Battleships VS. Aircraft Carriers
Bauman
this news group, the History channel, books, and the web -- not necessarily
in that order. On the History channel, at least when they talk about the
war in the Pacific, they imply that aircraft carriers displaced battleships
as the main capital ship because of its superior qualities. It almost seems
to me that the battleship was relegated into second place, not so much because
it didn't perform well, but because it was perceived after Pearl Harbor that
it would not do well against the aircraft carries. Yet, if one looks at the
battleships lost, they were rarely sunk by aircraft from aircraft carriers.
Mostly they were sunk while they were moored in a harbor or sunk by land
based aircraft or by other battleships.
It seems to me that the advantages of the battleship still out weighed the
advantages of the aircraft carrier. The american Essex class carriers were
poorly armored and did not seem to take battle damage very well. The
Japanese carriers fared little better. The British carriers were much
better armored but could not absorb the damage of the average battleship.
In the pacific, almost all the fighting on land that was in range of planes
from an aircraft carrier was also in range of naval gun fire from battleships.
And a typical battleship can deliver substantial more ordnance than the
typical large aircraft carrier. It seems to me that the allies should
have produced more battleships and less aircraft carries. Of course,
they should still produce small escort size aircraft carriers for
submarine patrol and fleet anti-aircraft defense.
Why then did the aircraft carrier displace the battleship as the main
capital ship? Was there some other mitigating factor that I have
not considered? What is wrong with this analysis?
--
Robert P. Bauman
--
Jeremy Hogue
news:<9qpi7j$16au$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu>...
It almost seems
> to me that the battleship was relegated into second place, not so much because
> it didn't perform well, but because it was perceived after Pearl Harbor that
> it would not do well against the aircraft carries.
What do you mean "perceived"? Battleships did fare poorly against
carriers. Had the U.S. fleet been in deep water rather than a
protected anchorage, all EIGHT of the battleships would have been
lost. After Pearl Harbor, there were no allied battleships in the
Pacific Ocean. Price of Wales and Repulse (admitedly a battlecruiser)
were sunk on December 8 and all eight of the U.S. battleships at Pearl
Harbor were sunk or damaged. All Nimitz had at the time were his
carriers to strike back with.
Yet, if one looks at the
> battleships lost, they were rarely sunk by aircraft from aircraft carriers.
> Mostly they were sunk while they were moored in a harbor or sunk by land
> based aircraft or by other battleships.
Of the battleships sunk during WWII, only Kirishima was sunk by
another battleship, the Washington. Hood, admitedly another
battlecruiser, was sunk by Bismark (which is debatable but accepted)
IIRC, the French lost 3 battleships at Oran. Bismark, Fuso, Yamashiro
and Scharnhorst were each sunk by a combination of gunfire, some of it
from battleships but some from supporting cruisers and destroyers, and
torpedos. The British never would have caught Bismark if Ark Royal's
torpedo planes hadn't jammed Bismark's rudder. Royal Oak, Barham and
Kongo were sunk by submarine torpedoes. Prince of Wales, Repulse,
Roma and Tirpitz were sunk by land-based bombers. Arizona, Oklahoma,
California, Nevada, West Virginia, Hiei, Haruna, Ise, Hyuga, Musashi
and Yamato were sunk by carrier-based aircraft. I also want to say
that the Italians had 3 battleships sunk at Taranto, but somebody
check me on that. Some will debate wether or not to count some of
those as "sunk" since they were refloated and repaired. BUT at dawn
on the days after the attacks, they were sitting in the mud at the
bottom of Pearl Harbor and Taranto. Total: Nine to surface gunfire
and torpedoes, three to submarine torpedoes, four to land-based
aircraft and fourteen to carrier based aircraft.
>
> It seems to me that the advantages of the battleship still out weighed the
> advantages of the aircraft carrier. The american Essex class carriers were
> poorly armored and did not seem to take battle damage very well. The
> Japanese carriers fared little better. The British carriers were much
> better armored but could not absorb the damage of the average battleship.
The results from Midway give a bad impression of Japanese carriers.
Yes, some of them such as Junyo, Hiyo, Hiryu, Soryu were not very well
protected. Akagi and Kaga were converted from battleships under the
terms of the Washington Naval Treaty and would have been tougher to
sink had circumstances turned out differently. They were lost due
primarily to fire and secondary explosions at Midway as a result of
American luck and Nagumo's decisions. Shokaku and Zuikaku fought at
Coral Sea, Santa Cruz and the Eastern Solomons and each was damaged on
at least one occassion. Shokaku was finally sunk by four torpedo hits
from an American submarine in the Marianas battle. Zuikaku was
overwhelmed by Halsey's third fleet at Leyte Gulf and didn't have a
chance. The loss of Taiho to an American submarine can be primarily
attributed to incompetent damage control and Shinano was not really
seaworthy (few of her watertight doors installed and an untrained
crew). The Japanese light carriers were not well protected, but the
American Independence class had the same problem.
The Americans lost only two carriers to Japanese carrier-based air,
another to land-based aircraft and two to submarine torpedoes during
the war. Lexington was damaged at Coral Sea and was doomed by a later
explosion and scuttled. Yorktown was actually sunk by a Japanese sub
as was Wasp. Hornet is debatable. She was rendered an inferno at
Santa Cruz and abandoned. A scuttling attempt failed and she was sunk
by Japanese surface units the night after the battle. The light
carrier Princeton was hit in 1944 by a land-based bomber in the
Philippines and scuttled. The Essex class held up fairly well I
think. Their larger airwings and more advanced aircraft were able to
provide much greater protection than earlier ships and they were
better protected than previous American carriers (although not as well
as the British ships). Bunker Hill and Franklin both survived damage
that would have sunk any other American class of carrier.
While it is true that the later British carriers were better armored
they also carried much smaller airwings as a result which limited
their effectiveness. Ark Royal, probably the most effective of the
early British carriers due to its larger capacity was sunk by poor
damage control after being torpedoed by a U-Boat in the Med.
> In the pacific, almost all the fighting on land that was in range of planes
> from an aircraft carrier was also in range of naval gun fire from battleships.
Except that when the Americans began their own offensive at
Guadalcanal in August, 1942, there were no battleships available to
provide gunfire support. Even when it was available, naval gunfire
support at times left much to be desired (such as at Tarawa and Omaha
Beach). Aerial fire support, while also lacking in accuracy at times,
was much more capable of accurate delivery (especially by the Marines)
and more immediate. In addition, some of the fighting took place on
islands surrounded by very tight waterways where large ships can't
maneuver as well.
And a typical battleship can deliver substantial more ordnance than
the
> typical large aircraft carrier.
Once the fleet train was built by mid-1944, the carriers could remain
on station almost indefinitely by means of underway replenishment.
While it is possible to move bombs, aerial torpedos, fuel and
replacement pilots to carriers from another ship while underway, I
wouldn't try it with a few hundred 16 inch shells, one shell at a
time.
It seems to me that the allies should
> have produced more battleships and less aircraft carries. Of course,
> they should still produce small escort size aircraft carriers for
> submarine patrol and fleet anti-aircraft defense.
The decision to begin building large numbers of aircraft carriers was
made prior to Pearl Harbor. The first eleven Essex class carriers
were ordered in 1940 and the Essex was built in less than 20 months.
Yorktown (the second one), was finished in less than 18. Many were
completed in less than 2 years. The shortest build time for
battleships around 30 months for Alabama, Iowa and New Jersey. (these
are from Jane's Fighting Ships of World War II, BTW). Each carrier
used around 60% as much steel and was built in 50 to 60% as much time
as a battleship. Why build two battleships when I can build four
carriers with the same investment in resources. Which made the
greater contribution to the Japanese war effort, Yamato and Musashi or
Shokaku and Zuikaku? For the investment in resorces to build Yamato,
Musashi and Shinano, the Japanese could have been eight or nine
Shokaku type carriers. Providing pilots and planes for them is
another issue altogether. For the investment in resorces to build
four Iowa class ships, the Americans could have built another six or
eight Essex class carriers, for which they DID have the pilots and
planes.
>
> Why then did the aircraft carrier displace the battleship as the main
> capital ship? Was there some other mitigating factor that I have
> not considered? What is wrong with this analysis?
In short, Taranto, Pearl Harbor and the sinking of Force Z (Prince of
Wales and Repulse) all proved that battleships were vulnerable to air
attack. Even early in the war, large formations of aircraft could
disable and sink capitol warships. As the war progressed and the
aircraft and their weaponry became more lethal, the battleships could
no longer survive without carriers to provide air cover.
Joel Shepherd
> On the History channel, at least when they talk about the
> war in the Pacific, they imply that aircraft carriers displaced
> battleships as the main capital ship because of its superior
> qualities.
The conclusion has some merit; the reasoning is flawed.
> It almost seems to me that the battleship was relegated into second
> place, not so much because it didn't perform well, but because it
> was perceived after Pearl Harbor that it would not do well against
> the aircraft carries.
I think you need to look a little deeper than that. The issue wasn't
battleships vs aircraft carriers: the issue was control of the air.
Consider what the US faced throughout the war (the same basic logic
applies to the Japanese as well). Surface ships without air protection
were vulnerable to air attack: the Japanese gave a very convincing
demonstration of this early in the war, sinking two armored British
warships (Repulse and Prince of Wales). And unlike Pearl Harbor, the
British ships were at sea and underway, capable of maneuver and
prepared for air defense. And yet they were sunk ... quickly.
So, it was not feasible to simply send some transports with an escort
of cruisers and battleships into the Solomons or the Marshalls or the
Marianas: they would be chewed to bits by Japanese aircraft, both
ground- and carrier-based. Two hundred, three hundred -- maybe more --
miles from their objective, they would be subject to air attack, with
only maneuver and anti-aircraft fire for defense. Distances were far
too great for US ground-based fighters to provide cover, so if landing
forces were to have air cover, it'd have to come from the carriers.
Carriers themselves were vulnerable to air attack -- though they
proved more durable than many expected. But they could also deliver
offensive blows from hundreds of miles away, long before heavy ships
had closed to within range of island objectives. So one of the primary
tasks assigned to the fast carrier forces was the destruction and
suppression of enemy air forces. The fast carriers would sweep in
ahead of the landing and bombardment forces, seize control of the air,
and maintain control of the air until local ground-based forces could
take over. This kind of offensive strike was the best possible
defense, both for the carriers and the heavy ships.
> Yet, if one looks at the battleships lost, they were rarely sunk by
> aircraft from aircraft carriers.
That's a shaky claim. A number of Japanese battleships and cruisers
were destroyed by carrier aircraft. A review of Leyte Gulf might be
instructive. Yes, there was a big-gun battle, but Japanese forces were
mauled by carrier-based planes throughout the battle, with heavy
losses.
> It seems to me that the advantages of the battleship still out
> weighed the advantages of the aircraft carrier. The american Essex
> class carriers were poorly armored and did not seem to take battle
> damage very well.
They didn't have to. Carriers and heavy ships were fundamentally
different weapons. A heavy ship could only throw its ordnance a few
miles; a carrier could strike targets hundreds of miles away. A heavy
ship had to stay in close proximity to its objective. A carrier 200 or
250 miles out had thousands of square miles of sea to disappear into,
and would still be in striking range of its targets. The fleet
carriers held the edge in terms of raw speed and maneuverability. And
they were more difficult to put out of action than anticipated. A ship
that's hard to find, hard to hit, and capable of delivering heavy
blows from hundreds of miles away is a formidable weapon.
> The British carriers were much better armored but could not absorb
> the damage of the average battleship.
They had more problems than that. "American & British Aircraft Carrier
Development 1919-1941" has an example that demonstrates the price the
British paid for that armor. In spring 1945, a typical US task group
(58.1) consisted of two Essex-class and two light carriers -- about
75,000 tons total displacement. Between them, they carried about 280
aircraft of which roughly 140 were strike aircraft: dive bombers and
torpedo planes.
Task Group 57.2 was composed of three British Illustrious-class
carriers, and one Implacable-class: about 92,000 tons total
displacement. Yet they carried only 235 aircraft total, of which only
*65* were strike aircraft.
With less tonnage, lightly armored USN CVs were capable of putting
over twice as much striking power in the air. They were much more
capable of destroying enemy air power. Why waste space on armor, when
you can simply destroy the threat to begin with?
> In the pacific, almost all the fighting on land that was in range of
> planes from an aircraft carrier was also in range of naval gun fire
> from battleships.
Assuming the battleships got within range. Without control of the air,
they could not have.
> And a typical battleship can deliver substantial more ordnance than
> the typical large aircraft carrier.
This isn't clear to me at all. If someone has statistics to back it
up, I'd be interested to read them, but I wouldn't accept this claim
at face value. Carriers had substantial armories, and were capable of
delivering extended heavy raids without replenishment.
> Why then did the aircraft carrier displace the battleship as the
> main capital ship?
Because battleships could not seize control of the air, and without
control of the air they could neither adequately protect other ships,
nor adequately defend themselves.
-- Joel.
Cub Driver
>Why then did the aircraft carrier displace the battleship as the main
>capital ship? Was there some other mitigating factor that I have
>not considered? What is wrong with this analysis?
Nobody really understood it at the time, but by 1942 there was no way
that battleships could come to grips with an enemy fleet containing
modern aircraft carriers and aircraft. Planes can fly farther than the
largest cannon shell.
My impression is that the USN grasped this essential fact as early as
the Battle of the Coral Sea, whereas the IJN (which with its Pearl
Harbor task force actually created the new style of carrier warfare)
still believed until 1944 that the climactic sea battle would be
fought between surface ships according to prewar doctrine. This
subject is beautifully laid out in "Kaigun" from Naval Institute
Press.
By the way, "Sunburst" is due out soon--more or less a naval-aviation
follow-on to Kaigun. Like the volume on IJN ships, this one deals (as
its sub-title promises) with "The Rise of Japanese Naval Air Power,
1909-1941". Both books present the Japanese naval forces as they
existed at the outbreak of war, not how they fared during the war.
all the best -- Dan Ford (email: let...@danford.net)
see the Warbird's Forum at http://danford.net
and message board at http://forums.delphi.com/annals/start/
Todd McAdam
1. Aircraft carriers have a far greater range of combat capability.
World
War II battleships could fire about 8 to 10 miles, if I recall
correctly,
and with decreasing accuracy over range. Aircraft had a combat radius
of a
couple hundred miles, and once there were as likely to be as accurate
as if
they were attacking the guy next door. While you correctly point out
that
many battles occured in range of land-based aircraft, the effectivness
of
those aircraft is another question. The Midway-based planes, for
example,
were of marginal effectiveness. So if a carrier-based task group
encounters
a battleship-based group, it can attack with no threat of response for
seven
or eight hours -- presuming the defending group can find the
attackers.
(Remember the limits of World War II radar; aircraft were more likely
to
find an enemy force at range than radar.)
2. You predicate your point almost solely on survivability, but not
offensive capacity. The amount of deliverable ordinance is only part
of the
equation. The accuracy of that ordinance is another factor to be
considered.
Dropping a torpedo from a couple thousand yards or a bomb from a few
hundred
feet is more likely to result in a hit than a shell from 12,000 or
15,000
yards. While the Essex class carriers were lightly armored, they were
built
for speed, range and offensive capacity -- by carrying more planes.
The
British carriers were more heavily armored because they were designed
for
wars closer to coastal England and the Med, where they needed much
less
range.
3. I suspect, but cannot say for certain, that aircraft carriers are
cheaper
and faster to build than battleships. The escort carriers were
launched,
once the construction system was set up, every few days. The Essex
class
launched, I believe, 14 carriers in less than 18 months. Battleships,
because of the complex nature of the main guns and the need to build
all
that armor into them, I suspect were more expensive. And with the
successes
of Pearl Harbor (well, from the aircraft carrier's perspective), Coral
Sea
and Midway, the benefit of such ships came under question.
Todd
John Lansford
> Yet, if one looks at the
>battleships lost, they were rarely sunk by aircraft from aircraft carriers.
>Mostly they were sunk while they were moored in a harbor or sunk by land
>based aircraft or by other battleships.
Let's see. Oklahoma and Arizona were sunk by carrier based planes. So
was Yamato, Musashi and Hiei. Prince of Wales, Repulse, Tirpitz and
Roma were sunk by land based air.
The problem is that carriers could project power further than
battleships, and more effectively.
> The american Essex class carriers were
>poorly armored and did not seem to take battle damage very well.
So name one that was sunk.
> The Japanese carriers fared little better.
Mainly because their battle damage response teams were not well
trained.
> The British carriers were much better armored but could not absorb the damage of the average battleship.
Since they were typically smaller and not as strongly built as the
typical battleship, this should not be surprising. I believe it was
Illustrious that took multiple AP bomb hits off of of Crete and
escaped to fight again, however.
>In the pacific, almost all the fighting on land that was in range of planes
>from an aircraft carrier was also in range of naval gun fire from battleships.
That's not the point, however. The battleship could not protect itself
from aerial attack. The carrier could avoid surface contact with enemy
forces while continuing to pound the enemy fleet. This was shown over
and over and over again during WWII.
>And a typical battleship can deliver substantial more ordnance than the
>typical large aircraft carrier.
Wrong. A battleship's 16" guns delivered a relatively small explosive
fire to a particular target. Even the HC (high capacity) round used
against shore targets had little explosive in it. A carrier had 70+
planes capable of carrying bombs of various sizes (100 to 2000 pounds)
and rockets to any target within 250-300 miles of the carrier.
> It seems to me that the allies should have produced more battleships and less aircraft carries.
Battleships were obsolete for everything but shore bombardment and
carrier escort after 1942.
>Why then did the aircraft carrier displace the battleship as the main
>capital ship? Was there some other mitigating factor that I have
>not considered? What is wrong with this analysis?
Too much reliance on the History Channel and (I suspect) naval warfare
board games.
Carriers beat up surface fleets nearly every time they met them. Even
when a superior surface fleet was matched against an inferior carrier
fleet, off the coast of Samar in 1944, the escort carriers came out
ahead. Kurita took four battleships, many cruisers and destroyers
against a group of slow, small escort carriers, and before he turned
and ran, he had lost several of his cruisers and suffered damage to
his battleships, while sinking only one of the escort carriers.
