SS Lancastria 17 June 1940
Don Phillipson
of the sinking of the Lancastria, retrievable up to July 11 at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00swj3b, with reference
to the diary of an RAF survivor, discovered only recently.
--
Don Phillipson
Carlsbad Springs
(Ottawa, Canada)
Don Phillipson
of the sinking of the Lancastria, retrievable up to July 11 at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00swj3b, with reference
to the diary of an RAF survivor, discovered only recently.
8000 on board, 4000 to 6000 killed.)
Bay Man
news:i0tfdh$4t0$1...@speranza.aioe.org...
> BBC Radio 4 reported on 70th anniversary commemoration
> of the sinking of the Lancastria, retrievable up to July 11 at
> http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00swj3b, with reference
> to the diary of an RAF survivor, discovered only recently.
Quite good. What stood out to me, was the French baby in the pram being
shot by a strafing German plane, which was shooting up civilians on the
roads. The mother, and was it her two children, who swam for hours before
being picked up covered in oil - one child was 2 years old. The ship was
not even painted camouflage colours, anchored with white superstructure.
The UK government did not designate the ship a war grave because it was in
French waters. The ship is UK property and international law means the
nation the ship is in has to give certain protection. US government did get
protection on the CCS Alabama off Cherbourg.
This ship had a thread about 6 months ago, re: why wasn't it, and others,
protected more by RAF and French, aircraft.
sctvguy1
re: why wasn't it, and others,
> protected more by RAF and French, aircraft.
WERE there any French aircraft actually engaging the enemy? Seems like the
RAF was the only one taking on the Germans. Didn't France have something
like over 2,000 planes themselves?
Bay Man
news:gLGYn.471184$Bs1....@en-nntp-01.dc1.easynews.com...
There were 3 raids in two hours. After 1, the men should have been taken
off and loaded in the dark.
The German bombers made clever use of cloud cover to elude patrolling RAF
Hurricanes. Well the odd one or two that was around and did turn up.
There is no common explanation why the ship was not fully protected. It was
only in France, not the Far East, and they knew where it was. Twin engines
Beaufighters were available with the range to operate from England to put a
24 hr CAP over the area, with the odd single engined fighter operating from
grass strips in France. The official report is locked away until 2040. The
ship accounted for around 1/3 of the total British military casualties in
the Battle of France I'm sure many reading this never knew of the
Lancastria sinking. Many believe the Germans waited for it to be full before
attacking, when they could have sunk it empty and took the men as POWs.
Don Phillipson
news:i0urp2$ae8$1...@news.eternal-september.org...
> This ship had a thread about 6 months ago, re: why wasn't it, and others,
> protected more by RAF and French, aircraft.
"sctvguy1" <sctv...@invalid.net> wrote in message
news:gLGYn.471184$Bs1....@en-nntp-01.dc1.easynews.com...
> WERE there any French aircraft actually engaging the enemy? Seems like
the
> RAF was the only one taking on the Germans. Didn't France have something
> like over 2,000 planes themselves?
Numbers do not help if the military is not organized to deploy
them in timely fashion. The French army and air force were
in 1940 notoriously badly organized (slow communications,
conflicting jurisdiction etc.) Being a ship (transatlantic liner,
commissioned as a troopship) the Lancastria was primarily
the RN's responsibility -- and the RN had in 1940 had no
training or equipment to fight for control of the air, even over
its own ships.
David H Thornley
> There is no common explanation why the ship was not fully protected. It
> was only in France, not the Far East, and they knew where it was. Twin
> engines Beaufighters were available with the range to operate from
According to Wikipedia, the Beaufighter was introduced into service over
a month after this incident.
Not to mention that it is impossible to cover all possible targets
with dawn-to-dusk CAP, particularly those at a considerable distance
from available airfields, and particularly with an overstretched
air force.
> locked away until 2040. The ship accounted for around 1/3 of the total
> British military casualties in the Battle of France
And if the RAF had devoted adequate resources to protect it from
Luftwaffe attack, that would have weakened the RAF defenses elsewhere,
possibly causing the loss of more people.
--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion, ask.
da...@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-
Bay Man
news:GPGdnbJHlJ5wdK7R...@posted.visi...
