Martin aircraft co and Truman Committee?
Jeff nor Lisa
investigated the Glenn Martin company because of crashes of one
of the airplanes, IIRC the B-26. According to the biographies,
Mr. Martin knew the problem causing the crashes, but wasn't too
motivated to fix it, and Truman saw that it was corrected. This
did not make Martin look that good. Truman also had the head of
US Steel (Fairless) before the committee because their steel was bad and
ships made of it would break apart.
It seemed, at least from the accounts in the biographies, that
these corporate leaders were pretty insenstive and greedy.
I do know that the Truman Committee and Senator Truman were
respected for their work. Would anyone know if there was a
public outrage about Martin and Fairless? Anything to add
to this? (In histories of US Steel, there is no mention
of this experience, rather, they laud Fairless quite highly.)
[II.public replies please]
--
Cub Driver
>investigated the Glenn Martin company because of crashes of one
>of the airplanes, IIRC the B-26. According to the biographies,
>Mr. Martin knew the problem causing the crashes, but wasn't too
>motivated to fix it, and Truman saw that it was corrected.
It was indeed the Martin B-26, famed for splashing "one a day in Tampa
Bay." Whatever the Truman Commission might have concluded, the problem
lay not with the Martin company but with the training of the pilots.
The B-26 always remained a dangerous plane, especially if an engine
went out on takeoff, but with proper training it proved a reliable
one, and it served throughout the war and afterward. It is loved by
the men who flew it (as is usually the case), and even its built-in
hazards have in retrospect become a point of pride (which is also
often the case).
1930s (and even 1940s and 1950s) aircraft design was largely
by-guess-and-by-gosh. It was the test pilot who discovered whether or
not the thing actually flew as expected, and many WWII warplanes had
fixes applied to them after the fact, to solve one or another problem.
The B-26 was very fast, and it carried a bomb load equivalent to the
four-engined Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress (though at lower altitude and
generally lesser distance). It was therefore over-engined and
under-winged, and nothing Truman did could have changed that fact. Its
dangers were also its virtues.
all the best -- Dan Ford
email: war...@mailblocks.com (put Cubdriver in subject line)
The Warbird's Forum www.warbirdforum.com
Expedition sailboat charters www.expeditionsail.com
--
lobomike
the plane in it's original configuration was too hot for the average pilot.
Also pilot training was an issue.
The plane was modified to reduce pilot demand, especially in take
off/landing to account for pilot inexperience. Jimmy Doolittle was an
advocate of the B-26 and went to lengths to prove it's value. The USAAF was
also strongly behind the plane.
As to motive to correct issues, I have no knowledge, but the plane's record
speaks for itself. I have never heard these types of criticisms of Glenn L.
Martin FWIW.
The Truman Committee is factual history after a series of B-26 mishaps. It
must be remembered this plane was ordered into production off the drawing
board, before any X or Y trials and adjustments.
HTH
--
LoboMike,
"I do not think any government has the right,
though they may very well have the power,
to deprive people for whom they are responsible
of the right to defend themselves."
"Jeff nor Lisa" <hanc...@bbs.cpcn.com> wrote in message
news:ci2md4$r7e$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
--
StNeel
>I do know that the Truman Committee and Senator Truman were
>respected for their work.
Hmmm - that is not my understanding. It seems that Truman was a political
ax-man for many of his party in Washington when he was a Senator. I suspect
that your Martin/US Steel affairs, which I am not familiar with, are political
driven battles of some sort.
--
Michael Emrys
war...@mailblocks.com wrote on 9/13/04 8:34 AM:
> ...it [Martin B-26 Marauder] served throughout the war and afterward.
Could you please tell me more about this, Dan? My previous understanding was
that the Marauder was taken out of service almost immediately after the end
of the war.
Michael
--
Chris Mark
>Cub Driver at
>war...@mailblocks.com wrote on 9/13/04 8:34 AM:
>
>> ...it [Martin B-26 Marauder] served throughout the war and afterward.
>Could you please tell me more about this, Dan? My previous understanding was
>that the Marauder was taken out of service almost immediately after the end
>of the war.
It was being taken out of service even during the war, with production ended in
March 1945. Long before that, in the Pacific units abandoned the B-26 for the
B-25 or B-24 and in Italy one unit transistioned from the B-26 to the B-25.
B-26 units generally converted to the A-26. After WW2 the A-26 (Douglas
improvement on the A-20) was renamed the B-26 since all the old Martin planes
of that name were gone.
The B-25, of the same era as the B-26, did soldier on for years after the war
in the TB-25 variant.
The Martin B-26, like the Bell P-39, was an interesting aircraft with
innovative design concepts that, in retrospect probably should never have been
put into production.
About as direct a comparison of the B-25 and B-26 as you could get was the
North African campaign. Here are operational statistics:
B-25 B-26
Total Sorties Flown 2689 1587
Losses 65 80
Percentage loss per sortie 2.4 5.00
Percentage aborts 3.0 12.0
Chris Mark
--
Cub Driver
>Could you please tell me more about this, Dan? My previous understanding was
>that the Marauder was taken out of service almost immediately after the end
>of the war.
