Re: Regia Aeronautica Airlift
Stephen Graham
Subject: Re: Regia Aeronautica Airlift
Date: Thu, 3 Nov 2005 22:53:38 +0100
"Louis Capdeboscq" <loui...@yahoo.com> ha scritto
> Just in case, you wouldn't have a breakdown by theater, by any chance,
> e.g. how many operated in A.S. vs Italy vs Russia vs Balkans ? On the
> one hand it sounds like very bad taste after all the data that you have
> already supplied, but since you seem such an inexhaustible source of
> useful information, I might as well shamelessly ask for more !
Russian Front:
Initial assignement (July 1941) was:
8x SM.81 (labeled as 245=AA Squadriglia on 01-Oct-41)
1x SM.82 (as an experiment, but soon proven too big and heavy for
the short unpaved Russian airfields and repatriated)
3x Ca.133/T (one each in support to a fighter Squadriglia, as per
Regia standard)
4x Ca.164 (liason, later augmented by 2x Fi 156 supplied
by Germany)
During October and November the planes operated mainly from the
bases of Tudora, Krivoi Rog, Dniepopetrovsk, Stalino, Maritei,
Pervomajsk and Belzy-Suceava, transporting about 100t of rations,
clothes and medicals plus 800 wounded and 120 other personnel.
On 25-Nov-41 the 246=AA Squadriglia was also formed (14x SM.81
between both at this date). The 247=AA was formed in December 41
or January 42 with a mixed line of SM.81 and SM.73, and was
based on Otopeni (near Bucarest) for "shuttle" services between
Russia and Italy.
On 15-nov-42 the airlift planes in Russia were:
12x SM.81
4x Ca.133/T
3x Ca.133/S (medevac version)
11x light liason planes, various models
plus 12x SM.81/SM.73 at Otopeni
On 16-Mar-43 the 245=AA was repatriated, while the 246=AA remained
in Crimea and the 247=AA at Otopeni until May.
>From 01-Aug-41 to 30-Apr-42 the activity was:
1.730 flights
3.820 flight hours (included the flight from Italy)
320,000 flight Km
450,000 Kg payload
120,000 Kg mail
1,800 passengers
4 planes lost
>From 01-May-42 to 15-Apr-43 the activity was:
4.260 flights
9.250 flight hours (included the flight from Italy)
540,000 flight Km
620,000 Kg payload
210,000 Kg mail
9,030 passengers
27 planes lost (8x SM.81 in a single day, 22-Jan-43)
Note: the mixed 247=AA flight line contradicts the data I previously
posted (SM.73 only). This is a common occurrence with the
official Air Force History (by Nino Arena, source for both
quotations, in two different pages). Is a mammoth-sized opera
(4,000 A4 pages) lacking any index (you have to laboriously
turn page by page...) and desperately in need of a througful
revision and a careful cross-check.
A.S.I. front:
At the start of the war the airlift line was:
604=AA Sq. - 6x SM.75 [arriving on 11-Jun-40]
608=AA Sq. - 6x SM.82
610=AA Sq. - 8x SM.75
On 01-Nov-40 there were 14x SM.82, 5x SM.82 bombers, 14x SM.75.
The 608=AA, part of 149=B0 Gruppo, repatriated at some time and was
exchanged with 600=AA Sq., which manned all medevac planes
in the sector (3x SM.81/S, 1x Ca.309/S, 8x Ca.133/S). The three
Squadriglie were grouped into 145=B0 Gruppo, date unknown, and
progressively standardized on the SM.75 Canguro for local
service under 5=AA Squadra (while the SM82 Marsupiale - actually the
military version of the former - ensured the line Lybia-Italy under
the centrally-controlled S.A.S.).
Up to 31-Jan-41 the 145=B0 Gr. had made 875 flight (3,227 hours)
transporting 1,140t and 11,600 passengers.
During 1941 the 244=AA Sq. was formed in Lybia with SM.81
transports, however the unit was mainly employed for patrol
and surveillance of convoys.
Also during 1941 the 148=B0 Gr. (605=AA & 606=AA Sq.) of the S.A.S.,
with 16x SM.73 at this date, was assigned more or less permanently
to the Italy-Lybia line (starting to receive G.12 in early 1942).
Again during 1941, the three old four-engined giant SM.74 of
the former 616=AA Sq. were assigned to the 604=AA Sq. The more
useful SM.82 started to arrive shortly thereafter.
In August 1942 there were in Lybia 14x SM.82 and 8x SM.75.
Subsequently the figure is confused since during the Tunisia
campaign virtually all the available transport planes were used
in the sector.
Balkans front: sorry, Arena provides no detailed breakdown.
However, I can provide the breakdown of the S.A.S. activity
from 10-Jun-40 to 10-Jun-42 (in my previous post):
[numbers are A.O.I. + A.S.I. + Albania + Russia + Aegean]
17,207 flights =3D 328 + 9,576 + 6,381 + 189 + 733
65,666 flight hours =3D 5,842 + 45,545 + 8,375 + 1,103 + 4,801
16,651,386 Km =3D 1,440,858 + 11,549,459 + 2,194,067 + 249,385 +
+ 1,217,617
237,447 passengers =3D 1,766 + 153,217 + 72,966 + 1,275 + 8,223
14,888,929 Kg payload =3D 274,582 + 10,119,661 + 3,668,337 +
+ 144,254 + 681,825
3,040,290 Kg mail =3D 81,404 + 1,636,099 + 1,065,722 + 23,730 +
+ 233,335
--=20
Davide
"Solo se la vostra visione va oltre quella del vostro maestro,
siete adatti per ricevere e tramandare la trasmissione."
(Massima Zen)
Stephen Graham
Newsgroups: soc.history.war.world-war-ii
Subject: Mediterranean Logistic
"Louis Capdeboscq" <loui...@yahoo.com> ha scritto
> As a background task, I'm trying to get a handle on logistics capabilit=
y
> in the Mediterranean in general and North Africa in particular. I find
> most of the Italian-language histories to be useful but very verbose.
You have probably read the Navy Official History. However, just
in case someone else is reading, I add some excerpts from volume
VI, "La Difesa del Traffico con l'Africa Settentrionale" [The defence
of traffic with North Africa] by Adm. Aldo Cocchia, about port
receptivity.
Peacetime max capability was:
Tripoli - up to 5 cargo ships (2.000 t per day) + 4 personnel ships
(500-600 men per hour) unloading at the same time.
Tobruk - up to 3 cargo ships (1,000-1,500 t per day) + 2 personnel
ships (250-300 men per hour) unloading at the same time.
Benghazi - up to 3 cargo ships (1,000 t per day) + 2 personnel ships
(250-300 men per hour) but only 3 ships unloading at the same time.
However by 1941, due to damage and attrition, capability had
dropped to 50% for Tripoli, and even less for Benghazi (recaptured
and then lost again).
Globally 1,803,022 t arrived in the Lybian ports between June 40 and
January 43; monthly totals exceeded 100,000 t only three times (June
41,
April 42, May 42) and often were below 40,000 t (July 40, October 40,
November 41, December 41, June 42) while in June 40, December 42
and January 43 the quantity was negligible.
The personnel transported totalled 189.198 men, the vast majority
of them during 1941 (about 20,000 in each of February, March and
April).
In addition 302,835 t and 17,204 passengers were lost in transit.
Giorgio Giorgerini's "La Guerra Italiana sul Mare" (a highly
controversial book claiming that The Italians *_won_* the naval
war in the Mediterranean, by transporting safely in Lybia most
of the embarked material) shows slightly different numbers:
[numbers are: 1940 - 1941 - 1942 & Jan-43]
Personnel
embarked 29,299 - 157,221 - 19,882
arriving 29,249 - 143,053 - 16,960
Material - Oil and gasoline (t)
embarked 47,520 - 234,426 - 317,391
arriving 47,520 - 181,015 - 248,168
Material - vehicles (t)
embarked 30,131 - 144,478 - 100,701
arriving 30,126 - 128,731 - 84,776
Material - Weapons & ammo (t)
embarked 21,948 - 61,054 - 87,058
arriving 21,938 - 53,281 - 74,243
Material - others
embarked 204,868 - 576,483 - 419,322
arriving 197,891 - 490,166 - 372,100
In addition, between November 42 and May 43 77,741 men were
embarked for Tunisia (77,246 arriving) along with 433,160 t
(306,532 t arriving).
There were 993 convoys (more than one per day) for Lybia with
1,905 cargo ship voyages and 2,206 escort ship voyages (so, the
typical convoy was formed by 1.9 cargo ships and 2.2 escorts).
In addition, 326 military ships' voyages (in 203 convoys) were
employed for transport.
There were 276 convoys for Tunisia with 438 cargo ship voyages and
548 escort ship voyages (average of 1.6 cargo ships and 2.0 escorts
per convoy) plus 657 military ships' voyages (in 167 convoys).
There were 3,116 convoys for Albania / Greece / Aegean [during the
entire war; more than two per day] with 5,527 cargo ship voyages
and 2,580 escort ship voyages (plus 28 isolated military voyages).
Actually, a very great number of such "convoy" was formed by just
a single cargo ship (with a lone, if any, escort).
Stephen Graham
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From: "John...@tricolour.queensu.ca"
<John...@tricolour.queensu.ca>
Newsgroups: soc.history.war.world-war-ii
Subject: Re: Cite? Stalin on WW2 -- "British gave time, Americans gave
money, and Russians gave blood".
Michele Armellini wrote:
> "Dave Smith" <adavid...@sympatico.ca> ha scritto nel messaggio
> news:dkbmic$1cq$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
> > hanc...@bbs.cpcn.com wrote:
>
> > As for the blood..... in many cases their were poorly trained and poo=
rly
> > armed troops sent in to battle with political troops behind them to s=
hoot
> > anyone who refused to advance or tried to retreat.
>
> Well, this is part of a long-established WWII folklore.
> I do wonder, however, what would happen to, say, German soldiers who
> "refused to advance or tried to retreat"? I suppose the Feldgendarmerie
> would welcome them back with a hug?
>
> Considering that so many of their casualties were the result of the
> > incompetence and inhumanity of their own leaders it is hard to conced=
e
> that
> > the Soviet people willingly gave their blood.
>
> Most of the Soviet soldiers were conscripts and not volunteers. I suspe=
ct
> the same applies to every other country involved in the war, but I'll g=
ladly
> acknowledge to be wrong if you can show the reverse is true for some ot=
her
> country than the USSR.
>
While Canada had conscription for home service from sometime in 1941,
all Canadian soldiers AFAIK serving overseas were volunteers until
after D-Day when increasing casuality figures forced the Canadian govt
to send conscripts though it appears not many saw combat.
http://www.warmuseum.ca/cwm/newspapers/canadawar/conscription_e.html
I suspect this was an anomaly due to the peculiar political
significance of conscription in Canada
John Kane, Kingston ON Canada
Stephen Graham
From: "Robert Willett" <rbwi...@triad.rr.com>
Newsgroups: soc.history.war.world-war-ii
Subject: Operation Market garden
Stephen notice one thing you would have done if more transport was
availa=
ble
was to lift 1st Airlanding Brigade. What did you mean by that/
Stephen Graham
Step 4.
The Other Side of the Hill
Malta Coastal Defences, based on a mammoth book (Stephen C. Spiteri,
British Military Architecture in Malta). All you may want to know
on the subject, including detailed plans of just anything. I didn't
try t=
o
place the ten-pound or so book over my scanner (fearing some
catastrophe).
The southern-eastern "beaches" (read: "horrid near-vertical rocky
cliffs"=
)
were virtually defenceless. I was a little shocked when I discovered
that=
,
and I strongly suppose that the British, after having taken a brief
look =
at
this coast, came to the conclusion that a landing there was an
impossible
achievement. However, they might have been wrong... Who knows.
The land works of interest for C3 are only six:
1) Fort Bingemma. This is on the extreme south-western corner of
Victoria line, near the coast. It's armed with a single 9,2" BL Mk X
with a western arc of fire nearly exactly from S to N, so as long as
the
landing crafts keeps on their side they are out of danger.
2) Fort Benghisa / Bengaisa. This is on the extreme south-eastern
corner
of Malta. It's armed with two 9,2" BL Mk X. The arc of fire cannot be
decided with 100% accuracy, lacking a "North" in the plan of the fort,
but it seems 99% sure that the guns are only able to fire eastward
from
N to S. Again, if the Italian landing crafts keep on their side they
are =
out
of danger. (On the other hand, the Germans are going to bear the brunt
of the fire).
3) Fort Delimara. At the end of the Delimara peninsula, just in front
of
Number 2 above. This is armed with two 6" BL Mk VII, pointed exactly
in direction of the Italian beachheads, EXCEPT THAT there is a not
negligible amount of land features between the guns and their targets.
This fort _could_ have execute only a totally blind fire in the
general
direction of the enemy, without any line of sight; however there is no
fixed observation station there.
4) "Wied Znuber Stop Wall". This is a (not very impressive: 30 feet
long)
stone wall built across the very narrow small valley there. On top of
the
wall there were a dozen or so loopholes for rifle-armed troops. The
main mechanized Italian effort would have been more or less here.
5 & 6) Two unnamed pillboxes on the south-western coast, in fron of
some
of the beachheads. One is shown in detail: it has four MG postation
plus
an observation upper turret. The other is probably similar.
And that's all. The book says: "Since the coastline along the
south-west
part of Malta was protected naturally by a wall of inaccessible
cliffs, t=
here
was never any need for man-made fortifications in that part of the
island
except, however, in a very few places where the line of cliffs was
broken
by small inlets."
Malta Land Forces
(based on various email exchange with a lot of different people.
Since a number of informations collided with each other, I made
a personal "average")
There were four brigade-sized unit:
"Southern Area Command"
OR "1st (Malta) Infantry Brigade"
OR "231st Infantry Brigade", according to three different quotes!
- 2nd Btn, Devonshires
- 1st Btn. Dorsetshires
- 1st Btn, Hampshires
- 3rd Btn, King's Own Malta Rifles
Northern Area Command / 2nd / 232nd
- 8th Btn, Manchesters
- 2nd Btn, Royal Irish Fusiliers
- 1st Btn, KOMR
- 2nd Btn, KOMR
Central Area Command / 3rd / 233rd
- 11th Btn, Lancashire Fusiliers
- 2nd Btn, Royal West Kents
- 1st Btn, Chesires (this being a MG Btn)
- 10th Btn, KOMR
Western Area Command / 4th / 234th
- 4th Btn, Buffs
- 1st Btn, Durham Light Infantry
- 8th Btn, KOMR
The single MG Btn was organised as:
3x MG Companies
3x Platoons (each with 4x Vickers MMG)
1x Mortar Company
4x Platoons (each with 4x 4.2" mortars)
Armored unit.
According to a friend:
"X" Troop, 7th Royal Tank Regiment; equipped with 4 x Matilda II
and 2 x Light Tank Mk VI (Source: "Royal Tank Regiment" by George
Forty, London: Guild, 1989)
However, I know for a fact that 1st Independent Troop, 44th Royal
Tank Regiment, was on Malta: I looked in their war diary for
1940-1942 at the Public Record Office in London once, back in the
1970s; perhaps this unit was created out of "X" Troop, 7th Royal
Tank Regiment? The strength was similar to that given for "X"
Troop above, i.e. a few Matildas and Mk VICs
According to another friend:
Tank strength included a platoon of Mk VIs from 3rd Hussars, and
6 or 7 Matilda from 7 RTR.
Malta Anti-Air Defences
There were two brigades:
10th HAA Brigade
4th HAA Rgt RA
7th HAA Rgt RA
10th HAA Rgt RA
2nd HAA Rgt RMA
11th HAA Rgt RMA
7th Brigade
32nd LAA Rgt RA
65th LAA Rgt RA
74th LAA Rgt RA
3rd LAA Rgt RMA
4th Searchlight Rgt RA/RMA
10th Brigade was armed with a total of 112 guns:
- 12x 4,5"
- 84x 3,7"
- 16x 3" 20cwt
arranged in 29 troops (27 with 4 guns and 2 with 2 guns) coupled in
14 or 15 batteries, 3 batteries for each regiment. The Malta book
goes to indicate the exact position of 27 of these troops.
7th Brigade was armed with 40mm Bofors, unknown effective number
but such Rgts attached to field divisions had a full theoretic
complement
of 54 guns each, in three 18-guns batteries. According to a friend,
there
were in total only 118 LAA guns but this number seems to me much too
low, less than half the official TOO.
According to another friend, the LAA were organized as "three
battalions
[an error I think: read "regiments"], one on each airfield, plus three
batteries [that's another Rgt] scattered about". There were in fact
four
airfields (Ta' Qali / Takali, Luqa, Safi, Hal Far) and I don't know
exact=
ly
at which three of them he was referring.
Malta Air Units
(courtesy of a friend)
Units operating from Malta from June to September 1942 were:
39 Sqn - Beaufort (torpedo bombers) [#1]
69 Sqn - Spitfire IV (recon), Baltimore (recon), Wellington (anti-sub)
[#=
2]
detachmnet of 89 Sqn - Beaufighter I (night fighters)
126 Sqn - Spitfire V
185 Sqn - Spitfire V
227 Sqn - Beaufighter VI (torpedo bombers) [#3]
249 Sqn - Spitfire V
603 (then 229) Sqn - Spitfire V [#4]
1435 Sqn - Spitfire V
NASM - Albacore [#5]
[#1] At first the Beaufort were officially operated by three smaller
detachments from 39 (old), 86 and 217 Sqn, but on 20-Aug-42 these
were officially combined into a new 39 Sqn.
[#2] Wellingtons operated as a detachment of 221 Sqn until 25-Aug-42,
when they were absorbed by 69 Sqn.
[#3] At first the Beaufighters were officially operated by two smaller
detachments from 235 and 248 Sqn, but on 20 August 1942 these were
combined into 227 Sqn.
[#4] 603 Sqn renamed 229 Sqn on 3 August 1942.
[#5] Naval Air Squadron Malta, combining 828 and 830 Sqn.
In early August 1942 there were:
- 136 fighters
- 38 torpedo bombers
- 16 recon
Stephen Graham
Step 3.
Italian Landing Ships and Craft
MC (Motocisterna / ne) ["motor tankers"]
Actually landing ships, classified as "water tankers" for deceiving
purpose. This did not prevent the Jane's in 1937, and the French
Revue Maritime in 1939, from guessing their real nature. It has to be
said that, in spite of secrecy, Sesia made a number of landing
exercises
in Summer 1937 near Massaua in AOI, in plain view of the Red Sea
shipping lane. There were five ships built (all named after rivers):
1) Adige
http://tinypic.com/fbcj5u.jpg
Laid down 09.05.1927 at Castellamare di Stabia
Launched 31.10.1928
Commissioned 26.04.1929
Displacement 780t
Dimensions 47m x 9.6m x 2.2m (Note: the last value is the official
one.
Actual immersion was 2.8m at the stern, and just 0.5m at the bow)
Armament 4x 6.5mm Colt MG, up to 48 mines
Engines 2x 140hp
Speed 8kts
This was one of the first dedicated landing ship ever built in the
world (previously, I'm aware only of the WW1 Russian ones).
A brainchild of Admiral Sirianni, then Sottosegretario di Stato
alla Marina (deputy Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary being
Mussolini), who had a number of bright ideas (he experimented
with a Schnorchel) along with some less bright ones (he was behind
the reach for speed in all ship categories), she could beach and land
an infantry battalion through a bow hand-worked gangway
(8.15m x 2.38m). Defects were the impossibility of carry vehicles
(gangway too small) and the inability of get under way after landing
without external assistance (weak engines).
2) Sesia
3) Garigliano
http://tinypic.com/fbcj8l.jpg
Laid down Spring 1933
Launched ?
Commissioned 1934
Displacement 1,460t (Sesia), 1,055t (Garigliano - experimental
welded hull)
Dimensions 65m x 19m x 3.4m (officially)
Armament 4x 13.2mm MG (1934), 2x 20/65 + 3x 8mm MG (1939),
up to 118 mines
Engines 2x 300hp (Sesia 315hp)
Speed 10kts
Range 5,000nm at 6kts or 3,454nm at 9.5kts
Evolution of the prototype, with ability to carry more troops (29 off,
44 nco, 989 men, 50 mules) plus vehicles and light tank through a
bigger
and sturdier elctrical-worked gangway (13m x 2.7m). Two interesting
features were the disappearing bow rudder, and a ballast tank in the
stern (to further reduce the bow immersion).
4) Tirso
5) Scrivia
Laid down ?
Launched ?
Commissioned 17.08.1937 and 18.10.1937
Displacement 1,086t (welded hull)
Dimensions, armament and engines as Garigliano
Speed 10.5kts
Range 4,000nm at 8kts, 2,700nm at 10kts
Further projects: the 1938-39 naval program included 18x "coastal
tankers
for gasoline or water", very probably a derivative of the above, plus
8x Bettoline Posamine ("minelaying barges"), probably a type similar
to
the future MZ.
Employment:
Adige was soon considered too small and weak, and used only for
auxiliary transport work (she was eventually captured by Germans while
in Greece). The others four took part in the occupation of Albania,
and
on 10.06.40 were at Taranto (except Scrivia at Pola).
It was planned to use them (based now at Valona) against Greece,
landing
on Corfu the Bari division ["organized on 15.09.1939 and intended
for amphibious work, having smaller artillery and supports than the
usual binary division". I have no further data on its OOB] under the
newly created FNS. The sea state precluded the action until the
disastrou=
s
situation on the land front lead to total cancellation (actually the
Greek commander on Corfu had surrendered the very first morning to
the only Italian presence on the island - the much embarrassed consul.
In the evening, no ship having show herself, the now very irked Greek
colonel had all Italians jailed). Two MC eventually succeeded to land
on Corfu elements of the division Acqui, but only after the Greek
surrender.
The MC were not employed in the attack to Crete, although one of the
FNS ship (the little merchant Porto di Roma, modified to carry light
tank=
s)
was sent to Rodi, embarked 13x L3 and landed them in eastern Crete, as
part of the VERY little-publicized Italian contribute to Merkur.
The MC were moved to Livorno in August 1941 as part of the preparation
of C2 (landing in Corsica - to be started by one of the periodic
frontier
incidents between Italy and France; an adventurous project toyed with
until October) and then of the much more serious C3. The ships were
modified so as to carry a disassembled floating bridge 70m long
(utilizing Army engineer equipment) to be mounted between the bow and
the land in order to overcome the sand bars; this bridge was fully
operat=
ive
19 minutes after the ship touched the sand. Unfortunately unable to
carry
M tanks, each MC would have landed two 75/18 batteries (8x pieces and
8x TL39 tractors).
The MC were then employed in the re-born C2 on 11-Nov-42, and then
in Tunisia. Further activities:
- Scrivia, scuttled at la Spezia 09-Sep-43
- Garigliano, captured at Bonifacio (Corsica) on 14.09.1943, renamed
Oldenburg and employed as minelayer until scuttled at Genova on
24-Apr-45
- Tirso, employed by Italy until 21.12.1948 then transferred to France
as
war reparation. Renamed Herault and employed there until late 50s
- Sesia, employed by Italy until 01/06/1972, pennant A5375
MZ (Motozattera / re) ["motor raft"]
http://tinypic.com/fbcjdd.jpg
First series units were a close copy of the German MFP. A further 51
of these had been built at Palermo for Kriegsmarine. Second series had
some differences:
1st Series, 65 units (all built between February and July 1942 - 15
lost
before end of August 42)
- MZ.701-/-731 C.R.D.A., Monfalcone
- MZ.732-/-741 Cantieri Navali Riuniti, Ancona
- MZ.742-/-749 Ansaldo S.A., Genova
- MZ.750-/-757 Cantieri del Tirreno, Riva Trigoso
- MZ.758-/-763 O.T.O. Muggiano, La Spezia
- MZ.764-/-765 Cantieri del Mediterraneo, Pietra Ligure
2nd Series, 44 units (30 completed)
- MZ.761-/-765 Cantieri Navali Riuniti, Palermo (started September
1942, never completed)
[the original 761-/-763 had been lost in August 1942, and the original
764 and 765 had been renamed 701 and 703 after the loss of these two
too]
- MZ.766-/-770 Cantieri del Tirreno, Riva Trigoso (started May 1943,
never completed)
- MZ.771-/-800 C.R.D.A., Monfalcone (started September 1942,
completed March 1943)
- MZ.801-/-804 Navalmeccanica, Castellamare di Stabia (started June
1943, never completed)
Normal displacement: 174t (1st), 195t (2nd)
Loaded displacement: 239t (1st), 279-291t (2nd)
Payload: 65t dry load (1st), 65t dry load + 19t of water ballast,
or 77t gasoline + 19t water ballast (2nd), four railway cars
(only MZ.764 =3D> 701 and 765 =3D> 703, converted in August 1942)
Both gasoline and water ballast were transported inside the double
bottom.
Dry load was carried inside a space of 19.50m x 2.90m x 2.75m
(total 115 cubic meters) and could include three M14 tanks.
Range: 800nm at 11kts max speed, 1,450nm at 9kts cruise (both series)
Armament: 1x 76/40, 1x (1st) or 2x (2nd) 20/65
The MZ were grouped in Squadriglie of 6 units under a Tenente di
Vascello.
The "1=AA Flottiglia Motozattere" formed in Tobruk on 10-Jul-42
(C.V. Bernardini) with an unknown number of Sq.
Probably another Flottiglia formed there, since a "Gruppo Flottiglie
A.S.=
I."
was in existence shortly afterward.
On 16-Oct-42, after many losses, the Gruppo was reduced and renamed
4=AA Flottiglia (with about 24 units), while 16 damaged units were
repatr=
iated
for refit, and grouped into a new 1=AA Flottiglia based in Italy.
In December the 4=AA under C.V. Puleo had about 20 units based in
Tripoli; transferred to Sfax in January. Transferred again in
mid-Febraur=
y
1943 to Palermo (with a dozen survivors) and consolidated there
with 1=AA Flottiglia.
ML (Motolancia / ce) ["motor launch"]
Other than MC and MZ, these were the only other purpose-built landing
units (40 to 50 available). Small wooden flat-keel boats of 15t, could
carry 30 to 40 men at 10kts and delivery them over a beach. Armament
of 1x 13.2mm MG.
MV (Motoveliero / ri) ["motor sailing ship"]
Converted trawlers (small engine with auxiliary sail), about 30
units.=20
According to Gabriele the typical capacity was about 300 men or 100t.
Photos shows two different kind of MV:
- a normal rigged boat, with a very narrow hinged gangway over the bow
and lowered through a mast capstan. The system seems unlikely to
work smoothly in presence of enemy reaction, and probably served only
for troops training purpose;
- a razed boat, with some shielded LMG, towing alongside a long
(40m ?) floating bridge to be fixed between boat and beach. This seems
slightly more warlike, although the problem of disembarking through
the
high sides is still present. However, one of the photo shows the men
unloading a 3-wheel motorcycle through an inclined ramp - it looks
pretty awkward, but it could be done.
Photos of last type shows the presence of four "armoured raft" towed
alongside (in the opposite side of the bridge). These were armoured
plates mounted over a small boat-like base, with four spiked wheels
in the lower hull for ground movement (by handwork) and intended to
provide cover for troops. The thing had about the same size of a VW
minivan, and seems pretty likely to stuck solid in anything different
fro=
m
a paved road.
MF (Motoscafo / fi) ["motor boat"]
Converted motorboats (mainly from Venice lagoon, about 20t).
About 24 available. According to Gabriele the capacity was 75 men.
The only photo shows the classic gangway over the bow of a MF
towed alongside a MZ (probably the little MF was not seaworthy
enough and/or lacked range).
Other small crafts
Photos show small boats (of type carried by major ships) armed with
a shielded LMG and full of troops. No classification given. These were
very probably to be used for shuttle service between ships and land.
Size similar to ML, but probably unable to closely approach the beach.
Troops are equipped with individual shields (about 2' x 2') arranged
over
the sides, and the assemble looks strangely similar to an ancient
galley
or a Viking drakkar.
