"Stephen Graham" <
gra...@speakeasy.net> wrote in message
news:envfam...@mid.individual.net...
> Jeffrey J. Clarke and Robert Ross Smith, Riviera to the Rhine, Center of
> Military History, United States Army, Washington, D.C., 1992.
>
> Chris Manteuffel's thread on "Nationality and accounts of the NW Europe
> Campaign" inspired me to pull Riviera to the Rhine off my figurative To Be
> Read pile. I've been meaning to read it for perhaps twenty years, ever
> since I realized that it finally was in print. It is the last operational
> history in the venerable United States Army in World War II series and one
> of the final volumes published in the series. Another volume in the
> Technical Series, The Medical Department: Medical Service in the European
> Theater of Operations, was also published in 1992. The ultimate volume of
> the series, The Medical Department: Medical Service in the War against
> Japan, was published in 1998, fifty-one years after the first volume was
> published. Riviera to the Rhine came out nineteen years after the
> preceding volume in the ETO series, The Last Offensive, was published, and
> fifteen years after the publication of Casino to the Alps. No mention as
> to why Riviera to the Rhine was delayed for twenty years.
>
> The volume starts with the rationale, planning, and arrangements for what
> would become Operation Anvil, the Allied landings in Southern France on 15
> August 1944. As you would hope and expect, the discussion of this material
> is thorough and well written. The authors are careful to discuss what the
> Allies expected to encounter - a weakened but still tough opponent - and
> how this affected considerations on loading priorities (combat heavy) and
> initial plans.
The supply plans were also heavy on civil support, given the
reports of shortages.
> Instead, the landing forces found an opponent even weaker than expected,
> in the midst of redeploying, and ultimately preparing to evacuate Southern
> France. This would lead to a continuing theme for these forces: not enough
> troops, insufficient armor at key points, and tenuous logistics, but
> always unexpected gains.
The troop issues were essentially the reality of needing to deploy
forces from the US, and what that cost in terms of time.
Also of course the casualties that resulted in units in the US
being stripped of trained men delayed their deployment.
The last 2 armoured divisions arrived in February 1945, the
last 2 infantry in March, the last tank battalion in March, the
last tank destroyer battalion in April, along with the last 8
artillery battalions. Then comes actually deploying them.
The supply claims are interesting, the south benefited from
the ports and associated infrastructure being largely
undamaged, and the rail system less so than in northern
France. Ports in south France landed around 27% of all
US army cargo, excluding bulk fuel over the course of the
campaign
In September and October 1944 the southern ports
discharged about 40% of all US Army cargo, again
excluding bulk fuel. Hence why they were better off then.
They could ship 12,000 tons per day by rail but see later
the problems in winter.
> While there were numerous details I hadn't known before or didn't
> remember, the discussion of which US divisions would be pulled from Italy
> for the invasion was surprising. Mark Clark's initial plan included the US
> 3d and 45th Infantry Divisions, but also the US 1st Armored Division.
> Certainly it would seem to make more sense to redeploy the 1st Armored
> from Italy than to retain it there. As we know, ultimately the decision
> was to use three US infantry divisions, ultimately choosing the 36th
> Infantry Division due to its amphibious experience. There had been
> discussion of using the 85th Infantry Division as a follow-up prior to
> selecting the 36th.
>
> A notable feature of this volume is that the discussion of the campaign
> moves beyond the usual focus on military operations to encompass more
> detail on logistics than usual in the series' operational histories.
Interesting given the various supply histories, including Cross
Channel Attack.
> There is also substantial discussion of issues of the use of air power,
> engineering, and other supporting services.
Much on 1st Tactical Air Force? Like 6th Army Group it tends to
be neglected. The amount of engineer work needed on the supply
system, plus the fixed border defences?
> Naturally, there is also reasonable attention paid to inter-Allied
> cooperation and civil affairs, particularly the transition back to
> civilian French control.
Use of German prisoners in things like coal mines?
> This drops off once the Anvil forces tie in to SHAEF, though there is
> always an underlying thread of logistical issues.
6th Army Group remained officially a Mediterranean formation for
supply purposes until November 1944.