It was my recollection that the French air force flew the B-26
postwar, and that the plane is on display at Le Bourget(?).
Jeff nor Lisa
> Hmmm - that is not my understanding. It seems that Truman was a political
> ax-man for many of his party in Washington when he was a Senator.
There is no evidence to support that. Truman earned the respect of
his fellow Senators.
> I suspect
> that your Martin/US Steel affairs, which I am not familiar with, are political
> driven battles of some sort.
The other posters confirm that the plane had some problems, although
it remains in question the responsibility of Mr. Martin himself in
fixing the design. The books suggest Martin could've and should've
fixed the design but that would've been added expense for him and
he already had the contract.
Overall Truman's committee had an excellent reputation and was
widely respected.
--
Lawrence Dillard
"Jeff nor Lisa" <hanc...@bbs.cpcn.com> wrote in message
news:ci2md4$r7e$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
> investigated the Glenn Martin company because of crashes of one
> of the airplanes, IIRC the B-26. According to the biographies,
> Mr. Martin knew the problem causing the crashes, but wasn't too
> motivated to fix it, and Truman saw that it was corrected. This
> did not make Martin look that good.
> It seemed, at least from the accounts in the biographies, that
> these corporate leaders were pretty insenstive and greedy.
> I do know that the Truman Committee and Senator Truman were
> respected for their work. Would anyone know if there was a
> public outrage about Martin and Fairless? Anything to add
> to this? (In histories of US Steel, there is no mention
> of this experience, rather, they laud Fairless quite highly.)
On the advice of Gen GC Marshall, Sen Truman dropped his plans to request a
return to active duty in some capacity with the US Army, and Marshall
further suggested that Truman could more powerfully serve the nation by
keeping a close eye on material purchases, with an emphasis on foiling
profiteering and delivery of sub-standard items to the services.
Truman accepted Gen Marshall's advice and the committee he led promptly
uncovered masses of improper practices on the part of many war materiel
suppliers, and balked payment for them and caused corrections to be made to
many such contracts. Truman and his committee have been credited with saving
billions of dollars from having been wasted.
One case which came to Truman's committee's attention quite prominently
involved the B-26.
Contrary, however, to the allegation that the Martin company had become
aware of but had ignored several problems with the a/c, its problems had
nothing to do with cheating the government, or profiteering or slovenly
attention to correcting its flaws.
Instead, its problems originated with its advanced design in combination
simultaneously with the explosive states of both force expansion and
manufacturing expansion.
As has been mentioned, procurement of this a/c was considered to be so
critical that it was ordered into production "straight off the drawing
boards". The B-26 was to offer unprecendented cruise, top-speed and payload
combined with extensive self-defense armament in a medium bomber platform.
It featured a low-drag, short-span wing and two new, powerful engines in
order to achieve its speed; a form of split flaps allowed for the short span
while still providing sufficient lift for a reasonable takeoff distance at
full operational weight, and enough drag for landings; a huge bomb-bay, for
the times; extensive use of plexiglas glazing; and trycicle landing gear.
This combination of attributes meant that the new ship would be "hot", with
high takeoff speeds.
But probably because time was considered to be short,some errors were made
which went undetected. After the initial rash of B-26 crashes occurred, the
Air Corps directed Boeing AC to evaluate the planform of the B-26. Boeing
concluded that the B-26's wing had been set at a wrong angle of incidence,
such that it was in stalled condition for most of its takeoff roll. Later
models haad their wings installed at a more amenable angle, which aided its
manners on takeoff.
All too many of the early-production a/c were outfitted with
propellor-control mechanisms which were defective and prone to fail at the
worst possible time, i.e. during maximum-power takeoffs. The prop rpm would
at times "run away", leaving one engine with no loading while the other was
fully loaded, usually creating a wing-over.
It took time to properly identify this defect, and more time to fabricate
and install competent replacement components. It proved to be a case of too
few experienced fabrication personnel and too few competent, experienced
inspectors to effect proper quality-control at the factory, and too little
experience among unit maintenance personnel. One a Day in Tampa Bay. This
problem was exacerbated by the shortage of crews with enough multi-engine
experience. The B-26 was almost too much of a handful for most tyro pilots
shortly out of training schools to deal with.
The answer in part was improved quality-controls at the
propellor-control-mechanism factory, improved maintenance at the air bases,
and more intense emphasis on emergency procedures in the multi-engine
training syllabus; pilots had to know emergency procedures "cold" and be
prepared to execute them RIGHT NOW when necessary.
As is reasonably well-known, then-Col James Doolittle, PhD, an experienced,
cerebral aviator, aerial racer and test pilot, was tasked with evaluating
the B-26 at the height of the criticism of the a/c. He was impressed with
it, in short, and used his experience and savvy in a series of
demonstrations of the a/c to fledgling pilots. He showed that the a/c, even
when heavily-loaded, could reliably survive an engine-out situation on
takeoff, demonstrated rolls into the "dead" (feathered) engine and other
aerobatics, and single-engine landings. He gave the a/c his blessing, an act
which some considered "saved" the project.