John Lansford
The unofficial I-26 Construction Webpage:
http://users.vnet.net/lansford/a10/
Justin Broderick
> It almost seems
> to me that the battleship was relegated into second place, not so much
because
> it didn't perform well, but because it was perceived after Pearl Harbor
that
> it would not do well against the aircraft carries. Yet, if one looks at
the
> battleships lost, they were rarely sunk by aircraft from aircraft
carriers.
> Mostly they were sunk while they were moored in a harbor or sunk by land
> based aircraft or by other battleships.
>
Whether sunk by land-based or carrier aircraft is incidental. The
point is
that aircraft weapons could sink a battleship. This meant that BBs
were
vulnerable to carriers and had to be protected against air attack. At
the
same time, the aircrafts' range meant that the battleships' main
batteries -- powerful though they were -- would be useless against the
carriers.
> It seems to me that the allies should
> have produced more battleships and less aircraft carries. Of course,
> they should still produce small escort size aircraft carriers for
> submarine patrol and fleet anti-aircraft defense.
>
You had to have a big propulsion plant to obtain the speeds necessary
for
fleet operations, and a lot of space for fuel to have decent range and
endurance-- especially important in the Pacific. This adds up to a
large
carrier. Also, a small aircraft carrier would not carry enough planes
to
provide both effective self-defense and striking power. A
radar-directed
combat air patrol proved better than anti-aircraft fire for air
defense,
which a battleship cold not provide. Battleships forming lines to use
their main batteries couldn't provide mutual AA support as could a
circular
task force formation. And the advantages of long distance air searches
to
find the enemy are obvious. The only advantage battleships might have
had
over carriers was if they got within range of a night gunnery battle.
US
commanders were very conscious of this and never let it happen.
The idea of keeping carriers in a defensive role was found to be
flawed
during the war in the Pacific. Their effectiveness lay in their
mobility.
One of the few criticisms leveled against Adm. Spruance was that in
keeping
his carriers to protect the beaches at Saipan he missed the
opportunity to
attack and probably eliminate a good part of the Japanese carrier
forces
(and thus protect the beaches no less effectively).
For comparable money, you could have a 32-kt carrier with (1944) 36
fighters, 36 dive bombers, and 18 torpedo bombers with a 600+ mile
radius
of action, or a 33-kt battleship with nine 16" rifles with a range
40,000
yards. The battleship can take a lot of punishment, it's true, but
that
doesn't give it more offensive value. The battleships in WW2 were
basically stuck with WW1 tactics, or used for AA and offshore gunfire
support. The carriers and their planes were state-of-the-art
super-weapons
of their day, and won the war in the Pacific as a battleship fleet
could
not possibly have done.
--JTB
Scott Boerhave
Bauman wrote in message <9qpi7j$16au$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu>...
>As an amateur W.W.II "buff", I get most of my information on W.W.II from
>this news group, the History channel, books, and the web -- not necessarily
>in that order. On the History channel, at least when they talk about the
>war in the Pacific, they imply that aircraft carriers displaced battleships
>as the main capital ship because of its superior qualities.
(snip)
>It seems to me that the advantages of the battleship still out weighed the
>advantages of the aircraft carrier. The american Essex class carriers were
>poorly armored and did not seem to take battle damage very well.
(snip)
>Why then did the aircraft carrier displace the battleship as the main
>capital ship? Was there some other mitigating factor that I have
>not considered? What is wrong with this analysis?
>
>--
>Robert P. Bauman
>
From the very start of the Pacific War carriers proved able to deliver
more
firepower onto targets than battleships. Hitting power is not only a
function of weapons, but also of the range and speed of its delivery
vehicles. American carriers could strike targets in any direction up
to
200-300 miles away. If closing a target for say a day at high speed
from an
initial launch range of 200 miles an American carrier could launch
repeated
deckloads of planes against the target before the battleship could
even get
within range - let alone get within range for very accurate shooting
of its
heavy guns. During this time the carriers' planes could inflict far
more
damage on a target than the battleship.
Another decisive advantage for the carrier was that they usually had
higher
speeds than battleships - most Amercian and Japanese fleet
carriers(except
for the Akagi and Kaga) had speeds of 32-34 knots. Not only could
they
almost always stay out of the reach of surface ships, but they could
use
this speed to strike one target one day then speed off to strike
another
target very far away the next day. This was a very useful capability
in
confusing and keeping off balance ones enemies.
Carriers carried large stores of munitions - usually several thousand
bombs
plus a small number of torpedoes. If supported by regular meeting
with
refueling tankers a carrier could remain in action long enough to
deliver
the great majority of this ordinance.
Perhaps another factor that should be mentioned is the survivability
issue.
Staying power comes not only from armor plating. Carriers could use
their
longer ranges and higher speeds to stand off out of the range of the
guns of
surface ships like battleships and strike them repeatedly, possible
sinking
them. Battleships, on the other hand, had little hope of ever getting
a
shot at a carrier unless their own planes damaged and slowed it down
first.
This latter fact demonstrates the enormous blunder Yamamoto and his
planners
made at Midway by keeping his main body battleships far to the rear of
Nagumo's carrier force.
Lastly even early American carriers actually did demonstrate great
durability. Both Hornet and Yorktown took repeated bomb and torpedo
hits
before going down. And the latter Essex class carriers were even
stronger.
The huge damages Bunker Hill and especially Franklin took after
kamakaze
hits(whole deckloads of fueled and armed planes ignited) would have
sunk
most ships, but these carriers survived - albiet with large losses of
life.
So I'd say on most accounts the carrier had the clear advantage over
the
battleship, and that even on those factors the battleships might have
had an
advantage on paper the carrier had almost insurmountable ways of
offsetting
them.
Thanks for the post Robert,
Scott Boerhave
Andrew Clark
"John Lansford" <jlns...@bellsouth.net> wrote
> I believe it was Illustrious that took multiple
> AP bomb hits off of of Crete and
> escaped to fight again, however.
HMS Illustrious was heavily damaged by a concerted enemy air
attack by German Ju 87 dive-bombers on 10 January 1941, when she
was hit by no less than seven 1100lb (500kg) AP bombs, including
one which penetrated the armoured flight deck armour and exploded
in the hanger below. Illustrious aircraft had been lured away by
a feint attack by Italian bombers. Despite extensive fires,
Illustrious nevertheless made her own way to Malta for temporary
repairs and then proceeded to Alexandria for further repairs. She
then crossed the Indian and Atlantic oceans for major repairs and
a refit at Norfolk, Va. between May-December 1941.
--
Joel Shepherd
Joel Shepherd wrote:
>
> Bauman wrote:
>
> > And a typical battleship can deliver substantial more ordnance
> > than the typical large aircraft carrier.
>
> This isn't clear to me at all. If someone has statistics to back it
> up, I'd be interested to read them, but I wouldn't accept this claim
> at face value.
Last night I came across an interesting table in Dunnigan and Nofis'
"Pacific War Encylopedia" (see caveat below). It shows the ammunition
allocations for a number of carrier types at various points during the
war. Hmm. How about Essex CV-9 in October '43:
Bombs Capacity
100-lb GP ... 504
100-lb Inc ... 296 GP - General Purpose
500-lb GP ... 296 AP - Armor-piercing
1000-lb AP ... 239 Inc - Incendiary
1000-lb GP ... 146
1600-lb AP ... 19
2000-lb GP ... 19
Torpedoes ... 36
Depth Charges ... 296
CV-6's capacity is comparable. That seems like a fair amount of
destructive capacity.
Would someone have similar figures for large-caliber shells carried by
one of the fast-battleship classes? I realize it's kind of apples and
oranges, but it might be instructive none-the-less.
Caveat: The "Encyclopedia", while fun to browse, is not the most
trustworthy source. I seem to recall another poster to this newsgroup
claiming to have found over 200 errors in the text, and from what I've
seen, that's a plausible claim. So, I wouldn't bet the farm on the
numbers above. They're a starting point, that's all.
-- Joel.
--
Andrew Toppan
>Why then did the aircraft carrier displace the battleship as the main
>capital ship? Was there some other mitigating factor that I have
>not considered? What is wrong with this analysis?
Take a force of battleships vs. a force of carriers.
The carriers can attack and disable or sink the battleships at a range
measured in hundreds of miles. The battleships can't do anything until the
enemy carriers (or other ships) are within 20 miles (or usually less). This
means the carrier force can annihilate (or at least render inoperable) the
enemy battleship force before those battleships can even *think* about taking
action against the carriers.
--
Andrew Toppan --- acto...@gwi.net --- "I speak only for myself"
"Haze Gray & Underway" - Naval History, DANFS, World Navies Today,
Photo Features, Military FAQs, and more - http://www.hazegray.org/
--
Hecate
font to screen and said:
>Why then did the aircraft carrier displace the battleship as the main
>capital ship? Was there some other mitigating factor that I have
>not considered? What is wrong with this analysis?
>
You are leaving out 2 things:
1. The reason most battleships were destroyed the way the were is
because Naval Commanders were terrified of being caught in open sea by
aircraft from an aircraft carrier.
2. To get within range of an aircraft to do any damage would mean
eluding all the search aircraft put aloft from a carrier battlegroup,
and hoping that you could do some damage before the aircraft sank you.
--
Hecate
hec...@newsguy.com
--
Rich Rostrom
>Why then did the aircraft carrier displace the battleship
>as the main capital ship? Was there some other mitigating
>factor that I have not considered?
Aircraft carriers have a striking range of several hundred
kilometers. Battleships are limited to at most 25 kilometers.
A battleship fighting a carrier loses because the carrier
can hit the battleship while the battleship cannot hit the
carrier.
The carrier also has far greater sighting range. Carrier
reconnaissance patrols routinely went 500-1000 kilometers
out; a battleship's sighting range was from the bridge to
the horizon, about 25 kilometers.
There were only two occasions in the entire war when
hostile surface ships got within gun range of carriers.
One was in June 1940, when HMS GLORIOUS was sunk by
SCHARNHORST and GNEISENAU. The other was in October 1944,
when the "Central Force" of the Japanese navy, including
battleships YAMATO, NAGATO, KONGO and HARUNA, slipped
through San Bernardino Strait and engaged the escort
carriers of the US Seventh Fleet.
Both incidents were due to gross errors by the carrier
forces (GLORIOUS had no air patrols up; Third Fleet left
San Bernardino Strait unguarded without telling Seventh
Fleet).
And in one of these cases, the carrier forces managed
to drive back the surface attack - losing the CVE
GAMBIER BAY, but sinking two CAs (CHOKAI and SUZUYA).
Meanwhile, carriers inflicted massive damage on
battleships at little or no risk to themselves on
numerous occasions.
DUNKERQUE was badly damaged in a raid by carrier
planes at Oran in July 1940.
LITTORIO, CAIO DUILIO, and CONTI DI CAVOUR were
sunk or badly damaged by a handful of carrier planes
at Taranto in November 1940.
VITTORIO VENETO was crippled by torpedo planes from
FORMIDABLE at Cape Matapan in February 1941.
BISMARCK was crippled and set up for destruction
by torpedo planes from ARK ROYAL in May 1941.
ARIZONA, OKLAHOMA, NEVADA, WEST VIRGINIA, and
CALIFORNIA were all sunk at Pearl Harbor, and
MARYLAND and TENNESSEE damaged, in December 1941.
TIRPITZ was badly damaged by planes from six
carriers in April 1944.
The super-battleship MUSASHI was sunk by carrier
planes of the US Third Fleet in October 1944. Her
sister YAMATO met the same fate in April 1945.
HYUGA, ISE, and HARUNA were sunk by US carrier
planes in Kure harbor, and NAGATO was badly
damaged by carrier attack at Yokosuka, in 1945.
Yes, in several of these cases, the battleships
were attacked in harbor. But that is part of the
advantage of the carrier - it can strike ships
in harbor while remaining safely at sea, out of
range of the big coast defense guns which
defended most naval bases.
Battleships which ventured in range of land-based
air were also beaten to a pulp, but carriers
could fight land-based air and even defeat it.
I think the record shows that carriers are
superior to battleships.
--
Never consume legumes before transacting whatsoever | Rich Rostrom
even in the outermost courtyard of a descendant of |
Timur the Terrible. | rrostrom@dummy
--- Avram Davidson, _Dr. Bhumbo Singh_ | 21stcentury.net
--
ERHarvey
advantages of the aircraft carrier.<
Not at all. The difference of a Navy with carriers and another with only
battleships is akin to a soldier with a gun and another with a knife.
>The american Essex class carriers were
poorly armored and did not seem to take battle damage very well.<
Statistically, this is incorrect. Aside from the effect of Kamikazes, Essex
carriers held up quite well. In fact, no Essex class carrier was ever sunk. No
other class of CV can make this claim.
>The Japanese carriers fared little better.<
What made the Japanese carriers at all equal to western designs was simply the
air units and the quality of the pilots.
>The British carriers were much
better armored<
While the British carriers had armored decks, they were forced to carry only a
limited number of aircraft as a result of this. What is more, the armored decks
of the British carriers didn't in fact prevent them from becoming damaged if,
say, hit by a bomb...which would put it out of action nonetheless. Furthermore,
there were all too many instances (especially in the Med) of British carriers
being sunk, in spite of their armored decks. Had the British carriers been able
to carry more aircraft, they would have potentially been more able to defend
themselves better.
>In the pacific, almost all the fighting on land that was in range of planes
from an aircraft carrier was also in range of naval gun fire from battleships.
And a typical battleship can deliver substantial more ordnance than the
typical large aircraft carrier.
>It seems to me that the allies should have produced more battleships and less
aircraft carries.<
My advice to you if you are interested in this concept, is to get a nice simple
wargame on the subject and run through a couple of scenarios of battleships vs.
carriers. Assuming the game is a realistic portrayel, you'll see what happens.
Consider the Japanese Yamato and Musashi BBs...greatest battleships ever built.
Both of them sunk by carrier aircraft . Considering the time it took to build
them both, a complete waste of resources.
>Why then did the aircraft carrier displace the battleship as the main
capital ship? Was there some other mitigating factor that I have
not considered? What is wrong with this analysis?<
You have to consider the huge expense of the battleships, the lengthy time it
takes to complete them, and the amount of resources required for them. To be
sure, the British already knew that the carrier was superior to the battleship,
the Japanese already knew...and the Americans were forced to figure that out
after losing most of its battleships at Pearl Harbor (and of course after the
power of the carrier was demonstrated at Midway).
In summary, just imagine what would have happened if the Americans had tried to
take on the Japanese carrier fleet with nothing but battleships at Midway.
--
David Thornley
Bauman <bau...@pa.uky.edu> wrote:
>As an amateur W.W.II "buff", I get most of my information on W.W.II from
>this news group, the History channel, books, and the web -- not necessarily
>in that order. On the History channel, at least when they talk about the
>war in the Pacific, they imply that aircraft carriers displaced battleships
>as the main capital ship because of its superior qualities. It almost seems
>to me that the battleship was relegated into second place, not so much because
>it didn't perform well, but because it was perceived after Pearl Harbor that
>it would not do well against the aircraft carries. Yet, if one looks at the
>battleships lost, they were rarely sunk by aircraft from aircraft carriers.
>Mostly they were sunk while they were moored in a harbor or sunk by land
>based aircraft or by other battleships.
>
warship is to get friendly merchant ships through an area and
denying enemy merchant ships the use of that area. In WWII,
warships also provided power projection themselves.
The proper question to ask about battleships vs. aircraft is
not whether they can protect themselves, but whether they can
protect friendly shipping, and the answer is generally no.
They could protect shipping if they could engage any enemy
carrier force in the operational area, but in general that was
impossible. Fleet carriers tended to be faster ships than
battleships, and given their searching ability could usually
strike and evade enemy battleships.
While a battleship can put out a great deal of firepower, a
deckload carrier strike is also very destructive, even if it
cannot be repeated as quickly. It is possible for carrier
aircraft to take out battleships. The only two US battleship
losses were destroyed by carrier aircraft at Pearl Harbor.
The largest battleships in the world, Yamato and Musashi, were
sunk by carrier aircraft (admitted, a whole lot of it).
The fact that carriers can, with great difficulty, sink battleships
at long range seemed to more than counter the battleships' ability
to reliably sink carriers at short range. This meant that
a carrier force would normally win in some sense against the
battleship force, when properly handled. (The British carrier
Glorious was *not* properly handled when it was surprised by
two German battlecruisers.)
Aircraft were not as devastating in WWII as they could become
postwar, but they were a lot cheaper than ships. The usual
course of an aircraft vs. ship battle was that the aircraft
would take losses, but the ships would normally be damaged
and a few possibly sunk. Once the surface force had taken losses
to key ships, either sunk or greatly slowed or damaged to
the point of being unable to carry out its mission, the surface
force would retreat out of aircraft range.
So, it was necessary for a naval force to have aircraft,
to defend against enemy aircraft and to attack enemy surface
forces. It was not necessary for such a force to have
battleships, although they were still very useful for some
roles. In WWI, a naval force had needed battleships, to
defend against enemy battleships and defeat smaller
enemy surface forces, and aircraft carriers had considerable
potential.
>typical large aircraft carrier. It seems to me that the allies should
>have produced more battleships and less aircraft carries. Of course,
>they should still produce small escort size aircraft carriers for
>submarine patrol and fleet anti-aircraft defense.
>
In general, the Allies had adequate battleships. The US and
British navies each had fifteen battleships and battlecruisers
going into WWII, which was more than Japan, Italy, and Germany.
During the war, the US completed ten battleships (and two
ships that might be considered battlecruisers) while the
British built five (a sixth was delayed because it didn't
appear to be needed, and was completed postwar). The
Japanese built two, as did the Germans, and the Italians
produced, I believe, three. This meant that the Allies
already had a considerable battleship superiority, except
for a while after Pearl Harbor.
On the other hand, carrier aircraft had to counter enemy land-based
aircraft, at least in the Pacific, and so the USN needed a lot
of large carriers to carry enough aircraft to deal with this.
The USN really did have enough battleships to deal with any
enemy, but needed all the fleet carriers it could get.
--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion, ask.
da...@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-
--
Timothy J. Lee
>capital ship? Was there some other mitigating factor that I have
>not considered? What is wrong with this analysis?
A big factor is striking range. An airplane can fly and drop bombs
and torpedoes much farther away from the aircraft carrier than a
battleship can fire its guns.