ADSEC advanced section COMZ, between the armies and COMZ.
COMZ, communications zone, rear areas.
CONAD, Continental Advanced Section, ADSEC for 6th Army Group
SOLOC, Southern Lines of Communication, the COMZ for 6th Army Group
On 20th November COMZ gains responsibility for supply to 6th Army
Group, the HQ SOLOC, southern lines of communication takes
command of CONAD and delta base section. Despite being under
COMZ SOLOC still has the right to communicate directly to the
Mediterranean theatre on movements between the Mediterranean
and European theatre. This is needed in November as the US ports
are shipping supplies for southern France and Italy together in bulk.
The US Army supply system in 1944 was very much a work in progress.
My conclusion from the supply histories,
As far as I can tell the US Army logistics system in the ETO between
June 1944 and May 1945 worked properly in around February 1945,
for perhaps no more than two months. Every other time period had a
shortage of equipment and/or a backlog of ships to unload and/or a
backlog of cargo to clear in the rear areas (often causing port, road
or rail congestion) and/or deliveries to the troops being under
requirements. Under the criteria established by General McNair at
least one US army in the ETO was experiencing a supply crisis for all
but two months of the campaign. Artillery ammunition was never
delivered in the quantities the armies wanted, which is not all that
surprising, but reserves were often below authorised levels.
According to the British the allied armies imported some 3,477,951
long tons of supplies (Including vehicles?) into France and Belgium
in April 1945. In addition to that there was the civil relief (a near
50:50 mix on average of food and coal not counting liquid fuels).
Dividing the figure for the civil relief tonnage for the second quarter
of 1945 by 3 gives an estimate of 778,852 long tons of such imports
in April 1945, so for an estimate (April times 12) this gives a yearly
tonnage of around 51 million long tons of military and civil relief
cargoes. No wonder the system was strained when you consider the
number of major French ports not working.
> The tie in and the comparative lack of support for the southern flank
> provide the theme for the rest of the volume. As has been more common in
> recent histories, the conflict between Eisenhower, Bradley, and Devers
> features strongly. Beginning with dispute over the establishment of Sixth
> Army Group, it continues with a struggle over the provision of additional
> US troops to the Seventh Army.
Which to an extent the supply problems dictated. It seems clear
6th Army Group was meant to be a supporting force, and this
does not seem to have changed in the minds of Eisenhower or
12th Army Group. They can justify it in terms of terrain and where
the major western German industrial plants were located.
The weakness of the French forces was a real handicap, 6th Army
group looked more powerful on paper than it was, something that
needs to be remembered.
So for Nordwind there were 11 US divisions, (2 armoured) and 9
French (2 armoured) in 6th Army Group.
There were 11 US armoured divisions in France end December 1944
including 1 new arrival.
End December 1944 there were 46 US divisions in France, including
6 new arrivals. So 12th Army Group (when it had all 3 of the other US
armies), had a 2 to 1 divisional count advantage and better than that in
firepower terms.
> Logistics provided the ultimate argument for the switch of Fifteenth Corps
> from the Third Army to the Seventh Army.
Yes, from the investigation into the US Army supply system,
On 22nd September Devers announces he can support an extra 3
divisions, and is promptly given XV corps for 7th Army (2nd French
Armoured and the US 79th Infantry divisions). The 6th Army Group
tries to demand the corps come with ammunition but is rebuffed.
> One gains the sense that port capacities provided the rationale for the
> reinforcing divisions received by Seventh Army in October and November:
> 44th, 100th, and 103d Infantry Divisions, and the 14th Armored Division.
In November 1944 the US starts landing larger trucks in southern
France to re-equip the lighter truck units. Up to six divisions were
diverted from their planned landing in northern France to the
southern ports according to the supply histories.
The 44th arrived in September 1944, the other three listed above
in October.
In September the 26th, 102nd, 104th infantry and 10th armoured
staged from the US direct to France. Then the US reverted to
staging divisions through Britain until January 1945.
All due to the port problems in northern France.