NT (Nave traghetto) ["ferry boat"]
There were two of these (Messina and Aspromonte, about 1,000t),
former Messina Strait railway ferries. They were to carry the M40 of
X Ra.Co. (so probably their capacity was 4 tanks each). Photos show
a VERY sturdy but short bow ramp, probably unlikely to reach the dry
land except when docking to a wharf.
Other small ships
Small ships were (at least in some units) equipped with long, high
firemen ladders, to reach the height of the Maltese cliff. This is
anothe=
r
feature very unlikely to work in presence of the enemy (or in presence
of even very moderate waves). I had listed from Gabriele:
5 x PM (Posamine)
[Buccari, Durazzo, Pelagosa, Crotone, Vieste]
Ex-light minelayer. Makeshift bow ramp (motorcycle-able).
Capacity 500 men.
2 x MN (Motonave) ["motor ship", i.e. diesel-engined]
[Aquileia and ?]
Ex-Venice ferries. Similar to PM. Capacity 400 men.
4 x PFP (Piroscafo Piccolo) ["small steamboat"]
[Tabarca, Sauro, Mafalda, Argentina]
Ex-Capri ferries. As MN.
Other bigger ships
These were to transport the final waves, and strongly required a port
to unload.
10 x PF (Piroscafo) ["steamship"]
[Aventino, Viminale, Quirinale, Italia, Milano,Tunisi, Calino,
Rosandra, Crispi, Donizzetti]
Small passenger ships. Capacity from 800 to 1,400 men.
6 x PFC (Piroscafo da carico) ["cargo steamship"]
[ ? ]
As above, but loaded with cargo. Capacity 3,000 tons.
Stephen Graham
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Subject: ***POSSIBLE SPAM*** Re: Blitzkrieg and horses
Roman "Polish lancer :-)" Werpachowski wrote:
> On the Wed, 2 Nov 2005 21:19:50 +0000 (UTC), Louis Capdeboscq
wrote:
> > Michael Emrys wrote:
> >>
> >> In the words of Jim Dunnigan, "You can't pull artillery on
grass."
Horses
> >> (and mules too, if being used) require high energy food, like
oats,
when
> >> called on to do heavy work. Otherwise, they eventually just fall
> >> over
and
> >> die.
> >
> > The keyword here is "eventually". In a static role, an infantry
> > division won't have to pull its artillery all that often so the
> > horses can do it occasionally and get their strength back
> > afterwards.
>
> Well, it's not that easy. You can't just substitute time for
> nutrients. Oats contains several ingredients which are very
important
> for horses' health and simply are not to be found in grass
(avenine).
Technically you're right, but that was not quite my point. What I=20
pointed out was that:
1. In Michael's sentence regarding horses eventually just falling
over=20
and dying, if inadequately fed "eventually" was the operative word,
i.e.=20
it was perfectly possible to either work a horse to death or to=20
temporarily overwork it and leave it to recuparate later.
2. For a division holding the front, providing a limited supply of
oats=20
to supplement grazing is not going to be a great logistical strain,
as=20
opposed to having to provide for 100% of the food for the horses as=20
would be the case for a unit in movement (plus the fact that the
latter=20
unit would require more food as the horses would be working more).
The general point was that you could perfectly well have a=20
horse-equipped force that didn't require much in the way of extra=20
logistics provided that it didn't move too much. Obviously, this
also=20
assumes that the unit is not stationed in the desert, toundra,
mountain e=
tc.
LC
--
Stephen Graham
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Subject: ***POSSIBLE SPAM*** Re: Blitzkrieg and horses
Roman Werpachowski wrote:
> On the Wed, 2 Nov 2005 21:20:20 +0000 (UTC), Louis Capdeboscq
wrote:
> > An additional solution - and also a traditional way to operate
for
> > cavalry forces - is to run your horse force to the ground, i.e.
kill
> > a lot of horses and get new ones to replace them. It's wasteful
but
> > it can work for a while, something which also applies to war in
> > general...
>
> Cavalry horses require some training, you know... high-school
riding
> was not just made for parades.
Believe it or not, yes, I know :-)
In practice, lots of mounted armies ended up with
inadequately-trained=20
horses, with the elite cavalry (particularly in the early war)
having=20
well-trained horses and the standards gradually declining ever after.
A=20
bit like human troops, after all. That was one of the reasons why I=20
mentioned it being wasteful.
But it works.
The Soviet Union "consumed" lots of horses, hundreds of thousands
of=20
which were "produced" in Mongolia during the war. That was that=20
country's most important contribution to the Soviet war effort.
LC
--
Stephen Graham
David Thornley wrote:
> It's probably not the weight so much as the enclosure and the
> increased difficulty in breathing.
Correct. You don't want to run a marathon while wearing a gas mask,
and=20
horses don't have very appropriate masks either, both because of
the=20
configuration of their head (plenty of models of masks were
designed,=20
none fully satisfactory, one problem being size variations between
differ=
ent
horses) and partly because they can't breathe through the mouth
which=20
makes it easier for them to suffocate if their nose runs.
Also, you can't eat with a gas mask and as explained elsewhere on
this=20
thread a horse needs to eat a lot, so letting it have a mask is only
an=20
emergency measure to get it out of harm's way, it can't be expected
to=20
work properly with one for prolonged periods.
> Gas masks work by breathing through some sort
> of filter, and it's got to be harder to get air. The time I tried
one
> on as a kid (mumble years ago), it was hard to breathe. (Not that
I
> have any memory of the condition of the mask.)
When I trained with one while doing my military service it was
indeed=20
harder to breathe, and we were using models that had been
essentially=20
unchanged since the 1920's so as so save the real modern stuff
filters=20
for when the Warsaw Pact (or whoever) would attack us. It's one thing
to=20
just wear the thing - hot, uncomfortable, makes breathing a bit
more=20
difficult - but yet another to do so in mock-real situations. I
suppose=20
all armies do it more or less the same way, essentially the soldiers
are=20
locked in a sort of gas chamber which is then flooded with a mixture
of=20
lacrymal and other incapaciting gasses (makes you cry, vomit a bit,=20
smells absolutely terrible, but not toxic). After the first try,
anyone=20
with a beard would either shave it or find an excuse not to do the=20
exercize. Even tiny gaps between the mask and your face lets the
gas=20
through, and you don't want that...
So assuming that the horse hasn't been trained to wear a gas mask,=20
there's a risk that it will panic. Though it probably won't choke
itself=20
to death, it will definitely exhaust itself. Horses aren't
particularly=20
intelligent creatures. Then there's the likely effect of chemicals
that=20
a mask doesn't protect from e.g. mustard gas. No way to adequately=20
protect a horse against that.
LC
--
Stephen Graham
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From: "Andrew Clark"
Sent: Monday, October 31, 2005 5:55 PM
> "Louis Capdeboscq" wrote
> > As others have pointed out that the combat
> > range has to be > 500m and preferably >
> > 1000m for that to occur, I was asking what
> > made you believe that this was the norm.
>
> I don't think that anyone has argued that the Sherman at close
ranges
> became the equal of the Panther, merely that at close range the
> Sherman stood a better chance of actually hurting its opponent.
It has not been argued that one Sherman never was the equal of one=20
Panther, except at point-blank range, but "the Sherman" as in, for=20
example "a battalion of Shermans vs a battalion of Panthers" could
come=20
close.
Numbers, mobility and sufficiently close terrain allow for tactics
that=20
will overcome the tank for tank inferiority. Again, that is how the=20
"inferior" German tanks overcame "superior" French, British and
Soviet=20
tanks in 1940-42.
> > As you made the claim, I think this is a
> > reasonable question.
>
> And, as indicated above, I think the question is something
> of a blind alley.
The problem is that you make an abundant use of adjectives, like=20
"grossly inferior", but when asked to pin down exactly how much is=20
"grossly" then the question becomes uninteresting.
> > The only statistics that I'm aware of are from
> > Zetterling's book on Normandy, other than
> > that I was going from combat reports by German
> > units, a couple of studies made by the US Army
> > (one being "Data on World War II Tank Engagements
> > Involving the U.S. Third and Fourth Armored
> > Divisions"
>
> So, do these studies actually provide a statistical overview of
*how*
> Panthers were knocked out?
Do you mean like in airlosses claims, i.e. Panther #1234 was knocked
out=20
by Sherman #5678, but Panther #1235 was knocked out by AT gun # 5679 ?
No.
They provide probable cause of loss, and it is from the context that
one=20
can extrapolate what killed them. The point remains that the
grossly=20
superior tanks (I know you didn't write it, but if the Sherman is=20
grossly inferior to the Panther it seems logical) ended up
destroyed,=20
mostly by high-velocity shots, which means either some of the
"grossly=20
inferior" Shermans made themselves useful, or some enterprising=20
infantrymen carrying a 17pdr AT gun on their backs managed to sneak
to=20
German tanks passing themselves off as a Chinese New Year parade...
> And I don't think the experience of 3rd and 4th US Armies against
the
> Panther will be of much help, as the Panther was mostly employed
> against other Allied armies.
3rd US Army did fight Panthers with Shermans so I don't see why its=20
experience should not be relevant, and besides the study was about 3rd
&=20
4th US armored divisions.
> > and the other building on that one plus other stuff) and plain
> > common sense: given that the Allies were advancing and that
airpower
> > was ineffective at knocking out tanks, exactly what else would
> > account for the - well-documented - Panther
> > losses ?
>
> Anti-tank guns, whether mounted or static. Mines. POL shortages
> leading to abandonment. Heavy bombing. Naval gunfire. And, of
course,
> tank guns other than those of the Sherman 75mm.
Heavy bombing & naval gunfire, hardly for the bulk of the Panther=20
losses. Ditto mines with the Allies generally advancing. This
leaves=20
high-velocity shot, most of which were delivered by Allied tanks -
since=20
the Allies were on the attack - most of which were Shermans.
> (snip)
>
> > Except that as was pointed out the Sherman was
> > superior in rate of fire and ability to get off the
> > first shot (e.g. turret traverse) which are important factors
when
> > the combat doesn't take place at long range.
>
> The fact that the Sherman had to pass through an outer ring of
extreme
> inferiority before reaching a state of mere inferiority seems a
very
> specious ground on which to argue that the Sherman was anything
other
> than grossly inferior overall. Unless, of course, the Sherman had
> either parachute-delivery or matter transportation facilities.
Any tank that is outgunned on flat terrain is "grossly inferior",
that=20
applies to the Sherman as well as to the Churchill, etc.
You are extrapolating general comments from a given tactical
situation.=20
Yes, the Sherman was inferior to the Panther - though not to the=20
majority of German armor - what I question is the "grossly
inferior"=20
part, particularly when compared with the Churchill and actual
results,=20
i.e. Allied armor beat its German counterpart.
> > As in "No, it was the way the US, uniquely
> > of all combatant nations, failed to develop
> > tank doctrine and design in the mid-war period." ?
>
> That statement was made in an earlier post in a discussion with
David
> Thornley about doctrine, and McNair in particular. I'm not sure
why
> you are quoting it here.
I addressed that comment in the post directly replying to the message
in=20
which you had made it. Please don't pretend that it was a separate=20
discussion.
It seems to me that this thread discusses, among other things, "US
...=20
tank doctrine and design ..." which is why I mentioned doctrine.=20
Specifically, I mentioned that if the US "failed to develop tank=20
doctrine and design in the mid-war period" then it had plenty of=20
company, specifically the British and the Soviets, so it could not
be=20
"uniquely of all combatant nations".
So you asked me why I was bringing up doctrine, I answered "because
you=20
did", and now there you are, trying to make it sound as if your
comment=20
came from a separate thread. I usually read a post before hitting
the=20
"reply" button, so sometimes I will address arguments made later in
the=20
post instead of only replying to the comment listed above.
> > My point was that things have to be put
> > in perspective. If the US is to be blamed
> > for deploying Shermans in 1944, then this
> > begs the question of who had a better
> > record. Not the Germans, not the Soviets
> > and definitely not the British. So why should
> > the US have listened to the latter ?
>
> With respect, this is manifest nonsense.
[Editing your post so as to match your comments US vs UK in an item
per=20
item way, rather than in the order you wrote them]
> The British deployed in 1944 what I would characterise as a
flexible
> and mostly capable armoured capability.
(...)
> The US had what I would characterise as a limited and inadequate
> armoured capability.
The demonstration that my statement is "manifest nonsense" will
consist=20
of more adjectives with no attempt made to quantify them or put them
in=20
perspective. So essentially, what I wrote is nonsense because it is=20
"manifest" that the British had a "mostly capable armoured
capability"=20
while the US had an "inadequate" one ? Right...
> The main [British]
> tank force was made up of a mix of fast reliable maneouverable
medium
> cruiser tanks with excellent AT capability (the Firefly) and good
HE
> capability (the 75mm Sherman and Cromwell),
(...)
> The main [US] tank force was made
> up of *wholly* of fast reliable and maneouverable medium cruiser
tanks
> with lousy AT capability and good HE capability,
Right, adjectives again. Never mind the fact that the "lousy AT=20
capability" was in fact sufficient against the bulk of the German
armor=20
encountered in Normandy, i.e. Pz IV's, StuG's and all the lighter
stuff.
Never mind the fact that the "excellent AT capability" still leaves
the=20
Firefly at a disadvantage against the Panther. If the 17pdr
provides=20
"excellent AT capability", then what term are you going to use for
the=20
Panther's gun ? "Outstanding" ? "Stellar" ? "Unmatched" ?
Never mind the fact that the British tank park is described as a mix
of=20
excellent AT tanks with good HE tanks with no mention of the=20
proportions. Adding 4th, 11th, Gds, 4th Canadian & Polish armoured=20
divisions with the 4th, 8th, 27th, 30th, 33rd, 2nd Canadian
armoured=20
brigades I find some 2,100 Shermans (leaving out the Crab & ARV=20
variants) of which 15% were Fireflies. The rest of the British tank=20
force consisted of Cromwells, Churchills and Stuarts, practically
none=20
of which to my knowledge had the "excellent AT capability" that you=20
mention. The "mix" is therefore clearly ineffective. Possibly less
so=20
than the US one - though that remains unproven - but not an order
of=20
magnitude less.
And of course, the problems with British doctrine are conveniently
left=20
out of the equation.
> backed by [UK] tank destroyers with
> excellent AT capability (the Archer and Achilles) and good
> SP artillery (Sexton), with excellent towed AT guns and good motor
> infantry.
(...)
> [US] backed by fast but badlty armoured tank
> destroyers with inadequate (the M10) or barely adequate (the
> M18) AT capability, good SP artillery (Priest), with inadequate
towed
> AT guns (the 57mm) and good motor infantry.
Let's see. The bulk of the British TD's were armed with the same gun
as=20
the US ones, yet they have "excellent AT capability" while the
Americans=20
only rate an "adequate". Same difference with the US AT which is=20
"inadequate" because it uses the 57mm gun, while the British AT is=20
"excellent" for mostly 6pdr AT guns and you keep coming back to how=20
superior the 6pdr was to the 75mm anyway. Also, US tank destroyers
are=20
"badly armoured" despite the fact that the Achilles was the British=20
version of the US M10 with the Achilles II being the US M10 with no=20
added armor but a 17pdr gun. I guess painting a Union Jack makes
the=20
armor better ? And you wonder why your posts are considered
nationalistic=
...
While we're on the subject of armor, the Archer was no better
armored=20
than the US TD's, it was slow, the gun had limited traverse, it was=20
oriented to the rear and firing it required the driver leaving his=20
position. In other words, this was a perfect vehicle to fight a=20
rear-guard ambush against the Warsaw Pact but of at best limited=20
tactical usefulness in the conditions that the Allies faced. Then=20
there's the fact that I'm not aware of a significant number of
Archers=20
(if any) reaching the battlefield in 1944. Finally, elsewhere in a
reply=20
to Rich you wrote that the Archer wasn't a TD but a self-propelled
AT=20
gun. Could you please stick to a category or, better still, explain
why=20
it is relevant ?
> This main force was backed and frequently
> tactically deployed alongside several brigades of well armoured and
> reliable assault and infantry support tanks in the Churchill,
backed
> in turn by battalions of specialist assault and engineering
vehicles
> like the AVRE, Crocodile and Ark.
Agreed with the specialist vehicles. Regarding assault tanks, the
Jumbo=20
rates a "makeshift" which avoids discussing its capability, whereas
the=20
Churchill is of course "well-armoured and reliable". Using your
logic,=20
what's to prevent me from saying that the British didn't have a
clue=20
about armored warfare since they fielded old and unnecessarily
complex=20
infantry tanks whereas the US had the "well-armoured and reliable"
Jumbo=20
which used the same spare parts as the main US tank ?
> As the war developed, the US slowly introduced into NW
> Europe limited numbers of better but still inadequately armed
tanks
> (the 76mm Sherman)
Please note that the US introduced more 76mm Shermans and more
advanced=20
ammunition. The 76mm gun with HVAP is as good as the 17pdr firing
APCBC=20
which you rate "excellent". Even allowing for the normal discount
in=20
adjectives when US forces are concerned, I'd say that should still
rate=20
a "very good".
Also, you're ignoring Rich's comments regarding the number of 76mm=20
Shermans vs Fireflies. If the former was only present in "limited=20
numbers" then why are the British so good since they had even less=20
Fireflies as a proportion of their force by the end of the year ?
> and a makeshift assault tank
> (the Sherman Jumbo), and at the very end of the war 200
> heavy tanks with excellent AT capability (the Pershing).
> The British introduced (or at least could have introduced)
> up to 600 better-armoured fast reliable maneouverable medium
cruiser
> tank with excellent AT capability (the Comet) and at the very end
of
> the war an excellent all-round Main Battle Tank (the Centurion).
So you are comparing what the British could have introduced with
what=20
the US introduced, and yet you wonder why everyone assumes that
your=20
only purpose is to make the British look good.
> That said and acknowledged, it must
> be obvious from the above that (a) the British to a far more
> significant extent than the US anticipated the armoured battlefield
> requirements of NW Europe and (b) the British were able, from June
> 1944, to meet the armoured battlefield requirements of NW Europe to
a
> far more significant extent than the US.
Regarding (a), I'd give the British credit for anticipating the
threat=20
from German tanks earlier. The US failure to field a more
AT-capable=20
tank "just in case" was clearly a mistake. Of course, by then the=20
British had such ample experience of being caught with their pants
down=20
in the matter of tank design that it would have been really
surprising=20
if they hadn't developed a healthy respect for German capabilities
by=20
then. But that doesn't excuse the US failure to heed their advice.
That=20
being said, I disagree that this makes the British anticipate "the=20
armoured battlefield requirements of NW Europe", as opposed to a
limited=20
part thereof i.e. advanced German tanks. Also, given British=20
shortcomings in the handling of their armor and particularly the=20
consistent failure to have infantry and armor working together, I
would=20
hesitate to make such a blanket statement, let alone wax lyrical
with=20
terms like "to a far more significant extent than the US".
Regarding (b), I don't think so. The British were less inadequate
than=20
the US regarding AT capability in Normandy but they were still=20
inadequate, so I don't think that they were "to a far more
significant=20
extent" better off than their ally. Also, and as I pointed out in a=20
previous post, the US recovery was extremely fast and that has to
be=20
taken into account as well. The Americans identified the problem,=20
fielded a quick fix AND a long-term solution within 9 months which
is=20
better than ANY other WWII army that I'm aware of. Here is a case
of=20
"the US, uniquely of all combatants" as you wrote, though not in
the=20
same sense. By December 1944, I don't see a particular British edge
over=20
the Americans, and none by VE Day.
> I pass over the German & Soviet issues due to lack of time and
> knowledge.
Well, the problem is that if you want to make a case that the US was
the=20
worst of WWII belligerents with regard to armored design and
doctrine,=20
it's going to be difficult to ignore the two most important
protagonists.
(snip)
> > 3 years into the war - Dec 44 - the US was
> > not fielding a grossly inferior force mix since
> > the 75mm Sherman was by then being
> > phased out of production and reliable tank-killers
> > were becoming available.
>
> Yes, but the 75 mm Sherman remained the mainstay of the tank force
and
> the 76mm Sherman was not a "reliable tank killer".
75mm-armed tanks remained the mainstay of both the US and the
British=20
tank forces, so if that's a problem with the US then it must also be
so=20
with the British. The 76mm Sherman was a reliable tank killer=20
particularly as greater numbers of it and better ammunition were=20
becoming available. Also, new TD's were being introduced like the M36
of=20
which 1,216 were converted from M10's and 187 produced in 1944.
Finally, the 75mm Sherman being phased out of production shows that
it=20
wasn't going to remain the mainstay of Allied tank forces for long.
> > The Comet doesn't qualify because a handful
> > of them appearing in the last month of the year
> > is "too little, too late". This would be "until
> > 1945 with the Comet and after the war
> > with the Centurion".
>
> This is inaccurate.
What is ? I'm saying that counting the Comet is dishonest because only
a=20
handful appeared in the last month of the year, you counter by
saying=20
that 29th Armoured brigade of 11th AD would have received 160 of them
by=20
20 December had the Germans not played nasty in the Ardennes.
All right, should I have written "in the last week of the year"
instead=20
of "the last month" ? You then mention another batch of Comets
reaching=20
Dunkirk on 19 December, but based on the previous division's
experience,=20
this means that the unit would be operational by mid-January 1945 at
the=20
earliest.
If you refer to your initial comment that "the Comet was deployed
in=20
divisional strength in November 1944", since you have just
contradicted=20
it I suppose it was indeed inaccurate.
And of course, nothing is inaccurate with the Centurion not belonging
in=20
a discussion about 1944 Allied armor.
This part of the thread originated with that remark of yours as a
reply t=
o
David: "Unless, of course, you had a Comet or an Archer or a 17-pdr=20
handy... ". My point is that no Comet or Archer was present on the=20
battlefield, and I'm willing to bet that there were more M36's in
the=20
ETO by December 1944 than there were Comets (and possibly Comets &=20
17pdr). By 1945, I'm sure that a count of the 90mm guns and the=20
76mm+HVAP ones in the US inventory would show at least as good a=20
proportion of "excellent AT" as in the British army.
> > I'd like your opinion as to why the Churchill was
> > less grossly inferior to the Panther than the Sherman. Certainly,
> > the Panther could penetrate the Churchill's armor at all the
usual
> > combat ranges, and well outside the Churchill's reliable
> > penetration range.
>
> The Churchill frontal armour of 102 mm was proof against the 75
> mm KwK 42 L/70 over 1000 metres (the 152 mm frontal armour
> was proof at all ranges). That gave the Churchill a much
> higher degree of survivability than the Sherman against the
> Panther.
Even if it were true, this would still make the Churchill "grossly=20
inferior" as the Panther was essentially immune from the Churchill's
gun=20
at such ranges. So in a long range fight, the Panther would be
quite=20
safe picking off the Churchill at 1,000m, all the more so as the
limited=20
speed of the British tank would not allow it to close the range
quickly.
But as a matter of fact, I find the Panther's gun firing Pzgr 39 to
be=20
rated at penetrating 111mm of armor at 30=B0 at 1,500m which leaves
a=20
comfortable security margin against the Churchill's vertical 102mm.
By the way, 152mm frontal armor when not angled is only the
equivalent=20
of 132mm at 30=B0 (using simple trigonometrics, it's actually worth a
bit=
=20
more as thickness is always preferable to angle) which the Panther
could=20
penetrate at a little under 1,000m. Say 700-800m with no safety
margin.=20
At 500m, it could certainly penetrate it reliably whereas I'm
afraid=20
that the Churchill would still not be able to reciprocate. And of=20
course, we may as well dismiss the notion of the Churchill=20
outmaneuvering the Panther so as to gain a more advantageous position.
> And Churchill RTR regiments in NW Europe after
> August 1944 trooped 75mm Churchills with Mk IV and VIII
> tanks fitted with the 6-pdr, which with APCBC could
> penetrate a Panther at 500 metres and with APDS could penetrate at
> over 1500 metres.
6pdr APCBC is rated as between 81 and 86.5mm at 500m angled at
30=B0.=20
Front turret of the Panther was 110mm@11=B0 or the equivalent of
97mm@30=B0=
.=20
So point blank range, or lucky shot.
APDS is another story, it can penetrate the Panther's turret at
1,500m,=20
the front hull at a little under 1,000m.
Of course, using the same rules the Churchill's turret had 89mm
vertical=20
armor which the Panther could penetrate at all ranges (up to 2,500m=20
though I don't think that it would come to that in NW Europe). The=20
Churchill VIII's front turret was 152mm like the front hull, but on
the=20
other hand Churchills with 152mm armor were the Mk VII (75mm gun) and
Mk=20
VIII (95mm howitzer).
The bottom line is that the Mk IV with APDS has a remote chance
against=20
the Panther if it hits the turret at 1,500m - never mind the fact
that=20
APDS had accuracy problems in 1944, so hitting the relatively small=20
turret at that range would require excellent gunnery - and a decent=20
chance under 1,000m. However, the Panther can pick it off at 2,500m=20
(turret, a bigger target than the Panther's turret) or 1,500m=20
(everywhere), with a more accurate gun, better optics, more
plentiful=20
ammunition supply (how many APDS rounds would the average Churchill
be=20
expected to carry ?), etc.
The Mk VII/VIII remains safe from the Panther at ranges over 1,000m=20
except that it can't expect to hurt the German tank until it closes
to=20
close range. In both cases, the Panther has a clear advantage.
> So, while the Churchill was most certainly not the equal of the
> Panther, a combination of its integral features and its tactical
> employment meant that Churchill-equipped units had a good chance
> against Panthers without having to resort to sneak and fire tactics
at
> point-blank range, which is what Sherman-equipped units had to do.
Is the spin with the gun penetration stats part of the "integral
features=
" ?
> Incidentally, the Cromwell-equipped recon regiments of British
> armoured divisions trooped 75mm Cromwells with the 17-pdr
Challenger
> for the same reason.
I'd be interested in figures for how many Challengers there were.
My=20
understanding is that it was a failure and promptly withdrawn from
the=20
front. Also, looking at the specs its armor actually makes the
Sherman=20
look good. It had good front armor, but a very large weakly-armored
turre=
t.
> > 1. I'd like to know in what respects the
> > Sherman was inferior to the Pz IV.
>
> Well, the 7.5 cm KwK 40 L/43 and the 7.5 cm KwK 40 L/48 had better
> armour penetration than the 75mm M3, for a start.
...and the Sherman had better protection. Using your rules for the=20
Churchill vs Panther above, the Sherman could penetrate the PzIV from
at=20
least 1,500m (I don't have figures for longer ranges) provided it
hit=20
the turret. Both tanks could destroy each other at normal battle
ranges,=20
the difference would be tactical settings, crew quality, who
spotted=20
whom first, etc.
(snip)
> The Allies were not forced into short engagement ranges,
> they chose them.
My point was that only in rare cases was close terrain unavailable,=20
which influences "usual combat ranges".
That they were able to choose short engagement ranges amounts to
the=20
same thing, it doesn't matter that they weren't forced into them
since=20
they wanted them. I admit that my wording was confusing, regarding=20
geography. What I meant was that the Soviets often were forced into
long=20
engagement ranges (e.g. at Kursk or in the late-1943 Ukrainian=20
offensives) whereas the Allies would generally have the option to
close=20
the range - except in Goodwood, Market Garden and a few other
exceptions.
> > During the late 1944 and the 1945 battles,
> > the Allies accepted long-range duels with
> > the Panthers far more often, given
> > how they had greater numbers of effective
> > AT guns than in Normandy.
>
> So you are agreeing that the US failure to provide a good
longer-range
> AT weapon to its forces in the summer of 1944 was a mistake?
Of course.
What I disagree with is the singling out of US doctrine and design
as=20
you have done.
> > One way to answer it is to look at the German
> > offensive performance with their Panthers.
> > Based on the results of Normandy and the
> > Ardennes, the answer seems to me that
> > attacking tanks have to close in
> > and therefore become vulnerable to
> > ambushing AT weapons.
>
> The two situations are not comparable in this way.
