Yugoslavia occupation map?
Daniel Titley
a map that shows BOTH the Axis occupation zones / pupet states AND the
modern borders of the region.
Is there such a map on the internet?
geo...@ankerstein.org
I should have mentioned that there was a major disagreement
between the British and the Soviets. Yugoslavia was an active
war zone of the British, who were supporting partisan groups,
and the Soviets, who were supporting different partisan groups
(Tito). And there were many other partisan groups with differing
aims. It is, after all, Yugoslavia.
The Soviets prevailed on every issue.
GFH
geo...@ankerstein.org
Not that I know of. But that is not surprising.
What are you looking for? My map collection
(maps printed in the Third Reich) show no
changes in Yugoslavia, with the exception of a
minor (OK, minor to me.) adjustment of the
border between southeastern Austria and
northwestern Yugoslavia.
Many countries were occupied. Denmark's
internal map did not change; nor did the
Netherlands map -- the boundaries of the
provinces remained the same.
Of course the changes in the boundaries of
Czechoslovakia and Poland are well known.
Slovakia was made independent of the former
Czechoslovakia, but history has shown over
and over that this separation met with the
approval of the Slovaks. The Soviets kept
"their share" of Poland. The Soviet-Nazi
treaty dividing up Poland was honored.
Maps are often for sale on ebay.de. With
some effort, you can find maps printed in
Berlin during the Third Reich of almost any
area, with political boundaries as they were
defined by the Germans at the time of printing.
All have printer's marks showing the date -- at
least the year.
GFH
kelly_gr...@yahoo.com
I don't know if images are online or not, but Charles
Messenger's
THE CHRONOLOGICAL ATLAS OF WORLD WAR TWO (c1989) has the
maps you need. Yugoslavia, indeed, was carved up like a Christmass
Goose!
Slovenia was divded (apperantly) between Italy and Austria (read
Germany),
Horthy's Hungary took parts of northern Croatia and northern Serbia,
the "Croat
Republic" (an axis state) broke from the Yugoslav Kingom and clain
Bosnia-
Herzogovina, while Bulgaria claimed most of Macedonia and a
southeastern
portion of Serbia! During the war - defacto - Yugoslavia seaced to
exist.
Kelly Paul Graham
Houston, TX.
Daniel Titley
> On May 1, 11:16 am, Daniel Titley <abe...@googlemail.com> wrote:
>
> > I'm reading up on the Axis ocupation of Yugoslavia and I'm looking for
> > a map that shows BOTH the Axis occupation zones / pupet states AND the
> > modern borders of the region.
>
> > Is there such a map on the internet?
>
> Not that I know of. But that is not surprising.
> What are you looking for?
What I'm looking for is this
http://www.zum.de/whkmla/histatlas/balkans/yugo1942.gif
with the modern borders shown as well.
geo...@ankerstein.org
OK, but there was a world of difference between "occupied"
and "incorporated into the Reich".
GFH
geo...@ankerstein.org
I have compared your map with a German map. The
area shown as "occupied" by Germany was actually
incorporated into the Reich.
I think that much more of Yugoslavia was occupied by
Germany.
IMHO, you need a better map.
GFH
geo...@ankerstein.org
Correction:
Only the north-western part called "occupied" by
Germany was incorporated into the Reich. I see
there are other areas which are shown as occupied
by Germany.
Also, the German map shows that Italy and Hungary
did incorporate the areas shown into their national
boundaries.
GFH
Marlock
I am surprised by the claim that there were more partisan groups.
Cetnici and Ustase were not partisans. There was only ONE partisan
movement in Jugoslavia.
Marlock
Italians incorporated much of the Adriatic coastline.
Daniel Titley
I'm not sure the people on the ground would have fully appreciated the
difference.
Michele
news:769aqkF...@mid.uni-berlin.de...
>
> I am surprised by the claim that there were more partisan groups. Cetnici
> and Ustase were not partisans. There was only ONE partisan movement in
> Jugoslavia.
>
Well, yes, that's true, provided one goes by the usual definition of
"partisan" in Yugoslavian historiography.
If one goes by another definition, such as, which people the German
occupation forces deemed so dangerous as to place bounty prizes on their
heads, then both Tito and Mihailovic qualify. If we go by the definition of
who got, at least for part of the war, recognition and pledges of support by
the Western Allies, then those same two men both qualify.
In the end, yes, the... Partisans were the only partisans, and the Chetniks
moved over to the Axis side. That does not hold true for the whole war,
however. In other words, history is more complicated than what you wrote
above, and I think you do know that.
Marlock
I think you know too little of the history of these parts.
Cetnici (Chetniks) never considered themselves as Partisans. In fact,
they were ready to shoot anyone who claimed so. They were fighting, at
first, for the restoration, or to put it more precisely, continuation of
the Kingdom (the Karadjordevic family). In that respect, they allied
themselves with the Germans who offered some assurances regarding the
future. Later on, they simply fought for the Serbia, and Serbian people.
In the end of the war, half of them joined, if permitted, the Partisans,
and the rest were hunted down and shoot (since they did a loot of
pillaging and robbery).
A similar thing can be observed on their Croatian counterparts, the
Ustashe, who, originating from a 150 strong Italian formed group, with
the help of Mussolini, and later on Hitler, formed and maintained the
Independent State of Croatia, a fascist and later on Nazi satellite, a
terror state in it's true form (I am a Croatia, btw). Partisans fought
both, and also the Domobrani, who were the remnants of the old Kingdom
of Jugoslavia army.
Therefore, the Partisans had nothing to do with any of the mentioned,
nor would any of the mentioned like to be considered partisans in any
respect.
Michele
> Michele wrote:
>> "Marlock" <marloc...@gmail.com> ha scritto nel messaggio
>> news:769aqkF...@mid.uni-berlin.de...
>>
>>> I am surprised by the claim that there were more partisan groups.
>>> Cetnici and Ustase were not partisans. There was only ONE partisan
>>> movement in Jugoslavia.
>>>
>>
>> Well, yes, that's true, provided one goes by the usual definition of
>> "partisan" in Yugoslavian historiography.
>> If one goes by another definition, such as, which people the German
>> occupation forces deemed so dangerous as to place bounty prizes on their
>> heads, then both Tito and Mihailovic qualify. If we go by the definition
>> of who got, at least for part of the war, recognition and pledges of
>> support by the Western Allies, then those same two men both qualify.
>> In the end, yes, the... Partisans were the only partisans, and the
>> Chetniks moved over to the Axis side. That does not hold true for the
>> whole war, however. In other words, history is more complicated than what
>> you wrote above, and I think you do know that.
>>
>
> I think you know too little of the history of these parts.
Well, everybody is entitled to his own opinions, but not to his own facts.
>
> Cetnici (Chetniks) never considered themselves as Partisans. In fact, they
> were ready to shoot anyone who claimed so. They were fighting, at first,
> for the restoration, or to put it more precisely, continuation of the
> Kingdom (the Karadjordevic family). In that respect, they allied
> themselves with the Germans who offered some assurances regarding the
> future. Later on, they simply fought for the Serbia, and Serbian people.
> In the end of the war, half of them joined, if permitted, the Partisans,
> and the rest were hunted down and shoot (since they did a loot of
> pillaging and robbery).
For instance, nothing of this changes the fact that initially, Churchill was
very much for supporting the Chetniks, and the fact that the Germans put a
bounty on Mihalovic's head.
Maybe you did not know these facts?
On the basis of the above facts, one might very well assess that the British
saw the Chetniks at the very least as potential allies, and the Germans as
actual enemies. At least for some time.
So I stand by my initial statement. It depends on what qualifies one as a
partisan - as opposed to "Partisan", which you are indeed using in the sense
established in Yugoslavian historiography.
It also depends on what part of the war one is assessing. If one is only
looking at the end of it, yes, there was one partisan or Partisan movement
in Yugoslavia. If one looks at the early part of it (early in the Balkans),
no, there was more than one adversary of the Axis there. If one wants to
state an overall judgement, it depends on how many lines he can write. If
just one line, he'll say that there was one partisan movement in Yugoslavia.
Fortunately, here we can go on and on, exactly as we are doing, and sweeping
the initial positions of the Chetniks under the carpet is not necessary. Nor
correct.
Note that this is really nothing to write home about. In plenty of
Axis-occupied countries, the opposition was as fractured as in Yugoslavia,
or more, or less, ranging from simple lack to coordination, to lack of
cooperation, to actual mutual hindrance, to occasional shootouts, to
full-fledged civil war among themselves, either after or even during the war
on the Axis occupier. You'll find that the resistance movements of France,
Poland, Italy, Greece and China, just to name a few, all find a place
somewhere on this scale. It would be surprising indeed if Yugoslavia, a
quarrelsome multi-ethnic jigsaw with all the usual political ingredients
added too, had a harmoniously united resistance movement.
Marlock
You are right in stating that the Allies (British more than the
Americans) initially supported the Cetnici, seeing them as a force
capable of providing enough trouble for the Germans should they be taken
to the other side. But please bear in mind that from the very start they
have allied themselves with the Wehrmacht, never to brake this
allegiance. Churchill at the time never very little, or in fact not much
at all about Tito (I am sure you have read his memoiers), but was aware
that some formations of the old Kingdom of Jugoslavia's Army still
exists under a command of a guy called Draza Mihalovic, who was in close
contact with the King who has escaped to Britain. Thus the connection,
thus the interest.
The reason why I decided to respond to your post was exactly to
contradict the claim that you have clearly stated in your last point.
There is absolutely no similarity, for example, with the French
Resistance movemenet that was, at the beginning, fractured, later on to
be united under De Gaulle and (was it) Dalamier (?). In France (as in
other countries that you have mentioned) the Cetnici, Ustase and
Domobrani never had in mind the fight against the Germans and the
Italians. They were satisfied with the status quo, providing that they
kept the rights promised by the occupying powers (Italian army,
Wehrmacht, Hungarian and Bulgarian army - (although, I don't know much
about the relationships regarding the last two)). Therefore, they can
not be seen as resistance in any sense. The ONLY resistance force was
the Partisan movement, that made it's first formal appearance exactly on
the day of the commencement of the operation Barbarossa. The Partisan
movement simultaneously (more or less) started in Serbia and Croatia,
with the Slovenian, Macedonian, Bosnian and Montenegrin movement soon to
follow.
There was an additional force to be mentioned, the Muslim divisions in
Bosnia, but those were under direct control of the Wehrmacht.
You have to understand that unlike the different resistance groups in
France that, although formed with different goals and different
backgrounds, had in fact the common goal, the liberation of France, and
creation of a different and a better State, the Partisans, Cetnici,
Ustase and Domobradni all followed totally different agendas, and had
absolutely NOTHING IN COMMON. As I have initially stated, Ustase and
Cetnici defended the status quo, allying themselves with the Germans
(and Italians in Croatia), and the Domobrani were under the control of
the political heads of the two regimes (one formed in a newly created
state, one in an occupied territory). Cetnici never planned to fight the
Germans. They were only hoping that through their cooperation with the
Germans, it would eventually be allowed that the Kingdom was to be
restored. The only resistance that the Germans faced in Serbia (no
matter how small), was the resistance by the Partisans.
And when Churchill's son, together with Americans emissaries, parachuted
to meet Tito and his Partisans, the British and Americans soon realized
this, and immediately turned their heads strictly to them.
The reason behind the later on support of Draza Mihajlovic was purely
political, and had nothing to do with the anti-fascist movement (for the
guy was a pure fascist).
I had a rare privilege, some 8 years ago, to talk in person with Tito's
main negotiator with the Allies, Vladimir Velebit, and it was very
interesting to listen to the stories from the war, especially the
"communication with the Allies" part. :)
Regarding the point about Germans having placed the bounty of
Mihalovic's head, this is the first time I hear about it, very
interesting. Do you know when this had happened, and what were the reasons?
One last note on the Partisan movement. Throughout most of the war, the
Partisan movement was formed by the people of all ethnical, intellectual
and religious background. One can make comparison with the Republicans
in the Spanish Civil War, especially if you take into account that many
to-be Partisans in Jugoslavia, fought in the 5th International Brigade
in Spain. Only near the end of the war, things started to change, as
Tito was already focusing of the future, wanting to create a strictly
communist Partisan movement (which for the most part of the war it
wasn't), and preparing his diplomatic strategey towards both East and
the West. Then, as I have mentioned, some fractions of other groups were
allowed to join in, again, for political and interior-stability reasons,
whereas, others were hunted down and destroyed.
Sry for the long post :)
LC
> But please bear in mind that from the very start they
> have allied themselves with the Wehrmacht, never to brake this
> allegiance.
Source for this, please?
As Michele wrote, the Germans identified all resistance & guerrilla
movements as "partisan" regardless of their being Partisans (under
Tito) or "partisans" i.e. guerrilla forces.
> There is absolutely no similarity, for example, with the French
> Resistance movemenet that was, at the beginning, fractured, later on to
> be united under De Gaulle and (was it) Dalamier (?). In France (as in
> other countries that you have mentioned) the Cetnici, Ustase and
> Domobrani never had in mind the fight against the Germans and the
> Italians.
Actually there were many similarities. In France as in Yugoslavia, the
army-run resistance movements recognized the futility of military
action and sought to build up so as to stage a general uprising when
the time was right (i.e. when an Allied army would come). In France as
in Yugoslavia, the communist-run resistance movements sought direct
action, even though it was often counter-productive in that the
Germans would kill more resisters than the resistance action would
harm the German war effort. In both cases, the more active communist
movements claimed the waiting strategy adopted by the other side
amounted to treason.
The similarities end there, though.
As to the Chetniks not wanting to fight the Germans, actions by both
them and the communist partisans were recorded.
See the following from the German reports about their antiguerrilla
operations in the Balkans:
"In some cases the Partisans were given credit for Chetnik attacks
against the occupation forces and their auxiliaries; on the other
hand, the Chetniks were credited with successful Partisan forays. To
complicate matters further, there were also guerrilla bands operating
under no other authority than their own. Thus, German references to
Partisans did not necessarily mean the forces of Tito, but rather the
Yugoslav resistance forces in general, regardless of political
sympathies."
The whole book is available here for download:
http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/antiguer-ops/AG-BALKAN.HTM
According to the following Wikipedia article
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chetniks
...the Chetniks started as an anti-German force, though not a
particularly active one for the reasons mentioned above (also, its
local recruitment made it more vulnerable to German reprisals), and
ended up primarily fighting Partisans, cutting deals with the Germans
in order to do so.
> I had a rare privilege, some 8 years ago, to talk in person with Tito's
> main negotiator with the Allies, Vladimir Velebit, and it was very
> interesting to listen to the stories from the war, especially the
> "communication with the Allies" part. :)
No doubt :)
LC
Marlock
Hi, tnx for your point!
First of all, the article you have proposed for reading contains the
information on how the Cetnici worked with the Germans. What it does not
say, but is probably taken for granted, is that they were supplied by
the Werhmacht. My sources are books in Serbian and Croatian, do you
speak the language? But it does not really matter. It is obvious that,
if they worked together with the Germans against Partisans, and took
part in the offensives, that they were probably supplied by the Wehrmacht.
From a German stand point, the only force they were actively involved
against, were the Partisans. Thus the 7 offensives (for example:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seven_anti-Partisan_offensives), and the
constant number of a few divisions present at Balkans (that could have
been used in Russia).
Regarding the similarities you are mentioning, again:
1."army-run resistance movements" in France never even considered
allying with the Germans, as Cetnici, Ustase and Domobrani did, either
from the very start, or a little bit later, still early in the war on
Balkans.
2. Cetnici could be perhaps compared with similar movements in occupied
countries and territories, on the line of collaborators (for example,
Norway, Ukraine, even Poland).
The quote you have stated makes absolute sense. Especially in the early
period of the fighting, the control of all groups was loose, thus making
it more probable that the one entity had groups conducting different
operations. But once Mihajlovic has consolidated his control and
influence, the Germans had no more problems with the Cetnici, all the
way up to the point when the Wehrmacht was forced to fall back from the
Balkans. At this stage, many Cetnici's groups decided to turn their guns
to the Germans, thus trying to appease the Partisans into accepting them
into their ranks and therefore avoiding retribution. But that is an act
of cowardice, and not of resistance. Therefore, it can not be seen as
such, although, as far as the OKW was concerened, at that end stage,
they were all regarded as "Yugoslav resistance forces in general".
Thank You for the link!!!! If you have other good suggestions, please
let me know!
I have been looking for a book by Bywater, "The Great Pacific War" (or
something like that) for some time now, I guess I will buy it through
the Amazon, but if you by any chance now of a link where it is available
for reading, please let me know.
Best regards!
Btw, this group is one of the best ones on Usenet, as far as I am
concerned :)
Don Phillipson
news:f1656548-0cd7-4d30...@z19g2000vbz.googlegroups.com...
Costs of public order illustrate the practical diffference. In France after
the armistice (both the Occupied Zone and the Unoccupied Zone)
Vichy collected taxes and paid for and maintained the police, post
office, railways, and so on. So French taxpayers paid for the French
public servants who rounded up Jews for deportation etc. The Vichy
authorities did what Germany wanted (most of the time) and did not
require that Germany do the work or even pay for it.
--
Don Phillipson
Carlsbad Springs
(Ottawa, Canada)
Michele
>
> You are right
Thanks.
in stating that the Allies (British more than the
> Americans)
Maybe because the time frame we're talking about here is 1941, early 1942.
The USA either weren't at war yet, or had other fish to fry rather than
support to partisans.
initially supported the Cetnici, seeing them as a force
> capable of providing enough trouble for the Germans should they be taken
> to the other side. But please bear in mind that from the very start they
> have allied themselves with the Wehrmacht,
No. That developed over time. You are wrong.
never to brake this
> allegiance. Churchill at the time never very little, or in fact not much
> at all about Tito (I am sure you have read his memoiers), but was aware
> that some formations of the old Kingdom of Jugoslavia's Army still
> exists under a command of a guy called Draza Mihalovic, who was in close
> contact with the King who has escaped to Britain. Thus the connection,
> thus the interest.
So to sum up. In 1941, Mihailovic ordered his men not to lay arms down and
to defend their strongholds against any attack (read the Axis); Churchill
wanted to support Mihailovic; and Hitler placed a bounty on Mihailovic's
head. In other words, every party involved thought that Mihailovic and his
men were enemies of the Axis.
Are you telling us that it's not the parties involved, but you, today, who
decide who's an enemy of the Axis?
>
> The reason why I decided to respond to your post was exactly to
> contradict the claim that you have clearly stated in your last point.
> There is absolutely no similarity, for example, with the French
> Resistance movemenet that was, at the beginning, fractured, later on to
> be united under De Gaulle and (was it) Dalamier (?).
I don't think so.
In France (as in
> other countries that you have mentioned) the Cetnici, Ustase and
> Domobrani never had in mind the fight against the Germans and the
> Italians.
This seems wrong. I suppose you meant in Yugoslavia.
You will have noticed that I did not make the same claim for the Ustashas
and Domobranis.
The reference to other countris I mentioned having a parallel of these
organizations is, of course, wrong. The Chinese Communists and Nationalists
fought each other, but neither organization allied with the Axis like the
Ustashas. It is true that in China there was a puppet state roughly
comparable with Croatia, yet there were also two separate anti-Japanese
forces which also fought their own civil war.
The situation in Poland was also complex, but there was even less
collaboration; yet it would be outlandish if one claimed that the
anti-Communist, far-right embryonal resistance groups that were set up in
1939-41 in Eastern Poland - to fight against the _Soviet_ occupation -
worked hand in hand with the GL (communist) organization! Why, the GL barely
cooperated with the rest of the AK, being part of it largely nominally!
That cleared away, what I said is that the resistance movements of the
countries I mentioned find a place somewhere on a scale assessing the mutual
relationships of their various resistance groups - from all out civil war
between enemies of the Axis (such as in China), down to civil war as a tail
to the anti-Axis war (Greece), down to occasional shoot-outs among partisan
movements (Italy), down to mutual hindrance (Poland), and finally on to lack
of cooperation or coordination (France).