> Bay Man wrote:
>> There is no common explanation why the ship was not fully protected. It
>> was only in France, not the Far East, and they knew where it was. Twin
>> engines Beaufighters were available with the range to operate from
>
> According to Wikipedia, the Beaufighter was introduced into service over
> a month after this incident.
There were planes available at the time with the range from England, which
was the point. They would be engaging bombers.
> And if the RAF had devoted adequate resources to protect it from
> Luftwaffe attack, that would have weakened the RAF defenses elsewhere,
> possibly causing the loss of more people.
As most British forces were back in the UK doing not much at all, a part of
the vast quantity of RAF planes could have been used to protect the
evacuating ships. Fighters could have operated from French grass strips
until the last moment and ditched the planes in the sea when running out of
fuel on the way back, with English based fighter planes taking up the CAP.
Flying boats could have picked up the ditched pilots. There was no excuse
not to have protected the ships. The 100 year secrecy wrap tells you a lot
of the incompetence surrounding the era.
Louis C
> RAF was the only one taking on the Germans. Didn't France have something
> like over 2,000 planes themselves?
The short answer is that the French lost as many aircraft as the
British in May and June 1940, and shot down about as many German
planes (though the exact figures are next to impossible to determine,
due to fragmentary records and conflicting claims).
That definitely wasn't good enough, as the Luftwaffe had complete
control of the air and was by far the best air force around at the
time. But the French air force did put up a fight. The French bombing
arm, on the other hand, was particularly ineffective.
LC
Louis C
> There were 3 raids in two hours. After 1, the men should have been taken
> off and loaded in the dark.
In the thread that you mention, we explained to you why that was
nonsense.
> There is no common explanation why the ship was not fully protected.
Plenty of explanations were provided in the other thread.
Lack of resources being one.
> Twin engines
> Beaufighters were available with the range to operate from England to put a
> 24 hr CAP over the area,
Simply put: no.
Beaufighters weren't in operational service at the time, let alone in
the numbers necessary for a continuous CAP.
> with the odd single engined fighter operating from
> grass strips in France.
...which did fly patrols, they just missed that particular German
attack. I provided a link to the official RAF history, you should read
it.
> The
> ship accounted for around 1/3 of the total British military casualties in
> the Battle of France
Briefly put again: no.
> Many believe the Germans waited for it to be full before
> attacking, when they could have sunk it empty and took the men as POWs.
Why should they have bothered waiting? POWs were more useful to them -
as bargaining chips and a potential source of labor - than victims.
Clever Germans, who knew exactly when every ship in every French port
would be fully loaded, and who knew exactly which ones of their air
attacks would succeed and which ones would fail. I wonder why they
still sent these attacks that would fail, BTW...
LC
Don Phillipson
> There were planes available at the time with the range from England, which
> was the point. They would be engaging bombers.
This appears not true: St. Nazaire is 250 miles from the nearest
military bases in England (say Plymouth.) No single-engined fighter
was in 1940 capable of patrolling or fighting 250 miles from home.
(Blenheims possessed the range, but were 100 m.p.h. slower than
the Ju-88s that bombed the Lancastria.)
> As most British forces were back in the UK doing not much at all, a part
of
> the vast quantity of RAF planes could have been used to protect the
> evacuating ships. Fighters could have operated from French grass strips
> until the last moment and ditched the planes in the sea when running out
of
> fuel on the way back, with English based fighter planes taking up the CAP.
> Flying boats could have picked up the ditched pilots. There was no excuse
> not to have protected the ships. The 100 year secrecy wrap tells you a
lot
> of the incompetence surrounding the era.
The safety of these troopships was the responsibility of the Royal Navy.
The Wikipedia narrative at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RMS_Lancastria
says the captain of HMS Havelock (destroyer) advised at 2 p.m. the
Lancastria
to depart immediately but the liner's captain decided to wait in case RN
escort
ships became available (to deter U-boats.) The first bombs hit before 4
p.m.
There appear to have been in 1940 no channels of communication for
the RN to seek RAF help fast enough for help to arrive in time. RAF
fighters could not " have operated from French grass strips" without
essential preparations (e.g. fuel, ammunition, and trolley accumulators
to start engines.) The only RAF squadrons in France had been those
attached to the British Expeditionary Force in Flanders, evacuated via
Dunkirk two weeks earlier (cf. also the Dowding/Churchill correspondence
about the minimum number of fighter squadrons for home defence.)