Consider the battle of Sibuyan Sea, where an IJN battleship force
sustained heavy losses (including the sinking of battleship Musashi)
to USN airplanes, while being unable to do anything to the USN
aircraft carriers that the airplanes came from.
Also, the same IJN force did not do too well at Samar against a USN
escort carrier force that it heavily outgunned, even though the
escort carriers were in range of the IJN battleships' guns.
--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Timothy J. Lee
Unsolicited bulk or commercial email is not welcome.
No warranty of any kind is provided with this message.
--
Dave Gower
> capital ship?
Among many things, a battleship could only project its power maybe 20 miles
or so, the effective range of its guns. A carrier could project power
hundreds of miles if it needed to. Furthermore, its attacking armament could
be aimed when quite close to the target. A battleship's shells were
committed to a set course the instant the guns were fired.
--
Emmanuel Gustin
news:9qpi7j$16au$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu...
> Yet, if one looks at the
> battleships lost, they were rarely sunk by aircraft from aircraft
carriers.
> Mostly they were sunk while they were moored in a harbor or sunk by land
> based aircraft or by other battleships.
Some time ago I received this list. As you can see, it was rare for
a battleship to sink another battleship:
List of battleship losses in WWII, provided by Steve Alvin
<sal...@heartland.bradley.edu>.
============================================================
14 Oct 1939 Royal Oak Britain submarine torpedo
3 Jul 1940 Bretagne France gunfire
3 Jul 1940 Provence France gunfire (salvaged)
12 Nov 1940 Conte di Cavour Italy aerial torpedo
24 May 1941 Hood Britain gunfire
27 May 1941 Bismarck Germany aerial torpedo, gunfire,
torpedo, scuttled
23 Sep 1941 Marat USSR artillery, bombs
25 Nov 1941 Barham Britain submarine torpedo
7 Dec 1941 Arizona USA bombs
7 Dec 1941 California USA aerial torpedo, bombs
7 Dec 1941 Nevada USA aerial torpedo, bombs
7 Dec 1941 Oklahoma USA aerial torpedo
7 Dec 1941 West Virginia USA aerial torpedo, bombs
10 Dec 1941 Prince of Wales Britain aerial torpedo, bombs
10 Dec 1941 Repulse Britain aerial torpedo, bombs
13 Nov 1942 Hiei Japan gunfire, torpedo, aerial
torpedo, bombs
15 Nov 1942 Kirishima Japan gunfire
27 Nov 1942 Dunkerque France scuttled
27 Nov 1942 Strasbourg France scuttled
8 Jun 1943 Mutsu Japan accidental explosion
9 Sep 1943 Roma Italy guided bombs
26 Dec 1943 Scharnhorst Germany gunfire, torpedo
24 Oct 1944 Musashi Japan aerial torpedo, bombs
25 Oct 1944 Fuso Japan gunfire, torpedo
25 Oct 1944 Yamashiro Japan gunfire, torpedo
12 Nov 1944 Tirpitz Germany bombs
21 Nov 1944 Kongo Japan submarine torpedo
15 Feb 1945 Conte di Cavour Italy bombs
19 Mar 1945 Haruna Japan bombs
27 Mar 1945 Gneisenau Germany bombs, scuttled
7 Apr 1945 Yamato Japan aerial torpedo, bombs
28 Jul 1945 Ise Japan bombs
28 Jul 1945 Hyuga Japan bombs
> Why then did the aircraft carrier displace the battleship as the main
> capital ship? Was there some other mitigating factor that I have
> not considered? What is wrong with this analysis?
I think the first thing to consider is --- I will firmly steady myself
against the expected storm of protest --- that 'dreadnought' battleships
were never very useful at all. They were largely the product of a
peacetime arms race, in which navies and countries competed to have
the thickest armour, the biggest guns and the largest ships. It was a
polically motivated evolution; to have battleships was the same as
being a great power. The result was that battleships became big,
costly vessels that were designed to fight a type of battle that was
very rare. Fleet formations around battleships became too big and
cumbersome for most naval tasks, and commanders became hesitant
to actually risk them in battle. Even during WWI, when attack by
aircraft was irrelevant, more battleships ran into mines, were
torpedoed by submarines, or spontaneously exploded (!), than
were sunk by other battleships.
In battle, an aircraft carrier was more likely to sink a battleship than
the other way around, because it could attack from a distance at which
the battleship could not hit back. And it could usually keep that distance
because it was faster. IIRC Glorious and Gambier Bay were the only
carriers sunk by gunfire from enemy ships; Glorious was surprised
by Scharnhorst and Gneisenau while transporting RAF Hurricanes
and the escort carrier Gambier Bay was exposed to Japanese gunfire
by Halsey's big blunder.
Aircraft carriers were also more useful than battleships because they
fought for the air superiority that is essential for successful operations
by other forces at land or sea. They were force multipliers, while pure
battleship fleets were often force drains --- they needed to be protected
against aerial and submarine attack (often by aircraft carriers), but could
not hit back. The most infamous example is the useless presence of
the 'Combined Fleet' at Midway.
Perhaps also important is that aircraft carriers destroyed other aircraft
carriers far more frequently than battleships destroyed each other.
Thus aircraft carriers became not only the decisive weapon, but also
the standard by which victory was judged.
--
Emmanuel Gustin <gus...@NoSpam.uia.ac.be>
(Delete NoSpam. from my address. If you can't reach me, your host
may be on our spam filter list. Check http://www.uia.ac.be/cc/spam.html.)
--
Tony Zbaraschuk
>advantages of the aircraft carrier.
>Why then did the aircraft carrier displace the battleship as the main
>capital ship? Was there some other mitigating factor that I have
>not considered? What is wrong with this analysis?
You are omitting the single largest advantage of the aircraft carrier.
Naturally your analysis is flawed.
Specifically, you are overlooking the fact that a WW II aircraft carrier
could strike at battleships from a range of 200+ miles, while a BB would
have to get to less than 10 miles to score a hit (well, OK, _Warspite_
did hit an Italian BB at 26,000 yards/14 miles in the Med, but that was
a lucky shot.) In other words, barring drastic malfeasance of duty on
somebody's part (_Glorious_ vs. _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisuau_) or major
communications foulups (Leyte Gulf), the carrier WILL sink or cripple
the battleship before the battleship can ever get into range (Leyte Gulf,
again; the _Yamato_ off Okinawa; _Bismarck_ -- the British could have
sunk her with torpedoes from _Ark Royal_'s Swordfish without ever coming
into gun range, if they'd been willing to spend a bit more time.)
Given the range advantage of the carrier, it doesn't _matter_ how good
the BB is when it gets close enough to use its guns, because it won't
get that close, except under very special circumstances. And you don't
plan a war on the assumption that your opponent will supinely fail to
exercise obvious precautions. (Again, Leyte Gulf, where the Japanese
had to deliberately sacrifice their entire carrier fleet just to _try_
and get the BBs into range, and it wouldn't have worked even then had
Spruance been in command, or Halsey exercised a modicum of thought.)
(Note that this analysis applies to WW II weapons. It's possible that
directed energy weapons will lead to a return of the BB; if lasers can
shoot down planes and missiles in line-of-sight, then you need armor
and projectiles capable of withstanding laser fire...)
Tony Zbaraschuk
--
"The King with half the East at heel is marched from lands of morning;
His fighters drink the rivers up, their shafts benight the air,
And he that stays will die for naught, and home there's no returning."
The Spartans on the sea-wet rock sat down and combed their hair.--A.E. Housman
--
Andrew Clark
"Jeremy Hogue" <snkyas...@juno.com> wrote
(snip excellent post)
> Even when it was available, naval gunfire
> support at times left much to be desired (such as at Tarawa and
Omaha
> Beach). Aerial fire support, while also lacking in accuracy at
times,
> was much more capable of accurate delivery (especially by the
Marines)
> and more immediate.
I can't comment on Tarawa, but I think you are being slightly
unfair about Omaha. Most of the German gun and observation
positions at Omaha had been specifically designed and constructed
to be immune to aerial bombing and plunging naval gunfire, with
5-6 foot reinforced concrete ceilings and front elevations. The
naval gunfire support and bombing was generally accurate but
ineffective. This was recognised by the Allied planners before
the landing took place.
Given the US's lamentable lack of armour - particularly
specialist armour - it took either point-blank fire from
destroyers or, more often, old fashioned infantry manoeuvre, to
silence the German bunkers at Omaha.
Geoffrey Sinclair
>this news group, the History channel, books, and the web -- not necessarily
>in that order. On the History channel, at least when they talk about the
>war in the Pacific, they imply that aircraft carriers displaced battleships
>as the main capital ship because of its superior qualities. It almost seems
>to me that the battleship was relegated into second place, not so much because
>it didn't perform well, but because it was perceived after Pearl Harbor that
>it would not do well against the aircraft carries. Yet, if one looks at the
>battleships lost, they were rarely sunk by aircraft from aircraft carriers.
>Mostly they were sunk while they were moored in a harbor or sunk by land
>based aircraft or by other battleships.
The key to the above is airpower, not just carrier air power. Of the
27
battleships sunk or damaged beyond repair in WWII airpower sank
14 and had a hand in 2 other losses. As well there are the 2 Italian
battleships at Taranto and 3 US battleships at Pearl Harbor that were
sunk or beached in shallow water as the result of air attacks.
It was the loss of Prince of Wales, a modern battleship with full
room to manoeuvre, that really made it clear what trained airpower
could do.
A major reason why so many axis battleships were sunk at moorings
was the practice of withdrawal of the target during the war, until
there
were no more safe harbors.
Apart from the battleships aircraft were responsible for 52 out of
116 USN destroyer/destroyer escort losses, and 56 out of 169
RN destroyer losses (from the HT Lenton books). According
to Warship losses of WWII by David Brown, of the 1319 warships
lost (excluding scuttled or captured) air attack sank 436, air raids
(presumably on harbours) sank 83 and guided missiles sank 6,
total 525, submarines sank 306, surface gunfire and torpedoes
sank 211, mines sank 186. Ships learnt to avoid aircraft.
An Iowa class battleship cost around three times that of an Essex
class hull, before taking into account the cost of the aircraft and
aircrew.
Battleships were the most expensive ship around, hard to build and
replace, but they were increasingly more vulnerable to aircraft. The
RN discovered the problem off Norway and had it rammed home
off Crete. One of the problems was as aircraft carried bigger and
bigger bombs they exceeded the ability of ships to carry the deck
armour needed to keep the bombs out. The glider bombs increased
airpower lethality more.
Of course it was not all one way. Hitting a moving target is always
harder, the air forces found it took extra training for both attack
and over water navigation before aircraft could expect success,
but the trend of the war is quite clear, increasingly dangerous
air power, provided the aircrew were trained. Better AA like
proximity fuses helped the ships but this was trumped by the
glider bombs.
To start off with the advantages of the battleship, it carried around
2 to three times the ammunition of a carrier (South Dakota 2,500
tons, Iowa 2,900 tons, Essex 1,200 tons) and could deliver this
in about an hour if it really had to, whereas the carrier would take
two to three days. So as long as the enemy was around 10 to 15
miles away if they were a ship, or perhaps twice that if it was a
ground target and the fall of shot could be spotted from the air,
there was little doubt the battleship would usually be the winner.
Zones with lots of bad weather or long nights limited carriers
more than battleships, in the arctic winter there was still a place
for the heavy units.
Now the disadvantages, to get within killing range of an enemy
ship (that his with a good hit chance) usually meant being within
torpedo range, to shoot at a ground target meant being close
to shore with minimal freedom to manoeuvre if attacked. The
battleships with the exception of the Iowas were slower than
other warship classes, meaning something had to slow the
enemy or they had to be surprised or they had to want battle. To
bombard the enemy requires that extra half day of steaming to
close the coast compared to a carrier can hit from 200 miles or
more. The enemy has more chance to react.
A battleship could effectively attack a naval or coastal target
within 10 to 15 miles of it's position, a carrier, or airbase, could
be used to effectively attack any target within hundreds of miles,
with accuracy effectively independent of distance in daylight.
Above all a carrier or airbase could house the fighters needed
to keep the enemy attack aircraft away from the surface ships
and provide anti submarine air patrols.
The carriers were the more effective warships, more flexible
and provided the greater combat power in most circumstances,
the good weather in the Pacific and the few places where
airfields could be built increased the carriers importance.
A carrier can be usually be relied upon to spot an enemy
battleship before it closes to gunnery range and has the
speed to out distance it, while launching strikes to sink the
battleship. The pre war problem of whether it could inflict
enough damage was answered during the war with a yes.
It is correct you should expect a carrier to usually lose a
fight against an equal sized equally trained land based
air group, since a few bombs on a land base is usually
much less of a problem than a few bombs on a carrier.
But war is all about not fighting equal battles, if the carrier
moves hundreds of miles each night, striking at a different
target the enemy has real problems providing enough
airpower, and land based air forces took a while to
understand the needs of anti shipping air groups.
For a fleet to operate it needed the airspace above it
controlled by friendly aircraft, carrier airpower was more
expensive than land based air, but could react quicker,
since the carriers were part of the fleet and could be used
to strike areas out of normal airpower range and give a
sudden, large increase in airpower over an important
target.
>It seems to me that the advantages of the battleship still out weighed the
>advantages of the aircraft carrier. The american Essex class carriers were
>poorly armored and did not seem to take battle damage very well. The
>Japanese carriers fared little better. The British carriers were much
>better armored but could not absorb the damage of the average battleship.
To start pre war, the USN wargames showed that a carrier in a
war zone, continually operating aircraft was the most vulnerable
of ships, a small amount of damage and the armed and fuelled
aircraft in the hanger or on the deck together with the open
avgas refuelling system could finish the job. The RN reacted to
this by treating the hanger and avgas storage as a magazine,
with fire curtains and salt water sprays for the hangars, meaning
more topweight, fewer aircraft, and more protection for the avgas,
meaning less was carried, and then finally, in the Illustrious class
went to fully armoured hangars. Apart from design flaws like the
boiler uptakes the RN carriers were in theory harder to sink than
other navy's, but this ignores the USN expertise in damage control.
Paying for it with decreased air groups and more need for
replenishment. Not a major concern in Europe, where operations
were always close to ports and within range of many airbases, but
the wrong choice for Pacific operations.
In any case a ship of around 23,000 tons is usually more vulnerable
than one of around 35 to 40,000 tons, especially to torpedoes, and
battleships had the best anti torpedo defences.
As aircraft performance increased so did the carrier's offensive
abilities. A Swordfish, carrying a torpedo, was hard pressed to
catch an enemy ship moving away at 25 knots into, say, a 25
knot wind. An SBD, cruising at 100+ knots faster than any
warship did not have this problem. When radar came into
service the problem of carrier vulnerability actually switched
around, designed to carry a large topweight, one that could be
easily jettisoned, a warned carrier, with fuel systems shut down
and no armed and fuelled aircraft on board became much
harder to sink. Radar also meant a better chance if intercepting
an incoming raid, breaking it up to give the ships a better
chance of fighting off the raid.
Another hidden improvement pre war was the increase in
aircraft range and radio range, giving the carrier more
freedom to manoeuvre, rather than be tied to near the
battle line because of the short radio and aircraft ranges.
The Essx class proved they could take heavy damage and
survive Japanese carriers were proof of one hidden value
of radar, add the larger US airstrikes in 1944 and
inexperienced crews and it is not surprising they performed
badly.
>In the pacific, almost all the fighting on land that was in range of planes
>from an aircraft carrier was also in range of naval gun fire from battleships.
>And a typical battleship can deliver substantial more ordnance than the
>typical large aircraft carrier. It seems to me that the allies should
>have produced more battleships and less aircraft carries. Of course,
>they should still produce small escort size aircraft carriers for
>submarine patrol and fleet anti-aircraft defence.
Think about what has just been said, if the strike aircraft were
so poor, why have a fleet air defence? Also the bigger carriers,
with their bigger decks had the lower accident rates, could
better launch aircraft in low winds and could keep up with the
rest of the fleet, escort carriers were about the slowest of the
allied warships.
The distances in the pacific meant carriers could overwhelm
an enemy airbase and indeed needed to do so since land
based airpower, particularly fighters, could not support
invasions like Leyte, Saipan, Iwo Jima and Okinawa, they
were too far away from the airbases. There were only a
relatively small number of places in the Pacific where
large airbases could be established, the New Guinea
fighting in late 1943/44 was a series of leaps to capture
Japanese airbases or ground thought suitable for airbases.
On at least one occasion the ground captured turned out
to be unsuitable.
The fast carriers intervened in the invasions because it was
them or nothing, the admirals did not like the idea of being
tied to being near a fixed point plus having to possibly
take on large amounts of land based airpower. The
alternative was many more invasions every 100 to 200
miles to ensure land based airpower was available.
Not all the islands were small enough to be completely
within battleship gunnery range, the Solomons, New Guinea,
the Philippines, Saipan and Guam for example.
>Why then did the aircraft carrier displace the battleship as the main
>capital ship? Was there some other mitigating factor that I have
>not considered? What is wrong with this analysis?
See above.
There is no absolute in war, the IJN battleships should never have
made it to the USN escort carriers off Leyte Gulf, with all the US
advantages in intelligence, airpower and radar the concept would
have been probably ruled impossible before it actually happened.
In the 1944 carrier battles both Admirals Spruance and Halsey
formed the USN battle line, they understood if the IJN fleet came
within range how effective the surface ships could have been,
indeed would have been needed to screen the carriers.
Carriers were more vulnerable to bad weather, but again the trend
of the war was for this to matter less and less, and for the weapons
the aircraft carried to become more and more dangerous. Fleets
needed the co-operation of trained airpower to protect them, to scout
for them and to help them strike the enemy. The statistics quoted
earlier give an idea of what sort of enemies the surface warships
were normally fighting, it was hard to bring an enemy surface fleet
to battle if that fleet did not want to fight.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.
Andrew Clark
"Joel Shepherd" <joel...@ix.netcom.com> wrote
> Would someone have similar figures for large-caliber shells
carried by
> one of the fast-battleship classes?
RN KGV battleships carried 100 rounds of 14" shells per gun,
total 1000 rounds. The weight of the 14" shells amounted to
1,590,000 pounds as against the 535,400 pounds of bombs carried
by the Essex class carriers.