--
Chris Mark
>Boeing
>concluded that the B-26's wing had been set at a wrong angle of incidence,
It wasn't "wrong," -- the airplane flew just fine -- but it did result in a
nose high attitude on landing approach, making it hard to see the runway. The
plane also needed a long final because speed had to be reduced below 170 before
the gear could be lowered. The gear also came down fairly slowly. Minimum
approach speed was 135 mph (150 on one engine), so it took a pilot very
familiar with the airplane to to keep the nose up, keep the speed up--but not
too fast--keep the runway in sight and set her down in one piece. Tough to do,
but thousands of 22-year-olds did it, and did it with panache.
Iincreasing the wing incidence allowed a somewhat lower nose-attitude on
approach, giving better visibility while landing, and that's all.
>such that it was in stalled condition for most of its takeoff roll.
I can't follow the logic of this. Wing incidence was _increased_ 3.5 degrees
on later versions for the above stated reasons.
>All too many of the early-production a/c were outfitted with
>propellor-control mechanisms which were defective and prone to fail at the
>worst possible time, i.e. during maximum-power takeoffs.
The plane used Curtiss electric props. The electrical system on the early
models, which was a 12-volt system with 50-amp generator, was not up to
handling the load these put on the system, resulting in frequent failures. On
later models the electrical system was upgraded to 24 volts with 100-amp
generator. More powerful R-2800-43 engines were also fitted, improving
power-to-weight ratio at bit (not much because this engine was heavier than the
original R-2800-5), wingspan was increased from 65 to 71 feet, reducing wing
loading, and a taller vertical stabilizer was installed, providing better
single-engine control. The bigger wing and vertical stabilizer increased drag
and lowered cruising speed.
>The prop rpm would
>at times "run away",
The Curtiss electric propeller
changed blade angle (pitch) using an electric motor with a friction brake on
the front of the hub, along with several stages of planetary reduction gearing
to reduce motor speed. Reduction-gearing output drove a slow-turning bevel
gear within the hub. Electrical power from the aircraft DC system was fed
through brushes mounted on the engine nose which rode on slip rings around the
back end of the hub, and run out to the rotating electric motor and brake.
If the airplane's electrical system failed, pitch control was lost on the
propeller. The B-26 had two generators, on the early models powering a marginal
12-volt electrical system. If one generator failed, everything still worked
normally. But it was considered too risky to continue a mission because,
should the remaining generator fail as well, the loss of the airplane was
pretty much
guaranteed. So when a generator failed on the B-26, the pilot had no
choice but to turn around and go home.
As mentioned, the early 50-amp 12 volt system wasn't up to the loads put on it
by the Curtiss electric props, resulting in frequent failures. The beefed up
electrical system on later versions reduced failure rates, but still, if a
generator failed, a mission abort was in order. It was an important part of
the of the pre-flight procedure to check the props. Here's what was done:
1. Set engine speed at 2000 RPM.
2. Selector Switch - Manual and Check each Magneto separately.
3. Propeller Check - Reduce engine speed 200 RPM using decrease
position of Selector Switch then increase to 2000 RPM.
4. Check Feathering switch by decreasing RPM, and then return to
normal.
5. With Selector Switch in Automatic position decrease engine speed
200 RPM with Quadrant control, then increase to 2000 RPM in the same
manner.
6. Run both engines up to 1800, Engineer checks amps end volts for
paralleling. -Generator switches On.
>It took time to properly identify this defect,
Important improvements began on the B-4 and subsequent.
The most harrowing use of the B-26 was with the very first models, which were
sent to Australia and staged out of New Guinea to attack the Japs at Lae and
Salamaua, Java and vicinity and even Rabaul from April 1942. These had the
most design problems and faced some of the worst enemy opposition, flying out
of the worst airfields, with the least amount of technical support and spare
parts (not to mention crappy gas, and oil in such short supply it would be
drained, filtered through chamois cloth and put back in the airplane). Yet the
airplane, overall, performed as advertised and gave the Japs fits.
In the early Med campaigns, the B-26s did a lot of low-level work and even ran
down and shot out of the sky plenty of Ju-52s, Me-323s and the like, using
their cheek guns.
Compared to a B-25, the B-26 had poor rough/short field performance, was
maintenance intensive and had poorer single-engine performance. The B-25 had
hydraulic props, which were more reliable than the Curitiss Electrics. But the
early model B-26s were fast sons of guns and could cook along at a faster
cruise than any other American bomber. The later big wing models cruised at
180, same as a B-25. But the short wing jobs would pass a B-25 like it was
standing still (slight exageration ; ) ).
