, based on what Hitler was saying, and what the Germans were
actually doing, the obvious conclusion is that they were serious
about the invasion. Equally obviously, from the situation, they
only had a very slight chance, and only if the Luftwaffe was
able to take air supremacy and the Brits screwed up royally
and followed it up with a panic.
To summarize the situation, the Germans had no hope of controlling
the sea, so they'd have to be very lucky to evade the RN. They had
nothing resembling decent landing craft, or enough boats, so
if the RN all went to a hot vacation spot like Tahiti the Germans
would have to be extremely lucky to land a coherent invasion force.
Note that the barges would almost certainly spend time crossing
the Channel at night, so the Luftwaffe, to protect the crossing,
would have to be able to hit British destroyers hard at night, so
they'd pretty much need infrared or radar terminally guided munitions.
Now, assuming the Germans crossed the Channel somehow, and were
able to keep the line of supply open (yeah, right), they'd face
numerous if not really well-armed defenders, fighting from prepared
positions with desperation spurring them on. Obviously, then,
the Germans would have to get something like two armies over, and
keep them supplied.
This means that the British would have had to completely fail in
their port demolition program, as well as completely fail to
interdict German supply runs. (Alternately, and with roughly
the same plausibility, the Germans could have made megatons of
gelatin mix, and create a Jell-O causeway that could be plated
over.)
>> In short, the British were quite serious about being prepared for
>> invasion.
>
> They have to be in case they were stupid enough to try.
>
That's actually a true statement. Congratulations.
> Why keep half in Gib preparing for offensive operations against Italy?
>
[lots of the navy, although not half the naval forces]
Because they didn't need it for home defense.
As explained, the German navy was at a very weak point then, and the
RN was very large. At that time, it was the largest in the world.
Therefore, the RN could keep enough force in home waters to absolutely
overwhelm anything the Germans could do, and have plenty left to oppose
the Italians.
L2008
> L2008 wrote:
>> The Brits conclude two things:
>>
>> 1. It was a ruse (which it was)
>>
>> 2. The Germans are mad.
>>
> I conclude one thing.
>
> You are unable to support anything you say, and have substituted
> repetition for argument.
What you mean is that you don't agree.
L2008
> The facts you are looking at seem to indicate
> (correctly) that the Germans didn't have a chance.
> That says nothing about Sealion being a ruse or not.
Even top German generals were saying it will not work. Hitler was talking
peace and the UK was not talking to him. A big threat of invasion may focus
their minds - in Hitler's mind. Germany even went into a luxury house
building programme after the fall of France.
> You can look at what the top
> commanders were saying. Hitler was
> very definite about preparing for
> an invasion, and I believe that
> holds for his conversations in private.
The invasion preparation were real. Sort of schoolboyish and did not have a
hope in hell of being successful. It was to push British public opinion for
peace - the top military men, on both sides, knew they could not succeed.
>>> In short, the British were quite serious about being prepared for
>>> invasion.
>>
>> They have to be in case they were stupid enough to try.
>>
> That's actually a true statement. Congratulations.
>
>> Why keep half in Gib preparing for offensive operations against Italy?
>>
> [lots of the navy, although not half the naval forces]
>
> Because they didn't need it for home defence.
Because no invasion was coming. The Brits never took it as seriously as
some may think. The British saw the invasion threat as a way of uniting the
people - Churchill loved this. Backs to the wall, triumph out of adversity,
etc. Unite the people - a difficult thing to do in a rigid class structured
UK. Anderson air raid shelters were built a great cost. The government knew
the shelters could not sustain a direct hit and still built them, to great
cost, to maintain morale. Preparing for the invasion that they knew was not
coming had many advantages: keeping forces on their toes, public morale and
awareness raised.
The British used this invasion ruse to great effect - greater effect than
the Germans. The myth of only the RAF and a handful of fighters, between us
an invasion is still perpetrated today. The myth is slowly being broken.
After Dunkirk many wanted to talk peace - after all it wasn't the UKs war,
as the UK was not directly threatened. Churchill's greatest achievement was
unifying a nation that had no stomach for war after the carnage of the Great
War only 20 years previously. He turned the nation into a fully mobilised
total war machine. So much so, not one German agent operated successfully
in the UK, the country was so vigilant.
> As explained, the German navy was at a very weak point then, and the
> RN was very large. At that time, it was the largest in the world.
> Therefore, the RN could keep enough force in home waters to absolutely
> overwhelm anything the Germans could do, and have plenty left to oppose
> the Italians.
If an invasion is about to be launched you have all you ships ready, front
line and reserve, to smash the hell out of the invasion fleet. Stop it in
its tracks by brute force. If the first wave is obliterated, they will not
launch the second.
David H Thornley
> "David H Thornley" <da...@thornley.net> wrote in message
> news:IZCdneLD2a_WKPrV...@posted.visi...
>
Correct.
Hitler was
> talking peace and the UK was not talking to him.
[citation needed]
In other words, I am completely unaware of any real peace talk Hitler
made. The closest I know of is the Reichstag speech, which the UK
didn't recognize as any sort of peace offering.
A big threat of
> invasion may focus their minds - in Hitler's mind. Germany even went
> into a luxury house building programme after the fall of France.
>
Okay, where did you get that? I've gotten to that point in reading
your favorite source, and I haven't noticed anything like that.