Bay Man
news:0df98f75-089f-4415...@b35g2000yqi.googlegroups.com...
> Bay Man wrote:
>> There were 3 raids in two hours. After 1, the men should have been taken
>> off and loaded in the dark.
>
> In the thread that you mention, we explained to you why that was
> nonsense.
I think I explained why it wasn't.
>> There is no common explanation why the ship was not fully protected.
>
> Plenty of explanations were provided in the other thread.
Opinions were given.
>> with the odd single engined fighter operating from
>> grass strips in France.
>
> ...which did fly patrols, they just missed that particular German
> attack.
The three of them?
> I provided a link to the official RAF history, you should read
> it.
The sinking is under wraps until 2040.
>> The
>> ship accounted for around 1/3 of the total British military casualties in
>> the Battle of France
>
> Briefly put again: no.
Briefly, about 1/3.
>> Many believe the Germans waited for it to be full before
>> attacking, when they could have sunk it empty and took the men as POWs.
>
> Why should they have bothered waiting? POWs were more useful to them -
> as bargaining chips and a potential source of labor - than victims.
They have to be fed.
> Clever Germans, who knew exactly when every ship in every French port
> would be fully loaded, and who knew exactly which ones of their air
> attacks would succeed and which ones would fail. I wonder why they
> still sent these attacks that would fail, BTW...
They were clever.
David H Thornley
> "David H Thornley" <da...@thornley.net> wrote in message
> news:GPGdnbJHlJ5wdK7R...@posted.visi...
>> a month after this incident.
>
> There were planes available at the time with the range from England,
> which was the point. They would be engaging bombers.
>
figure out which planes, how many there were available, what else
they might have been doing, and what their range and cruising speed
was.
Then, calculate their cruising time based on two-thirds of their range,
subtract what it would take to get to the area and back, and that's
their loiter time.
Then add up loiter time, transit time, and turnaround time, and
see how much these hypothetical fighters could have been over the
bombing site. Multiply that by the number available, and you'll
> As most British forces were back in the UK doing not much at all,
Preparing for the Battle of Britain; at that point, the Battle of
France had already been lost.
a part
> of the vast quantity of RAF planes
I see no sign that the RAF considered that it had vast quantities of
aircraft or pilots.
could have been used to protect the
> evacuating ships. Fighters could have operated from French grass strips
> until the last moment and ditched the planes in the sea when running out
> of fuel on the way back, with English based fighter planes taking up the
> CAP. Flying boats could have picked up the ditched pilots.
You're being awfully lavish with British fighters and pilots here.
The British had already committed what they felt they could lose, and
weren't interested in deliberately sacrificing more fighters. Any
plan that involved losing planes and risking pilots was out. Air-sea
rescue was in it infancy at that point, and neither the Atlantic nor
English Channel are good places to ditch. Please also find out what
the British had in the way of flying boats.
There was no
> excuse not to have protected the ships. The 100 year secrecy wrap tells
> you a lot of the incompetence surrounding the era.
>
You seem to be under the impression that this was all the British had to
worry about, probably because it's the thing that did happen. There
was, in fact, a war going on at the time, and the Brits had a whole lot
of things to worry about, a lot of uncertainty, and overstretched
resources.
For all you know, if the British had devoted all the resources you
say to defending SS Lancastria and every similar situation, something
worse might have happened.
If you want to convince us that this was incompetence, come up with
a realistic plan. This needs to cover all evacuation points within
German bomber range (which probably is most or all of France),
Figure out what the fighters you're proposing are doing ("not
doing much at all" doesn't suggest that you know for sure), and
what the consequences of diverting them was.
Alternately, you could stop throwing around charges of incompetence
in wartime when you clearly don't have the facts.
Rich
wrote:
> "Louis C" <louis...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
>
> news:0df98f75-089f-4415...@b35g2000yqi.googlegroups.com...
>
> > Bay Man wrote:
> >> There were 3 raids in two hours. After 1, the men should have been taken
> >> off and loaded in the dark.
>
> > In the thread that you mention, we explained to you why that was
> > nonsense.