One advantage the Curtiss electric prop had over the hydraulic props on the
B-25 was that, if a B-25 engine lost enough oil pressure (eg an oil line nicked
by flak), the prop couldn't be feathered. Coming off a target, especially on a
low level run, a B-25 losing oil didn't dare feather the engine until clear of
the target because it needed all power to get away. But by the time the target
was cleared it was often the case that there wasn't enough oil pressure to
feather the prop and the loss of the airplane was inevitable. Under a similar
situation, the B-26 could clear the target and feather the prop with no concern
about low oil pressure. So the terrible decision put on the B-25 flight deck
crew about how long to delay feathering while racing to escape the "kill zone"
didn't happen with a B-26.
Chris Mark
--
Duwop
>> investigated the Glenn Martin company because of crashes of one
>> of the airplanes, IIRC the B-26. According to the biographies,
I've often read rumors and opinions concerning Bell receiving contracts
undeservedly. The usual reasons being wanting to keep as many aircraft
manufacturers and designers in business "just in case" and that quite a bit
of the early rocket and jet plane business went their way because they
werent as busy as the other shops. Anyone with some (more) definitive
knowledge?
--
Cub Driver
>He showed that the a/c, even
>when heavily-loaded, could reliably survive an engine-out situation on
>takeoff,
Interesting information on the modifications to the B-26. Thank you!
A Marauderman I interviewed in the 1990s described what happened when
an engine went out on takeoff. He held out his hand to represent the
plane on takeoff. "It went over," he said, and turned the palm up.
"Like that. Whap!"
Yet even he said that the death toll in Tampa Bay was largely the
result of green pilots who were afraid of the aircraft, and that the
problems largely disappeared after Doolittle proved to them that the
plane was safe.
And that was before the modifications you have described so well.
Chris Mark
>Air Corps
Please. [Army] Air Force(s).
>then-Col James Doolittle
Lt. Col.
>, PhD, an experienced,
>cerebral aviator, aerial racer and test pilot, was tasked with evaluating
>the B-26
The problem with Doolittle's exhibitions was that they didn't address the
actual problems B-26 crews faced. The fact that his demonstrations were
valueless is illustrated by the fact that he made his first round of flying
exhibitions in January, 1942 and in November, 1942, training fatalities on the
plane were still so serious that he did another round of demonstrations.
> even
>when heavily-loaded,
Doolittle perfomed no exhibitions with heavily-loaded B-26s. He flew them
without bombs or equivalent payload, with one-fourth fuel load and with reduced
crew compliment. And he trimmed the plane for single-engine flight before he
released the brakes for the take-off roll. After he had achieved what today we
would call Vmc, he pulled power back on one engine, feathered the prop and
continued uneventfully with the take-off. Well, duh! Who couldn't do that?
He was cheating, and, worse, he didn't sit down and explain to the crews he was
demonstrating to what he was doing. He was just trying to wow them as if they
were a crowd of civilian gawkers.
What he did had no bearing on the situation a crew would encounter on a
combat-laden, fully fueled B-26, never mind one facing a marginal density
altitude situation, or a crappy make-shift runway, or riding in a plain
worn-out bird.
To understand the depth of Doolittle's fudging, keep in mind that a 10 percent
increase in take-off gross weight will cause:
1) a 5 percent increase in the speed necessary for takeoff
2) at least a 9 percent decrease in acceleration
3) at least a 21 percent increase in take-off distance.
That's without losing an engine during the take-off roll.
Consider also that in Florida, where the training was taking place it is hot
and humid much of the year, and pilots know--Beware high temperatures and
humidy. A rough rule of thumb is that for every 10 degrees above standard
temperature at the airfield's elevation, add 600 feet to the airport's
elevation to get an idea of density altitude.
So on many days, weather conditions would be such that a B-26 losing an engine
will not stay airborne. The early models with the short vertical stabilizer
did not provide enough rudder authority to counter the dead engine.
In any case the major cause of accidents on take-off was not _engine failure_
which Doolittle replicated by shutting down one engine and--VERY
significantly--feathering the prop.
The major cause of crashes was electrical system failure which resulted in loss
of pitch control. So not only did the pilot face sudden asymetrical loss of
engine power (although the engine was running it wasn't delivering thrust), he
was also faced with a sudden, huge asymetrical drag problem. In such a
situation, that airplane was going to crash and about the only thing a pilot
could do was chop power on the good engine and try to keep the airplane upright
and pointed straight ahead as it came down. Without sufficient rudder
authority, he could not do that, even with both pilot and co-pilot putting
might and main to the wheel and pedals.
What Doolittle did had no influence on the B-26 program. What did have an
effect was the percolation back into the training program of returning combat
crews who taught proper procedures, and by careful, thorough investigation of
the causes of accidents and the development of engineering solutions to them.
These were carried out by Martin and Wright Field.
Doolittle had nothing to do with revising the electrical system, with enlarging
the vertical stabilizer, with lengthening the wings or with increasing wing
incidence.
A major improvement that was not done was to redesign the landing gear
hydraulic system to provide a faster cycle time, which would have been of
enormous benefit in both taking off and landing on one engine.