>
> The vast bulk of Panther tanks in Normandy faced British forces
> lavishly equipped with static, SP and tank-mounted 17-pdr and 6-pdr
> both of which were highly effective against Panthers at long and
> medium range respectively. Not surprisingly, the Panther did not
> survive well in such attacks.
I'm not sure how "lavishly-equipped" British forces were, compared
to=20
the German attacks in the Ardennes which faced tons of 76mm guns
(AT,=20
TD, tanks) at shorter ranges. Also, the Germans still inflicted=20
favorable casualties ratio in Normandy due to their higher tactical=20
skill, but their superior tanks didn't help them when they did attack.
This originated when you wondered what the Allied advance would
have=20
looked like given better tanks. Based on the German experience, the=20
answer seems to be "the attacker is going to have to close the
range=20
until the ambush starts, stand-off weapons are not an option".
> The Germans in defence, however, had nothing approaching the same
> arsenal of defensive AT weaponry against a well-armoured tank like
the
> Panther (ie with 80-100 mm frontal armour).
Nothing approaching ? Well, they only had tons of specialized tank=20
hunters & AT guns.
The Panther, which you keep referring to when discussing the
Sherman,=20
had a better AT capability than the 17pdr for starters.
> While the 88mm dual-purpose gun was an
> excellent tank killer, its bulk made it useful really only
> at long ranges.
...which fortunately happens to be exactly what you're discussing
here.
(snip)
> > In 1940, there were plenty of French tanks that could destroy
German
> > tanks at longer ranges than they were themselves vulnerable to
the
> > panzers. The Germans used their
> > numbers not to overwhelm
> > but to outmaneuver their opponents.
>
> Yes. The German infantry quickly broke through a thin sector of the
> French defences then the armour raced through largely undefended
> territory to sever the Allied LOC and force a mass retreat. Tell me
> when that happened in 1944 in NW Europe.
We were discussing tactical and you're waxing lyrical again at=20
operational level. So to answer your question: "in August".
(snip)
> > 7,100 Sherman/76's
>
> Massively inferior to the Comet
So you say.
> > and 2,300 Sherman/105's.
>
> Close support tanks irrelevant to this debate.
So why did you bring up Churchills, then ?
> Building Comets in the latter half of 1944 would have made
> no difference whatsoever to Sherman numbers in 1944. It
> would have made a great deal of difference to Allied tank
performance
> in 1945. And don't tell me that the US knew in June 1944 that the
war
> would be over in May 1945.
I don't see why the US should build Comets, particularly "in the
second=20
half of 1944" by which time it was building Sherman 76's which were=20
almost as good as the Comet in practice and could be turned out in
far=20
greater quantities (no retooling necessary).
Regarding 1945, as I took pains to point out the US was preparing
to=20
field a force consisting entirely of M26's and upgraded Shermans by=20
then, regardless of when the Germans would surrender. Interim
solutions=20
like the M36 had also been implemented.
So the US definitely had the wrong force mix in Normandy, which means
we=20
can safely criticize some of their pre-D-Day production choices, but
I=20
strongly disagree that their post-D-Day production choices were=20
suboptimal. Producing large numbers of upgraded Shermans (better
armor,=20
better gun) was definitely worth producing smaller numbers of
Comets,=20
and then there was the M26 in the pipeline.
(snip)
> And there is no reason why the US could not have produced 2000
Comets
> in 1945.
Appart from the fact that it was better off with a larger quantity
of=20
Pershings ?
> > Production was 650 Sherman/75's,
> > 3,700 Sherman/76's, 2,400
> > Sherman/105 and 2,200 Pershings.
>
> My understanding is that M26 Pershing production started in
November
> 1944 and that somewhere around 200 actually reached Europe in March
> 1945. About 1400 were produced during WW2; production of a further
800
> happened after May 1945.
More like 2,000 produced during WWII with around 500 reaching Europe
by=20
VE Day. I agree that this isn't as many as the=20
600-Comets-that-didn't-actually-reach-Europe-but-might-have, though
I=20
admire your cheek quibbling with figures given your generous
assumptions=20
where the British are concerned.
> > Indeed, if you are going to replace "harder" by
> > "too hard" you might as well save yourself the
> > trouble of writing more nonsense.
>
> Well, you used the word 'harder' in the sense of being 'too hard'.
> Perhaps you might like to think about defining 'how much harder'
and
> whether that degree of extra difficulty was actually significant?
Actually I didn't even use the word "harder" at all, my words - which
I=20
had left in the post that you replied to - were "The Churchill was
not=20
as easy to manufacture and ship, it was more difficult to maintain,".
I=20
fail too see how that can possibly be interpreted as "the Churchill
was=20
too hard for the US to produce". Just not worth it.
In other words, the Churchill would have to have been better than
the=20
Sherman to offset these disadvantages. It wasn't, so that was that.
> > I'll go with the opinion of those who operated
> > Churchills, which is that it was maintenance-
> > heavy and a lot of work.
>
> The Churchill required on average 10% more maintenance time than
the
> Sherman (contemporary WO estimate). I guess the crews baling out of
> their burning Sherman were mighty pleased about that...
Could you please provide details about that ? What I'm using is=20
anecdotal evidence which I also find reproduced in Osprey's New
Vanguard=20
volume about the Churchill. Essentially, it says that maintenance
took=20
hours and in particular greasing the 22 bogies, usually in darkness,
was=20
a pain.
Regarding the "burning Shermans", as you well know this was a
problem=20
with inadequate ammunition stowage that could be - and was - fixed=20
without altering the design.
> > The crews put up with it because
> > they liked the extra protection compared
> > to other British tanks.
>
> Compared with the Cromwell, certainly. The Comet was pretty much
> co-equal with the Churchill in armour terms.
Yes, but we were discussing 1944, when the Comet was not a factor.
The=20
crews liked the Churchill's protection and ability to escape quickly
if=20
the protection failed, as well as the cross-country ability. They=20
disliked the weak armament, somewhat poor ergonomics and
maintenance=20
workload. I don't know if crews converted from Cromwell or Sherman
to=20
Churchill in which case the comparison would probably apply, too.
(snip)
> > The Churchill was not a superior tank in terms of availability,
> > which is an important factor.
>
> The Churchill could have been mass-produced by the US in 1943-44.
At what cost ?
The US retooled for mass-production of Shermans in 1941-42. As a
result,=20
1,300 M3's were produced in 1942, another 4,900 plus 8,000 Shermans
(tota=
l:
12,900) in 1943, and then 21,000 in 1943.
Producing Churchills in 1943 would lose economies of scale, and
involve=20
extensive retooling as well as a new learning curve. Given that the=20
Allies in general and the US in particular needed a lot of tanks
for=20
1944, most of which were produced in 1943, switching over to
Churchills=20
would have involved a huge production loss for a marginal increase
in=20
protection. If it had been decided that the Sherman needed more armor
-=20
which I agree would have been a good idea - then it would have been
far=20
easier to simply build a "Sherman on steroids" as was eventually
fielded=20
rather than switch over to a completely new tank.
In 1943, the British produced 2,800 cruiser tanks (600 Cromwells)
plus=20
some 1,400 cruiser hulls (mostly Crusader) for special purposes (e.g.
AA=20
vehicle) against 3,000 infantry tanks (1,300 Churchills, the rest
mostly=20
lend-lease Valentines). In 1944, production was a bit above 2,200=20
cruisers (1,900 Cromwells) and 1,097 infantry tanks (1,062
Churchills),=20
not counting conversions.
So the British wound down Churchill production and ramped up
Cromwell=20
production instead of going full Churchill as you suggest the
Americans=20
have done. I don't see any particular advantage that the Cromwell
had=20
over the
Sherman: it had a higher top speed which was useful for about a
week=20
during the pursuit from Normandy to Belgium, other than that both
tanks=20
were comparable except that the Cromwell wasn't quite as adaptable.
> End of availability problem. And they would all
> have fitted in only one Liberty ship hold, too...
Since the time when you were proven wrong after making that
particular=20
point, I have got hold of the schematics that Geoffrey was alluding
to=20
in his answer, and can confirm that Churchills would be more
complicated=20
to ship than Shermans. It could be done, of course, but it was more=20
difficult. Multiply "more difficult" by "several thousands" if you=20
contemplate substitution and you have a serious problem.
(snip repeats of false claims already answered above)
> The US had something like 630 Sherman 76 in NW Europe on 31
December
> 1944, against c 600 Fireflies. So, given that the US tank fleet was
> much larger than the British, the proportion of Sherman 76 to 75 in
> the US force must have been much less than the number of Fireflies
to
> Sherman 75 in the BCE Sherman force.
To my surprise, Rich's figures show that the British had more tanks
in=20
theater than the Americans by that date. Since they match other
figures=20
that I have for the British, and I don't have anything better to
offer,=20
I think that the case shows that the US had more AT-capable guns=20
(counting the 76mm) than the British as a proportion of the whole
force,=20
which kind of debunks the whole claim.
Now for a renaming of the thread "US tanks weren't as good, June &
July=20
1944" ? :-)
> As mentioned above, by August 1944 the BCE was trooping a 17-pdr
tank
> (Challenger or Firefly) alongside three 75mm
> (Cromwell/Sherman) and the RTR was aiming to troop 1 Churchill
6-pdr
> alongside 3 Churchill 75. I haven't seen any suggestion that the US
> army trooped on this basis.
What matters is how many 76mm Shermans the US was introducing. If
you=20
want to make a case that the Americans were using their 76mm
Shermans=20
less efficiently than the British were using theirs and their
Fireflies,=20
you'll have to show that the "one tank per troop" was the right way to
go.
> > The 76mm was in service with the TD units,
> > and was not introduced "late in 1944".
>
> OK, fair point. But it was not put on a tank until the
> summer of 1944 and not available on a tank in large numbers until
the
> fall of 1944.
As I indicated, the majority of the 1944 production of Shermans had
a=20
76mm gun. The Armored Force had requested production of 76mm Shermans
in=20
sufficient numbers to equip a third of the tanks in September 1943.
I would be surprised if the first 76mm Sherman appeared in the summer
of=20
1944.
> > So what needs to be compared is indeed
> > the "usual" gun available in operation at a given time.
>
> It still works out as rather less of the rather inferior gun on the
US
> side.
The way I see it, it works out as most of the Allied tanks - British
or=20
American - had a 75mm or 6pdr.
(snip)
> > When David came up with the 90mm gun, you
> > objected that it only reached the battlefield in 1945.
> > Yet the Comet only reached the battlefield in
> > 1945 and you find no problem including it in your arguments.
>
> The M-26 Pershing with 90mm gun arrived on the battlefield
> in March 1944, four months after the Comet was available for
> operational deployment in theatre in brigade strength. Only an
> accident of circumstance meant the Comet did not see service in
> December 1944.
The M36 Jackson was deployed on the battlefield in 1944 whereas the=20
Comet was not. If the 90mm gun doesn't count for 1944, then neither
does=20
the Comet, "accident of circumstance" or not.
> And the point is that the Pershing was a tank concept previously
> rejected by the US Army for doctrinal reasons and dashed into
service
> at the last minute when the enormity of the failure of US tank
> doctrine could no longer be ignored, while the Comet was a design
> concept eagerly driven forward by the British for the earliest
> possible deployment
No, the US Army never rejected the Pershing as a tank concept.=20
Development of a heavy tank was started in May 1940, cancelled in=20
December 1942 after the prototypes had all proved unreliable. The
T26=20
was the result of development work done on a successor to the
Sherman,=20
which was redesigned a heavy tank in June 1944.
Mass production was only authorized in January 1945, the only thing
that=20
was dashed into service was the shipment of the first 20 T26E3's=20
(produced since November 1944) to Europe following the Ardennes=20
offensive scare.
> > So what was the point of bringing up the fact
> > that the British had a combined-arms team
> > aimed at taking out the AT guns with
> > other means than tanks ?
>
> Because the OP was arguing that the poor HE performance of the
17-pdr
> meant that the Firefly was inferior to the Sherman 75 in non-tank
> warfare. To which I responded as above.
Well, it's true: the Firedly was essentially a specialized AT
vehicle.=20
So, to a lesser extent, was the 76mm Sherman in 1944.
Now if you want to claim that this didn't matter because the
British=20
could use other things than tanks to deal with non-tank threats,
fine=20
(though this rather defeats the purpose of having tanks). On the
other=20
hand I don't see the point of mentioning it in a comparison with the
US=20
as you did, given that US combined-arms tactics were no inferior to
the=20
British ones.
(snip)
> That's a splendid rationale for the tank destroyer concept. But
what
> about "Seek, Strike and Destroy"? Until the summer of 1944, TD
units
> organised en masse were supposed to go out
> *looking* for German tank formations.
I don't see any organization for these mass TD units in US TO&E's
and,=20
with all due respect, given your track record on this thread so far
I=20
hesitate to take your word for it. Would you mind providing more
detail ?
> > You'll get no defense of the US armored doctrine from me - for
> > obvious reasons - on the other hand singling out the Americans
for
> > pathetic doctrine is overdoing it as their mistake wasn't as
grave
> > as those made by many other countries, and they moved to correct
it
> > quickly enough (which again compares favorably to
> > *every* other belligerent that I'm
> > aware of).
>
> Firstly, I'm not singling out US doctrine. We are talking about US
> doctrine and I am criticising it. If we were talking about British
> tank doctrine in the desert, I'd be criticising it too.
You are claiming that the US decision to go with the Sherman in
general=20
and the 75mm gun in particular was an order of magnitude worse than=20
contemporary practice in the British army (which was also fielding
a=20
majority of 75mm-armed tanks).
If that's not singling out US doctrine, then what exactly are you=20
talking about ?
> Secondly, while accepting your point about US willingness -
eventually
> - to adapt theory to reality during 1944, it was nevertheless the
case
> that much sensible advice and research was ignored up until that
> point.
Yes, including some from Americans themselves. In June 1944, the
ETO=20
requested that tanks shipped to Europe in 1945 be armed with the
90mm=20
gun or the 105mm howitzer, but no more 75/76mm Shermans be sent by
that=20
date. AGF successfully managed to delay implementation of that
request.=20
Fortunately, the USAAF pulled the American tankers out of their=20
doctrinal hole, yet another example of the versatility and
flexibility=20
of US armed forces...
> It was obviously to the
> British in Tunisia that the Sherman 75 was inadequately armed; the
> Firefly was the immediate result.
If that were so, then how come that the British spent most of 1943
and=20
1944 switching production over 75mm tanks ?
> The same
> reality had to be thrust down the throats of many US theoreticians
and
> planners before they yielded and brought in the Sherman 76 and the
> Pershing. It's that pace of realisation and openness to doctrinal
> change which is as culpable as anything else.
I don't know.
The US in Tunisia was fielding mostly M3's, and they knew that a
better=20
tank was in the pipeline. So their incentive to upgrade the upgrade
was=20
less. Added to that is the fact that development was in fact ongoing
of=20
a successor to the Sherman, it just didn't work out.
The British definitely did better than the US as far as recognizing
the=20
new threat went. I don't think that they did much better, because
the=20
proportion of Fireflies was low reflecting no great urgency to
re-equip=20
their whole tank force. As far as adapting to the threat once it
had=20
been recognized (say in June 1944, and again in December 1944: two=20
different shocks), the US did very well.
> (snip)
>
> > The way you're favorably comparing late-war
> > British to US doctrine and tanks does sound
> > nationalistic to me.
>
> It would certainly be nationalistic if I ignored facts of which I
am
> aware in order to make an argument favourable to one side or the
> other. I do not believe I am doing so. If you have facts to
> contribute, please do so.
See above.
> > If the "British" part hurts your feelings, I can easily
substitute
> > "Soviet", my point being that as far as tank warfare went during
> > WWII the US didn't do all that badly.
>
> It was probably fortunate that history dealt the US forces more
often
> than not circumstances in which their armour could perform 'not all
> that badly'.
That's not what I meant.
What I meant was that the US track record of adapting to the
changing=20
realities of tank warfare in WWII wasn't bad. You could make a case
for=20
the Germans being better, but neither the Soviets nor the British
seem=20
to me to have done better overall.
Please note again: this remark is about fielding an appropriate
force=20
and anticipating/reacting to threats, not about "we won the day so
we=20
must have been the best".
LC
--
Stephen Graham
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On Tue, 08 Nov 2005 21:53:37 GMT, "Vic Spanner" <thor-...@mail.com>
wrote:
>Can anyone tell me why some officers seem to wear collar and tie with
>their uniform, and others have buttoned up tunics?
Field uniform as opposed to office work, perhaps? Well, not field
uniform, but what Americans would have called Class B (open-throat
khakis) as opposed to Class A with the tie.
I happened to watch "The Young Lions" last night. While not a paragon
of historical accuracy (Marlon Brando as a young German officer is
blown up while riding in a jeep), I assume it got the uniform right.
Never did understand how anyone could operate in that tunic (wool?)
all day without an undershirt. Crikey, how it must have stunk!
-- all the best, Dan Ford
email: usenet AT danford DOT net
Stephen Graham
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Subject: Re: Operation C3 [a.k.a. Herkules] 1 - FJ
Davide Pastore wrote:
>=20
> Let's start.
> I have here "Le Direttive Tecnico-Operative di Superaereo"
> [Superaereo Techno-Operative Orders], a collection of letters and
> orders relating to the Regia Aeronautica HQ during 1940-43, published
> by the Ufficio Storico Aeronautica Militare (four volumes).
Ok. Here's what I copy/pasted from your previous posts, don't know
what=20
is out of date.
Note to moderator: everything that follows is by Davide and not by=20
myself, so I fall under the heading "lack of original material". On
the=20
other hand I think it's valuable material and hope that Davide will=20
highlight the parts that have been superceded since. I'm also=20
contributing additional material at the end of the quote, though again
a=20
lot of it consists of quoting a book.
[beginning of Davide's old post]
Regia Aeronautica, circa June 1942
The situation is indicative only, since air units were transferred
at=20
will on a near-daily basis. I have also listed the units
transferred=20
from Italy during July-August.
I haven't listed:
- Units assigned to air defence of Italy;
- Units employed against Yugoslavian partisans;
- Units in training;
- Recon units in North and Central Italy;
- Air Observation (Army co-operation) units outside Sicily.
I wasn't able to find any accurate figure for Luftwaffe units.
Basic unit was the numbered Squadriglia [1st to 616th];
2 or 3 Squadriglie formed a Gruppo [1st to 167th];
2 Gruppi (very rarely 3) formed a Stormo [1st to 54th].
Stormi, Gruppi and Squadriglie were identified by a speciality, as:
C.T.=3D Caccia Terrestre [Land Fighter]
Ass.=3D Assalto [Ground Attack]
B.T.=3D Bombardamento Terrestre [Land Bomber]
B.G.R. =3D Bomb. Grande Raggio [Long-Range Bomber]
A.S.=3D AeroSiluranti [Torpedo Bomber]
R.M.=3D Ricognizione Marittima [Sea Recon] - units in center & north
Ital=
y=20
not listed.
R.S.T. =3D Ricogn. Strategica [Strategic Recon]
O.A.=3D Osservazione Aerea [Air Observation] - only units in Sicily
liste=
d.
T. =3D Trasporto [Airlift]
St.=3D Stormo
Gr.=3D Gruppo
Gr.aut.=3D Gruppo Autonomo [not part of a Stormo]
Sq.=3D Squadriglia
Sq.aut. =3D Squadriglia Autonoma [not part of a Gruppo]
---------------------------------------------
Comando Aeronautica Sardegna
[Sardinia Air Force HQ]
Bases: Alghero, Decimomannu, Elmas [Cagliari], Olbia, Villacidro.
C.T.
24th Gr.aut. [G.50bis & CR.42]
Note: full-strenght unit (very few actions).
B.T.
51st Gr.aut. [CantZ.1007bis]
A.S.
36th St. (108th & 109th Gr.) [SM.79]
R.M.
146th & 287th Sq.aut. [CantZ.506]
138th & 188 th Sq.aut. [CantZ.501]
----------------------------------------
Comando Aeronautica Sicilia
[Sicily Air Force HQ]
Bases: Augusta, Boccadifalco [Palermo], Caltagirone, Castelvetrano,=20
Chinisia, Gela, Pantelleria, Reggio Calabria, Sciacca, Stagnone.
C.T.
51th St. (20th & 155th Gr.) [MC.202]
54th St. (7th & 16th Gr.) [MC.200]
2nd Gr.aut. [Re.2001]
Ass.
5th St. (101th & 102th Gr.) [CR.42 & Ju-87B]
15th St. (46th & 47th Gr.) [CR.42]
Note: only very few Stuka were still flyable.
B.T.
7th St. (4th & 25th Gr.) [SM.84]
9th St. (29th & 33th Gr.) [CantZ.1007bis]
10th St. B.T. (30th & 32nd Gr.) [SM.79]
43th St. (only 88th Gr. present) [BR.20M]
Note: 10th St. transferred back to Italy in July, replaced by 37th St.
Note: 98th & 99th Gr. of 43th St. were in Yugoslavia.
A.S.
130th Gr.aut. [SM.79]
132nd Gr.aut. [SM.79]
R.M.
170th & 184th Sq.aut. [RS.14]
186th Sq.aut. [CantZ.506]
144th, 189th & 197th Sq.aut. [CantZ.501]
R.S.T.
173rd Sq.aut. [CR.25]
O.A.
40th Sq.aut. [Ca.311 & Ro.37bis]
-----------------------------------------------------------
Quarta Squadra Aerea
[4th Air Squadron - SE Italy]
Bases: Brindisi, Crotone, Gioia del Colle, Grottaglie, Lecce,
Manduria,=20
Taranto.
C.T.
161th Gr.aut. [MC.200]
B.T.
37th St. (54th & 55th Gr.) [BR.20M]
50th Gr.aut. [CantZ.1007bis]
Note: 116th Gr. of 37th St. was in Yugoslavia.
Note: 37th St. transferred to Sicily in July, replacing 10th St.
A.S. / B.T.
32nd St. (38th & 89th Gr.) [SM.84]
Note: although trained in torpedo-bombing, 32nd St. A.S. was never
used=20
in such role.
R.M.
171st & 288th Sq.aut. [CantZ.506]
141st & 142nd Sq.aut. [CantZ.501]
--------------------------------------------------------
Comando Aeronautica Grecia
[Greece Air Force HQ]
Bases: Araxos, Kalamata, Larissa.
C.T.
157th Gr.aut. [G.50bis & CR.42]
Note: full-strenght unit (very few actions).
---------------------------------------------------------
Comando Aeronautica Egeo
[Aegean Air Force HQ]
Bases: Gadurra', Lero, Maritza, Rodi.
C.T.
154th Gr.aut. [G.50bis & CR.42]
Note: full-strenght unit (very few actions).
B.T.
47th St. (106th &107th Gr.) [CantZ.1007bis]
A.S.
12th St. (only 41st Gr. present) [SM.79]
46th St. (only 104th Gr. present) [SM.79]
Note: 105th Gr. of 46th St. was still training in Italy.
Note: Second Gruppo of 12th St. was never formed.
R.M.
185th Sq.aut. [CantZ.506]
147th Sq.aut. [CantZ.501]
------------------------------------------------------------
Quinta Squadra Aerea, Settore Ovest
[5th Air Squadron, West sector - W Lybia]
Bases: Castelbenito, Mellaha [Tripoli], Hon, Zuara.
C.T.
12th Gr.aut. [G.50bis]
150th Gr.aut. [MC.200]
160th Gr.aut. [G.50bis]
B.T.
35th St. (86th & 95th Gr.) [CantZ.1007bis]
A.S.
131st Gr.aut. [SM.79]
133rd Gr.aut. [SM.79]
R.M.
145th, 148th & 196th Sq.aut. [CantZ.501]
-------------------------------------------------------------
Quinta Squadra Aerea, Settore Est
[5th Air Squadron, West sector - E Lybia]
Bases: Barce, Bu Amid, Derna, K.3 [Bengasi].
C.T.
1st St. (6th & 17th Gr.) [MC.202]
2nd St. (8th & 13th Gr.) [MC.200]
4th St. (9th & 10th Gr.) [MC.202]
Note: 1st St. was transferred back to Italy in July, replaced by 3rd
St.
Ass.
50th St. (158th & 159th Gr.) [CR.42]
---------------------------------------------------------------
Available units - Prima Squadra Aerea [1st Air Squadron - NW Italy]
C.T.
53th St. (151st & 153rd Gr.) [G.50bis & MC.200]
Note:Transferred to 4th Air Sq. in July-August
---------------------------------------------------------------
Available units - Seconda Squadra Aerea [2nd Air Squadron - NE Italy]
C.T.
3rd St. (18th & 23rd Gr.) [MC.202]
Note: Transferred to Lybia in July, replacing 1st St.
B.T.
30th St. (87th & 90th Gr.) [CantZ.1007bis]
Note: Transferred to 4th Air Sq. in July-August
--------------------------------------------------------------
Available units - Terza Squadra Aerea [3rd Air Squadron - Central
Italy]
C.T.
3rd Gr.aut. [MC.200]
22nd Gr.aut. [Re.2001]
Note: 3rd Gr.aut. transferred to 5th Air Sq. in July-August.
Note: 22nd Gr.aut. ransferred to 4th Air Sq. in July-August.
B.G.R.
274th Sq.aut. [P.108]
Note: Not fully operative yet. Transferred to Sardinia in September,
fou=20
use against Gibraltar.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Transport Units (T.)
18th St. (56th & 57th Gr.) [SM.81]
44th St. (146th & 149th Gr.) [SM.82]
45th St. (37th & 147th Gr.) [SM.82]
48th St. (144th & 148th Gr.) [SM.82 & G.12]
145th Gr.aut. [SM.75]
Note: 145th Gr.aut. permanently assigned to the Lybian sector.
Other=20
units too occasionaly employed there.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Unit strenght
All C.T. units, plus 50th St. Ass., had three Squadriglie in each
Gruppo.
Any other unit had two Squadriglie in each Gruppo.
C.T. & Ass. Squadriglie: 12 planes theorically, 6-7 ready planes
average =
in
the front line.
T. Squadriglie: 10-12 ready planes average.
Any other Squadriglie: 9 planes theorically, 5-6 ready planes average
in=20
the front line.
The units transferred from 1st, 2nd and 3rd Air Sq. were at full
strenght.
Also at full strenght were the fighter units stationed in quiet
sectors=20
(Sardinia, Greece and Aegean).
----------------------------------------------------------------
Total ready planes
600-640 fighters (C.T.)
380-440 attack planes (Ass., B.T., B.G.R., A.S.)
100-120 recon planes (R.M., R.S.T., O.A.)
180-220 airlift planes (T.)
for a grand total of 1,300-1,400 ready planes.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Considerations on pilots
4th Stormo was (and still is ! ) the elite unit of the Air Force,
whose=20
planes sported (and still sports) the famed "Ferrari black horse"
arm.=20
It was always the first to receive new equipment. Out of the 68
Italian=20
aces of the war (with 544 kills), 28 aces (with 237 kills) came from
4th=20
St. - this is 43%.
Other than the Little Black Horses, the best pilots were in the=20
torpedo-bombing units. These Gruppi collected a massive amount of=20
decorations - usually conceded "to the memory". The biggest problem
was=20
the insufficient number of torpedoes available, so that not all the=20
torpedo-trained units could be used in such role.
By and large the training level of the Regia Aeronautica was still
high=20
at the end of the war - due also to the low production of the
industry=20
!! Just every unit had more trained pilots than ready planes at any=20
period of the war.
The training of the fighter pilots stressed fanatically on
aerobatics.=20
The pilots didn't like a lot the "series 5" fighters (MC.205, G.55,=20
Re.2005) because, although provided with a very powerful armament,
they=20
lacked the maneuvrability of their ancestors.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Considerations on planes
MC.202 [Folgore] was about equivalent to Spitfire Mk.V and Bf.109F.
Re.2001 was slighty more maneuvrable, but slower.
MC.200 [Saetta] and G.50bis [Freccia] were about equivalent to
Hurricane=20
Mk.I and P-40C.
CR.42 [Falco] was slighty better than Gladiator.
