>What was the importance placed on Merseburg ?
I can't help with this specific query, but in Max Hastings 'Bomber Command' he
points out that RAF Bomber Command attacked some targets simply because they
could be attacked (ie they could actually find them), not because they had any
particular significance apart from contributing to the 'acres of houisng
destroyed' statistics.
Cheers.
Martin.
--
Martin Rapier, Database Administrator
Corporate Information & Computing Services.
University of Sheffield Tel 0114 222 1137
The opinions expressed here may be those of my employer, or they may not.
http://rhino.shef.ac.uk:3001/mr-home/
Some info can be found here:
http://mailer.fsu.edu/~research/RinR/War_Stories.html
On Dec. 6, 1944, 1st Lt. Charles W. McArthur swung down from the belly
of a B-24 Liberator for the last time, surviving his 35th and final
mission as a bombardier over enemy targets in France and Germany. After
retiring from FSU's math department in 1986, he wrote a book detailing
the contributions of a civilian-based, operational research program that
turned the U.S. Eighth Air Force, in which he served, into a weapon of
inestimable value in destroying the German war machine.
[lots of text deleted]
Freed from the bottleneck, Allied forces quickly fanned out into what
amounted to Hitler's front door, taking Paris in only a month. Priority
No. 1 for Allied bombers became Germany's fuel-making capacity,
distributed among several key industrial centers in the Reich. Two major
oil refineries--at Ludwigshafen and at Merseburg--stood out as prime
targets, and McArthur quickly learned to dread both.
Both plants were considered vital to the Reich's survival, so Hitler had
ordered them to be virtually ringed by antiaircraft batteries. Stationed
in the glass-walled nose of his B-24, McArthur early on had learned that
German flak posed a far greater menace than German fighters. Over Caen,
a piece of shrapnel from a flak burst smashed through his plexiglas
canopy where it "ricocheted around," narrowly missing him. Several times
his plane returned to base pierced by flak hits.
"Over Merseburg, the flak was just ungodly--it was one of our most hated
targets."
On November 2, 1944, McArthur flew his first of four missions--including
his last--aimed at knocking Merseburg's fuel-making capacity out for
good. Since May, the plant had withstood a terrible shellacking from the
air--but a total of 14 raids had been unsuccessful in putting it out of
action completely.
Although put down in the Air Force record books as "a minor raid," the
Nov. 2 air battle over Merseburg (a plant that was still operating when
the war ended) proved to be a short but vicious encounter. German
fighters showed up in greater strength that day than had been seen
since June, McArthur was to find out later. This, combined with an
accurate flak barrage, took a heavy toll on the attackers. In his book,
McArthur recounts another sight that has stuck with him for half a
century:
"I remember looking around the horizon through the bright haze and
seeing planes, near and far, bombers and fighters, friend and foe,
falling."
In all that day, 40 heavy bombers--including two from McArthur's
group--and 28 fighter aircraft, along with most of their 390 crew
members, were lost. McArthur's crew, as usual, came back untouched.
--
"Have you no sense of decency, sir?
At long last, have you left no sense of decency?"
Come join my web-ring! http://www.angelfire.com/nj/eglamkowski/null.html
>I can't help with this specific query, but in Max Hastings 'Bomber Command' he
>points out that RAF Bomber Command attacked some targets simply because they
>could be attacked (ie they could actually find them), not because they had
>any particular significance apart from contributing to the 'acres of houisng
>destroyed' statistics.
You kow nothing abut the signicance of this target, so why do you asiume it had
no significance?
Arthur
{snip}
>You kow nothing abut the signicance of this target, so why do you asiume it
had
>no significance?
Thats right I don't, which is why I said 'I can't help'.
All I was pointing out is that RAF attacked targets (where any
population centre of 100,000+ is defined as a "target") simply because they
were there, not because of any great strategic importance.
I believe the US Airforce was a bit more selective.
One thing the Allies did do was to have diversionary raids.
A main attack force may be sent out to bomb Bremen, but other
raids are sent out to attack Keil and several other targets.
They are all timed so as to cross the continental coast line
at the same time, with the hope that the germans would put their
biggest effort into intercepting the "wrong" raid, or else spread
their defenses too thin.