I did not claim I know exactly where to place the Yugoslavian resistance on
this scale. Note that countries shifted on the scale, depending basically on
how the Axis was faring, but also on other reasons. Yugoslavia - probably -
starts in 1941 somewhere between Italy and Poland, then gradually, as every
other organization moves over to the Axis' side, indeed by the end of the
war Tito's organization is the unified partisan movement. By the end of the
war, I wrote, not throughout the war. Which was the wrong claim you made.
LC
> First of all, the article you have proposed for reading contains the
> information on how the Cetnici worked with the Germans. What it does not
> say, but is probably taken for granted, is that they were supplied by
> the Werhmacht. My sources are books in Serbian and Croatian, do you
> speak the language?
I can't speak either, but I'm fluent in Russian and found that made
reading Serbian ok, if slow.
Not sure about the Wehrmacht supply bit. Are you claiming you know for
the certain the Wehrmacht was supplying the Chetniks and the article
just forgot to mention it, or that the article didn't mention it from
which you deduce the Germans must have been supplying them? Not the
same thing.
The Germans were never particularly generous in supplying allies,
particularly allies as loose as the Chetniks. Also, other resistance
movements had the same dilemma: the non-communist Greek resistance
movement had a fraction that was clearly collaborationist yet that
didn't prevent it to be generally anti-German. My point here is that
the common knowledge is that the Chetniks started out as a normal
resistance movement, though at some point they proved willing to cut
deals with the Germans the better to fight the Partisans, and they
ended up fighting Tito's forces more often than the Axis' which is why
Churchill withdrew support.
I'm not prepared to accept without some hard evidence that they should
be lumped together with the Ustashi etc.
> But it does not really matter. It is obvious that,
> if they worked together with the Germans against Partisans, and took
> part in the offensives, that they were probably supplied by the Wehrmacht.
More likely, the Wehrmacht let them live and provided them with
minimum support, asking them to provide their own weapons.
> From a German stand point, the only force they were actively involved
> against, were the Partisans. Thus the 7 offensives (for example:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seven_anti-Partisan_offensives), and the
> constant number of a few divisions present at Balkans (that could have
> been used in Russia).
The initial occupying force in Yugoslavia was actually quite small,
then with Barbarossa not working as planned and Yugoslav resistance
developing the Germans found they needed to boost their numbers in the
area.
> Regarding the similarities you are mentioning, again:
> 1."army-run resistance movements" in France never even considered
> allying with the Germans, as Cetnici, Ustase and Domobrani did, either
> from the very start, or a little bit later, still early in the war on
> Balkans.
Most of the army-run "resistance" that ended up fighting the Germans
in 1944 and 1945 had served under Vichy, which definitely was a
collaborationist regime.
I agree that no open resistance movement was willing to cut a deal
with the Germans the better to let them slaughter the resisters'
countrymen (even communist-led ones), but the distinction isn't as
clear-cut as you make it, in my opinion.
> 2. Cetnici could be perhaps compared with similar movements in occupied
> countries and territories, on the line of collaborators (for example,
> Norway, Ukraine, even Poland).
So you have claimed from the start, my understanding is the Germans
didn't consider them collaborators.
> But once Mihajlovic has consolidated his control and
> influence, the Germans had no more problems with the Cetnici, all the
> way up to the point when the Wehrmacht was forced to fall back from the
> Balkans.
Yes, however how much reflects the fact that the Chetniks had lost
strength as well as their waiting strategy?
> Thank You for the link!!!! If you have other good suggestions, please
> let me know!
There's a lot on the Internet, but it's been a while since I last
researched that.
> I have been looking for a book by Bywater, "The Great Pacific War" (or
> something like that) for some time now, I guess I will buy it through
> the Amazon, but if you by any chance now of a link where it is available
> for reading, please let me know.
Sorry, but that is a commercial book so I don't know of any such
place. What is available for free reading or download are a bunch of
official histories (mainly those of the English-speaking countries) as
well as official documents, or their translation in English.
LC
Rich Rostrom
> "Marlock" <marlockena...@gmail.com> ha scritto nel messaggio
> Not sure about the Wehrmacht supply bit. Are you claiming you know for
> the certain the Wehrmacht was supplying the Chetniks and the article
> just forgot to mention it, or that the article didn't mention it from
> which you deduce the Germans must have been supplying them? Not the
> same thing.
>
> The Germans were never particularly generous in supplying allies,
> particularly allies as loose as the Chetniks.
If they ever supplied the Chetniks at all.
The Chetniks did receive some arms from _Italy_,
not Germany; because both Italy and the Chetniks
regarded the Ustashe as enemies. Italy claimed
and occupied areas in Dalmatia which Croat
nationalists thought was Croatian territory. This
led to low-level violence, with Italian officers
being mysteriously shot while passing through
Croatian territory. Since Italy could not openly
attack Croatia, the Italians made a covert
alliance with the Chetniks, supplying them with
some arms to use in strikes against the Ustashe.
> "Marlock" <marlockena...@gmail.com> ha scritto nel messaggio
> > Regarding the similarities you are mentioning, again:
> > 1."army-run resistance movements" in France never even considered
> > allying with the Germans, as Cetnici, Ustase and Domobrani did,
This list is absurd. The Chetniks were affiliated with
the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, which was at war with
Germany.
The Ustashe were affiliated with the independent
government of Croatia, which was set up in
rebellion against the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, as
a satellite state in formal alliance with Germany.
The Ustashe were murderously anti-Serb, and
the Chetniks fought them regularly.
> Most of the army-run "resistance" that ended up fighting the Germans
> in 1944 and 1945 had served under Vichy, which definitely was a
> collaborationist regime.
And actively collaborated with German military
operations, in Syria for instance.
> "Marlock" <marlockena...@gmail.com> ha scritto nel messaggio
> > But once Mihajlovic has consolidated his control and
> > influence, the Germans had no more problems with the Cetnici...
Then why did the Germans put a large price
on Mihajlovic's head in 1943? The same reward
they offered for Tito?
Why were at least a hundred downed Allied aircrew protected
by Chetniks and assisted to return to Allied territory?
This was mostly early on, but it definitely happened.
Ivan Bajlo
> If they ever supplied the Chetniks at all.
Plenty of evidence of that was shown at Mihailovic trial, although
Germans didn't supply they directly instead they left it to Nedic
collaborations regime to do it.
Several Chetnik commanders "legalized" their forces with Germans
although claiming to be loyal to Mihalovic but since they considered
communist bigger threat they decided to fight them first, Germans even
included loyal Chetnik losses with Serbian collaborationist losses.
http://www.vojska.net/eng/world-war-2/serbia/casualties/
> alliance with the Chetniks, supplying them with
> some arms to use in strikes against the Ustashe.
This is silly since Ustashe were forced to leave Italian occupation
zone only Home Defense (Domobrani) were allowed.
Italian included virtually all Chetnik forces in their zone into MVAC
(anti-communist militia) in order to ease burden of occupation.
http://www.vojska.net/eng/world-war-2/italy/chetniks/
> The Ustashe were murderously anti-Serb, and
> the Chetniks fought them regularly.
Only in the beginning, once things got rough with communist Partisans
getting stronger and Germans getting angry both ustashe and local
Chetnik commanders signed several agreements by which Chetnik accept
ustashe goverment in exchange for arms and ammunition and all other
benefits of regular status.
http://www.vojska.net/eng/world-war-2/independent-state-of-croatia/chetniks/
Only some minor Chetnik commanders didn't sign these agreements but
they were hiding so deep inside the Bosnian mountains nobody cared
about them.
> Then why did the Germans put a large price
> on Mihajlovic's head in 1943? The same reward
> they offered for Tito?
I thought they made that much earlier, although Hitler wanted (loyal)
Chetniks disarmed and disbanded most local commanders went against his
wishes and kept Chetniks beside them even though their loyalty was
questionable. In 1944 when it appeared that British were going to land
on Yugoslav coast, Chetnik commander in Nevesinje attacked his allies
German 369th Infantry division (made of Croats with German officers)
with his men quickly taking control of several bunkers which were
jointly held. His decision proved to be fatal beacuse he quickly got
counterattacked by Germans and attacked by Partisans.
> Why were at least a hundred downed Allied aircrew protected
> by Chetniks and assisted to return to Allied territory?
> This was mostly early on, but it definitely happened.
Mihailovic biggest problem was attempt to act as resistance but avoid
provoking reprisals against civilian population, those two things
don't work together and Allies cared little about reprisals (hint:
Operation Anthropoid), they cared only about dead Germans, so they
made choice to send supplies to those that killed more Germans.
Until late 1943 amount of supplies being air dropped was ridicules,
190 tons from July to September '43! With capitulation of Italy,
Partisans managed to grab large amount of Italian equipment with
Chetniks capturing very little, this changed balance of power safely
into Partisan hands and they also secured several Adriatic islands
allowing for further aid to arrive in operation Audrey:
http://www.vojska.net/eng/world-war-2/operation/audrey-1943/
Ivan Bajlo
> So to sum up. In 1941, Mihailovic ordered his men not to lay arms down and
> to defend their strongholds against any attack (read the Axis); Churchill
not really Mihailovic had only few men when he decided not to lay arms
and move to mountains expecting to find remains of regular army which
have withdraw to continue fighting but he found none
http://www.vojska.net/eng/world-war-2/chetniks/begining/
> wanted to support Mihailovic; and Hitler placed a bounty on Mihailovic's
> head. In other words, every party involved thought that Mihailovic and his
> men were enemies of the Axis.
Churchill decided to drop Mihailovic in early 1944 so it seems he
wasn't very valuable ally.
Ivan Bajlo
> From a German stand point, the only force they were actively involved
> against, were the Partisans. Thus the 7 offensives (for example:
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seven_anti-Partisan_offensives), and the
> constant number of a few divisions present at Balkans (that could have
> been used in Russia).
Those 7 offensives are understatement, I never figured out why was
there a need to create them in Yugoslav historiography when Germans
were carrying out anti-partisan operations constantly either in
reaction to Partisan movements or to achieve some strategic objective.
http://www.vojska.net/eng/world-war-2/battles-and-operations/
> The quote you have stated makes absolute sense. Especially in the early
> period of the fighting, the control of all groups was loose, thus making
> it more probable that the one entity had groups conducting different
> operations. But once Mihajlovic has consolidated his control and
> influence, the Germans had no more problems with the Cetnici, all the
> way up to the point when the Wehrmacht was forced to fall back from the
> Balkans. At this stage, many Cetnici's groups decided to turn their guns
> to the Germans, thus trying to appease the Partisans into accepting them
> into their ranks and therefore avoiding retribution. But that is an act
> of cowardice, and not of resistance. Therefore, it can not be seen as
> such, although, as far as the OKW was concerened, at that end stage,
> they were all regarded as "Yugoslav resistance forces in general".
Chetniks are too broad term, in the beginning Mihailovic was nobody
and Kosta Pecanec was Chetnik legend to who everyone was looking to
lead Serbian resistance but he quickly decided that fighting
communists is more important and become active collaborator.
http://www.vojska.net/eng/world-war-2/serbia/chetniks/pecanac/
Mihailovic initially joined forces with communist as dead many other
Chetnik commanders who would later swear loyalty to him but Mihailovic
idea of resistance was to wait, gather weapons and wait for the right
moment (when Allies arrive at the Yugoslav border) for uprising,
communists wanted to fight Axis right now, add to that conflicting
ideology and conflict between them was just a matter of time. Axis
quick reaction in crushing 1941 uprising only speed things up:
http://www.vojska.net/eng/world-war-2/montenegro/chetniks/
http://www.vojska.net/eng/world-war-2/italy/chetniks/
http://www.vojska.net/eng/world-war-2/independent-state-of-croatia/chetniks/
Mihailovic had ally in Milan Nedic collaborationist regime which
wasn't too fond of Germans but also considered them lesser evil then
communist threat and become sort of middle men between Mihailovic who
didn't want to openly deal with Germans like Pecanac but need a way
for Germans to leave him alone and get his hands on weapons to fight
communists. Collaboration with Italians was much more open and
Mihailovic was even hiding in Italian zone for a period when Germans
wanted to capture him. When Partisans started their advance into
Serbia in strength in 1944 in order to link up with Red army any
modesty was gone as Chetniks needed weapons badly and Germans need any
help they could get to keep retreat route from Greece open.
Compared to Tito's Partisans, chetniks never had true centralized
command and Mihailovic was real commander of only Chetnik forces in
Serbia and only those close enough to him. Most commanders
acknowledged him as supreme commander but knew that he could do little
to exercise his authority unlike communists which had control of
Partisan formation through both Communist Party and military structure.
Michele
news:2f0d2661-9706-4a59...@e23g2000vbe.googlegroups.com...
> Michele wrote:
>> So to sum up. In 1941, Mihailovic ordered his men not to lay arms down
>> and
>> to defend their strongholds against any attack (read the Axis); Churchill
>
> not really Mihailovic had only few men when he decided not to lay arms
> and move to mountains expecting to find remains of regular army which
> have withdraw to continue fighting but he found none
> http://www.vojska.net/eng/world-war-2/chetniks/begining/
>
And the numbers are relevant how? If a resistance movement begins with only
a few men, should it be not considered as a resistance movement? Should it
be considered a collaborationist movement? How many men did Tito begin with?
How many men did the Polish resistance begin with? The Norwegian one? If one
single individual ex-soldier keeps his rifle, heads for the mountains, and
decides he'll go shooting at the occupiers, what is that man? A
collaborationist of the occupiers, because he's alone?
>> wanted to support Mihailovic; and Hitler placed a bounty on Mihailovic's
>> head.
I'm glad to see this is not contested. AFAIK (I'd need to check) the sum was
comparable with that on Tito's head. So it seems at least a very relevant
party - the Germans - did think he roughly rated at the same level of
threat.
In other words, every party involved thought that Mihailovic and his
>> men were enemies of the Axis.
>
> Churchill decided to drop Mihailovic in early 1944 so it seems he
> wasn't very valuable ally.
>
Thank you for confirming my position. If Churchill dropped Mihailovic as an
ally (and as late as 1944, I seemed to remember it was 1943, thanks), then
before he considered him as an ally.
So why don't you answer the question the other poster has shirked. We're
talking of 1941 exclusively. In that year, Mihailovic considered himself an
enemy of the Axis; Churchill considered him an ally; and Hitler placed a
bounty prize on his head. All the parties involved evidently agreed
Mihailovic and his men were enemies of the Axis. Who else is entitled to
decide that well they actually weren't, in 1941, and on what basis?
Ivan Bajlo
> And the numbers are relevant how? If a resistance movement begins with only
> a few men, should it be not considered as a resistance movement? Should it
Point is Mihailovic never expected to be resistance leader, he thought
he would join command of some more senior officer. Such small number
of men forced Mihailovic to remain passive (and experience from WW1
when thousands of Serbs perished in failed uprising organized by
Pecanac) and it was only after communist started popular uprising (and
communists were ordered to do it by Moscow after Hitler attacked
Soviet Union) forcing Mihalovic to start active resistance without
that he wouldn't leave his mountain until Allies arrived.
> be considered a collaborationist movement? How many men did Tito begin with?
Tito had at his disposal entire Communist Party of Yugoslavia network
which in 1940 had over 7000 members with further 17800 in communist
youth and numerous sympathizers, also many members served in Spanish
Civil war in order to gain military experience since before the war
CPY was planing revolution so expanding revolution into fighting
occupation wasn't that complicated.
> How many men did the Polish resistance begin with? The Norwegian one? If one
no idea
> single individual ex-soldier keeps his rifle, heads for the mountains, and
> decides he'll go shooting at the occupiers, what is that man? A
> collaborationist of the occupiers, because he's alone?
Unless he hits something he is nothing, there were many such fellows
here and they mostly wasted ammo taking shots at Germans from "very
safe distance", Germans rarely suffered losses from such attacks.
> I'm glad to see this is not contested. AFAIK (I'd need to check) the sum was
> comparable with that on Tito's head. So it seems at least a very relevant
> party - the Germans - did think he roughly rated at the same level of
> threat.
Germans also placed 100 000 Reich marks on Tuvia Bielski, hardly a big
threat, it seems that it was standard bounty Germans offered for
anyone they wanted to catch.
> Thank you for confirming my position. If Churchill dropped Mihailovic as an
> ally (and as late as 1944, I seemed to remember it was 1943, thanks), then
> before he considered him as an ally.
During 1941 nobody knew what was going on in Yugoslavia, 1942 was
similarly confusing and it was only during 1943 that there was enough
Allied missions to get a clear picture based on that intel, SOE
advised dropping Mihalovic in late 1943 but he was given one last
chance and give some targets to destroy which he never did. To make
things more chaotic during 1941-43 Chetniks got credit for most
Partisans sabotages but during 43-44 credits for few Chetnik sabotages
went to Partisans.
> So why don't you answer the question the other poster has shirked. We're
> talking of 1941 exclusively. In that year, Mihailovic considered himself an
> enemy of the Axis; Churchill considered him an ally; and Hitler placed a
> bounty prize on his head. All the parties involved evidently agreed
> Mihailovic and his men were enemies of the Axis. Who else is entitled to
> decide that well they actually weren't, in 1941, and on what basis?
Mihailovic simply went with the flow, started a resistance which he
didn't plan to do much until Germans got defeated but was forced to
join uprising in 1941 and become enemy of Axis once things got rough
he quickly give up on active resistance idea and decided to try
sitting on two chairs for the rest of the war attacking occupation
force just enough so he could claim he was resistance but not enough
to provoke any kind of response from them - resistance which doesn't
tie up enemy forces is hardly worth calling resistance.
Rich Rostrom
> Michele wrote:
> > All the parties involved evidently agreed
> > Mihailovic and his men were enemies of the Axis. Who else is entitled to
> > decide that well they actually weren't, in 1941, and on what basis?
>
> Mihailovic simply went with the flow, started a resistance which he
> didn't plan to do much until Germans got defeated but was forced to
Excuse me.
"Mihailovic... started a resistance..."
" but was forced to join uprising in 1941
and become enemy of Axis ..."
What enemy did Mihailovic's "resistance"
organization "resist", when he started it?
Who but the Axis?
There seems to be confusion here between
Mihailovic's "fabian" policy of avoiding open
warfare with the Axis until there was a chance
of actually defeating them, and not being
hostile to the Axis at all. Many other resistance
groups followed a similar policy - confining
anti-German activities to intelligence gathering,
rescue of Allied aircrew, propaganda, and
accumulation of arms and men for a future
uprising. None of these organizations have
been declared "collaborators" or "not enemies
of the Axis" because of this.
Even worse, another poster has repeatedly
asserted that the Chetniks were _always_
allied with the Wehrmacht, and equates
them with the Ustashe.
The later record of the Chetniks was much more
problematic, but that does not justify dismissing
the original purpose of the group,
Ivan Bajlo
> What enemy did Mihailovic's "resistance"
> organization "resist", when he started it?
Going into forest and declaring yourself a resistance (any fool can do
that) doesn't automatically make you a resistance in history books,
you actually have to do some sort of resisting to qualify.
> Who but the Axis?
Number of German troops and their activity in Serbia tend to disagree,
Serbia was spared from most war activities between 1942 and 1944 when
Mihailovic had control.
Felix Benzler in his report from 12 September 1941 reports that
Chetnik groups are taking hostile stand against Germans but no armed
conflicts occurred with them yet.
Mihalovic aid colonel Branislav J. Pantic said on meting with Germans
in Divice on 11 November 1941 that communist first started the combat
and that Mihalovic kept to himself preparing to strike into Bosnia and
Sandzak to avenge ustasha atrocities against Serbs. Major Vuckovic
commander of 1st Ravna Gora Corps also writes that communists were
first to start attacking Germans forcing Mihalovic to prematurely
commit his forces into action and even Mihailovic admitted it at his
own trail.
