Top 10 WWII quotes
Jerome Morrow
1. "...the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan's
advantage..."
-Emperor Hirohito, August 14, 1945
2. "I've seen the enemy and they are worms" Hitler 1938?
3. "Peace in our time" Chamberlain 1938
4. "When those torpedoes hit our ship, you'll hear a dull ding" USN
battleship officer, mistaking the attacking IJN planes as USN planes on
practise. Pearl Harbor Dec 7 1941. (See National Geographic PH 50th
anniversary special)
5. "Don't worry, its only just one bomber." Hiroshima civilian, May 1945.
6. "Get back here! Do you think this is a football game?" US Marine Sarge on
Wake Island after seeing his gunners run out and cheer after sinking an
attacking IJN destroyer.
7. "Scratch one flat top" (USN bomber pilot after striking the Shoho)
8. @#$% (unprintable shouts of exaultation by USN pilots after attacking the
Shoho... their transcript was passed to Nimitz who apparently appreciated
it.)
Group Captain Lionel Mandrake
To: Pearl Harbor Attack Force
Date: 7 Dec. 1941
" Brilliant success was achieved for our country through the splendid efforts
of you men. But we still have a great way to go. After this victory we must
tighten the straps of our helmets and go onward, determined to continue our
fight until the final goal has been won."
Source: Gordon W. Prange, At Dawn We Slept; The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor.
Penguin Books, 1982
"The number and strength of our surface units is so small compared to the
British fleet that they can only show how to die in honor- even when operating
with full effort."
Oberbefehlshaber der Marine, Großadmiral Erich Raeder, September 3th, 1939
Motoharu Okamura, commander of the Japanese 341st air group: "In our present
situation I firmly believe that the only way to swing the war in our favor is
to resort to crash-dive attacks with our planes. There is no other way. There
will be more than enough volunteers for this chance to save our country, and I
would like to command such an operation. Provide me with 300 planes and I will
turn the tide of the war."
Finally, how this is related, i don't know. "China is a big country, inhabited
by many Chinese." - Charles de Gaulle
Regards,
Tom
Jim Powers
Jerome Morrow wrote:
> This might seem a little trivial but what are your top 10 WWII quotes?
>
"Nuts!" Gen. McAuliffe's response to German demand for surrender at Bastogne.
Roosevelt's "Day of Infamy" speech to Congress.
MacArthur: "I shall return."
Churchill's "Blood, sweat, toil, and tears"
Matti Raustia
>Finally, how this is related, i don't know. "China is a big country,
>inhabited by many Chinese." - Charles de Gaulle
The only place I've seen it is "The British Army Pocket Guide" by Charles
Heyman which is a pocket-sized book covering the equipment and TO&Es of the
BA. It has a section of quotes which, as the editor says, may be found
usefull by young officers. I think de Gaulle might have said something like
that after the WWII when he was the president of France.
BTW, the same book has also a quote which is claimed to be said by the
commander of the Imperial Japanese Submarine force: "The beatings will
continue until the morale improves." Was physical punishment in use in the
IJN during the WWII?
matti
--
"China is a big country, inhabited by many chinese." - Charles de Gaulle
Summerfield1920
Charles K. Scott
Japanese shipping and being chased by a destroyer, what must be one of
the all time shortest combat reports: "Destroyer gunnin, Wahoo runnin"
Corky Scott
--
Jim Powers
Jerome Morrow wrote:
> This might seem a little trivial but what are your top 10 WWII quotes?
>
"Sighted sub, sank same." Radio message sent by a U.S. Navy pilot after sinking
a U-Boat off Newfoundland in January, 1942.
--
V-Man
>>
>
>"Nuts!" Gen. McAuliffe's response to German demand for surrender at
>Bastogne.
To add to that...
"General Patton, youwant to know what General MacAuliffe said to a German
surrender demand?"
"What?"
"NUTS!"
(Laughter) "Ha, ha, keep them moving. A man that eloquent has to be saved."
Happy Fat Tuesday! V-Man
<*> A Knight is sworn to Valor, His Heart knows only Virtue
=/\= His Blade defends the Weak, His Word speaks only Truth
(-o-) His Wrath undoes the Wicked
--
Michael Emrys
> 6. "Get back here! Do you think this is a football game?" US Marine Sarge on
> Wake Island after seeing his gunners run out and cheer after sinking an
> attacking IJN destroyer.
"Send more Japs!" Exuberant report from Wake after the initial Japanese
attempt to invade the island.
Unfortunately, they did.
Michael
--
Jerome Morrow
or 1942, protesting that he represented France with the words, "I am France.
I am Joan of Arc!" and beating his chest with anger.
I don't have the book reference for the quote. I read it in 1992.... nearly
ten years ago! How time flies.
--
Merlin Dorfman
...
: Finally, how this is related, i don't know. "China is a big country, inhabited
: by many Chinese." - Charles de Gaulle
I thought that was Dan Quayle :-)
How about these quotes:
- "Attack, repeat, attack"
- "By the time we are finished with this war, the Japanese
language will be spoken only in hell"
- "Shoot down all snoopers; not vindictively, but in a friendly
sort of way"
- "I shall return"
- "Uncommon valor was a common virtue"
I'm sure there are many others, but those are the first
few that come to mind.
(Halsey, Halsey, Halsey, MacArthur, Nimitz)
Merlin Dorfman
DOR...@COMPUTER.ORG
--
NCH
common
virtue. --Admiral Nimitz"
--
Remove "**" from address for reply by e-mail
Mark Gregory
news:9bivqh$dk6$1...@beast.TCNJ.EDU...
>
>
> Jerome Morrow wrote:
>
> > This might seem a little trivial but what are your top 10 WWII quotes?
> >
"What General Weygand called the Battle of France is over. I expect
that the
Battle of Britain is about to begin. Upon this battle depends the
survival
of Christian civilization. Upon it depends our own British life, and
the
long continuity of our institutions and our Empire. The whole fury and
might
of the enemy must very soon be turned on us. Hitler knows that he will
have
to break us in this Island or lose the war. If we can stand up to him,
all
Europe may be free and the life of the world may move forward into
broad,
sunlit uplands. But if we fail, then the whole world, including the
United
States, including all that we have known and cared for, will sink into
the
abyss of a new Dark Age made more sinister, and perhaps more
protracted, by
the lights of perverted science. Let us therefore brace ourselves to
our
duties, and so bear ourselves that, if the British Empire and its
Commonwealth last for a thousand years, men will still say, "This was
their
finest hour."
- Winston Churchill, June 18, 1940.
"Out of ammunition ... God Save the King"
- unknown signaller of 2nd Para Bn in the vicinity of Arnhem road
bridge,
Sept 22, 1944.
Supposedly picked up by German signallers, but not 1st Airborne
Div. HQ.
Merlin Dorfman
: >From the USS Wahoo while exiting from the battle scene after engaging
: Japanese shipping and being chased by a destroyer, what must be one of
: the all time shortest combat reports: "Destroyer gunnin, Wahoo runnin"
Maybe except for "Sighted sub, sank same."
Or, if we can leave WW II, "Veni, vidi, vici." (I came,
I saw, I conquered.)
Merlin Dorfman
DOR...@COMPUTER.ORG
--
Bruce Tucker
> BTW, the same book has also a quote which is claimed to be said by the
> commander of the Imperial Japanese Submarine force: "The beatings will
> continue until the morale improves." Was physical punishment in use in
the
> IJN during the WWII?
Absolutely. In his book _Japanese Destroyer Captain_ (I'm unsure what the
original title was, that's the Ballantine translation I read) Capt.
Tameichi Hara related how he was soured on the practice after being
permanently injured by routine and severe beatings at the academy, and how
during the war he had to work to dissuade his junior officers from beating
enlisted men for the most minor infractions. Apparently there were other
officers who felt as Hara did that corporal punishment was bad for morale,
but support for the practice was the norm.
I would expect, though, that this sort of thing would be much less common
when dealing with elites such as submarine crews. And I've seen so many
supposed attributions for that quote that I find it hard to credit.
--
Bruce Tucker disinte...@mindspring.com
--
Steve
The following was attributed to General Truscott at thededication of the
Anzio-Nettuno in 1945, by Bill Mauldin;
"When Truscott spoke he turned away from the visitors and addresses himself to
the corpses he had commanded there. It was the most moving gesture I ever saw.
It came froma hard boiled man who was incapable of planned dramatics. The
general's remarks were brief and extemporaneous. He apologized to thedead men
for their presence here. He said everybody tells leaders it is not their fault
that men get killed in war, but that every leader knows in his heart this is not
altogether true. He saidhe hoped anyone here through any mistake of his would
forgive him, but he realized this was asking a hell of a lot under the
circumstances. One of the Senators cigars went out;he bent over to relight it,
then thought better of it. Truscott said he would not speak of the glorious dead
because he didn't see much glory getting killed in your late teens or early
twenties. He promised that in the future he ran into anybody, especially old
men, who thought death in battle was glorious, he would straighten them out. He
said he thought it was the least he could do."
Steve Sepe
--
Jim Powers
"Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few."
--
dpyers
"I have forty Jap Planes Surrounded"
Matti Raustia
>Radio call from Ensign "Spider" Webb flying a Hellcat off of Guam...
>"I have forty Jap Planes Surrounded"
Which remainds me about a quote from a combat report of some Finnish fighter
ace (might have been Captain Hans Wind) from summer '44 during Soviet major
offencive on the Karelian Isthmus: "We (two Finnish fighters) were forced to
fight about one Soviet hundred planes". How come they counted them and how
may of the Soviet planes were actually engaged in combat I'm not aware :)
Dave Gower
U.S. forces brought up a 155mm cannon and blew a hole right through and out
the back of a building which was being used as a defensive strongpoint.
"When the Americans start using 155mm cannon as sniper weapons, it's time to
give up".
Cub driver
>> BTW, the same book has also a quote which is claimed to be said by the
>> commander of the Imperial Japanese Submarine force: "The beatings will
>> continue until the morale improves." Was physical punishment in use in
The Japanese routinely used beatings as a training tool. Saburo Sakai
in his "autobiography" Samurai! describes his treatment at the hands
of a sadistic sergeant. I suspect that Sakai in the Japanese-language
version did not treat the sergeant as harshly as the Martin Caidin
English-language version does, simply because it was so common.
Japanese writers generally describe the weapon as a wooden training
sword. American prisoners describe it as a baseball bat.
I'm not sure that beatings as such were carried forward into
operational units, but certainly slapping was accepted and ordinary.
Of course this physical maltreatment of recruits--its effect not only
on them but also on higher ranks who tolerated or encouraged it--had a
great deal to do with the savagery with which Japanese troops treated
occupied peoples and prisoners of war. In the latter case, there was a
doubling down of savagery, since many PW camp guards were Koreans
impressed into Japanese military service. The Japanese soldiers had
been brutalized, so they brutalized the Koreans as being lower on the
human scale than they, and the Koreans brutalized the prisoners.
all the best - Dan Ford (email: use...@danford.net)
The Only War We've Got (Early Days in South Vietnam)
http://danford.net/onlywar.htm
Steineck
I think the best is the speech George Patton gave to his troops prior to the
invasion in Normandy profanity and all:
Patton?s speech to the troops
Be Seated.
Men, this stuff we hear about America wanting to stay out of the war, not
wanting to fight, is a lot of bullshit. Americans love to fight - traditionally.
All real Americans love the sting and clash of battle. When you were kids, you
all admired the champion marble player; the fastest runner; the big league ball
players; the toughest boxers. Americans love a winner and will not tolerate a
loser. Americans despise cowards. Americans play to win - all the time. I
wouldn't give a hoot in hell for a man who lost and laughed. That's why
Americans have never lost, not ever will lose a war, for the very thought of
losing is hateful to an American.
You are not all going to die. Only two percent of you here today would die in a
major battle. Death must not be feared. Every man is frightened at first in
battle. If he says he isn't, he's a goddamn liar. Some men are cowards, yes! But
they fight just the same, or get the hell shamed out of them watching men who do
fight who are just as scared. The real hero is the man who fights even though he
is scared. Some get over their fright in a minute under fire, some take an hour.
For some it takes days. But the real man never lets fear of death overpower his
honor, his sense of duty to this country and his innate manhood.
All through your army career you men have bitched about "This chickenshit
drilling." That is all for a purpose. Drilling and discipline must be maintained
in any army if for only one reason -- INSTANT OBEDIENCE TO ORDERS AND TO CREATE
CONSTANT ALERTNESS. I don't give a damn for a man who is not always on his toes.
You men are veterans or you wouldn't be here. You are ready. A man to continue
breathing must be alert at all times. If not, sometime a German son-of-a-bitch
will sneak up behind him and beat him to death with a sock full of shit.
There are 400 neatly marked graves somewhere in Sicily all because one man went
to sleep on his job -- but they were German graves for we caught the bastard
asleep before his officers did. An Army is a team. Lives, sleeps, eats, fights
as a team. This individual heroic stuff is a lot of crap. The bilious bastards
who wrote that kind of stuff for the Saturday Evening Post don't know any more
about real fighting, under fire, than they do about fucking. We have the best
food, the finest equipment, the best spirit and the best fighting men in the
world. Why, by God, I actually pity these poor sons-of-bitches we are going up
against. By God, I do!
My men don't surrender. I don't want to hear of any soldier under my command
being captured unless he is hit. Even if you are hit, you can still fight.
That's not just bullshit, either. The kind of man I want under me is like the
lieutenant in Libya, who, with a Lugar against his chest, jerked off his helmet,
swept the gun aside with one hand and busted hell out of the Boche with the
helmet. Then he jumped on the gun and went out and killed another German: All
this with a bullet through his lung. That's a man for you.