Italian fighters were plagued by a ridicously weak armament, but
were=20
maneuvrable and sturdy. MC.202 was the fastest-climber plane around
at=20
the time, and with a little more artillery would have been better
than=20
either Spit V or 109F.
SM.79 [Sparviero] was a surprisingly agile plane for its size
(mainly=20
due to the absence of any dihedral on its surfaces). This made it
an=20
excellent torpedo bomber.
P.108 was the only heavy bomber in service, built after an offer of
B-17=20
licence production had been turned down in 1939. It was plagued by=20
problems. Mussolini's son Bruno died in an air crash during the
flight=20
tests.
The other bombers in service (CantZ.1007bis [Alcione], BR.20M
[Cicogna]=20
and SM.84) were unimpressive at best.
The recon machines weren't anything of special.
The transport SM.82 [Marsupiale] was maybe the more successful
Italian=20
plane of the time. Such machines routinely transported an entire=20
disassembled fighter to Etiopia. Some units carried night bombing
action=20
too over Gibraltar, and in one occasion as far as Barhein, without
losses.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Airlift capabilities and requirements
[see the landing section for for more info]
The Italian transport planes had the following cargo capabilities:
SM.82 [100-120 ready] : 4,000 Kg or 30-34 men.
SM.75 [20-25 ready] : 3,200 Kg or 24-28 men.
G.12 [20-25 ready] : 2,500 Kg or 18-20 men.
SM.81 [40-50 ready] : 1,600 Kg or 12-14 men.
So, employing _all_ the available planes the maximum single effort
would =
be:
600-700 tons or 4,500-6,000 men
Although this would have seriously disrupted the Afrika Korps
operations.
C3 plan called for a first wave of 4 Italian parachute Bns., plus
220=20
manikins and little groups of saboteurs. This means 4,000+ men.=20
Remaining 2 Bns, plus artillery, would have jumped in the second
wave.=20
German units would have to be transported by German planes.
According to C3 plan, the combined landed units would have required
a=20
_daily_ supplying (from ships and/or planes) of:
- bare minimum: 700 tons (520 supplies, 180 potable water).
- normal level: 2,400 tons (1,500 supplies, 900 potable water).
The Regia Aeronautica expected to be able to daily transport by plane
a=20
maximum of 300 tons (holding an airport) or 150 tons (parachuting
only).
I infer from this datas that she was expecting a _high_ initial
loss=20
ratio of transport planes (maybe 30-50%).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Maltese airfields
This is the only subject on which I've got precise informations for
both=20
sides. This are the Italian infos, and the reality (number, type
and=20
lenght of runways):
Identified as "airfields" [Italian & Brit Name]:
1) Micabba / Luqa - 4x tarmac paths (1,700-1,400-1,100-800 yards).
2) Hal Far / Hal Far - 4x stony (1,200-1,100-900-600 yards).
3) Ta Venezia / Taquali - 4x grass (1,200-1,100-850-850 yards).
Identified as "landing strips":
4) Gudra / Safi - 2x grass (1,200-1,200 yards).
5) Krendi / Qrendi - 2x tarmac (1,200-1,200 yards) - in construction.
Identified as "emergency strips":
6) Marsa / Marsa Race Course - 1x grass (1,300 yards) - Really=20
emergency-only !
7) Gozo / ?? - inexistant !!
Italians hadn't identified Qrendi as a "real" airfield. Being within
the=20
paras landing zone, it would have been a pleasant surprise for them
!!=20
While not fully operative yet (first landing happened on 10 November)
it=20
was definitely better than nothing at all.
-------------------------------------------------------
Evalutation of enemy strenght
Very little info here !
According to C3 plan, the expected RAF strenght at Malta was
"negligible".
The plan doesn't mention anything about air assets at Gibraltar and=20
Alexandria.
However, it was expected that some planes could fly-off from a CV,
as=20
done in previous occasions.
[end of quoted material]
In the original post, you asked about an RAF OOB at the time which
I=20
don't have, though may find one in the next few days as I sift
through=20
my stuff.
Regarding German information, I had just put my copy of "The Rise
and=20
Fall of the German Airforce 1933-1945" (PRO History) so it's easily=20
accessible, and while it doesn't have a complete OOB the following
may=20
be of use. All figures relate to German aircraft unless the Italians
are=20
explicitely mentioned.
Chapter 6, p.134
12. By the end of December, 1941, German strength in Sicily had
again=20
been raised to some 200 aircraft and by the end of March, 1942, had
been=20
further increased to 425 aircraft, of which 190 were long-range
bombers=20
and 115 single-engined fighters.
13. The resumption of operations against MAlta begain in
mid-January,=20
1942, on a relatively modest scale, some 65 sorties a day being flown
by=20
aircraft of all types, with a maximum of some 40-50 long-range
bomber=20
sorties. (...)
14. ...The scheme [assault on Malta] provided for strong German=20
paratroop forces under Student to land first and establish a
bridghehead=20
through which further airborne forces could be brought to the
island.=20
The transport force to be made available was 500 Ju.52's and
He.111's=20
and about 80 Savoi SM.82's. Student had realised that complete
surprise=20
was impossible, but to make the most of tactical surprise, he
proposed=20
to land on the south-west side of the island, which because of the=20
nature of the terrain, appeared to be the most unlikely. ...
15. Meanwhile, the Luftwaffe attacking force ranged against Malta,=20
consisting of 190 long-range bombers and 30 Ju.87 dive-bombers, had=20
maintained an average daily effort of 130 sorties throughout April,=20
1942, after opening with over 300 sorties on March 21st. On April
20th,=20
325 bomber sorties were flown against Malta and over 200 sorties on=20
seven other occasions during the month; this intensity of effort
was=20
only attained by aircraft and crews carrying up to 3 sorties each
per=20
day, in addition to which fighter escorts of the order of 200
aircraft=20
per 24 hours were regularly flown to cover these attacks.
16. ... wastage amounting to no less than 250-300 aircraft during
he=20
month of April alone, and some 500 aircraft over the whole period.=20
Further, the heavy tonnage of bombs and aircraft fuel consumed in=20
undertaking this assault were directly to the detriment of supplies
in=20
North Africa.
Later, (p.141) the book mentions the Luftwaffetransferring 40 Stukas,
30=20
109's and 15 110's from Sicily to North Africa, bringing total Axis
air=20
strength in NA as of 26 May (just before the Gazala offensive) to
600=20
Axis aircraft of which 260 were German. The Italians had similarly=20
reinforced North Africa.
Luftwaffe units elsewhere are listed as follows (all numbers are
Greece=20
and Crete / Sicily / total):
Long-range Bombers: 130 / 55 / 185
Bomber Recon: 20 / 20 / 40
Dive Bombers: 0 / 0 / 0 (all in NA)
S.E. fighters: 5 / 30 / 35
T.E. fighters: 20 / 10 / 30
Coastal: 35 / 0 / 35
(snip interesting German airborne OOB)
>>From the above, you can derive one (and only one) of the following
> two conclusions:
>=20
> A) All books, articles and sources about Ramcke Brigade need a
> drastic revisions! Germans had a complete Para division up their
> sleeves in mid 1942, totally jump-capable, and were ready to use
> it at short notice.
Don't know about that. I've read numerous times that Ramcke Brigade
had=20
been earmarked for Herkules and released to North Africa, but this=20
doesn't mean that _all_ of the German force scheduled to be used
against=20
Malta was that brigade.
As late as 1944, the Germans had at least one division's worth of=20
jump-capable troops, so I don't see why they couldn't have had one
in=20
mid-42.
> B) Kesselring was plainly kidding, and sent to Cavallero an OOB
> about one year old (since it is more or less the Crete one). Of course
> I assume that Kesselring should have known the exact German
> availability. So, it was just a bluff, a tale, a joke. [but, of course,=
we
> Italians are the ones betraying our ally...]
The possibility of a German SNAFU also exists. The Germans were'nt
above=20
leaving their ally in the dark, and did so on numerous occasions, but
I=20
expect Kesselring to have been relatively honest as the Malta
operation=20
was one that he personally supported IIRC.
LC
--
Stephen Graham
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Davide Pastore wrote:
> Italian armour formations.
> My original post was wrong in some points; here are some results
> of further research.
>=20
> X Ra.Co. comprised:
(snip information)
Thanks !
LC
--
Stephen Graham
Newsgroups: soc.history.war.world-war-ii
Subject: Re: Halifax Bomber
Date: Fri, 04 Nov 2005 14:20:54 -0800
in article dkdfiq$8d5$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu, Don Phillipson at
dphil...@ncf.ca wrote on 11/3/05 8:58 AM:
> Possibly only one Halifax bomber exists today, at RCAF Trenton, Ontario=
,
> rebuilt over 10 years by veterans after its salvage from a lake in Norw=
ay.
Came across an article on what I presume is the very plane:
http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20051102/success_hali=
fax
bomber_051102/20051102?hub=3DCanada
Amusing that the article says that it "...lied at the bottom of
Norway's
Lake Mhosa for 50 years..." I wasn't aware that Halifaxes were struck
by
such a lack of candor!
:-)
Michael
Stephen Graham
Date: Sat, 5 Nov 2005 09:40:49 +0100
Step 6.
Regia Aeronautica OOB (01-Aug-42)
Since I had previously prepared a nice .doc file (and since the
conversion in usenet makes a hopeless mess of my spacings) you
can download the OOB here:
http://www.filefactory.com/get/f.php?f=3D4b95bd82ef4fa42f935bf510
[a not exceptional hosting service. It is just the first I've found]
Caution: as said before, the main source (Nino Arena's official
Air Force history) is an exceedingly contradictory book. All infos
are to be taken with a big grain of salt. In case any of them being
at odds with other ones in my previous posts, don't be surprised.
Stephen Graham
Date: Sat, 5 Nov 2005 09:40:37 +0100
Step 5.
Regia Marina OOBs
(three different ones: spring, summer anf fall 1942)
Any (??) means an uncertainty.
A.A. =3D Ammiraglio d'Armata [4-stars]
A.S. =3D Ammiraglio di Squadra [3-starts]
A.D. =3D Ammiraglio di Divisione [2-stars]
C.A. =3D Contrammiraglio [1-star]
Ships are listed in the "short form" (some ship with long names
were usually referred to in a shorter way: for example the CL
"Luigi di Savoia Duca degli Abruzzi" was just "Abruzzi" in
everyday parlance).
---------------------------------------------------
25.03.42 - 30.06.42
Capo di Stato Maggiore - A.A. Arturo Riccardi (??)
SottoCapo di Stato Maggiore - A.D. Luigi Sansonetti (??)
A) Forze Navali (and 1a Squadra)
- A.S. Angelo Iachino, on Littorio
B) 2a Squadra
- A.S. Carlo Bergamini, on Duilio
3a Divisione
- A.D. Angelo Parona, on Gorizia
Ships
- Gorizia
- Trento (torpedoed and sunk 15.06.42)
- Bande Nere (torpedoed and sunk 01.04.42)
Bases
- Messina (until early June) but briefly at Augusta (late May)
- Taranto (from early June)
- Messina (from early July)
5a Divisione
- A.S. Carlo Bergamini (also commanding 2a Squadra) on Duilio
Ships
- Duilio (in reserve from summer 42)
- Doria (in reserve from summer 42)
- Cesare (in reserve)
Bases
- Taranto
7a Divisione
- A.D. Alberto Da Zara, on Eugenio
Ships
- Eugenio
- Montecuccoli (damaged by gunfire on 15.06.42)
Bases
- Taranto (until mid May)
- Cagliari (from mid May to Mid June)
- Napoli (from mid June)
8a Divisione
- A.D. Raffaele De Courten, on Garibaldi
Ships
- Garibaldi
- Aosta
Bases
- Taranto
9a Divisione
- A.D. Giuseppe Fioravanzo, on Veneto
Ships
- Veneto
- Littorio (torpedoed 15.06.42, out of service until August 42)
Bases
- Taranto
Destroyers Squadrons
7a Squadriglia
- Freccia (from June)
- Dardo (from June)
- Saetta
- Strale (sunk 21.06.42)
8a Squadriglia
- Folgore
- Lampo (from May)
10a Squadriglia
- Oriani
- Maestrale
- Grecale
- Gioberti (from May)
11a Squadriglia
- Camicia Nera
- Aviere
- Geniere
12a Squadriglia
- Corazziere
- Ascari
13a Squadriglia
- Fuciliere
- Bersagliere
- Alpino
14a Squadriglia
- Vivaldi (damaged 15.06.42)
- Malocello
- Da Noli
15a Squadriglia
- Pigafetta
- Zeno (damaged 15.06.42)
- Da Verrazzano
16a Squadriglia
- Da Recco
- Usodimare (sunk 08.06.42)
- Pessagno (sunk 29.05.42)
Unknown Squadriglia
- Premuda
- Mitragliere (from April)
- Legionario (from June)
C) Forza Navale Speciale
- A.S. Vittorio Tur, on Taranto
11a Divisione (from 01.06.42)
- A.S. Vittorio Tur, on Taranto
Ships
- Taranto
- assorted minor crafts
Bases
- Livorno
12a Divisione (from 01.06.42)
- A.D. Luigi Biancheri, on Bari
Ships
- Bari
- assorted minor crafts
Bases
- Livorno
D) Squadra Sommergibili
- A.S. Antonio Legnani
-------------------------------------------------------
01.07.42 - 31.08.42
Capo di Stato Maggiore - A.A. Arturo Riccardi (??)
SottoCapo di Stato Maggiore - A.D. Luigi Sansonetti (??)
A) Forze Navali (and 1a Squadra)
- A.S. Angelo Iachino, on Veneto (until early August)
- same, on Littorio (from early August)
B) 2a Squadra
- A.S. Carlo Bergamini, on Duilio
3a Divisione
- A.D. Angelo Parona, on Gorizia
Ships
- Gorizia
- Bolzano (torpedoed 13.08.42, never returned service)
Bases
- Messina
5a Divisione
- A.S. Carlo Bergamini (also commanding 2a Squadra) on Duilio
Ships
- Duilio (in reserve)
- Doria (in reserve)
- Cesare (in reserve)
Bases
- Taranto
7a Divisione
- A.D. Alberto Da Zara, on Eugenio
Ships
- Eugenio
- Montecuccoli (at works from early to mid July)
- Attendolo (from early July. Torpedoed on 13.08.42, out of service
until early December)
Bases
- Napoli (until mid July)
- Cagliari (from mid July to Mid August, except Attendolo which
stayed at Napoli, training, until hit)
- Napoli (from mid August)
8a Divisione
- A.D. Raffaele De Courten, on Garibaldi
Ships
- Garibaldi
- Abruzzi
- Aosta
Bases
- Navarino
9a Divisione
- A.D. Giuseppe Fioravanzo, on Veneto
Ships
- Veneto
- Littorio (from early August)
Bases
- Taranto
Destroyers Squadrons
7a Squadriglia
- Freccia
- Dardo (damaged 23.07.42)
- Saetta
8a Squadriglia
- Folgore
- Lampo
10a Squadriglia
- Oriani
- Maestrale
- Grecale
- Gioberti
11a Squadriglia
- Camicia Nera
- Aviere
- Geniere
12a Squadriglia
- Corazziere
- Ascari
13a Squadriglia
- Fuciliere
- Bersagliere
- Alpino
14a Squadriglia
- Malocello
- Da Noli
15a Squadriglia
- Pigafetta
- Da Verrazzano
16a Squadriglia
- Da Recco
Unknown Squadriglia
- Premuda
- Mitragliere
- Legionario
- Corsaro (from August)
- Sebenico (from August)
C) Forza Navale Speciale
- A.S. Vittorio Tur, on Taranto
11a Divisione (disbanded on 31.08.42)
- A.S. Vittorio Tur, on Taranto
Ships
- Taranto
- assorted minor crafts
Bases
- Livorno
12a Divisione (disbandede on 31.08.42)
- A.D. Luigi Biancheri, on Bari
Ships
- Bari
- assorted minor crafts
Bases
- Livorno
D) Squadra Sommergibili
- A.S. Antonio Legnani
------------------------------------------------
01.09.42 - 12.11.42
Capo di Stato Maggiore - A.A. Arturo Riccardi (??)
SottoCapo di Stato Maggiore - A.D. Luigi Sansonetti (??)
A) Forze Navali (and 1a Squadra)
- A.S. Angelo Iachino, on Littorio
B) 2a Squadra
- A.S. Carlo Bergamini, on Duilio
Out of formation
- Littorio
Bases
- Taranto
3a Divisione
- A.D. Angelo Parona, on Gorizia
Ships
- Gorizia
- Trieste
Bases
- Messina
5a Divisione
- A.S. Carlo Bergamini (also commanding 2a Squadra) on Duilio
Ships
- Duilio (in reserve)
- Doria (in reserve)
- Cesare (in reserve)
Bases
- Taranto
7a Divisione
- A.D. Alberto Da Zara, on Eugenio
Ships
- Eugenio (at works from early to mid November)
- Montecuccoli
Bases
- Napoli
8a Divisione
- A.D. Raffaele De Courten, on Garibaldi
Ships
- Garibaldi
- Abruzzi
- Aosta
Bases
- Navarino
9a Divisione
- A.D. Giuseppe Fioravanzo, on Veneto
Ships
- Veneto
- Roma (training until October)
Bases
- Taranto
Destroyers Squadrons
7a Squadriglia
- Freccia
- Saetta
8a Squadriglia
- Folgore
- Lampo
10a Squadriglia
- Oriani
- Maestrale
- Grecale
- Gioberti
11a Squadriglia
- Camicia Nera
- Aviere
- Geniere
12a Squadriglia
- Corazziere
- Ascari
13a Squadriglia
- Granatiere (from October)
- Fuciliere
- Bersagliere
- Alpino
14a Squadriglia
- Malocello
- Da Noli
15a Squadriglia
- Pigafetta
- Da Verazzano (sunk 19.10.42)
16a Squadriglia
- Da Recco
Unknown Squadriglia
- Premuda
- Mitragliere
- Legionario
- Corsaro
- Sebenico
- Bombardiere (from October)
- Lubiana (from October)
- Velite (from November)
C) Forza Navale Speciale
- A.S. Vittorio Tur, on Bari
Ships
- Bari
- Taranto
- assorted minor crafts
Bases
- Livorno
D) Squadra Sommergibili
- A.S. Antonio Legnani
Stephen Graham
Newsgroups: soc.history.war.world-war-ii
Subject: Re: Question about the P-47 Thunderbolt (Ricochet bullets)
Date: Sat, 5 Nov 2005 10:44:52 -0500
"ikonoqlast" <ikono...@cox.net> wrote in message=20
news:dk865m$e8n$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
> It was a first rate ground attack aircraft armed with 8 .50 caliber
> machineguns.
>
> Why?
>
> Specifically, why not, say, 4 20mm cannon? Cannon would, I think, do a=
=20
> much
> better job attacking just about anything on the ground a plane could=20
> attack.
> Other planes had cannon instead of machineguns. Was it just a case of=20
> '8x50
> is good enough'? Or lack of availability/familiarity with cannon? Not
> enough room? Too heavy? Were cannon not that much more effective?
>
> Anyone know?
> --=20
>
I've seen several references on TV over the years about P-47 pilots
aimi=
ng=20
ahead of Tiger Is so that the .50 caliber bullets would ricochet up
into =
the=20
bottom of the vehicle.
That doesn't sound plausible to me. (especially now that I've typed it
ou=
t).
Seems to me that any bullet that didn't penetrate the road surface
would =
be=20
badly deformed and have lost most of its energy if it did somehow
managed=
to=20
ricochet up into the tank. I don't know how thick the bottom of a
Panzer =
VI=20
is but I seem to remember one continuous plate on the one that I saw
at=20
Abeerdean Proving Grounds. Shooting at the engine deck would seem to
be =
a=20
better bet.
Even if it retained a lot of energy, accurately placing a shot on
variety=
of=20
road surfaces would seem pretty much impossible.
What do you fellows think?
Dave Kennedy
Stephen Graham
Subject: Re: Why wasnt the British army semi-elite?
Date: Sat, 05 Nov 2005 20:53:58 -0800
On Fri, 14 Oct 2005 16:39:27 +0000 (UTC), Drazen Kramaric
<draxNEV...@post.t-com.hr> wrote:
>On Mon, 3 Oct 2005 16:34:15 +0000 (UTC), Admiral Sir Francis Haddock
><Gavin....@whackme.gavnem.fslife.co.uk> wrote:
>
>
>>Remind me, who commanded Montgomery in Normandy
>
>Montgomery was an army group commander in Normandy.
Monty was also ground forces commander, under Ike, until 1 Aug 44,
when he reverted to army group commander and Ike became ground forces
commander. At _all_ times in the TEO, Monty was subordinate to Ike.
Stephen Graham
Italian
Land Forces
Date: Sun, 6 Nov 2005 15:00:42 +0100
Step 7
Italian Land Forces
Italian Infantry Divisions
XXX Corpo d'Armata [1st wave]
1st Div ("Superga) 91st & 92nd Inf Rgt 5th Art Rgt
4th Div ("Livorno") 33rd & 34th Inf Rgt 28th Art Rgt
20th Div ("Friuli") 87th & 88th Inf Rgt 35th Art Rgt
XVI Corpo d'Armata [2nd wave]
26th Div ("Assietta") 29th & 30th Inf Rgt 25th Art Rgt
54th Div ("Napoli") 75th & 76th Inf Rgt 54th Art Rgt
In the 1943 Sicily campaign these units were under 6a Armata;
however, it seems that for C3 an ad hoc joint Army/Navy/German
army-level command would have been employed.
Paper (ideal) divisional organisation was:
2x Infantry Rgt, each with:
1x Infantry Gun company
2x Platoons, each with 4x 47/32 guns
1x Mortar Company, with:
3x Platoons, each with 3x 81mm mortars
3x Infantry Battalions, each with:
3x Infantry Companies, each with
3x Infantry Platoons, each with 4x Breda 30 LMG
1x Mortar section, with 3x 45mm Brixia mortars
1x MG Company, with:
2x MG Platoons, each with 4x Breda 38 MMG
Note: I came upon an OOB showing the two infantry Rgt of an
Italian binary division as part of an "Infantry Brigade", under the
divisional 2inC. I don't know if the same was applicable to above.
1x Artillery Rgt
I Group (apparently nor earmarked for C3)
3x Batteries, each with 4x 100/17 (or /22) T.M. howitzers
II Group
3x Bts, each with 4x 75/18 T.M. howitzers (or 75/27 T.M.
guns)
III Group (as II)
IV Group (to 1st wave only; 2nd wave had just one Company)
3x Companies (but only two usually present), each with:
4x Sections, each with 2x 20/65 AA guns
Note: before the war these divisions had the "mountain" OOB with
one/two Group(s) equipped with the (WWI war booty) 75/13 Skoda
mountain howitzer. Although old, weak and hopelessy outdated in a
modern mechanized battle, these small and handy weapons _might_
have been useful here, and so someone _might_ have been present.
Divisonal assets
1x Antitank Gun company
2x Platoons, each with 4x 47/32 guns
1x Mortar Battalion (number as per Div) with:
2x Mortar Company
3x Platoons, each with 3x 81mm mortars
1x Additional Mortar Battalion, as above
(present only in 1st wave divisions, detached from other
inactive divisions in Italy).
1x Engineer Battalion (number as per Div) including:
1x Mortar Company (as above, 9x 81mm mortars)
1x L40 Battalion (as per OOB previously provided)
Note: the mortar Co. in the engineer Btn was a "Chemical" company,
for throwing smoke (and gas) projectiles.
Additionally, some divisions had an attached CC.NN. (Blackshirts)
"Legione d'Assalto" (Assault Legion), being a very weak Regiment
with 2x rifle Btns + 1x regimental MG co., intended as a third
(understrength) tactical unit:
Friuli 88a Legione d'Assalto "Cappellini"
Assietta 17a Legione d'Assalto "Cremona"
Napoli 173a Legione d'Assalto "Salso"
However, it is not clear if these units (which were not exactly elite)
would have taken part in C3.
Note: the divisional and regimental 47/32 companies were identical,
with the same HE/AP ammo ratio, although the former was officially
"antitank" while the latter was officially "infantry gun" (with 65/17
pieces prewar).
Transport assets:
- each 75/18 and /27 T.M. (Trasporto Meccanizzato, i.e. with pneumatic
wheels) was towed by a TL37 4x4 Light Tractor (roughly similar to the
British Quad), same for 100/17 and /22 (these last ones being longer
barrelled versions built by Skoda for various European armies,
captured
by Germany and turned over to us)
- each bigger artillery pieces (Corps support) was towed by a TM40
4x4 Medium Tractor (roughly similar to the British Matador)
- each 20/65 was towed by a light (i.e. 4x2 2,5 ton) truck, typically
a
SPA 38 R
- 65/17 and 47/32 had to be towed by hand or carried OVER a truck,
being impossible to tow these rigid-suspension, solid-wheels weapons
at speed without damaging them. Both were easily disassembled for
simpler manhandling
- mortars and MGs were transported by hand or inside the 3-wheels
motorcycles or other vehicles
So, the divisional paper weapons were:
12x 100/17 (or /22) T.M. [+ tractor]
24x 75/18 (or /27) T.M. [+ tractor]
24x 47/32
8-24x 20/65 [+ truck]
45-63x 81mm
Actually, according to the plan, the weapons and material to be landed
would have been:
Superga Livorno Friuli Plus1 Assietta Napoli
P=
lus2
M40 - - -=20
- - -
L40 19=20
- - - - 19
149/19 - - - - -
=
=20
- 12
105/28 - - - - -
=
=20
- 24
100/17-22 - - - - -
=
=20
- 12
90/53 - - - - -
=
=20
- 6 [*]
75/18-27 8 24 24 - 24
=
20=20
12 [**]
65/17 - -=20
- - - -
47/32 24 24 24 - 24=20
24 -
20/65 16 24 16 - 8=20
8 -
81mm 63 63 54 - 45=20
45 -
Tractors 8 24 24 - 12
=
20=20
65
Trucks 8 24=20
- - - 242
Cars - - - -
62=20
76 40
M/bykes 150 170 150 298 26
26=20
181
Men 9200 9850 10000 7055 9000 8900
780=
0
[*] Probably mounted over a heavy truck ("Autocannone") although
offroad mobility would have been nearly zero. Probably intended
for static port AA defense.
[**] This last dozen _might_ have been either 75/32 ATG or 75/46 AAG
"Plus1" =3D additional assets (X Ra.Co., San Marco, etc.) to be landed
with 1st wave, day X+1
"Plus2" =3D additional assets (Corps troops & 1st wave rear echelon)
to be landed with 2nd wave, day X+N
"Cars" are actually the Italian category of "Autocarrette", i.e. a
little
(more or less Kubel-size) 4x4, 4-wheel steering, 800kg truck
originally built for Alpini support, very slow but able to negotiate
just any kind of terrain.
"M/bykes" includes both 2- and 3-wheelers.
--------------------------------------------------------------
"Corpo d'Armata di Aviosbarco" (Air Landing Corps)
would have included:
- 185th Folgore Div
- 80th Spezia Div
- Amedeo d'Aosta Rgt
- Italian Special Forces units
- German FJ units
It is possible that the Corps would have been commanded by
General Kurt Student. At least, Italians seems to have expected so.
-----------------------------------------------------------
185th ("Folgore") Parachute Div
185th, 186th and 187th Para Infantry Rgt, each with:
3x Infantry Battalions, each with:
3x Infantry Companies, each with:
3x Infantry Platoons
1x MG Company, with:
2x MG Platoons, each with 3x MMG.
1x Anti-tank Platoon, with 6x m.35 (ex Polish)
anti-tank r=
ifles
Note: 185th Para Infantry Rgt had 3rd, 8th and 11th Para Infantry
Btns.
186th had 5th, 6th and 7th and 187th had 2nd, 4th and 9th. 1st Para
Btn,
never part of the division, was a Carabinieri unit employed in
commando
actions in North Africa at the time.
Note: the 185th Rgt was ready and jump-capable, but apparently not
earmarked for C3. Actually, it is not reported in most of the Folgore
OOBs, becoming in late 1942 part of the second para division, 184th
"Nembo". Presumably this was to make room for additional German
Para units other than the Ramcke Brigade. The 185th Rgt could have
been thrown in if the Germans had fielded a smaller force.