> There seems to be confusion here between
> Mihailovic's "fabian" policy of avoiding open
> warfare with the Axis until there was a chance
> of actually defeating them, and not being
Now you make Mihailovic sound like a military genius, same genius who
believed faked communist reports of Serbia being ready for anti-
communist uprising in 1945 and instead of retreating west he attempted
to move back into Serbia only to run into trap communists prepared for
him and annihilated his entire force at the same place they themselves
almost got destroyed two years earlier - Zelengora.
Mihailovic was at best mediocre strategist who failed to create
effective command and control of his subordinates and any kind of long
term strategy, commander of Montenegro Chetniks Pavle Djurisic (well
know for his actions of ethnic cleansing) was in doubt whether to join
Mihailovic in Bosnia or retreat through Albania into Greece he decided
to join his commander and once he realized Mihailovic has no idea what
to do next fell for bait by Sekula Drljevic (his relative, who was
Monenegrin separatist) to withdraw west to Slovenia where other
Chetnik formations already moved too, Sekula used ustashe to trap
Djurisic who killed him in Jasenovac, his chetniks were reorganized as
Montenegrin National army under Sekula command and moved into
defensive positions in front of Zagreb and got their orders and
supplies from Ustashe! Confusing, isn't it?
> hostile to the Axis at all. Many other resistance
> groups followed a similar policy - confining
> anti-German activities to intelligence gathering,
> rescue of Allied aircrew, propaganda, and
> accumulation of arms and men for a future
Such passive activities are hardly a consolation to troops dying on
the front line, idea of resistance is to force occupiers to commit
extra troops from front line to occupation of regions they thought
were secured. If resistance is passive it will hardly have any impact
on the war effort and it sounds like wanting to be a little bit
pregnant. Communist uprising forced Germans to send 113 and 342
infantry divisions plus 125 regiment to crush them before both
division were free again to send them to Russian front.
Germans were probably more hurt by worker strikes in Belgium,
Denmark... then Mihailovic sitting on top of his mountain and waiting
for "the right moment".
> uprising. None of these organizations have
> been declared "collaborators" or "not enemies
> of the Axis" because of this.
When resistance is receiving weapons from Axis in order to fight
another resistance which attacking Axis troops it stops being
resistance and becomes collaborators, its simple as that or are you
one of those people who thinks its ok to serve Nazis in order to be
able to fight against communists?
Mihailovic already at the end of October 1941 sent two of his aids to
Germans with offer to cleanup Serbia from communists for which he
needs 5000 rifles, 350 light and 20 heavy machine guns and assurances
that Germans will stop with reprisals. Germans requested to meet him
in person and to show Germans he was serious he order attacked on
Partisans which begun on 1 November, meeting between Draza and Rudolf
Kogard, intelligence officer of German commander in Serbia as I have
mentioned took place on 11 November 1941 at Divice village which
turned out to be big disappointment beacuse Germans were only
interested in his surrender. Lack of German aid (and promised British
aid) was critical and Partisan counterattack after two weeks of not
very hard fighting managed to surround his HQ at Ravna Gora (again
Mihailovic military genius shows big holes) and was only saved by
radio broadcast from Radio Moscow which claimed Mihailovic as leader
of all resistance forces in Serbia forcing Tito to stop attack and
start negotiating with Mihalovic once more.
During his stay in Montenegro where he was safe under Italians he did
complete opposite thing (probably under pressure from British)
compared to what he was saying few months ago by calling for sabotages
along railway for Greece which was one of the supply routs for Afrika
Korps. Few responded to his call fearing German reprisals unlike
communists which carried out party orders.
Remains of Serbian State Guard which was army of Nedic quisling regime
in Serbia joined Mihailovic during retreat into Bosnia only to get
disillusioned with Mihalovic and later return to Germans.
> Even worse, another poster has repeatedly
> asserted that the Chetniks were _always_
> allied with the Wehrmacht, and equates
> them with the Ustashe.
Not for the start but later they become even worse then Ustashe who at
lest had Germans to keep them in line, many Chetnik groups become
notorious for their atrocities against non-Serbs and families of those
Serbs who were fighting with Tito.
> The later record of the Chetniks was much more
> problematic, but that does not justify dismissing
> the original purpose of the group,
Originally communism was great idea on paper until live experiment
went horribly wrong.
There was almost no Mihailovic activities (unless you count Chetniks
of Momcilo Djuic attacking and looting Croat viliages) until
communists got orders from Moscow to start attacking Nazis and left
him no option to join or risk losing any role in events.
Michele
> Michele wrote:
>> And the numbers are relevant how? If a resistance movement begins with
>> only
>> a few men, should it be not considered as a resistance movement? Should
>> it
>
> Point is Mihailovic never expected to be resistance leader, he thought
> he would join command of some more senior officer.
And that isn't a point that makes him a collaborationist, or anything
different from an enemy of the Axis. By this reasoning, how should a common
partisan having nobody at his orders be rated? As a friend of the Axis?
Such small number
> of men forced Mihailovic to remain passive (and experience from WW1
> when thousands of Serbs perished in failed uprising organized by
> Pecanac) and it was only after communist started popular uprising (and
> communists were ordered to do it by Moscow after Hitler attacked
> Soviet Union) forcing Mihalovic to start active resistance without
> that he wouldn't leave his mountain until Allies arrived.
>
Yeah. So what? Being in the mountains with guns and not obeying the
occupiers' orders still at the very least doesn't qualify one as a
collaborationist, and somebody - namely the occupation authorities, whose
opinion seems somewhat relevant in the issue - would call that, in and by
itself, hostility.
>> be considered a collaborationist movement?
Failure to answer to this question goes to show what the only possible
answer is.
How many men did Tito begin with?
>
> Tito had at his disposal entire Communist Party of Yugoslavia network
> which in 1940 had over 7000 members with further 17800 in communist
> youth and numerous sympathizers, also many members served in Spanish
> Civil war in order to gain military experience since before the war
> CPY was planing revolution so expanding revolution into fighting
> occupation wasn't that complicated.
>
"At his disposal". By this kind of reasoning, of course, any Serbian
nationalist should be counted as being at the disposal of Mihailovic. For
Mihailovic, you want to count the number of men who actually were with him
in time and place. For Tito, you want to count even the sympathizers who
could, or could not, eventually join. Ain't that double standards?
>> How many men did the Polish resistance begin with? The Norwegian one? If
>> one
>
> no idea
>
The answer is very few. It's not terribly accurate, but it is enough to let
you understand it is not the number of men one has with that qualifies what
he is doing.
>> single individual ex-soldier keeps his rifle, heads for the mountains,
>> and
>> decides he'll go shooting at the occupiers, what is that man? A
>> collaborationist of the occupiers, because he's alone?
>
> Unless he hits something he is nothing, there were many such fellows
> here and they mostly wasted ammo taking shots at Germans from "very
> safe distance", Germans rarely suffered losses from such attacks.
>
Fine. So did this make them collaborationists of the Germans? Did this make
them firends with the Germans? if the Germans happened to meet one of these
pot-shooters, did they offer him drinks?
What you are arguing is that only an effective, successful resistance can be
called resistance, while everything else is not resistance, or it's even
collaborationism. I suppose you'll conclude the ZOB was no resistance to the
Germans; after all, they tended to wait for the right time, they did not
cause huge casualties on the Germans, they weren't effective and they were
defeated.
>> I'm glad to see this is not contested. AFAIK (I'd need to check) the sum
>> was
>> comparable with that on Tito's head. So it seems at least a very relevant
>> party - the Germans - did think he roughly rated at the same level of
>> threat.
>
> Germans also placed 100 000 Reich marks on Tuvia Bielski, hardly a big
> threat, it seems that it was standard bounty Germans offered for
> anyone they wanted to catch.
Yeah. So in the German eyes, Tito was just anyone, like Mihailovic. So
either Mihailovic was as big a threat as Tito, or Tito was as small a threat
as Mihailovic. You choose, it's the same for me.
>
>> Thank you for confirming my position. If Churchill dropped Mihailovic as
>> an
>> ally (and as late as 1944, I seemed to remember it was 1943, thanks),
>> then
>> before he considered him as an ally.
>
> During 1941 nobody knew what was going on in Yugoslavia, 1942 was
> similarly confusing and it was only during 1943 that there was enough
> Allied missions to get a clear picture based on that intel, SOE
> advised dropping Mihalovic in late 1943 but he was given one last
> chance and give some targets to destroy which he never did. To make
> things more chaotic during 1941-43 Chetniks got credit for most
> Partisans sabotages but during 43-44 credits for few Chetnik sabotages
> went to Partisans.
>
So Churchill may have taken an ill-informed decision. It doesn't change the
decision he made, now does it?
>> So why don't you answer the question the other poster has shirked. We're
>> talking of 1941 exclusively. In that year, Mihailovic considered himself
>> an
>> enemy of the Axis; Churchill considered him an ally; and Hitler placed a
>> bounty prize on his head. All the parties involved evidently agreed
>> Mihailovic and his men were enemies of the Axis. Who else is entitled to
>> decide that well they actually weren't, in 1941, and on what basis?
>
> Mihailovic simply went with the flow, started a resistance which he
> didn't plan to do much until Germans got defeated but was forced to
> join uprising in 1941 and become enemy of Axis once things got rough
> he quickly give up on active resistance idea and decided to try
> sitting on two chairs for the rest of the war attacking occupation
> force just enough so he could claim he was resistance but not enough
> to provoke any kind of response from them - resistance which doesn't
> tie up enemy forces is hardly worth calling resistance.
>
So as mentioned above, you want to reserve to yourself the right to decide
which was a resistance and which was not - regardless of what the decision
makers of all parties involved at the time thought. Additionally, in order
to do that, you have to ignore uncomfortable facts and choose standards to
your liking, which you further do not apply equally or fairly to all
resistance movements.
This is politics, not history, but if you like to do that, go ahead. I'll
stick with history.
Rich Rostrom
> Rich Rostrom wrote:
> > What enemy did Mihailovic's "resistance"
> > organization "resist", when he started it?
>
> Going into forest and declaring yourself a resistance (any fool can do
> that) doesn't automatically make you a resistance in history books,
> you actually have to do some sort of resisting to qualify.
"Mihailovic simply went with the flow, started a resistance ..."
_You_ called it a "resistance".
> > Who but the Axis?
>
> Number of German troops and their activity in Serbia tend to disagree,
>From 1940 until well into 1943, there were very few
German occupation troops in France, Belgium, the
Netherlands, or Norway. Most German forces in these
countries (especially France and Norway) were posted
on the exposed coastlines to guard against Allied
invasion.
Does that mean there was no "resistance" in these
countries?
> > There seems to be confusion here between
> > Mihailovic's "fabian" policy of avoiding open
> > warfare with the Axis until there was a chance
> > of actually defeating them...
> Now you make Mihailovic sound like a military genius...
The same policy was largely followed by the French
resistance (the one attempt at open rebellion by the
Maquis before D-Day was a disaster). It was followed
by the Polish Armee Krajowa (Home Army) who
delayed their open uprising against the Germans
until Allied troops were near enough to support them.
(Those troops were Soviet, and rather than move to
link up with AK, waited passively a few miles away
while the Germans destroyed them.) It was followed
by the Belgian, Dutch, and Norwegian resistance
movements.
> Such passive activities are hardly a consolation to troops dying on
> the front line, idea of resistance is to force occupiers to commit
> extra troops from front line to occupation of regions they thought
> were secured.
IOW, you claim that the _only_ form of resistance
that counts is armed attack on the occupying
forces. Anything else - intelligence gathering,
propaganda, rescue of friendly aircrew or
escaped PoWs - is irrelevant, even if such
activities are viewed by the occupiers as
resistance, and punished by them with
imprisonment or execution.
> Mihailovic already at the end of October 1941 sent two of his aids to
> Germans with offer to cleanup Serbia from communists for which he
> needs 5000 rifles, 350 light and 20 heavy machine guns...
This is an explosive allegation, for which I
would like to see evidence _not_ from
sources controlled by Tito's government.
(Mihailovic's testimony at the 1945 show
trial doesn't count.)
> > Even worse, another poster has repeatedly
> > asserted that the Chetniks were _always_
> > allied with the Wehrmacht, and equates
> > them with the Ustashe.
>
> Not for the start but later they become even worse then Ustashe...
Given the Ustashe's documented enthusiasm
for wholesale murder, which shocked even
many Germans, I find this claim dubious.
Ivan Bajlo
> "Mihailovic simply went with the flow, started a resistance ..."
>
> _You_ called it a "resistance".
I said started, there is a big difference between starting something
and going through with it to the end.
> From 1940 until well into 1943, there were very few
> German occupation troops in France, Belgium, the
> Netherlands, or Norway. Most German forces in these
> countries (especially France and Norway) were posted
> on the exposed coastlines to guard against Allied
> invasion.
>
> Does that mean there was no "resistance" in these
> countries?
I like knowledge on those countries like you apparently lack knowledge
on Yugoslavia but France was only partially occupied until 1942 and
from looking at the map Netherlands looks like poor ground for
resistance unless its urban, Belgium has some rough ground but it
lacks maneuvering space like Poland, Yugoslavia or occupied parts of
Soviet Union. Norway although having great terrain like Greece lacked
food sources in countryside to support larger guerrilla force in the
field - fishing was easily controlled by Germans.
> The same policy was largely followed by the French
> resistance (the one attempt at open rebellion by the
> Maquis before D-Day was a disaster). It was followed
> by the Polish Armee Krajowa (Home Army) who
> delayed their open uprising against the Germans
> until Allied troops were near enough to support them.
> (Those troops were Soviet, and rather than move to
> link up with AK, waited passively a few miles away
> while the Germans destroyed them.) It was followed
Although lot of information on Polish resistance was kept hidden by
communists I recall there was lot more activities before Warsaw
uprising, actions equal to those of Yugoslav partisans:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Wieniec
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zamo%C5%9B%C4%87_Uprising
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Belt
> by the Belgian, Dutch, and Norwegian resistance
> movements.
As mentioned above these countries would have big problems fielding
guerrilla force which needs larger areas of rough ground where there
are few good roads which Germans can use for quick movement.
> IOW, you claim that the _only_ form of resistance
> that counts is armed attack on the occupying
No but if you want to get liberated sooner shooting Nazis will speed
things up a little.
> forces. Anything else - intelligence gathering,
> propaganda, rescue of friendly aircrew or
> escaped PoWs - is irrelevant, even if such
> activities are viewed by the occupiers as
> resistance, and punished by them with
> imprisonment or execution.
So since your are risking your life (and your entire family) already
why not shoot few Nazis?
> This is an explosive allegation, for which I
> would like to see evidence _not_ from
> sources controlled by Tito's government.
If you never heard of Divce meeting then you are hardly informed on
Yugoslavia, The Chetniks by Jozo Tomasevich and Serbian sources are
numerous on this.
http://books.google.com/books?id=yoCaAAAAIAAJ&pg=PA150&dq=divci&ei=Qt0ISpbLOZHGzAS9valW#PPA141,M1
http://books.google.com/books?id=yoCaAAAAIAAJ&pg=PA150&dq=divci&ei=Qt0ISpbLOZHGzAS9valW#PPA149,M1
As mentioned in footnotes, original German documents can be found in
National Archives.
> (Mihailovic's testimony at the 1945 show
> trial doesn't count.)
Mihalovic trial was carefully done beacuse communists need to
dismantle Mihailovic image and reveal his true nature to the people if
they wanted to stabilize their rule. If they created standard show
trail they would have turned him into martyr.
> Given the Ustashe's documented enthusiasm
> for wholesale murder, which shocked even
> many Germans, I find this claim dubious.
Germans brought Ustashe under control during 1942 (all ustashe and
domobrani formations come under direct German command also) beacuse
they needed to exploit key natural resources for their war effort not
to mention they wanted their troops on Russian front not policing
Bosnian mountains. By November 1942 over 10000 Bosnian Chetniks made
agreements with Ustashe government.
Michele
> Rich Rostrom wrote:
>> "Mihailovic simply went with the flow, started a resistance ..."
>>
>> _You_ called it a "resistance".
>
> I said started, there is a big difference between starting something
> and going through with it to the end.
>
So your position is that only a successful resistance can be called a
resistance?
By this you have ruled out that the Jewish fighting the Germans in the
Warsaw Ghetto were a resistance.
Or is the idea that resisting in 1941 is somehow made non-existant by
changing sides later?
If that is the idea, then the Italian, Romanian, Finnish troops never fought
with the Axis - because you know, they changed sides too, like Mihailovic.
You do understand your positions seem remarkably 1984-ish.
Rich Rostrom
>
>... from looking at the map Netherlands looks like poor ground for
> resistance unless its urban, Belgium has some rough ground but it
> lacks maneuvering space ... Norway although having great terrain like Greece lacked
> food sources in countryside to support larger guerrilla force...
IOW, yes - in your view, if there was no armed attack on
German forces, there was no "resistance". That is a
definition not shared by anyone else that I know of.
> > IOW, you claim that the _only_ form of resistance
> > that counts is armed attack on the occupying forces.
>
> No but if you want to get liberated sooner shooting Nazis will speed
> things up a little.
Really? Even when at most only a few Germans
could be killed, and every German killed would
be answered with reprisal shootings of ten or
one hundred people?
There is an old saying: When you strike a king,
strike to kill.
> So since your are risking your life (and your entire family) already
> why not shoot few Nazis?
There is a difference between covert operations
which when successful will avoid any reprisals,
and open warfare that _guarantees_ massive
reprisals far in excess of any damage done to
the enemy.
Even the Partisans recognized there were times
to fight and times to hold back. On many occasions
Partisans chose not to kill a German, merely
because fifty or a hundred of them would have
been killed by the German reaction.
Of course there were times when they said
"Damn the reprisals, open fire!"
Stevan K. Pavlowitch in _Hitler's New Disorder:
The Second World War in Yugoslavia_ cites
German reports that "the initial insurgence in Serbia
was put down with the cost of thirty three thousand
lives of Partisan fighters or Serbian hostages while
German casualties numbered 203. Similarly the
number of Partisan casualties and executed prisoners
after the Kozara battle reached twenty six thousand
with German casualties being thirty three killed,
eighty injured and thirty three missing in action."
It is hard to see how such disasters did anything
to advance the liberation of Yugoslavia. At a this
sort of ratio (about 180-to-1), the entire population
of Yugoslavia would die to eliminate one German
division.
> > This is an explosive allegation, for which I
> > would like to see evidence _not_ from
> > sources controlled by Tito's government.
>
> If you never heard of Divce meeting then you are hardly informed on
> Yugoslavia, The Chetniks by Jozo Tomasevich and Serbian sources are
> numerous on this.
> http://books.google.com/books?id=yoCaAAAAIAAJ&pg=PA150&dq=divci&ei=Qt...
> http://books.google.com/books?id=yoCaAAAAIAAJ&pg=PA150&dq=divci&ei=Qt...
If you are going to include a URL, include it
only once. Tomasevich seems to be an
authority, but I do not trust any source
until I have verified its reliability.
Ivan Bajlo
> IOW, yes - in your view, if there was no armed attack on
> German forces, there was no "resistance". That is a
> definition not shared by anyone else that I know of.
I'm talking about developing resistance beyond the scope of covert
operations and small scale sabotages, you need to have certain
environment to be able to do it. It is kind a difficult to move
thousand armed soldiers through streets of Paris without Germans
noticing it. And force of any strength will easily be destroyed if
caught in the open ground so for expanding from covert operations you
need large forested and mountains area which still have enough local
population to feed guerrilla.
> Really? Evenf when at most only a ew Germans
> could be killed, and every German killed would
> be answered with reprisal shootings of ten or
> one hundred people?
If the Germans notice that reprisals have effect they will carry them
out but if they see that it has negative effect and only creates more
hatred towards them they'll be forced to give it up.