Still, even with all the changes, a combat-laden B-26 that lost pitch control
on take-off was doomed. Had Doolittle been at the controls of one such, he
would have been killed, along with all his crew. And he would have been dead
so fast he wouldn't have had time to complete the phrase, "What the fu--!"
Chris Mark
--
Y. Macales
> >respected for their work.
>
> Hmmm - that is not my understanding. It seems that Truman was a political
> ax-man for many of his party in Washington when he was a Senator. I suspect
> that your Martin/US Steel affairs, which I am not familiar with, are political
> driven battles of some sort.
Histories of the period that I have read showed that the
Truman Committee had a very good reputation and had real
achievements in saving money and increasing efficiency.
This is how Truman was able to overcome the taint that
accompanied him to Washington when he first went to the Senate
and was almost a pariah known as "The Senator From
Pendergast" referring to the corrupt political boss of
Kansas City who promoted Truman's career. It was this
that allowed the Democratic Party bosses to accept Truman
as Vice Presidential candidate in 1944. According
to Robert Caro's biography of Lyndon Johnson "Master of
the Senate" when the Korean War broke out, LBJ used the
example of Truman to try to set up a similar committee with
himself as the head in order to further his own career.
--
dp
Acording to the air force history web site, the b-26 had the lowest loss
rate of any usaaf bomber during the war - less that one-half of one percent.
Couple of points I recall from anecdotal reading...
- One pilot remarked about seeing Doolittle do his b-26 dog and pony show
that (sic) "Doolittle could fly anything with wings. Most of us were nowhere
near his caliber as a pilot."
- Another pilot who had switched from b-25's to b-26's noted (sic) "The b-25
was a forgiving plane to fly and was suited for us early war pilots who had
limited training, but the b-26 would get you home with damage that would
have knocked a b-25 down".
__
dp
Chris Mark
> the b-26 would get you home with damage that would
>have knocked a b-25 down".
If said damage involved losing an engine, definitely not true. There are
countless examples of B-25s flying home on one engine--even when "home" was
hours away. A B-26 with one engine out won't stay in the air very long at all.
One of the epic flights of the war happened in the spring of 1945 when B-25s
flying out of Palawan attacked shipping in the Saigon and Dong Nai Rivers. One
of these planes had half the right elevator and the right trim tab shot away by
flak. It also collided with the mast of a freighter, which smashed in the
right engine cowling and tore off the bottom section of the right vertical
stabilizer, in which some seven feet of the mast lodged solidly. The right
engine was shut down, the prop feathered.
Another one of these B-25s was hit by a 40mm anti-aircraft shell which exploded
just behind the auxiliary fuel tank. It blew a huge hole through the top of
the left wing and severed the control cables to the left aileron, causing the
plane to roll violently before the pilots were able to regain control. The
left engine was shut down, the prop feathered.
Both of these airplanes continued their bombing and strafing attacks, then flew
_750 miles_ home, making the trip in about five hours, and landing safely, one
still impaled by that ship's mast. Both planes were repaired and flew missions
again.
The B-25 was an amazingly rugged airplane and stories such as the above are
legion.
In November 1942 Eisenhower, after learning that a B-26 needed essentially the
same size runway as a B-17 to operate out of suggested the B-26 units set for
North Africa be replaced with B-17 units; he couldn't see the value of the B-26
at all. Eisenhower also saw a demonstration of a whole squadron of B-25s,
flown by ordinary AAF crews, taking off with full bomb loads in less than 800
feet. To say he was impressed is an understatement.
The B-25 was an amazingly good airplane, exceptionally versatile, reliable,
maintainable. I don't believe there was a combat theater in the war that did
not see B-25s involved--and well liked. It is no wonder that almost twice as
many B-25s were built as B-26s, or that the B-25 was still in service with the
USAF some 15 years after WW2 ended (in the TB-25 varient; the Air Force Air
Weather Service was using them as late as 1961), while the B-26 was being
replaced even before the war ended.
Chris Mark
--
ArtKramr
>that (sic) "Doolittle could fly anything with wings. Most of us were nowhere
>near his caliber as a pilot."
That demo was done with a B-26 with no bomb load, just enough gas to do the
demo, no crew, just a copilot and the waist guns and ammo belts removed. It was
a stripped plane with far less wing loading than a combat loaded Marauder.
Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer
--
ArtKramr
> I don't believe there was a combat theater in the war that did
>not see B-25s involved-
Yes but not for long. Al the B-25's in th ETO were replaced by B-26's as
fgast as thye became availlabe and th eb_25's were shuttled doown to hte MTO, a
lews demandisng threatre.
It is no wonder that almost twice as
>many B-25s were built as B-26s, or that the B-25 was still in service with
>the
>USAF some 15 years after WW2 ended (in the TB-25 varient; the Air Force Air
>Weather Service was using them as late as 1961), while the B-26 was being
>replaced even before the war ended.
>
Not true. We flew our B-26's right up to and past the last day of the war. They
were replaced by A-26 Invaders, not B-25's which were "make do" and
obsolescent by then. Too slow with too small a bomb load.