185th Para Artillery Rgt, with:
3x Battalions, each with:
2x Companies, each with:
2x Platoons, each with 2x 47/32 guns
Note: according to another source, there was only one such battalion
plus three detached companies, each 6x guns, one each to the Para
rgts.
20th Mortar Company, with:
3x Platoons, each with 3x 81mm mortars
Note: according to another source, there was one such compnay
attached to each Para Rgt.
8th Guastatori (demolition engineers) Para Btn, with:
3x Companies, each with 12x flamethrowers
Some of these flamethrowers could have been the Assault model
("Lanciafiamme d'Assalto"), specifically designed for Paras and
special forces and adopted at some time during 1942. This was
a very interesting weapon, little bulkier than a LMG:
http://tinypic.com/fd6po1.jpg
Weight 6.2Kg empty, 8.7kg ready (with 8 litres of flammable liquid).
Can eject 4-5 sprays of 3-4 seconds each up to 20 meters distance.
Note that the front probe can rotate, for use round a corner or from
behind a protection.
Italian paras, as opposite to German ones, jumped with a rope-attached
individual bag containing weapons and ammo, floating some meters
under the body during descent. Although I'm not an expert, ISTM
that Allied paras used a similar system. However the Italian parachute
(IF.41/SP) was very similar to the German one, lacking the shoulder
main ropes of the Allied types.
Additional note: in a letter of 19-Apr-42, Superaereo to Comando
Supremo, there is an airlanding plan for Folgore against Malta
which is somewhat at odds with the above OOB. Numbers are the
required SM.82 voyages (140 in total - but only 70 planes available):
- 1st Para Btn + 1 Pto 47 + 1 Pto 81 (17+2+2=3D21)
- 2nd Para Btn + 1 Pto 47 (17+2=3D19)
- 3rd Para Btn + 1 Bty 47 + 1 Pto 81 (17+5+2=3D24)
- 4th Para Btn + 2 Pto 47 + 1 Pto 81 (17+2x2+2=3D23)
- 5th & 6th Para Btn + 1 Pto 81 + 2 Bty 47 (2x17+2+2x5=3D46)
- 1st & 2nd Para Rgt HQ (2x3=3D6)
- Divisional HQ (1)
It is not clear what the various items means.
Divisional OOB would have been:
- Divisional HQ (1)
- 2x Para HQ Rgt (2x3=3D6)
- 6x Para Btn (6x17=3D102)
- 3x Bty 47 (4 guns + HQ each ?) (3x5=3D15)
- 4x Pto 47 (2 guns each ?) (4x2=3D8)
- 4x Pto 81 (3 mortars each ?) (4x2=3D8)
------------------------------------------------------
80th ("Spezia") Air-Transportable Div
125th and 126th Infantry Rgt, each with:
1x Mortar Company, with:
3x Platoons, each with 3x 81mm mortars
1x Anti-Aircraft Company, with:
4x Sections, each with 2x 20/65 AA guns
1x Guastatori (demolition engineers) Company, with
flamethrower=
s
3x Infantry Battalions, each with:
3x Infantry Companies, each with:
3x Infantry Platoons
1x Mortar section, with 3x 45mm mortars
1x MG Company, with:
2x MG Platoons, each with 4x MMG
80th Artillery Rgt, with:
3x Groups, each with:
3x Batteries, each with 4x 65/17 guns
Divisional assets:
80th Anti-tank Battalion, with:
3x Anti-tank Company, each with:
4x Platoons, each with 2x 47/32 guns
80th Engineer Battalion
39th Reconnaissance Battalion
Note: the particulars about this last unit are not clear. An educated
guess would be, a two- or three-company Bersaglieri bicycle (or
motorcycle) Battalion.
Spezia had an integral transport asset of about 400 3-wheels
motorcycles,
to be transported inside cargo airplanes (6 on a SM.82, 4 on a SM.75,
2 on a SM.81).
---------------------------------------------------
"Amedeo d'Aosta" Assault Rgt
These were the Regia Aeronautica air-dropped combat troops. The
Rgt was officially organised only in November 1942, but its two
Battalions were formed in May and June and scheduled for C3:
- 1st Air Force Assault Para Btn, specifically task-trained with the
conquest and occupation of an enemy airfield;
- "Loreto" Repairers Btn, specifically task-trained with re-activation
and maintenance of same airfield, so to make it available for airlift
of Spezia etc.
----------------------------------------------------------
Air-dropped Special Forces units
- A.D.R.A. Btn (Arditi Distruttori Regia Aeronautica) [Air Force]
- elements from 10th Arditi Rgt [Army]
- "P" Battalion [Navy. See below]
All three of them were trained for commando-type sabotage actions.
---------------------------------------------------
Amphibious Troops
San Marco Rgt (part of Regia Marina) with:
2x Gun Companies
2x Mortar Companies
2x Infantry Battalions (1st "Bafile" and 2nd "Grado") each with:
4x Infantry Companies
1x Gun Company
1x Mortar Company
3x Special Forces Battalions:
"P" (Paracadutisti) Btn (about 300 paras in 6x Cos.)
"N" (Nuotatori, swimmers) Btn (about 500 frogmen in 5x Cos.)
"G" (Guastatori) Btn (80-100 demolition engineers)
I CC.NN. (Blackshirts) Landing Group (Regiment) with:
2x Legions (Battalions): XLIII ("Belluno") & LX ("Pola"), each
with:
3x Infantry Companies
II CC.NN. Landing Group with:
2x Legions: XLII ("Vicenza") & L ("Treviso"), as above
Note: these Blackshirt unit, contrary to the divisional ones above,
were
picked elite troops. Particulars about the support units for above are
not clear, although I Group seems to have fielded a third (weapons)
Btn
later, with 8x 47 + 9x 81. See below.
The regiments would have operated not as above, but in three tactical
forces as:
a) 1x San Marco Btn, 1x CC.NN. Btn - against Gozo Island
b) 1x San Marco Btn, 1x CC.NN. Btn - against main beachheads on
Southern coast [very first wave]
c) 2x CC.NN. Btn (probably one full Landing Group) - against Fort
Benghai=
sa
Apparently each tactical force above would have consisted of:
2x Infantry battalions
1x Gun Company, with:
4x Platoons, each with 2x 47/32 guns
1x Mortar Company, with:
3x Platoons, each with 3x 81mm mortars
1x Guastatori (demolition engineer) Company
Stephen Graham
Stephen Graham
Newsgroups: soc.history.war.world-war-ii
Subject: Re: Supplies From the U.S to Germany After Start of WWII
Date: Mon, 07 Nov 2005 03:02:42 +0100
On Mon, 26 Sep 2005 20:16:29 +0000 (UTC), Don Phillipson
<dphil...@ncf.ca> wrote:
>Ford of Germany was solely a sales agency for British and
>US imports, and was managed by Germans, not Americans
>like Henry Ford. Ford was favourably mentioned in Mein Kampf
>because of his subsidy of antisemitic propaganda, not his
>wealth or factories. Ford USA's main asset in Germany was
>the shares the firm owned in Opel, an all-German auto manufacturer.
Ford produced between 1939 and 1945 for military purpuses about 65,000
trucks. Opel, owned by General Motors, produced about 107,000 trucks
and busses. Such numbers during a war and solely a sales agency? These
US-based companies were by far the largest 'german' producers of
trucks during the war. The next producer with large number was
Borgward with about 30,000 pieces.
Source:=20
Kraftfahrzeuge und Panzer der Reichswehr, Wehrmacht und Bundeswehr,
page 107.
--=20
Best regard
Klaas
Roman Werpachowski
> From: Louis Capdeboscq <loui...@yahoo.com>
> Subject: ***POSSIBLE SPAM*** Re: Blitzkrieg and horses
>
> Roman "Polish lancer :-)" Werpachowski wrote:
> > On the Wed, 2 Nov 2005 21:19:50 +0000 (UTC), Louis Capdeboscq
> wrote:
> > > Michael Emrys wrote:
> > >>
> > >> In the words of Jim Dunnigan, "You can't pull artillery on
> grass."
> Horses
> > >> (and mules too, if being used) require high energy food, like
> oats,
> when
> > >> called on to do heavy work. Otherwise, they eventually just fall
> > >> over
> and
> > >> die.
> > >
> > > The keyword here is "eventually". In a static role, an infantry
> > > division won't have to pull its artillery all that often so the
> > > horses can do it occasionally and get their strength back
> > > afterwards.
> >
> > Well, it's not that easy. You can't just substitute time for
> > nutrients. Oats contains several ingredients which are very
> important
> > for horses' health and simply are not to be found in grass
> (avenine).
>
> pointed out was that:
>
> 1. In Michael's sentence regarding horses eventually just falling
> and dying, if inadequately fed "eventually" was the operative word,
> it was perfectly possible to either work a horse to death or to=3D20
> temporarily overwork it and leave it to recuparate later.
>
> 2. For a division holding the front, providing a limited supply of
> to supplement grazing is not going to be a great logistical strain,
> opposed to having to provide for 100% of the food for the horses as=3D2=
0
> would be the case for a unit in movement (plus the fact that the
> unit would require more food as the horses would be working more).
>
> horse-equipped force that didn't require much in the way of extra=3D20
> logistics provided that it didn't move too much. Obviously, this
> assumes that the unit is not stationed in the desert, toundra,
> tc.
To sum it up, you can use horses as a means of transport provided you
are using them in the terrain which allows for easy movement of...
trucks?
I can see one point horses have over mechanized transport -- stealth.
They do not generate so much noise (a small number of horses, at
least)
and they do not leave so much tracks behind them. (Maybe that's why
Americans are now using horses in Afghanistan to fight the Taliban).
Twenty people moving through the woods will be much harder to hear and
spot, even from the air, than the same twenty people moving in a
truck.
Not to say that in the woods, driving a trucks is much harder. All and
all, horses are a good choice for partisans.
--=20
"Kiedy widz=EA kto nam proponuje IV Rzeczpospolit=B1, to poprosz=EA o
pi=B1=
t=B1"
Davide Pastore
>
> As late as 1944, the Germans had at least one division's worth
> had one in mid-42.
>From http://www.ww2.dk/
Summer 1942 situation:
I./FJR 1 - In Russia with 7.FD
II./FJR 1 - In Russia with 7.FD
III./FJR 1 - In Russia with 7.FD
I./FJR 2 - In Russia with 7.FD (to Germany in July, then Ramcke
brigade)
II./FJR 2 - In Russia with 7.FD (to Germany in July)
I./FJR 3 - Ramcke brigade
II./FJR 3 - In Russia with 7.FD
III./FJR 3 - In Russia with 7.FD
I./FJR 5 - At Reims, training for action against Malta
II./FJR 5 - Ramcke brigade
III./FJR 5 - At Reims, training for action against Malta
I./LLStR - At Hildersheim, training for action against Baku (???)
IV./LLStR - In Russia with 7.FD
FJLehr Btn - Ramcke brigade
A total of 14 infantry btns, 8 currently employed as foot infantry on
the Eastern Front (including one later part of Ramcke brigade). I will
not call these 8 units "jump-capable", unless it means "a year ago,
they were capable." I'm fairly sure that jump-capability needs costant
training, and is lost after a few months' rest. This leaves just six
battalions
ready for action.
I./ and II./FJR 2 could have started their re-training in July 42, but
would have required some time to return to their old level. However,
note that Kesselring's letter is dated 31-May-42, when they were still
in their Russian trenches. Moreover, all Italian contemporary sources
stress the fact that C3 had to be implemented not later than August,
else would have been postponed to 1943.
At best, Kesselring was out of touch with actual FJ availability.
At worst, it was a bluff. Or maybe, he happened to have an old
FJ OOB and attached it to his letter - that is the same as a bluff,
just to "have something to show."
I stress this point because any single book I've read repeat the
same old story - Kesselring wanted Malta very strongly - Rommel
didn't want it - Kesselring was beaten - Rommel won. But, if
Kesselring in truth had just made a show, then... maybe some part
of the old story might need a revision!!!
--
Davide Pastore
>
> Regarding German information
The same source (Kesselring's letter) also shows the proposed
Luftwaffe OOB for the action. It doesn't show the numeration of
individual Gruppen, but from http://www.ww2.dk/ I have
managed the following picture:
2. Luftflotte
II. Fliegerkorps
- Trapani [ZG 26]:
1x Z Gr III./, 4./ZG 26 - Bf 110
- Gerbini [KG 77]:
3x K Gr Stab/, II/, III/KG 77, KGr 606 (or 806) - Ju 88A
1x K Staf ?/KG 26 - He 111H-4/6 (torp) [#1]
- Catania [KG 54]:
3x K Gr Stab/, I/, IV/KG 54, KGr 806 (or 606) - Ju 88A
1x NJ Gr I./NJG 2 - Ju 88C
- Pachino [StG 3]:
2x Stu Gr Stab/, II./, III./StG 3 - Ju 87R/D
1x Stu Staf Erg/StG 3 - Ju 87R/D
- Gela [JG 27]:
2x J Gr Stab/, II./, III./JG 27 - Bf 109F
1x Jabo Staf 10./JG 27 - Bf 109F
- Comiso [JG 53]:
3x J Gr Stab/, II./, III./JG 53, I./JG 77 - Bf 109F
1x Jabo Staf 10./JG 53 - Bf 109F
X. Fliegerkorps
[Crete]
2x K Gr Stab/, I./, II./LG 1 - Ju 88A
[plus] II./KG 100 - He 111H [#2]
1x Aufk Gr 2.(F)/123, 2./125, 1./, 2./, 3./126 - Ar 196 et al.
Fligerfuhrer Afrika
[Lybia]
1x J Gr I./JG 27 - Bf 109F
1x Stu Gr I./StG 3 - Ju 87R/D
1x Aufk Gr 4.(H)/12, 1.(F)/121 - Bf 109, Bf 110, et al.
1x K Staf ? [#3]
[#1] Service in Norway, but underwenting torpedo training (one
staffel at a time) at Grosseto [courtesy of Italian instructors, one
of
the very few things we could teach them].
[#2] There is a Gruppe too much. From the timetable below it
seems that II./KG 100 would have been based in Sicily, so
displacing another one there.
[#3] I was unable to identify this lone bomber Staffel.
About transport units, in Mediterranean there were at least:
KGrzbV 172 (at Rome)
KGrzbV 300 (at Athens, until July)
KGrzbv 400 (at Brindisi)
KGrzbv 600 (at Brindisi, from July)
KGrzbv 800 (at Brindisi, from July)
[all four-staffel Gruppen]
However Kesselring's letter calls for 1x transport group "from OBS"
plus 6x to 8x groups "from OKL."
Alfred Price, The Luftwaffe Data Book (London 1997) shows
somewhat different units for 2. LF on 27-Jul-42 (number in
parenthesis are available planes, "total"/"serviceable"):
Stab/, I./, II./, III./JG 27 [Bf 109] (3/2+23/15+24/16+20/7)
Stab/, II./, III./ JG 53 [Bf 109] (4/4+30/20+26/12)
2./, 3./JG 77 [Bf 109] (25/18)
III./ZG 26 [Bf 110] (33/14)
10./ZG 26 [Do 17] (9/4)
I./NJG 2 [Ju 88C] (30/8)
Stab/, I., II., IV./LG 1 [Ju 88] (1/0+28/11+26/13+49/19)
I./, II./KG 26 [He 111] (36/27+31/8)
III./KG 26 [Ju 88] (29/20)
Stab/, I./KG 54 [Ju 88] (2/1+28/6)
Stab/, II./, III./KG 77 [Ju 88] (3/0+27/5+27/12)
II./KG 100 [He 111] (25/12)
KGr 806 [Ju 88] (18/8)
Stab/StG 3 [Bf 110] (4/2)
I./, II./, III./ StG 3 [Ju 87] (22/11+29/14+32/17)
1./121 [Ju 88] (10/8)
1./122 [Ju 88] (10/3) + [Bf 109] (2/2)
2./, 3./122 [Ju 88] (9/5+12/11)
2./123 [Ju 88] (9/6) + [Ju 86P] (3/1)
4./12 [Bf 110] (12/5)
2./125 [Ar 196] (9/4)
SAGr 126 [He 111] (9/3) + [Ar 196] (17/12) + [He 60] (1/0)
III./, IV./KGzbv 1 [Ju 52] (32/17+50/26)
KGrzbv 400 [Ju 52] (28/14)
KGrzbv 600 [Ju 52] (38/29)
KGrzbv 800 [Ju 52] (32/11)
Kesselring had also prepared a very detailed timetable for day X:
- from Y-7h to Y-5h30' [following the night attack]
Attacks (annoyance and destruction) by StG 3 and JG 37 [sic! 27]
- from Y-5h30' to Y-1h30'
Mass attack against:
a) defensive implements
b) AA defence
c) airports
- Y-1h30'
Tranfer of the transport groups [from Puglia to Sicily, N.d.R.]
- from Y-1h [sic! correct hour unclear] to Y-3h
Italian fighter and bomber intervention.
- from Y-3h to Y-0h30'
Seven TrGruppen take off with escort (III./26 ZG and JG 53)
- from Y-0h30' to Y
Neutralization of drop area defenses (KG 34 [sic! 54] and JG 27)
- from Y to Y+0h10'
Drop of 1st para wave, including Italians. Force: about 2 German
rgts or [meaning "and" ?] 1 Italian Rgt = 9 Battalions
- from Y+0h10' to Y+1h10'
Neutralization of defenses in the zone ahead, and support to paras
(StG 3 and Jabo). Airport surveillance (JG 27)
- up to Y+3h
Support to paras (3x KGruppe and JG 53)
- from Y+1h to Y+3h30'
Italian fighter and bomber intervention, for neutralization of the
zone ahead
- from Y+3h30'
Intervention of waves of German bombers for the continuous
support of the paras.
- from Y+1h15'
Drop of 1st half of 2nd para wave (3x TtGruppen from
Comiso). 2x German Btns plus first ammo load.
- from Y+3h30'
Drop of the 3rd half of the 3rd wave [sic!!!]. (4x TrGruppen from
Gerbini or Reggio) with weapons and ammo.
- from Y+3h20' to Y+5h45'
Attack to Bengahaisa and Delimara forts (StG 3 and Italians), then
neutralization of defensive implements (III./ZG 26, I./NJG 2, JG 27
and Italians)
- from Y+5h50'
Drop of mannequins and fog (III./100 KG) [probably II.]
- from Y+6h
Gliders drop at Benghaisa, then beginning of dusk and night attacks
against La Valletta harbor exits.
Davide Pastore
>
> Step 7
> Italian Land Forces
Of course, a few minutes after sending the post I re-discovered
a couple of dust-covered books with additional informations.
First of all, the C3 Army Plan (formalized in May 1942) seems
a mixture of "really-extant" and "just-intended" units, and it is
often at odds with the theorical OOBs.
Infantry divisions earmarked for the landing were labeled "Assault
divisions" with a number of variations compared with standard OOB.
I have _NOT_ the official OOB, but at least Superga and Livorno
*_seem_* to have attained the following structure (although, of
course,
additional variations could have been implemented later):
2x Infantry Regiment [as previously described]
1x Artillery Regiment, with:
I Gruppo - 3 btys, each 4x 75/18 M.35 T.M. howitzers
II Gruppo - as I
III Gruppo - 3 btys, each 4x 100/17 M.14 T.M. howitzers
IV Gruppo - as III
unattached - 3 btys, each 8x 20/65
Divisional assets:
1x Mortar Battalion [as previously described]
1x Additional Mortar Battalion, temporarily detached from another
division [as above]
1x Engineer Battalion [including a chemical mortar coy]
1x Guastatori [i.e. demolition engineers] Battalion
[only detail I'm aware is, heavy on the flamethrowers side]
1x SP Antitank Battalion, with Semoventi 47/32 L40 [as described,
except that 3rd co. had 12, not 8, Solothurn ATR. This Btn
should
have superseded the old divisional ATG company; however for
some reasons the Plan's OOB seems to include both. Unclear]
1x SP Artillery Group, with Semoventi 75/18 M40 [as described]
This last one is the most interesting addition. The first eleven M40
groups organized, DCI (551st) to DCXI (561st), were intended (as
per late 41/early 42 plans) for:
DCI & DCII to Ariete Armoured Div
DCIII to Superga Infantry Div
DCIV to Livorno Infantry Div
DCV to X Ra.Co. [#1]
DCVI & DCVII to Littorio Armoured Div
DCVIII to R.E.Co. Lodi [#1]
DCIX & DCX to Centauro Armoured Div
DCXI initially unassigned, then to Friuli Infantry Div
Caution: this is all nice theory. Most of these units ended in Lybia
and Tunisia, usually with a different division than the intended one.
[#1] Was also to receive three SP groups (CLXI, CLXII & CLXIII) of
Semoventi 90/53 M41 (formed in April 42, but vehicles non accepted
in service until 16-aug-42) intended for the Russian front, but in the
end
remaining in Sicily until Husky.
[#2] "Raggruppamento Esplorante Corazzato" (Armoured Recon Group)
of I Gruppo Squadroni [Btn], 15th Cavalry Rgt, "Cavalleggeri di Lodi"
(also had 1x Sqd [Coy] AB41, 2x Sqd L6/40, 1x Sqd Semoventi L40.
Intended for the Russian front, but sent instead to Africa).
The groups for Superga and Livorno were ready since early 1942, and
were eventually shipped to Lybia only in July-August. C3 plan doesn't
mention them, although there are some unclear references to "tanks".
Unclear and very intriguing.
It *_seems_* that X Ra.Co. (probably chosen since during summer 42
it was still basically a "head" without a "body", waiting for the 90s
to
depart for Russia) would have acted as a "holding unit" for all C3
armoured units.
Only Superga and Livorno uniformed to the above full OOB (Superga
was later sent to, and destroyed in, Tunisia, while Livorno was the
hardcore of 1943 Sicily defense). Friuli (later sent to Corsica) seems
to have been "work in progress" but apparently never fully completed
the transformation, while Napoli and Assietta, further down the
pipeline,
seem never to have obtained anything different from a normal infantry
division [readers will note the overabundance of "seem" in this post].
Of course, after the shelving of C3 (July 1942) such transformation
had no reason.
The artillery was a weak point. As late as June 43 Assietta Arty Rgt
had:
I & II Gruppo - 12x 100/17 M.14 [horse driven] howitzers
III & IV Gruppo - 12x 75/27 M.06 (or M.11) [horse driven] guns
unattached - 2 btys, each 8x 20/65
While both Napoli & Friuli had:
I Gruppo - 12x 100/17 M.14 [horse driven] howitzers
II Gruppo - 12x 75/27 M.06 (or M.11) [horse driven] guns
III & IV Gruppo - 12x 75/18 M.35 T.M. howitzers
unattached - 2 btys, each 8x 20/65
However, until shortly before, Friuli's III Group had been equipped
with 75/13 mule-pack mountain howitzers [i.e., the division had a
normal "mountain infantry" 3-groups Arty Rgt] and the 75/18s seem
to be a very recent addition. Probably the same applies to Napoli too.
Note: 75/27s came in a variety of flavours. TM ones could be either
Model 1906 (Krupp) or Model 1911 (Deport) [and there was also
the Model 1912 for horse artillery]. The M.11, a quite sophisticated
twin-cradle weapon, had a much greater horizontal sector (useful in
the AT role) but the M.06 was more rugged and robust and had a lower
silohuette.
XXX Corps artillery
29? Raggruppamento (OOB of Tunisia 1943)
LVII, LVIII & LVIX Gruppo - 12x 105/32 guns
LXV Gruppo - 12x 100/17 M.14 T.M. howitzers
XVI Corps artillery
40? Raggruppamento (OOB of Sicily 1943)
CIX & CX Gruppo - 12x 149/13 howitzers
X, XVI & XXIX Gruppo - 12x 105/28 guns
[note: divisional Arty Rgt's groups were always I-II-III-and-so-on of
the
relevant Rgt, while all the groups outside a division had a numeration
of their own]
Both these OOBs are 1 year later than C3, so, it is possible that 1942
strength could have been somewhat different. All Corps pieces were
tractor-driven.
The much-mentioned C3 plan (May 42) called for the landing of:
Medium Arty:
12x 149mm
24x 105mm
Light Arty:
12x 100mm
6x 90mm [probably truck-mounted]
112x 75mm
while, as per above, summer 1942 availability of tractor-driven
artillery in Sicily _seems_ to have been just:
Medium Arty:
24x 149/13 (40? Rgrp)
36x 105/28 (40? Rgrp)
36x 105/32 (29? Rgrp)
Light Arty:
60x 100/17 (Superga, Livorno & 29? Rgrp)
48x 75/18 (Superga & Livorno)
The Army plan for C3 is very clear about the absence of any draught
animal amongst the landing force, so - since the horse driven pieces
could _NOT_ be dragged behind a tractor without being very soon
disabled - it *_seems_* that Superga and Livorno would have to detach
some of their groups to the other divisions (or, the other divisions
would have received a lot of new artillery).
Note: in my previous post I took for granted that Italy would have
handpicked the best it had, so I listed the modern 149/19s and so on.
Further reflections made me doubt it - the Italian conduct of the war
seems often bizarre, to say the least. The above listed Corps
artillery
in Sicily was wholly formed of WW1 pieces (most of them, and the
best of them, ex Austrian war booty), as the bulk of units in Lybia
was,
while the flower of Italian artillery was sent to waste in faraway
Russia to "make a show" with Germany.
--
Michael Emrys
> soc.history.war.world-war-ii Subject: Re: Question about the P-47 Thunderbolt
> (Ricochet bullets) Date: Sat, 5 Nov 2005 10:44:52 -0500
>
> ahead of Tiger Is so that the .50 caliber bullets would ricochet up into the
> bottom of the vehicle. That doesn't sound plausible to me. (especially now
>
> Seems to me that any bullet that didn't penetrate the road surface would be
> badly deformed and have lost most of its energy if it did somehow managed to
> ricochet up into the tank.
That sounds about right to me. Even if the belly armor on the Tiger
(or any
tank for that matter) were very thin (and it has to be heavy enough to
offer
some protection from mines), the bullets would also be hitting at such
an
oblique angle that, added to the deformation and loss of energy, I
can't
believe that anything outside of a one-in-a-billion lucky shot would
penetrate.
Apparently this is an urban legend with a lot of "gee whiz" factor
that got
picke up by some tv producer a while ago and now gets endlessly
repeated. So
I guess if enough people hear it enough times and repeat it to still
other
people, it becomes part of the legend.
Michael
Davide Pastore
Royal Navy Assets
Evalutation of RN strenght, according to a Supermarina memorandum
dated 19-May-42:
At Gibraltar:
1-2x BBs/BCs, 2-3x CVs, 0-2x CAs, 2-6x CLs, 12-30x DDs.
[possible intervention against Sardinia 38h, and against Sicilian
waters 44h, after alarm]
At Alexandria:
0-2x BBs, 0-1x CVs, 0-2x CAs, 5-7x CLs, 15-20x DDs.
[possible intervention against convoys and beacheads 40-48h
after alarm]
No other RN assets until 10-20 days thereafter.
Light forces (CLs and DDs) were expected to reach Malta and
then stay there for 3 to 6 days (depending upon the agibility of
La Valletta for refuelling).
It was expected that enemy BBs wouldn't have ventured in the
Maltese waters, inside the Sicily air cover.
Instead, Italian HQ was particularly worried about the possibility
of a reprisal bombing action of Force H against Genova. It was
considered a more dangerous action (for political reasons) that an
attack mission against the invasion convoy (which would have
been air-covered).
Another expected British operation was a landing against the
Vichy-controlled Algeria, Tunisia and particularly Corsica, to
force Italy to redeploy its assets.
---------------------------------------------
Real RN strength (some help required)
Probable landing date would have been morning of 12-Jul-42 for
first airdrop and night of 12/13-Jul-42 for the landing (see below
for explanation of this choice).