>
> I think I explained why it wasn't.
No, in fact you did not, nor have you shown you have any actual
knowledge of the events or what was possible. In fact there were two
air raids on the shipping that day that were of consequence, not
three.
Lancastria anchored about 5 kilometers offshore at 0600 and began
loading between 0700 and 0800 from ships and boats moving the troops
and civilians from St Nazaire. By 1300 Sharp estimated about 6,000
were aboard. And yet after taking at least seven hours to get 6,000
aboard some want to believe that in less than three hours another
3,000 were crammed on?
At 1348 the first attack occurred when Oronsay was hit by a single
bomb that caused no casualties. The second attack at 1545 targeted
Lancastria. The other 23-odd ships then in the roadstead were
untouched. Four bombs hit and one near missed although 25 other major
ship targets were there and all of them equally crammed with people.
> >> There is no common explanation why the ship was not fully protected.
>
> > Plenty of explanations were provided in the other thread.
>
> Opinions were given.
Yes, by you, but with no evidence to back that opinion up.
> >> with the odd single engined fighter operating from
> >> grass strips in France.
>
> > ...which did fly patrols, they just missed that particular German
> > attack.
>
> The three of them?
No, two.
So, which "two engined fighters"? Which "odd single engined fighter
operating from grass strips"? As of 3 June Fighter Command had just
331 Hurricanes and Spitfires operational and 36 in reserve. The last
two fighter squadrons in France evacuated the morning of 18 June; 1
and 73 Squadron with zero Hurricanes on charge.
> > I provided a link to the official RAF history, you should read
> > it.
>
> The sinking is under wraps until 2040.
Sorry, but that is complete codswallop. There is nothing "under
wraps", no "secret report", and nothing else to see in "2040". Sharp
and his First Officer Grattidge may have penned a report of the
sinking, but it has never turned up and is unlikely to contain
anything of interest since they both spoke about the orders they
received from the two (or three) RN (or RNVR) officers that appeared
aboard in the morning. They also both also thought that one of the
German bombs went down one of Lancastria's stacks, but that doesn't
make them correct. In any case ***there is no such report in the
National Archives (PRO) and Downing Street, MOD, the Admiralty, and
Cunard, all deny that any such report exists***. The story of a "100-
year hold" under the Official Secrets Act is just that - a story.
> >> The
> >> ship accounted for around 1/3 of the total British military casualties in
> >> the Battle of France
>
> > Briefly put again: no.
>
> Briefly, about 1/3.
Are you challenged? It is barely possible that one-third of the
British ***killed*** in the battle for France were lost on Lancastria,
but "total British military casualties" in the campaign were 68,111
Army and 1,526 RAF. If you think that 33,000 British military
personnel were lost on Lancastria then you are beyond being
mathematically challenged - you're demented.
In any case the casualty numbers on Lancastria are problematic. Best
bets are that at least 2,000 military and 1,000-plus civilians died.
But at least 3,600 survivors (not the 2,500 usually quoted, taken from
Sharp's account) arrived in England acording to the tallies of the
various rescue ships, which makes the notion that any more than an
absolute upper limit of 5,400 military and civilians perished
unlikely.
> >> Many believe the Germans waited for it to be full before
> >> attacking, when they could have sunk it empty and took the men as POWs.
>
> > Why should they have bothered waiting? POWs were more useful to them -
> > as bargaining chips and a potential source of labor - than victims.
>
> They have to be fed.
Are you being intentionally obtuse? "Many" also believe that the moon
landings were faked, that AIDS is a CIA plot, and that a cabal of Jews
in Zurich are the real rulers of the earth. Or are you a believer in
those notions as well?
> > Clever Germans, who knew exactly when every ship in every French port
> > would be fully loaded, and who knew exactly which ones of their air
> > attacks would succeed and which ones would fail. I wonder why they
> > still sent these attacks that would fail, BTW...
>
> They were clever.
So they were so clever that they made two air attacks that got four
hits and a near miss on two vessels when there were at least 25 major
ones there that were targets?
This has gone beyond the farcical to the simply stupid...
Rich
> but "total British military casualties" in the campaign were 68,111
> Army and 1,526 RAF. If you think that 33,000 British military
> personnel were lost on Lancastria then you are beyond being
> mathematically challenged - you're demented.