Chris Mark
>Al the B-25's in th ETO were replaced by B-26's as
>fgast as thye became availlabe and th eb_25's were shuttled doown to hte MTO
If you are talking about the AAF, the B-25 was never used in the ETO. The RAF
certainly used it in the ETO.
>>the B-26 was being
>>replaced even before the war ended.
>
>Not true. We flew our B-26's right up to and past the last day of the war.
You will note I did not say the B-26 was replaced but that it was _being_
replaced, and that is certainly true. It was long withdrawn completely from
the Pacific replaced by the B-25, and at least one group in Italy replaced the
B-26 with the B-25.
>They
>were replaced by A-26 Invaders,
True.
>not B-25's which were "make do" and
>obsolescent by then.
If that is so, why did B-26 production end in March, 1945, while B-25
production continued until V-J day. Peak B-26 AAF inventory occurred in March,
1944, at 1931 aircraft, while peak B-25 inventory occurred in July, 1944, at
2656 aircraft. So B-26s were being phased out of service even before D-Day
while B-25s were seeing increasing use.
>Too slow
The earliest B-26s had significantly faster cruise than the B-25 but the later
models had about the same 180 cruising speed, as you know.
>with too small a bomb load.
The problem was not the lifting capacity of the B-25 but bomb-bay size.
Solutions were found for that.
Chris Mark
--
Merlin Dorfman
Cub Driver <war...@mailblocks.com> wrote:
...
> It was my recollection that the French air force flew the B-26
> postwar, and that the plane is on display at Le Bourget(?).
I suspect that is the renamed A-26 (Douglas Invader). I
haven't been to le Bourget [and don't intend to go any time soon
:-) ], but I know the Invader was used in Indochina in the 50s,
as it was used by the USAF in Korea.
Dave
>production continued until V-J day. Peak B-26 AAF inventory occurred in
>March,
>1944, at 1931 aircraft, while peak B-25 inventory occurred in July, 1944, at
>2656 aircraft. So B-26s were being phased out of service even before D-Day
>while B-25s were seeing increasing use.
Not to detract from the honor of either aircraft, is it possible that the
increase in production for the B-25 was due to the gun platform variants
(apples) rather than its value as a medium bomber (oranges)? One would have to
examine was was being manufactured and deployed.
Dave
www.Historylink.org
The online encyclopedia of Washington state history.
--
ArtKramr
>Cub Driver <war...@mailblocks.com> wrote:
>
>...
>> It was my recollection that the French air force flew the B-26
>> postwar, and that the plane is on display at Le Bourget(?).
>
The French Air Force flew the B-26 Martin Marauder DURiNG the war with the
cross of Lorraine on the wings and fuselage. In fact when I went through cadet
training at Big Springs Texas we had a detachment of French Air Cadets training
in that field at the same time we did.
Michael Emrys
xmar...@aol.compost wrote on 9/23/04 9:30 AM:
> If you are talking about the AAF, the B-25 was never used in the ETO.
Hmmm, as I recall, a cousin of mine was shot down over France while flying a
B-25. I think this was in 1944. The French Resistance hid him and helped him
escape the Germans.
Michael
--
Corky Scott
>A Marauderman I interviewed in the 1990s described what happened when
>an engine went out on takeoff. He held out his hand to represent the
>plane on takeoff. "It went over," he said, and turned the palm up.
>"Like that. Whap!"
>
>Yet even he said that the death toll in Tampa Bay was largely the
>result of green pilots who were afraid of the aircraft, and that the
>problems largely disappeared after Doolittle proved to them that the
>plane was safe.
Was that Marauder man Jim Wilson? Sounds like him.
Part of the problem with the B-26 and it's reputation was that the
pilots tasked with flying it trained in the Cessna "Bamboo bomber"
which was a twin engine light airplane with fixe pitch props and low
performance. It's top speed was about where the B-26 stalled.
Those graduates were put into the B-26 on which new engines and new
props were mounted. At the time, there was no medium bomber with
engines that powerful. It was like transitioning from a Stearman to a
Mustang in one step.
Jim has a video about the B-26 in which a man who was once an
instructor in the bomber was interviewed. He had been told to go to
the airfield where all the crashes had been occuring and find out how
competent their pilots were.
He went to the airfield, asked to be intruduced to their best pilot,
and took him up. They went up to 8,000 feet (I think) and the
instructor told the pilot to put the airplane into takeoff
configuration and reduce the speed to about what the airplane would be
making as it climbed out after lifting off. When this was done, he
told the pilot he was going to lose and engine, and specified which
one it was. Told him to get ready to react, then pulled the throttle
back.
The airplane almost instantly flipped over on it's back and entered a
spin. The instructor let this go for a moment or two and then
declared that they were in a standard inverted spin, took control and
got out of it. By the time the rolled out to level flight, they were
down under 2,000 feet.