> The invasion preparation were real. Sort of schoolboyish and did not
> have a hope in hell of being successful. It was to push British public
> opinion for peace - the top military men, on both sides, knew they could
> not succeed.
>
First hint: Repetition is not proof.
Second hint: You've never supplied any evidence for this, whatsoever.
Third hint: Since this is contrary to everything I've ever read,
except for your claims, I'm not going to believe you unless you can
supply some evidence. Neither is anybody else, since they've all
read the same sorts of things that I have.
>
>> [lots of the navy, although not half the naval forces]
>>
>> Because they didn't need it for home defence.
>
> Because no invasion was coming.
In which case, why keep a battleship and four destroyer flotillas
in the Channel? Seriously?
The British were very short of destroyers at this point, and four
whole flotillas took dozens of destroyers. Dozens of destroyers
that could have been used securing the Western Approaches from
U-boats (you might remember that 1940 was the "First Happy Time"
for the U-boat captains), or escorting the fleet.
This was the period in which the Brits were very happy to get
their hands on fifty US flush-deck destroyers, considerably
inferior to their late WWI models.
The battleship wasn't all that important, but the destroyers were.
The British would not have kept them in the Channel if they thought
they weren't needed.
The Brits never took it as seriously as
> some may think.
Wrong. The British took it plenty seriously. They were very
confident of winning, should the Germans try, but that was because
they put a great deal of effort into making sure of that.
The Brits also rigged their own ports for demolition, which created
potential problems, but which would guarantee the Germans couldn't
possibly be adequately supplied.
Lots of destroyers held back, lots of work on preparing to repel
an invasion, etc. This was not a phony effort; it was a real
project to repel an invasion seen as quite possible.
> and still built them, to great cost, to maintain morale. Preparing for
> the invasion that they knew was not coming had many advantages: keeping
> forces on their toes, public morale and awareness raised.
>
It also meant a great deal of effort, danger (rigging ports for
demolition is not a trivial exercise), and sunk merchant ships.
> After Dunkirk many wanted to talk peace - after all it wasn't the UKs
> war, as the UK was not directly threatened.
Not directly threatened by invasion, but threatened in power. Britain
could yield to Germany, at the cost of ceasing to be a Great Power
and forswearing any attempt to liberate Western Europe.
However, if you've read Tooze, you may have noticed that the economic
situation was favorable to the British, who were counting on US help.
This means that the British had an excellent chance of winning, if they
didn't lose first. As they couldn't actually lose unless they made
serious mistakes, what was the point in yielding?
After all, it's not as if Hitler was offering anything in the way of a
reasonable peace - and if you disagree with that, please provide some
details so we can track it down.
>> As explained, the German navy was at a very weak point then, and the
>> RN was very large. At that time, it was the largest in the world.
>> Therefore, the RN could keep enough force in home waters to absolutely
>> overwhelm anything the Germans could do, and have plenty left to oppose
>> the Italians.
>
> If an invasion is about to be launched you have all you ships ready,
> front line and reserve, to smash the hell out of the invasion fleet.
No. You have enough ships to smash the hell out of the invasion fleet.
You don't have to have all your ships ready if you don't need all of
them.
You do keep enough ships to be absolutely sure of smashing the hell
out of the invasion fleet, no matter what it actually costs. For
example, if four flotillas of destroyers are considered to be
enough, then no matter how desperately they are needed elsewhere
they will be held ready.
The RN had absolutely no need for all its forces, given the very
limited forces the Germans could field for the operation. Why not
use the unneeded forces elsewhere, where they'd be useful?
> Stop it in its tracks by brute force. If the first wave is obliterated,
> they will not launch the second.
>
Pity about that; the RN had the ability to sink everything the Germans
sent out on the surface, with what the RN had available in the area,
so if the Germans sent more waves that was all the better for the
British.
David H Thornley
> "David H Thornley" <da...@thornley.net> wrote in message
> news:hLWdnSXu74Ech_rV...@posted.visi...
>>
>> You are unable to support anything you say, and have substituted
>> repetition for argument.
>
> What you mean is that you don't agree.
>
before, given quite a few years of reading about WWII, and you never
provide any evidence. On the rare occasions you do provide
some sort of cite, it's either been a reference to vague to be
useful (such as "Tooze"), or a more specific reference that, on
examination, doesn't say what you claim it does.
Since I, and others, have asked repeatedly for references, and not
getting relevant ones, the obvious conclusion is that you do not
have any support for your arguments. If you did have support, you
would presumably have brought it up by now.
I don't think I've agreed all the time with any group regular,
and yet I have a good deal of respect for them. They provide
arguments and references when appropriate, and do not simply
repeat themselves.
I know what I mean when I say I don't agree with someone. That
isn't what I meant about you.
Besides, either you're claiming to be a telepath, or you must
disclaim any particular knowledge of what I mean by what I write.
Michele
>> Because no invasion was coming.
>
> In which case, why keep a battleship and four destroyer flotillas
> in the Channel? Seriously?
>
> The British were very short of destroyers at this point, and four
> whole flotillas took dozens of destroyers. Dozens of destroyers
> that could have been used securing the Western Approaches from
> U-boats (you might remember that 1940 was the "First Happy Time"
> for the U-boat captains), or escorting the fleet.