And I guess I was sleep challenged since of course I should have
typed 23,000 rather than 33,000 there...
Bay Man
news:e4160dfe-fa90-4dbd...@y4g2000yqy.googlegroups.com...
>> Opinions were given.
>
> Yes, by you, but with no evidence to back that opinion up.
"Opinions" were given by apologists. I was saying the British had enough
planes to cover the ships(s), as the main fighting in France was over and
most UK forces back in the UK. About half the men on board were RAF who
were manning or setting up airfields - so no shortage of men to service land
based aircraft right until the last minute - men that could have been left
to be POWs if need be. After a raid which hit a ship men should have been
unloaded, no matter how many got ashore they would be safe - even as POWs.
The ship was a brilliant white superstructure.
I also questioned why the event has been largely airbrushed from history as
few major books on WW2 or the Battle of France ever mention the sinking
which accounted for approximately 1/4 to 1/3 of the total UK casualties. So
many casualties on one ship would alert attention, but few ever mention it.
And why a 100 year wrap on the event. What are they hiding? I asked the
normal type of obvious questions. Apologists answers with opinions.
Louis C
> There appear to have been in 1940 no channels of communication for
> the RN to seek RAF help fast enough for help to arrive in time.
True.
Also, given the general chaos of hurried evacuation, communication
between different parts of the RN wasn't always easy either.
> RAF
> fighters could not " have operated from French grass strips" without
> essential preparations (e.g. fuel, ammunition, and trolley accumulators
> to start engines.)
Yes, and such preparations had been made, so they did.
Of course, stores were inadequate so serviceability and sortie rates
were generally poor. Radar was nonexistant, and ground controlled
interceptions almost so. Still, some fighters were there and did
fight. The official history of the RAF is on line and mentions their
actions. I had provided a link to the relevant parts in the other
thread.
> The only RAF squadrons in France had been those
> attached to the British Expeditionary Force in Flanders, evacuated via
> Dunkirk two weeks earlier (cf. also the Dowding/Churchill correspondence
> about the minimum number of fighter squadrons for home defence.)
There were actually two parts in the RAF in France. The Air Component
included some reconnaissance and light bomber squadrons, plus the bulk
of the fighter squadrons. Its task was to support the BEF. But the
AASF (Advanced Air Striking Force) was a part of Bomber Command and,
at least initially, had a different mission i.e. the bombing of
Germany. Its 10 squadrons of Fairey Battles didn't have the range to
do that job from British bases, so they were forward based in France,
preparations for that having been made before the war.
In late 1939, the AASF received a few fighter squadrons for the
defense of its bases against Luftwaffe attacks, as the French Air
Force claimed it couldn't guarantee it (the French were of course
doing their best to make the British relocate as many RAF fighter
squadrons as possible to France, and would have claimed being unable
to fly at all if it could have helped their cause). Of course, the
inadequacy of the AASF as a strategic bombing force was recognized and
its role gradually became the same as that of the Air Component.
Crucially, however, its bases were south of the German advance, so the
squadrons didn't have to evacuate in a hurry or be overrun by German
tanks. This means the units gradually withdrew south, and by June 1940
they were in a position to provide (very sketchy) cover to some of the
French Atlantic ports.
LC
Bay Man
> Don Phillipson wrote:
>
>> There appear to have been in 1940 no channels of communication for
>> the RN to seek RAF help fast enough for help to arrive in time.
>
> True.
>
> Also, given the general chaos of hurried evacuation, communication
> between different parts of the RN wasn't always easy either.
>
>> RAF
>> fighters could not " have operated from French grass strips" without
>> essential preparations (e.g. fuel, ammunition, and trolley accumulators
>> to start engines.)
>
> Yes, and such preparations had been made, so they did.
>
> Of course, stores were inadequate so serviceability and sortie rates
> were generally poor. Radar was nonexistant, and ground controlled
> interceptions almost so. Still, some fighters were there and did
> fight. The official history of the RAF is on line and mentions their
> actions. I had provided a link to the relevant parts in the other
> thread.