So, probable RN assets would have been at least:
1) from Gibraltar / UK [same as "Pedestal" in August]
BB - Nelson, Rodney
CV - Victorious, Furious, Eagle, Argus
CL - Nigeria, Kenya, Manchester
CLAA - Phoebe, Sirius, Charybdis, Cairo
2) from Alexandria [same as "MG3" in August]
CL - Arethusa
CLAA - Euryalus, Cleopatra, Dido
I have not precise data on RN disposition at the time, other than:
3) unavailable, Indian Ocean
CV - Indomitable [#1], Formidable
BB - Warspite, Ramillies, Resolution, Revenge, Royal Sovereign
CL - Emerald, Enterprise, Dragon
CLAA - Caledon
[#1] Harpoon in August, but still in the Indian Ocean in July
4) unavailable, Pacific Ocean
CA - Australia
CL - Hobart
5) unavailable, repairing recent damage
CV - Illustrious ["Her Ship's Cover is quite clear that she had never
recovered from the damage she'd taken in WW2 and was limited to
around 22 knots for all practical purposes" according to
http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-030.htm ]
BB - Queen Elizabeth, Valiant [after human torpedoes hits]
CL - Birmingham, Newcastle, Liverpool [after hits during "Harpoon"]
This leaves a *_LOT_* of RN vessels somewhere around the world.
Help required: Does anyone here knows anything about mid-July 42
position of:
CVE - Archer, Avenger, Biter, Dasher
BB - King George V, Duke of York, Anson [training ?], Malaya
BC - Renown
CA - Berwick, Cumberland, Kent, Suffolk, Devonshire, London,
Shropshire, Sussex, Norfolk
CL - Achilles, Ajax, Leander, Orion, Aurora, Penelope, Glasgow,
Sheffield, Belfast, Gambia, Jamaica, Mauritius
CLAA - Argonaut, Scylla, Coventry, Curacoa, Carlisle
CL old - Colombo, Caradoc, Cardiff, Ceres, Capetown, Frobisher,
Hawkins, Danae, Dauntless, Dehli, Despatch, Diomede, Durban
Fast Minelayer - Abdiel, Manxman, Welshman
(I didn't ever try to list all the DDs)
-------------------------------------------------
Appendix: About the moon
In my original 1998 post, I wrote:
"For such a difficult landing, some moonlight is required"
However, a more careful reading of the sources reveal that the
landing would have taken place with new moon, so possible
dates are:
13 June [sunrise 04h45', sunset 19h19']
13 July [sunrise 04h55', sunset 19h20']
11 August [sunrise 05h17', sunset 18h57']
(according to NightCal, downloadable at http://www.nightcal.co.uk/
for a place 35deg 49min N, 14deg 27min E, i.e. the landing beaches)
[note that the first date coincides with "Harpoon", and the last
one with "Pedestal" - either would have disrupted any landing]
On 30-Apr-42 at Berchtesgaden (amongst the present were: Hitler,
Mussolini, Cavallero, Keitel, Jodl and Kesselring) it was agreed
that C3 would have taken place "not later than the July new moon",
after the conclusion of Rommel's offensive against Tobruk (scheduled
for late June). Eventualy Tobruk fell much sooner than planned,
Rommel went berserk, and we all know how the story ended.
Admiral Sir Francis Haddock
<davide....@alice.it> wrote:
>5) unavailable, repairing recent damage
>CV - Illustrious
I thought she was operational in the Indian Ocean in July 1942?
>["Her Ship's Cover is quite clear that she had never
>recovered from the damage she'd taken in WW2 and was limited to
>around 22 knots for all practical purposes" according to
>http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-030.htm ]
She was still used actively, both in the Mediterranean (Salerno) and
the Far East.
Duke of York, Cumberland & London were all with the Home Fleet doing
distant cover for PQ17 in July 1942, while KGV was being repaired
after being depth-charged by one of her escorts after ramming her
IIRC.
Gavin Bailey
--
Windows OS great advance. Reliable, stable operating system install
real smooth.
When try to use tough app, resource hungry, like Notepad, give
informative message
like this one, "int 19H bot error". What problem here? - Bart Kwan En
Louis Capdeboscq
> To sum it up, you can use horses as a means of transport provided
you
> are using them in the terrain which allows for easy movement of...
> trucks?
No, providing you are using them in terrain allowing easy foraging.
Some
terrain allows relatively easy movement of trucks (desert, toundra)
but
isn't particularly good for keeping horses. Other terrain isn't
particularly easy on trucks (e.g. forest, trackless hills or
mountains)
but you can keep animals there.
> I can see one point horses have over mechanized transport --
stealth.
Not really. Mechanized transport is faster, so you can park the
vehicles
somewhere back and have them rush the enemy when you move. An
artillery
fire will also drown the noise of the vehicles if you want to use
sophisticated tactics.
Let's remember that the two main advantages that horses had over
trucks
from the point of view of Germany and other belligerents were 1/ they
were already available and could be requisitioned, 2/ they didn't use
oil (or rubber).
There were also tactical advantages to horses in certain situations,
like increased mobility in poor terrain like marshes, forest or
somewhat
broken terrain. But the main reason why most armies used horses were
the
above two.
LC
--
Remove "e" from address to reply
Nicholas Smid
"Michael Emrys" <em...@olypen.com> wrote in message
news:437d461...@news.pacific.net.au...
about 5
mm in the Mk II up to 33 mm in the panther, 20+13 it says, most were
about
10-15 so I can't see you bouncing .50 slugs through it, well maybe the
Mk II
if you got real lucky. Far more likely as an air attack target would
be
shoot up the engine deck and hope to get sluge, or fragments through
into
the radiators which will stop in in a few minutes, or wreck the engine
if he
dosn't shut down. Actually to judge from the gun cammera pictures you
see
from time to time aiming for exact points on a tank dosen't look very
practical, you just sought of smother the area and hope for the best.
For
most of the early panzers the decking was only10-15 mm thick so a .50
might
have a chance of getting through though you'd need to be in a dive,
still
the .50 was meant to be able to do over 20 mm of armour at 500 yards
or
something like that so you wouldn't have to come too low.
> Michael
>
Geoffrey Sinclair
Geoffrey Sinclair
<438a464...@news.pacific.net.au>...
(snip)
>This leaves a *_LOT_* of RN vessels somewhere around the world.
>Help required: Does anyone here knows anything about mid-July 42
>position of:
>
>CVE - Archer, Avenger, Biter, Dasher
Of the above 4 RN escort carriers in service by July 1942 the Archer
served in the Atlantic from February to November 1942, including time
in the South Atlantic. Avenger needed flight deck modifications and
had it first operation with PQ18. Biter and Dasher also needed flight
deck modifications and first served in operation Torch in November
1942.
PQ17 was in June and PQ18 was in September 1942.
Avenger had arrived in Britain in May 1942 after commissioning in
March 1942, Biter was commissioned on 1 May 1942, Dasher
commissioned on 1 July 1942.
So only Archer would be available.
>BB - King George V, Duke of York, Anson [training ?], Malaya
KGV under refit May to July 1942
DoY in the Home fleet.
Anson was commissioned on 1 June 1942 and joined the home
fleet on 29 August 1942.
Malaya was in Gibraltar in May 1942, it was under refit from
November 1942.
>BC - Renown
Was part of the home fleet from early 1942 until October 1942.
Did escort the USS Wasp on its ferry missions to Malta but was
in Iceland for most of July.
>CA - Berwick, Cumberland, Kent, Suffolk, Devonshire, London,
> Shropshire, Sussex, Norfolk
Norfolk and London were part of the covering force for PQ-17
in July 1942. Cumberland was with the battleships on this
operation.
Sussex, under repair until August 1942.
Devonshire was part of the Indian Ocean fleet.
Berwick, Kent, Suffolk, Shropshire no information.
>CL - Achilles, Ajax, Leander, Orion, Aurora, Penelope, Glasgow,
> Sheffield, Belfast, Gambia, Jamaica, Mauritius
Sheffield, Penelope, Ajax, Belfast, being refitted/repaired.
Leander and Achilles were in the Pacific, manned by New Zealanders.
Mauritius part of the Indian Ocean fleet.
Jamaica completed 29 June 1942 so still working up.
Orion, Aurora, Glasgow, Gambia, no information.
>CLAA - Argonaut, Scylla, Coventry, Curacoa, Carlisle
Argonaut still under construction, Scylla completed 24 June 1942
so still working up.
Coventry, Curacoa, Carlisle no information.
>CL old - Colombo, Caradoc, Cardiff, Ceres, Capetown, Frobisher,
> Hawkins, Danae, Dauntless, Dehli, Despatch, Diomede, Durban
No comment, finding the above information was hard enough and
the smaller the ship or the less fighting it did the less information
is
available.
>Fast Minelayer - Abdiel, Manxman, Welshman
As above.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.
Louis Capdeboscq
Louis Capdeboscq
> You have probably read the Navy Official History. However, just in
> case someone else is reading, I add some excerpts from volume VI,
"La
> Difesa del Traffico con l'Africa Settentrionale" [The defence of
> traffic with North Africa] by Adm. Aldo Cocchia, about port
> receptivity.
Thanks for the figures.
Yes, I had read it, and quoted it in a previous thread on North
African
logistics. Some relevant messages (warning: they're all fairly long
posts, particularly the last two):
http://groups.google.com/group/soc.history.war.world-war-ii/msg/b8acb0d4297a17b1
http://groups.google.com/group/soc.history.war.world-war-ii/msg/4e303a64203f6829
http://groups.google.com/group/soc.history.war.world-war-ii/msg/15e1d4cf59c49138
The last post has data from the Italian official histories, and I had
sent more to Geoffrey by private email, he uses it in his replies
(which
I don't quote, but you can follow the thread if you're interested).
> However by 1941, due to damage and attrition, capability had
dropped
> to 50% for Tripoli, and even less for Benghazi (recaptured and then
> lost again).
Yes, though Benghazi was later improved starting in early 1942.
> Giorgio Giorgerini's "La Guerra Italiana sul Mare" (a highly
> controversial book claiming that The Italians *_won_* the naval war
in
> the Mediterranean, by transporting safely in Lybia most of the
> embarked material) shows slightly different numbers:
Thanks, I didn't have these !
> Actually, a very great number of such "convoy" was formed by just a
> single cargo ship (with a lone, if any, escort).
Yes, and as we figured out with Geoffrey many of these cargo ships
weren't even fully loaded. Wether that's because they were
combat-loaded, to increase speed and reduce draft, or some other
reason
I haven't been able to find out yet.
Bill Shatzer
On Tue, 15 Nov 2005, Louis Capdeboscq wrote:
-snip-
> Let's remember that the two main advantages that horses had over
> trucks from the point of view of Germany and other belligerents were
> 1/ they were already available and could be requisitioned, 2/ they
> didn't use oil (or rubber).
One additional somewhat ancillary advantage of horses was that they
didn't require trained drivers and mechanics.
Horses, admittedly, required veterinarians but any farmboy could
drive horses and provide basic care without additional training.
And most horse aliments could be cured by simply resting them for
a while.
Cheers,
Michael Emrys
loui...@yahoo.com wrote on 11/15/05 11:55 AM:
> Other terrain isn't particularly easy on trucks (e.g. forest, trackless hills
> or mountains) but you can keep animals there.
Well, you *can*, but you'd need several hundred acres per animal if
you
aren't bringing feed along. There isn't much that grows in those kinds
of
terrain for a horse to eat, compared to grassland. Of course, the
situation
is not so acute if you are just moving quickly through an area rather
than
setting up housekeeping for an extended period. But even in that case,
a
fair amount of your time is going to be spent looking for something
for your
animals to eat and then letting them eat it. All in all, that's
probably a
satisfactory scenario for partisans, but I'd say that if you are an
army
unit of more than company strength, you'd better bring your own feed
and not
hope to do more than extend it a bit with whatever might be growing in
place.
Michael
Davide Pastore
> Yes, and as we figured out with Geoffrey many of these cargo ships
> weren't even fully loaded. Wether that's because they were
> combat-loaded, to increase speed and reduce draft, or some other
> reason I haven't been able to find out yet.
No combat-load AFAIK. Just a cocktail of haste and disorganization.
Davide Pastore
Thank you. Meanwhile I've searched the web for some info
about RN OOB (the problem is, too many links) and the
best I've found is:
http://www.lemaire.happyhost.org/
with its alphabetical index:
http://www.lemaire.happyhost.org/ship/edito/9907.html#18113
Of course it's not perfect.
>From the book Pedestal, it appears that Nelson and Rodney (with
a group of DDs which for the most part had been in PQ17) were in
Freetown (roughly, first days of August). What were they doing there?
> Anson was commissioned on 1 June 1942 and joined the home
> fleet on 29 August 1942.
Really? Just 70-90 days (my sources says commission was on
22 June) of training for a big BB?
David Thornley
Bill Shatzer <asp...@pacific.net.au> wrote:
>
>One additional somewhat ancillary advantage of horses was that they
>didn't require trained drivers and mechanics.
>
>Horses, admittedly, required veterinarians but any farmboy could
>drive horses and provide basic care without additional training.
>And most horse aliments could be cured by simply resting them for
>a while.
>
vehicles was that they didn't need veterinarians. The majority
of Americans could drive cars or trucks, and many were fair
amateur mechanics. By 1941, I suspect that more Americans could
drive trucks than horse-drawn wagons.
--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion,
ask.
da...@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-
Louis Capdeboscq
> "Louis Capdeboscq" ha scritto
>
> > Yes, and as we figured out with Geoffrey many of these cargo
ships
> > weren't even fully loaded. Wether that's because they were
> > combat-loaded, to increase speed and reduce draft, or some other
> > reason I haven't been able to find out yet.
>
> No combat-load AFAIK. Just a cocktail of haste and disorganization.
Sorry, I may not have been sufficiently clear.
I came upon explicit reference (in Italian sources) to ships sailing
on
half-load. This occurred repeatedly so can't have just been the
product
of haste and disorganization (as opposed to poor organization, but
that's another story).
No precise explanation was given (or if it was I missed it), but
reasons
invoked elsewhere and which might tie in were:
- Lack of sufficient stores in Italy itself. So a full load wasn't
available and it was decided to send the ship half-loaded rather than
wait for the depot to be fully-stocked ?
- Risk of Allied interception. So sending half-loaded ships would 1/
spread the risk in case of Allied attack, as well as 2/ increase
survivability (greater speed) ?
- Insufficient port capacity. Sending half-loaded ships might 1/
reduce
draft (a problem in Tobruk, at least at times, IIRC) and 2/ ease the
strain on port capacity if the half-load was also a combat load, i.e.
a
loading that would be inefficient in terms of utilizing the full cargo
capacity, but that would be far easier to unload.
Haste and disorganization were certainly part of it at times, but I'm
pretty sure that they don't explain everything.
Louis Capdeboscq
> Louis Capdeboscq
>>Other terrain isn't particularly easy on trucks (e.g. forest, trackless hills
>>or mountains) but you can keep animals there.
>
> Well, you *can*, but you'd need several hundred acres per animal if
> you aren't bringing feed along.
If I'm not bringing feed along *and* if I intend to keep the horses
there year round.
But horse-borne logistics allow me to bring feed along where trucks
can
go, that's the point.
> All in all, that's probably a
> satisfactory scenario for partisans, but I'd say that if you are an
> army unit of more than company strength, you'd better bring your own
> feed and not
> hope to do more than extend it a bit with whatever might be growing in
> place.
My point was that given the limits of WWII technology, there was still
an ecological niche for horse vs motorized units in certain terrains
like swamp, forrested, rough or semi-mountainous terrain.
This isn't to say that keeping horses there would be easy, just more
practicable than having WWII motor vehicles. Doubtless that these
horsemen would have preferred SUVs but they simply weren't available.
:-)
Louis Capdeboscq
> Of course, from the US point of view, one advantage of motor
> vehicles was that they didn't need veterinarians.
In the Wehrmacht, there was 1 veterinarian for 300 or 400 horses and 1
farrier for 250. The latter had a wagon serving as workshop. Smaller
mounted units (like mounted reconnaissance detachments in infantry
divisions) and mountain units had a portable forge that could fit on
two
pack horses; the farrier using this took care of 50-100 horses.
The cavalry support services in 1939 numbered 13,000 men, including
5,600 veterinarians, 3,700 farriers, 8,100 NCOs and other ranks; the
rest were officers.
I remember seeing a figure of 24,300 personnel tending in veterinary
units with the 1943 Ostheer.
Davide Pastore
> The Other Side of the Hill
Update, after further research (and help).
Sources: various bits and pieces collected from friends, plus:
- the website http://home.adelphia.net/~dryan67/orders/uk.html
(British Army 3 september 1939)
- "British Army in WW2, an organizational history"
- Stephen C. Spiteri, "British Military Architecture on Malta"
- Peter C. Smith, "Pedestal: The Malta Convoy of August 1942)
- Mike Spick, "Air Battles in Miniature"
- "After the Battle" #10 (Malta during WWII) 1975
- HPS boardgame "El Alamein" (maybe not a very scholastic source...).
INFANTRY
1939:
The Malta Brigade
- 2nd Btn, Devonshire Rgt
- 1st Btn, Dorsetshire Rgt
- 2nd Btn, Queen's Own Royal West Kent Rgt
- 2nd Btn, Royal Irish Fusiliers (Princess Victoria's) Rgt
Independent
- 1st Btn, King's Own Malta Regiment
1942 (early July):
Southern Command
- 2nd Btn, Devonshire Rgt
- 1st Btn, Dorsetshire Rgt
- 1st Btn, Hampshire Rgt
- 3rd Btn, Kings Own Malta Rgt
3 KOMR defended Wied iz-Zurrieq and the perimeters of Luqa,
Hal Far, Krendli.
Northern Command
- 8th Btn, Manchester Rgt
- 2nd Btn, Royal Irish Fusiliers (Princess Victoria's) Rgt
- 1st Btn, Kings Own Malta Rgt
- 2nd Btn, Kings Own Malta Rgt
1 KOMR defended the areas north of Bajda Ridge, Mellieha Ridge,
Mellieha Bay, Marfa Ridge.
2 KOMR defended Ghajn Tuffieha, Gnejna, St. Paul's Bay, Bugibba,
Bahar ic-Caghaq.
Central Command
- 2nd Btn, Queen's Own Royal West Kent Rgt
(D Coy was part of the Northern Command at some unspecified time)
- 11th Btn, Lancashire Fusiliers
- 10th Btn, Kings Own Malta Rgt
- 1st Btn, Cheshire Rgt
- Military Police Coy
1 Chesire was an MG battalion with 3 coys x 3 platoons x 4 Vickers MG,
plus 4th company x 4 platoons x 4 4.2" mortars (after Niehorster).
Western Command
- 4th Btn, The Buffs (Royal East Kent Rgt)
- 1st Btn, Durham Light Infantry
- 8th Btn, Kings Own Royal Rgt
TANK
1st Independent Troop, 44th Royal Tank Rgt, composed of:
- detachment of 7th Royal Tank Regt (4x Matilda II)
- detachment of 3rd (King's Own) Hussars (2x Vickers VIc)
ARTILLERY ETC.
1939 (with evolution => 1942):
16th Fortress Company RE
24th Fortress Company RE
4th H Rgt (6th, 10th, 23rd H Bty) RA
=> 4th Coast Rgt (6th, 10th Coast Bty) RA
7th HAA Rgt (10th, 13th HAA Bty) RA
26th AT Rgt (15th, 40th, 48th, 71st AT Bty) RA
=> 26th Defence Rgt (15th/40, 48th/71st Def Bty RA, 13th Def Bty
RMA)
(1942: 30x 3.7" & 6" howitzers; 18-pdr guns according to HPS)
1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th H Bty, RMA
=> 1st H Rgt, RMA
5th, 6th HAA Bty, RMA (6th might have had Bofors, see below)
=> 2nd HAA Rgt, RMA (?)
7th Searchlight Bty, RMA
=> 4th Searchlight Rgt, RA/RMA (1942: 64 searchlights)
Additions 1940-42:
12th Field Rgt (1939: 6th/23rd, 49th/91st, ?th Fld Bty) RA
(1942: 24x 25-pdr)
4th HAA Rgt (1939: 16th, 18th, 23rd HAA Bty) RA
10th HAA Rgt, RA
11th HAA Rgt, RMA
14th HAA (Relief) Bty, RMA
32nd LAA Rgt (1939: 55th, 98th, 103rd LAA Bty) RA
65th LAA Rgt, RA
74th LAA Rgt, RA
3rd LAA Rgt, RMA
225th LAA Bty, RA
ORGANIZATION OF THE COAST ARTILLERY
1) Outer Fire Command - 4th H / Coast Rgt RA
East coast:
- Fort Bingemma (1x 9.2" BL Mk X) - 1939: ?, 1942: 10th Coast Bty ?
- Fort Madalena (2x 9.2" BL Mk X) - 1939: ?, 1942: 10th Coast Bty ?
West coast:
- Fort San Leonardo (2x 9.2" BL Mk X) - 23rd H Bty until April 1942,
then 6th Coast Bty
- Fort Benghisa (2x 9.2" BL Mk X) - 1939: ?, 1942: 6th Coast Bty ?
2) Inner Fire Command - 1st H Rgt RMA
- 1st Bty (East coast):
Fort Delimara (2x 6" BL Mk VII)
Fort San Rocco (3x 6" BL Mk VII)
- 2nd Bty (West coast):
Fort Tigne (3x 6" BL Mk VII)
Fort Campbell (2x 6" BL Mk VII)
- 3rd Bty (Center):
Fort St. Elmo (12x 6pdr 10cwt QF Mk I)
Fort Ricasoli (6x 6pdr 10cwt QF Mk I)
- 4th Bty: ?
(Maybe Fort Ricasoli ? Maybe converted to AA ?)
ORGANIZATION OF THE AA ARTILLERY
In september 1939 there were 34 HAA guns and 8 Bofors.
At some unspecified time during 1942 there were 112 HAA guns
in 29 troops (27 x 4 + 2 x 2):
3" 20cwt - 3 troops x 4, 2 troops x 2, total 16
3.7" - 21 troops x 4, total 84
4.5" - 3 troops x 4, total 12
(1st - Fort San Giacomo, 2nd - Spinola Battery, 3rd - ?)
According to "British Army in WW2, an organizational history" :
4th HAA Rgt RA - 16x 3.7"
7th HAA Rgt RA - 20x 3.7", 4x 3"
10th HAA Rgt RA - 4x 4.5", 16x 3.7", 4x 3"
2nd HAA Rgt RMA - 16x 3.7"
11th HAA Rgt RMA - 6x (8x ?) 4.5, 16x 3.7", 7x (8x ?) 3"
Parenthesis are my guesses to make the total right with the other
source.
According to HPS, 2nd HAA Rgt RMA had 4th (old H ?) and 5th Bty,
while 11th HA Rgt RMA had 11th and 12th Bty.
There were also 118 Bofors (at some unspecified time in 1942).
According to "British Army in WW2", each LAA Rgt on Malta had (or
had to have) 36 Bofors (2 Bty x 3 Trp x 6 guns ?).
According to HPS, 3rd LAA Rgt RMA had 6th and 7th Bty.
AIR ASSETS
Number of planes after Smith, as per early August, but after "over a
hundred aircraft were flown in from the Middle East which increased
the RAF's nominal strength to 250 machines." The 192 planes shown
are just the ready ones at any time.
RAF Malta (Air Vice-Marshal Sir Keith Park)
Fighters:
126 Sqn - Spitfire Vc
185 Sqn - Spitfire Vc
249 Sqn - Spitfire Vc
603 Sqn - Spitfire Vc
1435 Sqn - Spitfire Vc
(about 100 planes)
detachment 89 Sqn - Beaufighter I (night fighters)
Torpedo Bombers:
detachment 235 Sqn - Beaufighter VI
detachment 248 Sqn - Beaufighter VI
detachment 252 Sqn - Beaufighter VI
(36 planes, including night fighters)
detachment 39 Sqn - Beaufort
detachment 86 Sqn - Beaufort
detachment 217 Sqn - Beaufort
(30 planes)
Naval Air Squadron Malta (828 and 830 Sqn.) - Albacore
(3 planes)
Bombers:
detachment 38 Sqn - Wellington
detachment 40 Sqn - Wellington
detachment 159 Sqn - Wellington
(3 planes)
? Sqn - Liberators
(2 planes)
55 Sqn - Baltimore
(2 planes)
Recon:
69 Sqn - Spitfire (IV ?), Baltimore
(6 + 5 planes)
203 Sqn - Maryland
(0? planes)
detachment 221 Sqn - Wellington VIII
(5 planes)
According to Spick, at the start of 1942 there were:
110 Hurricanes (81 ready)
36 Blenheim
40 Wellington
25 Swordfish & Albacore
16 Maryland
Spitfire arrivals during 1942 were:
15 - 07 March
9 - 21 March
7 - 29 March
46 - 20 April
60 - 9 May
17 - 18 May
27 - 3 June
32 - 9 June
31 - 16 July
28 - 21 July
37 - 11 August
29 - 17 August
29 - 24 October
Airfields
Due to its lenght, I've posted the relevant part (OCRed from
"After the Battle") in another post.
On Malta there were, in total, 27 miles of dispersal runway.
In April 1942 there were 358 pens, over 200 for fighters and
over 150 for bombers, built using for the most part earth-filled
4-gal petrol cans. A Wellington pen measured 100' x 100', 13 feet
high, and required 60,000 cans (along three sides) which, filled,
weighted more than 3,000 tons. The walls were 14 cans wide at
the base, and 2 cans wide at the top. 200 men could built it in
3 weeks. There were also 24 pens for road-rollers which,
according to Spick, represented the most important assets of
the RAF on the island, having plenty of work filling bomb
craters along the runways.
Radar Station:
(relaying information to the underground War Headquarters at
Lascaris Bastion)
241 AMES - Ghar Lapsi
242 AMES - Dingli Cliffs
501 AMES - Fort Tas-Slig
502 AMES - Fort Madliena
504 AMES - Dingli
521 AMES - Gozo
(?) AMES - Wardija
(?) AMES - Qawra
There was also an acoustic mirror (i.e., a *large* paraboloid wall
which could concentrate sound waves in its focus) built in stone at
Ta' San Pietro during the 30s, aimed in direction of Catania and able
(in theory) to detect approaching planes at 25 miles.
NAVAL ASSETS
(after Smith)
DD Matchless
DE Badsworth
(both damaged during Harpoon, stayed at La Valletta for repairs,
ready at an unknown date but however before Pedestal)
17th Minesweeping Flotilla: Speedy, Rye, Hebe, Hythe
3rd Motor Launch Flotilla: ML.121, ML.126, ML.134, ML.135,
ML.168, ML.459, ML.462
10th Submarine Flotilla: Safari, Unbroken, Uproar, Ultimatum,
Unruffled, Utmost, United, Una, P.222
Davide Pastore
> Regia Marina OOBs
Update.
These are the *probable* Italian naval assets that would have
been employed in C3, according to plans formalized in May
1942 (and taking into account actual ship availability on 12 July,
my chosen landing date).
The picture of battleships and cruisers is more or less the real
one (but see notes). However, the endlessy-swapping destroyers
are more difficult to fix in place, and this is just my best
conjecture (being an average between June and August OOB,
plus some wild guesses of mine). Smaller vessels are nearly
impossible to pinpoint with any accuracy, and I just listed
the units scheduled in May plans.
REGIA MARINA - situation on morning, 12 July 1942
1? Squadra (Iachino) - Western waters, against Gibraltar forces
9? Divisione (Fioravanzo) - Napoli
BB - Veneto (Flag), Cesare [#1]
12? Squadriglia
DD - Legionario, Ascari, Fuciliere, Corsaro [#2]
[#1 - Littorio being at repairs until August, 9? Div. was a bit on
the weak side. Due to its outdated AA armament, Cesare would
probably not have taken part in the preliminary bombardment
action of Malta by 5? Div. - the sources are unclear on this point -
so she *might* have been employed here, although somewhat
slowing Veneto]
[#2 - New construction, date of operativity unclear. Maybe still
training]
7? Divisione (Da Zara) - Cagliari
CL - Eugenio (Flag), Montecuccoli, Regolo [#3]
10? Squadriglia
DD - Oriani, Gioberti, Maestrale, Premuda
[#3 - Attendolo finished repairs on 10 July, but the following day
during trials a steam pipe burst, forcing further works until 21 July.