All real heroes are not story book combat fighters either. Every man in the army
plays a vital part. Every little job is essential. Don't ever let down, thinking
your role is unimportant. Every man has a job to do. Every man is a link in the
great chain. What if every truck driver decided that he didn't like the whine of
the shells overhead, turned yellow and jumped headlong into the ditch? He could
say to himself, "They won't miss me -- just one in thousands." What if every man
said that? Where in hell would we be now? No, thank God, Americans don't say
that! Every man does his job; every man serves the whole. Every department,
every unit, is important to the vast scheme of things. The Ordnance men are
needed to supply the guns, the Quartermaster to bring up the food and clothes to
us -- for where we're going there isn't a hell of a lot to steal. Every last man
in the mess hall, even the one who heats the water to keep us from getting the
GI shits has a job to do. Even the chaplain is important, for if we get killed
and if he is not there to bury us we'd all go to hell.
Each man must not only think of himself, but of his buddy fighting beside him.
We don't want yellow cowards in this army. They should all be killed off like
flies. If not they will go back home after the war and breed more cowards. The
brave men will breed brave men. Kill off the goddamn cowards and we'll have a
nation of brave men.
One of the bravest men I ever saw in the African campaign was the fellow I saw
on top of a telegraph pole in the midst of furious fire while we were plowing
toward Tunis. I stopped and asked what the hell he was doing up there at that
time. He answered, "Fixing the wire, sir." "Isn't it a little unhealthy right
now?," I asked. "Yes sir, but this goddamn wire's got to be fixed." There was a
real soldier. There was a man who devoted all he had to his duty, no matter how
great the odds, no matter how seemingly insignificant his duty might appear at
the time.
You should have seen those trucks on the road to Gabes. The drivers were
magnificent. All day and all night they rolled over those son-of-a-bitching
roads, never stopping, never faltering from their course, with shells bursting
around them all the time. We got through on good old American guts. Many of
these men drove over forty consecutive hours. These weren't combat men. But they
were soldiers with a job to do. They did it -- and in a whale of a way they did
it. They were part of a team. Without them the fight would have been lost. All
the links in the chain pulled together and that chain became unbreakable.
Don't forget, you don't know I'm here. No word of the fact is to be mentioned in
any letters. The world is not supposed to know what the hell became of me. I'm
not supposed to be commanding this Army. I'm not even supposed to be in England.
Let the first bastards to find out be the goddamn Germans. Someday I want them
to raise up on their hind legs and howl, "Jesus Christ, it's the goddamn Third
Army and that son-of-a-bitch Patton again."
We want to get the hell over there. We want to get over there and clear the
goddamn thing up. You can't win a war lying down. The quicker we clean up this
goddamn mess, the quicker we can take a jaunt against the purple pissing Japs an
clean their nest out too, before the Marines get all the goddamn credit.
Sure, we all want to be home. We want this thing over with. The quickest way to
get it over is to get the bastards. The quicker they are whipped, the quicker we
go home. The shortest way home is through Berlin. When a man is lying in a shell
hole, if he just stays there all day, a Boche will get him eventually, and the
hell with that idea. The hell with taking it. My men don't dig foxholes. I don't
want them to. Foxholes only slow up an offensive. Keep moving. And don't give
the enemy time to dig one. We'll win this war but we'll win it only by fighting
and by showing the Germans we've got more guts than they have.
There is one great thing you men will all be able to say when you go home. You
may thank God for it. Thank God, that at least, thirty years from now, when you
are sitting around the fireside with your grandson on your knees, and he asks
you what you did in the Great War, you won't have to cough and say, "I shoveled
shit in Louisiana."
Terence O'Brien
> Or, if we can leave WW II, "Veni, vidi, vici." (I came,
> I saw, I conquered.)
Under that condition the prize would surely go to Napier for his
PECCAVI, after the victory at Sind. But to return to our own wartime,
and keeping only vaguely to the topic, here are three signals I remember
with pleasure. They are in descending order of participant's rank - and
in propriety.
FIRST: General Stilwell, in command of the First Chinese Army, was
finding it difficult to capture Myitkyena The airfield had been taken
by the American force known as Merrils Marauders but their casualties
had been so severe that they were almost finished as an effective
fighting force, so Stilwell had only his wayward Chinese army to
complete the task. To launch the assault the garrison town of Mogaung
had first to be captured, and to effect this Stilwell called upon the
British 77 Brigade, under Brigadier Calvert, which had been severely
reduced in numbers after fighting for nearly three months behind the
lines, and which possessed neither armour nor artillery. They did
however have vital support from the 10th US Air Force in the bloody
battle that ensued, and out of their original strength of 2,355 against
a superior Japanese entrenched force, they were down to 806 effective
men when they had finally captured the town. The effective public
relations staff at Stilwell's headquarters issued a bulletin declaring
that his Chinese forces had captured the town. When the news broadcast
was picked up Calvert then sent this signal to Stilwell:
"The Chinese having taken Mogaung 77 Brigade is proceeding to take
Umbrage".
SECOND: We had problems trying to contact base some 300 miles away when
operating behind the lines in Burma in 1944. The Army 22-set simply did
not have the range to operate effectively at that distance. When Major
Cane filed a critical report about it after only a fortnight in the
field he had back from General Wingate's headquarters no sympathy but
just a pontifical statement that the set could, and had been, operated
perfectly well at such a range. He was advised to experiment with
different positions of the aerial. He sent this signal in reply:
"Have experimented with every position except one. Leave that one to
you."
THIRD. This was in March 1941. I was given an easy task for my first
operational flight, a Blenheim to cover a convoy approaching southern
Ireland. It had been under attack crossing the Atlantic and a Heinkel
had sunk a ship the previous day so I approached with care, and while
still out of range had the gunner flashing letter-of-the-day to the
leading destroyer. It flashed back acceptance, aim so exact and light so
bright I had to look away. I then began to fly about the two long lines
of merchant ships, all the time keeping particularly wide of the three
destroyers weaving about them. About an hour later as I was flying
parallel to the line, busily sky-watching, I had a call from the gunner
that a destroyer among the ships was flashing. I banked and saw the
signalling, but the signal-light seemed partially shielded, nothing like
as bright as the original reception signal, and the morse letters were
coming out at naval pace, which I certainly could not recognise even had
the focus been surer. I called Davy, the gunner, but he too was lost.
"I can't read him, sir. I'll IMI him" ( flash for a repeat).
I began to circle on station so as to keep the destroyer within sight,
but although Davy kept flashing for repeat the navy signaller seemed to
make no effort to improve his aim nor to reduce his speed. It occurred
to me that perhaps the destroyer was actually transmitting to one of the
others, not to us, and we were simply an irritating intrusion with our
flashes, so I called Davy to stop. But he had already stopped, and when
I banked to sight the destroyer I knew that he had been stilled by the
sight-flinching direct glare we now had from the navy signaller. Davy
had already begun to call out the amateur-paced letters.
"N... O... T.... That's Not. Y... O... U... You. Not you. "C...
U........"
I saw the last two letters but had already guessed them when Davy,
having announced the third one, had barely called the fourth when he
stopped abruptly - realising.
"Oh! He wasn't signalling us, sir," he murmured.
Terence O'Brien
Merlin Dorfman
: Merlin Dorfman wrote:
: > Or, if we can leave WW II, "Veni, vidi, vici." (I came,
: > I saw, I conquered.)
: Under that condition the prize would surely go to Napier for his
: PECCAVI, after the victory at Sind.
I had forgotten this one, but it rates not only for
brevity but for wit. ("Brevity is the soul of...")
However as was pointed out in another message, surely
"Nuts!" is the shortest quote we are likely to find.
For some reason there seem to be many more memorable
quotes from WW I than WW II. But I digress (from the topic
of this NG).
: But to return to our own wartime,
: and keeping only vaguely to the topic, here are three signals I remember
: with pleasure. They are in descending order of participant's rank - and
: in propriety.
(Thanks for these three quotes. Outstanding!)
Merlin Dorfman
DOR...@COMPUTER.ORG
Gary J. Mac Donald
>
> This might seem a little trivial but what are your top 10 WWII quotes?
A small RCN escort vessel departing Newfoundland (N.F.) signalled the Flag
Officer (F.O.) Newfoundland for permission:
"To F.O.N.F.: Request permisson to F.O. from N.F."
GaryJ
Andrew Clark
"Steineck" <musikint...@yahoo.se> wrote
> No, thank God, Americans don't say that!
A shame then that desertion was so endemic in US units in
Normandy and NW Europe - far worse than British or Canadian
units.
--
casita
> I think the best is the speech George Patton gave to his troops prior
to the
> invasion in Normandy profanity and all:
Arthur Harris did not beat around the bush either. And he did it with far
fewer words, without the profanity and 9 months before Gen Patton gave his
pep talk.
"Harris bounded up on the platform and his very first words were, 'Most of
you people won't be here in a few weeks. We are about to begin a series of
raids that will demand the best from all of you. We know there will be
tremendous losses, but it has to be done. We must beat Germany to her
knees."
Air Marshall Harris's address to 408 ( Goose ) and 426 ( Thunderbird )
Squadrons, RCAF 6 Group. Linton-on -Ouce, England 14 Sept 1943.
He was as blunt with the Germans as he was with his aircrew:
"We in Britain know quite enough about air raids. For ten months your
Luftwaffe bombed us. 43 000 British men women and children lost their lives.
Many of our most cherished historical buildings were destroyed. I will speak
frankly about whether we bomb single military targets or whole cities.
Obviously, we prefer to hit factories, shipyards and railways. It damages
Hitler's war machine the most. But, those people who work in those plants
live close to them. Therefore, we hit your houses and you. We are going to
scourge the Third Reich from end to end if you make it necessary for us to
do so."
--
Summerfield1920
>The Japanese routinely used beatings as a training tool.
And for punishment, from what I understand.
However, it wasn't that much earlier that equally brutal punishments were
routine in the militaries of the West, with whippings, beatings, and all sorts
of tortures and even hangings normal for even small infractions. Read Herman
Melville's "White Jacket" for some naval examples and any one of Capt. Charles
King's novels of the Far West for cavalry examples.
One reason for why such punishments were stopped, at least in the US and
Britain, was the force of evangelical Christianity, in particular John Wesley
and the Methodists. The religious reform movements that gathered steam through
the 19th century in the English-speaking world, aimed at treating the ordinary
man with decency and dignity did not touch the Japanese.
--
Lawrence Dillard
"You will climb Niitakayama, 1208 & 1208!"--Yamamoto Isoroku
"With Ray Spruance in command (at end of first day of the Midway
battle)
why should I not sleep soundly?"-- Adm Nimitz
"I have also to announce to the House, that during the night and the
early
hours of this morning the first of the series of landings upon the
European
continent has taken place..."--WSC
"Under the command of General Eisenhower, Allied naval forces
supported by
strong air forces began landing Allied armies this morning on the
coast of
France"--BBC
"The mission of this Allied force was fulfilled at 0241 local time,
May
7,1945"--Ike
"I want you to make those Germans f*****g howl: 'Goddamn, it's the
Third
Army and that sumbitch Patton again!"--GSP,jr
"Where is Task Force 34?"--Adm Nimitz
"Tora, tora, tora!"--Cmdr Fuchida Mitsuo
"Man your battle stations, this is no shit!"--PA system, USS OKLAHOMA
"AIR RAID, PEARL HARBOR. THIS IS NOT DRILL!"--Lcdr Logan Ramsey
"Hostilities with Japan commenced with air raid on Pearl Harbor"--Adm
Kimmel, 0812 hrs 12-7-41
"You! What's your most valuable possession?--general to soldier
"My rifle, sir!"--soldier in reply
"No, it's Your Life, and I'm going to save it for
you!"--
Sir BL Montgomery
"We don't have to apologize (for the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor at
dawn on
a Sunday) because we did it by order"--Zero pilot Maeda Takeshi
"Our cause is just; the Nazis must be vanquished; victory will be
ours"--Molotov
" Intelligence must not be regarded as just another tour of duty, but
as a
profession"--Ellis Zacharias
"Jerome Morrow" <nospam_jer...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:9bhs7u$4a9$1...@beast.TCNJ.EDU...
James Wingert
Somerville, Flag Office Gibralter who signalled Admiral Cunningham, Flag
Officer Eastern Mediterranean on the occasion of his second knighthood
"Congratulations! Twice a knight at your age is remarkable".
Gary J. Mac Donald <ga...@freenet.carleton.ca> wrote in message
news:9c16rl$chm$1...@beast.TCNJ.EDU...
--
JimLillie
>> This might seem a little trivial but what are your top 10 WWII quotes?
>>
"Sank sub, open bar." Pilot off Iceland.
Admiral had ordered new officer's bar not to open until the antisub patrols
accomplished more than flight time.
Jim
JB Lillie IBM Engineer (ret) USArmy SP5 Nuc Wpns
JimLillie
<72327...@compuserve.com> writes:
>Churchill's tribute to the RAF:
>"Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few."
>
>
To which the pilots replied that he was refering to their bar bills.
They
noted that a municipal bus driver was higher paid.
Michael Emrys
Cunningham received an R/T that one of his flying boats had spotted an
Italian counterpart and was giving chase. Some while later, the same flying
boat transmitted that it had successfully downed the Italian. Cunningham
congratulated them with: "You big bully!"
Michael
--
First Name Last Name
>>> This might seem a little trivial but what are your top 10 WWII quotes?
>>>
>>
>>Bastogne.
>
> To add to that...
>
> "General Patton, youwant to know what General MacAuliffe said
> to a German
> surrender demand?"
>
> "What?"
>
> "NUTS!"
>
> (Laughter) "Ha, ha, keep them moving. A man that eloquent
> has to be saved."