Andrew Clark
"ERHarvey" <erha...@aol.com> wrote
> Furthermore, there were all too many instances
> (especially in the Med) of British carriers
> being sunk, in spite of their armored decks.
There were only two RN carriers lost in the Mediterranean, the
fleet carrier Ark Royal torpedoed by U81 on 13 November 1941 and
the escort carrier Eagle torpedoed by U73 on 11 August 1942.
Surprisingly enough, an armoured deck is not much help against a
torpedo attack. On the other hand, HMS Illustrious & Victorious
both survived intensive bombing attacks in the Med. which would
have sunk any carrier without an armoured deck.
> Had the British carriers been able
> to carry more aircraft, they would have
> potentially been more able to defend
> themselves better.
This is very debatable. Illustrious was within range of Luftwaffe
VIII Air Corps with hundreds of fighters, bombers and dive
bombers. Even thirty more fighters on Illustrious would have
hardly sufficed to prevent a successful attack.
Bauman
>
> As an amateur W.W.II "buff",
> Why then did the aircraft carrier displace the battleship as the main
> capital ship? Was there some other mitigating factor that I have
> not considered? What is wrong with this analysis?
There were so many replys to my original post the I am going to send a common
response to them instead individual responses so that I do not have to repeat
my self.
Firstly, I was hoping to limit the scope of the discussion to the war in
the pacific and English, American and Japanese Navies. The reason for this
is the fact that the Italian, German, French, Canadian and other navies had very
few if any aircraft carriers. Therefore, one can find numerous examples
of battleships in their navies being sunk and no examples of aircraft
carries sunk. The pacific war seems to me, from a historical perspective,
to be better for the discussion of aircraft carrier vs. battleship in
that both were present.
Secondly, I am not saying that aircraft carriers did not have their place.
For example, the small escort carriers were invaluable in the anti-submarine
war in the Atlantic. Rather, I was addressing the overall ratio of
battleships vs. aircraft carriers that were deployed, as to whether
this was optimal or not. Also, I not suggesting that a Task - Force
of battleships should not include aircraft carriers. Just that these
aircraft carrier should have been used more in the role they were originally
envisioned (scouts and local air-defense) and not so much as the principle
offensive capital ships. Also, that in general, the battleships of most
navies were poorly (or rarely used) to their full advantage.
In response to my original post Jeremy Hogue wrote:
: What do you mean "perceived"? Battleships did fare poorly against
: carriers. Had the U.S. fleet been in deep water rather than a
: protected anchorage, all EIGHT of the battleships would have been
: lost.
I strongly disagree with this last statement. Not one USN battleship
was sunk by Japanese aircraft carrier based aircraft while under
way and in deep water. Nor do I recall any being sunk by Japanese
land based aircraft either.
Furthermore, in a discussion of battleships vs. aircraft carries, the
fact that it was battleships and not aircraft carriers, sunk at Pearl
Harbor is almost incidental.
Certainly, one would conceded that if
it had been eight aircraft carriers at anchor, then at least as many,
and probably more, would have been sunk. This is because aircraft
carriers do not sustain battle damage as well as battleships when hit.
In addition, they could not deploy their principle means of defense
when at anchor. The battleships, with more reliance on AAA, could
at least somewhat defend them selfs.
Also, the fact that it was aircraft carriers that conducted the attack
at Pearl Harbor is not a necessity. Since the Japanese successful
launched a battleship oriented surprise attack in her 1904 war
with Russia at Port Author, it is conceivable that she could have
done the same thing at Pearl Harbor.
Thus, the many example of aircraft of all sort attaching and sinking
battleships in harbors is a very weak argument. Aircraft carriers
in port are every bit as vulnerable as battleships. One could argue
that the attacks were successful because they were more of a surprise
that a similiar attack by battleships. However, their are examples of
ships lost in port to battleship gun fire as well.
: After Pearl Harbor, there were no allied battleships in the
: Pacific Ocean. Price of Wales and Repulse (admittedly a battlecruiser)
: were sunk on December 8 and all eight of the U.S. battleships at Pearl
: Harbor were sunk or damaged. All Nimitz had at the time were his
: carriers to strike back with.
As for the Prince of Wales and the Repulse, again, this example does not
lend itself very well to this debate. They were sunk by land based aircraft,
not carrier based aircraft. Also, as these were early in the Pacific war,
both had inadequate AAA, later battleships would have been refitted with
much better AAA. Certainly, if they had been a pair of aircraft carriers
instead of battleships one could argue they the could have defended themselves
better against the land based. But that Mr. Hogue responsible. This example,
by itself does not lend itself to the debate of aircraft carriers vs. battleships
very well.
In my original post I wrote:
:: And a typical battleship can deliver substantial more ordnance than the
:: typical large aircraft carrier.
To which Jeremy Hogue replied:
: Once the fleet train was built by mid-1944, the carriers could remain
: on station almost indefinitely by means of underway replenishment.
: While it is possible to move bombs, aerial torpedos, fuel and
: replacement pilots to carriers from another ship while underway, I
: wouldn't try it with a few hundred 16 inch shells, one shell at a time.
While I am no expert on the subject, I fail to see how it is substantial
harder to transfer a few hundred 16 inch shells vs. a few hundred 500 lb
bombs and a 1000 lb torpedoes. As for pilots and planes, that fact they
are easy to replace is hardly an advantage as battleships don't have
these items. In addition, it fails to address the issue of
ordinance delivery. I don't have the numbers before me, but I believe
a battleship can deliver ordinance at about 10 times the rate (weight/time)
of an aircraft carrier.
battleship -> (2 salvos/min * 9 guns * 2300lbs/shell = 41400 lbs/min) vs.
aircraft carrier -> (1 aircraft/min (launch and retrieved) * 2000 lbs/aircraft = 2000 lbs/min)
This is of course limited to the amount of
ordinance on hand. And the ordinance on hand, I believe, is going to be greater for a
battleship because it does not have to carry planes, aviation fuel,
and pilots. The Iowa class battleships carried 1220 16-inch shells or about
2.8 million pounds (50-50 mix AP/HE shells) and another .8 million pounds of
5 inch shells. The typical Essex class aircraft carrier carried .75 million
pounds of bombs of all types (GP, AP, Incendiary and torpedoes).
In my original post I wrote:
:: ... American Essex class carriers ... did not seem to take battle damage very well. The
:: Japanese carriers fared little better
To which Jeremy Hogue replied:
: The results from Midway give a bad impression of Japanese carriers.
: Yes, some of them such as Junyo, Hiyo, Hiryu, Soryu were not very well
: protected.
My argument exactly. Perhaps the Japanese would have been better off
if these were battleships instead.
In my original post I wrote:
:: It seems to me that the allies should
:: have produced more battleships and less aircraft carries.
To which Mr. Hogue replied:
: The decision to begin building large numbers of aircraft carriers was
: made prior to Pearl Harbor. The first eleven Essex class carriers
: were ordered in 1940 and the Essex was built in less than 20 months.
: Yorktown (the second one), was finished in less than 18. Many were
: completed in less than 2 years. The shortest build time for
: battleships around 30 months for Alabama, Iowa and New Jersey.
This is perhaps his strongest argument to which I do not have real
reply. Anyone care to comment ?
In a different reply by Joel Shephard, he wrote:
: I think you need to look a little deeper than that. The issue wasn't
: battleships vs aircraft carriers: the issue was control of the air.
In the Pacific, the issue was control of the islands. The question
was which of these two types of capital warships best help achieve
this. Or better yet, what was the optimal mix of these two types.
He also replies:
: So, it was not feasible to simply send some transports with an escort
: of cruisers and battleships into the Solomons or the Marshalls or the
: Marianas: they would be chewed to bits by Japanese aircraft, both
: ground- and carrier-based.
I agree that aircraft carriers are useful in the role of air-defense,
although, for point defense against the Kamakazi's the situation
was often reversed -- with the battleships suppling anti-aircraft
artillery in support of the aircraft carriers.
He also replies:
: ... they (battleships) would be subject to air attack, with
: only maneuver and anti-aircraft fire for defense.
In addition to their armor.
He also replies:
: Carriers themselves were vulnerable to air attack -- though they
: proved more durable than many expected.
I think that they were much less durable than expected. Light armor,
aviation fuel and ordinance on top of the deck due not make something
very durable.
He also replies:
:The fleet carriers held the edge in terms of raw speed and maneuverability.
The Iowa class battleships were designed to travel with the fast carrier groups
and where among the fastest capital ships afloat. The heaviest Japanese aircraft
carriers traded speed for armor and fire-power and were not fast. In general,
I think the most modern battleships of that era were as fast, if not faster,
than the comparable aircraft carriers.
Unfortunately, I find that I am not going to be able to respond to all of
the replies. The crux of most of the their arguments was that the ability
of aircraft carriers to strike at large distances far outweight any disadvantage
it might have (in theory or practice) compared to battleships. Thus, the argument
is that a aircraft carrier is more likely to sink a battleship than the other
way around. In addition, they could strike land based targets while at the same
time being out of range of land based gunfire (and apparently land based enemy
aircraft). However, I believe most of the reply's fail to find the proper
level of importance that the survivability of a battleship played, or could
have played. Many of the US aircraft carriers were much more vunerable to
land based aircraft (Kamakazi's) than most would admit. While no Essex carriers
were lost, several were damaged so bad that they had to withdrawl. Furthermore,
if operation Olympic( the first part of the invasion of Japan ) had to have
taken place, this vunerability to Kamikazi would have been more evident. In
addition, all this took place in a war, that after Midway, was decidedly one-sided.
Thanks for all the responces.
Cheers to all.
Robert
--
JD Lail
<joel...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>> The British carriers were much better armored but could not absorb
>> the damage of the average battleship.
>They had more problems than that. "American & British Aircraft Carrier
>Development 1919-1941" has an example that demonstrates the price the
>British paid for that armor. In spring 1945, a typical US task group
>(58.1) consisted of two Essex-class and two light carriers -- about
>75,000 tons total displacement. Between them, they carried about 280
>aircraft of which roughly 140 were strike aircraft: dive bombers and
>torpedo planes.
>Task Group 57.2 was composed of three British Illustrious-class
>carriers, and one Implacable-class: about 92,000 tons total
>displacement. Yet they carried only 235 aircraft total, of which only
>*65* were strike aircraft.
>With less tonnage, lightly armored USN CVs were capable of putting
>over twice as much striking power in the air. They were much more
>capable of destroying enemy air power. Why waste space on armor, when
>you can simply destroy the threat to begin with?
Folks you are missing a point on British Fleet Aircraft Carriers.
They were built with completely different assumptions than were the
American carriers. To be blunt one was built for Pacific operations
while the other was built to operate in Coastal Atlantic and
Mediterranean waters. If you are going to operate where massive
numbers of land based dive bombers are based you damn well are
going to need deck armor.
The WWII Carrier had two weaknesses; night and submarines. Carriers
can not operate at night without making themselves into glowing
targets for all to see. One advantage of land based planes was that
with properly trained pilots they can operate at night without escorts
or carrier fighter opposition. In the ETO and the MTO it was not all
that inconceivable that a carrier would be in range of night flying
bombers. Again deck armor would be useful. OTOH it was not useful
against submarines or for that matter torpeckers.
Three other points;
1) We had to build ships that were not too big for the Panama Canal.
Did the British have a similar limitation with the Suez Canal ?
2) Did the British still view the carrier role in a combined fleet as
secondary to the Battleship ? All those fighters made the
British Carrier a better scout and provider of CAP than an
offensive force.
3) Any fleet action in Europe would have been with the range of
massive numbers of land based planes from both sides from
Day 1. This condition did not exist in the Pacific.
--
ANDREW ROBERT BREEN
Andrew Clark <ww2...@acpub.duke.edu> wrote:
>There were only two RN carriers lost in the Mediterranean, the
>fleet carrier Ark Royal torpedoed by U81 on 13 November 1941 and
>the escort carrier Eagle torpedoed by U73 on 11 August 1942.
Nitpick: _Eagle_ wasn't an escort carrier - certainly not by RN
standards. She had been built and always acted as a fleet carrier, albeit
a small and slow one (partially because she'd started life as a battleship
- sister to the Chilean _Admiral Latorre_ that the US considered buying in
the aftermath of Pearl Harbor, partially because she was, after all, the
oldest "real" 'carrier, with the sole exception of _Argus_). "Second-class
Fleet Carrier" would describe _Eagle_ rather well.
--
Andy Breen ~ Interplanetary Scintillation Research Group
http://users.aber.ac.uk/azb/
"Time has stopped, says the Black Lion clock
and eternity has begun" (Dylan Thomas)
--
ANDREW ROBERT BREEN
D.K. Brown (former Assistant Director of Naval Construction, head of
the RN historical branch) gives a very good discussion of this in 'From
Nelson to Vanguard' (Chatham Press) - to summarise, the battleship went
away not because it was more vunerable to things that hit it than the
carrier - the carrier was more vunerable - but because the carrier had a
much greater chance of inflicting damage on other ships that the
battleship did, and because (with its scouts and fighter screen) a much
greater chance of protecting itself against taking damage. The 'carrier
could inflict damage and protect itself. The battleship could only sit
there and get hit.
--
Andy Breen ~ Interplanetary Scintillation Research Group
http://users.aber.ac.uk/azb/
"Random events tend to cluster" (P.J.S. Williams)
--
John Lansford
>RN KGV battleships carried 100 rounds of 14" shells per gun,
>total 1000 rounds. The weight of the 14" shells amounted to
>1,590,000 pounds as against the 535,400 pounds of bombs carried
>by the Essex class carriers.
Simply measuring how much the total weight of the rounds was vs the
weight of the bombs is a meaningless exercise, though. An AP shell,
for example, was mostly steel; very little explosive was in it (I
believe about 100-200 pounds). With an HE shell, there was still a lot
of steel although obviously more explosive would have been present,
but less than a comparable weight of HE bomb.
IOW, a carrier had more explosives than a battleship had. That was the
important feature to be concerned about, not how much the ammo
weighed.
a...@aber.ac.uk
>fleet carrier Ark Royal torpedoed by U81 on 13 November 1941 and
>the escort carrier Eagle torpedoed by U73 on 11 August 1942.
Nitpick: _Eagle_ wasn't an escort carrier - certainly not by RN
standards. She had been built and always acted as a fleet carrier,
albeit
a small and slow one (partially because she'd started life as a
battleship
- sister to the Chilean _Admiral Latorre_ that the US considered
buying in
the aftermath of Pearl Harbor, partially because she was, after all,
the
oldest "real" 'carrier, with the sole exception of _Argus_).
"Second-class
Fleet Carrier" would describe _Eagle_ rather well.
--
Andy Breen ~ Interplanetary Scintillation Research Group
http://users.aber.ac.uk/azb/
Yau-ming
tried its best to get their BBs out of the harms way of IJN CVs in 1942. You
also have to realize that by the end of 1942, most of the IJN's best strike
pilots were dead. Moreover, the USN had developed proximity fuses for their
AA by the end of that year. Why don't you talk about the IJN BBs like the
unsinkable Yamato and Musashi?
Do you honestly think the USN could have won Midway with 4 or 10 modern BBs
instead of their CVs air power? Imagine sending your BBs without the benefit
of air cover against a strong carrier fleet? USN Rear Admiral Fiske and Sims
in 1919 asked the same question. Where was the best allocation of resources?
Would it be better spent building more battleships or more carriers? They
opted for the latter but the BB supporters overruled their judgement. The
battleship is the backbone of the USN, they said.
"Bauman" <bau...@pa.uky.edu> wrote in message news:9r44mh$13v2
> I strongly disagree with this last statement. Not one USN battleship
> was sunk by Japanese aircraft carrier based aircraft while under
> way and in deep water. Nor do I recall any being sunk by Japanese
> land based aircraft either.
I think you are better off directing your question to sci.military.naval
The answer is quite self-evident from current events - how many BBs are in
operation today as compared to CVs? Now do you think there is a world wide
conspiracy against the Battleship?
--
Andrew Clark
"I reckon that the Essex bomb load mentioned earlier contained
around 188,000 lbs of TNT. A KGV with only HE shells would carry
around 200,000 lbs of Torpex, representing around a million
pounds of TNT".
It turns out that US GP aerial bombs had a CTW ration of around
55%, not 35% as per RAF GP bombs. That fact makes the total
explosive weight of the Essex carrier bomb load around 294,000
pounds of TNT. It also turns out that RN HE shells were more
likely to be RDX than Torpex, giving the KGV class the explosive
equivalent of around 600,000 pounds of TNT.
--
ANDREW ROBERT BREEN
JD Lail <jdl...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>2) Did the British still view the carrier role in a combined fleet as
> secondary to the Battleship ? All those fighters made the
> British Carrier a better scout and provider of CAP than an
> offensive force.
RN 1930s thinking seems to have been that the carriers should operate
independently but in support of the battle fleet (that is, they'd
be a separate squadron, possibly with a battlecruiser as a heavy escort),
but would act to:
(a) Scout for the fleet
(b) Attack and harrass the enemy fleet once located
(i) Light bombers (Nimrod, later Skua) and fighters (ditto) to
suppress AA fire
(ii) Dive bombers (1934 trials onwards) to attack enemy cruisers,
'carriers (if any)
(iii) Torpedo bombers to attack, cripple and slow (and, if
possible, sink) enemy heavy ships
Having destroyed the enemy's scouting capacity and slowed his heavy ships
the carrier force's aircraft could then guide to heavy ships in for the
kill. Think of the later phases of the Bismarck chase on the grand scale.
If the enemy fleet failed to come out, then:
(iv) Destruction of the enemy fleet in harbour (this had been a
'carrier role in the RN since at least 1918, and plans
were kept up to date. Taranto is the illustration of
what was planned).
There was considerably advantage seen in operating 'carriers in groups -
_Glorious_, _Courageous_ and _Furious_ operated as a single force in the
Med. Fleet through most of the 1930s (ISTR this was the only multi-carrier
force in the world at the time). Failing that, 'carriers were intended to
operate with a heavy escort (ideally a battlecruiser and a big cruiser -
Force H would be the famous example). The USN/IJN idea of having heavy LA
guns on the 'carrier itself had been given up early on in favour of
operating the 'carrier with a surface escort force.