2nd Panzer Army had almost 8000 dead from September '43 to December
'44
http://www.vojska.net/eng/world-war-2/germany/casualties/pzaok2/
So they were suppose to shot 800 000 persons in reprisals (1 for 100)
but it seems there weren't that many reprisals in that period and when
they did it often completely missed their target and only helped
resistance - 7th SS Prinz Eugen got ambushed near Sinj and in reprisal
massacred several villages nearby only to turn out that these villages
were made up of Catholic Croats with majority of male population
serving in Ustashe or regular Domobrani, this only increased desertion
of regular Domobrani to Partisan ranks.
> There is a difference between covert operations
> which when successful will avoid any reprisals,
> and open warfare that _guarantees_ massive
> reprisals far in excess of any damage done to
> the enemy.
What classify as covert operations which don't get reprisals? Germans
usually shot anyone sabotaging them in any way.
> Even the Partisans recognized there were times
> to fight and times to hold back. On many occasions
> Partisans chose not to kill a German, merely
> because fifty or a hundred of them would have
> been killed by the German reaction.
Yugoslav communist carried out several high ranking assassination
despite the fact that in retaliation many high ranking communist in
Axis prisons were executed and in the end they won, hmm.
> Stevan K. Pavlowitch in _Hitler's New Disorder:
> The Second World War in Yugoslavia_ cites
> German reports that "the initial insurgence in Serbia
> was put down with the cost of thirty three thousand
> lives of Partisan fighters or Serbian hostages while
> German casualties numbered 203. Similarly the
These numbers cover entire period or only crushing of uprising? Most
German losses are inflicted by ambushes and attacks on isolated
garrisons not against well prepared attacking force.
> number of Partisan casualties and executed prisoners
> after the Kozara battle reached twenty six thousand
> with German casualties being thirty three killed,
> eighty injured and thirty three missing in action."
Something is wrong with does numbers. Around 68 600 civilians were
sent to the concentration camps, as forced workers to Germany or
relocated to other regions and post war causalities mentions that 24
483 persons from Kozara region died as victims of fascism during
entire war of which two thirds or around 16000 are mentioned to have
died as result of this single battle.
I got no data for German losses but Ustashi and Domobrani suffered
significant losses during Kozara operation. Partisans estimate their
losses at around 1900.
But it is pointless to compare casualties of Kozara operation, region
had large number of Serbs (back in 1931 there were 137 719 Serbs, 32
613 Muslims, 25 651 Croats, 1643 Germans, 1337 Ukrainians and some
Italians) and if didn't rebel and fought they would be sent to
concentration camp by Ustashe anyway.
Decision to remove most of Kozara population is strategic one and has
little to do with reprisals, mountain was very close to the vital
Zagreb-Belgrade railway plus it also served as Partisan base against
iron ore mine in Ljubije near Prijedor which Germans were exploiting
until Partisans took Prijedor not to mention the fact that Kozara was
thorn for Ustashe regime since it was threatening Banja Luka which was
planed to become capital by Ustashe.
Kozara operation tied down over 40000 Axis troops out of which 15000
Germans, 21000 Croatian Ustasha and Domobrani plus 2000 local Chetniks
and knowing that Partisan units evaded destruction further 11000 Axis
troops remained in the area afterwords as garrison.
> It is hard to see how such disasters did anything
> to advance the liberation of Yugoslavia. At a this
> sort of ratio (about 180-to-1), the entire population
> of Yugoslavia would die to eliminate one German
> division.
Choosing two extreme cases to prove a point? There were thousands of
Partisans attack during that period, the fact that they forced Axis to
commit 40000 troops to some Bosnian mountain just proves how much
trouble was steered up.
Rich Rostrom
> Rich Rostrom wrote:
> > IOW, yes - in your view, if there was no armed attack on
> > German forces, there was no "resistance". That is a
> > definition not shared by anyone else that I know of.
>
> I'm talking about developing resistance beyond the scope of covert
> operations and small scale sabotages, you need to have certain
> environment to be able to do it.
That is not the question. The question
is whether anti-occupation activities
other than armed attack on the occupation
forces count as "resistance". You asserted
that because Mihailovic did not support
such attacks, his force was not a "resistance
force".
In France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and
Norway, there were very few such attacks.
Yet the "underground forces" in these
countries are recognized as "resistance
forces".
> > Really? Evenf when at most only a ew Germans
> > could be killed, and every German killed would
> > be answered with reprisal shootings of ten or
> > one hundred people?
>
> If the Germans notice that reprisals have effect they will carry them
> out but if they see that it has negative effect and only creates more
> hatred towards them they'll be forced to give it up.
Reprisal shootings were very effective in
some situations. For one thing, they caused
some people in occupied countries to oppose
"guerrilla" attacks for which _they_ would pay
the price.
> ...7th SS Prinz Eugen got ambushed near Sinj and in reprisal
> massacred several villages nearby only to turn out that these villages
> were made up of Catholic Croats...
Shooting the wrong people doesn't work,
of course. But occupier stupidity is hardly
to be expected.
> > There is a difference between covert operations
> > which when successful will avoid any reprisals,
> > and open warfare that _guarantees_ massive
> > reprisals far in excess of any damage done to
> > the enemy.
>
> What classify as covert operations which don't get reprisals?
Rescuing aircrew.
Spying.
Propaganda.
Sabotage.
> Germans usually shot anyone sabotaging them in any way.
_If_ they were caught.
As a rule, reprisal executions were reserved
for occasions when German personnel were killed.
> > ... On many occasions Partisans chose not to kill a German, merely
> > because fifty or a hundred of them would have been killed by the German reaction.
>
> Yugoslav communist carried out several high ranking assassination
> despite the fact that in retaliation many high ranking communist in
> Axis prisons were executed and in the end they won, hmm.
Because the Soviet army marched into
Germany from the East and the British and
American armies marched in from the west
and south. Partisan activities such as these
assassinations made only a very small
contribution to the defeat of the German
armed forces, at a very high price.
However, while the targeted assassination
of a "high value target" might be justified,
even in the event of severe reprisals, was
it worth the sacrifice of 50 or 100 people
merely to kill a random Landser?
> But it is pointless to compare casualties of Kozara operation, region
> had large number of Serbs (back in 1931 there were 137 719 Serbs, 32
> 613 Muslims, 25 651 Croats, 1643 Germans, 1337 Ukrainians and some
> Italians) and if didn't rebel and fought they would be sent to
> concentration camp by Ustashe anyway.
Resisting massacre is a non-decision. But
there is always a question of when the extreme
measure of open warfare with its certain high
cost is justified. To say that it is at all times
appropriate is reckless.
A clever occupier can "boil the lobster slowly".
> > It is hard to see how such disasters did anything
> > to advance the liberation of Yugoslavia. At a this
> > sort of ratio (about 180-to-1), the entire population
> > of Yugoslavia would die to eliminate one German
> > division.
>
> Choosing two extreme cases to prove a point? There were thousands of
> Partisans attack during that period, the fact that they forced Axis to
> commit 40000 troops to some Bosnian mountain just proves how much
> trouble was steered up.
quoting from earlier section
> 2nd Panzer Army had almost 8000 dead from September '43 to December '44.
The article linked indicates fewer than 6,000
German dead before 9/1/44, at which time
Soviet forces approached from the East,
Germans abandoned the attempt to occupy
Yugoslavia. II Panzer Army then fought
Partisan and Soviet forces in the field, for
the rest of 1944.
During the previous year of guerrilla warfare
September 1943-August 1944 there were
(accordingh to that table)
only about 27,000 German casualties of
all sorts, against at least 200,000 Yugoslav
dead and who knows how many wounded.
This doesn't strike me as proportionate.
Ivan Bajlo
> That is not the question. The question
> is whether anti-occupation activities
> other than armed attack on the occupation
> forces count as "resistance". You asserted
> that because Mihailovic did not support
> such attacks, his force was not a "resistance
> force".
No I said beacuse Mihailovic wasn't doing almost anything besides
fighting communists (with guns received from Axis) he cannot be
considered a resistance. Those few acts of resistance carried out by
Chetniks had less weight then communist show trails since their main
purpose was to show Allies that Chetniks are "resistance" once Allies
give up on Chetniks, Chetniks give up on pretending to be a
"resistance".
> In France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and
> Norway, there were very few such attacks.
> Yet the "underground forces" in these
> countries are recognized as "resistance
> forces".
Did those resistances collaborate with Nazis to get weapons in order
to fight communist resistance? Those resistances had their bases in
urban areas which are ill suited to large armed formations, Mihalovic
base was in countryside and he managed to maintain several large armed
formations and instead of committing them into fight against Axis he
used them to fight communist resistance and you claim he was a
resistance??? Only if you count his resistance to communist rule from
May 1945 on.
> Reprisal shootings were very effective in
> some situations. For one thing, they caused
> some people in occupied countries to oppose
> "guerrilla" attacks for which _they_ would pay
> the price.
If people prefer living under Nazi boot then dying fight them why
waste lives to liberate them?
> Shooting the wrong people doesn't work,
> of course. But occupier stupidity is hardly
> to be expected.
Such instance were numerous in Yugoslavia, Germans made very little
distinction between Slavs so they ended up doing very good job of
turning population towards Partisans (Italians did even better job
since they attempted to Italianize local population)
> Rescuing aircrew.
Any caught hiding them got shot.
> Spying.
Same.
> Propaganda.
Same.
> Sabotage.
I seriously doubt that Germans would be so lenient towards local
population to tolerate acts of sabotages and wouldn't round up bunch
of people and shot them, they left entire Netherlands to starve to
death after railway strike - that is 18000 dead for ZERO German
soldiers! It would have been better to make uprising at lest some
nazis would get killed.
> _If_ they were caught.
>
> As a rule, reprisal executions were reserved
> for occasions when German personnel were killed.
Maybe in the west but not in the east.
> Because the Soviet army marched into
> Germany from the East and the British and
> American armies marched in from the west
> and south. Partisan activities such as these
> assassinations made only a very small
> contribution to the defeat of the German
> armed forces, at a very high price.
Soviet army also suffered horrendous casualties during first two years
of the war does that means they should have surrendered in 1941 to
save lives???
> However, while the targeted assassination
> of a "high value target" might be justified,
> even in the event of severe reprisals, was
> it worth the sacrifice of 50 or 100 people
> merely to kill a random Landser?
Do you really believe that Germans shot even 50 or 100 people for
every solider they lost in Yugoslavia? One million Yugoslavs died
during the war and only around 650000 of these were Partisans and
civilians, others died as members of Axis formations and lot more then
6500 or 13000 Germans died in Yugoslavia.
> Resisting massacre is a non-decision. But
> there is always a question of when the extreme
> measure of open warfare with its certain high
> cost is justified. To say that it is at all times
> appropriate is reckless.
Partisans rarely engaged in open warfare and German reprisals dwindled
with time as they realized they have little effect.
> A clever occupier can "boil the lobster slowly".
Ustashe weren't clever, unlike Nazis who exterminated people
methodically in the beginning Ustashe wild gangs would go around
murdering people at random, this give many of them plenty of warning
to hide in the woods and organize themselves to fight them.
> During the previous year of guerrilla warfare
> September 1943-August 1944 there were
> (accordingh to that table)
> only about 27,000 German casualties of
> all sorts, against at least 200,000 Yugoslav
> dead and who knows how many wounded.
Where did you find number of 200,000?
For 1944 Yugoslav Partisans list 80650 killed, 8066 who died from
wounds.
http://www.vojska.net/eng/world-war-2/yugoslavia/statistics/losses/
German losses don't cover formations not part of 2. Panzer Army and
none of the collaborations forces which suffered huge casualties
during that period.
> This doesn't strike me as proportionate.
And Soviet army losses do?
Michele
>
> No I said beacuse Mihailovic wasn't doing almost anything besides
> fighting communists (with guns received from Axis) he cannot be
> considered a resistance.
and
> Did those resistances collaborate with Nazis to get weapons in order
> to fight communist resistance?
Look, nobody has ever claimed that by the end of the war, the Chetniks were
a staunch enemy of the Axis and an ally of the Allies.
On the other hand, I have claimed that immediately after the defeat of the
Yugoslavian regular forces in 1941 and for some time after that, Mihailovic
and his men were enemies of the Axis, and I provided the vidence for that.
Now, continuing to mention Mihailovic's hostility towards Communists and the
arms supplies by the Germans will not serve to make your point because, as
you very well know, at the time we're talking about - 1941 - the Germans
weren't supplying Mihailovic with guns.
So could we please leave the red herring aside?
Those few acts of resistance carried out by
> Chetniks had less weight then communist show trails since their main
> purpose was to show Allies that Chetniks are "resistance" once Allies
> give up on Chetniks, Chetniks give up on pretending to be a
> "resistance".
>
So have you got a reputable source stating that the Chetnik attacks on the
Germans were for show, that their only purpose was to convince the Western
Allies that they were partisans? Or is it your personal opinion? Or does it
come from some patriotic account of the Partisan (with capital P) war?
Michele
> Rich Rostrom wrote:
>> IOW, yes - in your view, if there was no armed attack on
>> German forces, there was no "resistance". That is a
>> definition not shared by anyone else that I know of.
>
> I'm talking about developing resistance beyond the scope of covert
> operations and small scale sabotages,
Which confirms that you want to own the right to define what qualifies as
resistance, regardless of the fact that any reputable historian disagrees
with you. You are entitled to your own opinion of course, I'd just like you
to be aware it is not held by anyone else.
>
> Choosing two extreme cases to prove a point? There were thousands of
> Partisans attack during that period, the fact that they forced Axis to
> commit 40000 troops to some Bosnian mountain just proves how much
> trouble was steered up.
>
While interesting, all of this is quite beside the point. No reputable
historian holds the ludicrous position that the AK, whose stated policy was
to conserve strenght, train, prepare and wait for the right moment to
strike, was not a resistance movement for this reason. You might be right
that this isn't the right choice (possibly depending on the terrain type),
or you might be wrong - it's irrelevant.
(Of course, it is somewhat surprising that on the one hand you claim
Mihailovic had very few men at the beginning, and on the other you criticize
him for not attacking immediately - unless the unstated wish was a Kamikaze behavior that would solve the entire problem).
The point is that your peculiar views are at odds with the established
historiography of the resistance movements against the Axis in WWII. It is
probabiy only a coincidence that your very personal opinion is ideally
suited to select only one of the Yugoslavian organizations as "the real
resistance" - not just at the end of the war or on balance, but in any given
year of the war.
Ivan Bajlo
> Which confirms that you want to own the right to define what qualifies as
> resistance, regardless of the fact that any reputable historian disagrees
> with you.
Name one?
> While interesting, all of this is quite beside the point. No reputable
> historian holds the ludicrous position that the AK, whose stated policy was
> to conserve strenght, train, prepare and wait for the right moment to
> strike, was not a resistance movement for this reason. You might be right
> that this isn't the right choice (possibly depending on the terrain type),
> or you might be wrong - it's irrelevant.
I don't recall AK asking Germans for guns to fight other resistance
movements.
> (Of course, it is somewhat surprising that on the one hand you claim
> Mihailovic had very few men at the beginning, and on the other you criticize
> him for not attacking immediately - unless the unstated wish was a Kamikaze behavior that would solve the entire problem).
>
Mihailovic has excuses for not acting the minute he decided to start
his resistance but he got situation handed to him on silver platter -
Ustashe persecution of Serbs - while his decision to avoid fighting
Germans in Serbia might have been tactical successes but strategic
failure in a long term, his decision stay in Serbia instead of moving
his base of operation to Bosnia like Tito turned out to be
catastrophic failure, Partisans benefited the most by increasing their
ranks while small and spread out Chetniks forces were forced to seek
protection of Axis forces.
Ivan Bajlo
> Yugoslavian regular forces in 1941 and for some time after that, Mihailovic
> and his men were enemies of the Axis, and I provided the vidence for that.
Which evidence? Having bounty on your head only means Germans think of
you as a bandit, lot of that occurred during the war in Yugoslavia,
including some German soldiers who got lost and simply became looters.
> Now, continuing to mention Mihailovic's hostility towards Communists and the
> arms supplies by the Germans will not serve to make your point because, as
> you very well know, at the time we're talking about - 1941 - the Germans
> weren't supplying Mihailovic with guns.
Only because they didn't take him seriously, the fact remains that he
asked for guns and would have used them against communists if he got
them like he used guns communists give him just before he attacked
them.
> So have you got a reputable source stating that the Chetnik attacks on the
> Germans were for show, that their only purpose was to convince the Western
> Allies that they were partisans? Or is it your personal opinion? Or does it
> come from some patriotic account of the Partisan (with capital P) war?
Read the book it took several British requests to get Mihailovic into
action and even then it was barely symbolic.
Rich Rostrom
> On May 14, 1:44 am, Rich Rostrom <rrostrom.21stcent...@rcn.com> wrote:
>
> > You asserted that because Mihailovic did not support
> > such attacks, his force was not a "resistance force".
>
> No I said beacuse Mihailovic wasn't doing almost anything besides
Wrong. Here is your statement:
----
Going into forest and declaring yourself a resistance (any fool can do
that) doesn't automatically make you a resistance in history books,
you actually have to do some sort of resisting to qualify.
...
Felix Benzler in his report from 12 September 1941 reports that
Chetnik groups are taking hostile stand against Germans but no armed
conflicts occurred with them yet.
----
Neither you (nor the earlier poster)
cited attacks on Communists in
1941 as evidence against the Chetniks;
only failure to attack Germans.
> Those few acts of resistance carried out by
> Chetniks had less weight then communist show trails since their main
> purpose was to show Allies that Chetniks are "resistance"...
They were enough to convince the Germans
that Mihailovic and the Chetniks were hostile,
since the Germans treated them as hostile for
a considerable period. How insanely stupid the
Germans must have been, to declare Mihailovic
an enemy and offer a reward for his capture,
when for two years he had been doing nothing
but attack Communists.
Incidentally, are you aware that the Communist-
controlled faction of the Greek Resistance
attacked and largely destroyed the non-Communist
faction? Or that the Communist resistance in
Indo-China (led by Ho Chi Minh) informed the
Japanese occupiers about other resistance groups
(thus insuring that by the end of the war, Ho's
faction would be the only resisters left)?
There is evidence that the Communists used their
control of the Partisan movement to destroy
political opponents who were _not_ collaborators
with the Axis.
> > In France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Norway, there were very few such attacks.
> > Yet the "underground forces" in these countries are recognized as "resistance forces".
>
> ... Those resistances had their bases in
> urban areas which are ill suited to large armed formations...
France was over twice the size of Yugoslavia, with large
rural and mountainous areas. Population density was
only slightly greater. Belgium was much more densely
populated, but 1/3 of Belgium is the Ardennes Forest.
Denmark is a bit more densely populated than France,
but is divided into numerous large and small islands.
Norway is mostly wilderness. In none of these countries
did Resistance forces try to emulate the Partisans by
attacking German forces without immediate prospect
of US/UK forces arriving. (The French Maquis attempted
a premature uprising in the Vercors region in June 1944;
the entire force was destroyed with only minor German
losses.)
> > Reprisal shootings were very effective in some situations. For one thing, they caused
> > some people in occupied countries to oppose "guerrilla" attacks for which _they_ would pay
> > the price.
>
> If people prefer living under Nazi boot then dying fight them why
> waste lives to liberate them?
This sort of thinking would fit right in with the Japanese
Army's plan for the entire population to die in suicide
attacks with minimal weapons rather than submit to
occupation.
> > Shooting the wrong people doesn't work,
> > of course. But occupier stupidity is hardly
> > to be expected.
>
>
> > Rescuing aircrew... Spying... Propaganda.
> Any caught hiding them got shot... Same... Same.
I hope you can see the difference
between actions which _risk_ one's
own life, and actions which will
_certainly_ sacrifice the lives of
others.
> > Sabotage.
>
> I seriously doubt that Germans would be so lenient towards local
> population to tolerate acts of sabotages and wouldn't round up bunch
> of people and shot them...
If so, then such reprisals should be well
known in the historical record. Perhaps
some examples could be given.
> > Partisan activities such as these assassinations made only a very small
> > contribution to the defeat of the German armed forces, at a very high price.