Another quote attributed to an anonymous GI during the Battle of the Bulge (Ardennes offensive):
"So they have us surrounded. The poor bastards."
On other events, here are a few I remember:
"Within 3 weeks, England will have her neck wrung like a chicken."
-- French General Gamilin(?)
"Some Chicken! Some Neck!"
-- Churchill's response, in a speech to Canada's Parliment
"We are waiting for the long-promised invasion. So are the fishes."
-- Winston Churchill
"Never in the field of human conflict
has so much been owed
by so many
to so few."
-- Winston Churchill, to RAF aircrew, during the Battle of Britain
"Good speech."
-- Harry Hopkins to FDR, at the end of one of Churchill's speeches
"All of Winston's speeches are good ones."
-- FDR's response
------------------------------------------------------------
--== Sent via Deja.com ==--
http://www.deja.com/
AlanS
"First Name Last Name" <pgm...@my-deja.com> wrote in message
news:9c97bo$l2t$1...@beast.TCNJ.EDU...
| V-Man (velo...@aol.com.CanDo) wrote
| >>> This might seem a little trivial but what are your top 10 WWII quotes?
|
| -- Harry Hopkins to FDR, at the end of one of Churchill's speeches
| "All of Winston's speeches are good ones."
| -- FDR's response
Churchill's speeches were scripted & rehearsed. The speeches to
Parliament
were later recorded in a BBC studio as sound recording of Parliament
was
illegal. It would be nice if the writers got some credit as well.
The kids were watching a silly SF movie last night & the aliens had a
slogan
"Never surrender, never give up" - Churchill again! I think I would
have
been stirred to that view by hearing those words crackling over a
1940's
radio. I think it ends the "We will fight them on the beaches . . . "
speech.
Alan Saunders
Lawrence Dillard
concomitant
casualties US units took; Canadian and British troops had had Monty's
word
that they would not be asked to move until and unless he could provide
them
with generous artillery and air support. That served to keep
casualties low
and morale high enough to forestall desertion. By way of contrast, the
US
leadership took the position that time was short and generally ordered
the
troops forward whether an ample artillewry and armor support were
made
available or not. The attitude was, "there's a war to be won".
Thanks for the post.
"Andrew Clark" <acl...@cedar-consultancy.co.uk> wrote in message
news:9c1nnc$ulg$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu...
Lawrence Dillard
"After the war when a man is asked what he did it will be quite
sufficient for him to say 'I marched and fought with the Desert Army' ".
###
Paraphrasing Shakespeare less closely, Gen GS Patton, jr., told his
soldiers in 1944:
"When it's all over and you're home once more, you can thank God
that twenty years from now, when you're sitting around the fireside with
your grandson on your knee and he asks you what you did in the war, you
won't have to shift him to the other knee, cough, and say, "I shovelled shit
in Louisiana".
###
Yamamoto Isoroku warning ultranationalists about warring on the US, in
January, 1941:
"Should hostilities once break out between Japan and the United
States, it is not enough that we take Guam and the Philipines, nor even
Hawaii and San Francisco. We would have to march into Washington and sign
the treaty in the White House...."
###
"Time is Short!"
--sign above doorway leading into Ike's private office in England.
###
"You don't have to be Crazy to work here, but It Helps"
--sign seen in a number of Allied radio intel offices, Pacific Ocean Areas.
###
"My mind was extremely fatigued. It should probably be called a "judgment of
exhaustion'. I did not feel tired at the time but, under great strain and
without sleep for three days and nights, I was exhausted both physically and
mentally".
--Adm Kurita Takeo, explaining why he abandoned his assault at Leyte with
victory apparently in his grasp.
###
"I knew you were scared, "Ziggy", but I didn't know you were that scared!"
--Fellow USN Admiral to Adm Sprague, after reading of Kurita's estimate of
the thirty-knot speed reached by Sprague's escort carriers (top speed:
eighteen knots) while trying to escape at Leyte.
###
"What shall we do? What shall we do?"
--CoS FM William Keitel, to OB West, FM Gerd von Runstedt, June 29,
1944
"Make peace, you fools! What else can you do?"
--Runstedt in reply. (He was fired immediately by Hitler and replaced by FM
Hans von Kluge)
###
"Third Army is to bypass Trier, as it would need four divisions to capture
the city."
--SHAEF (direct to 3d Army, bypassing 12th AG) March
2, 1945
"10th Armored and 94th Inf Div have just captured Trier."
_Gen Walton Walker, to 3d Army, March 2, 1945
"Have taken Trier with two divisions. What do you want me to do? Give it
back?"
--Gen GS Patton, jr., to SHAEF (via 12th AG) March 2,
1945
###
"Mr President, several German divisions are deep in Polish territory; there
are reports of German bombers over the city of Warsaw...."
--US Amb to France William C Bullitt to FDR via
telephone
"Well, Bill, it has come at last. God help us all."
--FDR in reply
###
Thanks for the post.
"Jim Powers" <72327...@compuserve.com> wrote in message
news:9bivqh$dk6$1...@beast.TCNJ.EDU...
>
>
> Jerome Morrow wrote:
>
> > This might seem a little trivial but what are your top 10 WWII quotes?
> >
>
> "Nuts!" Gen. McAuliffe's response to German demand for surrender at
Bastogne.
>
> Roosevelt's "Day of Infamy" speech to Congress.
>
> MacArthur: "I shall return."
>
> Churchill's "Blood, sweat, toil, and tears"
>
casita
fire alone would suffice to destroy the whole city, as happened once before,
200 years ago. Goring wants to use innumerable incendiary bombs of an
altogether new type to create sources of fire in all parts of London. Fires
everywhere. Thousands of them. Then they'll unite in one gigantic area
conflagration. Goring has the right idea. Explosive bombs don't work, but it
can be done with incindiary bombs - total destruction of London. What use
will their fire department be once that really starts?"
Adolf Hitler 1940 ref: "Inside the Third Reich" by Albert
Speer pg 388-9.
"For they have sown the wind, and they shall reap the whirlwind."
Hosea 8:7
Ref: "Reap the Whirlwind: The Story of Canada's bomber Force in WW2". ( 50
000 of the 125 000 airmen of Bomber Command were Canadian ).
"It drives one mad to think that some Canadian boor, who probably can't even
find Europe on the globe, flies here from a country glutted with natural
resouces to bombard a continent with a crowded population."
Joseph Goebels
ref: "Canadians in Bomber Command" pg 1.
Craig Ayres-Sevier
crucial in
their absurd
irony. Personally, i've always liked this ditty, from the speech
Hitler
gave to Reichstag, declaring war on the United States in December
1941.
"I shared the fate of millions, and Franklin Roosevelt only the fate
of the
so-called Upper Ten Thousand."
Craig.
Andrew Clark
"AlanS" <webapp...@theraf.codotuk> wrote
> Churchill's speeches were scripted & rehearsed.
That is certainly true, but Churchill was the more-or-less sole
author of all his keynote wartime speeches, as is confirmed by
his biographies and those of his staff. His speeches on other
subjects, especially domestic matters, were usually drafted by
others.
> The speeches to Parliament were later recorded in a BBC studio
> as sound recording of Parliament was illegal.
Not so. It was illegal to record the proceedings of Parliament
without its permission, which was invariably obtained beforehand
by a procedure motion. Most of Churchill's keynote Parliamentary
speeches were recorded live; some were re-recorded for clarity.
Gary J. Mac Donald
> Churchill's speeches were scripted & rehearsed. The speeches to
> Parliament were later recorded in a BBC studio as sound recording of Parliament
> was illegal. It would be nice if the writers got some credit as well.
The writer does get the credit.
GaryJ
--
Andrew Clark
"Lawrence Dillard" <ldil...@enteract.com> wrote
> Not in view of the disproportionate amount of fighting done and
> concomitant casualties US units took
Rubbish. The fact is that US forces in NW Europe took far lower
proportionate levels of casualties than Commonwealth forces, yet
suffered far higher proportionate levels of desertion,
absence-without-leave and psychological illness.
> By way of contrast, the US leadership took the position that
time
> was short and generally ordered the troops forward whether
> an ample artillewry and armor support were made
> available or not. The attitude was, "there's a war to be won".
This is not a recognisable command attitude when one actually
looks at the tactics employed by the US army in NW Europe. US
infantry assaults were just as likely to be preceded and
supported by artillery, armour and air as those of the
Commonwealth forces. In addition, of course, the US faced far
less stubborn resistance than Commonwealth forces. Neither of
these facts supports your rather offensive and facile suggestion
that the Commonwealth troops faced less battlefield stress than
US troops.
--
Dirk Lorek
> Or, if we can leave WW II, "Veni, vidi, vici." (I came,
>I saw, I conquered.)
Which reminds me of a Third Reich joke from the time shortly after
France's surrender.
Q: What is the difference between Caesar and Mussolini?
A: Caesar came, saw, and conquered, Mussolini came when he saw that
one conquered.
More Third Reich jokes (in German only, sorry) at
http://www.geocities.com/BourbonStreet/2043/witz_menu.html
Dirk
______________________________________________________________________
What am I, Life? A thing of watery salt, held in cohesion by unresting
cells,which work they know not why, which never halt, myself unwitting
where their Master dwells. - John Masefield -
--
Lawrence Dillard
"Another running gun battle...Japs gunning, WAHOO running...."
I think that's the way O'Kane quoted Cmdr Morton, anyway.
Thanks for the post.
"Charles K. Scott" <Charles...@dartmouth.edu> wrote in message
news:9bkijq$m10$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu...
> >From the USS Wahoo while exiting from the battle scene after engaging
> Japanese shipping and being chased by a destroyer, what must be one of
> the all time shortest combat reports: "Destroyer gunnin, Wahoo runnin"
>
> Corky Scott
>
> --
>
David Thornley
Andrew Clark <acl...@cedar-consultancy.co.uk> wrote:
>
>Rubbish. The fact is that US forces in NW Europe took far lower
>proportionate levels of casualties than Commonwealth forces, yet
>suffered far higher proportionate levels of desertion,
>absence-without-leave and psychological illness.
>
by the US Army.
>> By way of contrast, the US leadership took the position that
>time
>> was short and generally ordered the troops forward whether
>> an ample artillewry and armor support were made
>> available or not. The attitude was, "there's a war to be won".
>
>This is not a recognisable command attitude when one actually
>looks at the tactics employed by the US army in NW Europe. US
>infantry assaults were just as likely to be preceded and
>supported by artillery, armour and air as those of the
>Commonwealth forces.
This isn't quite an answer, even if it is correct. It may be that
the US was better able to provide such support to its troops.
Of course, the Vosges offensive was quite successful even with
the near-total absence of air support.
In addition, of course, the US faced far
>less stubborn resistance than Commonwealth forces.
That "of course" really needs to be backed up with evidence. It
seems to me that the Germans fought rather hard in Huertgen Forest
and Lorraine, and that the largest German counteroffensive
(the Ardennes) was against the US Army. The last significant
German counterattack was also against the US. The bocage fighting
in Normandy was not lackadaisical on either side, and the reason
the British and Canadians (and Poles and....) faced the most German
armor was simply terrain.
Neither of
>these facts supports your rather offensive and facile suggestion
>that the Commonwealth troops faced less battlefield stress than
>US troops.
>
I have no evidence that one set of troops had less battlefield
stress than the others. One possible difference is that, by 1944,
lots of Commonwealth formations had been in combat much longer
than most US formations, and were feeling burnt out.
--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion, ask.
da...@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-
--
Andrew Clark
"David Thornley" <thor...@visi.com> wrote
> This was likely due to the really lousy handling of combat
stress
> by the US Army.
And to generally lower standards of junior leadership and
discipline, and a laxity by senior officers in matters of
discipline. Poorly led and undisciplined troops are far more
likely to suffer psychological trauma.
> This isn't quite an answer, even if it is correct.
It's a perfectly good answer to the stupid assertion which was
made, which was that the US leadership was so gung-ho for victory
that it was prone to order attacks without proper support and
preparation, whereas the British were much more cautious, and by
implication timid and less focused on victory. It was a nasty and
groundless smear, and I'm reluctant to drift into answering other
issues, such as the one you raise, when it needs a direct
response.
(snip remainder).
Les .
<3af9b72...@news.pacific.net.au> :
>"First Name Last Name" <pgm...@my-deja.com> wrote in message
>news:9c97bo$l2t$1...@beast.TCNJ.EDU...
>| V-Man (velo...@aol.com.CanDo) wrote
>| >>> This might seem a little trivial but what are your top 10 WWII quotes?
>| "Good speech."
>| -- Harry Hopkins to FDR, at the end of one of Churchill's speeches
>| "All of Winston's speeches are good ones."
>| -- FDR's response
>Churchill's speeches were scripted & rehearsed.
Churchill was the one who wrote them. He wrote them
in a prose style, evidently for easy reading, and
read them in his speaches to Parliment.
> The speeches to
>Parliament
>were later recorded in a BBC studio as sound recording of Parliament
>was
>illegal.
Did a Churchill "sound-alike" reread his speeches
in the BBC studio? I heard this happened, but do not
have a written source for it.
>It would be nice if the writers got some credit as well.
The writer did get credit. Churchill wrote his own stuff.
That was one of the things that made him an irritant to the
Conservative Party, because he frequently departed from the
party line, and there was no way the party could convince
the speech writer to alter content ;-)
It also IMNSHO, was part of the reason of why Churchill's
speeches were so effective. The words he spoke were what
he wrote, and were what he knew (or at least believed).
>The kids were watching a silly SF movie last night & the aliens had a
>slogan
>"Never surrender, never give up" - Churchill again! I think I would
>have
>been stirred to that view by hearing those words crackling over a
>1940's
>radio. I think it ends the "We will fight them on the beaches . . . "
>speech.