Of course, when war came things were too stretched for all of these
lessons to be applied (in particular the loss of Glorious and Courageous
early on - both lost through inexperiance of war conditions) put paid to
the idea of a mulit-carrier force for several years.
--
Andy Breen ~ Interplanetary Scintillation Research Group
http://users.aber.ac.uk/azb/
"Time has stopped, says the Black Lion clock
and eternity has begun" (Dylan Thomas)
--
Joel Shepherd
Bauman wrote:
>
> Also, I not suggesting that a Task - Force of battleships should not
> include aircraft carriers. Just that these aircraft carrier should
> have been used more in the role they were originally envisioned
> (scouts and local air-defense) and not so much as the principle
> offensive capital ships.
So, you're suggesting that task forces sit back and simply wait for
attack by land-based planes? What evidence do you have that this is
markedly more effective than pro-actively destroying the enemy's
aircraft and airfields?
I have to believe you have no concept of the sheer numbers of Japanese
aircraft destroyed on the ground by carrier raids throughout 1944 and
1945 ... or the style of operations that led to their destruction.
> Also, that in general, the battleships of most navies were poorly
> (or rarely used) to their full advantage.
Which was what, specifically?
> In addition, they could not deploy their principle means of defense
> when at anchor. The battleships, with more reliance on AAA, could
> at least somewhat defend them selfs.
If you look at the records, you'll find that anti-aircraft fire was
not the most effective defense against air attack: well-managed
fighters on patrol did significantly better. Furthermore, carriers did
not skimp on AA armament. Again, if someone can post corresponding
numbers for a fast battleship class, I'd be grateful. Following her
1943 overall, CV-6 carried nearly 100 barrels for AA defense: 8 5"/38,
40 40mm and 50 20mm.
>
> In a different reply by Joel Shepherd, he wrote:
> : I think you need to look a little deeper than that. The issue
> : wasn't battleships vs aircraft carriers: the issue was control of
> : the air.
>
> In the Pacific, the issue was control of the islands.
Huh? No-one cared about the *islands*. Islands in and of themselves
had no value. Guadalcanal had no value until the Japanese started
building an airfield on it; it became priceless when the Americans
captured it and started operating aircraft from it. The Marianas and
Marshalls were a threat until recaptured because of the aircraft
operating from them, not because of their trees and beaches. Iwo Jima
was valued solely for its airfields.
There's a theme there.
> He also replies:
> : So, it was not feasible to simply send some transports with an
> : escort of cruisers and battleships into the Solomons or the
> : Marshalls or the Marianas: they would be chewed to bits by
> : Japanese aircraft, both ground- and carrier-based.
>
> I agree that aircraft carriers are useful in the role of
> air-defense, although, for point defense against the Kamakazi's the
> situation was often reversed -- with the battleships suppling
> anti-aircraft artillery in support of the aircraft carriers.
Which was still less effective than fighter planes in the air.
Carriers assumed this role by default: they carried the planes after
all. But it would have been the height of folly for the carriers to
just sit back and wait for enemy aircraft to attack when they wanted,
how they wanted, where they wanted: to hand over that initiative
entirely to the opponent.
> He also replies:
> : ... they (battleships) would be subject to air attack, with
> : only maneuver and anti-aircraft fire for defense.
>
> In addition to their armor.
Previously, you dismiss the argument that aircraft were used
effectively against battleships by pointing out that no USN BB's were
destroyed by air attack underway. Yet you utterly ignore the record of
Japanese BB's and other heavy ships which *were* destroyed entirely or
in part by carrier aircraft: Yamato, Musashi, Hiei, Kirishima, to
start with. These ships were armored: armor wasn't a save-all panacea.
> He also replies:
> : Carriers themselves were vulnerable to air attack -- though they
> : proved more durable than many expected.
>
> I think that they were much less durable than expected.
Then I think you're unfamiliar with what expectations *were* in, say,
1942. Carriers were considered exceedingly vulnerable to air attack,
and it was common wisdom that a carrier-vs-carrier battle would go to
the side that landed the first blow. The expected outcome of such
battles was that one side or the other would simply suffer the
destruction of its carriers.
On occasion this happened, but not as predictably as one might think.
Consider, for example, what it took to put Hornet CV-8 down in October
1942:
First attack:
6 bombs (250kg variety, near as I can tell)
2 near-misses
2 crashing planes
2 torpedoes
After this, she was in rough condition (big surprise), but considered
in good enough shape to be worth towing to safety.
Afternoon attacks:
2 bombs
1 torpedo
US attempts to scuttle:
9 torpedoes (only counting hits that detonated)
430 5" rounds
After all this -- 12 torpedo hits! -- the Japanese found her still
afloat, and apparently in good enough shape that they made an attempt
to attach a towline to her. When that failed, it took another 4
torpedoes to finally put her down.
Her sisterships proved equally tough. In the same engagement,
Enterprise was hit by two bombs and damaged by a near miss, yet within
an hour she was operating aircraft again. She suffered worse the
previous August and similarly recovered. Yorktown was severely damaged
at Coral Sea, but with only the most cursory repairs was capable of
fighting hard at Midway.
> Light armor, aviation fuel and ordinance on top of the deck due
> not make something very durable.
This was the reason for magazines, CO2-filled gasoline lines, and the
like. The USN carriers' main vulnerability was to torpedoes.
> He also replies:
> : The fleet carriers held the edge in terms of raw speed and
> : maneuverability.
>
> The Iowa class battleships were designed to travel with the fast
> carrier groups and where among the fastest capital ships afloat.
No doubt. None-the-less, the carriers had to operate at less than
flank speed to stay with their heavier escorts: typically no more than
27 knots, when the carriers were capable of over 30. There's evidence
that on at least one occasion, a USN carrier outran her escorts
(including a fast BB) while under attack.
> I think the most modern battleships of that era were as fast, if
> not faster, than the comparable aircraft carriers.
That's fine, but why make guesses when there is ample empirical
evidence?
> they could strike land based targets while at the same time being
> out of range of land based gunfire (and apparently land based enemy
> aircraft).
I didn't read anything suggesting the latter. Land-based aircraft were
typically more "long-legged" than their carrier-based counterparts.
That didn't stop carriers from repeatedly racing in undetected from
unexpected directions and catching land-based planes on the ground. A
battleship, with another 200 miles to cover before being able to
engage offensively, had a much more difficult time springing a
surprise.
> However, I believe most of the reply's fail to find the proper
> level of importance that the survivability of a battleship played,
> or could have played.
Which is easy to do when one selectively dismisses the record of heavy
ships destroyed under way by aircraft, carrier-based and otherwise.
> Many of the US aircraft carriers were much more vunerable to land
> based aircraft (Kamakazi's) than most would admit.
They were also much more effective *against* land-based aircraft than
you seem to want to understand. Again: do you really think it's
practical to sit and wait for the enemy to attack, armored or not?
> In addition, all this took place in a war, that after Midway, was
> decidedly one-sided.
Rubbish. A common enough perception it seems, but one that betrays a
lack of familiarity with the major campaigns of the war.
-- Joel.
--
Yau-ming
away
from hitting the vulnerable decks of the carriers and, of course, to
help
shoot the hostiles down. If the IJN had not held back their BB fleet,
sending them to bombard Midway luring away the USN air strike force
from the
Akagi group, the IJN could have won Midway.
BBs during WWII served as useful support vessels to the carriers. The
USN
used to position two BBs on either side of their carrier group to
offer
invaluable AA protection.
But eventually, a good carrier force (mind you I said good - the IJN
carrier
fleet in 1944 cannot be considered "good"... mediocre maybe) would
destroy
the enemy bb fleet which I assume you left with little or no air
support.
Rich Rostrom
Bauman <bau...@pa.uky.edu> wrote:
>Bauman wrote:
>>
>I was addressing the overall ratio of battleships vs.
> aircraft carriers that were deployed, as to whether
>this was optimal or not.
It wasn't. The battleships should have been discarded.
>the battleships of most navies were
>poorly (or rarely used) to their full advantage.
Most efforts to use battleships aggressively ended in
disaster.
>I strongly disagree with this last statement. Not one USN
>battleship was sunk by Japanese aircraft carrier based
>aircraft while underway and in deep water.
No US battleships were sunk after Pearl Harbor by any cause,
so this proves nothing.
However, PENNSYLVANIA, NEW MEXICO, IDAHO, CALIFORNIA, and
MARYLAND all received disabling damage from air attack at
various times during the war,
>Also, the fact that it was aircraft carriers that conducted the attack
>at Pearl Harbor is not a necessity. Since the Japanese successful
>launched a battleship oriented surprise attack in her 1904 war
>with Russia at Port Author, it is conceivable that she could have
>done the same thing at Pearl Harbor.
Extremly unlikely. What was possible in 1904 was not possible
in 1941.
Also you seem to be determined to ignore the importance
of strike range. I'll tell you what. You can have the
biggest, sharpest broadsword you can wield. I'll take a
rifle. Who wins?
It's a lot easier to sneak up to rifle range of a target
than to get to knife 'range' undetected.
>However, there are examples of
>ships lost in port to battleship gun fire as well.
Only two such examples from WW II: Mers-el-Kebir and
Casasblanca.
And in both of these cases, the attack was possible only
because of the weird political context.
On the other hand we have dozens of air attacks on
battleships in harbor. (Mostly by land-based air in
Europe, but at least 5 by carrier air.)
>While I am no expert on the subject, I fail to see how it is
>substantially harder to transfer a few hundred 16 inch shells
>vs. a few hundred 500 lb bombs and a 1000 lb torpedoes.
The shells are heavier. Much heavier. 1 tonne each.
>In my original post I wrote:... American Essex class
>:: carriers ... did not seem to take battle damage very
>:: well. The Japanese carriers fared little better
>
>To which Jeremy Hogue replied:
>: The results from Midway give a bad impression of Japanese.
>: carriers Yes, some of them such as Junyo, Hiyo, Hiryu, Soryu
>: were not very well protected.
>
>My argument exactly. Perhaps the Japanese would have
>been better off if these were battleships instead.
The carriers at least scored some damage on US ships before
they were sunk. Japanese battleships were impotent.
Of course, they would have been harder to sink.
Maybe what the Japanese should have built were _rams_.
They could have omitted those heavy, useless guns.
(Of Japan's twelve battleships, only YAMATO, NAGATO,
KONGO, HARUNA, HIEI, and KIRISHIMA ever fired their
main guns at an enemy, on a total of five occasions,
and only HIEI and KIRISHIMA were at four of those.)
So they could have carried a lot more armor and been
made a lot harder to sink. And any US carrier rammed
by such a ship would certainly have sunk.
>for point defense against the Kamakazi's the situation
>was often reversed -- with the battleships supplying
>anti-aircraft artillery in support of the aircraft carriers.
The best defense against air attack was fighter interceptors
in the air. Combat Air Patrol (CAP) can intercept attackers
before they get into striking range. CAP from several carriers
can help protect another that is kilometers away.
AA guns (especially the smaller caliber weapons) are useful
mainly for point defense against a plane that is attacking
that particular ship.
If the object was to have lots of AA guns, then destroyers
gave the most punch to the pound.
An IOWA class battleship carried 20 x 5" DP guns, 60 x 40mm
AA guns, and 50 x 20mm AA guns, and displaced 52,000 tons.
A FLETCHER class destroyer carried 5 x 5" DP guns, 10 x 40mm
AA guns, and 7 x 20mm AA guns, and displaced 2,100 tons.
Ten FLETCHERs would carry far more AA guns than an IOWA,
on 1/5 the tonnage.
>He also replies:
>: Carriers themselves were vulnerable to air attack --
>: though they proved more durable than many expected.
>
>I think that they were much less durable than expected.
Battleships were not all that much better.
NEW MEXICO was hit by a kamikaze on 5/12/1945, and was under
repair for two months.
>I think the most modern battleships of that era were as
>fast, if not faster, than the comparable aircraft carriers.
Not true.
Here's a table of "modern" battleships and carriers:
class speed (kts)
IOWA 33
MONTANA* 28
BISMARCK 29
H-40* 30
KING GEORGE V 27.5
LION* 30
VANGUARD 29.75
LITTORIO 30
RICHELIEU 30
YAMATO 27.5
ENTERPRISE 33
ESSEX 33
MIDWAY 33
ARK ROYAL 30.75
ILLUSTRIOUS 30.5
ARK ROYAL (ii) 32
SHOKAKU 34
TAIHO 33
UNRYU 34
* proposed or cancelled classes
I think it is fairly clear that carriers were faster
than any battleships except the IOWAs. In some cases
the gap was six knots. The IOWAs had thinner armor
than most other BBs and were very large.
Throughout the history of the battleship, speed was
always a problem. The weight of heavy armor and guns
meant that high speed could be achieved only by
sacrificing protection or hitting power, or by building
a _very_ large, _very_ costly ship.
>...I believe most of the replies fail to find the proper
>level of importance that the survivability of a battleship
>played, or could have played.
If you're counting on your armor, you're already in trouble
because you're assuming the enemy is going to hit you.
What's the best defense? A good offense, right? If you
can strike the enemy first, that's worth a lot more than
being able to survive some blows.
Joel Shepherd
>
> On Mon, 22 Oct 2001 00:26:02 GMT, Joel Shepherd
> <joel...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>
> >> The British carriers were much better armored but could not
> >> absorb the damage of the average battleship.
>
> >They had more problems than that.
> >
> > carrier task forces in 1945, showing British at definite
> > disadvantage.>
>
> Folks you are missing a point on British Fleet Aircraft Carriers.
> They were built with completely different assumptions than were the
> American carriers.
That's a fair point, but I believe the example above is still valid,
with regard to the PTO. For purposes of operations in the PTO, the
British carriers had some serious disadvantages.
> The WWII Carrier had two weaknesses; night...
Erm... No.
> and submarines.
Erm... Okay.
> Carriers can not operate at night without making themselves into
> glowing targets for all to see.
Rubbish. Carriers can and *did* operate effectively at night without
giving off excessive amounts of light. The USN deployed several night
air groups on carriers in late '44 and through the remainder of the
war, and there is simply no indication that those carriers
(Enterprise, Saratoga, Intrepid, Bonhomme Richard amongst the fleet
carriers) were considered exceptionally vulnerable due to their
night-time operations.
It might be fun to brush up a bit on USN night operations doctrine as
it was in 1945:
http://www.cv6.org/ship/logs/nite_op_intro.htm
Read closely:
http://www.cv6.org/ship/logs/nite_op_material.htm#lighting
For a general history of the early days of carrier night-ops:
http://www.cv6.org/ship/logs/cardiv7.htm
> One advantage of land based planes was that with properly trained
> pilots they can operate at night without escorts or carrier fighter
> opposition.
In the PTO, this was disproven as early as November 1943.
-- Joel.
ANDREW ROBERT BREEN
>: Pacific Ocean. Price of Wales and Repulse (admittedly a battlecruiser)
>As for the Prince of Wales and the Repulse, again, this example does not
>lend itself very well to this debate. They were sunk by land based aircraft,
>not carrier based aircraft. Also, as these were early in the Pacific war,
>both had inadequate AAA, later battleships would have been refitted with
>much better AAA. Certainly, if they had been a pair of aircraft carriers
The significance of the loss of PoW was that a first-class modern
battleship, fitted with the the best heavy- and light-calibre AA guns
available to a major power (the RN 5.25" was inferior to the US 5"/38
as a heavy AA weapon, but PoWs heavy AA suite was better than all but
the
most recent US battleships and her light AA suite was probably better
-
and she was the only battleship in the world at the time with full
radar
control of heavy and light AA), with good modern anti-torpedo
protection
operating at sea, with full room for manoever, had been sunk by air
attack. The Japanese seem to have been as suprised (and as alarmed) by
this as anyone else.
Brown's comments stand (and as the opinions of a professional designer
of
warships they should be accorded some respect). The 'carrier could
hand
out punishment and defend itself. The battlship, by 1942-44, could
only
sit there and take punishment. And you couldn't build them to take
enough
punishment - the amount of deck armour needed to protect against 2000
lb
AP bombs was *startling*, as was the effect of these weapons against
_Nelson_ (one of the best-protected battleships ever) in 1946 trials.
And there was no defence at all against things like the broach bomb
(250lb HE weapon, shaped to dive under the keel and explode, breaking
the
ship's back).
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk
(JD Lail) wrote:
> Did the British have a similar limitation with the Suez Canal ?
All the armoured carriers completed originated from a design
constrained by the treaty system. While this design was modified in
the later ships a major increase in size required a new design. This
resulted in the Eagle and Malta classes.
Ken Young
ken...@cix.co.uk
Maternity is a matter of fact
Paternity is a matter of opinion
Andrew Clark
"John Lansford" <jlns...@bellsouth.net> wrote
> Simply measuring how much the total weight of the rounds was vs
the
> weight of the bombs is a meaningless exercise, though.
Not quite. Firstly, of course, blast alone is not very useful
against military targets except in larger bombs (larger, in fact,
than could be carried by carrier aircraft), although blast is of
great use against civilian targets like housing. So in military
use, the bomb or shell case, creating high velocity fragments, is
equally important as the explosive content.
Secondly, the explosive type is also of some importance. British
Torpex explosive, for example, was the most effective, followed
by British RDX. The USAAF was still using simple TNT, about a
fifth of the effectiveness of Torpex and a third of RDX, until
late in the war.
Thirdly, the purpose of a large calibre AP naval shell is to fly
true (assisted by a windshield improving ballistic performance)
and penetrate armour by the application to the target of a
hardened steel cap with considerable kinetic energy. The shell
proper, following behind the cap, consisted of a frangible case
to create fragments and bursting charge to impart velocity to
those fragments and create blast. The bursting charge in RN 14"
AP shells weighed only around 100 pounds, but it was of little
use without the other components if the shell was to perform its
stated purpose.
RN 14" HE shells used for ground bombardment are perhaps a better
comparison to bombs. They contained around 200 pounds of
explosive with a case of around 600 pounds (the remainder was
windshield and other stuff like dye). A 1944 RAF GP aerial bomb
of 1000 pounds had a Charge-to-Weight ration of around 35%,
meaning that it contained around 350lbs of RDX explosive.