Corky Scott
Corky Scott
On 21 Sep 2004 17:24:31 -0500, "dp" <norep...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>Acording to the air force history web site, the b-26 had the lowest loss
>rate of any usaaf bomber during the war - less that one-half of one percent.
There is a reason for that that in my opinion has nothing to do with
the B-26, it's constructon or performance. The B-26 was a medium
bomber, it was sent to bomb targets in France, for the most part,
until after the invasion, and therefore was not subject to the massed
AA artillery surrounding German cities. The B-26 missions faced flak
for sure, no question about that, but it was not of similar intensity
that the heavy bomber formations faced when they bombed German cities.
In addition, the fighter arm of the Luftwaffe had direct orders to
attack the heavy bomber formations to the exclusion of all other
aircraft. Continental weather being what it was and is, good bombing
weather was hard to come by. When clear skies appeared, all bomber
formations, including the heavies and mediums, went out on missions.
Because the heavies were up, the mediums got scant attention from the
Luftwaffe. When the German fighters actually did encounter the
mediums and attacked them (usually because their paths happened to
cross) the result was severe damage to the bomber formation and a much
higher loss rate from that mission.
I asked Jim Wilson, a friend of my father's and squadron commander for
a B-26 group in England during the war (he was one of the early
participants), if he had ever seen any German fighters on any of his
missions, he said no.
Corky Scott
dp
Wasn't the A-26 also used during the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba?
__
dp
Chris Mark
>From: davew5078
>Not to detract from the honor of either aircraft, is it possible that the
>increase in production for the B-25 was due to the gun platform variants
>(apples) rather than its value as a medium bomber (oranges)?
Don't think so, as that's not a real distinction. Many glass-nosed D-models
were gunned-up in the Pacific in the field, and solid-nosed G and H models in
Italy had nose guns (and that cannon) pulled out in the field and the planes
flew "normal" missions alongside glass-nosed variants.
In the closing weeks of the war before V-J Day, units stateside preparing to go
overseas for the expected invasion were being equipped with brand-new J-32
variants with wing racks for rockets.
As an example of how it is not really useful to make a distinction between the
"strafer" B-25 and the "bomber" B-25, consider the Aug. 5, 1945, attack on the
Japanese city of Tarumizu. Four B-25 groups specialized for low-level attack
were directed to destroy this city (which was believed to host the factory
building the Ohka rocket-propelled suicide plane). They swept in at low-level
dropping napalm and para-incendiaries, as well as strafing everything in their
path, turning this lovely small coastal city of mostly wooden buildings into a
monstrous inferno, with black smoke billowing over 10,000 feet into the air.
Were these B-25s acting as medium bombers or strafers? Or just killing
machines?
Chris Mark
ArtKramr
>Subject: Re: Martin aircraft co and Truman Committee?
>From: davew...@aol.combeehive (Dave)
>Date: 9/23/2004 4:40 PM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: <civmub$o3v$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu>
Exactly right. The B-25 was great on the deck. The B-26 wasn't. But the name of
the game in level bombing is range, speed and bomb load. The B-25 was
outclassed in all three by the B-26 Marauder and the A-26 Invader Of course of
the three the A-26 was by far the best of all of them.. when I flew missions in
a B-26 I felt as if I was in a garbage truck. When I flew in the A-26 I felt as
though was in a racing car.
Hal Hanig
"Chris Mark" <xmar...@aol.compost> wrote in message
news:cj3v69$7...@gazette.corp.bcm.tmc.edu...
It seems obvious that people who don't like what war involves shouldn't start
them. I seem to recall that there was a bit of strafing done at Pearl Harbor
and I don't remember that anyone claimed it to be a war crime.
Michael Emrys
in article cj3v3s$7...@gazette.corp.bcm.tmc.edu, dp at
norep...@hotmail.com wrote on 9/25/04 7:25 AM:
>> ...I know the Invader was used in Indochina in the 50s,
>> as it was used by the USAF in Korea.
>
> Wasn't the A-26 also used during the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba?
Yes, and in Southeast Asia as well. It also put in appearances in Indonesia
at one point or another, if I recall correctly. Probably a few other places
I am unaware of. It was a very good plane, like a lot of Douglas productions
(Dauntless, Skyraider, Skyhawk, etc.).
Michael
[Moderatr's Note: Any further followups to this needs to be about wwii;further discussion of the A/26/B26
postwar should be taken to another group...rhm]
Chris Mark
From: "Hal Hanig"
>It seems obvious that people who don't like what war involves shouldn't start
>
>them. I seem to recall that there was a bit of strafing done at Pearl Harbor
>
>and I don't remember that anyone claimed it to be a war crime.
I am assuming, since you don't quote text, that you are referring to my mention
of the low-level attack on Tarumizu. In my post I only described the attack in
broad terms. It is interesting that that brief description brought to your
mind "war crime," although I did not describe the action as such.