>Alan Saunders
If you want some confirmation, you might want to look at:
http://winstonchurchill.org/words.htm
It has a some of Churchill's speeches, as well as a few
other of his quotes.
Churchill also stated, in an address to a high school:
"... never give in, never give in,
never, never, never, never-in nothing,
great or small, large or petty -
never give in except to convictions of honour and good sense.
Never yield to force;
never yield to the apparently overwhelming might of the enemy."
Besides to being another good quote, it pretty much
sums up Churchill's character.
Lawrence Dillard
understanding of the issues addressed in the thread and also reveals his
almost knee-jerk anti-Americanism at work.
I would have hoped that Mr Clark would have realized that he was responding
to a "pep talk" given by Gen Patton many times to his troops prior to their
entering combat in nw Europe. As "Casita" has pointed out in a post to this
ng, other commanders, notably "Bomber" Harris, gave his troops a similar,
singular, (albeit non-profanity-laced) exhortation, even before Gen Patton
gave his. But apparently Mr Clark fails to possess the perspective to
undersand this. Hence his inapposite diatribe about alleged US Army
desertions and about how US infantry operations were conducted.
In fact, US infantry operations were at times hampered, especially before
and after the Ardennes battle, by shortages of infantry replacements and by
shortages of artillery ammunition. In fact, Gen Patton had to "raid" the
forces he left in blocking positions, of infantry so as to flesh out the
counterattack force he led on Bastogne. All too often, US infantry attacks
went in **without** the necessary numbers of men and **without** the
desired artillery preparation because of shortages in both categories, even
to the final days of the campaign.
By way of contrast, Monty always insisted on stopping to regroup and on
building up massive stocks of artillery ammo prior to attempting any
offensive operation. My favorite Monty exhortation involved a trick of
command he invariably used during early 1944, prior to the invasion, when he
visited Commonwealth units:
Typically, Monty would confront a private soldier.
He would inquire: "You. What's your most valuable
possession?
reply: "My rifle, Sir!"
Monty's riposte: "No. It's Your Life, and I'm going to save
it for you. Now listen to me:"
Monty would then explain that he would never call on his infantry to advance
without complete air, armor and artillery support.
Ultimately, the US contributed about 48 infantry and armor divisions to the
fighting in nw Eurpoe compared to about 14 such Commonwealth units.
Try as I might, I cannot discover those instances of which Mr Clark posted
wherein US forces allegedly faced opposition which was "far less stubborn"
than that faced by Commonwealth forces. I invite Mr Clark to provide chapter
and verse in support of his claims, if such is available.
Recall that while Monty dithered about at and around his D-Day objectives at
Caen and a nearby airfield, US forces marched into the Cherbourg Peninsula
before turning about, prior to launching Gen Bradley's Operation COBRA.
Recall that two US airborne divisions were dropped into the Operation
MARKET-GARDEN fiasco, yet accomplished all their objectives, only to be
retained by Monty and essentially wasted for between 58 to 100 days. Recall
that the overwhelming majority of combat during the German Ardennes
Offensive was conducted by US forces. In these cases, both the fighting
undertaken and the casualties suffered were indeed disproportionate. And
the Commonwealth contributed nothing at all to the efforts of the 6th Allied
Army Group.
Furthermore, I do not recall having made any "facile" or "offensive" claims
that Commonwealth troops faced any less batlefield stress than US troops.
If he thinks somehow that I have, I certainly would appreciate it if he were
to point out these alleged transgressions to the NG and to me.
I am disappointed that Mr Clark has elected to take a pre-battle pep-talk
and convert it into a platform for his hostilities towards the US.
Thanks forthe post.
"Andrew Clark" <acl...@cedar-consultancy.co.uk> wrote in message
news:9ck8hs$f6g$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu...
Gary J. Mac Donald
(((Various attributions snipped)))
> Did a Churchill "sound-alike" reread his speeches in the BBC
> studio? I heard this happened, but do not have a written source for it.
Yes.
In fact, a number of the recordings that we have today were in fact made by his
boice-double, who acquired quite a skill at "doing Churchill".
> >It would be nice if the writers got some credit as well.
The writer *does* get the credit!
> It also IMNSHO, was part of the reason of why Churchill's
> speeches were so effective. The words he spoke were what
> he wrote, and were what he knew (or at least believed).
He also prepared them far far more carefully than anyone who did not work with
him would understand.
He wrote and re-wrote, and rehearsed over and over. This also meant that he
knew the stuff very well and did not read much if at all, generally just
glancing at a page in his hand from time to time.
Sometimes, when he had something really good to say, he would write it and work
it out, and then save it until the opportunity arose to use it in debate or some
other situation.
This, and the extent to whcih he knew his speaches off the top of his head, made
it seem like he was speaking extemporaneously when in fact he was not. He could
do that and was good at it, but no one ever really knew how much he had scripted
in his head in advance.
GaryJ
--
Martin Rapier
<3affe07b...@news.pacific.net.au>...
{snip}
> preparation, whereas the British were much more cautious, and by
> implication timid and less focused on victory. It was a nasty and
Funnily enough I was reading Patrick Delaforces history of 51st Highland
Division last night, and one quotation in it struck. Just before Mareth the
Divisional Commander ('Big Tam') was describing the usual procedure for
tackling minefields - which was simply for the infantry to march through
them 'accepting the casualties', while the engineers lifted them later and
made paths for the tanks and AT guns to follow. He thought it might be a
'good idea' to revise this approach and clear gaps in the minefields before
the infantry had the fun job of walking though them....
And I thought only Zhukov was reputed to have this approach! Perhaps the
caution came later.
Cheers
Martin.
--
V-Man
>understanding of the issues addressed in the thread and also reveals his
>almost knee-jerk anti-Americanism at work.
While I am not going to address Mr. Clark's comments, I *will* address yours.
You have GROSSLY oversimplified matters WRT GSP and BLM. Your
characterisation of BLM's tactics is unfair, as it was, for many US Officers,
accepted practice.
Before an assault, one prepare for it by collecting strung out units,
stockpiling ammo for the mission, and preparing with recon, rest for the
troops, and *rehearsals*. This was standard American procedure and EVEN PATTON
used it.
That Patton was known for attacking from the march is because he was better
at exploiting opprotunities, perhaps, but NOT that Monty was a bad general
officer.
I submit that while you are accusing Mr Clark of "anti-Americanism"
(whatever that its), perhaps you are engaged in some myth-making for the
purpose of stroking your own American Ego.
Wish you were here! V-Man
<*> A Knight is sworn to Valor, His Heart knows only Virtue
=/\= His Blade defends the Weak, His Word speaks only Truth
(-o-) His Wrath undoes the Wicked
--
Lawrence Dillard
SNIP
> It's a perfectly good answer to the stupid assertion which was
> made, which was that the US leadership was so gung-ho for victory
> that it was prone to order attacks without proper support and
> preparation,
I made no "stupid assertion", Andrew, just a factual statement easily
verifiable in the literature of WWII, pertaining to the shortages of US
infantry, gasoline and ammunition stocks for supporting artillery, often
experienced by advancing US formations due to supply shortfalls.
whereas the British were much more cautious, and by
> implication timid and less focused on victory.
Here, I believe, you have drifted into the Twilight Zone. My posting had to
do with the different attitudes held by Allied armies; that is, Monty,
conscious of the slaughters of WWI, and equally conscious of the manpower
crisis facing the Empire, was determined to see to it that *every* attack
ordered, in his army, was to be properly supported, even if this meant delay
had to be accepted. How does this translate into an intimation of timidity
or less ardor for victory? By way of contrast, US Army commanders, wisely
or not, were prone to attempt advances whether infantry numbers and
supporting fires were adequate or not. That is all I wrote about.
It was a nasty and
> groundless smear,
With all respect, here you are clearly mistaken. I made no attempt at a
"smear" of anyone or anything. Please keep in mind that the thread has to do
with **WWII quotations**, of which Gen Patton's seems to have drawn your
ire and precipitated your unfortunate post about desertions, etc.
and I'm reluctant to drift into answering other
> issues, such as the one you raise, when it needs a direct
> response.
>
> (snip remainder).
--
Lawrence Dillard
August 20, 1940:
"The gratitude of every home in our island,
In our Empire, and indeed throughout the world,
Except in the abodes of the guilty,
Goes out to the British airmen who, undaunted by odds,
Unwearied in their constant challenge and mortal danger,
Are turning the tide of the World War
By their prowess and their devotion.
Never in the field of human conflict
Was so much owed by so many to so few."
---WSC, House of Commons tribute to the RAF
##
A harried Lord Beaverbrook, at the end of a Sept 2 memo to WSC:
"Nobody knows the troubles I've seen."
(Beneath this, in WSC's handwriting):
"I do."
##
"The Battle of Britain is about to begin. Members of the Royal Air Force,
the fate of generations lies in your hands."
---ACM Sir Hugh Dowding, upon learning of Hitler's order
for operation ADLERANGRIFF (Eagle Day)
###
"Now that they have begun to molest the capital, I want you to hit them
hard, and Berlin is the place to hit them."
---WSC, minute to Chiefs of Air Staff, Aug 25, 1940
###
"Mr Churchill is demonstrating his new brainchild, the night air raid....We
will raze their cities to the ground! The hour will come when one of us will
break, and it will not be Nazi Socialist Germany!"....In England, they're
filled with curiousity and keep asking: Why doesn't he come? Don't worry,
he's coming! Don't worry, he's coming!"
--Herr Hitler, addressing an audience of nurses and social
workers in the wake of the first British air attack on Berlin
##
"Patiently have We waited and long have We endured, in the hope that Our
government might retrieve the situation in peace. But Our adversaries,
showing not the least spirit of concilliation, have unduly delayed a
settlement and in the meantime they have intensified the economic and
political pressure to compel thereby Our Empire to submission. Tis trend of
afairs would, if left unchecked, not only nullify Our Empire's efforts of
many years for the sake of the stabilization of East Asia, but also endanger
the very existence of Our nation. Our Empire, for its existence and
self-defense, has no other recourse but to appeal to arms and to crush every
obstacle in its path."
--from Emperor Hirohito's rescript explaining Japan's
attacks on Dec. 7, 1941 in the "Southern Areas".
###
"A brave man, and a very capable commander in small operations, but not
really qualified for high command."
--FM G von Runstedt's assessment of FM Erwin Rommel,
whom he often referred to as "FM 'bubbi'
###
"...simply because it was my duty as a soldier not to refuse at a moment of
the greatest danger."
--FM G von Runstedt, explaining why he accepted recall to duty in
time for the Ardennes offensive
##
"...the best chance of a quick finish (to the war in nw Europe) was probably
lost when the 'gas' was turned off from Patton's tanks in the last week of
August, when they were a hiundred miles nearer the Rhine, and its bridges,
than the British."
--historian BH Liddell Hart
###
"In the ruins and rubble of our bombarded cities, life goes on. Not as rich
as before, it can no longer be ladled from a full pot. But we stand solidly
on our feet and show not the smallest inclination to sink to our knees."
--Joseph Goebbels, April, 1944
##
"Crank her up. Let's go."
--Gen Curtis LeMay, whenever boarding a bomber
###
"If it's all a failure, and I don't produce any results, then he can fire
me."
--Curtis Lemay, explaining why he did not tell his boss, Gen
Arnold, in advance that he was stripping his B-29s of
most of their defensive armament, loading up with
incendiaries, and attacking at night from low level.
###
"WE HAVE COMPLETED OUR TASK. YOU MAY CARRY ON."
--Possibly apocryphal signal lamp communication from Japanese torpedo
bomber to British destroyers involved in rescue operations just after the RE
PULSE and PRINCE OF WALES, encountered without air cover, had been sunk
###
"Hullo, Captain, I'm glad to see you're safe."
--Reporter to Captain Tennant of REPULSE after being rescued by destroyer
VAMPIRE
"Thanks, and the same to you. Well, did you fellows get what you wanted?"
--Captain Tennant in reply
###
"There are clear indications that Japan does not know which way to turn.
Tojo is sratching his head. There is a reassuring state of uncertainty in
Japan."
--Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, Dec 3, 1941
"We can get on all right with Buffaloes out here, but they haven't the speed
for England. Let England have the sjuper-Spitfires and the hyper-Tornadoes.
Buffaloes are quite good enough for Malaya."
--Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, Dec. 3, 1941
###
"Boy, those little yellow bastards certainly can fly. That bombing, it was
beautiful."
--anonymous AVG pilot, after Dec 23 Japanese bombing attack on Rangoon
Thanks for the post.
"Jerome Morrow" <nospam_jer...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:9bhs7u$4a9$1...@beast.TCNJ.EDU...
> This might seem a little trivial but what are your top 10 WWII quotes?
SNIP
--
David Thornley
Martin Rapier <m.ra...@sheffield.ac.uk> wrote:
>
>Funnily enough I was reading Patrick Delaforces history of 51st Highland
>Division last night, and one quotation in it struck. Just before Mareth the
>Divisional Commander ('Big Tam') was describing the usual procedure for
>tackling minefields - which was simply for the infantry to march through
>them 'accepting the casualties', while the engineers lifted them later and
>made paths for the tanks and AT guns to follow. He thought it might be a
>'good idea' to revise this approach and clear gaps in the minefields before
>the infantry had the fun job of walking though them....
>
a minefield that is covered with machine guns is almost certainly a
Bad Idea. However, if a minefield is undefended at the moment,
walking through it immediately might save lives on the whole, whereas
stopping for the engineers might make it possible for the Germans
to redeploy.
Sometimes time is more important than preparation, and sometimes it
isn't.