While I agree with everything else you wrote (and I wonder at your patience
in answering to that time-wasting guy), I'd like to point out a detail: the
destroyers in Plymouth had a double job. On the one hand they mostly served
in securing the final stretch of the Western Approaches. On the other hand,
had a serious pre-invasion alarm been sounded (and it would be sounded; the
Germans had no way to get across the Channel by surprise, the British would
have known it days in advance), they were, well, in the Channel.
L2008
> L2008 wrote:
>> "David H Thornley" <da...@thornley.net> wrote in message
>> news:hLWdnSXu74Ech_rV...@posted.visi...
>>> I conclude one thing.
>>>
>>> You are unable to support anything you say, and have substituted
>>> repetition for argument.
>>
>> What you mean is that you don't agree.
>>
> No, what I mean is that you have
> been making claims I've never seen
> before,
Few WW2 authors have assessed the strategic aspect of the war properly. AJP
Taylor and Tooze are two that have. AJP Taylor was shunned at Oxford Uni
for his views. Tooze's newish book, has some recent unearthed research into
it. They look at the motives for the war and the feasibility of Germany to
achieve anything based on strength and economies. German gains were
achieved by wild gambles with all forces committed and no reserves, that
paid off. Few top generals around the world would engage in such wild plans.
These gains were not conclusive although spectacular. Tooze is acclaimed by
all leading historians on WW2.
These two authors do not go on the Hollywood and propaganda versions of
history. Tooze hit many nails on the head sharply. Others, like Keegan, are
good fillers. Others concentrate on tactical and operational matters.
Some people on here have an attitude problem. When someone turns on its
head their "traditional" views of WW2, they demand chapter and verse. I have
given on occasions and they still come back with the same indoctrinated
views. Some demand the same chapter and verse a few weeks later. It is not
worth it. I will just give the books and authors and let them read them -
even then they only read what they want to read. Many claim to have read
Tooze, yet the prime points of Tooze clearly flit over their heads.
Repetition and assertion may be successful in these cases.
L2008
> L2008 wrote:
>> "David H Thornley" <da...@thornley.net> wrote in message
>> news:IZCdneLD2a_WKPrV...@posted.visi...
>>
>> Even top German generals were saying it will not work.
>
> Correct.
>
> Hitler was
>> talking peace and the UK was not talking to him.
>
> [citation needed]
> In other words, I am completely unaware of any real peace talk Hitler
> made. The closest I know of is the Reichstag speech, which the UK
> didn't recognize as any sort of peace offering.
>
> A big threat of
>> invasion may focus their minds - in Hitler's mind. Germany even went
>> into a luxury house building programme after the fall of France.
>>
> Okay, where did you get that? I've gotten to that point in reading
> your favorite source, and I haven't noticed anything like that.
The house building programme was mentiond by Tooze. This indicates the
Germans winged it (as AJP Taylor insisted decades ago) and acted as events
unfolded. The 50,000 US planes, and those the UK would build, was paramount
in Hitler's mind and affected his decision making.
>> The invasion preparation were real. Sort of schoolboyish and did not
>> have a hope in hell of being successful. It was to push British public
>> opinion for peace - the top military men, on both sides, knew they could
>> not succeed.
>
> First hint: Repetition is not proof.
What didn't you understand? I'll go through it for you.
"The invasion preparation were real."
They were.
"Sort of schoolboyish"
Concrete barges and no navy? schoolboyish? Yes.
"and did not have a hope in hell of being successful."
They would have been slaughtered.
"It was to push British public opinion for peace"
Which it was.
"- the top military men, on both sides, knew they could not succeed."
Which is correct.
> Second hint: You've never supplied
> any evidence for this, whatsoever.
I'll name all the WW2 books for you if you want.
>>> [lots of the navy, although not half the naval forces]
>>>
>>> Because they didn't need it for home defence.
>>
>> Because no invasion was coming.
>
> In which case, why keep a battleship
> and four destroyer flotillas
> in the Channel? Seriously?
In case they were foolish to try. They were foolish to attack France on
plan, with no reserves, and if the logistics broke down for any reason would
founder. The Germans were foolish to attack any of the major powers at the
time - they took gambles that paid off. The Brits were prepared for their
gambles by then.
> The British were very short of destroyers at this point, and four
> whole flotillas took dozens of destroyers. Dozens of destroyers
> that could have been used securing the Western Approaches from
> U-boats (you might remember that 1940 was the "First Happy Time"
> for the U-boat captains), or escorting the fleet.
In 1940 the U-Boat threat was no so great at all.
> This was the period in which the Brits were very happy to get
> their hands on fifty US flush-deck destroyers, considerably
> inferior to their late WWI models.
That was more a political deal than anything and few of those old tubs were
used.
>> The Brits never took it as seriously as
>> some may think.
>
> Wrong. The British took it plenty seriously.
So seriously half the home fleet was in Gib.
> Lots of destroyers held back, lots of work on preparing to repel
> an invasion, etc. This was not a phony effort; it was a real
> project to repel an invasion seen as quite possible.
and unified the people into a war mentality, which Churchill was doing very
well.
> > and still built them, to great cost, to maintain morale. Preparing for
>> the invasion that they knew was not coming had many advantages: keeping
>> forces on their toes, public morale and awareness raised.