The attack _was_ quite horrific. It came without warning to the inhabitants of
the small city/large village. The B-25s raced up Kagoshima Bay at 50ft.,
giving no hint of their approach until they swept across the city in waves of
line-abreast strafers, expending about 1 million rounds of .50cal. as well as
dropping some 600,000 pounds of napalm and incendiaries. There was no
resistance and not a single B-25 was lost. The P-47 fighter escort, facing no
air opposition, and in accordance with the July 16 directive from 5th Air Force
Headquarters that no one on the home islands was to be considered a civilian,
fell on the city and strafed everything that moved.
Was it a war crime? Maybe. If it was, as far as I am concerned, the
responsibility for it lay at the feet of the Japanese government, which
willfully and in utter disreguard of the well-being of its own people continued
a war that had been lost long, long before Aug. 5, 1945. I suppose it is worth
pointing out that once the Japanese government surrendered, such attacks ceased
immediately, to be replaced by a massive American effort to provide
humanitarian aid and economic assistance. Had the Japanese government
surrendered on Aug. 4, Tarumizu would have been untouched.
It baffles me that the new government that came into power in mid-1944 after
the Tojo government fell did not immediately sue for peace. They had the
perfect scapegoat for the war in Tojo, and Roosevelt would have loved to have
gone into the 1944 election campaign waving Japanese surrender documents over
his head.
Chris Mark
Rich Rostrom
>It baffles me that the new government that came into power
>in mid-1944 after the Tojo government fell did not immediately
>sue for peace.
The men who formed the new government had been, AFAIK, part
of the group that made the original decision to attack the
US and before that to invade China.
Rationalization, not rationality, was the mode for the ruling
clique. They clung to the belief that if Japan could make the
war costly enough, the US would accept some partial victory
leaving the militarists in power and Japan in possession of
some part of its empire.
Surrender to the Allies meant all of at least the following:
Surrender of all Japanese armed forces to the Allies.
Occupation of Japan by Allied forces.
Independence for Korea.
Restoration of Manchuria and Formosa to China.
Abolition of the Japanese armed forces.
Scrapping of all combat equipment of the Japanese Navy, Air
Force and Army excluding small arms, i.e. all warships, all
fighters, all bombers, all tanks, all artillery.
These last two clauses meant a permanent end to Japan's role
as a military power - which meant a permanent end to the
careers of all military officers. The post-Tojo regime was
mostly generals and admirals, for whom this was about as
acceptable as a poke in the eye with a sharp stick.
--
Nothing which was ever expressed originally in the English language resembles,
except in the most distant way, the thought of Plotinus, or Hegel, or Foucault.
I take this to be enormously to the credit of our language. -- David Stove
--
Chris Mark
To get back to the original subject of this thread, recently ran across the
late Sen. Stuart Symington's (D-Mo.) recollections of his run-in with the
Truman Committee. During the war, he was president of the Emerson Electric
Co., which, among other things, manufactured aircraft power gun turrets. The
company ran into problems with the government fairly quickly, through,
according to Symington, no fault of its own.
The company was asked to manufacture a British gun turret design, which it
contracted to do for a specified price. Problem was that the British design
was for a .30 cal turret and the US services wanted it .50. This involved an
extensive and costly redesign. The cost overruns brought the attention of
congress first in the form of the the House Armed Services Committee, chaired
by Andrew Jackson May (D-ky.), who issued "a dreadful statement" about the
plant, according to Symington, "none of it true."
Symington appeared in person before the committee to clear up the situation.
Then, however, the company was also investigated by the Senate War
Investigating Subcommittee, alias the Truman Committee.
When Symington heard about the planned Senate investigation, he was furious.
He had been all through that with the House and he knew there was nothing
underhanded about the company's turret business, and that all the problems had
been caused by the military requesting the company build a British turret
designed to use .30 cal guns and then insisting it be equipped with .50 cal
guns. This required a complete redesign; in fact, it would have been easier
and cheaper had the US simply aske the company to design and build a .50 cal
gun turret from the beginning. So Symington, who had had his company build a
new factory to produce the gun turret, decided to just give the contract, and
the new factory, to the government, washing his hands of the whole affair. He
didn't want to deal with government war contracts anymore.
In response, Truman arranged to have lunch with Symington and his banker and
lawyer. The two had never met, and Truman did not identify himself, he was
merely introduced to Symington as a friend of his banker. Truman listened to
Symington's complaints, grasped that he sincerely wanted out of the government
contract business. Then he identified himself and promised the investigation
would be orderly and would not interfere with Emerson's operations. He also
asked that if Symington suffered any problems as a result of the investigation,
he call Truman personally.
So Symington agreed to keep building turrets for the government, the Committee
gave Emerson a clean bill of health, and Symington became so impressed with
Truman that in later years he entered his cabinet in a number of positions,
including first secretary of the Air Force, before embarking on a long career
in the senate himself.
Chris Mark
Cub Driver
>Surrender to the Allies meant all of at least the following:
And the prosecution of war criminals! This was a very important point
to the Japanese war cabinet, who wondered if the emperor (not to
mention themselves) would be put on trial.
all the best -- Dan Ford
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