> IOW, a carrier had more explosives than a battleship had. That
was the
> important feature to be concerned about, not how much the ammo
> weighed.
I reckon that the Essex bomb load mentioned earlier contained
Michael Emrys
wrote on 10/23/01 9:08 AM:
> Did the British have a similar limitation with the Suez Canal ?
The Suez, being a sea level canal, has no locks. Therefore, the size
restrictions imposed by the width of the Panama Canal locks do not apply.
Even the very large carriers of the present-day USN can and do transit it
without difficulty.
Michael
--
Tony Zbaraschuk
> Firstly, I was hoping to limit the scope of the discussion to the war in
> the pacific and English, American and Japanese Navies. The reason for this
> is the fact that the Italian, German, French, Canadian and other navies had very
> few if any aircraft carriers. Therefore, one can find numerous examples
> of battleships in their navies being sunk and no examples of aircraft
> carries sunk. The pacific war seems to me, from a historical perspective,
> to be better for the discussion of aircraft carrier vs. battleship in
> that both were present.
Certainly, but there were plenty of aircraft carriers (and several sunk,
including half the face-to-face BB-CV confrontations in the entire war)
in the Atlantic, so I would not simply rule that entire theater out of
order simply because the Pacific War was the only one with carriers on both sides.
To discuss your specific concerns:
> Also, I not suggesting that a Task - Force
> of battleships should not include aircraft carriers. Just that these
> aircraft carrier should have been used more in the role they were originally
> envisioned (scouts and local air-defense) and not so much as the principle
> offensive capital ships.
Again, you're overlooking the range factor. Carriers have something like
twenty times the range of battleships, meaning that they don't have to be
anywhere near as effective in close combat, because for 19/20s of the
approach the battleship has to just sit there and take it. Yes, they're
very good at taking it, and the carrier isn't (so much), but carriers
don't _have_ to be armored against gunfire, because a carrier captain
shouldn't ever have to let a battleship get into range. And they're
not defenseless even so -- look at Leyte Gulf, when _Yamato_, the premier
battleship of the IJN, spent most of its time in action running away from
American torpedoes...
> Also, that in general, the battleships of most
> navies were poorly (or rarely used) to their full advantage.
You'll have to be a little more specific here. How do you think, given
the conditions in the Pacific War, that battleships could have been
better used?
> Not one USN battleship
> was sunk by Japanese aircraft carrier based aircraft while under
> way and in deep water.
This is because (1) when the US didn't have any carriers to spare
to cover them, the battleships were kept well out of reach of Japanese
air, and (2) when the US did have carriers operating along with the
battleships, the Japanese air was going mostly for the carriers (e.g.,
in the various battles around Guadalcanal in 1942). Obviously
the Japanese felt that the carriers were the greater threat, and the
USN felt the air threat was so great as to deny BBs the sea area
within range of enemy aircraft.
> Nor do I recall any being sunk by Japanese
> land based aircraft either.
Because none of the US BBs were operated without fighter cover in range
of Japanese airpower, whether land- or sea-based. Take your focus off
the USN for a moment and recall what happened to _Prince of Wales_
and _Repulse_ when they were caught by Japanese torpedo bombers...
> Certainly, one would conceded that if
> it had been eight aircraft carriers at anchor, then at least as many,
> and probably more, would have been sunk. This is because aircraft
> carriers do not sustain battle damage as well as battleships when hit.
> In addition, they could not deploy their principle means of defense
> when at anchor. The battleships, with more reliance on AAA, could
> at least somewhat defend them selfs.
Note that carriers CAN hit BBs in harbor (Taranto, Pearl Harbor, Halsey
overkilling the IJN's remnants in the summer of 1945), whereas BBs
can't get close enough to do that to carriers. (They'd be spotted by
patrol planes, giving the carriers time to sortie and launch air, if
the land-based air around the harbors wasn't sufficient already.)
> Also, the fact that it was aircraft carriers that conducted the attack
> at Pearl Harbor is not a necessity. Since the Japanese successful
> launched a battleship oriented surprise attack in her 1904 war
> with Russia at Port Author, it is conceivable that she could have
> done the same thing at Pearl Harbor.
No, it isn't. The Russians didn't have patrol planes available (land-
based, admittedly, but patrol planes.) You might ask yourself why the
Japanese never even considered a BB strike on Pearl Harbor instead of
a CV strike. BBs would have been spotted long before they got into
gun range of Pearl Harbor.
> Thus, the many example of aircraft of all sort attaching and sinking
> battleships in harbors is a very weak argument. Aircraft carriers
> in port are every bit as vulnerable as battleships. One could argue
> that the attacks were successful because they were more of a surprise
> that a similiar attack by battleships. However, their are examples of
> ships lost in port to battleship gun fire as well.
Certainly: the French BBs in North Africa. Note that at both Oran
and Casablanca, the Anglo-American forces had carriers along for air
cover and the French didn't have effective anti-shipping air available.
> As for the Prince of Wales and the Repulse, again, this example does not
> lend itself very well to this debate. They were sunk by land based aircraft,
> not carrier based aircraft.
*cough* Yamato and Mushashi *cough*
_Prince of Wales_ and _Repulse_ were sunk by aircraft, not gunfire;
the reason no USN BBs were so sunk is that the USN made very very sure
to not operate BBs in areas where they would be exposed to air attack
without fighter cover. Obviously they thought aircraft were dangerous.
Whether it's land-based or sea-based air is entirely subsidiary to that
very basic point. Both types were equally dangerous to ships, given
the appropriate weapons and training.
> Also, as these were early in the Pacific war,
> both had inadequate AAA, later battleships would have been refitted with
> much better AAA.
Even with the proximity-fused AA of the late war, the Americans _still_
felt that the best defense against a plane was another plane, not AA
fire. Note that _Yamato_ and _Musashi_ went down very late in the war
after heavy refitting with anti-aircraft (including the development of
special AA shells for their main batteries.)
> In my original post I wrote:
> :: And a typical battleship can deliver substantial more ordnance than the
> :: typical large aircraft carrier.
Once it gets within range. IF it ever gets within range.
Note, also, that aircraft carriers carry torpedo-equipped planes.
It is much easier to sink a ship by letting water in through the
bottom than by letting air in through the top.
Going back to the Atlantic, note that _three_ torpedo hits were sufficient
to cripple _Bismarck_, whereas two hours of concentrated gunfire by two
British BBs didn't sink him; he went down to either _Dorsetshire_'s
torpedo or German scuttling charges, depending on whose account you
believe.
> While I am no expert on the subject, I fail to see how it is substantial
> harder to transfer a few hundred 16 inch shells vs. a few hundred 500 lb
> bombs and a 1000 lb torpedoes.
> I don't have the numbers before me, but I believe
> a battleship can deliver ordinance at about 10 times the rate (weight/time)
> of an aircraft carrier.
It's the difference between a knife and a gun: the guy with the knife
wins if the fighters start less than 20 feet apart (because he can
draw and stab first), but the guy with the gun has to _let_ him get into
range before the knife-wielder can even scratch him.
> In my original post I wrote:
> :: ... American Essex class carriers ... did not seem to take battle
> :: damage very well. The Japanese carriers fared little better
>
> To which Jeremy Hogue replied:
> : The results from Midway give a bad impression of Japanese carriers.
> : Yes, some of them such as Junyo, Hiyo, Hiryu, Soryu were not very well
> : protected.
>
> My argument exactly. Perhaps the Japanese would have been better off
> if these were battleships instead.
No, they really wouldn't have been. They'd have taken much heavier
damage (no Zeroes around to shoot down the torpedo bombers) AND they
would not have been able to inflict ANY damage at all on the American
carriers. A battleship might survive more than a carrier, but a carrier
can inflict damage at a much longer range and therefore does not need to
be as survivable.
And Midway is somewhat of an anomaly anyway, in that the Japanese
were caught with a loaded strike on deck. Any carrier is in bad shape
when that happens -- given enough warning to fly the planes off, fill
the gas lines with CO2, and strike ordnance below, carriers can take
pretty heavy damage -- see _Yorktown_ at Midway, or _Franklin_ later
in the war -- and still survive.
> In the Pacific, the issue was control of the islands. The question
> was which of these two types of capital warships best help achieve
> this. Or better yet, what was the optimal mix of these two types.
Battleships were useful for heavy bombardment, but (a) only against
really dug-in bunkers; against most open areas, a 2000-pound bomb
works much better (much more HE), (b) BBs couldn't gain air superiority
over the islands, meaning that they were extremely vulnerable to getting
caught by land-based air. Look at the contortions the Japanese had to
go through to bombard Henderson Field at Guadalcanal, for instance --
run in at night, throw a few shells, run away to be out of air range
by morning; when they couldn't, you get things like _Hiei_ getting sunk
by land-based air because she couldn't get out of range fast enough
(due to damage from cruiser gunfire).
Compare Halsey's obliteration of Truk and numerous other Japanese
airbases. And Halsey could do it from 200 miles away, hitting with
surprise from long range, whereas BBs would have had to plow in and endure
the island's airstrikes. (If there's no air on the island, it doesn't
matter one way or the other.)
> I agree that aircraft carriers are useful in the role of air-defense,
> although, for point defense against the Kamakazi's the situation
> was often reversed -- with the battleships suppling anti-aircraft
> artillery in support of the aircraft carriers.
Fighter planes could hit the strikes forty miles out and break them
up before they had a chance to hit the carrier. Note that BBs are
_part_ of a _layered_ defense, not the whole defense in and of
themselves.
Also note, for the cost of a BB you could have built quite a few
_Atlanta_-class AA cruisers. BBs were big gun platforms, sure, and
had a lot of AA, but carriers could carry a lot of AA too, and did.
Basically, use of BBs as AA platforms is a secondary adaptation;
it's not what they were originally intended for.
> He also replies:
> : ... they (battleships) would be subject to air attack, with
> : only maneuver and anti-aircraft fire for defense.
>
> In addition to their armor.
Not real effective against torpedoes, most of the time -- and even
single aerial torpedoes could cripple or mission-kill a battleship.
(_Vittoria Veneto_ at Matapan, _Bismarck_). Again, and importantly,
CVs can strike at BBs from outside the BBs' gun range.
And it's a lot easier to fit new planes and better ordnance on a CV
than it is to change out a BB's main battery for new weapons.
> The crux of most of the their arguments was that the ability
> of aircraft carriers to strike at large distances far outweight any
> disadvantage it might have (in theory or practice) compared to battleships.
Precisely. It doesn't _matter_ how survivable a carrier is against a
BB's shells if the carrier is never in range of them. A carrier has
much longer scouting and striking range.
Note that the _only_ two times BBs actually caught CVs in gun range during
the war (_Glorious_; Leyte Gulf) were due to errors on the carrier's part
(_Glorious_ not posting even lookouts; Halsey neglecting to tell Seventh
Fleet that he had left Surigao Strait unguarded). A properly handled
carrier should simply never come in range of a BBs guns, should sink or
cripple it before coming that close.
> However, I believe most of the reply's fail to find the proper
> level of importance that the survivability of a battleship played, or could
> have played. Many of the US aircraft carriers were much more vunerable to
> land based aircraft (Kamakazi's) than most would admit. While no Essex
> carriers were lost, several were damaged so bad that they had to withdrawl.
And several BBs were sunk by air attack in the same period. Your point?
> Furthermore,
> if operation Olympic( the first part of the invasion of Japan ) had to have
> taken place, this vunerability to Kamikazi would have been more evident.
Quite possibly, but (again) the best defense against a plane is usually
another plane; American fighters were the first line of defense. And while
the BBs would have had a part to play in Operation Olympic, note that the
"part" would have been primarily that of floating artillery.
Note that when Halsey brought the USN into range of the Japanese coast
in 1945, it was carrier strikes, not battleship gunfire, that he used
to finish off the Japanese navy; the BBs mostly shelled steel plants.
BBs could do things that carriers couldn't, BUT the things that carriers
could do that BBs could not were much more important. Hit ships at a
much longer range, hit targets more than 20 miles inland, hit targets
200 miles away in two hours instead of eight, protect a zone two hundred
miles wide against submarines...
You might ask yourself why the USN stopped building BBs in the middle
of WW II (two Iowas and the entire Montana class were either scrapped
on the slip or never laid down) and built CVs at a frantic rate (more
than a hundred by the end of the war, including counting escort carriers)
> In addition, all this took place in a war, that after Midway, was
> decidedly one-sided.
The battles around Guadalcanal were decidedly not one-sided, and in
several of them the Japanese came off much better (Santa Cruz, for
instance).
The naval side of World War II in the Pacific may be summed up as:
1941: the Japanese equalize the odds
1942: the pre-war fleets sink each other
1943: both sides rebuild
1944: it becomes obvious the USN has a lot more rebuild capacity
1945: the mopping up
None of which has anything to do with the relative merits of
BBs and CVs. I suspect, though, that the Japanese would have been a
lot better off at the Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf with two-four
extra fleet carriers and a lot more trained air squadrons than they
were with _Yamato_ and _Musashi_.
Tony Z
--
Justin Broderick
>
> Firstly, I was hoping to limit the scope of the discussion to the war in
> the pacific and English, American and Japanese Navies.
> Also, I not suggesting that a Task - Force
> of battleships should not include aircraft carriers. Just that these
> aircraft carrier should have been used more in the role they were
originally
> envisioned (scouts and local air-defense) and not so much as the
principle
> offensive capital ships. Also, that in general, the battleships of most
> navies were poorly (or rarely used) to their full advantage.
>
>
I don't follow this line of thinking. What was their full advantage and
how could they have achieved it in the Pacific war?
Forget about weights of broadside and armor and speed and what ship was
sunk when and how for a minute. At the base of it, why have a battleship
fleet? To destroy the enemy's battle fleet, thus preventing he enemy from
pressing a naval war against you. Or, at the very least, make a battleship
contest so costly that the enemy is deterred and does not press a naval
war.
The design of the battleship was based upon hitting ships like itself, and
protecting itself from similar ships. It could put very heavy loads of
ordnance on targets at impressive ranges, and could take considerable
punishment. Tactics developed to employ these strengths effectively. As
long as the enemy builds a similar fleet, the battleship is king of the
sea.
But technology finds a way to challenge the battleship. In the late 1800s,
it is the torpedo boat. Small and fast, they fire the Whitehead torpedo
that suddenly makes the expensive, prestigious battleship fleet vulnerable.
The threat must be countered, and it is. Searchlights, rapid-fire guns and
internal anti-torpedo protection become standard. Most important is the
anti-torpedo-boat, the destroyer. The destroyer becomes an indispensable
part of the battle fleet (and absorbs the torpedo-boat's duties as well).
The airplane poses even more of a threat. The enemy fleet can now project
its offensive power hundreds of miles, not dozens. The enemy fleet can now
strike potentially devastating blows to which the battleships, AA
notwithstanding, can not respond. The enemy's power to pursue a naval war
against you is viable regardless of your battleships.
To counter the enemy air threat, the fleet must have its own air power. It
must have planes that can find and strike the enemy's carriers (or air
fields) first, and planes that can intercept and destroy incoming enemy
attacks. And, ultimately, it was found in the Pacific, the air power must
be the fleet's main punch, spearheading an offense, not tied to surface
forces.
So what is the role for the battleships in that scenario? Just what they
were used for in WW2: providing AA, offshore fire support, and flag
accommodation, and engaging elements of the enemy fleet IF the opportunity
presented itself, but not taking the offensive. The AA role was important,
but could have been done more cost-effectively by smaller ships. Likewise,
monitors for offshore bombardment need not be fast nor heavily armored.
The battleship had become a secondary weapon, useful in some ways but not
capable of winning the war. Bombing pilots on both sides were always
instructed to concentrate on the flattops, because that was the real
threat.
> In addition, all this took place in a war, that after Midway, was
decidedly one-sided.
Really? The Guadalcanal operations, for an example, were not dazzling
American successes. In the spring of 1943, when Enterprise was being
overhauled, the US had ONE fleet carrier (old Saratoga) in the Pacific
(soon the RN lent Victorious for a couple months). The IJN had Shokaku,
Zuikaku, Hiyo, Junyo, and (CVLs) Zuiho and Ryuho.
--JTB
--
Andrew Clark
"Joel Shepherd" <joel...@ix.netcom.com> wrote
> That's a fair point, but I believe the example above is still
valid,
> with regard to the PTO. For purposes of operations in the PTO,
the
> British carriers had some serious disadvantages.
That's a fair point, but I believe the example above is invalid,
with regard to the Mediterranean and Atlantic before 1944.
For purposes of operations in these areas, the
US carriers had some serious disadvantages.
--
David Thornley
>the pacific and English, American and Japanese Navies.
This seems odd. Battleships proved much more useful in the Atlantic
and the Mediterranean, so if you're arguing that battleships were
supreme you'd think you'd want to include these.
>
>Secondly, I am not saying that aircraft carriers did not have their place.
>For example, the small escort carriers were invaluable in the anti-submarine
>war in the Atlantic. Rather, I was addressing the overall ratio of
>battleships vs. aircraft carriers that were deployed, as to whether
>this was optimal or not.
The small escort carriers were insufficient to cover a battle force.
As far as the ratio, no, it wasn't optimal. The various navies
were overcommitted in battleships.
Also, I not suggesting that a Task - Force
>of battleships should not include aircraft carriers. Just that these
>aircraft carrier should have been used more in the role they were originally
>envisioned (scouts and local air-defense) and not so much as the principle
>offensive capital ships.
In other words, that the battle fleet should not be able to attack
at great distances? What sense does that make?
Carriers were not arbitrarily made the principle capital ships,
they developed into that position. The carriers that were designed
to support the battle line developed large offensive capabilities
on their own. Once they had this offensive capability, it
turned out to be more useful than that of a battleship. It
was an evolutionary thing, and happened against the desires of
most of the admirals.
Also, that in general, the battleships of most
>navies were poorly (or rarely used) to their full advantage.
>
What would be their full advantage? I really don't see how
I can respond to that claim without knowing what you think
the right way to use a battle fleet was.
>Furthermore, in a discussion of battleships vs. aircraft carries, the
>fact that it was battleships and not aircraft carriers, sunk at Pearl
>Harbor is almost incidental.
True.
>In addition, they could not deploy their principle means of defense
>when at anchor. The battleships, with more reliance on AAA, could
>at least somewhat defend them selfs.