>And I thought only Zhukov was reputed to have this approach! Perhaps the
>caution came later.
>
I've read that Patton considered this a good idea. Patton seems to
have been interested in saving the lives of his men, using whatever
methods worked. This included such things as madcap advances, since
if the advances actually worked they could save a lot of lives.
Similarly, the Soviets took very heavy casualties, and were interested
in practices that would save their soldiers' lives (Zhukov was a
cruel man, but intelligent).
R. Peters
saying,
"Give me 10 years and you won't recognize Germany".
If he said it, it's actually fairly accurate. :
bob
casita
> How about some of the following?
I enjoyed them, thanks for the post and here are some more:
"I welcome the bombing of Essen, Berlin and other industrial centres of
Germany. Every blow delivered by your air force to the vital German centres
evokes a most lively echo in the hearts of many millions throughout the
lenth and breath of our country."
Stalin to WSC 12 Apr 1943.
"Thousands of airmen were shot out of the skies over Europe while engaged in
operations against the Third Reich on targets in occupied territory. A very
large number, sucessfully evaded capture.
An airman who gets away from his wrecked aircraft in enemy territory finds
himself in a position which is unique among fighting men. To continue his
type of fighting against the enemy, he must first return home, and to do
this, he ussually begins his travels alone; often in a state of shock, and
sometimes wounded. He knows that the alternative to a long, difficult and
nerve racking evasion will be captivity, interrogation and possibly death.
Above all, he wants, and is constantly looking for help."
General Carl A. 'Tooey' Spaatz
Commander USSAF- Europe.
"It is perhaps difficult for anyone who has not lived under the oppression
of German occupation and witnessed first hand the frightful evil of Gestapo
police methods to appreciate fully what it means to work in direct
opposition to them. The married man or woman caught harbouring an Allied
airman brought reprisals on the whole family - even small children were put
to death. This was the price for patriotism, and the Gestapo held most of
the cards, the odds were strongly in their favour. Their peril was far
greater than the airman whom they helped, because if the evader was caught,
he would merely become a prisoner of war, but if they were found helping or
sheltering him they were tortured and shot."
Rendevous 127 the Diary of Anne Brusselmanns by ACM Basil Empry.
"Will you please give to William McCollum's mother this little
Cross of Loraine I made from the position in the aircraft her son occupied.
If the photo of William appears too natural, will you tear it up. She will
certainly wish to have the others. Tell her that her son was prepared for
burial by a Frenchwoman with as much love and tenderness as if he had been
her own son and that the farewell kiss given to William was thinking of
her." MRES # 136 Paris 1945.
--
David Thornley
Lawrence Dillard <ldil...@enteract.com> wrote:
>
>In fact, US infantry operations were at times hampered, especially before
>and after the Ardennes battle, by shortages of infantry replacements and by
>shortages of artillery ammunition. In fact, Gen Patton had to "raid" the
>forces he left in blocking positions, of infantry so as to flesh out the
>counterattack force he led on Bastogne. All too often, US infantry attacks
>went in **without** the necessary numbers of men and **without** the
>desired artillery preparation because of shortages in both categories, even
>to the final days of the campaign.
>
keeping formations up to strength and providing artillery ammunition.
The shortage of shells was relative to what the Army wanted, and the
US artillery was typically well supplied by German standards. (The
US Army replacement system, while frequently bad, could be used very
well. Bonn, in "When the Odds Were Even", discusses how well it
worked
for Seventh Army. This is in marked contrast to First Army in the
Huertgen Forest.)
>By way of contrast, Monty always insisted on stopping to regroup and on
>building up massive stocks of artillery ammo prior to attempting any
>offensive operation. My favorite Monty exhortation involved a trick of
>command he invariably used during early 1944, prior to the invasion, when he
>visited Commonwealth units:
>
Montgomery was cautious, but still aggressive where he could be.
Remember
that he did not fall behind the US for long in the race across France.
>Monty would then explain that he would never call on his infantry to advance
>without complete air, armor and artillery support.
>
Very interesting, but I'd like to see what this means practically.
What was the average level of support for an infantry attack in the
three Army Groups? Is there evidence that's more than anecdotal?
>
>Ultimately, the US contributed about 48 infantry and armor divisions to the
>fighting in nw Eurpoe compared to about 14 such Commonwealth units.
>
Yup. The US could field much greater forces than the British Empire.
I'm not clear what that means.
>Try as I might, I cannot discover those instances of which Mr Clark posted
>wherein US forces allegedly faced opposition which was "far less stubborn"
>than that faced by Commonwealth forces. I invite Mr Clark to provide chapter
>and verse in support of his claims, if such is available.
>
I too would like to see some sort of evidence for that statement. It
looks to me like everybody had their share of stubborn Germans.
>Recall that while Monty dithered about at and around his D-Day objectives at
>Caen and a nearby airfield, US forces marched into the Cherbourg Peninsula
>before turning about, prior to launching Gen Bradley's Operation COBRA.
Monty didn't do a whole lot of dithering. The German response to the
landing was surprisingly fast and strong (as usual), and for very good
reasons concentrated on the British/Canadian side of the beachhead.
It took the US a long time to break out into clear terrain, and even
then
was on the wrong side of the German army to envelope it (and I believe
only succeeded due to Patton, among other factors). If Crerar or
Dempsey
had broken through, they would immediately be in the main German
communications.
Thing would have gone much better if Villers-Bocage had not been
botched,
but I don't see that as particularly Monty's fault.
>Recall that two US airborne divisions were dropped into the Operation
>MARKET-GARDEN fiasco, yet accomplished all their objectives, only to be
>retained by Monty and essentially wasted for between 58 to 100 days.
While the US airborne divisions fought heroically, the fact is that
their
task was easier than the British airbourne, who also fought
heroically.
I don't understand what is meant by wasted. There really was no role
for airborne operations, and therefore only a limited role for the
divisions.
Recall
>that the overwhelming majority of combat during the German Ardennes
>Offensive was conducted by US forces. In these cases, both the fighting
>undertaken and the casualties suffered were indeed disproportionate. And
>the Commonwealth contributed nothing at all to the efforts of the 6th Allied
>Army Group.
>
True, although one must remember British and Commonwealth forces had
their own nasty battles, such as the Scheldt estuary.
David Thornley
V-Man <velo...@aol.com.CanDo> wrote:
> Before an assault, one prepare for it by collecting strung out units,
>stockpiling ammo for the mission, and preparing with recon, rest for the
>troops, and *rehearsals*. This was standard American procedure and EVEN PATTON
>used it.
In support of this, see the tactical instructions Patton issued that
are in the appendix of "War as I Knew It". Patton emphasizes that a
battalion attack that takes four hours of preparation will take less
overall time than a battalion attack with half an hour of
preparation.
> That Patton was known for attacking from the march is because he was better
>at exploiting opprotunities, perhaps, but NOT that Monty was a bad general
>officer.
I consider Patton to be a better general than Montgomery. I also
consider Montgomery to be a very good one, better than Patton in
some respects.
> I submit that while you are accusing Mr Clark of "anti-Americanism"
>(whatever that its), perhaps you are engaged in some myth-making for the
>purpose of stroking your own American Ego.
>
Mr. Clark has expressed opinions of Patton that seem to me comparable
to the lower opinions of Montgomery I've seen on this group. I
disagree
with both sets of these opinions.
casita
> Recall that while Monty dithered about at and around his D-Day objectives
at Caen
Maybe Monty dithering a bit saved some of his soldiers. Caen was the
first
use in the history of warfare of strategic bombers for close ground
support.
My Uncle Bill was there:
Target: Caen. 7 July 1944. Lancaster ND 859. Code: UL-L2. Up:
1950.
Down: 2350.
Ref: PRO AIR 27 / 2047 RAF Form # 541 and 576 Sqn Form 540.
"18 aircraft were detailed for this Operation. Cloud was 3/10ths at
the
Base and increased to 5/10ths at the south coast. These conditions
persisted to the target and crews bombed below the cloud. Weather on
return
was similar. The target was marked by PFF with red and yellow T I's
both of
which were accuartely placed. The Master Bomber instructed crews to
bomb
first on the red T I's and later on the yellows. As the attack
developed
the Master Bomber instructed crews to bomb the edge of the smoke pall
which
drifted away towards the north of the target. Bombing was
exceptionally
well concentrated. Accuarate and heavy light flak was encountered in
the
target area at the outset of the attack. No fighter opposition was in
evidence. All our aircraft returned to Base. A message of
appreciation was
received from the 2nd Army in Normandy."
The message read: "Please tell your brave and gallant pilots how
greatly the
Allied soldiers admire and applaud their work. Thank you very much."
"A week later aircraft of Bomber Command were used for the first time
to
prepare the way for offensive action by our army. The 1st Canadian
and 2nd
British armies were pressing the enemy hard at Caen, the hinge of the
German line, but could make little headway against the strong German
positions. Bomber Command was called upon to attack these positions
and did
so in daylight on July 7th; 2350 tons of high explosives were dropped
in
just under 40 minutes. A full account of the effect of this attack on
the
German troops was afterwards got from the enemy. It appears that
casualties
were comparatively light but, the effect on morale was shattering;
this
was confirmed by the state of the prisoners that were taken then, and
by
what they said about the bombing. German officers on the staff of
Runstedt,
Commander- in - Chief in the West, afterwards described the
'terrifying
immobility on the battlefield' which was produced by what they called
our
'carpet-bombing'. 'The troops could not move...the communications
system
broke down; artillery and anti-tank pieces were knocked out; and
tanks
were immobilised in craters or beneath heaps of dirt and debris.'
After one
such attack it was reported that a whole division was without food or
supplies for 24 hours. On this occassion, at Caen, it is clear that
the
enemy lost, for the time being, all power of offensive action but
the army
did unfortunately did not exploit its opportunities, and our armour
did not
move forward until the morning of July 8th. The German comment
afterwards
was that it would have been very different if our troops had shown
'sufficient initiative in following up the bombing.' As it was, when
our
armour did go forward, 24 hours later, the first objectives were
taken
with scarcely a struggle, the enemy in the front line being still in
complete confusion. But after the initial success, the armour did
not push
on.
Shortly afterwards the view was expressed, among staff officers of
the
Allied Expeditionary Air Force, that as the army did not seem able to
take
advantage of our tactical bombing, or indeed our attacks on the
enemy's
railways, the heavy bombers might be doing more good by returning to
the
attack on German war industry and at the same time by bombing what
bottlenecks could be found in the production or transport of flying
bombs.
We knew by now that air attack on the railways was having the most
serious
effect on the fighting power of the German army; fuel and motor
transport
were being kept from the battlefield, reinforcements were held back
for
long periods, and the Panzer divisions were frittering away their
strength
as a result of having to make long journeys by road."
"Bomber Offensive"
>From the RCAF Official History Vol 3 Caen:
Crews were "very enthusiastic over the success of this raid".
"We were well aware of the military necessity to break the enemy at
Caen so
that our ground troops could deploy into open country.
Some of the bombs were timed to explode up to 6 hours after the
attack, so
that there would not be too large a time lag before the ground force
went in
the next morning.
............I distinctly saw a German tank thrown into the air, like
a
childs toy, and turning over and over before it fell to the ground."
WC JE "Johnnie" Johnson.
"The Canadian infantrymen................found the 'smoke and flame
wonderful, it improved their morale 500%.
The mere sight of a massive bomber attack quickened the spirit of
troops who
were by now coming to rely upon overwhelming firepower for any success
at
all and who realized, as postwar studies would confirm, that heavy
bombers
produced a barrage 'out of all comparison with that obtainable by any
artillery concentration that can at present be contemplated.
Lest we forget, in the weeks after D Day casualties in Bomber Command
were
higher than the British Second Army in Normandy. In Bomber Command
"casualty" almost always meant MIA then KIA.
It wasn't just Monty who was cautious, Gen Eisenhower insisted on
control of
the bomber fleet or he "was going home." He considered his insistence
on the
Transportation Plan as his greatest contribution to Victory. The enemy
agreed: "France, in which all means of transportation were
interupted, was
the cause of our defeat." Gen Henrich Hans Eberbach, CO of Panzer
Group
West on 26 Sept 1944.
Jeremy
Andrew Clark wrote:
> > The speeches to Parliament were later recorded in a BBC studio
> > as sound recording of Parliament was illegal.
>
> Not so. It was illegal to record the proceedings of Parliament
> without its permission, which was invariably obtained beforehand
> by a procedure motion. Most of Churchill's keynote Parliamentary
> speeches were recorded live; some were re-recorded for clarity.
I don't know the validity of the information in this link, nor really
care who spoke the words on radio, but it seems to confirm something I
read about the subject a long time ago and might further (or confuse,
sorry) the argument ...
David Thornley
Andrew Clark <acl...@cedar-consultancy.co.uk> wrote:
>
>"David Thornley" <thor...@visi.com> wrote
>
>> This was likely due to the really lousy handling of combat
>stress
>> by the US Army.
>
>And to generally lower standards of junior leadership and
>discipline, and a laxity by senior officers in matters of
>discipline. Poorly led and undisciplined troops are far more
>likely to suffer psychological trauma.
>
not to be seen in Third Army territory without your tie on properly
(unless you were right in the front lines). Patton had a better
understanding of combat stress than the US Army as an institution.
Not that he behaved correctly in the Sicily hospitals, of course.
>> This isn't quite an answer, even if it is correct.
>
>It's a perfectly good answer to the stupid assertion which was
>made, which was that the US leadership was so gung-ho for victory
>that it was prone to order attacks without proper support and
>preparation,
Patton was of the opinion that a properly planned attack would succeed
much faster than an improperly planned one (although, again, he did not
always follow that in practice).
whereas the British were much more cautious, and by
>implication timid and less focused on victory.