>>
> It also meant a great deal of effort,
> danger (rigging ports for
> demolition is not a trivial exercise),
> and sunk merchant ships.
You missed the point.
>> After Dunkirk many wanted to talk peace - after all it wasn't the UKs
>> war, as the UK was not directly threatened.
>
> Not directly threatened by invasion,
> but threatened in power.
The UK had no power over Continental Europe. The UK has always turned its
back on Europe and faced the open sea.
> However, if you've read Tooze, you may have noticed that the economic
> situation was favorable to the British, who were counting on US help.
> This means that the British had an excellent chance of winning, if they
> didn't lose first. As they couldn't actually lose unless they made
> serious mistakes, what was the point in yielding?
At no time could the UK lose WW2. The US pre-WW2 supplied a lot of
foodstuffs and raw materials to the UK - wheat and animal feed was cheaper
from the US, although could be grown in the UK. When war breaks out, the
US miraculously is then supplying the UK war effort by exporting what it has
done for decades.
The UK wanted the war over quickly and relied on US industry to supply some
of the equipment, as the lead time to build the factories and train the
skills would be long - not to mention the expense of doing so.
> After all, it's not as if Hitler was
> offering anything in the way of a
> reasonable peace - and if you disagree
> with that, please provide some
> details so we can track it down.
Hitler wanted peace - the terms would be negotiated.
>> If an invasion is about to be launched
>> you have all your ships ready,
>> front line and reserve, to smash the
>> hell out of the invasion fleet.
>
> No. You have enough ships to
> smash the hell out of the invasion fleet.
> You don't have to have all your ships ready
> if you don't need all of them.
You need reserves
> The RN had absolutely no need
> for all its forces, given the very
> limited forces the Germans could
> field for the operation. Why not
> use the unneeded forces elsewhere,
> where they'd be useful?
The Germans used all their forces, with no reserves, to attack France. They
could do the same with an invasion sending all over at once. All this has
to be considered.
>> Stop it in its tracks by brute force.
>> If the first wave is obliterated,
>> they will not launch the second.
>>
> Pity about that; the RN had the ability
> to sink everything the Germans
> sent out on the surface, with what
> the RN had available in the area,
The effect of aircraft was considered very real.
Rich Rostrom
>In 1940 the U-Boat threat was no so great at all.
In the first 4 months of 1940, the U-boats were
comparatively ineffective, sinking only 77 ships
of 326K tons, while losing 13 boats.
But in the last 8 months of 1940, the Germans sank
745 Allied ships of 3.1M tons, while losing only
10 U-boats, while boats in service increased from
58 to 88.
This period saw the highest ratios of ships sunk
(by numbers or tonnage) to U-boats in service of
the entire war.
(NOTE: U-boats in service defined as launched
but not sunk or written off. This includes boats
not completed or still working up - but it is at
least a rigorous number.)
Rich
> (NOTE: U-boats in service defined as launched
> but not sunk or written off. This includes boats
> not completed or still working up - but it is at
> least a rigorous number.)
Hi Rich,
To be even more rigorous, in terms of fleet boats (Typ-VII, IX, and
UA) in operational flotillas (the Ducks were all more or less
withdrawn from operational service by the end of April), on 1 January
1940 the KM had 19 and on 1 January 1941 they had 20. During 1940 the
monthly average operational was 18.75. That is with 23 new boats
becoming operational, 17 sunk, and five retired.
BTW.how refreshing to be able to reply to someone exhibiting an IQ
somewhat more than a radish. :)
Rich
L2008
news:rrostrom.21stcentury-...@news.isp.giganews.com...
>
>>In 1940 the U-Boat threat was no so great at all.
>
> In the first 4 months of 1940, the U-boats were
> comparatively ineffective, sinking only 77 ships
> of 326K tons, while losing 13 boats.
>
> But in the last 8 months of 1940, the Germans sank
> 745 Allied ships of 3.1M tons, while losing only
> 10 U-boats, while boats in service increased from
> 58 to 88.
>
> This period saw the highest ratios of ships sunk
> (by numbers or tonnage) to U-boats in service of
> the entire war.
You may find that UK shipbuilding was still outstripping losses. The losses
were mainly outdated slow tubs, while new ships were fast and difficult to
sink. My uncle died on one of the tubs, being sunk by a U-Boat 500 mile
east of Cape Race.
David H Thornley
>> No, what I mean is that you have
>> been making claims I've never seen
>> before,
>
> Few WW2 authors have assessed the strategic aspect of the war properly.
> AJP Taylor and Tooze are two that have. AJP Taylor was shunned at
> Oxford Uni for his views.
Unfortunate; all he did was try to consider the prewar diplomatic
situation objectively. Later research has confirmed some of his
earlier claims (see, for example, Montefiore's "Red Tsar" about
the negotiations with the Soviet Union). Since his message was
that (a) Hitler didn't get to where he got by being evil (although
I never saw him denying that Hitler was evil), and (b) prewar
British and French diplomacy was really bad, almost as incompetent
as US diplomacy of the time, he faced some rough going.
Tooze's newish book, has some recent unearthed
> research into it.
I have been reading it.
They look at the motives for the war and the
> feasibility of Germany to achieve anything based on strength and
> economies. German gains were achieved by wild gambles with all forces
> committed and no reserves, that paid off. Few top generals around the
> world would engage in such wild plans. These gains were not conclusive
> although spectacular. Tooze is acclaimed by all leading historians on WW2.