> While the Allied forces in Northwest Europe were perennially short of
> divisions, the discussion of Sixth Army Group operations in October
> through January highlights a set of what-if questions. The French First
> Army was always hobbled by the lack of trained replacements, especially in
> specialists. While it was able to use FFI as light infantry forces,
> finding infantry replacements and building up additional necessary
> divisions was hard and slow.
So essentially the French divisions were often light infantry with
weak heavy weapons support, presumably due to lack of ammunition
weapons and people who knew how to use them.
The theater wide shortage of ammunition and the too low forecasts
of weapons losses also played their part.
> Adding the limited number of US divisions available stretched available
> forces thin, limiting offensive options and keeping divisions in line
> longer than was good for them.
This applied across the US line after the Normandy beak out, most
people remember the Eisenhower push to create a US Army reserve
pre Ardennes and failing except for the refitting airborne units.
Meantime Montgomery had XXX corps out of the line. The US had
the forces but many were still in transit or the US.
> Thus the French were unable to clear the Belfort Gap in October. Limited
> US forces were able to keep a favorable attritional battle going in the
> Vosges. Yet there was never enough force to breakthrough the defenses,
> which may have been possible.
That is a repeated theme and being tried along the line at different
places. The US had to make choices and increases in southern
force activity would have come via decreases elsewhere and so
the ability of the Germans to move defensinve forces.
On 22nd November the 12th Army group could attack until 15th
December exhausting most reserves, the lack of 105 and 155mm
howitzer ammunition would force static operations assuming no
enemy attacks, crossing the Rhine was out of the question unless
the Germans collapsed.
In December the southern rail network is having severe trouble
with the winter weather in the mountains, together with a lack of coal and
illness amongst the civilian staff, rail jams grow to the equivalent of 8
days
supply, with the situation becoming worse during January.
> When sufficient forces were available in November, the ensuing attacks had
> the potential to be decisive or at least much more influential than they
> turned out to be. The seizure of multiple points along the Rhine, both in
> the Strasbourg area and also running north from the Swiss border to the
> vicinity of Mulhouse held the promise of potentially allowing a jump of
> the Rhine in November.
And the German forces deployed in the Ardennes in December mounting
a strong counter attack.
And then comes what exactly was on the German side of the Rhine
that was so important. It seems a common theme of cross the Rhine
as if it was the objective. If 6th Army Group kept driving east it has
to clear the Black Forest including, near the Swiss border, mountains
about as high as the Vosges.
Looks like the March 1945 attacks saw much of 7th Army drive
south east behind the Black Forest
> The authors are clear in blaming Eisenhower and Bradley for reorienting
> Seventh Army north into the Saar in support of Third Army.
Yet if the simple map I have is correct crossing near Karlsruhe seems
to avoid much of the forest and high ground on the German side of the
river, it is also the point the pre war Germany/France border and so
defences diverge from the Rhine.
There are many US forces cross the Rhine in 1944 and do well
what ifs around, making it hard for yet another one to gain credibility.
> Combined with Hitler's illogical attachment to holding any part of Alsace,
> this led to the formation of the Colmar pocket. Naturally this stretched
> Allied resources further than necessary and required additional effort in
> January and February to clear, in addition to making the Seventh Army more
> vulnerable to North Wind.
So if Hitler had been more logical both sides would have been
better off but the allies thought they held the initiative.
> The history concludes after the clearance of the Colmar Pocket in early
> February 1945. This set the stage to the invasion of Germany proper
> covered in The Last Offensive. I was left with a higher opinion of Devers,
> Patch, and de Lattre, and a bit of a lower opinion of Truscott.
Devers seems to be the main candidate for the most under rated
US general in the campaign.
> Riviera to the Rhine is available as either a hardback or paperback from
> multiple sellers, including direct from the US GPO. It's also available as
> a free PDF download from
>
http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/007/7-10-1/index.html
>
> [I also came to the conclusion that there were just too many First Armies
> running around NW Europe in 1944-5: First Canadian, First French, First
> German, and First US. Surely there were more integers available.]
They were all snapped up at the used integer sale, it was the 3.141597...
to 1 offer that did it, had the buyers going round in circles near the pie
stands, totally irrational.
You could add the 1st armoured and infantry etc.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.