>
> Soviet army also suffered horrendous casualties during first two years
> of the war does that means they should have surrendered in 1941 to
> save lives???
Soviet resistance to Axis attack in 1941
had actual useful results besides Axis
casualties - preventing Axis forces from
occupying more Soviet territory.
When did Partisan operations hold any
territory against Axis attack?
And it should be noted that in the
winter offensive of 1941-42, Soviet
forces pressed their counterattacks
beyond the useful point, and ultimately
lost huge numbers of troops for
negligible gains. Other troops were
sacrificed at times to hold indefensible
positions. There are times when
all-out offensive or never-give-an-inch
defense plays into the enemy's hands.
As for assassinations of individual
leaders: in 1943 Czech resisters
assassinated "Hangman" Heydrich.
The Germans then masscred the
residents of the village of Lidice in
reprisal: 180 were killed at once, and
another 200 were sent to a
concentration camp of which 50 died.
Heydrich certainly needed killing;
but what did his death do to advance
the defeat of Germany? Was it worth
over 200 lives?
> > was it worth the sacrifice of 50 or 100 people merely to kill a random Landser?
>
> Do you really believe that Germans shot even 50 or 100 people for
> every soldier they lost in Yugoslavia?
No, of course not. But you mentioned the
assassination of German commanders and
leaders, carried out despite reprisal executions
of some large number of Partisan prisoners.
Such trade-offs may have to be made, but
they are not something to be done automatically.
If the killing of some Germans was answered
by the execution of an equal number of hostages,
was the exchange worth while? What if five times
as many hostages were killed? Or ten times?
> Partisans rarely engaged in open warfare...
I thought that was the definition of "resistance".
Also that open warfare by Partisans engaged
large numbers of Axis troops. But I guess not.
> > A clever occupier can "boil the lobster slowly".
>
> Ustashe weren't clever...
Has anyone said they were? My
point was the difficulty of deciding
when open armed resistance is
required.
Such resistance is an "all-in" move,
to use a poker metaphor. If it fails,
complete massacre is likely to follow
immediately. But _if_ that is the enemy's
long-term intent, there's nothing to lose.
_If_.
> > During the previous year of guerrilla warfare
> > September 1943-August 1944 there were (accordingh to that table)
> > only about 27,000 German casualties of all sorts, against at least
> > 200,000 Yugoslav dead and who knows how many wounded.
>
> Where did you find number of 200,000?
An estimate.
Given that about 1M Yugoslavs died in the
war from April 1941- May 1945, it seems likely
at least 200,000 perished in September 1943-
August 1944, especially since after October
1944, the Germans had been driven out of
most of Yugoslavia.
> For 1944 Yugoslav Partisans list 80650 killed, 8066 who died from
> wounds. http://www.vojska.net/eng/world-war-2/yugoslavia/statistics/losses/
I see this is your personal web site.
It is bit bold to cite yourself as an
authority.
However this lists only Partisan
casualties, not deaths from German
reprisals or collateral casualties.
The total of Partisan dead given
is 306K; this obviously omits most
of the war deaths. Of course many
Ustashe and other satellite forces
were killed; but I see no reason not to
think that the vast majority of additional
deaths were also victims of the Axis.
Michele
> On May 14, 7:14 pm, "Michele" <don'tspammeat...@tln.it> wrote:
>> On the other hand, I have claimed that immediately after the defeat of
>> the
>> Yugoslavian regular forces in 1941 and for some time after that,
>> Mihailovic
>> and his men were enemies of the Axis, and I provided the vidence for
>> that.
>
> Which evidence? Having bounty on your head only means Germans think of
> you as a bandit, lot of that occurred during the war in Yugoslavia,
> including some German soldiers who got lost and simply became looters.
Right. So the same applies to Tito. The Germans placed a bounty on his head,
they thought of him as a bandit.
Now that you mention it, "Banditen" was exactly the term the Germans
employed for partisans in plenty of other countries, for instance in Italy.
>
>> Now, continuing to mention Mihailovic's hostility towards Communists and
>> the
>> arms supplies by the Germans will not serve to make your point because,
>> as
>> you very well know, at the time we're talking about - 1941 - the Germans
>> weren't supplying Mihailovic with guns.
>
> Only because they didn't take him seriously, the fact remains that he
> asked for guns and would have used them against communists if he got
> them like he used guns communists give him just before he attacked
> them.
>
You're very dodgy when it comes to dating the events you quote. When did he
ask for guns? When did he receive guns by the communists? When did he attack
the communists? Go ahead, place some dates.
>> So have you got a reputable source stating that the Chetnik attacks on
>> the
>> Germans were for show, that their only purpose was to convince the
>> Western
>> Allies that they were partisans? Or is it your personal opinion? Or does
>> it
>> come from some patriotic account of the Partisan (with capital P) war?
>
> Read the book it took several British requests to get Mihailovic into
> action and even then it was barely symbolic.
>
Which is not the same as claiming that the attacks were merely for show. It
is one thing to say that an operation is carried out half-heartedly, because
the arms supplier insist that something be done; it is entirely different to
claim that the operation is carried out in full bad faith, in order to
deceive the arms supplier into believing something that is not true.
You have claimed the latter, not the former, and something tells me you have
no evidence to back this up.
As a side note, the former could be applied to the early communist
resistance in France. They were poorly armed and trained, but when the push
came to shove in the Soviet Union in 1941, they were ordered to act
immediately, to do something now - and they did, and they paid the price of
their lack of preparation. The outcome of their first operations can be
defined as "barely symbolic".
Do they qualify as attacks carried out "for show", then?
The overall problem with your positions is that I'll always test them by
applying them to other resistance movements. Either what you state can be
applied as a general rule, or it will be exposed as a double standard. This
far, it's always remained a double standard which you apply to the Chetniks
but which gives ridiculous results if applied anywhere else - which means it
is actually to be discarded for the Chetniks too.
Michele
news:66ba4984-6344-40ae...@o20g2000vbh.googlegroups.com...
>
> Incidentally, are you aware that the Communist-
> controlled faction of the Greek Resistance
> attacked and largely destroyed the non-Communist
> faction? Or that the Communist resistance in
> Indo-China (led by Ho Chi Minh) informed the
> Japanese occupiers about other resistance groups
> (thus insuring that by the end of the war, Ho's
> faction would be the only resisters left)?
>
> There is evidence that the Communists used their
> control of the Partisan movement to destroy
> political opponents who were _not_ collaborators
> with the Axis.
>
For that matter, Yugoslavian-influenced Italian Communist partisans
operating in Italy near the Yugoslavian border rounded up and murdered the
leaders of a non-Communist brigade operating roughly in the same area. The -
ludicrous - accusation was that they were collaborating with the Fascists.
After the war, the Communists morphed this unsustainable accusation into an
accusation that these non-Communists would be likely to object to the
Yugoslavian plan to shift the border much farther West than it actually went
in the end.
The basic underlying fact is that some resistance movements saw the
guerrilla as a war to get rid of foreign occupiers and/or Nazi-fascism. The
Communists, on the other hand, saw the guerrilla as a war to gain power for
themselves by violent means. It's a noticeable difference.
Michele
news:66ba4984-6344-40ae...@o20g2000vbh.googlegroups.com...
>
> As for assassinations of individual
> leaders: in 1943 Czech resisters
> assassinated "Hangman" Heydrich.
> The Germans then masscred the
> residents of the village of Lidice in
> reprisal: 180 were killed at once, and
> another 200 were sent to a
> concentration camp of which 50 died.
>
> Heydrich certainly needed killing;
> but what did his death do to advance
> the defeat of Germany? Was it worth
> over 200 lives?
It did achieve a significant result, and it is the same result that was
typically, explicitly and, I'd add, cold-bloodedly predicted in Communist
resistance and guerrilla doctrine and planning. It is usually summed up as
"the worse the better".
There are sources that claim that Heydrich was relatively popular with
certain sectors of the Protectorate's population. That was, alone, a good
reason for the Allies to want him dead. Additionally, the predictable and
unavoidable reprisal would certainly generate more Czech haters of the
German rule. Reprisals are not a bad thing in this theory, because they help
polarization. Collaborators are bad, but masses of passive citizens who
refuse to take sides are even worse if you are out not just to win a war but
to win a revolution in the war or right after it.
Michele
> On May 14, 7:14 pm, "Michele" <don'tspammeat...@tln.it> wrote:
>> Which confirms that you want to own the right to define what qualifies as
>> resistance, regardless of the fact that any reputable historian disagrees
>> with you.
>
> Name one?
>
Sure. Andrzej Kunert, Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, and of course Norman Davies;
they all agree the Armia Krajowa was a resistance movement even at the time
when it spent most of its time organizing, gathering intelligence,
husbanding its resources and strength, making propaganda, and carrying out
carefully selected sabotage acts.
And frankly, I'd be surprised if _you_ could name a reputable historian who
thinks the above is not resistance.
>> While interesting, all of this is quite beside the point. No reputable
>> historian holds the ludicrous position that the AK, whose stated policy
>> was
>> to conserve strenght, train, prepare and wait for the right moment to
>> strike, was not a resistance movement for this reason. You might be right
>> that this isn't the right choice (possibly depending on the terrain
>> type),
>> or you might be wrong - it's irrelevant.
>
> I don't recall AK asking Germans for guns to fight other resistance
> movements.
>
Sure. By the same token, the Italian CIL was fully outfitted by the British
by late 1944. This clearly means the Italians never fought the British in
WWII, by your reasoning. Which, as I mentioned, is really 1984-ish.
Orwellian.
Nobody has ever claimed Mihailovic did not end up on the Axis side. What I
have claimed is that in 1941 he wasn't on that side, at the very least, and
that everybody interested in the issue thought at the time he actually was
on the other side. This is what you steadfastly try to dodge, to no avail
because everyone sees you attempting that.
>> (Of course, it is somewhat surprising that on the one hand you claim
>> Mihailovic had very few men at the beginning, and on the other you
>> criticize
>> him for not attacking immediately - unless the unstated wish was a
>> Kamikaze behavior that would solve the entire problem).
>>
>
> Mihailovic has excuses
excuses or reasons?
for not acting the minute he decided to start
> his resistance
so was it that?
Ivan Bajlo
> Neither you (nor the earlier poster)
> cited attacks on Communists in
> 1941 as evidence against the Chetniks;
> only failure to attack Germans.
I said Mihailovic wasn't doing anything besides attacking communist
resistance so if the communists didn't show up he still wouldn't do
anything besides sitting on his mountain and watching Germans do
whatever they want unopposed - anyone can do that.
> They were enough to convince the Germans
> that Mihailovic and the Chetniks were hostile,
> since the Germans treated them as hostile for
> a considerable period. How insanely stupid the
> Germans must have been, to declare Mihailovic
> an enemy and offer a reward for his capture,
> when for two years he had been doing nothing
> but attack Communists.
Germans had little clue about who was attacking them as did everyone
else outside Yugoslavia, at Divce meeting they were trying to get
information from Mihailovic on who was actually communist leadership.
Germans classified all hostile forces as bandits and wanted to destroy/
disarm all of them it took them sometime before they partially copied
Italian occupation model in which Chetniks are used as part of anti-
communist militia.
> Incidentally, are you aware that the Communist-
> controlled faction of the Greek Resistance
> attacked and largely destroyed the non-Communist
> faction? Or that the Communist resistance in
> Indo-China (led by Ho Chi Minh) informed the
> Japanese occupiers about other resistance groups
> (thus insuring that by the end of the war, Ho's
> faction would be the only resisters left)?
Yugoslav and Greek communist were well connected so I wouldn't be
surprised if Greek decision to attack was influenced by developments
in Yugoslavia and ELAS didn't want to be attacked from behind like
Tito, also British intervention in Greece influenced Tito to become
suspicious of British intentions and forbid western Allies to land
major force on Yugoslav mainland even if it would greatly benefit his
struggle against Germans.
I doubt news from Vietnam were well known in Yugoslavia.
> There is evidence that the Communists used their
> control of the Partisan movement to destroy
> political opponents who were _not_ collaborators
> with the Axis.
'Left deviations' were one of the major cause why many early Partisans
formations fell apart, communist attempted already in 1941 to fight
anyone they considered enemies of the revolution (another thing that
was served to Mihailovic on silver platter and he managed to only to
gain minimal benefits from it). Communist decided to change their
strategy after this failure and concentrate on fighting Axis (besides
Chetniks) and leave revolutionary ideas to be implemented after the
war when many of those who actively supported Partisans perished as
class enemies.
> France was over twice the size of Yugoslavia, with large
> rural and mountainous areas. Population density was
But it wasn't occupied as a whole until 1942 and I don't recall Vichy
government giving some support and providing bases for resistance.
> only slightly greater. Belgium was much more densely
> populated, but 1/3 of Belgium is the Ardennes Forest.
IIRC Ardennes have a good road network or Germans wouldn't have used
them for two of their offensives, roads are death to any guerrilla
force since it allows Germans motorized units to react quickly - often
Partisan attacks on major towns got foiled when garrison got
reinforcements in once case German 92. Motorized Brigade come from
Hungary just in time!
> Denmark is a bit more densely populated than France,
> but is divided into numerous large and small islands.
Islands can be death traps for guerrillas as Partisans learned the
hard way (as did the British in Dodecanese), only very large island
like Crete can significant guerrilla force.
http://www.vojska.net/eng/world-war-2/operation/herbstgewitter-1943/
Germans also suffered heavy losses from joint Allies-Partisan landing
operations so it works both ways.
> Norway is mostly wilderness. In none of these countries
But like Greece it is depended on outside source for food since
Germans can easily control fishing, guerrillas can't really sustain
larger numbers on foraging and what they can get from local
populations not to mention really harsh climate requiring well built
shelters during winter months which is why Germans launched their
major anti-partisan operations during winter.
> did Resistance forces try to emulate the Partisans by
> attacking German forces without immediate prospect
> of US/UK forces arriving. (The French Maquis attempted
> a premature uprising in the Vercors region in June 1944;
> the entire force was destroyed with only minor German
> losses.)
They probably expected Germans to come on foot and got surprised by
airborne landing like Tito at Drvar when his best units were deployed
facing Axis troops preparing to attacks his free state.
> This sort of thinking would fit right in with the Japanese
> Army's plan for the entire population to die in suicide
> attacks with minimal weapons rather than submit to
> occupation.
And you would prefer living under such regime instead of fighting it?
> I hope you can see the difference
> between actions which _risk_ one's
> own life, and actions which will
> _certainly_ sacrifice the lives of
> others.
Persons family would usually get sent to concentration camp if not
murdered at the spot.
> If so, then such reprisals should be well
> known in the historical record. Perhaps
> some examples could be given.
I have no knowledge of major sabotage which didn't involve killing at
lest one Axis soldier, blowing up railway or telegraph poles even if
it didn't kill anyone would usually result in anti-partisan operation
which would burn several suspected villages along the route with its
populations shot, sent to camps or work to Germany.
> When did Partisan operations hold any
> territory against Axis attack?
In Yugoslavia? Many times, Kozora you mentioned earlier managed to
repulsed several Ustasha attack which is probably why Germans
committed so much troops. Ozren mountain also defeated two attacks
until chetnik coup eliminated communists leadership.
http://www.vojska.net/eng/world-war-2/operation/ozren-1941/
Operation Braun was only operation in which Germans were subordinated
and it was complete failure allowing Partisans to continue holding
territory.
http://www.vojska.net/eng/world-war-2/operation/braun-1943/
Partisans managed to hold port city of Split for several weeks
allowing them to move large quantities of captured Italian material to
the mountains.
> Heydrich certainly needed killing;
> but what did his death do to advance
> the defeat of Germany? Was it worth
> over 200 lives?
I agree with that, he was more of a political target, it would have
probably been better to create major sabotage in Skoda factory which
at the time was out of reach of bombers.
> No, of course not. But you mentioned the
> assassination of German commanders and
> leaders, carried out despite reprisal executions
> of some large number of Partisan prisoners.
Many target were local quislings, especially those who knew too much
about communists from their previous police work during Yugoslav
monarchy.
> Such trade-offs may have to be made, but
> they are not something to be done automatically.
Communist bigger concern was risk to men and material committed to
action beacuse unlike Heydrich most important targets (either person
or object) were well protected, wasting elite group and hard to get
equipment on a single target is pointless if several minor ones could
be taken out with little risk.
> If the killing of some Germans was answered
> by the execution of an equal number of hostages,
> was the exchange worth while? What if five times
> as many hostages were killed? Or ten times?
Ones who got targeted for execution where usually those that presented
biggest threat (private Hans from Bavaria isn't really a threat worth
spending precious ammunition on or planing entire operation). And as
we know Heydrich was relatively easy target and after that I doubt any
more nazis were driving around unescorted.
> I thought that was the definition of "resistance".
By open warfare I mean moving 10000 troops into a frontal assault, a
thousand men assaulting lightly garrisoned town, taking everything
they can use, burning anything enemy can use and escaping before enemy
reinforcements arrive could hardly be called open warfare? I think it
is called guerrilla warfare? It wasn't until 1943 that Partisans begun
to taking German troops in frontal battles on regular basis (few
attempts before usually ended up in disaster).
> Also that open warfare by Partisans engaged
> large numbers of Axis troops. But I guess not.
Until 1943 it would be suicidal to attempt to engage Germans in
frontal battle, Kozara is example of what happens (Ustashe and
Domobrani were engaged but they weren't armed much better then
Partisans and only had more ammo), standard tactics involved setting
up ambush and then retreating to next ambush position before Germans
could bring its tanks, artillery and aircraft on Partisans position.
Another tactic would be to let armored and motorized units pass, block
the road and then attack foot infantry and rear column coming behind
them, without gas tanks and trucks won't get far.
One of the nickname for Partisan soldier was five-rounder beacuse on
average he only had five rounds so unless he managed to capture
something from the enemy he would quickly run out of ammo in any
combat that took more then few minutes.
> Such resistance is an "all-in" move,
> to use a poker metaphor. If it fails,
> complete massacre is likely to follow
> immediately. But _if_ that is the enemy's
> long-term intent, there's nothing to lose.
>
> _If_.
Ustashe made no attempt to hide what they wanted to do and they
managed to create a mess which not even Germans could clean up.
> I see this is your personal web site.
> It is bit bold to cite yourself as an
> authority.
These are official Yugoslav figures, some of my pages have source
listed on them but early ones have only been added into bibliography
since I never thought my website would get so big.
> The total of Partisan dead given
> is 306K; this obviously omits most
> of the war deaths. Of course many
> Ustashe and other satellite forces
> were killed; but I see no reason not to
> think that the vast majority of additional
> deaths were also victims of the Axis.
In study by Vladimir Zerjavic, quislings and collaborates are
estimated at 209 000, victims at 501 000 and Partisans at 237 000,
plus 80 000 died outside Yugoslavia.
http://www.vojska.net/eng/world-war-2/losses/
Rich Rostrom
> Rich Rostrom wrote:
> > ... How insanely stupid the Germans must have been, to declare Mihailovic
> > an enemy and offer a reward for his capture when for two years he had been
> > doing nothing but attack Communists.
>
So. The German commanders in Yugoslavia really were _that_
incompetent?
They could not tell friend from foe?
> > ...the Communist-controlled faction of the Greek Resistance
> > attacked and largely destroyed the non-Communist faction?
> > ..the Communist resistance in Indo-China ... informed the
> > Japanese occupiers about other resistance groups...
>
> Yugoslav and Greek communist were well connected so I wouldn't be
> surprised if Greek decision to attack was influenced by developments
> in Yugoslavia and ELAS didn't want to be attacked from behind like Tito...
This is bizarre. ELAS, the Communist force in Greece,
attacked EDES, which was non-Communist but also non-
monarchist, unlike the Chetniks. Now Communist attacks
on other resistance movements are justified as pre-emptive
self-defense, because, I guess, all non-Communists were
nascent collaborators.