>
No argument.
> These two authors do not go on the Hollywood and propaganda versions of
> history.
There's plenty of authors who do not go on the Hollywood and propaganda
versions. You have mentioned two. On the other hand, somebody who
is going with the conventional wisdom may well be correct; the
conventional wisdom is going to be correct on quite a few things.
> Some people on here have an attitude problem. When someone turns on its
> head their "traditional" views of WW2, they demand chapter and verse.
Do you think that's an attitude problem? You're telling them not
only that they're wrong, but that a good many excellent historians
are wrong, in many of these cases. I'd call it a lack of gullibility
myself. If you're going to insist that you're right and I'm wrong,
you aren't going to convince me without some sort of evidence.
I
> have given on occasions and they still come back with the same
> indoctrinated views.
Right - because the cites you gave do not support what you said
that is controversial. Some of the things you said about Sealion
seem to come straight from Tooze, and those agree with other things
I've read, so I agree with them. Your claims that Sea Lion was a
ruse that the British didn't take seriously are not supported by
the relevant part of Tooze, and are in disagreement with other books
I have read. In order to accept those claims, I need some sort
of evidence. Since you're contradicting some people who actually
researched this, I need good evidence.
If you want to suggest that maybe Sea Lion was a ruse, that's one thing.
We can discuss it and try to come up with evidence one way or another.
If you claim that it was, and do not provide good support, you're
going to do nothing except annoy people who do know something about
history.
Some demand the same chapter and verse a few weeks
> later. It is not worth it. I will just give the books and authors and
> let them read them - even then they only read what they want to read.
I'm currently reading Tooze. I am not finding support for lots
of things you claimed. Got another source?
> Many claim to have read Tooze, yet the prime points of Tooze clearly
> flit over their heads.
They fly over somebody's head, anyway.
Repetition and assertion may be successful in
> these cases.
>
Wrong. Completely wrong. By just making unsupported claims, and
repeating them again and again, you look like an opinionated
turkey who can't think and won't realize that fact. If you aren't
such a turkey, you're doing a really excellent job of making
yourself look like one.
mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net
> Few WW2 authors have assessed the strategic aspect of the war properly. AJP
Gilbert did an admirable job; much of the strategy of the allies was
based on the fact that the allies were reading almost the entire German
communications, and could adjust accordingly.
> Taylor and Tooze are two that have. AJP Taylor was shunned at Oxford Uni
> for his views. Tooze's newish book, has some recent unearthed research into
> it. They look at the motives for the war and the feasibility of Germany to
> achieve anything based on strength and economies. German gains were
> achieved by wild gambles with all forces committed and no reserves, that
Few reserves; however, this is hardly news, and if you'd read any other
books, you'd realize this was (eg) published in the 1960s.
> Some people on here have an attitude problem.
Yes, some here ask for citations, and a few relevant quotes.
Others simply make vague statements, and demonstrate no understanding of
questions asked of them.
> head their "traditional" views of WW2, they demand chapter and verse. I have
> given on occasions and they still come back with the same indoctrinated
Uh, no; you have not given chapter and verse ANYWHERE.
Mike
David H Thornley
>>>>
>> Okay, where did you get that? I've gotten to that point in reading
>> your favorite source, and I haven't noticed anything like that.
>
> The house building programme was mentiond by Tooze.
Okay, it may be in a chapter I haven't read yet. Could you tell
me which chapter?
> events unfolded. The 50,000 US planes, and those the UK would build,
> was paramount in Hitler's mind and affected his decision making.
>
Tooze notes that the US threat affected Hitler's decision making, and
that he was actually pretty realistic about the threat, but I didn't
see anything that implied that the US threat was paramount in Hitler's
mind, let alone just the aircraft.
The US also had the second largest navy in the world (pretty close
behind the RN), and the potential of raising an enormous and well-
equipped army.
>> First hint: Repetition is not proof.
>
> What didn't you understand? I'll go through it for you.
>
> "The invasion preparation were real."
>
> They were.
>
Good; we're agreed on that.
That does suggest that the invasion wasn't a ruse. Fake preparations
would have served that purpose well enough.
> "Sort of schoolboyish"
>
> Concrete barges and no navy? schoolboyish? Yes.
>
Schoolboyish is not the term I would have used, but it's good enough.
> "and did not have a hope in hell of being successful."
>
> They would have been slaughtered.
>
Certainly.
> "It was to push British public opinion for peace"
>
> Which it was.
>
Sure about that? Got any support? It looks to me like it was an
attempt to conquer Britain. Not a *good* attempt, but an attempt.
We both know that Hitler was going through a long series of gambles
at that time, and this time he lost.
> "- the top military men, on both sides, knew they could not succeed."
>
> Which is correct.
>
Correct. Hitler is not a top military man, by this definition.
Churchill did know how likely the invasion was to succeed, and
from what I can tell rather wanted to see it tried.
Now, the reason the British knew it wasn't going to work was
that they prepared for it. They stationed overwhelming
force in the Channel, rigged ports for demolition, built
defensive works, and had elaborate plans.
>> Second hint: You've never supplied
>> any evidence for this, whatsoever.
>
"This" refers to the claims that the invasion was a ruse, and that
Churchill knew that.