Here is what it said
"Command aircraft from Tangmere would also give help over Cherbourg, while
Coastal Command would protect returning vessels. With these arrangements
made, Barratt then took off for England. The final operations came under the
control of his Senior Air Staff Office, Air Vice-Marshal D. C. S. Evill, who
had been throughout the campaign, in Barratt's words, 'a tower of strength'.
In spite of the inevitably sparse nature of the cover provided, and in spite
of 'scenes of indescribably confusion' at Nantes, the evacuation was
entirely successful. the Luftwaffe dropped bombs by day and mines by night,
but achieved remarkably little. Only off St. Nazaire, where on the afternoon
of 17th June German bombers making their third attempt within two hours sank
the Lancastria with five thousand troops abroad, was there a major disaster.
In this case the enemy made clever use of cloud cover to elude our
patrolling Hurricanes.
By the afternoon of 18th June the ground forces had made good their escape,
and the fighters, most of whom had flown six sorties on the previous day,
were free to depart. After No. 73 Squadron had flown the final patrol, the
last Hurricanes left Nantes for Tangmere and the mechanics set fire to the
unserviceable machines. A little time was lost while a thoughtful sergeant
gave one of the staff cares to a well-disposed café proprietor nearby, and
while a more commercially-minded airman endeavoured to sell an Austin Seven.
Then the rear parties of the ground and operations staff took off in
transport aircraft. A few hours later German tanks came rumbling into
Nantes."
----
It says:
"sparse nature of the cover provided"
"the evacuation was entirely successful"
That cover could have been better.
entirely successful? That had an odd idea of what success is.
Bay Man
>
> Are you challenged? It is barely possible that one-third of the
> British ***killed*** in the battle for France were lost on Lancastria,
> but "total British military casualties" in the campaign were 68,111
> Army and 1,526 RAF. If you think that 33,000 British military
> personnel were lost on Lancastria then you are beyond being
> mathematically challenged - you're demented.
Battle of France, World War II (10 May-22 June, 1940): 185 000
Ellis John, World War II : a statistical survey, (killed+missing, France
Campaign)
French: 120,000
Germans: 43,110
British: 11,010
Belgians: 7,500
Dutch: 2,890
Italians: 1,250
[TOTAL: ca. 185,000]
Yep I was right, about a third. Demented? But I can count.
>> > Why should they have bothered waiting? POWs were more useful to them -
>> > as bargaining chips and a potential source of labor - than victims.
>>
>> They have to be fed.
>
> Are you being intentionally obtuse?
The Germans were short of food because of the RN blockade.
> "Many" also believe that the moon
> landings were faked,
Do you?
> This has gone beyond the farcical to the simply stupid...
But I can count.
Rich
<xyxbayman...@xyxmailinator.xyxcomnospam> wrote:
> "Rich" <RichT...@msn.com> wrote in message
>
> news:e4160dfe-fa90-4dbd...@y4g2000yqy.googlegroups.com...
>
> >> Briefly, about 1/3.
>
> > Are you challenged? It is barely possible that one-third of the
> > British ***killed*** in the battle for France were lost on Lancastria,
> > but "total British military casualties" in the campaign were 68,111
> > Army and 1,526 RAF. If you think that 33,000 British military
> > personnel were lost on Lancastria then you are beyond being
> > mathematically challenged - you're demented.
>
> Battle of France, World War II (10 May-22 June, 1940): 185 000
> Ellis John, World War II : a statistical survey, (killed+missing, France
> Campaign)
> French: 120,000
> Germans: 43,110
> British: 11,010
> Belgians: 7,500
> Dutch: 2,890
> Italians: 1,250
> [TOTAL: ca. 185,000]
>
> Yep I was right, about a third. Demented? But I can count.
Thank you for yet again confirming your obtuseness. The actual figures
for Killed and Died of Wounds: 11,014, Wounded: 14,074, and Missing/
POW: 41,338, for a total of 66,426, are as given in F.A.E. Crew, The
Army Medical Services: Volume 1 London 1953. However, it is unclear
whether that figure includes losses just to 3 June or to 18 June, as
the figure given in Ellis et al, The War in France and Flanders,
1939-1940, p, 326, 68,111 (and the 1,526 RAF on p. 326) apparently
does include all those to 18 June.