> also British intervention in Greece influenced Tito to become
> suspicious of British intentions and forbid western Allies to land
> major force on Yugoslav mainland even if it would greatly benefit his
> struggle against Germans.
British forces landed in Greece in October 1944. By that
time Belgrade had been liberated and Partisan/Soviet
forces were driving the Germans back on Zagreb.
Of course Tito was right to bar British forces from
Yugoslavia; their presence could have greatly hindered
his program of destroying all non-Communist political
forces and securing total Communist control.
> I doubt news from Vietnam were well known in Yugoslavia.
Ho, like Tito, was an agent of the Comintern,
who had spent time in Moscow learning Stalin's
methods. It does not seem likely Tito was
influenced by Ho, but it is certain that they
had a common background, and that their goals
were in parallel, and thus very likely their
methods too.
> > There is evidence that the Communists used their
> > control of the Partisan movement to destroy
> > political opponents who were _not_ collaborators
> > with the Axis.
>
> 'Left deviations' were one of the major cause why many early Partisans
> formations fell apart, Communists attempted already in 1941 to fight
> anyone they considered enemies of the revolution....
A sin exactly eqivalent to what Mihailovic
is accused of. And this Communist attitude
predated the war.
> > France was over twice the size of Yugoslavia, with large
> > rural and mountainous areas. Population density was
>
> But it wasn't occupied as a whole until 1942...
So? Most of France was occupied in 1940. None of
Yugoslavia was occupied until 1941. A substantial
part of Yugoslavia was never 'occupied', because its
population formed a pro-German satellite state.
> and I don't recall Vichy
> government giving some support and providing bases for resistance.
What's that got to do with anything? No government
provided support and bases for any resistance in
Yugoslavia.
> > This sort of thinking would fit right in with the Japanese
> > Army's plan for the entire population to die in suicide
> > attacks with minimal weapons rather than submit to
> > occupation.
>
> And you would prefer living under such regime instead of fighting it?
What are the choices?
1) Futile acts of armed resistance which do not
destroy or expel the enemy, and which immediately
sacrifice my life, and those of my family, friends,
neighbors, or countrymen.
2) Temporary submission, with the intent of
organizing for long-term resistance and true
liberation at some future date.
Yes, I would choose 2.
> > I hope you can see the difference between actions which _risk_ one's
> > own life, and actions which will _certainly_ sacrifice the lives of others.
>
> Persons family would usually get sent to concentration camp if not
> murdered at the spot.
Sometimes; if the person had a family. And in
most cases of covert resistance operations,
the resisters had the support of their immediate
families for their work. This is very different
from callously getting unwilling strangers killed.
> > If so, then such reprisals should be well known in the historical record. Perhaps
> > some examples could be given.
> Blowing up railway or telegraph poles even if
> it didn't kill anyone would usually result in anti-partisan operation
> which would burn several suspected villages along the route with its
> populations shot, sent to camps or work to Germany.
Usually? There were thousands of documented
railroad sabotage actions in Denmark, a much
smaller country than Yugoslavia. Suppose there
was a comparable number in Yugoslavia (say,
about 5,000). Now suppose that "usually" (60%
of the time which is 3,000 incidents) several
(average 3) villages would be destroyed and
their populations shot or deported.
If such villages averaged 100 people each,
then 900,000 people would have been shot or
deported just in reprisals for railroad
sabotage: about a third to a half of all Axis
victims in Yugoslavia. I don't think so.
> > When did Partisan operations hold any territory against Axis attack?
> In Yugoslavia? Many times, Kozora you mentioned earlier managed to
> repulsed several Ustasha attack which is probably why Germans
> committed so much troops.
At which point the position was overrun,
not held.
> Ozren mountain also defeated two attacks...
and then was overrun.
> Partisans managed to hold port city of Split for several weeks...
and were then driven out.
In short, many occasions on which a location was
temporarily held by Partisans until the Axis
massed substantial force. Nothing comparable to
the Soviet achievement of stopping the most
powerful attacks the Axis could muster and permanently
securing territory as a base for war operations.
> By open warfare I mean moving 10000 troops into a frontal assault, a
> thousand men assaulting lightly garrisoned town, taking everything
> they can use, burning anything enemy can use and escaping before enemy
> reinforcements arrive could hardly be called open warfare?
I would call it open warfare. So I think
would almost anyone else. The opposite of
"guerrilla warfare" is "conventional warfare".
> > I see this is your personal web site.
> > It is bit bold to cite yourself as an
> > authority.
>
> These are official Yugoslav figures...
Then the original source should be cited.
> In study by Vladimir Zerjavic, quislings and collaborates are
> estimated at 209 000, victims at 501 000 and Partisans at 237 000,
> plus 80 000 died outside Yugoslavia.http://www.vojska.net/eng/world-war-2/losses/
Then 200,000 for the number of Yugoslav
"good guys" dead in any one year of the
war is about right.
Michele
news:01c73179-a948-4e97...@n4g2000vba.googlegroups.com...
>
> This is bizarre. ELAS, the Communist force in Greece,
> attacked EDES, which was non-Communist but also non-
> monarchist, unlike the Chetniks. Now Communist attacks
> on other resistance movements are justified as pre-emptive
> self-defense, because, I guess, all non-Communists were
> nascent collaborators.
>
As I mentioned, that was exactly the justification for the partisans
murdering partisans, on the Italian-Yugoslavian border.
Ivan Bajlo
wrote:
> So. The German commanders in Yugoslavia really were _that_
> incompetent?
> They could not tell friend from foe?
Or they didn't really care? If Germans wanted in 1941 they could have
recruited thousands of Soviet soldiers and citizens for fight against
Stalin but since they considered them subhuman Slav they started doing
it only when they started facing manpower shortages and once it become
clear that Germans were going to lose the war combat quality of such
units simply melted away.
> This is bizarre. ELAS, the Communist force in Greece,
> attacked EDES, which was non-Communist but also non-
> monarchist, unlike the Chetniks. Now Communist attacks
> on other resistance movements are justified as pre-emptive
> self-defense, because, I guess, all non-Communists were
> nascent collaborators.
In any post war power struggle non-communist resistance would stand in
its way so why not strike first instead of giving it time to grow
stronger?
> British forces landed in Greece in October 1944. By that
> time Belgrade had been liberated and Partisan/Soviet
> forces were driving the Germans back on Zagreb.
Huh? In October 1944 Partisan/Soviet forces where nowhere near Zagreb
unless you count Partisan division operating in mountains near Zagreb
but they were far too weak to take it.
During November and December main partisan body attempted to advance
through Syrmia and in open warfare they suffered horrendous losses
since flat plains allowed Germans armor and artillery to maximize its
effectiveness and launch counter attack which is probably one of the
biggest Partisan defeat during entire war, in a few days elite
Proletarian divisions lost as much as third of their strength mostly
newly recruited Belgrade youth forcing them to go on to defensive
until April!
http://www.vojska.net/eng/world-war-2/operation/wintergewitter-1945/
Also during October Partisans liberated most of Dalmatia and in
January 1945 main focus shifted towards Mostar through which German
Army Group E was withdrawing from Greece and Albania since Belgrade
route was blocked and axis also launched surprise attack in partisan
held Herzegovina which was hastily abandoned earlier and had few
supporters of communist rule.
http://www.vojska.net/eng/world-war-2/operation/bura-1945/
http://www.vojska.net/eng/world-war-2/operation/mostar-1945/
> Of course Tito was right to bar British forces from
> Yugoslavia; their presence could have greatly hindered
> his program of destroying all non-Communist political
> forces and securing total Communist control.
Most non-communist political forces were waiting for British to land
so they could join them and ask them for help in fighting communists,
British would probably refuse since they had little to gain from it
but Tito decided to play it safe.
> Ho, like Tito, was an agent of the Comintern,
> who had spent time in Moscow learning Stalin's
> methods. It does not seem likely Tito was
> influenced by Ho, but it is certain that they
> had a common background, and that their goals
> were in parallel, and thus very likely their
> methods too.
Still no CNN in those days and I doubt Radio Berlin, London or Moscow
knew much about events in Vietnam, I doubt even Tokyo knew too much.
> A sin exactly eqivalent to what Mihailovic
> is accused of. And this Communist attitude
> predated the war.
Communist ideology was directed at workers but at that time Yugoslavia
was peasant country one of the main reasons why early attempt of class
struggle failed so miserably.
> So? Most of France was occupied in 1940. None of
> Yugoslavia was occupied until 1941. A substantial
> part of Yugoslavia was never 'occupied', because its
> population formed a pro-German satellite state.
Huh, what? Creation of Independent State of Croatia is a prime reason
for Tito's success, multiethnic state with regime which wanted to
exterminate big part of its population and anyone opposing the new
regime, maybe the regime was pro-German but population certainly
wasn't.
> What's that got to do with anything? No government
> provided support and bases for any resistance in
> Yugoslavia.
Quisling regimes in Yugoslavia provided enough support and bases for
resistance even if they didn't plan for it. Ustashe terror served as
great motive too many.
> 1) Futile acts of armed resistance which do not
> destroy or expel the enemy, and which immediately
> sacrifice my life, and those of my family, friends,
> neighbors, or countrymen.
If you are careless yes, but many Partisans managed to survive entire
war fighting from 1941.
> 2) Temporary submission, with the intent of
> organizing for long-term resistance and true
> liberation at some future date.
>
> Yes, I would choose 2.
Thus allowing enemy to reduce number of troops it needs for occupation
and guard duties and send them to the front.
> Sometimes; if the person had a family. And in
> most cases of covert resistance operations,
> the resisters had the support of their immediate
> families for their work. This is very different
> from callously getting unwilling strangers killed.
If occupier is executing innocent civilians in reprisals at random
that usually only helps resistance, I have never heard a story of
someone who had his family executed by occupiers going after
resistance who are to blame for their deaths but instead joins
resistance in order to get his revenge against occupiers.
21st century moral perspective has very little to do with guerrilla
warfare, in middle ages slaughtering entire nations to pacify a region
was standard military tactics and great military leaders of ancient
times would today be sentenced as war criminals.
> If such villages averaged 100 people each,
> then 900,000 people would have been shot or
> deported just in reprisals for railroad
> sabotage: about a third to a half of all Axis
> victims in Yugoslavia. I don't think so.
Don't know much about Denmark but railroad sabotages in Yugoslavia are
well documented since Partisan sabotage groups would send in their
reports and axis guard units would send in their and unless these were
minor which could easily be repaired in few hours with almost no
impact of rail traffic little would be done but Partisans managed to
keep several lines out of service for weeks and Axis would regularly
launch operations to secure them.
6000 persons were evacuated in just one of these operations and these
are just persons who stayed home beacuse they considered no harm would
come to them while thousands would flee to the woods no matter which
army appeared coming to their village.
http://www.vojska.net/eng/world-war-2/operation/silberstreifen-1943/
> I would call it open warfare. So I think
> would almost anyone else. The opposite of
> "guerrilla warfare" is "conventional warfare".
If you say so, English isn't my first language.
Ivan Bajlo
> And that isn't a point that makes him a collaborationist, or anything
> different from an enemy of the Axis. By this reasoning, how should a common
> partisan having nobody at his orders be rated? As a friend of the Axis?
What?
> Yeah. So what? Being in the mountains with guns and not obeying the
> occupiers' orders still at the very least doesn't qualify one as a
> collaborationist, and somebody - namely the occupation authorities, whose
> opinion seems somewhat relevant in the issue - would call that, in and by
> itself, hostility.
What??? I have no idea what you are trying to say.
> "At his disposal". By this kind of reasoning, of course, any Serbian
> nationalist should be counted as being at the disposal of Mihailovic. For
Should and was is a big difference, Mihailovic had everything hand to
him on silver platter and he failed at every point.
> Mihailovic, you want to count the number of men who actually were with him
> in time and place. For Tito, you want to count even the sympathizers who
> could, or could not, eventually join. Ain't that double standards?
Mihailovic had almost three years to prepare for Tito's return to
Serbia and barely managed to scrape 50000 men of all ages most with
little combat experience and this with supplies of weapons from both
Nedic quisling regime and Germans and got almost wiped out by Tito's
veterans who also had to fight Germans and Nedic troops besides
Mihailovic by the time Soviets arrived Tito was all but finished with
Mihailovic who was in full retreat towards Bosnia.
> What you are arguing is that only an effective, successful resistance can be
> called resistance, while everything else is not resistance, or it's even
> collaborationism.
No, I'm arguing that to qualify as resistance you actually have to do
something instead of siting on your mountain yelling curses at the
enemy and getting drunk - last two parts are very common way of
"fighting" a war in Balkans. Many post war "heroes" never left local
bar and were rarely sober enough to stand up.
> So as mentioned above, you want to reserve to yourself the right to decide
> which was a resistance and which was not - regardless of what the decision
> makers of all parties involved at the time thought. Additionally, in order
History tends to judge things very differently from what individuals
who made it would want.
> to do that, you have to ignore uncomfortable facts and choose standards to
> your liking, which you further do not apply equally or fairly to all
> resistance movements.
> This is politics, not history, but if you like to do that, go ahead. I'll
> stick with history.
History tends to corrects itself as hidden facts surface which have
been covered up in interests of politics like western Allies allowing
many quislings to escape justice since they considered them possible
allies against new communists regimes - most Italian war criminals
avoided firing squads thanks to politics.
Ivan Bajlo
> So your position is that only a successful resistance can be called a
> resistance?
No.
> By this you have ruled out that the Jewish fighting the Germans in the
> Warsaw Ghetto were a resistance.
So your comparing resistance movement started by bunch of kids under
impossible conditions in desperation to "resistance" started by
regular army officer who had plenty of time and opportunity to prepare
and actually do something effective but decided to do absolutely
nothing?
> Or is the idea that resisting in 1941 is somehow made non-existant by
> changing sides later?
No.
> You do understand your positions seem remarkably 1984-ish.
You do understand that making assumption based on lack on information
is even more 1984-ish?
Ivan Bajlo
> Sure. Andrzej Kunert, Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, and of course Norman Davies;
> they all agree the Armia Krajowa was a resistance movement even at the time
I thought subject was Mihailovic not AK?
> when it spent most of its time organizing, gathering intelligence,
> husbanding its resources and strength, making propaganda, and carrying out
> carefully selected sabotage acts.
Please let me know when did Mihailovic do any of those things between
April and November 1941.
> Sure. By the same token, the Italian CIL was fully outfitted by the British
> by late 1944. This clearly means the Italians never fought the British in
> WWII, by your reasoning. Which, as I mentioned, is really 1984-ish.
> Orwellian.
What in the world are you talking about???
> Nobody has ever claimed Mihailovic did not end up on the Axis side. What I
> have claimed is that in 1941 he wasn't on that side, at the very least, and
> that everybody interested in the issue thought at the time he actually was
> on the other side. This is what you steadfastly try to dodge, to no avail
> because everyone sees you attempting that.
Yep, he wasn't on anyone side, he did nothing for weeks and then
decided that offering his services to Nazis is the right strategy.
LC
> > This is bizarre. ELAS, the Communist force in Greece,
> > attacked EDES, which was non-Communist but also non-
> > monarchist, unlike the Chetniks. Now Communist attacks
> > on other resistance movements are justified as pre-emptive
> > self-defense, because, I guess, all non-Communists were
> > nascent collaborators.
>
> In any post war power struggle non-communist resistance would stand in
> its way so why not strike first instead of giving it time to grow
> stronger?
There was that. The other part is that, just as in Greece, the two
organizations could compete for resources and that parts of the non-
communist networks were definitely collaborating with the Germans.
Parts of EDES undisputably did, some of the perpetrators were executed
after the war, others successfully managed to sell their experience
fighting communism.
Given how the communists were really a minority in both countries, but
were gaining traction with the people because they played the
patriotic angle - essentially, they claimed that they were the only
ones truly to resist the invaders - it would make sense from their
point of view to declare war on "collaborators".
> Most non-communist political forces were waiting for British to land
> so they could join them and ask them for help in fighting communists,
> British would probably refuse since they had little to gain from it
> but Tito decided to play it safe.
It made more military sense for a resistance movement to confine
itself to non-military activities like propaganda, recruiting new
members, setting up escape networks for people the Germans wanted
dead, and intelligence. The reason was that the impact of military
action would be negligible on the Wehrmacht, but devastating on the
resistance networks, so better to keep them as a force in being that
would support a "true" Allied invasion.
In France - the only country that was both occupied by the Axis and
that had had a relatively strong communist party before the war -
there is no doubt that the "active resistance" stance taken by the
communists was the result of direct orders from Moscow. The Soviets
wanted action now, regardless of the long-term consequences. They were
on the ropes and wanted to divert as many German troops as they could.
Thanks to German clumsiness in blaming everything on "communist
terrorists", and to the fact that non-communist organizations were
even less competent in recruiting, this allowed the communist-
organized resistance to hold a major position by 1944-45. But again,
that was based on patriotism, not on communism or military success. As
I wrote above, the Greek story was largely the same.
I know that the military equation was different in Yugoslavia, still I
wonder how much the more active stance by Tito owed to a reasoned
military analysis and how much to Moscow orders?
(snip points of agreement)
> If occupier is executing innocent civilians in reprisals at random
> that usually only helps resistance, I have never heard a story of
> someone who had his family executed by occupiers going after
> resistance who are to blame for their deaths but instead joins
> resistance in order to get his revenge against occupiers.
Lots of people were terrified into submission, not when their own
family had been targetted but some neighbor's.
A regime with a known track record of executing anyone standing in its
way can be very successful keeping populations in check: just look at
the Axis and Soviet dictatorships. Not to mention the fact that the
bulk of the population in occupied Europe didn't lift a finger against
the invader. Even in Yugoslavia, I wonder what the ratio of active
resisters to collaborationists and non-committed people was.
Most people everywhere hated the Germans, including many who actively
collaborated with them. But only a few actually did something about it
for as long as they had a choice.
> 21st century moral perspective has very little to do with guerrilla
> warfare,
So the reason people don't rob banks is because of their morals? I
thought security guards, the police and all that had a lot to do with
it, too...
LC
Michele
> On May 15, 5:17 pm, "Michele" <don'tspammeat...@tln.it> wrote:
>> Sure. Andrzej Kunert, Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, and of course Norman Davies;
>> they all agree the Armia Krajowa was a resistance movement even at the
>> time
>
> I thought subject was Mihailovic not AK?
>
If your standards are valid, then they should be applicable elsewhere. They
aren't, of course.
Michele
> On May 12, 5:16 pm, "Michele" <don'tspammeat...@tln.it> wrote:
>> So your position is that only a successful resistance can be called a
>> resistance?
>
> No.
Oh good. Then Mihailovic's movement, until he decided to switch sides, was a
resistance movement. Thanks for admitting that.
>
>> By this you have ruled out that the Jewish fighting the Germans in the
>> Warsaw Ghetto were a resistance.
>
> So your comparing resistance movement started by bunch of kids under
> impossible conditions in desperation to "resistance" started by
> regular army officer who had plenty of time and opportunity to prepare
> and actually do something effective but decided to do absolutely
> nothing?
>
Of course I do. The point isn't achieving something, or being successful, or
being desperate versus not being desperate.
If that were the qualifiers, then the Polish defenders of the Hel peninsula
on September 30, 1939 were an army; they were desperate, in impossible
conditions, and inexperienced, and fought the Germans, so they were an army.
But the French army on the same date had regular officers, had had plenty of
time and opportunity to prepare, and decided to do nothing at that time. So
the French army on September 30, 1930, was not an army.
Ridiculous, ain't it? It's all yours.
You see, however much you move the goalposts and try to reshape your
position, it still remains ludicrous, as immediately demonstrated as soon as
the same standards are applied elsewhere. This should be evident even to
you.
>> Or is the idea that resisting in 1941 is somehow made non-existant by
>> changing sides later?
>
> No.
>
Oh good. So you now admit that in 1941 Mihailovic had resisted.
>> You do understand your positions seem remarkably 1984-ish.