> I'll name all the WW2 books for you if you want.
>
Please do. I do want to see where you've gotten these conclusions.
>> In which case, why keep a battleship
>> and four destroyer flotillas
>> in the Channel? Seriously?
>
> In case they were foolish to try.
Bingo! That's precisely it.
The British had to take the threat seriously, in case the Germans
did try. The top people were very confident of winning, and that
Hitler would suffer a serious defeat and morale issues if he tried.
They were foolish to attack France on
> plan, with no reserves, and if the logistics broke down for any reason
> would founder.
Much less foolish, in any event. They were working with their
military strong points, basically mobile combined-arms operations
with battlefield air support, and the logistics issues were far more
solvable.
The Germans were foolish to attack any of the major
> powers at the time - they took gambles that paid off. The Brits were
> prepared for their gambles by then.
>
We need to consider the context of the gambles.
If Hitler had not gambled on a possible war with Britain and France,
he would have had to back down. This would have caused the German
economy to go pretty much into collapse, probably sometime in 1940,
maybe 1941. You can figure this out from Tooze.
This would have greatly cut down on armaments production, just like
Tooze describes in 1939 and (IIRC) 1937. It wouldn't have stopped
the British and French rearmament.
In other words, 1939 and 1940 were as good chances to attack as Hitler
was going to get. He had to go to war then, or not at all, and he had
to make war pay for itself in some way.
Hitler considered that to be a dead loss for Germany. He believed that
Germany had to conquer or die, and given his twisted view of history
this was logical. Therefore, he had to go to war sometime; loss in
a war would be no worse than not having a war.
Once in a war with France and Britain, Tooze points out that he needed
a quick win, and shows that Hitler was correct in believing the war
could only be won by fast offensive action.
So, Hitler considered Germany to be in an extremely bad situation before
going to war, and that even desperate measures would be required. He
also had all that Nazi pseudo-scientific nonsense to assure him that
victory could be achieved by the determination and self-sacrifice of
true Aryan men.
In this context, gambling made sense. If you've got some sort of
illness that's going to kill you in a few years, and the only way to
treat it is an operation that's probably going to kill you but might
cure you, you probably should go for it, and schedule it for when
the (low) chance of success is at its highest. This is the situation
Hitler believed Germany was in, and his decisions were therefore
pretty good, as long as you accept his premises and world view
(which I recommend against).
>> The British were very short of destroyers at this point, and four
>> whole flotillas took dozens of destroyers. Dozens of destroyers
>> that could have been used securing the Western Approaches from
>> U-boats (you might remember that 1940 was the "First Happy Time"
>> for the U-boat captains), or escorting the fleet.
>
> In 1940 the U-Boat threat was no so great at all.
>
Early 1940, no. Later in 1940, they were extremely successful.
If you get a look at tonnage leaders among U-boat captains
(Kretschmer was first), and see when they were active, you'll
notice that the top ones are almost all from 1940 or so.
The British definitely needed convoy escorts, and the corvettes
were not a good solution.
>> This was the period in which the Brits were very happy to get
>> their hands on fifty US flush-deck destroyers, considerably
>> inferior to their late WWI models.
>
> That was more a political deal than anything and few of those old tubs
> were used.
>
Actually, quite a few were used, although only for a year or so, as
the RN got better alternatives. They were serviceable destroyers,
and were used in pretty much all early war destroyer roles by the USN,
they were just inferior to a lot of other ships. As more British
destroyers were built, and frigates started to appear, there was no
point in keeping the flush-deckers in operation.
>> Wrong. The British took it plenty seriously.
>
> So seriously half the home fleet was in Gib.
>
Or elsewhere in the Med.
Anyway, the British fleet was *large*. So large that well over half
of it could go away, and the remainder would be perfectly capable
of defeating a German invasions.
>> Lots of destroyers held back, lots of work on preparing to repel
>> an invasion, etc. This was not a phony effort; it was a real
>> project to repel an invasion seen as quite possible.
>
> and unified the people into a war mentality, which Churchill was doing
> very well.
>
I find the idea that lots of destroyers were held back in order to
unify the people quite puzzling. That was a considerable real cost
for speculative gains.
>> It also meant a great deal of effort,
>> danger (rigging ports for
>> demolition is not a trivial exercise),
>> and sunk merchant ships.
>
> You missed the point.
>
No, I thought the point incorrect. There's a difference.
How were sunken merchant ships supposed to help British morale?
What the British needed, then, was encouragement that they could
make it. If the defenses were not intended to be used, the Brits
could have cut down on the destroyer flotillas in the Channel,
and that would have had good results elsewhere.
However, you said above that the British had to defend in case
the Germans were stupid enough to try - and that is correct.
The British didn't know that the Germans weren't going to try.
They didn't know what the Germans had. For much of this
period, they assumed that the Germans were amassing a large
invasion fleet in German ports, to operate against the East
coast of England, and that they simply couldn't get good info
on that. (After all, they did know what the Germans had in
the Channel, and it wasn't impressive at any time.)
>> Not directly threatened by invasion,
>> but threatened in power.
>
> The UK had no power over Continental Europe. The UK has always turned
> its back on Europe and faced the open sea.
>
Okay, give me a time when it did.
World War I? The Napoleonic Wars? Spanish Succession? Got any example
in reasonably modern times of a large war the British decided to sit
out?