>From what I've read, some of them were more timid, particularly the ones
who had been fighting for years on end. I'm not trying to imply anything
negative about the British, but they did have a longer time to get burnt
out in than most of the US formations.
There was certainly a case of "I don't want to be the last casualty in
this war" going on all over the front, but the main examples I've seen
cited are the way overused formations, which were of course all Brits.
Lawrence Dillard
"David Thornley" <thor...@visi.com> wrote in message
news:3b0580be...@news.pacific.net.au...
> In article <9crtr1$93q$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu>,
> Lawrence Dillard <ldil...@enteract.com> wrote:
> On the other hand, the US was much better than most nationalities at
> keeping formations up to strength and providing artillery ammunition.
> >By way of contrast, Monty always insisted on stopping to regroup and on
> >building up massive stocks of artillery ammo prior to attempting any
> >offensive operation. My favorite Monty exhortation involved a trick of
> >command he invariably used during early 1944, prior to the invasion, when
he
> >visited Commonwealth units:
> >
> Montgomery was cautious, but still aggressive where he could be.
> Remember
> that he did not fall behind the US for long in the race across France.
After the German positions had been unhinged by Gen Bradley's Operation
COBRA and the Mortain counterattack had been contained, the Germans, as was
their wont, fell back quickly in order to avoid encirclement. In theory, all
Allied armies in Normandy then turned in pursuit of the Germans, including
21 AG.
>
> >Monty would then explain that he would never call on his infantry to
advance
> >without complete air, armor and artillery support.
> >
> Very interesting, but I'd like to see what this means practically.
> What was the average level of support for an infantry attack in the
> three Army Groups? Is there evidence that's more than anecdotal?
I can give an example from Monty's extended preparation for his belated
crossing of the Rhine: His plan called for 250,000 tons of supplies,
including 600 rds/gun for each piece of artillery. He once again called on
Bomber Command, which laid on 50,000 tons of bombs in support, beginning
March 11.
By way of contrast, under Ike's allocation of supplies, as is mentioned
often in both Genls Patton's and Bradley's accounts of the campaign, even
after the Ardennes battle, artillery support suffered a shortfall, which
brought on severe rationing in order to economize on artillery usage. Patton
was especially bitter, as he criticized Ike for failing to provide his
armies enough men and enough artillery. How can you fight a war without
enough men and without enough artillery? he complained to his diary.
>
> >
> >Ultimately, the US contributed about 48 infantry and armor divisions to
the
> >fighting in nw Europe compared to about 14 such Commonwealth units.
> >
> Yup. The US could field much greater forces than the British Empire.
> I'm not clear what that means.
Only that these forces carried out the bulk of the Ardennes fighting and
virtually all of the 6th Army Group's fighting, with little or no
Commonwealth contribution.
>
> >Try as I might, I cannot discover those instances of which Mr Clark
posted
> >wherein US forces allegedly faced opposition which was "far less
stubborn"
> >than that faced by Commonwealth forces. I invite Mr Clark to provide
chapter
> >and verse in support of his claims, if such is available.
> >
> I too would like to see some sort of evidence for that statement. It
> looks to me like everybody had their share of stubborn Germans.
>
> >Recall that while Monty dithered about at and around his D-Day objectives
at
> >Caen and a nearby airfield,
Snip
>
> Monty didn't do a whole lot of dithering. The German response to the
> landing was surprisingly fast and strong (as usual),
As had been anticipated by Monty in his planning for OVERLORD/NEPTUNE.
Unfortunately, the formations entrusted with seeing to Monty's planned rapid
penetration inland from the vicinity of Caen and to staking out claims with
powerful forces, as a means of nullifying the expected swift German response
to the landings, were unable for good reason to accomplish their missions.
and for very good
> reasons concentrated on the British/Canadian side of the beachhead.
True enough, as the terrain favored or at least did not strongly inhibit an
armored thrust from the vicinity of Caen in the direction of Paris,
something clearly understood by the Germans, who'd occupied the territory
for a few years. Furthermore, it would not be lost on the Germans that where
they found Commonwealth troops, they would inevitably be led by a capable
general, Monty; and, as the Commonwealth forces were found to be on the Left
of the Allied line, it made sense to concentrate major armored forces in
"good tank country" against them.
> It took the US a long time to break out into clear terrain, and even
> then
> was on the wrong side of the German army to envelope it (and I believe
> only succeeded due to Patton, among other factors).
Monty's planning did not sufficiently or at all take into account that
immediately beyond the beaches, the US forces would encounter bocage and
hedgerow country, extremely fasvorable for economic defense, and hardly
amenable to the use of large amounts of armor. Gen Brooke was extremely
pessimistic about the US Army's ability to fight its way through such
territory. Gen Bradley's forces had to endure savage fighting and take huge
casualties in order to reach terrain from which they could deploy large
groups of armor and initiate a war of movement.
It is clear that Operation GOODWOOD was initially intended to resolve the
virtual stalemate into which the fighting in Normandy had fallen after
Monty's planning and leadership had failed to compete with the swiftness of
the German response to the Allied landings. The Germans had essentially
roped off the Allies into a small lodgement area and were hoping to contain
them there indefinitely, just as Monty had feared prior to the landings.
However, once Gen Bradley had forced his way onto the St Lo-Periers road, he
generated his Operation COBRA, possibly out of sheer frustration as well as
impatience, which succeeded in penetrating the ring around the Allied
forces, and ushered in a time of mobile warfare. Instead of the breakout
coming from the Left of the Allied Line, it came from the Right. And as you
write, it was due to Gen Patton's leadership (and a stupid decision on the
part of Herr Hitler) that a potential envelopment was created.
If Crerar or
> Dempsey
> had broken through, they would immediately be in the main German
> communications.
True enough. All the more reason to rue that the objectives of Operation
GOODWOOD were whittled down By Monty between the time the operation was
conceived and the time the operation was executed. If successful, the
initial operation planned might have resulted in the breakout coming from
the Left of the Allied Line. However, Monty had second thoughts about
GOODWOOD, so we'll never know.
snip
> >Recall that two US airborne divisions were dropped into the Operation
> >MARKET-GARDEN fiasco, yet accomplished all their objectives, only to be
> >retained by Monty and essentially wasted for between 58 to 100 days.
>
> While the US airborne divisions fought heroically, the fact is that
> their
> task was easier than the British airbourne,
I'm not sure that such was the case. True, the mission objectives were
nearer to Allied lines. The Germans nonetheless certainly gave the US paras
a stubborn resistance. Yet all the several missions assigned to them as
objectives were in fact taken.
who also fought
> heroically.
no disagreement with you there.
> I don't understand what is meant by wasted.
To better understand my use of the term "wasted", see Donald Burgett's
volume on his experiences as a paratrooper during and after MARKET-GARDEN.
As an infantryman, he could understand quite well what it meant to be
treated as if expendable. He gives his comments on the worth of the combat
activities he and his cohorts were ordered to undertake, such as
straightening out the lines; they amounted to wasting excellent
light-infantry which had recently carried out harrowing operations
successfully, which should have been returned to reserve immediately
thereafter, and which consituted Ike's only reserve formations. Commiting
light infantry to sustained combat operations of this nature was not
sensible.
There really was no role
> for airborne operations, and therefore only a limited role for the
> divisions.
Not really. But after Gen Bradley's breakout on the Allied right, the pace
of operations was such that airborne operations were negated because of the
time needed to plan them and coordinate air transport meant that logical
objectives for such operations were consistently overrun by ground troops
before they airdrops could be carried out. Hence a logical role for them was
that of SHAEF reserve. But in the wake of MARKET-GARDEN and its aftermath,
both US paratroop divisions on the continent were forced into inactivity
while they absorbed such replacements as were available. During this time
they could be of little use to Ike. Recall that their losses were so severe
from MARKET-GARDEN and post MARKET-GARDEN combat that the two divisions were
still trying to re-constitute themselves when they were called into action
for the Ardennes Battle.
>
> Recall
> >that the overwhelming majority of combat during the German Ardennes
> >Offensive was conducted by US forces. In these cases, both the fighting
> >undertaken and the casualties suffered were indeed disproportionate.
snip
> True, although one must remember British and Commonwealth forces had
> their own nasty battles, such as the Scheldt estuary.
Certainly, I have not forgotten these battles. Yet, assuming these battles
were conducted under Monty's aegis, then one can be sure that they were
supported by ample artillery and air support.
>
> --
> David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion,
> ask.
> da...@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
> http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-
>
--
ldillard
>"David Thornley" <thor...@visi.com> wrote in message
>news:3b0580be...@news.pacific.net.au...
>> In article <9crtr1$93q$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu>,
>> Lawrence Dillard <ldil...@enteract.com> wrote:
>SNIP>
On the other hand, the US was much better than most nationalities at keeping
formations up to strength and providing artillery ammunition.
>SNIP
Montgomery was cautious, but still aggressive where he could be. Remember
that he did not fall behind the US for long in the race across France.
After the German positions had been unhinged by Gen Bradley's Operation
COBRA and the Mortain counterattack had been contained, the Germans, as was
their wont, fell back quickly in order to avoid encirclement. In theory, all
Allied armies in Normandy then turned in pursuit of the Germans, including
21 AG. The rising tide caused by the success of Cobra caused all Allied
fortunes to rise.
>
SNIP
>> Very interesting, but I'd like to see what this means practically.
>> What was the average level of support for an infantry attack in the
>> three Army Groups? Is there evidence that's more than anecdotal?
>
I can give an example from Monty's extended preparation for his belated
crossing of the Rhine: His plan called for 250,000 tons of supplies,
including 600 rds/gun for each piece of artillery. He once again called on
Bomber Command, which laid on 50,000 tons of bombs in support, beginning
March 11.
By way of contrast, under Ike's allocation of supplies, as is mentioned
often in both Genls Patton's and Bradley's accounts of the campaign, even
after the Ardennes battle, artillery support suffered a shortfall, which
brought on severe rationing in order to economize on artillery usage. Patton
was especially bitter, as he criticized Ike for failing to provide his
armies enough men and enough artillery. How can you fight a war without
enough men and without enough artillery? he complained to his diary.
>>
units.
SNIP
>> Yup. The US could field much greater forces than the British Empire.
>> I'm not clear what that means.
>
>
Only that these forces carried out the bulk of the Ardennes fighting and
virtually all of the 6th Army Group's fighting, with little or no
Commonwealth contribution.
>
>
>>
SNIP
Lawrence Dillard
"V-Man" <velo...@aol.com.CanDo> wrote in message
news:9cs8mg$ri2$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu...
> >Andrew Clark's response to my post demonstrates a lack of clear
> >understanding of the issues addressed in the thread and also reveals his
> >almost knee-jerk anti-Americanism at work.
>
> While I am not going to address Mr. Clark's comments, I *will* address
yours.
> You have GROSSLY oversimplified matters WRT GSP and BLM.
I have done no such thing. Remember the thread had to do with war
quotations; Gen Paton's somehow led Mr Clark into a diatribe on which
nation's army took more losses, who did the most grueling fighting and
desertion rates, etc., NOT ME.
Your
> characterisation of BLM's tactics is unfair, as it was, for many US
Officers,
> accepted practice.
> Before an assault, one prepare for it by collecting strung out units,
> stockpiling ammo for the mission, and preparing with recon, rest for the
> troops, and *rehearsals*. This was standard American procedure and EVEN
PATTON
> used it.
As I tried to point out in my post, "the book" called for the measures you
recount. However, it is a matter of impartial fact that US Army forces moved
into the attack often without sufficient infantry and without sufficient
artillery support, simply because time was considered to be of essence and
it was believed that delay imposed due to these factors was more harmful
than attacking now, with timing and perhaps surprise at work, the
insufficiencies notwithstanding. IAt times, the supply allocations rendered
by Ike meant that 3rd Army had but five rounds per day per gun to fire on
given days. Yet 3rd Army and others nevertheless attempted to advance under
such circumstances. By the way, Gen Patton's 3rd Army regrouped but once
during the entire campaign in nw Europe.
Gen Patton was conscious of the time dimension in military operations and
desired to have it work for him whenever possible.
> That Patton was known for attacking from the march is because he was
better
> at exploiting opprotunities, perhaps, but NOT that Monty was a bad general
> officer.
To repeat, I never suggested on this thread that Monty was a bad general
officer. But it is a matter of fact that Monty liked to have "GRIP" on his
operations. He found it necessary to regroup fairly often so as to be sure
that his forces were balanced and that an unexpected enemy initiative would
not automatically result in an enemy coup.
I did not suggest or write that Monty was a bad general officer. I would
ask that you actually read my post, because when you do you might see that I
quoted favorably one of Monty's tricks of command, which contained a promise
on which he in large part carried through.
> I submit that while you are accusing Mr Clark of "anti-Americanism"
> (whatever that its), perhaps you are engaged in some myth-making for the
> purpose of stroking your own American Ego.
Frankly, you have lost me. I was responding to a post in a thread dealing
with WWII quotations when I read Mr Clark's contribution to the ng mentioned
above. Thanks for the post.
>
Shawn Fisher
news:3affe07b...@news.pacific.net.au...
> "It was a nasty and groundless smear,"
That's your words Andrew.
> "And to generally lower standards of junior leadership and
> discipline, and a laxity by senior officers in matters of
> discipline. Poorly led and undisciplined troops are far more
> likely to suffer psychological trauma."
And so are these. In the same post. So basically US leadership in the war
was poor at the junior level, and at the higher level. In fact, what you're
saying is that US troops were "Poorly led and undisciplined troops."
That's as nasty and groundless a smear as I've ever seen. I hope on one
smears the brit units like you just did to the Yanks.