Regolo, currently unemployed, *might* have taken its place]
2? Squadra (Bergamini) - Eastern waters, against Alexandria forces
5? Divisione (Bergamini) - Messina [#4]
BB - Duilio (Flag), Doria
14? Squadriglia
DD - Malocello, Da Recco
15? Squadriglia
DD - Pigafetta, Da Verazzano, Zeno
[#4 - This formation would have bombarded Maltese targets]
3? Divisione (Parona) - Messina
CA - Gorizia (Flag), Bolzano, Trieste [#5]
11? Squadriglia
DD - Camicia Nera, Aviere, Geniere, Grecale
[#5 - The exact date on which Trieste finished repairs is unclear,
and *might* not have been ready at this date. In such case, one DD
of 11? Sq. would probably transfer to 12? Sq., Veneto's escort]
8? Divisione (De Courten) - Augusta
CL - Garibaldi (Flag), Abruzzi, Aosta
13? Squadriglia
DD - Corazziere, Bersagliere, Alpino, Mitragliere
Forza Navale Speciale (Tur)
11? Divisione (Tur) ["Famagosta" beach]
DE - Procione (Flag)
12? Divisione (Biancheri) ["Cipro" beach]
DE - Orione (Flag)
Kriegsmarine forces (Weichold) ["Larnaca" beach]
DD - ZG3 (Flag)
Forces:
1? Squadriglia
DD - Euro, Turbine
7? Squadriglia
DD - Freccia, Dardo, Saetta
8? Squadriglia
DD - Folgore, Lampo
4? Squadriglia
DE - Pegaso, Orsa
plus minor forces [#6]
plus German forces [#7]
[#6 - According to plans of May: 17x TB, 13x MS, 23x MAS,
9x VAS, 12x minesweepers and the armed yacht Diana, all in
Sicilian waters. Plus, coming from Greece and Aegean waters
if required, 10x TB and 28x MAS, plus DD Crispi and Sella]
[#7 - Details unclear. Still researching]
CJ Adams
no-one who has ever done stables in the dark of a winter morning, cold
fingers fumbling with a frozen dock sponge, will fail to see the
advantages of internal combustion.
Cheers
CJ Adams
Arte et Marte
Davide Pastore
> No precise explanation was given (or if it was I missed it), but
> reasons invoked elsewhere and which might tie in were:
> - Lack of sufficient stores in Italy itself. So a full load wasn't
> available and it was decided to send the ship half-loaded rather than
> wait for the depot to be fully-stocked ?
Mmh... yes and no. Italian efforts in WW2 was often VERY poorly
organized, and actually there was a lot of weapons and other
materials available but never sent to the front. In late 1943 the
Germans, after the occupation of north-central Italy, were
amazed at the quantity of weapons and materials they have found
in stores and magazines - in a country which had loudly called for
German help for three years. But, while there was plenty of
stuff to send to Africa, its distribution structure was so inefficient
that some ships might have started with incomplete load, tired
to wait for days or weeks. Moreover, for most of the war the
Lybian front was in a state of perpetual emergency, and
waiting in port would have been difficult if not impossible,
under the continuous urge.
> - Risk of Allied interception. So sending half-loaded ships would 1/
> spread the risk in case of Allied attack, as well as 2/ increase
> survivability (greater speed) ?
I don't think so. I don't think a cargo ship's speed is much affected
by the amount of its load. Actually, in the return trip is it normal
practice, if no cargo is available, to carry a good amount of ballast.
[Note. I recall I've read somewhere about a visionary Italian
industrialist who, during the 1930s, had conceived the idea
of amassing some rare mineral with could have future industrial
applications. The mineral was carried by Italian cargo ships
during the return trip, as ballast (rocks), at token cost if not for
free althogeter. I don't remember the kind of mineral, but ISTM
it was something like wolfram or molybdenum (or another exotic
name). By 1940 this industrial had amassed a veritable little
mountain, but was unable to interest the Italian government in it,
and it was eventually "discovered" by Germans]
> - Insufficient port capacity. Sending half-loaded ships might 1/
> reduce draft (a problem in Tobruk, at least at times, IIRC)
This seems a valid point.
> and 2/ ease the strain on port capacity if the half-load was also
> a combat load, i.e. a loading that would be inefficient in terms
> of utilizing the full cargo capacity, but that would be far easier
> to unload.
I'm less sure about this. ISTM that a single ship with 2,000 tons
of stuff amassed in the hold will require less unloading time
that two ships - one at a time - with 1,000 tons each carefully
stacked. After all, the unloading work is just to amass anything
on the wharf!! Combat-load has a validity in amphibious
landing operations, when there is not a wharf, nor a port.
Michael Emrys
loui...@yahoo.com wrote on 11/17/05 12:59 PM:
> My point was that given the limits of WWII technology, there was still
> an ecological niche for horse vs motorized units in certain terrains like
> swamp, forrested, rough or semi-mountainous terrain.
Sure, as long as you bring some feed along and don't linger too long
in one
spot. That sounds like normal cavalry ops during WW II to me. Better
keep
your artillery on the light side though.
Michael
Geoffrey Sinclair
>http://www.lemaire.happyhost.org/
>with its alphabetical index:
>http://www.lemaire.happyhost.org/ship/edito/9907.html#18113
>Of course it's not perfect.
Thanks for the information.
>From the book Pedestal, it appears that Nelson and Rodney (with
>a group of DDs which for the most part had been in PQ17) were in
>Freetown (roughly, first days of August). What were they doing there?
Most probably trying to keep the axis guessing, rather than assembling
the whole force in England, which would be a real give away if
spotted.
http://members.fortunecity.com/rwbrown1942/Busterssite/id18.html
http://www.homestead.com/nelson1/OperationPedestal.html
Destroyers in the convoy covering force,
Laforey, Lightening, Lookout, Quentin, Somali , Eskimo, Tartar,
Ithuriel, Antilope, Wishart, Wescott, Wrestler, Zetland, Wilton
Convoy escort,
Ashanti, Intrepid, Icarus, Foresight, Fury, Pathfinder, Penn,
Derwent, Bramham, Bicester, Ledbury.
Force Y,
Matchless, Badsworth,
Force W,
Keppel, Malcolm, Venomous, Wolverine, Vidette.
http://www.convoyweb.org.uk/russian/index.html?convoy1.php?convoy=PQ.17~rumain
The only overlap in destroyers appears to be,
ASHANTI, FURY, KEPPEL, LEDBURY
>> Anson was commissioned on 1 June 1942 and joined the home
>> fleet on 29 August 1942.
>
>Really? Just 70-90 days (my sources says commission was on
>22 June) of training for a big BB?
I checked the date I wrote was incorrect, it should have been the
22nd,
I turned a June 1942 into a 1 June 1942.
In wartime, yes. Note Prince of Wales was commissioned on 31 March
1941, and fought Bismarck on 24 May.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Davide Pastore wrote in message
>"Louis Capdeboscq" <loui...@yahoo.com> ha scritto
(snip)
>> and 2/ ease the strain on port capacity if the half-load was also
>> a combat load, i.e. a loading that would be inefficient in terms
>> of utilizing the full cargo capacity, but that would be far easier
>> to unload.
>
>I'm less sure about this. ISTM that a single ship with 2,000 tons
>of stuff amassed in the hold will require less unloading time
>that two ships - one at a time - with 1,000 tons each carefully
>stacked. After all, the unloading work is just to amass anything
>on the wharf!! Combat-load has a validity in amphibious
>landing operations, when there is not a wharf, nor a port.
The capacity of a port is the lower of available berths, available
labour/cranes and available transport from the wharves.
Assuming the labour is available then unloading rates are
determined by the number of hatches available and the cranes
available per hatch.
So a single ship with 2,000 tons can unload at the same rate
as it would with 1,000 tons, assuming the same cargo and
port facilities.
On the other hand of you have the labour and the berths and the
cranes then two ships can be unloaded at twice the rate as
one ship, assuming the same number of hatches on each ship.
Note stevedores talk in terms of "hatch rates".
Combat loading, or perhaps in this case no extensive crating, is
what you require for a quick usage of the cargo after unloading.
So for example all the trucks are on wheels, instead of being
crated, which means the ship can take much less cargo. This
saves the work to crate and uncrate the goods, which, given the
time to sail between Italy and Africa would be a significant increase
in the time the cargo is "in transit" between the port depots in
Europe and those in Africa. It would also cost labour in North
Africa, which would require its own supplies. It is a trade off
against lower utilisation of ship cargo capacity.
So, given the time and effort to crate and uncrate cargo, the amount
of cargo to ship relative to the shipping, and the dangers of the
North
African ports and the seas between Italy and North Africa, it made
sense to spread the cargo over more hulls, for insurance and to enable
quicker turn around in North Africa.
It took the US Army until well into 1943 to have its sea cargo
shipping
system working well. As a result I am not surprised the Italian
system
had problems.
Davide Pastore
>>From the book Pedestal, it appears that Nelson and Rodney (with
>>a group of DDs which for the most part had been in PQ17) were in
>>Freetown (roughly, first days of August). What were they doing there?
>
> Most probably trying to keep the axis guessing, rather than assembling
> the whole force in England, which would be a real give away if
> spotted.
This seems to me *very* strange. Sending a couple of precious
battleships half an ocean far, and then return, risking a close
encounter
with an U-boote in both trips (to say nothing of mechanical attrition,
in ships scheduled for an important action immediately thereafter)
just to confuse the enemy? I'm still convinced they had some precise
duty to perform. Moreover, Smith says: "...and it was decided to
use the Nelson and the Rodney who were then at Freetown. They
were immediately sailed back to Scapa Flow"
> The only overlap in destroyers appears to be,
> ASHANTI, FURY, KEPPEL, LEDBURY
According to the site lemarie.happy etc. etc., PQ17 included also
Tartar and Somali. Of course, it might be an error.
According to Smith, when sailing from Scapa Flow Nelson and
Rodney were escorted by 6th Destroyer Flotilla, consisting then
of Ashanti, Tartar, Eskimo, Somali, Pathfinder, Penn and Quentin.
(Actually there is nothing in the book saying explicitly that these
same DDs were also at Freetown - it's just a guess of mine)
>>Really? Just 70-90 days (my sources says commission was on
>>22 June) of training for a big BB?
>
> In wartime, yes. Note Prince of Wales was commissioned on 31
> March 1941, and fought Bismarck on 24 May.
That was an emergency (but of course, with KGV damaged and
Tirpitz ready, this one may look as an emergency too). Bismarck,
commissioned 24 August 1940, was declared "ready for action"
only on 16 January 1941 (Bercuson & Herwig, "Bismarck").
Louis Capdeboscq
> "Louis Capdeboscq" ha scritto
>
> > No precise explanation was given (or if it was I missed it), but
> > reasons invoked elsewhere and which might tie in were:
>
> > - Lack of sufficient stores in Italy itself. So a full load
wasn't
> > available and it was decided to send the ship half-loaded rather
> > than wait for the depot to be fully-stocked ?
>
> Mmh... yes and no. Italian efforts in WW2 was often VERY poorly
> organized, and actually there was a lot of weapons and other
materials
> available but never sent to the front.
That is not necessarily contradictory. I should have phrased my
point=20
better by writing "at the Italian end" rather than "in Italy". That
the=20
Italian depot at Naples or Brindisi might be empty would be all
that=20
mattered to the shipping authority, never mind how many tons of the=20
stuff are sitting around idle in a Turin depot (and under custody of
the=20
Army which would be loathe to part with any of it !).
Taking one of the recently-read (and therefore most
easily-available)=20
Italian histories from the shelves, Ogliari's "Storia Dei Trasporti=20
Militare", Terre d'Oltremare vol V I find the following (p.1763):
"Per la semplice sopravvivenza vi =E8 necessit=E0 di 24.000
tonnellate=20
mensili di rifornimenti a cui si aggiungono altre 20.000 tonnellate
di=20
munizioni, materiali e carburanti per un'eventuale offensiva. Altre=20
60.000 tonnellate mensili occorrono alla popolazione civile italiana
in=20
Libia. In complesso, quindi, oltre 104.000 tonnellate mensili mentre
le=20
attrezzature portuali di Tripoli consentono lo scarico di sole
45.000=20
tonnellate.
La gravit=E0 =E8 ancora pi=F9 evidente in quanto in Italia no si
riesce a=
=20
produrre l'enorme materiale necessario in Libia e che i convogli
navali=20
sono spesso caricati solo parzialmente per la disorganizzazione=20
esistente nei comandi che, per sordidi rancori, or per "intelligenza
con=20
il nemico" si contrastano fra loro."
The first paragraph says that requirements were 104,000t of
shipments=20
monthly: 24,000 tons of supply, plus another 20k of ammunition, fuel
and=20
equipment for a possible attack, and 60k for the Italian civilians
in=20
Libya. The problem being that Tripoli was only rated for a maximum
of=20
45.000 tons.
The second paragraph says that in addition to that Italy doesn't=20
"produce" these large amounts, forcing the convoys to leave
partially=20
loaded, though the disorganization & petty rancors of the commands=20
involved (as opposed to the valiant troops at the front) is also=20
mentioned as a factor.
It's indeed possible that "produce" could be taken to mean, as in=20
English, "make available" i.e. Italy actually "produced" (in
Italian=20
factories) the necessary equipment but didn't make it available.
That=20
isn't how I would interpret it but I may be influenced by the fact
that=20
this meaning of "produce" doesn't exist in French or Spanish so I=20
extrapolated it to be the same for Italian. Perhaps you could
clarify...
> In late 1943 the
> Germans, after the occupation of north-central Italy, were amazed
at
> the quantity of weapons and materials they have found in stores and
> magazines - in a country which had loudly called for German help
for
> three years.
There are a lot of such stories like Rommel easing his supply
problems=20
in early 1942, not because the convoys had picked up (though they
were=20
on their way to) but because an Italian cache of 13,000 tons of fuel
had=20
been discovered. Partly this is poor organization, but I think it runs
a=20
bit deeper than that.
The first factor is German willingness to go the limit. There is a=20
cultural emphasis on maximum effort, fighting to the last cartridge
of=20
the last man, etc. Most other countries also paid lipservice to the
same=20
principle, but the Germans actually implemented it to a greater
extent=20
than the others. This cultural factor also helps explain generally=20
superior German aggressiveness as well as some strategic choices
like=20
systematically fighting it out until it became impossible to resist
any=20
longer (e.g. Normandy).
The second factor, and just as important in my opinion, is the=20
distinction between a peripheral theater and the main one. All=20
organizations will husband reserves to defend their core areas. The=20
Italians were not going to lose their whole Army + Navy + Airforce
to=20
defend Tripoli. So the Italian state maintained reserves to
militarily=20
defend the mainland as well as for other important sovereignty
tasks=20
like fighting domestic uprising, keeping the Germans at arm's length
etc.
On the other hand, from the German point of view Italy was a
peripheral=20
theater so there was no point in maintaining strategic reserves and
the=20
Wehrmacht was willing to run them down, as well as to fight over
every=20
inch of the Italian peninsula. Germany itself maintained sufficient
fuel=20
stocks to allow for a greater effort by the Regia Marina, so
technically=20
Rommel could have been better-supported. But the Germans just chose
not=20
to release those stocks, just like the Italians had.
The combination of these two factors is in my opinion of far
greater=20
weight than Italian administrative ineptness.
> But, while there was plenty of
> stuff to send to Africa, its distribution structure was so
inefficient
> that some ships might have started with incomplete load, tired to
wait
> for days or weeks. Moreover, for most of the war the Lybian front
was
> in a state of perpetual emergency, and waiting in port would have
been
> difficult if not impossible, under the continuous urge.
>
>
> > - Risk of Allied interception. So sending half-loaded ships would
1/
> > spread the risk in case of Allied attack, as well as 2/ increase
> > survivability (greater speed) ?
>
> I don't think so. I don't think a cargo ship's speed is much
affected
> by the amount of its load. Actually, in the return trip is it
normal
> practice, if no cargo is available, to carry a good amount of
ballast.
A ship sailing empty has far inferior seagoing capabilities than a=20
loaded one, however once the load is sufficient that the propellers
are=20
deep enough (water density is better at depth, so more "bite" from
the=20
props) and stability isn't impaired (i.e. crosswinds don't affect=20
steering, ship has better inertia to go through waves) then the
extra=20
load does slow it down. Not by a lot, but every little bit helps I=20
suppose. I'm not claiming that this was a factor, because again I
don't=20
know what the actual Italian motives were. I was just listing a list
of=20
possible explanations. IMO that one counts though as you noted it's
not=20
necessarily an important factor.
And yes, I've been in an (Italian) cargo ship that was sailing empty
in=20
a storm and the crew had no end of trouble. Not because they were=20
Italian wimps - the captain in particular was an excellent seaman -
but=20
because they couldn't even maintain course due to the hull being
pushed=20
downwind.
> > - Insufficient port capacity. Sending half-loaded ships might 1/
> > reduce draft (a problem in Tobruk, at least at times, IIRC)
>
> This seems a valid point.
I know for a fact that ocean-going ships unloaded at Tobruk, though
they=20
may have been half-loaded. The Kriegsmarine considered the port=20
unsuitable to supply DAK/PAA with, and mostly coastal shipping was
used=20
there.
> > and 2/ ease the strain on port capacity if the half-load was also
a
> > combat load, i.e. a loading that would be inefficient in terms of
> > utilizing the full cargo capacity, but that would be far easier
to
> > unload.
>
> I'm less sure about this. ISTM that a single ship with 2,000 tons
of
> stuff amassed in the hold will require less unloading time that two
> ships - one at a time - with 1,000 tons each carefully stacked.
After
> all, the unloading work is just to amass anything on the wharf!!
> Combat-load has a validity in amphibious landing operations, when
> there is not a wharf, nor a port.
Combat loading isn't just about making amphibious assaults. Here
are=20
some definitions from a US field manual (1966 FM 101-10-1)
BEGIN QUOTE
7-50 Military Loading Methods
Military cargo is loaded on board ships according to its intended=20
employment at its destination. There are four distinct types of
military=20
loading.
a. Combat Loading. Combat loading gives primary consideration to
the=20
facility with which troops, equipment, and supplies can be unloaded
and=20
ready for combat on landing, rather than to the economical
utilization=20
of ship space. There are three methods of combat loading. (...)
(1) Combat unit loading ... is the loading of an assault troop
unit,=20
together withs its essential combat equipment and supplies, in a
single=20
ship in such a manner that the unit will be available to support
the=20
tactical plan upon debarkation and to provide for maximum flexibility
to=20
meet possible changes in the tactical plan.
(2) Combat organizational loading ... is the loading of a troop
unit=20
with its equipment and supplies on the same ship, in such a manner as
to=20
be available for unloading in a predetermined order. ... This method
is=20
more economical in ship space than combat unit loading.
(3) Combat spread loading ... is th eloading of some of the troops,=20
equipment, and initial supplies of a unit on one ship and the
remainder=20
on one or more ships. This method is commonly used with troop units
with=20
heavy equipment. ...
b. Administrative Loading ... is a method of loading troops and/or=20
equipment and supplies in a ship for maximum utilization of
personnel=20
and cargo space. ... Therefore, equipment and supplies must be
unloaded=20
and sorted before they can be used.
c. Commodity Loading ... is a method of loading in which various
types=20
of cargo, such as ammunition, rations, or boxed vehicles, are
loaded=20
together in order that each commodity can be discharged without=20
disturbing the others.
d. Selective Loading ... is the arrangement and stowage of equipment
and=20
supplies aboard a ship in a manner designed to facilitate issue to=20
units. Specific items may be discharged on call.
END QUOTE
So when you're short of shipping - as the Allies generally were -
you=20
want to cram as much stuff as possible into each ship so as to
optimize=20
cargo space. This results on a greater strain for port
installations=20
since the cargo takes longer to load, then it has to be unloaded,=20
sorted, assembled etc.
On the other hand, when shipping isn't a problem you can use combat=20
loading. This means that units are available immediately after
unloading=20
for tactical use (as opposed to having to draw their equipment,
regroup,=20
and generally sort themselves out). It also means less work for the
port=20
installations since figuratively speaking the units walk/drive off
the=20
ship and can directly move away toward the battlefield. So the port=20
installations only have to unload the ship by putting the cargo
ashore=20
rather than having to unload the ship AND manhandle the cargo to
various=20
depots AND sort it out, etc.
As the Axis had enough shipping available but was short of other
things=20
like port capacity, as well as unable to afford too much time in
port=20
(due to the risk of Allied air attacks), then combat-loading would
make=20
sense.
Of course, this is just speculation.
--=20
Andrew Clark
"Davide Pastore" <davide....@alice.it> wrote
> I'm still convinced they had some precise
> duty to perform.
Nelson and Rodney were used to escort troop convoys from UK
to Cape Town in the summer of 1942, based on Freetown. That
made them on hand for Pedestal in August 1942.
Davide Pastore
> Nelson and Rodney were used to escort troop convoys from UK
> to Cape Town in the summer of 1942, based on Freetown.
VERY interesting. Have you any precise info about the timing
of their trips?
Davide Pastore
>> Nelson and Rodney were used to escort troop convoys from UK
>> to Cape Town in the summer of 1942, based on Freetown.
>
> VERY interesting. Have you any precise info about the timing
> of their trips?
After some web search
( http://www.convoyweb.org.uk/index.html & others)
I came upon a few possible candidates:
Convoy WS 20 (transported 51st Division from UK in Egypt)
escorted by: CA Shropshire, CL Frobisher
http://uboat.net/allies/warships/ship/1210.html
UK (?) - Freetown (?) - Capetown (July 18) - Aden (?) - Suez (?)
Convoy WS 21 (transported unspecified troops)
escorted by: CL Hawkins, DD Petard, DE Catterick
http://www.warsailors.com/convoys/ws21.html
UK (July 30) - Freetown (August 10 / 15) - Capetown (August 27) -
- Aden (September 9) - Suez (?)
Convoy WS 21P (transported unspecified troops)
escorted by: unknown
http://www.warsailors.com/convoys/ws21p.html
UK (July 15) - Freetown (July 25 / August 1) - Capetown (August 14) -
- Aden (August 29) - Suez (?)
However, upon further reflection, Nelson and Rodney seems a bit
on the heavy side as 1942 South Atlantic escort. Which danger
were they to counter? (The Jean Bart, maybe?)
Louis Capdeboscq
> Davide Pastore wrote:
> > Mmh... yes and no. Italian efforts in WW2 was often VERY poorly
> > organized, and actually there was a lot of weapons and other
> materials
> > available but never sent to the front.
>
> That is not necessarily contradictory. I should have phrased my
> point=20
> better by writing "at the Italian end" rather than "in Italy".
Not quite sure how I can help with the formatting, some of my posts
appear ok, others are illegible with formatting problem. In that case
it
was partly my fault as I left the accents in the Italian text, but the
=20 stuff is anoying.
Anyway, I found two other references to ships going at half load. The
first was an Italian conference mentioning how a given fuel load was
spread among more tankers than would have been strictly necessary, so
as
1/ to spread the risk i.e. one tanker sunk meant a smaller fraction of
the fuel was lost, and 2/ to improve tanker survivability if hit.
The second was Sadkovich's history of the Italian navy which also
mentions ships sailing with what was available and shortages in
Italian
production accounting for empty depots in Italy. It's possible - even
likely - that both Sadkovich and Ogliari were getting their
information
from the same source.
LC
--
Cub Driver
<loui...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>the
>
>=20 stuff is anoying.
On one or two days recently, all my posts had -20's in them. Then it
went away. I assumed it was something at the moderators' end, since it
affected no other newsgroup than this.
-- all the best, Dan Ford
email: usenet AT danford DOT net
Warbird's Forum: www.warbirdforum.com
Piper Cub Forum: www.pipercubforum.com
the blog: www.danford.net
In Search of Lost Time: www.readingproust.com
Michael Emrys
davide....@alice.it wrote on 11/23/05 12:51 AM:
> However, upon further reflection, Nelson and Rodney seems a bit on the heavy
> side as 1942 South Atlantic escort. Which danger were they to counter? (The
> Jean Bart, maybe?)
Just guessing, but was it still felt that there might be a significant
threat from the Japanese fleet in the Western Indian Ocean at that
late
date?
Michael
PaulJ
> from time to time aiming for exact points on a tank dosen't look very
> practical, you just sought of smother the area and hope for the best.
Absolutely. Given the vagaries of firing in combat (especially at
fleeting targets, from a jinking bouncing aircraft), the general
mantra
pounded into service personnel of all stripes is aim for "the centre
of
visible mass".
Or at least, that's what was pounded into me. There's no fancy
picking
out of special spots, or "aim for their legs" a la Hollywood. Its
always, in all cases, as an immediate reaction, aim for the centre of
visible mass.
But that raises an interesting question: can anyone document actual
guidance or direction to pick out any specific aiming points on any
sort
of target in WWII?
Davide Pastore
> Just guessing, but was it still felt that there might be a significant
> threat from the Japanese fleet in the Western Indian Ocean at that
> late date?
Sure, but Freetown seems a bit distant!!
Davide Pastore
> Royal Navy Assets
Update.
Royal Navy assets, available for Malta support, on 12 July 1942.
For Malta, Gibraltar and Alexandria I've listed all ships; for
other ports I've listed only fast and modern units, excluding
older major ships, DEs, and all DDs less than recent.
[d?] = damaged during Harpoon / Vigorous operation in June.
Unsure of the actual availability on C3 date.
(?) = doubtful
Malta (remnants of Harpoon convoy):
DD - Matchless [d?]
DE - Badsworth [d?]
Mediterranean Fleet, Alexandria:
CL - Arethusa [d?]
CLAA - Cleopatra, Dido, Euryalus, Coventry, Carlisle (?)
DD - Hero, Sikh, Zulu, Javelin, Jervis, Kelvin, Pakenham, Paladin,
Conduriotis (?), Spetsai (?), Vasilissa Olga (?)
DE - Aldenham [d?], Avon Vale (?), Beaufort, Croome, Dulverton,
Eridge, Exmoor, Hursley, Hurworth, Tetcott
Force H, Gibraltar:
CV - Eagle
BB - Malaya
CLAA - Charybdis, Cairo
ML - Welshman (?)
DD - Antelope, Escapade, Partridge [d?]
DE - Vansittart, Vidette, Westcott, Wrestler, Wishart
Home Fleet, Scapa Flow:
CV - Victorious
BB - Duke of York
BC - Renown (?)
CA - Berwick, Cumberland, Kent, London, Norfolk, Suffolk (?)
CL - Manchester, Glasgow, Kenya, Nigeria, Gambia (?)
CLAA - Phoebe (?), Curacoa (?), Sirius (?)
DD - Ashanti, Eskimo, Somali, Tartar, Loyal (?), Marne, Martin,
Myrmidon (?), Nonpareil (?), Nepal (?), Offa, Onslow, Oribi,
Pathfinder, Penn, Quentin, Isaac Sweers (?), Blyskawica (?), Piorun
(?)
Freetown:
BB - Nelson, Rodney
Escorts - ?
Eastern Fleet, Diego Suarez and/or Maldives (unsure of the actual
location of the Eastern Fleet. I've supposed it was in one or both
of these two bases):
CV - Formidable, Indomitable
CA - Devonshire
CL - Mauritius, Tromp (?)
CLAA - Jacob van Heemskerk (?)
DD - Laforey, Lightning, Lookout, Napier (?), Nizam (?), Norman (?),
Panther
Evaluation of RN cruising speed
Except for a few specific ships (Nelson, Rodney, Malaya, Eagle),
by and large the speed of every RN formation would have been set
by its escorts. Surfing my sources (admittedly, not very exhaustive)
I collected the following information about cruising range:
- Tribal class: 5,700nm/15kts - 3,200nm/20kts
- A to L classes: 5,500nm/15kts
- Hunt class: 2,500nm/20kts
The two Tribal values are near-exactly (less than 0.2% difference)
proportional to the inverse of the respective squared speed, i.e.,
at 20kts the cruising range is very similar to: 5,700 x (15^2 / 20^2).