British grand strategy for that period was based on the fact that, if
they had the best navy, Britain was invulnerable. For most of that
period, Britain was not the economically strongest power, and therefore
was vulnerable to the possibility of one or more major Continental
powers creating a navy that could overwhelm Britain's. That's what the
Spanish Armada was about, and Trafalgar was Nelson's successful attempt
to stop a superior French and Spanish fleet.
This meant that no European power could be allowed to get strong enough
to devote its main effort to creating a large navy. In the Napoleonic
wars, Britain worked hard to keep France occupied. Before WWI, Germany
not only created a very powerful army, but a navy that was good enough
to challenge the RN early in the war, if the Germans had decided to
actually use the fleet for something like, say, naval operations.
At that point, Britain was in much the same position. If the British
made peace, Germany would command a very large economy, and could
built up to a point where they could outbuild Britain navally.
You mentioned the possibility of the Germans building a large navy;
your time estimates were way off, but the possibility did exist.
Therefore, Britain had a choice of continuing to fight a war they
really couldn't actually lose, or being relegated to at best second-
rate power status.
>> However, if you've read Tooze, you may have noticed that the economic
>> situation was favorable to the British, who were counting on US help.
>
> At no time could the UK lose WW2.
That's what I said, so we're in agreement there.
> The UK wanted the war over quickly and relied on US industry to supply
> some of the equipment, as the lead time to build the factories and train
> the skills would be long - not to mention the expense of doing so.
>
Certainly. The British didn't want to fight a long war any more
than anybody else.
>> After all, it's not as if Hitler was
>> offering anything in the way of a
>> reasonable peace - and if you disagree
>> with that, please provide some
>> details so we can track it down.
>
> Hitler wanted peace - the terms would be negotiated.
>
You missed what I said. "Please provide some details so we
can track it down." If you have any evidence that Hitler wanted
to make a reasonable peace, some of us would be very interested
in it.
>> No. You have enough ships to
>> smash the hell out of the invasion fleet.
>> You don't have to have all your ships ready
>> if you don't need all of them.
>
> You need reserves
>
Right. The RN had overwhelming force on the spot. Then they
had powerful reserves at Scapa Flow, and other forces nearby.
Once they had the situation completely under control, more than
once, they sent what was left abroad.
>> The RN had absolutely no need
>> for all its forces, given the very
>
> The Germans used all their forces, with no reserves, to attack France.
Right. Look at the forces available. Germany did not have any
real superiority in combat power.
> They could do the same with an invasion sending all over at once.
Um, how? The British had some idea as to the absolute maximum
amount of force the Germans could possibly send, if the RAF and
RN happened to be away at a wild party in the Caribbean, and made
preparations to defeat double that, should it land.
Exactly how are you suggesting that multiple field armies were
to cross? Were they to put on water wings and swim? I'd rather
not be one of the guys towing a howitzer, myself. Were they
to cut down innumerable trees and make dugout canoes? This is
firmly into alien space bat territory.
All
> this has to be considered.
>
It was. Very, very carefully. The British were leaving nothing
to chance.
Having the fighter forces to fight the Luftwaffe, and enough
naval forces to sink anything the Germans sent even if the fighter
forces were defeated, and enough force on the ground to defeat
what the Germans could send over if the RN failed completely,
they thought they'd send some surplus force where it might do
some good.
L2008
news:g58trk$s2q$7...@news.stanford.edu...
> L2008 <removemebay...@removemeeasy.removemecom> wrote:
>
>> Few WW2 authors have assessed the strategic aspect of the war properly.
>> AJP
>
> Gilbert did an admirable job; much of the strategy of the allies was
> based on the fact that the allies were reading almost the entire German
> communications, and could adjust accordingly.
>
>> Taylor and Tooze are two that have. AJP Taylor was shunned at Oxford Uni
>> for his views. Tooze's newish book, has some recent unearthed research
>> into
>> it. They look at the motives for the war and the feasibility of Germany
>> to
>> achieve anything based on strength and economies. German gains were
>> achieved by wild gambles with all forces committed and no reserves, that
>
> Few reserves; however, this is hardly news, and if you'd read any other
> books, you'd realize this was (eg) published in the 1960s.
AJP and Tooze make it clear that Hitler had no grand strategy in place
before 1939, reacting events as they saw them. Some of the decisions were
clearly not well thought out and rather desperate. Like, declaring war on
the USA on a massive assumption they could see off the USSR in mid 1942. If
they knew the USSR would be along slog they would "maybe" have thought a
little more, although the declaration of war was heavily based on getting
the British away from them by having the Japanese attack them.
>> Some people on here have an attitude problem.
>
> Yes, some here ask for citations, and a few relevant quotes.
And they are given and still come back and ask the for the same a few weeks
later. Many clearly just need to read more.
> Others simply make vague statements,
> and demonstrate no understanding of
> questions asked of them.
I agree with that.
> Uh, no; you have not given chapter and verse ANYWHERE.
You don't read my posts then.
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk
> As more British
> destroyers were built, and frigates started to appear, there was no
> point in keeping the flush-deckers in operation.
Not as destroyers but most were reworked as escorts with a boiler or
two removed to provide weight and space for other equipment. The same or
similar was done to surviving S and V class ships.