To answer your assertion however, one must look at the truth. Combat trauma
is usually treated by keeping the individual close to the primary group,
near the front, but not off the front lines, and by letting them rest for a
few days, then returning them to their unit.
FWIW, there are many other reasons for psychological trauma in the
US--Repple Depple's and the US replacement system for one, and the practice
of keeping units in combat continuosly, and not rotating them out off the
line. I'd say those two policies are much more to blame than your "smears."
I've never seen any evidence to support the assertion that US units had more
comabt trauma than than any one else, other than the often cited reasons
above. Someone have a good source?
Note: I've never noticed a newsgroup to be so quick to slam other
nationalities. Patriotism is certainyl alive and well on SHWWII.. Almost
borders on racism at times.
Shawn A. Fisher
safi...@swbell.net
-----------------------------------------------------
"Greater love has no one than this,
that he lay down his life for his friends."
--John 15:13
Andrew Clark
"Lawrence Dillard" <ldil...@enteract.com> wrote
> Andrew Clark's response to my post demonstrates a lack of clear
> understanding of the issues addressed in the thread and also
reveals his
> almost knee-jerk anti-Americanism at work.
What I pointed out was a plain and simple fact: US forces in NW
Europe in 1944/45 suffered significantly higher levels of
desertion and psychological illness than Commonwealth forces.
That throws a somewhat tarnished light on Patton's vainglorious
speech, which was:
"He could say to himself, "They won't miss me -- just one in
thousands." What if every man said that? Where in hell would we
be now? No, thank God, Americans don't say that!"
I find it interesting that merely pointing out the truth behind
the hubris is characterised as "knee-jerk anti-Americanism". When
did disagreement become un-American, anyway?
> Furthermore, I do not recall having made any "facile" or
"offensive" claims
> that Commonwealth troops faced any less batlefield stress than
US troops.
> If he thinks somehow that I have, I certainly would appreciate
it if he were
> to point out these alleged transgressions to the NG and to me.
Your post in full was:
"Not in view of the disproportionate amount of fighting done and
concomitant casualties US units took; Canadian and British troops
had had Monty's word
that they would not be asked to move until and unless he could
provide them with generous artillery and air support. That
served to keep casualties low
and morale high enough to forestall desertion. By way of
contrast, the US leadership took the position that time was short
and generally ordered the
troops forward whether an ample artillery and armor support were
made available or not. The attitude was, "there's a war to be
won".".
The first sentence cannot be interpreted as anything other than a
claim that the US took higher proportionate casualties than
Commonwealth troops. The fact is that US forces in NW Europe took
far *lower* proportionate levels of casualties than Commonwealth
forces.
The second sentence claims that lower levels of desertion in
Commonwealth forces was due directly to those fictional lower
casualty rates and the fact that the US forces did a
"disproportionate amount of fighting". It is not the case that
the US forces did a "disproportionate amount of fighting" and I'd
like to see you try and prove it.
The third sentence claims that "by way of contrast" to British
refusal to attack without "generous artillery and air support",
US leaders "ordered the
troops forward" with a ""there's a war to be won" attitude. I
characterised this as "not a recognisable command attitude when
one actually looks at the tactics employed by the US army in NW
Europe", which is demonstrably true, and again I'd like to see
you try and prove your claim.
Pulling all this together, I characterised your post as a "rather
offensive and facile suggestion that the Commonwealth troops
faced less battlefield stress than
US troops". I stand by that analysis for the reasons above, and I
do not propose to enter into the matter further, although I will
be happy to examine your evidence for the claims above.
Lawrence Dillard
>
> "Lawrence Dillard" <ldil...@enteract.com> wrote
>
> > Andrew Clark's response to my post demonstrates a lack of clear
> > understanding of the issues addressed in the thread and also
> reveals his
> > almost knee-jerk anti-Americanism at work.
>
> What I pointed out was a plain and simple fact: US forces in NW
> Europe in 1944/45 suffered significantly higher levels of
> desertion and psychological illness than Commonwealth forces.
And you clearly demonstrated your lack of focus as well as your willingness
to all but automatically make some sort of invidious comparison involving US
troops. What, exactly, do your observations have to do with the thread?
Andrew, the thread had to do with "top ten quotes" from WWII; so far, I have
been unable to locate a post from you which follows up on the thread
initiator by offering up a quote from any WWII figure. However, you instead
went into "auto-heel-kick-the US mode" by challenging the substance of a PEP
TALK given by a US commander to his troops prior to their going into combat
in nw Europe, which had been offered, by another poster to the ng, as a
response to a request for such posts.
> That throws a somewhat tarnished light on Patton's vainglorious
> speech, which was:
>
> "He could say to himself, "They won't miss me -- just one in
> thousands." What if every man said that? Where in hell would we
> be now? No, thank God, Americans don't say that!"
>
> I find it interesting that merely pointing out the truth behind
> the hubris is characterised as "knee-jerk anti-Americanism". When
> did disagreement become un-American, anyway?
The moment you introduced a low and ugly tone to the thread by venting your
feelings and emotions about Gen Patton and about US troops in general--in a
thread involving interesting quotes from the war--in this case a pep-talk.
You would have done better, I submit, to introduce a quotation in rebuttal
to Gen Patton's pep talk; instead you appear to have allowed yourself to
enter the Twilight Zone with your response.
>
> > Furthermore, I do not recall having made any "facile" or
> "offensive" claims
snip
>
> Your post in full was:
> SNIP
> "Not in view of the disproportionate amount of fighting done and
> concomitant casualties US units took; Canadian and British troops
> had had Monty's word
> that they would not be asked to move until and unless he could
> provide them with generous artillery and air support. That
> served to keep casualties low
> and morale high enough to forestall desertion. By way of
> contrast, the US leadership took the position that time was short
snip
> The first sentence cannot be interpreted as anything other than a
> claim that the US took higher proportionate casualties than
> Commonwealth troops.
In many cases US forces in fact did so, and there is not a thing "facile"
about it. To demonstrate this to yourself, (1) I urge you to consult
D'Este's "Decision in Normandy" (p. 340 et seq) for details of the estimated
40,000 US Army casualties sustained during Gen Bradley's early July
offensives in the hedgerow country, esp the footnote in which Weigley is
quoted (4) arguing that an additional 25 to 35 per cent needs to be added to
that total to account for troops suffering psycholgical damage from such
combat. Undoubtedly, you have access to casualty figures for Commonwealth
formations during the same time period. "Do the math".
(2) In the wake of the Operation COBRA breakout, Gen Patton's 3rd Army
fought on fronts stretching approximately six-hundred miles from west to
east.
(3) The overwhelming proportion of the Allied casualties suffered during the
battle of the Bulge were suffered by US troops, a fact which WSC
acknowledged in the wake of FM Montgomery's unfortunate post-battle
press-conferece.
(4) Commonwealth forces played no role in the fighting related to the
invasion of southern France, Operation ANVIL, or in the fighting following.
The fact is that US forces in NW Europe took
> far *lower* proportionate levels of casualties than Commonwealth
> forces.
I'd like to see you sustain this claim. I will not, however, hold my breath
in anticipation. And please post the information to a separate thread.
>
> The second sentence claims that lower levels of desertion in
> Commonwealth forces was due directly to those fictional lower
> casualty rates and the fact that the US forces did a
> "disproportionate amount of fighting". It is not the case that
> the US forces did a "disproportionate amount of fighting" and I'd
> like to see you try and prove it.
See above.
>
> The third sentence claims that "by way of contrast" to British
> refusal to attack without "generous artillery and air support",
> US leaders "ordered the
> troops forward" with a ""there's a war to be won" attitude. I
> characterised this as "not a recognisable command attitude when
> one actually looks at the tactics employed by the US army in NW
> Europe", which is demonstrably true, and again I'd like to see
> you try and prove your claim.
Try reading my post again, please. I wrote, actually, that Commonwealth
forces had Monty's word, iterated many, many times, that they would not be
asked to move until and unless he (Monty) could provide them with generous
air and artillery support. I made no mention of a "British refusal to
attack"; (where'd you get that from?)
Try reading Gens Bradley's and Patton's reminiscences on the war. Therein
you will find their accounting of trying to prosecute the war against
Germany with inadequate means in terms of artillery support, POL and
infantry numbers.
Also, examine the various offensives attempted by Gen Montgomery in the
month after the Normandy landings, in his effort to prevent the landings
from becoming another Anzio. Examine the levels of artillery and strategic
air support for these offensives. Therein you will locate the "generous
artillery and air support" of which I wrote. This sort of support was an
article of faith with Monty in all his offensives.
>
>
> Pulling all this together, I characterised your post as a "rather
> offensive and facile suggestion that the Commonwealth troops
> faced less battlefield stress than
> US troops". I stand by that analysis for the reasons above, and I
> do not propose to enter into the matter further,
Fine with me, as that in any case appears to be the indicated course of
action for you.
However I urge you to carefully read a post to the ng, thread "Re: Germans
rate enemy infantry" from May 05, by Dan Stevlingson. Drawn from British
sources and studies, he demonstrates that (1) British troops were not
necessarily more disciplined than were US troops, (2) were no less immune
from shell-shock than US troops, and (3) were not necessarily led at the
small-unit level any better than US units, all of which you imply.
although I will
> be happy to examine your evidence for the claims above.
Fine; start with D'Este, Bradley and Patton. You might find the exercise
edifying. Thanks for your post.
--
Gangster6
On the evacuation of crete
"it takes 5 years to build a Cruiser It takes 500 years to build a tradition"
--
Rob Davis
>The kids were watching a silly SF movie last night & the aliens had a
In case nobody's noticed, the inter-ship dialogue between the fighters
attacking the Death Star in STAR WARS is an almost exact match for the
radio-telephone and intercom chatter between the Lancasters attacking
the Mohne Dam, in the DAM BUSTERS film.
=====================
Rob Davis MSc MIAP
Telford Shropshire UK
Ian Wood
circumstances, but here goes....
then-Captain Arleigh Burke, after ordering his destroyer flotilla to
proceed at full speed through The Slot at night in pursuit of Japanese
reinforcements, was asked what he was doing.
The reply
"Thirty-one knots!"
Thereafter referred to as 'Thirty-one knots' Burke.
Also, at a inter-war dinner party:
von Ribbentrop to WSC (loudly): "The next war will be different, for we will
have the Italians on our side!"
WSC (smiling): "That's only fair - we had them last time!"
--
Ian Wood, New Zealand
Land of Divine Defence Forces
Please add an "a" to the start of my url
Andrew Clark
"Lawrence Dillard" <ldil...@enteract.com> wrote
> In theory, all
> Allied armies in Normandy then turned in pursuit of the
Germans, including
> 21 AG.
And cautious Montgomery, cautious Dempsey, cautious Horrocks,
cautious Adair and all the other cautious British outpaced every
US unit in their pursuit of the Germans from the Seine. The
Guards Armoured Division set the record for any Allied *tactical*
movement of 75 miles in a single day.
> I can give an example from Monty's extended preparation for his
belated
> crossing of the Rhine: His plan called for 250,000 tons of
supplies,
> including 600 rds/gun for each piece of artillery. He once
again called on
> Bomber Command, which laid on 50,000 tons of bombs in support,
beginning
> March 11.
The crossing was hardly belated, whatever that may mean. And the
doctrine of overwhelming force employed by Montgomery is also
quite sound. What are you, jealous?
> By way of contrast, under Ike's allocation of supplies, as is
mentioned
> often in both Genls Patton's and Bradley's accounts of the
campaign, even
> after the Ardennes battle, artillery support suffered a
shortfall, which
> brought on severe rationing in order to economize on artillery
usage.
In his directive of 31 December 1944, Eisenhower specifically
ordered that the maximum supply priority should be given to 12
Army Group (1st and 3rd Armies) during the Ardennes battle, and
that after that battle was won the main Allied effort should be
made by 2 British and 9th US Armies north of the Ruhr, with
supply priority being given to that assault. This was not
Montgomery's plan, but almost word for word that of Marshall as
set out in his telegram to Eisenhower of 29 December.
Now, as you seem to want to score nationalistic points, I will
point out that Marshall and Eisenhower were, IIRC, American
generals and that the supply deficiencies about which you seem to
feel so strongly were accordingly the consequence of *US*
decisions.
(snip remaining much-travelled ground)
John Halliwell
or...@hotmail.com> writes
>This might seem a little trivial but what are your top 10 WWII quotes?
"No enemy aircraft will fly over Reich territory." Goering.
"I suppose this means we'll be bloody late for breakfast?" Lanc Flight
Engineer after feathering an engine for the second time, still hundreds
of miles inside Germany.
"All that happened was that we had made a number of attacks against
England between 1940 and 1941. Then we discovered that we were not
achieving the desired effect, and so we retired. There was no battle,
and we did not lose it." Adolf Galland.
"The nearness of London to German airfields will loose them the war."
Hugh Dowding after Dunkirk.
--
John
Preston, Lancs, UK.
Lawrence Dillard
Gen GS Patton, USA, crossed the Rhine R at Oppenheim via a pontoon bridge.
At mid-stream, he paused, unbuttoned his fly, and urinated--a long, high
steady stream. While buttoning up, the general said,
"I've waited a long time to do that; I didn't even piss this morning when I
got up so I would have a really full load. Yes, Sir, the pause that
refreshes."
###
"...the history of warfare knows no other like undertaking from the point of
view of its scale, its vast conception and its masterly execution."
---Stalin on OVERLORD/NEPTUNE
###
"...it may well be the most ghastly disaster of the whole war."
---FM Sir Alan Brooke
###
"Well, there it is. It won't work, but you must bloody well make
it."