>
> You do understand that making assumption based on lack on information
> is even more 1984-ish?
>
No, of course. You should read that book. Making assumptions based on
incomplete information might lead to wrong conclusions, of course. For sure
I haven't complete information, but it is also no less sure that until now
you have utterly failed to demonstrate that my conclusions were wrong, so
probably I have sufficient, if incomplete, information.
But it is your continuous use of double standards, your attempts at
redefining events ex-post, and your denial of obvious evident information
that echoes Orwell's book.
Michele
> On May 11, 4:58 pm, "Michele" <don'tspammeat...@tln.it> wrote:
>> And that isn't a point that makes him a collaborationist, or anything
>> different from an enemy of the Axis. By this reasoning, how should a
>> common
>> partisan having nobody at his orders be rated? As a friend of the Axis?
>
> What?
You claimed Mihailovic's movement did not rate, in 1941, as an enemy of the
Axis, or a partisan movement, because he had too many men at his orders. So
it logically follows that a common partisan, having nobody at his orders,
does not rate as a partisan.
>
>> Yeah. So what? Being in the mountains with guns and not obeying the
>> occupiers' orders still at the very least doesn't qualify one as a
>> collaborationist, and somebody - namely the occupation authorities, whose
>> opinion seems somewhat relevant in the issue - would call that, in and by
>> itself, hostility.
>
> What??? I have no idea what you are trying to say.
>
You claimed that not carrying out a policy of immediate, near-suicidal,
reprisal-causing attacks meant being a collaborationist. Above, I pointed
out that plenty of people, including historians of, say the Polish
resistance movement, disagree with such a ludicrous notion, and that the
occupation authorities themselves, whose point of view did carry some weight
at the time, also disagree.
I'm sorry, I don't feel I can explain it more clearly than that. Maybe you
should polish your English.
>> "At his disposal". By this kind of reasoning, of course, any Serbian
>> nationalist should be counted as being at the disposal of Mihailovic. For
>
> Should and was is a big difference, Mihailovic had everything hand to
> him on silver platter and he failed at every point.
>
By which you evade the question, of course. You don't like applying the same
standards to the two organizations.
>> Mihailovic, you want to count the number of men who actually were with
>> him
>> in time and place. For Tito, you want to count even the sympathizers who
>> could, or could not, eventually join. Ain't that double standards?
>
> Mihailovic had almost three years to prepare for Tito's return to
> Serbia
Which is wholly irrelevant. You are trying to squirm away from the
uncomfortable question.
We are not talking about three years into the guerrilla war.
We are talking about the beginning.
You claimed Mihailovic's was not a partisan movement because he had few men
with him, in that beginning.
I asked you how many men did Tito have in the beginning, in order to make a
comparison based on the same standards.
You quickly dodged the question, referring to the Communist party member and
sympathizers. By which, you are simultaneously claiming that a Chetnik
actually out there in the mountains with Mihailovic and a rifle in his hands
does not count, but a Communist party sympathizer who might eventually join
the partisans in the future if all goes well, does count.
To repeat the question: if Mihailovic had "few" men with him in the
beginning, how many men did Tito have with him in the beginning? It's you,
not me, who tried to use that ridiculous standard to disqualify the
Chetniks, in 1941, as opposers of the Axis. Try to apply the same standard
to the other organization. I guess you wont, considered your dodgy behaviour
until now.
>> What you are arguing is that only an effective, successful resistance can
>> be
>> called resistance, while everything else is not resistance, or it's even
>> collaborationism.
>
> No, I'm arguing that to qualify as resistance you actually have to do
> something instead of siting on your mountain yelling curses at the
> enemy and getting drunk
Then you are wrong. Area denial, alone, is a key tenet of insurgency. The
mere fact that certain areas of the country are not controlled by the
occupation forces means that those forces are not invincible, that the
resources of those areas, however marginal, aren't available to them, and
that those areas provide a sanctuary for further would-be opponents. The
very fact that there is a number of able-bodied men who aren't serving or
working for the occupation forces is a disadvantage for those forces.
This is confirmed, again, both by historians and by the behavior of the
Germans. Time and again, in late 1944, the Germans overran partisan holdouts
in Northern Italy. Why? Were they really a threat to the German occupation?
No, they occupied marginal mountain areas. But the very fact that they
existed, and broadcasted their existence as local "Republics", was a
propaganda defeat for the Germans, so they felt they _had_ to attack them.
As to the historians, I can quote again the same Polish ones. The AK, in the
beginning, did _not_ control any denied area. They did nothing, initially,
but to gather intelligence and make propaganda. Yet nobody would dream of
saying that that was not resistance.
(snip irrelevant obfuscation)
Rich Rostrom
> On May 16, 10:08 pm, Rich Rostrom <rrostrom.21stcent...@rcn.com> wrote:
>
> > So. The German commanders in Yugoslavia really were _that_
> > incompetent? They could not tell friend from foe?
>
> Or they didn't really care? If Germans wanted in 1941 they could have
Failure to recruit potential allies is
not the same as actively striking
at current allies.
> In any post war power struggle non-communist resistance would stand in
> its way so why not strike first instead of giving it time to grow stronger?
Congratulations. You have just proven
that Mihajlovic's anti-Communist policy
was completely justified.
Apparently, the Communists were the
implacable enemies of all non-Communist
elements in the country, unshakeably
determined to destroy all non-Communists
and impose Communist rule by violence.
Accordingly, it was Mihajlovic's duty, as
a sworn officer of the lawful government,
to oppose these mad dogs and to seek
and accept any possible aid against them.
> > British forces landed in Greece in October 1944. By that
> > time Belgrade had been liberated and Partisan/Soviet
> > forces were driving the Germans back on Zagreb.
>
> Huh? In October 1944 Partisan/Soviet forces where nowhere near Zagreb...
At the end of October 1944, the front
was on the Drina River, 130 km from
Belgrade and within 250 km of Zagreb.
I did not say the Partisan and Soviet
forces were near Zagreb, only that they
had taken Belgrade and were moving
toward Zagreb.
That is, half of Yugoslavia had been
liberated, and liberation of the rest was
in progress.
The Partisan rejection of British or
U.S. forces had been made long before -
that is, long before the British intervention
in Greece. Now it may be that there was
a further proposal for British operations
in Yugoslavia in late 1944 or in 1945 -
perhaps in northern Dalmatia or Istria -
which was also rejected. I don't know.
> Still no CNN in those days and I doubt Radio Berlin, London or Moscow
> knew much about events in Vietnam...
You might be surprised to learn just
how much was known about events
in "remote" places.
Moscow in particular made a point of
having agents everywhere. It was the
center of the Communist _International_,
after all.
And of course the point is not that Tito
was following an example set by Ho, but
rather that both of them were agents of
the Comintern, and both worked on the
principles taught in Moscow.
> > A substantial part of Yugoslavia was never 'occupied', because its
> > population formed a pro-German satellite state.
> maybe the [Croatian] regime was pro-German but population certainly wasn't.
Large numbers of Croatians joined the
pro-Axis Ustashe and the Croatian Army.
Many of them fought on the Eastern
Front. I think that shows that Croatian
in general were "pro-German".
> > What's that got to do with anything? No government
> > provided support and bases for any resistance in Yugoslavia.
>
> Quisling regimes in Yugoslavia provided enough support and bases for
> resistance even if they didn't plan for it. Ustashe terror served as great
> motive too many.
If it comes to that, there was considerable
"leakage" of weapons and other support
from the Vichy regime to the French
resistance. But I really find it bizarre that
you would consider Axis satellite regimes
to be providing "support and bases" to
Resistance forces because some of their
equipment was captured.
Or because their brutal polices provoked
rebellion.
> > 1) Futile acts of armed resistance which do not destroy or expel the
> > enemy, and which immediately sacrifice my life, and those of my
> > family, friends, neighbors, or countrymen.
>
> If you are careless yes,
Or hopelessly outgunned and outumbered.
> but many Partisans managed to survive entire war fighting from 1941.
And far more, I suspect, were killed - along
with great numbers of civilians.
> > 2) Temporary submission, with the intent of organizing for long-term
> > resistance and true liberation at some future date.
>
> > Yes, I would choose 2.
>
> Thus allowing enemy to reduce number of troops it needs for occupation
> and guard duties and send them to the front.
But also preserving the strength of the
Resistance for use when it could be
effective. A premature uprising that
results in the annihilation of the
Resistance is even more useful to
the occupiers. Once the Resistance
have come into the open and been
wiped out, there is nothing more for
the occupiers to worry about.
Besides which - what is more useful
to the defeat of the occupiers? An
early overt uprising, which diverts
a few thousand second-rate troops?
Or a blow in force during the battle of
the occupiers and the incoming liberators,
which disrupts the defense and enables
the liberators to win a decisive victory
with many thousands of the enemy killed
or captured?
When the French Resistance came into
the open in Vercors, they were destroyed
in matter of weeks by fairly small German
forces. Such would have been the fate of
any similar Maquisard move in 1940-1944.
The Allies made great efforts to prevent
any such uprisings and preserve the Maquis
for later operations.
Then, _after_ the D-Day
landings, when strong US/UK forces were
actually engaged with the Germans, the
Maquis came forward, disrupting German
transport and communications all through
the country. Furthermore, the Maquis
harassed German reserve units moving
to Normandy, delaying them by days and
weeks, and thus greatly assisting the
success of the US/UK invasion in a
critical period.
These contributions would not have been
possible had the Maquis sacrificed itself
earlier in open attacks on the occupier;
and they were certainly more valuable
than what such attacks could have
achieved: the diversion of a few thousand
reserves from the Eastern Front or Italy.
Michele
news:cc44f108-f19b-4049...@r13g2000vbr.googlegroups.com...
> Ivan Bajlo wrote:
>
>> > This is bizarre. ELAS, the Communist force in Greece,
>> > attacked EDES, which was non-Communist but also non-
>> > monarchist, unlike the Chetniks. Now Communist attacks
>> > on other resistance movements are justified as pre-emptive
>> > self-defense, because, I guess, all non-Communists were
>> > nascent collaborators.
>>
>> In any post war power struggle non-communist resistance would stand in
>> its way so why not strike first instead of giving it time to grow
>> stronger?
>
> There was that.
There was. Of course, there is also the fact that fighting the enemy of the
occupier usually actually helps the occupier, and could be seen as being a
collaborator of the occupier. While Mihailovic gets blamed because after a
while he began fighting the Communists, and thus he helped the Axis, the
Communists are excused for doing exactly the same (fighting against a
movement that resisted the Axis occupation). After all, "why not strike
first"? For some reason, the same excuse isn't mentioned when it comes to
explaining the behavior of anti-Communist movements which also fought the
Axis.
As already mentioned, double standards are the norm in these posts.
LC
> As already mentioned, double standards are the norm in these posts.
While I agree with the gist of your remarks, it is a fact that in
Greece some branches of EDES were unquestionably collaborationist
(i.e. that wasn't communist propaganda, it was fact). It seems that
the same was true of the Chetniks, i.e. I've come across various
German accounts where Chetniks are mentioned as fighting on their
side, but Partisans never are. Maybe it's a case of the Germans only
labelling guerrillas "Partisans" when they were on the other side, I
don't know.
So there are double standards involved, but we shouldn't dismiss
everything as simply double standards.
LC
T. Fink
I am not sure, if they were called "Partisanen". I think, in most cases,
like reports or news broadcasts, they were called "Banditen" (bandids)
like ordinary criminals.
Cheers
Torsten
Michele
> Michele wrote:
>
>> As already mentioned, double standards are the norm in these posts.
>
> While I agree with the gist of your remarks, it is a fact that in
> Greece some branches of EDES were unquestionably collaborationist
> (i.e. that wasn't communist propaganda, it was fact). It seems that
> the same was true of the Chetniks, i.e. I've come across various
> German accounts where Chetniks are mentioned as fighting on their
> side, but Partisans never are.
That is undoubtedly true. I never claimed the Chetniks fought the Axis until
the end of the war. I only claimed they were a resistance organization -
albeit admittedly not particularly active (just like many others) - in 1941.
Ivan Bajlo
> Failure to recruit potential allies is
> not the same as actively striking
> at current allies.
Hitler through entire war often demanded disarming of Chetniks (which
took place on several occasions in one instance during operation
Schwartz, 1st Mountain Division disarmed Pavle Djurasic group and then
used them as porters and guides against communists) but it seems to
have been ignored by field commanders who preferred to use them as
buffer, Chetniks also preferred not to go into open collaboration so
that was one very weird arrangement.
> Congratulations. You have just proven
> that Mihajlovic's anti-Communist policy
> was completely justified.
If you shoot an attacker before he strikes you probably saved your
life but in the eyes of the law you are a murderer unless you have a
very good lawyer but if you let attacker strike first and then you
shoot him it is called self-defense.
> Accordingly, it was Mihajlovic's duty, as
> a sworn officer of the lawful government,
> to oppose these mad dogs and to seek
> and accept any possible aid against them.
Even if stretch that it is valid only until 1944 when King Peter
issued his backing for Tito and request everyone join him.
And Tito being obedient communist obeyed Moscow in 1941 to halt his
counterattack against Mihailovic who was considered leader of Yugoslav
resistance at that time. From today perspective things look really
ridicules beacuse if Mihailovic tried he could have easily used his
influence through British and Soviet to force Tito to obey him but he
had nowhere the idea of the status he achieved outside Yugoslavia.
Even Greek communist party obeyed Moscow in 1944/45 to remain passive
and Greek Civil war didn't really start until WW2 was over.
> The Partisan rejection of British or
> U.S. forces had been made long before -
> that is, long before the British intervention
> in Greece. Now it may be that there was
> a further proposal for British operations
> in Yugoslavia in late 1944 or in 1945 -
> perhaps in northern Dalmatia or Istria -
> which was also rejected. I don't know.
Earlier? Which ones?
I'm familiar with idea to land large force around Dubrovnik in order
to cut off some 20,000 Germans in Montenegro, there was another idea
to land in Dalmatia and create airfield near Zadar but by then front
lines were moving fast enough that Partisans didn't need British land
aid, only support from air and naval transport along the coast
(landing crafts mostly).
2nd Commando was based at Vis island and carried out several landings
together with 26th Dalmatian Division and some US detachments.
> Moscow in particular made a point of
> having agents everywhere. It was the
> center of the Communist _International_,
> after all.
Moscow liked to keep eye on everything but that doesn't mean it told
its minions what was going.
> Large numbers of Croatians joined the
> pro-Axis Ustashe and the Croatian Army.
Croatian army aka Domobranstvo had notorious reputation for desertion
and defection to Partisans, only German trained units with new young
officers had some combat value rest had old Yugoslav royal army
officers who enlisted in 1941 but very few of them had will to fight
and often deserted even Partisans didn't like them and usually
assigned them to some irrelevant rear area positions.
> Many of them fought on the Eastern
> Front. I think that shows that Croatian
> in general were "pro-German".
Croat Legion on Eastern Front had one reinforced infantry regiment,
fighter and bomber squadron and naval brigade plus Italian mobile
brigade in all not even 10,000 soldiers, neutral Spain sent more
troops to Eastern front.
Pro-German attitude may have existed for few months in 1941 but it
quickly vanished as the war dragged on.
> If it comes to that, there was considerable
> "leakage" of weapons and other support
> from the Vichy regime to the French
> resistance. But I really find it bizarre that
> you would consider Axis satellite regimes
> to be providing "support and bases" to
> Resistance forces because some of their
> equipment was captured.
Don't know about France but defection to Partisans thanks to communist
network was pretty high already in 1942 Partisans had two aircraft
from Croatian Air Force in use for several days before they were
destroyed. Entire stockpiles of weapons were being turned over and
entire units defected.
> But also preserving the strength of the
> Resistance for use when it could be
> effective. A premature uprising that
> results in the annihilation of the
> Resistance is even more useful to
> the occupiers. Once the Resistance
> have come into the open and been
> wiped out, there is nothing more for
> the occupiers to worry about.
So how did Partisans survive four years of guerrilla warfare?
> Or a blow in force during the battle of
> the occupiers and the incoming liberators,
> which disrupts the defense and enables
> the liberators to win a decisive victory
> with many thousands of the enemy killed
> or captured?
How about tying up several enemy division into garrison duties
hundreds of miles from the nearest front line?
> When the French Resistance came into
> the open in Vercors, they were destroyed
> in matter of weeks by fairly small German
> forces. Such would have been the fate of
> any similar Maquisard move in 1940-1944.
> The Allies made great efforts to prevent
> any such uprisings and preserve the Maquis
> for later operations.
Odd how Tito managed to maintain mobile force of several thousand men
and constantly avoid Germans.
> These contributions would not have been
> possible had the Maquis sacrificed itself
> earlier in open attacks on the occupier;
> and they were certainly more valuable
> than what such attacks could have
> achieved: the diversion of a few thousand
> reserves from the Eastern Front or Italy.
If Germans had few less reserves available Anzio landing by some
miracle could have worked despite all the efforts from general Lucas.
Ivan Bajlo
> Oh good. Then Mihailovic's movement, until he decided to switch sides, was a
> resistance movement. Thanks for admitting that.
Nope, he wasn't doing anything so technically as ridiculous as it may
sound he was neutral or more correctly he was on his own side thinking
what to do next.
> But the French army on the same date had regular officers, had had plenty of
> time and opportunity to prepare, and decided to do nothing at that time. So
> the French army on September 30, 1930, was not an army.
You mean 1939? I think they call it Phony war, guess way. French Saar
offensive makes you really wonder if it was done by army, poor Poles
with allies like that who needs enemies.
> Oh good. So you now admit that in 1941 Mihailovic had resisted.
Again he wasn't doing anything for weeks in which your claiming his
resitance.
> No, of course. You should read that book. Making assumptions based on
> incomplete information might lead to wrong conclusions, of course. For sure
> I haven't complete information, but it is also no less sure that until now
> you have utterly failed to demonstrate that my conclusions were wrong, so
> probably I have sufficient, if incomplete, information.
In this entire debate you have failed to produce single fact to
support your theory... hmm.
Ivan Bajlo
> You claimed Mihailovic's movement did not rate, in 1941, as an enemy of the
> Axis, or a partisan movement, because he had too many men at his orders. So
> it logically follows that a common partisan, having nobody at his orders,
> does not rate as a partisan.
Nope, I said Mihailovic had excuse in lack of men for not attacking
the Germans immediately (in April 1941), communists on the other hand
waited for orders from Moscow although they had entire network set up
and could have begun immediately.
As weeks passed Mihailovic gathered his strength and did nothing! Once
communist started uprising he pretended joining them only to betray
them thinking he can please Germans.
> I'm sorry, I don't feel I can explain it more clearly than that. Maybe you
> should polish your English.
My English is fine, what you have failed is to produce single shred of
evidence of Mihailovic doing something besides claiming he was
resistance leader sitting on top of his mountain which nobody cared
about. Even a communists have some fishing stories about their
"resistance" until Hitler attacked Soviet union but even books written
by Chetnik commanders who glorify Chetniks to point of ridicules fail
to provide evidence of resistance activities during 1941.
> Then you are wrong. Area denial, alone, is a key tenet of insurgency.
>
What area was denied to Germans by Mihailovic in 1941??? Only reason
Mihailovic was allowed to start his "resistance" is beacuse Germans
never bothered to properly occupy the country since they were to busy
preparing invasion of Russia, many parts of Serbia didn't even see a
German solider before 1942 not beacuse they were blocked by chetniks
or communists but simply beacuse they never bothered to go there.
(snip irrelevant obfuscation)
Ivan Bajlo
> If your standards are valid, then they should be applicable elsewhere. They
> aren't, of course.
I thought this was history not mathematical theorems?
Michele
Logic can be applied to history. Alternatively, you can acknowledge what has
become increasingly evident, i.e. that you prefer an illogical approach to
this particular historical issue. You have carefully framed a definition of
being a resistance movement, or an armed force hostile to the Axis, that
will exclude this particular organization, but your problem, which you
evidently prefer not to address, is that the definition also ridiculously
rule out plenty of other resistance movements, or armed forces hostile to
the Axis.