In either case you may be able to count, but you are apparently
incapable of understanding the difference between "Killed and Died of
Wounds" and "casualties". So I will repeat myself again, this time a
bit louder in the hope that you may understand THIS TIME:
***THE TOTAL BRITISH MILITARY KILLED ON LANCASTRIA MAY HAVE BEEN ONE-
THIRD THE TOTAL KILLED DURING THE CAMPAIGN IN FRANCE, BUT IT IS
UTTERLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR THEM TO BE ONE-THIRD OF THE CASUALTIES***
But if you want to continue to be an obtuse prat then be my guest.
> >> > Why should they have bothered waiting? POWs were more useful to them -
> >> > as bargaining chips and a potential source of labor - than victims.
>
> >> They have to be fed.
>
> > Are you being intentionally obtuse?
>
> The Germans were short of food because of the RN blockade.
Really? So that's why they bombed Lancastria?
> > "Many" also believe that the moon
> > landings were faked,
>
> Do you?
No, do you?
> > This has gone beyond the farcical to the simply stupid...
>
> But I can count.
So then you are apparently an idiot savant, since you can count, but
cannot reason.
Louis C
> "Opinions" were given by apologists.
Facts were provided by knowledgeable posters. You provided opinions.
> I was saying the British had enough
> planes to cover the ships(s)
So how many is enough, and how many did they have?
If you follow your usual pattern, you'll reply something like "they
had enough" and move on to waste some more bandwidth, further
demonstrating that you don't know.
> as the main fighting in France was over and
> most UK forces back in the UK.
You may want to look into how many of the RAF planes dispatched to
France actually made it back to the UK. The short version is that the
RAF took a beating in France.
> About half the men on board were RAF who
> were manning or setting up airfields - so no shortage of men to service land
> based aircraft right until the last minute - men that could have been left
> to be POWs if need be.
There was a war on, the War Office decided to take the risk of
evacuating its personnel.
I quite agree that if Britain had rolled over and agreed to become so
many millions POWs, there might have been less deaths, at least in
1940. Fortunately for world history, Churchill doesn't seem to have
shared your point of view.
> After a raid which hit a ship men should have been
> unloaded, no matter how many got ashore they would be safe - even as POWs.
There was no telling how many raids there would be that day. The idea
was to get underway without getting hit. Most of the ships moored in
St-Nazaire managed it, too.
> I also questioned why the event has been largely airbrushed from history as
> few major books on WW2 or the Battle of France ever mention the sinking
> which accounted for approximately 1/4 to 1/3 of the total UK casualties.
1. Your ratio is still wrong, though you're on the right track
revising it down.
2. The sinking of the Lancastria is hardly a secret, lots of books
mention it. Can you list some of the "major books on WWII or the
Battle of France" that "airbrush it from history"? That might be a
start...
> And why a 100 year wrap on the event.
Because there isn't any.
> What are they hiding?
Nothing.
LC
Louis C
> "Command aircraft from Tangmere would also give help over Cherbourg, while
> Coastal Command would protect returning vessels.
Ok, at this point, there's something fairly complex that I have to
point out. I'll try to make it as simple as possible, but there's no
going around the fact that it's fairly advanced.
Ready?
Here goes: Cherbourg and St-Nazaire are two different places.
Tangmere to Cherbourg is 94 miles according to the distance
measurement tool in Google Maps.
Tangmere to St-Nazaire is 258 miles according to the same source.
So just because the RAF could provide some measure of fighter cover -
which was well short of a round-the-clock CAP - over Cherbourg doesn't
mean it could have done it over St-Nazaire.
That being said, you did read the right page. That source shows you
Barratt did his best, with inadequate resources, to cover the ports
from which evacuation was taking place. He was generally successful
except for Lancastria. So what's the big deal?
> It says:
> "sparse nature of the cover provided"
> "the evacuation was entirely successful"
Yes, as well as "patrolling Hurricanes". So the RAF did provide some
measure of cover.
> That cover could have been better.
How so?
"Barratt's task was to cover seven ports with five squadrons. It was
merely another variant of the problem with which the Royal Air Force
was already familiar--how to make a pint go as far as gallon."
(BTW, for those wanting to read it for themselves, the url is:
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/UK-RAF-I/UK-RAF-I-5.html )
LC
Bay Man
> That source shows you
> Barratt did his best, with inadequate resources, to cover the ports
> from which evacuation was taking place. He was generally successful
> except for Lancastria. So what's the big deal?