---FM Sir Alan Booke to Lt Gen Sir F Morgan (COSSAC)
###
"Your big weakness," said Adm Ernest King to an associate, "is that you are
not a son-of-a-bitch. And a good naval officer HAS to be a son-of-a-bitch."
In reply, the officer said, "I'd rather not have my crews think of me that
way. And besides, Adm King," he continued, "You are a good naval officer and
universally regarded as such. I must say I have NEVER heard ANYONE refer to
YOU as a son-of-a-bitch."
King stomped out of the officer's cabin, knowing full well that he was
lying.
###
"...without him England was lost for a certainty, with him England has been
o the verge of disaster time and again..."
--Alanbrooke on WSC
###
"...the destinies of two great empires..., seemed to be tied up in some
God-damned things called LSTs"
---WSC, professing belief that an Allied invasion of
Europe in 1944 ws endangered by a lack of these
specialized vessels
###
"The things that man has called me, you wouldn't believe. But don't think he
has it all his own way. No, sir. You know perhaps the clearest indication
of the strength of our alliance is that we can call each other every name we
can lay our tongues to and yet remain good friends. Once we start being
polite to each other it won't be anything like the same tjhig."
---FDR, to Lt Gen Sir Frederick Morgan
###
"Sink the BISMARCK!"
---WSC, upon learning that BISMARCK had embarked
on a convoy-raid in the N Atlantic
###
"What can I do for BISMARCK? I can see her star-shells and gunflashes.
Sudden bursts of gunfire. Itis an awful feeling to be so near yet unable to
help. "
---Herbert Wolfarth, U-556
###
"We fight to the last in our belief in you my Fuhrer and in the firm faith
in Germany's victory."
---Adm Lutjens' last message from BISMARCK to Hitler
###
Thanks for the post.
--
John Halliwell
I can't fully remember the details, but I did read one reference to
how
H2S got it's name. Apparently some high up guy in the RAF was told
about
H2S and how they could have had it much sooner (I forget the supposed
reason). This RAF guy's reaction was something like "That stinks!",
and
H2S was so named after the aroma of Hydrogen Sulphide.
Can anybody confirm or deny?
M.J.Powell
>"The nearness of London to German airfields will loose them the war."
>Hugh Dowding after Dunkirk.
I have some difficulty in understanding Dowding's remark. 'Stuffy' was
not known for his sense of humour.
Mike
--
M.J.Powell
Lawrence Dillard
>
> "Lawrence Dillard" <ldil...@enteract.com> wrote
>
> > In theory, all
> > Allied armies in Normandy then turned in pursuit of the
> Germans, including
> > 21 AG.
>
> And cautious Montgomery, cautious Dempsey, cautious Horrocks,
> cautious Adair and all the other cautious British outpaced every
> US unit in their pursuit of the Germans from the Seine.
I don't believe so. IIRC, even as the Mortain counterattack was being
contained, Gen Patton, beginning Aug 14, pushed out toward the Seine
R. In
the meantime, his XVth Corps (Haislip) had reached and continued to
hold the
shoulder at Argentan. Gen Patton sent two divisions of Haislip's
corps to
the Seine; Gen Bradley would not approve of both divisions operating
on the
far bank; so only one crossed to the far side, while the other
advanced
downriver on the near bank. These divisions arrived at the Seine far
in
advance of any Commonwealth formations.
You did not mention the other Commonwealth formations. Where were they
and
what were they doing at the time?
Folllowing the Falaise lost Allied opportunity, few organized German
formations were left in France to oppose a general 21 AG forward
movement.
Furthermore, Ike and Marshall decided to shift the Allied center of
gravity
north by east, in order to eliminate the V-1 and V-2 launching sites
and to
bring Antwerp on line. Hence the supply allocations were tilted toward
21 AG
to the detriment of US 1st and 3rd Armies (12 AG). At the time, Ge
Patton
was preparing to cross the Moselle R between Nancy and Metz when the
supply
axe fell.
The
> Guards Armoured Division set the record for any Allied *tactical*
> movement of 75 miles in a single day.
Against what resistance? And why was there so little resistance in
their
path?
>
> > I can give an example from Monty's extended preparation for his
> belated
> > crossing of the Rhine: His plan called for 250,000 tons of
> supplies,
> > including 600 rds/gun for each piece of artillery. He once
> again called on
> > Bomber Command, which laid on 50,000 tons of bombs in support,
> beginning
> > March 11.
>
> The crossing was hardly belated, whatever that may mean.
Indeed the crossing *was* belated. Monty elected to wait, delaying his
crossing until such time as he had accumulated three armies of 30
divisions
(6 armored, two airborne) plus 10 US 1st Army divisions in reserve and
more
than 5,000 artillery pieces (each with 600 rds/gun or 60,000 tons of
ammunition), 30,000 tons of engineering equipment and 28,000 tons of
"other"
supplies in addition to normal daily requirements. 69,000 engineers
were on
hand. The Royal Navy provided landing craft and Allied strategic
bombers
dumped 49-50,000 tons of bombs beginning March 11.
By way of contrast, one of Bradley's formations crossed on a captured
bridge
at Remagen on March 7/8; in just days, sans the elaboratre preparation
and
lascivious supply allocatioin, Bradley has pushed three corps of seven
divisions across the Rhine and had established a bridgehead thirty
miles
wide by ten miles deep. Bradley had done so while in a posture of
"aggressive defense" in light of Ike's supply allocations which
allowed
Monty's massive, belated crossing.
And the
> doctrine of overwhelming force employed by Montgomery is also
> quite sound. What are you, jealous?
That's a good word to describe the feeling, yes. Overwhelming force?
What
German formations in his path need Montgomery more than have
"whelmed"? At
the same moment, US forces were being forced to operate on a virtual
shoestring, by way of contrast. And to what end?
>
> > By way of contrast, under Ike's allocation of supplies, as is
> mentioned
> > often in both Genls Patton's and Bradley's accounts of the
> campaign, even
> > after the Ardennes battle, artillery support suffered a
> shortfall, which
> > brought on severe rationing in order to economize on artillery
> usage.
>
> In his directive of 31 December 1944, Eisenhower specifically
> ordered that the maximum supply priority should be given to 12
> Army Group (1st and 3rd Armies) during the Ardennes battle, and
> that after that battle was won the main Allied effort should be
> made by 2 British and 9th US Armies north of the Ruhr, with
> supply priority being given to that assault. This was not
> Montgomery's plan, but almost word for word that of Marshall as
> set out in his telegram to Eisenhower of 29 December.
Sadly, Gen Marshall reavched that conclusion from thousands of miles
away.
But it was consistent with Ike's determination that the Allies be seen
as a
partnership with the British as co-equals. All allied armies were to
move
from the Rhine into Germany with a major push on the Allied left, with
subsidiary thrusts on the Allied right. But time was being consumed
awaiting
Monty's massive preparations. Ike by this time (March 7), in the wake
of the
end of the Ardenes battle, Monty's unfortunate press-conference in
which he
belittled the efforts of the US Army and its leadership, and his
last-ditch
attempt to displace Ike as overall land-forces commander even after
having
promised not to raise the issue again, had abandoned, in writing, his
exclusive devotion to a main thrust in the north and had returned to
his
twin-thrust strategy in order to gain flexibility and to ends the war
as
soon as possible.
Thus Patton initiated the Saar-Palatinate campaign, reached and
crossed the
Rhine; followed by the double-envelopment of the Ruhr (Ninth Army from
the
north, 1st and 3rd from the south).
>
> Now, as you seem to want to score nationalistic points, I will
> point out that Marshall and Eisenhower were, IIRC, American
> generals
At last, we agree on something. Praise the Lord, from Whom all Good
things....
and that the supply deficiencies about which you seem to
> feel so strongly were accordingly the consequence of *US*
> decisions.
I never maintained that all decisions reached by either Gen Marshall
or Gen
Ike were the apposite ones. In the cases of the supply of artillery
shells
and infantry replacements, they were clearly deficient. In electing
constantly to favor Monty in supply allocations at the expense of the
12th
AG they were also, imho, not justified. But at least at the 11trh
hour, Ike
returned to his twin-thrust strategy and speeded up the end of the war
in
the west thereby.
Thanks for the post.
Lawrence Dillard
Jbeck
Kilroy Was Here!
"Cub driver" <lo...@my.sig.file> wrote in message
news:9bq6d9$2j2$1...@beast.TCNJ.EDU...
>
> >> BTW, the same book has also a quote which is claimed to be said by the
> >> commander of the Imperial Japanese Submarine force: "The beatings will
> >> continue until the morale improves." Was physical punishment in use in
>
> The Japanese routinely used beatings as a training tool. Saburo Sakai
> in his "autobiography" Samurai! describes his treatment at the hands
> of a sadistic sergeant. I suspect that Sakai in the Japanese-language
> version did not treat the sergeant as harshly as the Martin Caidin
> English-language version does, simply because it was so common.
>
> Japanese writers generally describe the weapon as a wooden training
> sword. American prisoners describe it as a baseball bat.
>
> I'm not sure that beatings as such were carried forward into
> operational units, but certainly slapping was accepted and ordinary.
>
> Of course this physical maltreatment of recruits--its effect not only
> on them but also on higher ranks who tolerated or encouraged it--had a
> great deal to do with the savagery with which Japanese troops treated
> occupied peoples and prisoners of war. In the latter case, there was a
> doubling down of savagery, since many PW camp guards were Koreans
> impressed into Japanese military service. The Japanese soldiers had
> been brutalized, so they brutalized the Koreans as being lower on the
> human scale than they, and the Koreans brutalized the prisoners.
>
> all the best - Dan Ford (email: use...@danford.net)
>
> The Only War We've Got (Early Days in South Vietnam)
> http://danford.net/onlywar.htm
--
W. Lydecker
to escape." - Jochen Peiper
Michael Emrys
> H2S was so named after the aroma of Hydrogen Sulphide.
I believe you got that part of the story right. What you omitted was that
the device actually did stink with the same odor of hydrogen disulfide.
Apparently (if my sources are correct) it used a liquid coolant/insulator
that leaked and produced the odor.
Michael
--
Osmo Ronkanen
said after signing the ratification o the peace treaty after
Winter War: "Let the hand that signed this treaty dry off". A few
months later Kallio resigned on health reasons and when he was
leaving Helsinki, he got a stoke at the railway station and died.
Osmo
Jerome Morrow
taking a piss in the Rhine ?
George Hardy
<jerome...@hotmail.com> says:
>
>Is there a picture of Patton, Ike and a few other key Allied commanders
>taking a piss in the Rhine ?
Patton, yes, I have it. In Military History Quarterly,
the one in which Ambrose gets the date of the Rhine
crossing wrong by a week. I could look it up, but
you can too. Keep in mind that by the time that
Patton crossed the Rhine the Brits had already done
it. And, but the time the Brits had crossed the
Rhine the US had eight divisions across the Rhine.
Neither Monty nor Patton was across first. Think
Remagan.
GFH
***************************************************************
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The Anchor Stone Building Set (Anker-Steinbaukasten) Home Page
--
Andrew Clark
"George Hardy" <geo...@mail.rlc.net> wrote
> Keep in mind that by the time that
> Patton crossed the Rhine the Brits had already done
> it. And, but the time the Brits had crossed the
> Rhine the US had eight divisions across the Rhine.
Or to be more explicit:
7 March, US 1st Army captures bridge at Remagen and establishes
bridgehead over Rhine. Bridge soon collapses and bridgehead
cannot be exploited despite limited German resistance.
22 March, elements of US 5th division, 3rd Army, cross Rhine at
Nienstein following ULTRA intelligence that the German defenders
had left the area unguarded.
23 March, 21 AG crosses Rhine at Rees and Emmerich with three
corps, drawing German reserves northward.
24 - 28 March, US forces make dramatic advances into central and
southern Germany against weak resistance. 21 AG moves into Ruhr
from north.
Lawrence Dillard
15,
Bradley had consructed six pontoon bridges across the river and nine
divisions of troops on the far side, and a sizable bridgehead.
On the night of March 22/23, 5th Inf Div, US 3d Army crossed the Rhine
at
Oppenheim. Gen Patton did the honors from a pontoon bridge, from the
middle
of which, in the words of Col Codman, a Patton aide, "Gen Patton au
fait
pipi dans la Rhine" during the morning of March 23. Among other
things, Gen
Patton referred to the act as "The pause that refreshes." Although
elements
under the command of Gen Montgomery had reached Rhine on March 7 (9th
US
Army) they were halted by Gen Montgomery, who elected to await full
preparation of Operation PLUNDER/VARSITY, which tok place beginning on
the
night of March 23/24. Thanks for the post.
"George Hardy" <geo...@mail.rlc.net> wrote in message
news:9e3rvr$t52$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu...
> In article <9e30h8$5oq$1...@beast.TCNJ.EDU>, "Jerome Morrow"
> <jerome...@hotmail.com> says:
SNIP
Michael Emrys
> Is there a picture of Patton, Ike and a few other key Allied commanders
> taking a piss in the Rhine ?
There is one that is alleged to be of Patton making that gesture. It ran in
an issue of _After the Battle_ magazine a couple of decades back. Whether it
had been altered or not I cannot say, but it looked like the real thing to
my eyes.
Michael
--
AndersonTDI
> Keep in mind that by the time that
>Patton crossed the Rhine the Brits had already done
>it. And, but the time the Brits had crossed the
>Rhine the US had eight divisions across the Rhine.
>Neither Monty nor Patton was across first. Think
>Remagan.
>
>GFH
Sorry, close but no cigar. The Remagen Bridge was seized on 7 March 1945.
Patton crossed at Oppenheim with the 5th Division on 22 March. Montgomery
crossed the Rhine with the Second British Army on 23 March and the US Ninth
Army on 24 March.
--