Ken Young
mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net
> <mtfe...@netMAPSONscape.net> wrote in message
> > Gilbert did an admirable job; much of the strategy of the allies was
> > based on the fact that the allies were reading almost the entire German
> > communications, and could adjust accordingly.
> >
> >> Taylor and Tooze are two that have. AJP Taylor was shunned at Oxford Uni
> >> for his views. Tooze's newish book, has some recent unearthed research
> >> into
> >> it. They look at the motives for the war and the feasibility of Germany
> >> to
> >> achieve anything based on strength and economies. German gains were
> >> achieved by wild gambles with all forces committed and no reserves, that
> >
> > Few reserves; however, this is hardly news, and if you'd read any other
> > books, you'd realize this was (eg) published in the 1960s.
> AJP and Tooze make it clear that Hitler had no grand strategy in place
> before 1939, reacting events as they saw them.
And, as indicated, this was published decades earlier.
> clearly not well thought out and rather desperate. Like, declaring war on
> the USA on a massive assumption they could see off the USSR in mid 1942. If
According to you, this was all thought out previously; you CLAIMED
Hitler forsaw an armada of planes heading his way, and desperately
begged the Japanese to declare war on the US (that was wrong, but that
was your claim.) Now, you're claiming none of this was thought out...
> they knew the USSR would be along slog they would "maybe" have thought a
> little more, although the declaration of war was heavily based on getting
> the British away from them by having the Japanese attack them.
Which is wrong; the Japanese were going to attack the British anyway, as
the US and UK knew.
You've been given references.
> >> Some people on here have an attitude problem.
> >
> > Yes, some here ask for citations, and a few relevant quotes.
> And they are given and still come back and ask the for the same a few weeks
You are lying; you have NEVER presented a quote.
> > Uh, no; you have not given chapter and verse ANYWHERE.
> You don't read my posts then.
We read all your nonsense; why don't you simply cut-and-paste something
that was actually quoted?
Can't do it, can you?
Mike
L2008
news:g58trk$s2q$7...@news.stanford.edu...
>
>> Few WW2 authors have assessed the strategic aspect of the war properly.
>> AJP
>
> Gilbert did an admirable job; much
> of the strategy of the allies was
> based on the fact that the allies
> were reading almost the entire German
> communications, and could adjust accordingly.
That is well known, however the German strategy was not so clear. The Allies
reacted to the Germans who reacted to what they knew of what the Allies were
proposing - like attacking the USSR before 50,000 US planes plus the British
output was set upon them. The Germans ended up with a bigger war than what
they anticipated, like fighting in Greece, Italy, the USSR and North Africa.
If they had not had such a swift victory over France, they would not have
been so arrogant and overconfident in thinking they could defeat the USSR,
and most probably would not have attacked. But that still would have left
them short of resources to counter a huge air armada set against them.
In 1940/41, with the Germans knowing they could not defeat the USSR, so
would not attack and knowing a huge air armada was coming their way, what
would they do? Swiftly increase the air force of course, but then they are
short of energy and raw materials. Talk peace terms? Not likely. Only when
they are being pummelled by bombers would they may talk peace. But would
Hitler do such a thing? Not likely.
mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net
> <mtfe...@netMAPSONscape.net> wrote in message
> news:g58trk$s2q$7...@news.stanford.edu...
> > L2008 <removemebay...@removemeeasy.removemecom> wrote:
> >
> >> Few WW2 authors have assessed the strategic aspect of the war properly.
> >> AJP
> >
> > Gilbert did an admirable job; much
> > of the strategy of the allies was
> > based on the fact that the allies
> > were reading almost the entire German
> > communications, and could adjust accordingly.
> That is well known, however the German strategy was not so clear.
You have claimed the Germans had no grand over-arching strategy. This is
old news.
> The Allies
> reacted to the Germans who reacted to what they knew of what the Allies were
No, the allies, once the US entered the war, developed a long-range
strategy.
> proposing - like attacking the USSR before 50,000 US planes plus the British
Again with this nonsense; please provide a quote that Hitler was
motivated to attack the Soviets due to some fear of US aircraft.
> output was set upon them. The Germans ended up with a bigger war than what
> they anticipated, like fighting in Greece, Italy, the USSR and North Africa.
They anticipated fighting the British, which would presume North Africa
at some point. They anticipated fighting the USSR from prior to the
outbreak of war.
Your statement has no meaning.
> In 1940/41, with the Germans knowing they could not defeat the USSR, so
> would not attack and knowing a huge air armada was coming their way, what
> would they do?
If they "knew" they weren't going to defeat Russia, they wouldn't have
declared war.
And again, your references to "a huge air armada" is nonsense.
> Swiftly increase the air force of course, but then they are
> short of energy and raw materials. Talk peace terms? Not likely. Only when
> they are being pummelled by bombers would they may talk peace. But would
> Hitler do such a thing? Not likely.
In fact, Stalin offered peace to the Germans, and Hitler turned them
down. Again, no apparent fear of "a huge air armada".
Again, could you provide some quotes?
Mike
.sergio.
> 2. If Hitler had approved Hess's flight as an envoy, he (apparently)
> changed his mind within the first 24 hours and repudiated the "mission."
> (I cannot think of any likely third alternative that the facts support.)
this happens often if a secret mission goes wrong :)