>
Carriers had a lot of AAA, also. However, what you're saying is
that a battleship with guns is more effective than a carrier
without aircraft, which hardly seems a fair comparison.
>Also, the fact that it was aircraft carriers that conducted the attack
>at Pearl Harbor is not a necessity. Since the Japanese successful
>launched a battleship oriented surprise attack in her 1904 war
>with Russia at Port Author, it is conceivable that she could have
>done the same thing at Pearl Harbor.
>
People gave that sort of thing a great deal of thought, and that
is why most naval bases were impregnable to such attacks during
WWII. The main exceptions are the French, who had to base in
less satisfactory North African bases for political reasons.
Sailing the battle fleet to Pearl Harbor means getting within
ten or less miles, not two hundred, with slower ships. It
means being visible before the attack, and being opposed by
large land-based guns. It forfeits surprise.
>As for the Prince of Wales and the Repulse, again, this example does not
>lend itself very well to this debate. They were sunk by land based aircraft,
>not carrier based aircraft.
So? They were sunk by aircraft torpedos.
Now, it is true that a small number of fairly good fighters could
have saved those ships. It would have been necessary to lug a
carrier along in order to keep a good combat air patrol. Now,
if a battle line needs a carrier to go into harm's way, while a
carrier force doesn't need a battleship (think the early raids),
isn't that suggestive?
Also, as these were early in the Pacific war,
>both had inadequate AAA, later battleships would have been refitted with
>much better AAA.
Later battleships were also sunk by aircraft. Think Yamato and
Musashi.
>While I am no expert on the subject, I fail to see how it is substantial
>harder to transfer a few hundred 16 inch shells vs. a few hundred 500 lb
>bombs and a 1000 lb torpedoes.
Because of the unit weight. Several years ago, my wife and I had
no great difficulty moving a couple tons of gravel in an evening.
Collect a quarter of that into one large rock and there's no way
we could have budged it.
Now, the USN eventually did find a way to replenish battleship
main gun ammo at sea, but even in 1944 some experts thought it
could not be done. I don't know if this could be done with the
big 2700-pound shells of the modern battleships, or only the
somewhat smaller shells of the earlier ones.
As for pilots and planes, that fact they
>are easy to replace is hardly an advantage as battleships don't have
>these items.
They're easier to replace than a gun barrel, should that wear out
or suffer damage.
In addition, it fails to address the issue of
>ordinance delivery. I don't have the numbers before me, but I believe
>a battleship can deliver ordinance at about 10 times the rate (weight/time)
>of an aircraft carrier.
Probably, depending on range. However, that's really not important.
The only time the rates really matter are actually in battle, and
carriers can evade enemy battleships unless a gross mistake is made.
Both a carrier and a battleship could drop a large amount of
ordnance on target in a few hours, and that's what was important.
>ordinance on hand. And the ordinance on hand, I believe, is going to be greater for a
>battleship because it does not have to carry planes, aviation fuel,
>and pilots.
And lesser because the main gun shells carry considerably less
explosive than a bomb. Less accurately for most purposes, because
battleship main guns are optimized to hitting a battleship-sized
target at sea from several miles away, and this is a very specialized
scenario.
The Iowa class battleships carried 1220 16-inch shells or about
>2.8 million pounds (50-50 mix AP/HE shells) and another .8 million pounds of
>5 inch shells. The typical Essex class aircraft carrier carried .75 million
>pounds of bombs of all types (GP, AP, Incendiary and torpedoes).
>
*Don't* count pounds. Those AP shells have almost no explosive
in them, by weight. Virtually all the weight is dedicated to getting
the explosives into an enemy battleship where they can do some
serious harm.
>To which Jeremy Hogue replied:
>: The results from Midway give a bad impression of Japanese carriers.
>: Yes, some of them such as Junyo, Hiyo, Hiryu, Soryu were not very well
>: protected.
>
>My argument exactly. Perhaps the Japanese would have been better off
>if these were battleships instead.
>
Considering how cheesy some of those Japanese light carriers were,
one would be tempted to say "yes", except of course that the
Japanese got very little use out of their battleships.
The four oldest, the Kongo class, were the most used. This is
why half the class didn't survive the first year of the war.
The others saw approximately no service until 1944 (not counting
the sorties in the Midway battle, which burned fuel oil but
didn't put the battleships anywhere they might actually get
their paint scratched), and were fairly quickly sunk then without
doing corresponding damage.
>: I think you need to look a little deeper than that. The issue wasn't
>: battleships vs aircraft carriers: the issue was control of the air.
>
>In the Pacific, the issue was control of the islands. The question
>was which of these two types of capital warships best help achieve
>this. Or better yet, what was the optimal mix of these two types.
>
You know what? We left most of the islands in the hands of the
Japanese.
We generally went into a whole archipelago and took maybe three
islands or atolls. We left an army of a hundred thousand Japanese
soldiers in Rabaul for the whole war.
The islands were only useful if they could base aircraft and
ships. Therefore, when we destroyed the aircraft, and cut off
the supply routes, it didn't matter whether the island was controlled
by Japanese, Americans, or little green men from Mars. (Well,
the last would probably have better supply-from-orbit facilities.)
The best way to cut supply routes was to provide aircraft, as
aircraft patrol areas much better than ships do. What this
implies is that the really important thing about islands was
airfields.
It's also instructive to look at the Guadalcanal battles. We
started by taking an airfield, and that determined the entire rest
of the campaign. Japanese ships took great care to avoid being
attacked in the daytime by aircraft from Henderson Field.
This includes battleships: the first battleship sunk in the
Solomons was damaged so it could not escape the bombers, and
the second was scuttled after being damaged, since it obviously
wasn't going to get away.
>I agree that aircraft carriers are useful in the role of air-defense,
>although, for point defense against the Kamakazi's the situation
>was often reversed -- with the battleships suppling anti-aircraft
>artillery in support of the aircraft carriers.
>
Not really. The main line of defense against kamikazes was
the defending fighters. The AA guns of the fleet would be used
against kamikazes getting through the fighters, and if the
5" guns failed the lighter AA would fire at the kamikazes with
the net effect of pretending to do something effective.
Nor can you justify a $75 million or $100 million battleship
versus a $25 million heavy cruiser on the grounds that it's
over 50% better as an anti-aircraft platform. If battleships
were primarily useful as anti-aircraft ships, they should
have been scrapped and replaced with cruisers.
>He also replies:
>: Carriers themselves were vulnerable to air attack -- though they
>: proved more durable than many expected.
>
>I think that they were much less durable than expected. Light armor,
>aviation fuel and ordinance on top of the deck due not make something
>very durable.
>
Which belies the damage that carriers frequently took before going
down. Hornet took an unbelievable pummelling before finally sinking.
Shokaku was hard hit on more than one occasion before we finally
got her. They were more vulnerable than battleships, but that is
largely irrelevant.
Remember that the purpose of a warship is to allow friendly cargo
ships and transports use an area, and to prevent the enemy from
doing the same. If the question is whether a battleship can
survive an attack by armor and massive construction, then if
it's escorting merchant ships it's completely irrelevant: those
ships do not have battleship armor and are much more lightly
constructed, and they're going down.
>Unfortunately, I find that I am not going to be able to respond to all of
>the replies. The crux of most of the their arguments was that the ability
>of aircraft carriers to strike at large distances far outweight any disadvantage
>it might have (in theory or practice) compared to battleships.
That's one of them.
Thus, the argument
>is that a aircraft carrier is more likely to sink a battleship than the other
>way around.
Empirically, yes, this is true. It isn't the most important result of
range.
In addition, they could strike land based targets while at the same
>time being out of range of land based gunfire (and apparently land based enemy
>aircraft).
They could defend themselves, and the vessels they were supporting,
against land-based aircraft. Battleships can be hard put to defend
themselves against land-based aircraft, and certainly can't protect
other vessels.
However, I believe most of the reply's fail to find the proper
>level of importance that the survivability of a battleship played, or could
>have played.
I believe you are placing far too much importance on the survivability
of a warship, and far too little on the survivability of friendly
shipping in areas it patrols.
Many of the US aircraft carriers were much more vunerable to
>land based aircraft (Kamakazi's) than most would admit. While no Essex carriers
>were lost, several were damaged so bad that they had to withdrawl.
You could say exactly the same thing about US battleships, if you
would like.
Furthermore,
>if operation Olympic( the first part of the invasion of Japan ) had to have
>taken place, this vunerability to Kamikazi would have been more evident.
You know what would have been even more evident?
The kamikazes would not have been approaching over water, where they
could possibly be engaged by warship AA before approaching the
transports.
Instead, they'd be coming overland at the approaching transports.
There would be no chance for battleships to shoot them down before
they set crowded troopships afire and sinking. The only possible way
to save those men would be to put lots of fighter cover overhead and
try to hit the kamikazes before they got close.
Therefore, the most important sort of warship would be one that
carried
lots of fighters, which would be, well....
With a hundred thousand soldiers burnt to death or drowned or killed
in other horrible ways by kamikazes, who cares about whether the
battleships are still around?
In
>addition, all this took place in a war, that after Midway, was decidedly one-sided.
>Thanks for all the responces.
>
You know when it was one-sided?
When the USN had a large numbers of carriers, that's when.
--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion,
ask.
da...@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-
mike
> Secondly, the explosive type is also of some importance. British
> Torpex explosive, for example, was the most effective, followed
> by British RDX. The USAAF was still using simple TNT, about a
> fifth of the effectiveness of Torpex and a third of RDX, until
> late in the war.
Where did you get these values?
RDX is generally the most effective military HE, rates at
1.5X of TNT, C-4 at 1.34X,Torpex at 1.28X(a mix of TNT,RDX
and aluminum) Tetrytol at 1.2 and Amatol at 1.17
(Det cord is higher yet- but can't use it as a filling)
Torpex gets higher ratings in some write-ups when compared
underwater, as the aluminum in the mix works really well
with water acting as a tamper- even then about 150% of TNT
IIRC 100%RDX was more sensitive, expensive to make and could
crystallize, while TNT was the easist to cast into a shell,
and more stable: along with Amatol, the cheapest to make.
A vauge memory that theUSArmy didn't like RDX for safety
reasons, but USN had no problems using it. Army didn't use
RDX mixtures till postwar, again, IIRC.
I think the USAAC used Tetrytol with some bombs over just TNT
after '43, and the US GP bombs having a better charge/case ratio,
about 50%.
Probably means that a US 1000lbs bomb had about the same effect
as a UK 1000lbs bomb, except the US bomb probably was cheaper to
produce.
**
mike
**
--
Joel Shepherd
Did I say something to upset you? I scaled back the scope of my
original statement. Why the parody?
-- Joel.
--
David Thornley
Andrew Clark <acl...@cedar-consultancy.co.uk> wrote:
>
>"John Lansford" <jlns...@bellsouth.net> wrote
>
>> I believe it was Illustrious that took multiple
>> AP bomb hits off of of Crete and
>> escaped to fight again, however.
>
>HMS Illustrious was heavily damaged by a concerted enemy air
>attack by German Ju 87 dive-bombers on 10 January 1941, when she
>was hit by no less than seven 1100lb (500kg) AP bombs, including
>one which penetrated the armoured flight deck armour and exploded
>in the hanger below.
While this is impressive, other carriers in the Pacific with
less armor took a lot of damage and survived. However, carriers
in the Pacific that took anywhere near that amount of bomb
damage had to expect to be torpedoed as well.
Nor did this armor mean that Illustrious could continue to operate
in waters too dangerous for other carriers, only that it could
survive an attack without sinking.
While it was useful, it was only in the special circumstances
that prevailed against Germany earlier in the war and against
Japan in 1945, which is to say no effective torpedo bombers
but lots of dive bombers or kamikazes. It did not provide
perfect protection against those. Against the Japanese in
1942, the relatively small aircraft and aviation fuel capacity
would have hurt more than the armored deck helped.
--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion, ask.
da...@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-
--
David Thornley
Emmanuel Gustin <Emmanue...@skynet.be> wrote:
>I think the first thing to consider is --- I will firmly steady myself
>against the expected storm of protest --- that 'dreadnought' battleships
>were never very useful at all. They were largely the product of a
>peacetime arms race, in which navies and countries competed to have
>the thickest armour, the biggest guns and the largest ships. It was a
>polically motivated evolution; to have battleships was the same as
>being a great power. The result was that battleships became big,
>costly vessels that were designed to fight a type of battle that was
>very rare. Fleet formations around battleships became too big and
>cumbersome for most naval tasks, and commanders became hesitant
>to actually risk them in battle. Even during WWI, when attack by
>aircraft was irrelevant, more battleships ran into mines, were
>torpedoed by submarines, or spontaneously exploded (!), than
>were sunk by other battleships.
>
I'm going to disagree with this.
Dreadnoughts were critical in World War I. The British blockade
depended on having enough force to stop any German attempt to
break it. This blockade was usually enforced by light ships,
but if the British had only light ships the Germans could
have sent out heavier ships at will to disperse the British.
The battle fleets had only one full-scale battle, which was
largely inconclusive, in that it left the situation the same
as before. Had there been more battles, they would have likely
had the same result, and therefore the Germans saw no use
in fighting them.
In WWII, the Germans had a small fleet, and therefore the British
operated their battleships in small formations. For defense
against raiders, they relied on the fact that, if they could
damage a raider seriously, they could almost certainly catch
it and sink it. The RN also had relatively few carriers
with relatively small air groups and low-performance aircraft,
for a variety of reasons.
The British pretty much ruled the Eastern and Western Med
against the Italians with battleships. The general rule was
that the RN could go where it wanted, provided it took enough
battleships, and the Italians could stay out of the way, run
when spotted, or get sunk (and practiced all three at various
times). When the Luftwaffe arrived in force, battleships
were no longer so free, but neither were carriers, as a single
British carrier simply could not carry enough fighters to
defend itself adequately.
In the Pacific, battleships were of less use in naval battles,
although the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea showed that it was
difficult to stop all of a strong battleship force if it
was willing to take serious losses. They were also good
for shore bombardment, although lighter ships were actually
more valuable in landing support (look at what happened to
German counterattacks at Salerno opposed by light cruisers).
That being said, there was a great deal of national symbolism
involved. The German High Seas Fleet in WWI was largely
built on the grounds that a great power needed a great navy.
(The British Grand Fleet was built on the much more reasonable
grounds that a great sea power needed a great navy.) Between
the wars, the Japanese took great umbrage at having their
battleship tonnage limited by treaty. It's hard to come
up with a rationale for the Agincourt design other than
having more guns than the other guy.
Of course, this was not limited to battleships. Some navies
were fond of running trials, and announcing speeds, with only
enough weight in the ship to keep the engines running. Other
navies preferred to run them in something closer to battle
conditions, and got significantly lower speed listed in
Jane's Fighting Ships.
Guard Cdr
>with regard to the Mediterranean and Atlantic before 1944.
>For purposes of operations in these areas, the
>US carriers had some serious disadvantages.
What would those disadvantages be? The only thing in my estimation that made
the US carriers less useful in the Atlantic was the fact that they were in the
Pacific.
I fail to see how superior aircraft, larger airgroups, greater speed and better
aircraft handling could cause the American carrier forces to suffer in any way
when compared to British counterparts.... at any point in the war and in any
location.
--
Guard Cdr
>> navies were poorly (or rarely used) to their full advantage.
>
>You'll have to be a little more specific here. How do you think, given
>the conditions in the Pacific War, that battleships could have been
>better used?
Just my $0.02 here, as I don't think that the BB over CA argument
holds much
weight, but...
The US BBs of TF34 could have remained to face the Japanese at Leyte.
So there
is one example of better use.
ANDREW ROBERT BREEN
Tony Zbaraschuk <to...@eskimo.com> wrote:
>Bauman <bau...@pa.uky.edu> wrote in message news:<9r44mh$13v2$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu>...
>> Also, as these were early in the Pacific war,
>> both had inadequate AAA, later battleships would have been refitted with
>> much better AAA.
>
>Even with the proximity-fused AA of the late war, the Americans _still_
>felt that the best defense against a plane was another plane, not AA
>fire. Note that _Yamato_ and _Musashi_ went down very late in the war
>after heavy refitting with anti-aircraft (including the development of
>special AA shells for their main batteries.)
It is important to realise that the emphasis on increased AA firepower
on
battleships (essential if the were going to have any hope of survival)
had a very serious impact on their ability to fight a big-gun action.
This was for several reasons:
1. Extra weight. All those extra AA gun mountings, their control gear
and
the shells to feed them are heavy. This means the ship floats lower in
the
water than designed, so the armour scheme is more deeply immersed (and
that is serious - if the armour is immersed then your ship can be only
lightly protected or completely unprotected at the waterline, which
leaves
you open to really big flooding problems. The navies of the world had
learned all about that one 40 years before when analysing Tsushima).
2. Ammunition storage. AA guns are greedy. You need lots of ammunition
for
them (if you don't have it then you get caught like the RN off Crete -
you're fine as long as the AA ammunition lasts, after it runs out
you're a
target). You also need to be able to bring ammunition up to the guns
fast,
and you're quite likely bringing it to guns that weren't there in the
original design. This means that the AA ammunition storage isn't as
well
protected as the main battery magazines (because you need more storage
space), the supply routes aren't as well protected - and AA shells are
HE
and can be rather easily touched off by shell hits. The RN 4" AA shell
certainly was a bit touchy like that. This makes for big trouble if
you go
into a gun action.
_Hood_ is the classic example - she was grossly overweight at the time
of
the Bismarck action, at least partially due to the extra weight of the
4" AA that had replaced her old 5.5" LA guns, plus the extra
ammunition. As she'd come from the Med. where air attack was a big
broblem
she was carrying a big load of AA ammunition, a lot of it outside the
heavy armour. The most likely cause of loss was a 15" hit setting off
4" ammunition behind light armour, which then set off the main
4" magazines, which then vented back into the main 15" magazine which
blew
the ship in half. Adding extra AA firepower can make your ship *much*
more
vunerable to big gun hits.
3. Congestion. The AA guns have to be added somewhere, and if you look
at
any late-war battleship they're all over the place, to the extent that
until you've cleared your AA guns your main guns can't fire (and when
they
do they'll probably wreck the AA guns - we're talking blast pressures
in
the 30 tons/square foot range around a big naval gun). This is one
reason
the Japanese couldn't fight their big guns effectively when under even
light air attack, as in the Halsey (?) action.