Assuming this handy formula holds true for the entire useful speed
spectrum, the cruising range at speed N for a typical (5,500nm/15kts)
DD will be: 5,500 x (15^2 / N^2) or:
3,088nm/20kts - 2,806/21 - 2,557/22 - 2,339/23 - 2,148/24 -
- 1,980/25 - 1,831/26 - 1,698/27 - 1,578/28 - 1,471/29 - 1,375/30
While the cruising range for Hunt class will be:
2,500nm/20kts - 2,272/21 - 2,070/22 - 1,894/23 - 1,740/24 -
- 1,603/25 - 1,482/26
This is (of course) a huge simplification. If anyone happens to have
access to more precise information, please let me know.
Distances between selected RN bases (Google Earth misuration):
#01) Gibraltar-Malta (C3 beachheads): 1,000nm
#02) Gibraltar-Malta and return, plus 100nm battle cruise, without
refuelling at La Valletta: 2,100nm
Max cruising speed: DD 24kts, DE 22kts
(the return trip might have been slower, with less fuel consumption,
but this is counterbalanced by the higher speed during the combat
phase in Malta waters)
#3) Scapa Flow-Gibraltar: 1,760nm
DD 26kts
#4) Freetown-Gibraltar: 2,290nm
DD 23kts
#5) Alexandria-Malta: 820nm
#6) Alexandria-Malta and return, plus 100nm battle cruise, without
refuelling at La Valletta: 1,740nm
DD 26kts, DE 24kts
#7) Aden-Alexandria: 1,560nm
DD 28kts
#8) Maldive-Aden: 1,770nm
DD 26kts
#9) Diego Suarez-Aden: 1,870nm
DD 25kts
Estimate Time of Arrival (ETA)
C3 amphibious fleet would have assembled in the starting ports on
10 July, a thing RAF recon planes could not have missed. So RN
would have had some time to ready its ships, and prepare them to
sail at short notice.
The invasion would have started on 12 July at 05:00 (first airdrop).
There is an inevitable short delay before departure (raising steam
etc.)
of about 6 hours (my wild guess) so the ships would have exit ports
at 11:00 on 12 July (12-11:00).
Units from Atlantic and Indian Oceans would have required one or
two intermediate refuels (at Gibraltar, Aden and Alexandria) losing
about 12 hours for each stop (another wild guess of mine).
The transit across Suez Canal would have required a further 24h
delay (third guess).
#A) Gibraltar-Malta (1,000nm)
Charybdis, Cairo, DDs (24kts)
Duration 42h, ETA 14-05:00
#B) Gibraltar-Malta (1,000nm)
Malaya, Argus, DEs (20kts - speed limited by BB/CV)
Duration 50h, ETA 14-13:00
#C) Scapa Flow-Gibraltar-Malta (1,760+1,000nm)
Modern ships escorted by DDs (26kts, then 24kts)
Duration 122h (68+12+42), ETA 17-13:00
#D) Freetown-Gibraltar-Malta (2,290+1,000nm)
Nelson, Rodney, escorts (20kts - speed limited by BB)
Duration 177h (115+12+50), ETA 19-20:00
#E) Alexandria-Malta (820nm)
Arethusa, CLAAs, DDs (26kts)
Duration 32h, ETA 13-19:00
#F) Alexandria-Malta (820nm)
As above, but also escorted by DEs (24kts)
Duration 34h, ETA 13-21:00
#G) Maldive-Aden-Alexandria-Malta (1,770+1,560+820
Modern ships escorted by DDs (26, then 28, then 26kts)
Duration 204h (68+12+56+24+12+32), ETA 20-23:00
#H) Diego Suarez-Aden-Alexandria-Malta (1,870+1,560+820
Modern ships escorted by DDs (25, then 28, then 26kts)
Duration 211h (75+12+56+24+12+32), ETA 21-06:00
Summary
12-05:00 - 1st airdrop
[6h delay]
12-11:00 - RN exits from various ports
[17h delay]
13-04:00 - 1st amphibious landing
[15h delay]
13-19:00 - arrival from Alexandria (fast)
[2h delay]
13-21:00 - arrival from Alexandria (slow)
[8h delay]
14-05:00 - arrival from Gibraltar (fast)
[8h delay]
14-13:00 - arrival from Gibraltar (slow)
[72h delay]
17-13:00 - arrival from Scapa Flow (along with a second sortie
of Gibraltar units ?)
[55h delay]
19-20:00 - arrival from Freetown
[27h delay]
20-23:00 - arrival from Maldive (along with a second sortie
of Alexandria units ?)
[7h delay]
21-06:00 - arrival from Diego Suarez
However, by this time the land battle would have been raging for
nearly nine days. Or more probably, it would have ended a few days
before, with either the attackers being bloody repulsed or having
overwhelmed the defenders.
So it seems that only the ships present in Gibraltar and Alexandria at
the time of landing would have a chance to influence the land battle.
Italian 1? Squadra would have prefer to meet the Gibraltar force in
the most favourable position, right south of Sardinia: after some
700nm navigation, 29h in the fast option, the RN cruisers would
have been there at 13-16:00.
Italian 2? Squadra could have instead met the Alexandria force the
previous morning, somewhere southwest of Greece and more or
less at the far edge of friendly air cover, although luckily there
were
no enemy CV to face.
Davide Pastore
> Regia Aeronautica OOB (01-Aug-42)
Update.
Regia Aeronautica planned organization for C3, according to two
Superaereo letters of 20 and 25 June 1942, giving instructions for
the future constitution of the "Armata Aerea C3" (with additional
available assets according to my research):
A) Armata Aerea C3 (at ?)
A1) 4? Squadra Aerea
A1a) Comando Bombardamento Puglie (Lecce)
part of 16? Stormo B.T.
50? Gruppo B.T.
210?, 211? Squadriglia B.T. (CZ.1007bis) Manduria
30? St. B.T.
87? Gr. B.T.
192?, 193? Sq. B.T. (CZ.1007bis) Manduria? (from
Forli)
90? Gr. B.T.
194?, 195? Sq. B.T. (CZ.1007bis) Manduria? (from
Forli)
32? St. A.S. / B.T. [#1]
38? Gr. B.T.
49?, 50? Sq. B.T. (SM.84) Crotone (from Gioia del
Colle)
89? Gr. A.S.
228?, 229? Sq. A.S. (SM.79) Crotone (from Gioia
del Colle)
37? St. B.T.
55? Gr. B.T.
220?, 221? Sq. B.T. (BR.20) Lecce
116? Gr. B.T.
266?, 267? Sq. B.T. (BR.20) Lecce
A1b) Unattached
161? Gr. Autonomo C.T.
162?, 163?, 164? Sq. C.T. (G.50, C.200) Lecce,
Crotone?
A2) Comando Aeronautica Sicilia
A2a) Comando Bombardamento Sicilia (Palermo)
7? St. A.S. (B.T.) [#2]
4? Gr. A.S. (B.T.)
14?, 15? Sq. A.S. (B.T.) (SM.84) Sciacca
25? Gr. A.S. (B.T.)
8?, 9? Sq. A.S. (B.T.) (SM.84) Castelvetrano
9? St. B.T.
29? Gr. B.T.
62?, 63? Sq. B.T. (CZ.1007bis) Chinisia
33? Gr. B.T.
59?, 60? Sq. B.T. (CZ.1007bis) Chinisia
10? St. B.T.
30? Gr. B.T.
55?, 56? Sq. B.T. (SM.79) Sciacca
32? Gr. B.T.
57?, 58? Sq. B.T. (SM.79) Boccadifalco
part of 43? St. B.T.
88? Gr. B.T.
264?, 265? Sq. B.T. (BR.20M) Castelvetrano
Unattached
173? Sq. Aut. R.S. (CR.25) Boccadifalco
A2b) Comando Assalto Sicilia (Belpasso)
part of 3? St. C.T.
18? Gr. C.T.
83?, 85?, 95? Sq. C.T. (MC.200) ? (from Mirafiori)
5? St. Ass. / B.a.T.
101? Gr. Ass.
208?, 238? Sq. Ass. (CR.42) Gela
102? Gr. B.a.T.
209?, 239? Sq. B.a.T. (Ju 87R) Gela
15? St. Ass. [#3]
46? Gr. Ass.
20?, 21? Sq. Ass. (CR.42, Ca.314?) ? (from
Vicenza)
47? Gr. Ass.
53?, 54? Sq. Ass. (CR.42, Ca.314?) ? (from
Vicenza)
53? St. C.T.
151? Gr. C.T.
366?, 367?, 368? Sq. C.T. (G.50) ? (from Caselle)
153? Gr. C.T.
372?, 373?, 374? Sq. C.T. (MC.200) ? (from
Caselle)
A2c) Comando Caccia Sicilia (at ?)
51? St. C.T.
20? Gr. C.T.
151?, 352?, 353? Sq. C.T. (MC.202) Gela
155? Gr. C.T.
351?, 360?, 378? Sq. C.T. (MC.202) Gela
54? St. C.T.
7? Gr. C.T.
76?, 86?, 98? Sq. C.T. (MC.200, CR.42) Pantelleria
16? Gr. C.T.
167?, 168?, 169? Sq. C.T. (MC.200, CR.42)
Castelvetrano
Unattached
2? Gr. Aut. C.T.
150?, 152?, 358? Sq. C.T. (Re.2001) Caltagirone
Unattached
377? Sq. Aut. C.T. (Re.2000) Boccadifalco
A2d) Comando Divisione Trasporti (Palermo) [#4]
part of 18? St. T.
56? Gr. T.
222?, 223? Sq. T. (SM.81T) Sciacca
44? St. T.
146? Gr. T.
603?, 609? Sq. T. (SM.82) Gela
149? Gr. T.
607?, 608? Sq. T. (SM.82) Gela
45? St. T.
37? Gr. T.
47?, 48? Sq. T. (SM.82) Gela
147? Gr. T.
601?, 602? Sq. T. (SM.82) Gela
48? St. T.
144? Gr. T.
617?, 618? Sq. T. (SM.82) Sciacca
part of 148? Gr. T.
606? Sq. T. (G.12) Sciacca
A2e) Comando Soccorso (Catania)
612? Sq. Socc. (CZ.506S) Stagnone
615? Sq. Socc. (CZ.506S) Siracusa
A2f) Unattached
part of 46? St. A.S.
104? Gr. A.S.
252?, 253? Sq. A.S. (SM.79) Reggio Calabria
(from
Decimomannu)
Unattached
130? Gr. Aut. A.S.
280?, 283? Sq. A.S. (SM.79) Pantelleria? (from
Elmas)
132? Gr. Aut. A.S.
278?, 281? Sq. A.S. (SM.79) Pantelleria? (from
Gerbini)
B) Not part of Armata Aerea C3, but available for sea action
B1) Comando Aeronautica Sardegna
part of 16? St. B.T.
51? Gr. B.T.
212?, 213? Sq. B.T. (CZ.1007bis) Villacidro
36? St. A.S.
108? Gr. A.S.
256?, 257? Sq. B.T. (SM.84, SM.79) Decimomannu
109? Gr. A.S.
258?, 259? Sq. A.S. (SM.84, SM.79) Decimomannu
Unattached
24? Gr. Aut. C.T.
354?, 370? Sq. C.T. (G.50, CR.42) Elmas
365? Sq. C.T. (G.50, CR.42) Alghero
Unattached
274? Sq. Aut. B.G.R. (P.108B) Decimomannu
613? Sq. Aut. Socc. (CZ.506S, S.66) Elmas
B2) 5? Squadra Aerea [#5]
35? St. B.T. [#6]
86? Gr. B.T.
190?, 191? Sq. B.T. (CZ.1007bis) Barce
95? Gr. B.T.
230?, 231? Sq. B.T. (CZ.1007bis) Barce
attached from 145? Gr. T. [#7]
Section, 604? Sq. T. (S.82B) Barce
unattached
131? Gr. Aut. A.S.
279?, 284? Sq. A.S. (SM.79) Bengasi
133? Gr. Aut. A.S. (R.S.) [#8]
174?, 175? Sq. A.S. (R.S.) (SM.79) Bengasi
unattached
614? Sq. Aut. Socc. (CZ.506S) Tripoli
B3) Comando Aeronautica Grecia
157? Gr. Aut. C.T. [#9]
357?, 384?, 385? Sq. C.T. (MC.200) Kalamata
B4) Comando Aeronautica Egeo
41? Gr. A.S.
204?, 205? Sq. A.S. (SM.79) Gadurra
154? Gr. Aut. C.T.
395? Sq. C.T. (G.50, CR.42) Rodi
396? Sq. C.T. (G.50, CR.42) Gadurra
B5) Comando S.A.S. [#10]
Nucleo Comunicazioni Ala Littoria (various planes)
Nucleo Comunicazioni L.A.T.I. (various planes)
Nucleo Comunicazioni Aviolinee Italiane (various planes)
C) Aviazione Ausiliaria per la Regia Marina (Marinavia)
Comando Aviazione Alto Tirreno
140? Sq. Aut. R.M. (CZ.501) Torre del Lago
187? Sq. Aut. R.M. (CZ.506, CZ.501) Cadimare
Comando Aviazione Basso Tirreno
182? Sq. Aut. R.M. (CZ.506, CZ.501) Nisida
Comando Aviazione Jonio e Basso Adriatico
139? Sq. R.M. (CZ.506, CZ.501) Prevesa
141? Sq. Aut. R.M. (CZ.501) Brindisi
142? Sq. Aut. R.M. (CZ.501) Taranto
171? Sq. Aut. R.M. (CZ.506) Taranto
288? Sq. Aut. R.M. (CZ.506) Taranto
Comando Aviazione Sicilia
83? Gr. Aut. R.M.
170?, 184?, 186?, 189? Sq. (CZ.501, CZ.506, RS.14)
Augusta
85? Gr. Aut. R.M.
144?, 197? Sq. R.M. (CZ.501, CZ.506, RS.14)
Stagnone
Comando Aviazione Sardegna
138? Sq. Aut. R.M. (CZ.501) Olbia (Sardegna)
146? Sq. Aut. R.M. (CZ.506) Elmas (Sardegna)
188? Sq. Aut. R.M. (CZ.501) Elmas (Sardegna)
287? Sq. Aut. R.M. (CZ.506) Elmas (Sardegna)
Comando Aviazione Libia
145? Sq. Aut. R.M. (CZ.506, CZ.501) Pisida
148? Sq. Aut. R.M. (CZ.501) Menelao
196? Sq. Aut. R.M. (CZ.501) Bengasi
Comando Aviazione Egeo
147? Sq. Aut. R.M. (CZ.506, CZ.501) Lero
185? Sq. Aut. R.M. (CZ.506, CZ.501) Lero
D) Aviazione Ausiliaria per il Regio Esercito (Esercitavia)
40? Sq. Aut. O.A. (Ca.311, Ro.37bis) Boccadifalco
and Pantelleria [#11]
[#1] 32? Stormo was to operate in coordinated anti-ship attacks,
using the traditional torpedo in 89? Gruppo A.S. and the new
"Motobomba F.F.F." in 38? Gruppo B.T.
[#2] 7? Stormo B.T. was officially converted to A.S. on 1 May 42,
but apparently never operated in the torpedo role, and eventually
reverted to B.T. on 1 October 1942.
[#3] 15? Stormo Ass. had spent long disappointing months from
mid 1941 to early 1942 trying to find some use for the useless
Ca.314 they had been equipped with, finally giving up and receiving
CR.42 fighter-bombers instead. By this time the entire Stormo
should have converted to the "new" planes; however, according
to the 25 June project, "a Gruppo of Ca.314 and a Gruppo of CR.42
are to be equipped with smoke dischargers." This *might* refer to
the two Gruppi of 15? Stormo.
[#4] The units at Gela (44? St. and 45? St.) had planes modified for
paratroop launch, while the units at Sciacca (18? St. and 48? St.)
could
only drop supplies.
[#5] 5? Squadra Aerea had plenty of fighter and fighter-bomber units
in Lybia, but all of them were needed on the land front (the more so,
after the transfer in Sicily of the bulk of Fliegerfuhrer Afrika).
[#6] 35? Stormo B.T. was busily employed on the land front, but
one Squadriglia at a time was on maritime duty as convoy escort.
[#7] Detachment of 2-3 armed planes, employed in long range
bombing actions against targets in Egypt.
[#8] 133? Gruppo Autonomo A.S. was officially formed on 1 April
1942 with two previously independent recon Squadriglie, but apparently
never operated in the torpedo role, being employed instead as convoy
escort until disbanded on 31 December 1942.
[#9] 157? Gruppo Autonomo C.T. provided air coverage for ships
operating in Greek waters.
[#10] Each Nucleo Comunicazione had been formed in 1940 with
the planes and pilots of the respective civilian air transport
company.
They could have contribuited with about a dozen planes each or so,
airlifting supplies to a captured airfield (since they had no airdrop
capability).
[#11] 40? Squadriglia Autonoma O.A. was the only Army Aviation
unit in Sicily at the time, occasionally doing some naval recon work
near the Sicilian coast.
On invasion day (12 July) probable average strength per Squadriglia
would have been (my guess, based on historic availability in various
similar situations):
- single-engined combat (Ass., B.a T., C.T.): 4-8 planes
- multi-engined combat (A.S., B.G.R., B.T.): 3-6 planes
- recon & rescue (O.A., Socc., R.M., R.S.T.): 6 planes
- transport (T.): 9 planes
These are just the ready planes. A further 50% would have been
present but unavailable, damaged.
The invasion would have come after 10-15 days of fierce, intense
preparatory action against Malta, so the 3-4 planes value refers to
the (by now depleted) anti-land units in Sicilia and Puglia, and the
6-8 planes to the (by and large inactive) other sectors, along with
all anti-ship units. Recon and transport assets would not have
experienced any severe attrition.
Also, the units recently transferred (with a full complement) from
northern Italy would have had a slightly higher strength, and the
others a slightly lower one.
Additionally, there were a couple of quite famous (for their role
against Pedestal convoy in August) "special units": two Re.2001
of a "Sezione Speciale" of 2? Gruppo had been modified to carry
a special 640Kg AP bomb (a modified large calibre AP projectile:
according to the sources, a 381mm one, although their weight would
rather indicate a 320mm one) and a SM.79 had been converted into
a radio controlled flying bomb. Actually both attempts failed, but
it was in both cases it was sheer bad luck.
Geoffrey Sinclair
(Snip) of RN deployment estimates.
>Estimate Time of Arrival (ETA)
>
>C3 amphibious fleet would have assembled in the starting ports on
>10 July, a thing RAF recon planes could not have missed. So RN
>would have had some time to ready its ships, and prepare them to
>sail at short notice.
>
>The invasion would have started on 12 July at 05:00 (first airdrop).
>There is an inevitable short delay before departure (raising steam etc.)
>of about 6 hours (my wild guess) so the ships would have exit ports
>at 11:00 on 12 July (12-11:00).
The above 2 days from fleet assembly to invasion is simply too short,
think how long it takes ships to move at less than 10 knots.
Unless the idea is to do no training and suddenly switch shipping from
its regular duties to the invasion with no real preparation for the
new
mission.
You would expect the allies to have steadily firmer information on the
invasion fleet in the weeks leading up to any invasion. As ships were
pulled from regular duties and assembled.
Then add a big part of the invasion plan was paratroops and the
Luftwaffe
had the lowest signal security of all the German forces. Add
additional
airfields being built to handle the transport fleet.
In another post you talk about 2 weeks of large scale suppressive air
raids
before the invasion. This would be a good clue.
Historically the Luftwaffe flew some 6,482 day bomber sorties against
Malta in the first 11 months of 1942, 4,082 of these were in April,
then
277 in May, 2 in June, 328 in July and 8 in August. There were night
sorties.
Simply I would suspect the best idea for the axis is to assume the RN
would be able to know the invasion date well enough to intervene but
to have enough airpower available to negate it, along with fuel for
the
Italian navy. So, unlike Crete, this time the RN cannot effectively
stop
the surface reinforcements.
Michael Emrys
davide....@alice.it wrote on 11/26/05 3:24 PM:
> "Michael Emrys" <em...@olypen.com> ha scritto
>
>> Just guessing, but was it still felt that there might be a significant
>> threat from the Japanese fleet in the Western Indian Ocean at that
>> late date?
>
> Sure, but Freetown seems a bit distant!!
Well, yes, that doesn't make a lot of sense, does it? One might
suppose that
basing in Freetown gave them the option of deploying either to the
Atlantic
or Indian Oceans, but why would that be important at that particular
time?
If they were meant to be part of the Torch operations, you wouldn't
want
them to be embroiled in the Indian Ocean on some mission. If instead,
they
are to guard against some expected threat in the IO, why not base them
farther east, say at Durban? What was the Admiralty up to?
Michael
Andrew Clark
"Michael Emrys" <em...@olypen.com> wrote
> One might suppose that basing in Freetown gave
> them the option of deploying either to the
> Atlantic or Indian Oceans, but why would that be important
> at that particular time?
The Admiralty were concerned about the distant risk of
German heavy cruisers breaking out from the North Sea and
attacking Atlantic convoy routes. Freetown was well-placed
not just for the UK-Cape route, but also the transatlantic
Gib - USA route.
Davide Pastore
> The above 2 days from fleet assembly to invasion is simply too short,
> think how long it takes ships to move at less than 10 knots.
I may agree with you, however the official 1942 papers said
exactly that.
Maybe the invasion would have to be postponed one or two
or three or N days, waiting for the assembly?
Davide Pastore
> Simply I would suspect the best idea for the axis is to assume the RN
> would be able to know the invasion date well enough to intervene
RN would have known that the invasion was likely to happen in
the near future (say, "during next two weeks" or so) but maybe not the
precise date until shortly before.
(Well, thinking a bit about it: betting on the new moon day
would have been a logical choice... OK, no secret)
Andrew Clark
"Davide Pastore" <davide....@alice.it> wrote
> (Well, thinking a bit about it: betting on the
> new moon day would have been a logical
> choice... OK, no secret)
And the weather would have been a good give-away as well.
The beach landing operations needed calm seas.
Drazen Kramaric
<loui...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>I suppose all armies do it more or less the same way, essentially the soldiers
>are locked in a sort of gas chamber which is then flooded with a mixture
>of lacrymal and other incapaciting gasses (makes you cry, vomit a bit,
>smells absolutely terrible, but not toxic). After the first try, anyone with a beard
>would either shave it or find an excuse not to do the exercize. Even tiny gaps
>between the mask and your face lets the gas through, and you don't want that...
How did WW2 armies planned to use nearsighted soldiers (wearing
glasses) with their gas masks on?
I don't know whether soldiers with glasses were deemed fit for
infantry and am puzzled how were such soldiers expected to fight with
their masks on and glasses off.
I know from personal experience during my time in Yugoslav army that I
had to take my glasses off whenever we trained with gas masks. Putting
mask was probably going to save my health and life, but it would have
me rendered useless in combat, especially in my role of an antitank
gun aimer.
Drax
Drazen Kramaric
<gsinc...@froggy.com.au> wrote:
All ships' positions as of May, 1942.
>Berwick, Kent, Suffolk, Shropshire no information.
Berwick, Kent, Suffolk were in Home Fleet, Shropshire was doing escort
duties in Atlantic.
>Orion, Aurora, Glasgow, Gambia, no information.
Glasgow and Orion were doing escort duties in Atlantic, Gambia was in
Indian ocean. Aurora was in Home Fleet.
>Coventry, Curacoa, Carlisle no information.
Coventry and Carlisle were in Mediterranean Fleet, Curacoa was in the
Atlantic.
>>CL old - Colombo, Caradoc, Cardiff, Ceres, Capetown, Frobisher,
>>Hawkins, Danae, Dauntless, Dehli, Despatch, Diomede, Durban
Colombo, Caradoc, Ceres, Capetown, Frobisher, Hawkins, Danae,
Dauntless and Durban were in Indian Ocean, Cardiff, Despatch, Diomede
were doing escort duties in Atlantic. Delhi was at home
Drax.
CJ Adams
I've seen issue prescription glasses with flat elastic fabric temples
leading to large D-rings that fitted over the ear. The lenses were
round and made to fit under the mask. (Canadian Forces, 1970's and
1980's)
Cub Driver
<draxNEV...@post.t-com.hr> wrote:
>How did WW2 armies planned to use nearsighted soldiers (wearing
>glasses) with their gas masks on?
The U.S. Army combat glasses (granny glasses, metal frames and round,
shatterproof lenses) fit under a U.S. Army gas mask, to the best of my
recollection. I have worn glasses since I was two years old, and I'm
sure I would have remembered if I had had to take off my specs in the
gas chamber in basic training. (That was in 1956, but we used WWII
gear entirely.)
Davide Pastore
> All ships' positions as of May, 1942.
Thank you Drax. However, as had been rightly argued on this forum,
all this research is pointless because RN would have had at least a
week, and maybe two, of pre-alarm to concentrate just everything she
wanted at Gibraltar or Alexandria. The research had a sense only in
case of a _real_ surprise, but with RAF Malta still active the Axis
would never had dared to do so.
Klaas
<draxNEV...@post.t-com.hr> wrote:
>How did WW2 armies planned to use nearsighted soldiers (wearing
>glasses) with their gas masks on?
>
>I don't know whether soldiers with glasses were deemed fit for
>infantry and am puzzled how were such soldiers expected to fight with
>their masks on and glasses off.
>
>I know from personal experience during my time in Yugoslav army that I
>had to take my glasses off whenever we trained with gas masks. Putting
>mask was probably going to save my health and life, but it would have
>me rendered useless in combat, especially in my role of an antitank
>gun aimer.
In the german army you got special glasses for the use within the
mask. The glasses were fixed on the ears with thin ribbons. Works
fine, since the ribbons were thin enough and didn't disturb the
sealing of the mask. I didn't smell any gas, when I had to test it in
the gas chamber.
These ribbon-fixed glasses were in use AFAIK during ww-i, for shure
during ww-ii and afterwards.
--
Best regards
Klaas
Cub Driver
<usenet.AT.da...@giganews.com> wrote:
>The U.S. Army combat glasses (granny glasses, metal frames and round,
>shatterproof lenses) fit under a U.S. Army gas mask, to the best of my
>recollection. I have worn glasses since I was two years old, and I'm
>sure I would have remembered if I had had to take off my specs in the
>gas chamber in basic training. (That was in 1956, but we used WWII
>gear entirely.)
After reading the other posts about flexible-frame glasses, I begin to
wonder how accurate my recollection was. With young eyes, I had no
problem seeing without my glasses, though I would soon get a headache
if I tried to do reading or other close work. It's possible I took the
specs off when I was in the gas chamber.
We were required to take our masks off and don them again, in the
chamber. I suppose it was some kind of tear gas. Naturally the cadre
sergeant picked out the biggest doofus in the squad (platoon?) and had
him leave his mask off for a time, while sarge questioned him. His
answers became gradually more ludicrous, until he was staggering
drunk. We thought it was very funny, though today sarge would probably
be out on the street if he tried that on a 'cruit.
Drazen Kramaric
<davide....@alice.it> wrote:
>Thank you Drax. However, as had been rightly argued on this forum,
>all this research is pointless because RN would have had at least a
>week, and maybe two, of pre-alarm to concentrate just everything she
>wanted at Gibraltar or Alexandria.
This presumes that Malta would have been considered the most important
spot on the Globe as far as Royal Navy is concerned.
While some reinforcements were likely, I doubt that RN watch over
Tirpitz would have slackened. PQ17 sailed on June 1942.
Eastern fleet was in the process of been (re)formed after Nagumo's
raid so some "fleet in being" had to be left in the Indian ocean
anyway. Sure, after Coral Sea and Midway the pressure was reduced and
Eastern Fleet was again reinforcing Mediterranean Fleet, but I doubt
there would have been major redeployments of Royal Navy even if
British discovered something was cooking on.
Were there any major reinforcements sent to Alexandria between the
fall of Greece and assault on Crete?
Drax