Sifting through your ever-changing rules (because, BTW, you continuously
move your goalposts):
a) the Chetniks were no resistance movement in 1941 because they were too
few.
- by that token, the ZOB in the Warsaw Ghetto was no resistance movement.
Besides, it seems likely that Tito's movement in 1941 also was no resistance
movement by the same token.
b) the Chetniks were no enemies of the Axis in 1941 because they did
nothing.
- by that token, the French army in October 1939 was no enemy of the Axis
because it did nothing, and the Coalition armed forces in December 1990 were
no enemies of Iraq because they did nothing.
c) the Chetniks were no resistance movement in 1941 because they did ignore
the Axis's orders, they did keep their guns, they did control their mountain
tops, but that amounts to nothing, see b) above.
- by that token, the Italian resistance movement's "Republics" of late 1944
were no resistance.
d) the Chetniks were no real resistance movement in 1941 because the few
attacks they carried out (note the shifting of goalposts from points b) and
c) above) were done on the urging of the Western Allies.
- by that token, the French Communist resistance movement in 1941 also was
no real resistance movement because the few attacks they carried out were
done on the urging of the SU.
e) the Chetnik's few attacks in 1941 achieved little, so they really weren't
a resistance movement.
- by that token, the Ghetto uprising was no resistance.
f) the Chetniks were Axis collaborationists becase they were, even in 1941,
hostile to other resistance movements.
- by that token, of course, most Communist resistance movements, starting
with the Chinese one, were Axis collaborationists.
In general, you seem unable to assess the Chetniks' behavior in 1941
separately from their later behavior. Of course, if we were trying to draw
an overall judgement, we'd need to consider their entire history. But from
the start, I have made it very clear that I don't question what they did
from 1942 onwards. You, on the other hand, will not accept that the fact
that later in the war they were collaborationists, doesn't mean they had
been all along. That's why your position is Orwellian. By that token, the
fact that the Romanians ended the war on the Allies' side should somehow
undo the fact that they began it on the Axis' side. It doesn't work, really.
Enough said. I gather you have your own, non-historical reasons to hold your
logically unsound position. A pity, because at least in my eyes, this makes
anything you post dubious, as is always the case when one has non-historical
motives.
I rest my case.
Ivan Bajlo
> this particular historical issue. You have carefully framed a definition of
> being a resistance movement, or an armed force hostile to the Axis, that
what definition? I use only facts
> a) the Chetniks were no resistance movement in 1941 because they were too
> few.
your words not mine
> b) the Chetniks were no enemies of the Axis in 1941 because they did
> nothing.
> - by that token, the French army in October 1939 was no enemy of the Axis
no argument there, if you let enemy destroy your ally while you
virtually do nothing with thousands of troops, tanks and aircraft you
have it hardly qualifies you as enemy of Germany, if other nations
acted like that today Germania would stretch from Gibraltar to Ural
> because it did nothing, and the Coalition armed forces in December 1990 were
> no enemies of Iraq because they did nothing.
IIRC there was UN Resolution 678 with withdrawal deadline of 15
January 1991 if Saddam obeyed there wouldn't be a need for
hostilities
> d) the Chetniks were no real resistance movement in 1941 because the few
> attacks they carried out (note the shifting of goalposts from points b) and
> c) above) were done on the urging of the Western Allies.
> e) the Chetnik's few attacks in 1941 achieved little, so they really weren't
> a resistance movement.
what attacks? name at lest one instance when Mihailovic ordered
something, anything!
> f) the Chetniks were Axis collaborationists becase they were, even in 1941,
> hostile to other resistance movements.
no it was beacuse Mihailovic already in November 1941 offered his
services to Germans to attacks commies in exchange for guns and ammo,
if de Gaulle stayed in France and made similar offer to Germans I
doubt he would celebrated as national hero today, more likely he would
be shot in 1944 as collaborator or would be tried for treason like his
buddy Mihailovic was
> I rest my case.
So many words so little meaning, you wasted so many posts without
providing single piece of facts, proofs, evidence, document of any
kind to support your claims. You do know it sounds like Gobbles "A
lie, repeated often enough, will end up as truth."
David H Thornley
> On Jun 5, 3:20 pm, "Michele" <don'tspammeat...@tln.it> wrote:
>> - by that token, the French army in October 1939 was no enemy of the Axis
>
> no argument there, if you let enemy destroy your ally while you
> virtually do nothing with thousands of troops, tanks and aircraft you
> have it hardly qualifies you as enemy of Germany, if other nations
> acted like that today Germania would stretch from Gibraltar to Ural
>
What could they have done to save Poland? Bear in mind that the Poles
were essentially defeated in two weeks, as after that time they had
no real offensive capability and no real regenerative capability.
After the fall of Poland, what could they have done? Bear in mind
that the Luftwaffe was considerably larger and had better aircraft
and organization.
And what was the difference between this and what other countries
did? In general, they got seriously involved in attacking Germany
some time after they were attacked. One could make exceptions
for the British, who fought hard after France was attacked, and
the Dominions and Brazil, I suppose.
--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion, ask.
da...@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-
Ivan Bajlo
> OK, so what should the French have done?
Not much but anything is better then doing nothing.
> What could they have done to save Poland? Bear in mind that the Poles
> were essentially defeated in two weeks, as after that time they had
> no real offensive capability and no real regenerative capability.
As you have said Poles were defeated so OKW would transfer most of its
division to west as soon as possible leaving only enough divisions for
moping up operations, this would give Poles extra week or two and
allow them to withdraw few more men to Romania, also Stalin would
probably wait a bit longer before moving into eastern part of Poland.
> After the fall of Poland, what could they have done? Bear in mind
> that the Luftwaffe was considerably larger and had better aircraft
> and organization.
After not much, but French army had massive numerical superiority on
the ground at the start even if it was organized as WW1 army, probing
attack along entire border would make Germans nervous and since French
army had impregnable Maginot Line covering its rear there would be
little risk of some German blitz through Alsace and Lorraine cutting
off entire army so full weight of the army could have been used to put
pressure on the Germans before withdrawing to safety of Maginot Line.
Also encounter with Luftwaffe and Panzer divisions half a year before
they would smash through Ardennes would give French army some badly
needed experience and possibly soften the shock of blitzkrieg.
> And what was the difference between this and what other countries
> did? In general, they got seriously involved in attacking Germany
> some time after they were attacked. One could make exceptions
> for the British, who fought hard after France was attacked, and
> the Dominions and Brazil, I suppose.
Other countries didn't have military alliance with Poland, if you
claim somebody is you friend and you will protect him if he gets
attacked it looks really bad if you sit and do nothing.
If in real life you run into some gang beating up one of your friends
in the street do you call the police and sit there and watch or do you
get into the fight even thou you have no chance and will get beat up
yourself?
David H Thornley
> On Jun 6, 3:04 am, David H Thornley <da...@thornley.net> wrote:
>> OK, so what should the French have done?
>
> Not much but anything is better then doing nothing.
>
but it isn't clear to me they could have done anything effective.
>> What could they have done to save Poland?
>
> moping up operations, this would give Poles extra week or two and
> allow them to withdraw few more men to Romania, also Stalin would
> probably wait a bit longer before moving into eastern part of Poland.
>
And this is worth what? The French goal was to defeat Germany, not
to fight long and hard to allow some more Polish refugees to escape
to Romania.
Once Poland was defeated, there was no military purpose in continuing
what could only be a futile attack.
>> After the fall of Poland, what could they have done?
>
> After not much, but French army had massive numerical superiority on
> the ground at the start even if it was organized as WW1 army,
Which it wasn't. The French, at the start, were not a well-rounded
army as in 1918. A whole lot of support structure was mobilizing
from reserves.
probing
> attack along entire border would make Germans nervous
Two problems with that.
First, the French goal was not to make Germans nervous, it was to defeat
Germany.
Second, probing attacks weren't going to make the Germans all that
nervous, unless they had some prospect of breaking through.
Also, most of the border was across the Rhine, which is a very
formidable barrier.
> Also encounter with Luftwaffe and Panzer divisions half a year before
> they would smash through Ardennes would give French army some badly
> needed experience and possibly soften the shock of blitzkrieg.
>
Um, no.
The Luftwaffe was primarily in Poland, and all the Panzer divisions
were.
If you're suggesting afterwards, then you really do need to explain what
attacking across the Rhine against considerable enemy air superiority
was supposed to do, and why it was in the Allied interest to advance
infantry divisions into places where they could be cut to pieces by
Panzers.
Attacking out of excellent defensive positions against a considerably
superior enemy, also with excellent terrain, is not usually considered
a good idea, unless there's very good reason. You haven't provided one.
>> And what was the difference between this and what other countries
>> did?
>
> Other countries didn't have military alliance with Poland, if you
> claim somebody is you friend and you will protect him if he gets
> attacked it looks really bad if you sit and do nothing.
>
There was never any claim of protecting Poland; that would have been
self-evidently impossible. The Allied plan was to try to divert
German forces, which was only going to work as long as Poland could
hold out, and then build up and defeat Germany.
In fact, the French did attack, ineffectually, and the Poles
defended ineffectually.
> If in real life you run into some gang beating up one of your friends
> in the street do you call the police and sit there and watch or do you
> get into the fight even thou you have no chance and will get beat up
> yourself?
>
Who said Poland was a friend of Britain or France? Their relations
had been quite cool, and Poland's grab of a piece of Czechoslovakia
didn't help any.
Britain had determined that German territorial expansion needed to be
stopped, and France had gone along with it. Poland was a line in the
sand, a trip-wire. Nothing more.
Drazen Kramaric
wrote:
>So how did Partisans survive four years of guerrilla warfare?
By avoiding confrontations with stronger enemy formations. In
addition, Tito and communists had superior understanding of Yugoslav
and international political situation than any other political and
military factor in Yugoslavia.
>How about tying up several enemy division into garrison duties
>hundreds of miles from the nearest front line?
Yugoslavia was going to be garrisoned even if no resistance unit
stronger than detachment existed. Four German divisions were assigned
to garrison duty in Yugoslavia before Barbarossa, Italians, Hungarians
and Bulgarians were going to keep their forces there as well,
regardless of any possible resistance.
>Odd how Tito managed to maintain mobile force of several thousand men
>and constantly avoid Germans.
Before September 1943 all he had to do was to cross the demarkation
line and enter Italian occupied territory. And he was doing exactly
that whenever Germans actually felt they should have do something
about partisans.
Whenever Germans got serious about partisans they were inflicting
heavy losses to partisans and established control over any particular
piece of Yugoslavia they wanted. Operation Schwartz aka Fifth
Offensive was partisan victory only if Tito's survival is deemed as
the only prerequisite for partisan victory. Half of the Main
Operational Group that was 16 thousand strong was killed. These were
some of the most seasoned partisan fighters Tito had. In fact, if it
weren't for well organised Croatian and Western Bosnian (Krajina)
partisan corps, partisan movement would have collapsed as unified
organisation in Summer 1943.
Drazen Kramaric
wrote:
>Nope, I said Mihailovic had excuse in lack of men for not attacking
>the Germans immediately (in April 1941), communists on the other hand
>waited for orders from Moscow although they had entire network set up
>and could have begun immediately.
The organisation and the level of preparation of communist party for
the uprising has been exagerated for decades. The so called "uprising"
in Serbia officially started when Serbian communist shot Serbian
gendarme at the local fair. Hardly an organised uprising.
The early days of uprising in Serbia saw several occassions where
partisans and chetnicks jointly operated against Germans. The most
recently published book about Tito has a famous picture of captured
Germans in Uzice. What's new about the picture is that it is published
for the first time in its entirety with both partisan and chetnick
guards around captured Germans.
So called "uprisings" in Croatia and Bosnia were actually joint
operations of Serb nationalists and communists against Croatian
gendarme outposts with quite a few massacres of Croatian population.
Back in 1941 neither partisans nor chetnicks were unified
organisations acting under single supreme commander.
>As weeks passed Mihailovic gathered his strength and did nothing! Once
>communist started uprising he pretended joining them only to betray
>them thinking he can please Germans.
>From the strictly military point of view, Mihailovic's strategy was
correct. Since it was virtually impossible to free Yugoslavia before
large Allied formations appeared near Yugoslavia, any premature
military operations against Germans would have only draw reprisals.
German reprisals in Kragujevac and Kraljevo shocked Serbs and to any
reasonable Serb it was obvious that Serbs were on the verge of
genocide if they continue with the conventional resistance.
On the other hand, Tito, as Kominterne trained terrorist leader had no
qualms about suffering of the civilians. He ordered the start of the
resistance because it was what Soviets wanted him to do and military
ignorant as he was he believed invincible Red Army was going to drive
through Romania and reach Serbia in 1941.
When military reality smacked him in the head, he sacrificied Workers'
Battalion and Kadinja�a and fled for Bosnia with the remnants of the
partisans.
So, as far as 1941 is concerned, Mihailovic emerged from it as Tito's
military and political superior. It was only after when Tito's
survival instict kicked in that partisans took the right political and
military moves that eventually brought them to the top.
Mihajlovic, on the other hand, failed to draw the right conclusions
and take advantage of Tito's mistakes from the opening phase of the
war in Yugoslavia.
Drax
Ivan Bajlo
wrote:
> Yugoslavia was going to be garrisoned even if no resistance unit
> stronger than detachment existed. Four German divisions were assigned
> to garrison duty in Yugoslavia before Barbarossa, Italians, Hungarians
> and Bulgarians were going to keep their forces there as well,
> regardless of any possible resistance.
Germans planed only four divisions but that number rose quickly even
when they turned over almost entire Serbia to Bulgarian occupation,
Italians were also badly stretched out with Mussolini sending out
troops from Africa to Russia, they ended up abandoning large area of
their occupation zone and turning to MVAC as aid.
> Whenever Germans got serious about partisans they were inflicting
> heavy losses to partisans and established control over any particular
> piece of Yugoslavia they wanted. Operation Schwartz aka Fifth
But to maintain that control they had leave a strong garrison so they
would limit themselves to control of strategic communication lines and
economic resources needed for the war.
> Offensive was partisan victory only if Tito's survival is deemed as
> the only prerequisite for partisan victory. Half of the Main
> Operational Group that was 16 thousand strong was killed. These were
> some of the most seasoned partisan fighters Tito had. In fact, if it
> weren't for well organised Croatian and Western Bosnian (Krajina)
> partisan corps, partisan movement would have collapsed as unified
> organisation in Summer 1943.
German goal was to eliminate main partisan force before possible
Allied landings in Italy or Balkans and Italian capitulation which
they failed, also Partisan forces broke through into eastern Bosnia
(badly mauling 1st Ustasha Brigade 'Black Legion' in the process)
which didn't see much fighting after chetnik coups eliminated several
communist leaders and truce was made with Ustashe authorities. This
made eastern Bosnia active again and forced Germans to deploy troops
to the region and launch new operations.
Ivan Bajlo
> the uprising has been exagerated for decades. The so called "uprising"
> in Serbia officially started when Serbian communist shot Serbian
> gendarme at the local fair. Hardly an organised uprising.
Uprising start was unexpected beacuse nobody excepted such easy
progress, Axis troops were very limited to main communication lines so
isolated garrison quickly fell adding fuel to the uprising, of course
once Axis response come it didn't take much for people to cool off.
> The early days of uprising in Serbia saw several occassions where
> partisans and chetnicks jointly operated against Germans. The most
> recently published book about Tito has a famous picture of captured
> Germans in Uzice. What's new about the picture is that it is published
> for the first time in its entirety with both partisan and chetnick
> guards around captured Germans.
In early days many Chetnik commanders joined Partisans, orthodox
priest Vlado Zecevic is probably best know example, in Partisan
hierarchy he rose to member of Tito's Supreme Headquarters in charge
of religious activities and later become minister of internal affairs
and traffic.
> So called "uprisings" in Croatia and Bosnia were actually joint
> operations of Serb nationalists and communists against Croatian
> gendarme outposts with quite a few massacres of Croatian population.
Yugoslav historiography clearly names most early fighters in NDH
simply as guerrillas with both communists and nationalists leading
them until they split often in bloody attempt of one side to eliminate
another.
Don Phillipson
news:R6mdnUhTNofeR6vX...@posted.visi...
> Ivan Bajlo wrote:
> >> What could they have done to save Poland?
> >
> > mopping up operations, this would give Poles extra week or two and
> > allow them to withdraw few more men to Romania, also Stalin would
> > probably wait a bit longer before moving into eastern part of Poland.
> >
> And this is worth what? The French goal was to defeat Germany, not
> to fight long and hard to allow some more Polish refugees to escape
> to Romania.
>
> Once Poland was defeated, there was no military purpose in continuing
> what could only be a futile attack. . . .
> Britain had determined that German territorial expansion needed to be
> stopped, and France had gone along with it. Poland was a line in the
> sand, a trip-wire. Nothing more.
Other essential background concepts:
1. Naval warfare from the first week in Sept. 1939 confirmed
that WW2 would recapitulate WW1 so far as each navy
attempted to sink or block the enemy's shipping -- for which
Britain (as an island) and (continental) Germany had prepared
differentlly, each with an eye on the other.
2. In 1939-40 economics doctrine was taken very seriously
by the British government (and perhaps others) after the
experiences of funding WW1 and attempting to cope with
the world-wide "slump" of 1931: and Germany had its own
history of unorthodox economics. Treasury economists told
the Chamberlain government Germany could not afford to
sustain war costs longer than 12 to 18 months, i.e. Hitler
would be forced within that period to cease aggression.
(When UK missions seeking American aid admitted in
late 1940 British cash resources had been nearly exhausted,
some US economists may have correspondingly believed
the UK could not afford to fight more than one year or two.)
The basic British forecast turned out wrong, but appears
to have influenced the Chamberlain government profoundly
(cf. Chamberlain's greatest personal success as Chancellor,
as distinct from Prime Minister.)
Perhaps Poland was indeed a "trip wire:" but it tripped
world-wide events (as far distant as the Falkland Islands)
that could not be reversed just by wishing.
--
Don Phillipson
Carlsbad Springs
(Ottawa, Canada)
Bay Man
news:h2qbdm$qmn$1...@theodyn.ncf.ca...
> Treasury economists told
> the Chamberlain government Germany could not afford to
> sustain war costs longer than 12 to 18 months, i.e. Hitler
> would be forced within that period to cease aggression.
...
> The basic British forecast turned out wrong,
That was about right. They were thinking of a locking-horns sustained war.
The Germany economy was not robust enough and the country lacked most
essential things. They took France beyond their widest dreams because of
allied incompetence. If the war from 1939 as sustained battle Germany would
have keeled over.
Drazen Kramaric
wrote:
>Germans planed only four divisions but that number rose quickly even
>when they turned over almost entire Serbia to Bulgarian occupation,
>Italians were also badly stretched out with Mussolini sending out
>troops from Africa to Russia, they ended up abandoning large area of
>their occupation zone and turning to MVAC as aid.
The number of German divisions was raising only moderately as long as
Italy was in war. There were six of them in January 1942 with 342nd
leaving for Russia in February. Six months later there were only four
since 113th went to Ostfront as well. In January 1943 there were 8
German divisions active.
>But to maintain that control they had leave a strong garrison so they
>would limit themselves to control of strategic communication lines and
>economic resources needed for the war.
Define strong. The units that had no problems dealing with partisans
were useless against front line Soviets. In addition, Germans were
increasingly using domestic manpower to fight partisans and garrison
the territory.
>German goal was to eliminate main partisan force before possible
>Allied landings in Italy or Balkans and Italian capitulation which
>they failed,
Germans indeed failed to kill every last partisan in the country but
they cleared the coast and deployed in strength against possible
Allied invasion. The rest pf the troops had little problems securing
Yugoslav goods and manpower in order to sustain German war effort. In
the end, Germans withdrawal from Yugoslavia was caused by Soviet
advance into the Balkans and Hungary.
Drax