4. And you've added a lot more people to the crew, so the ship is
crowded,
uncomfortable and efficiency drops off fast (this was much worse for
the
Japanese and Germans who built wretchedly uncomforatble ships than for
the
US and UK, whose ships were less crowded to begin with).
Of course late-war none of the above mattered so much, as the
battlewagons
weren't going to need to fight a major gun action, as the carriers
would
deal with any attack first. They were there as command ships (esp. in
the
RN, which was concerned about interference between ship-ships and
ship-air
radar and communications), AA gun farms and as a long-stop incase
someone
sneaked a cruiser attack against the carrier line.
Andrew Clark
"Joel Shepherd" <joel...@ix.netcom.com> wrote
> Again, if someone can post corresponding
> numbers for a fast battleship class, I'd be grateful.
> Following her> 1943 overall, CV-6 carried nearly 100
> barrels for AA defense: 8 5"/38, 40 40mm and
RN KGV class fitted for PTO in 1945 had 16 5.25" HA, 48 2-pounder
pom poms, 18 20mm Oerlikons and 48 40 mm Bofors, total 130
barrels. All were radar directed and the 5.25" had proximity
fused shells.
ANDREW ROBERT BREEN
Guard Cdr <guar...@aol.com> wrote:
>>That's a fair point, but I believe the example above is invalid,
>>with regard to the Mediterranean and Atlantic before 1944.
>>For purposes of operations in these areas, the
>>US carriers had some serious disadvantages.
>What would those disadvantages be? The only thing in my estimation that made
>the US carriers less useful in the Atlantic was the fact that they were in the
>Pacific.
Atlantic: the open bow of the US carriers could be a problem in heavy
weather.
Med., up to 1942 or so surface-based air warning radar wasn't good
enough
to give reliable warning of attacks, and air search radar was
difficult to
fit to 'carrier-based aircraft. The FAA did have surface-search radar
on
aircraft (Swordfish, mainly, and they were very effective) but this
doesn't help in controlling air intercepts.
>I fail to see how superior aircraft, larger airgroups, greater speed and better
>aircraft handling could cause the American carrier forces to suffer in any way
>when compared to British counterparts.... at any point in the war and in any
>location.
A good deal of the fighting (almost half the war!) the RN carriers did
was
before the US came in - for a lot of this time we didn't have the
advantages of radar controlled CAP, air search radars on aeroplanes or
much of the other stuff that came in from ~1942 onwards. *With* all of
these aids which would allow it to use its large air group to protect
itself effectively against landbased air attack a US carrier would
possibly be a better bet in the Med. than one of the British armoured
carriers, and equal to _Ark Royal_ if she'd survived long enough to
get
these enhancements. However, the armoured carriers had a big advantage
in the years *before* radar-controlled CAP was possible.
There's also the rather importtant point that until at least mid-war
and
probably rather later, the RN was struggling to get up to the nominal
aircraft complements of even the armoured carriers - the RAF had first
call on production, so air complements were generally well under
strength. As the US didn't have the problem of home defence to worry
about
the USN did not have this problem (just as well - imagine trying to
fight
Midway with 25%-40% of your nominal air complement - that wasn't
atypical
for RN carriers in the early war).
I don't think anyone would argue that if we'd known in 1936-8 or so
(when
the armoured carriers were designed) that radar-controlled CAP would
have
been a possibility from the mid-war period then the carriers which
folled
after _Illustrious_ would have been much more like repeat _Ark
Royals_,
trading armour for a second full-height hanger and a big air group -
thuogh hopefully with 2-shaft machinery and the boiler uptake
leak-path
problem removed.
Rich Rostrom
>
>RN KGV class fitted for PTO in 1945 had 16 5.25" HA,
no, these were DP guns, same as the US 5"/38.
>48 2-pounder pom poms, 18 20mm Oerlikons,
>and 48 40 mm Bofors,
My sources (Breyer and Lenton) both state that
only 8 40mm were fitted - in two quad mountings on
the former boat deck.
>total 130 barrels. All were radar directed...
RDF was provided for the 5.25" guns and for the
multibarrel AA mounts, but most of the 20mm guns
were in single mounts with no RDF.
Andrew Clark
"mike" <mara...@yahoo.com> wrote
> Where did you get these values?
>From the official history of the Royal Engineers. They ought to
knowm surely, although it is possible (not being an explosives
expert) that I am misinterpreting their figures.
> RDX is generally the most effective military HE, rates at
> 1.5X of TNT, C-4 at 1.34X,Torpex at 1.28X(a mix of TNT,RDX
> and aluminum) Tetrytol at 1.2 and Amatol at 1.17
On the basis of your figures, then, the Essex carrier had an
explosive load of 188,000 lbs of TNT. A KGV with only HE shells
would carry around 200,000 lbs of RDX, representing around
350,000 lbs of TNT.
--
Drazen Kramaric
>Dreadnoughts were critical in World War I. The British blockade
>depended on having enough force to stop any German attempt to
>break it. This blockade was usually enforced by light ships,
>but if the British had only light ships the Germans could
>have sent out heavier ships at will to disperse the British.
This might be considered off topic, but I'll try to make a comment and
propose continuation of the debate at some other forum.
Royal Navy conducted a distant blockade in WW1, meaning that German
dreadnoughts were rendered completely ineffective due to their small
range. With sufficent number of cruisers positioned outside the range
of German dreadnoughts, all German foreign trade would have been cut
and there would have been nothing German dreadnoughts could do about
it. A fleet of battlecruisers would be needed to destroy German
battlecruisers of cruisers trying to attack the cruiser line.
Drax
--
Andrew Clark
"Guard Cdr" <guar...@aol.com> wrote
> I fail to see how superior aircraft, larger airgroups, greater
speed and better
> aircraft handling could cause the American carrier forces to
suffer in any way
> when compared to British counterparts.... at any point in the
war and in any
> location.
All of these factors are of immense value to any carrier. On the
other hand, the restricted size of the Mediterranean and European
coastal waters meant that it was impossible for carriers to
expect to successfully evade German and Italian land-based air
power from 1939-43. That air power was greatly superior in
numbers to any conceivable carrier-based force - eg GAF VIII Air
Corp in the eastern Med in 1941 fielded 280 medium bombers, 150
dive bombers, 180 fighters and 40 recon aircraft. Such numbers
would sooner or later inevitably overwhelm any carrier-based air
defence and the carrier could thus expect to be hit, and hit
hard, at regular intervals.
RN carriers were designed with this in mind with strongly
armoured decks and hangers. (They were in fact battleships rather
than battlecruisers, for exactly the same reason). They proved
capable of surviving repeated heavy attacks with large AP bombs
(Illustrious survived hits by three 1600 lb AP bombs, two 1000
lbs and two 500 lbs). Am I right in thinking that the largest
bomb used by Japanese carrier aircraft was a 1000 lb AP?
The inevitability of a heavy attack on a US carrier in the
Pacific was however far lower than the inevitability of such an
attack on a RN carrier in the Med, due to many factors including
geography, sea room and the relative weakness of Japanese carrier
air wings and land-based air. Those facts made it sensible for
the US to build faster, lighter-constructed and lightly-armoured
carriers with a larger air wing.
Just as RN carriers were at a disadvantage in Pacific war
conditions in 1944/45, so US carriers would have been at a
disadvantage in the Med. and European coastal waters in 1939-43.
--
Andrew Clark
"Rich Rostrom" <rros...@21stcentury.net> wrote
> no, these were DP guns, same as the US 5"/38.
Thank you for the correction.
> My sources (Breyer and Lenton) both state that
> only 8 40mm were fitted
According to Janes' Fighting Ships, 40 additional 40mm were
fitted immediately prior to departure, but Janes' is not
infallible
> RDF was provided for the 5.25" guns and for the
> multibarrel AA mounts, but most of the 20mm guns
> were in single mounts with no RDF.
There was apparently a voice channel to the 20mm mounts over
which range, height and bearing information could be communicated
from the gunnery fighting stations. The 20mm mounts were not
RDF-guided but rather RDF directed.
--
Chris Manteuffel
<acl...@cedar-consultancy.co.uk> arranged electrons in an arbitrary
pattern familiar to all as:
> Illustrious aircraft had been lured away by
>a feint attack by Italian bombers.
Richard Hough in _The Longest Battle_ says that the Italian torpedo
bombers who drew all of Lusty's CAP down on the deck were only two in
number. That was a direct consequence of the small airgroup that the
Illustrious class carried, their CAP's were so small that all of them
were sent down to handle two torpedo planes. I believe that this
example is a good one for the tradeoffs that had to be made by ship
designers of the time, the armor versus planes tradeoff.
Chris Manteuffel
"...the war situation has developed not necessarily
to Japan's advantage..."
-Emperor Hirohito, August 14, 1945
--
Guard Cdr
>Corp in the eastern Med in 1941 fielded 280 medium bombers, 150
>dive bombers, 180 fighters and 40 recon aircraft. Such numbers
>would sooner or later inevitably overwhelm any carrier-based air
>defence and the carrier could thus expect to be hit, and hit
>hard, at regular intervals.
Except that didn't happen to the British. When Illustrious took a hard
blow it
was a direct result of her small CAP chasing a low value target. A US
carrier
would have a larger CAP. 2 US carriers at sea in 1940 could put up at
least 140
aircraft, and more likely 160-170. It would require at least 3
British
Carriers to handle that many aircraft.
It is interesting to note, that at Coral Sea, it was the armored US
carrier
that was sunk, despite the fact that the Yorktown suffered a more
furious
assault. And that at Midway the Yorktown twice suffered heavier attack
than the
British ever suffered and would likely have survived if I-168 hadn't
showed up
to deliver 3 extra torpedoes.
It took 5 torpedoes and 3 bombs. And Japanese torpedoes were very
good, the
Submarine used 24" torps.
>(Illustrious survived hits by three 1600 lb AP bombs, two 1000
>lbs and two 500 lbs). Am I right in thinking that the largest
>bomb used by Japanese carrier aircraft was a 1000 lb AP?
Not sure, I would have to look. But I do know that the Germans and
Italians
didn't use 24" torpedoes, the weapon of demise for 2 US fleet
carriers.
>The inevitability of a heavy attack on a US carrier in the
>Pacific was however far lower than the inevitability of such an
>attack on a RN carrier in the Med, due to many factors including
>geography, sea room and the relative weakness of Japanese carrier
>air wings and land-based air.
Certainly not relitively weak compared to the Italians. But yes, the
Med is
smaller than the Pacific. It doesn't change that fact that anywhere
worth
fighting over is going to be close to land of some sort.
Bear in mind that the US carriers in operation in 1940 were capable of
delivering 600 combat aircraft anywhere within range of the sea. And
that is
from a peacetime footing. The Enterprise and Yorktown could have taken
on 15
more, the Lex and Sara 20 more, the Ranger 10 more and the Wasp could
have been
rushed.
Rich Rostrom
> 2 US carriers at sea in 1940 could put up at
>least 140 aircraft, and more likely 160-170.
No they couldn't. They could ship that many total,
but some would be down for maintenance or repair
at any given time.
Also, most of those would be strike aircraft not
fighters. And a continous CAP would have little
more than half the fighters in the air at one time.
The rest would be down refueling, pilots resting
and eating, etc. Also continuous flight ops would
run down the planes and send some into maintenance
and repair.
A US carrier with 80 planes embarked would be able
to maintain about 6 planes in continuous CAP. Which
would not be enough to halt a strike by 30-50 land
based planes, the sort of attacks that struck
ILLUSTRIOUS and other British carriers in the Med.
David Thornley
Andrew Clark <acl...@cedar-consultancy.co.uk> wrote:
>
>According to Janes' Fighting Ships, 40 additional 40mm were
>fitted immediately prior to departure, but Janes' is not
>infallible
>
for anything, most especially Axis ships but also for Allied.
I'd suggest finding other reference sources. One that has
similar coverage and is much more accurate (being based on
hindsight, for one thing) is Conway's "All the World's Fighting
Ships" for the appropriate period, most WWII ships being covered
in the 1923-1946 volume.
Conway's is best for a general Janes-like overview, but there
are of course authors that will provide much more detail in
more specific areas. Without going into more detail, almost
anything published in the 1960s or later will be much more
accurate than Janes'.
Lawrence Dillard
>
> "Jeremy Hogue" <snkyas...@juno.com> wrote
>
> (snip excellent post)
>
> > Even when it was available, naval gunfire
> > support at times left much to be desired (such as at Tarawa and
> Omaha
> > Beach).
At Tarawa, the USN learned it had much still to learn about shore
bombardments, opening fire from too short a range, hence obviating the
plunging-fire which was actually most needed. In later invasion fire
preparation schemes, the gunships set up much fatrher off-shore, to gain the
distance needed for plunging fire.
At Omaha, the USN probably erred in believing that the 5" guns of its
destroyers could demolish the fortifications there. As it eventuated,
several destroyers closed to almost keel-dragging ranges in order to provide
the needed support. Probably it would have gone better if a few heavy
cruisers with 8" guns had been spared for use in Normandy. By way of
contrast, the smallest calibre gunship used by the RN was 6", aboard light
cruisers.
Aerial fire support, while also lacking in accuracy at
> times,
> > was much more capable of accurate delivery (especially by the
> Marines)
> > and more immediate.
Such was only true when reasonably fair weather conditions were extant. At
OMAHA, that was the rub, as the "combat boxes" constructed by the Germans at
that beach went unharmed by the planned aerial bombardment, which, due to an
undercast, was toggled late so as to avoid the possibility of friendly-fire
casualties; all the bombs fell well-inland of OMAHA. Recall also that Hitler
planned the Ardennes Offensive to begin during a period of poor flying
weather, so as to allow his armies to operate without the lethal
interference otherwise to be expected to be offered up by Allied
fighter-bombers since the N African campaigns.
>
> I can't comment on Tarawa, but I think you are being slightly
> unfair about Omaha. Most of the German gun and observation
> positions at Omaha had been specifically designed and constructed
> to be immune to aerial bombing and plunging naval gunfire, with
> 5-6 foot reinforced concrete ceilings and front elevations. The
> naval gunfire support and bombing was generally accurate but
> ineffective. This was recognised by the Allied planners before
> the landing took place.
Actually, the bombing at OMAHA, which was to be radar-assisted, missed the
mark completely. The weight of the planned gunfire support was predicated
upon information as the the construction of many of the fortifications
gained via MAGIC, an Allied intel penetration of Amb Oshima's reports to
Tokyo which detailed their dimensions, etc.
>
> Given the US's lamentable lack of armour - particularly
> specialist armour -
It certainly didn't help that the specialist armor intended to accompany the
first wave at OMAHA was essentially swamped due to surf conditions; nor did
it help that they were launched from about 10,000 yds off-shore.
it took either point-blank fire from
> destroyers or, more often, old fashioned infantry manoeuvre, to
> silence the German bunkers at Omaha.
A famous quote: "...miracle, hell! It was the Infantry..." with regard to
OMAHA.
--
Andrew Clark
"Lawrence Dillard" <ldil...@EnterAct.com> wrote
> At Omaha, the USN probably erred in
> believing that the 5" guns of its
> destroyers could demolish the fortifications
> there.
Probably erred? US planners believed that bombing and shell fire
*could* destroy the defences. They were wrong.
> As it eventuated, several destroyers closed
> to almost keel-dragging ranges in order to
> provide the needed support.
Note that BB Texas and the RN light cruiser Glasgow also closed
to within 3000 yards of Omaha beach, although 6 destroyers (3 RN
among them) closed to 800 yards.
> Probably it would have gone better
> if a few heavy cruisers with 8" guns
> had been spared for use in Normandy.
This is wholly inaccurate. The naval gunfire group supporting the
Omha landing consisted of two battleships (with ten 14inch,
twelve 12-inch, and twelve 5-inch guns), three 6-inch cruisers,
and eight 4 & 5 inch destroyers.
Accompanying the assault waves were 5 LCG (L)'s with two 47-mm
guns each, and 9 LCT (R)'s each firing 1,000 HE rockets. The LCTs
were adapted so that the Shermans could fire before
disembarkation, and there were also 10 LCTs with 36 105 mm SP
howitzers capable of firing before disembarkation.
After the landings, continued support was vailable from two naval
support groups consisting of a battleship, 6-inch cruiser, and
four destroyers and a battleship, two cruisers, and four
destroyers respectively.
Note that the Omaha naval gunfire group included 1 British and 2
French cruisers and 3 British destroyers.
> By way of contrast, the smallest calibre
> gunship used by the RN was 6", aboard light
> cruisers.
There were a lot of RN 4" destroyers and smaller gunships also.
> Actually, the bombing at OMAHA, which was to be
> radar-assisted, missed the mark completely.
Certainly the 329 heavy bombers deliberately droopped their loads
inland to avoid hitting the invasion fleets. But the two medium
bomber raids, by 72 Mitchell bombers, and the two 72-strong
fighter-bomber raids were remarkably accurate.
> It certainly didn't help that the specialist armor
> intended to accompany the first wave at OMAHA
> was essentially swamped due to surf conditions; nor did
> it help that they were launched from about 10,000 yds
off-shore.
Not accurate.
Companies B and C of the 741st Tank Battalion were launched at
H-50 minutes, 6,000 yards off shore, to lead in the first assault
wave on the eastern beach sectors. Of the 32 tanks, only 2 swam
in; the rest were swamped. However, in the 116th RCT zone, the
officers in charge LCT's decided not to risk the sea, and the 32
DD's of the 743d Tank Battalion were carried in to the beach.
Unfortunately, all the successfully landed tanks were quickly
knocked out by German AT fire.
These tanks were not specialist armour (eg AVRE tanks with petard
mortars, brdge-layers, flails etc). They were standard 75mm gun
Shermans.
ANDREW ROBERT BREEN
Lawrence Dillard <ldil...@EnterAct.com> wrote:
>contrast, the smallest calibre gunship used by the RN was 6", aboard light
>cruisers.
The RN used a lot of destroyers for fire support during the D-day
landings - particularly the small 'Hunt' class which had a
sufficiently
shallow draft to get in close. Their 4" guns were considered most
effective.