But when he failed on...what a failure.
Bay Man
> Bay Man wrote:
>
>> "Opinions" were given by apologists.
>
> Facts were provided by knowledgeable posters. You provided opinions.
I asked question, then applied reasoning.
Rich
<xyxbayman...@xyxmailinator.xyxcomnospam> wrote:
> entirely successful? That had an odd idea of what success is.- Hide quoted text -
I missed this gem of idiocy somehow. A bit more digging into the RAF
support for the evacuation shows that the AASF had five Hurricane
squadrons deployed to France by 17 June, 1, 17, 73, 242, and 501, with
a nominal operational strength of 60 aircraft. On 17 June they were
deployed:
1 Squadron was at Nantes, moving there that morning from Boos, after
having lost 23 aircraft since operations began on 10 May. One of their
aircraft reportedly shot down the German that sank Lancastria.
17 Squadron was moving from Dinard to Jersey and Guernsey on 17 June.
Elements had first flown with the AC prior to returning to England on
21 May, losing 13 aircraft and then another 8 over Dunkirk before
returning to France on 8 June at Le Mans. They lost 1 more there
before moving to the Channel Islands to cover the withdrawals from
Brest and Cherbourg.
73 Squadron was at Nantes as well, having lost 16 aircraft by 17 June.
Part of their ground echelon was on Lancastria with 6 KIA and 31 MIA.
242 Squadron was at Nantes after elements had first flown with the AC
prior to returning to England on 21 May after losing two aircraft.
They lost 7 more over Dunkirk and then returned on 8 June, arriving at
Le Mans with 17 Squadron, losing 1 more before arriving at Nantes on
17 June.
501 Squadron was at Dinard supporting operations at Dunkirk, losing 3
aircraft in the process.
At the time these five squadrons were attempting to cover evacuations
from Cherbourg, Saint-Malo, Brest, Nantes, Saint-Nazaire, La Pallice,
and La Rochelle. Five squadrons with a nominal strength of 60 aircraft
had lost 75 in operations since 10 May. Note that the line La Rochelle
to Saint-Malo is about 280 kilometers. Three were in position at
Nantes having arrived there that morning.
Bay Man
> On Jul 8, 11:40 am, "Bay Man"
> <xyxbayman...@xyxmailinator.xyxcomnospam> wrote:
>> "Rich" <RichT...@msn.com> wrote in message
>>
>> news:e4160dfe-fa90-4dbd...@y4g2000yqy.googlegroups.com...
>>
>> >> Briefly, about 1/3.
>>
>> > Are you challenged? It is barely possible that one-third of the
>> > British ***killed*** in the battle for France were lost on Lancastria,
>> > but "total British military casualties" in the campaign were 68,111
>> > Army and 1,526 RAF. If you think that 33,000 British military
>> > personnel were lost on Lancastria then you are beyond being
>> > mathematically challenged - you're demented.
>>
>> Battle of France, World War II (10 May-22 June, 1940): 185 000
>> Ellis John, World War II : a statistical survey, (killed+missing, France
>> Campaign)
>> French: 120,000
>> Germans: 43,110
>> British: 11,010
> Thank you for yet again confirming
> your obtuseness. The actual figures
> for Killed and Died of Wounds: 11,014,
Wow!! How obtuse was that!!! I was 4 out! See, I can count.
Rich
> At the time these five squadrons were attempting to cover evacuations
> from Cherbourg, Saint-Malo, Brest, Nantes, Saint-Nazaire, La Pallice,
> and La Rochelle. Five squadrons with a nominal strength of 60 aircraft
> had lost 75 in operations since 10 May. Note that the line La Rochelle
> to Saint-Malo is about 280 kilometers. Three were in position at
To follow up a bit, unfortunately when working the Battle of Britain
records for the BoB Database I didn't have the time or wherewithal to
copy some records prior to 31 July 1940. However, as of that date the
status of the five AASF squadrons was (operational/operational in
under 12 hours/operational in over 12 hours):
1 - 18/1/0
17 - 16/0/6
73 - 21/1/1
242 - 20/1/1
501 - 14/4/3
Establishment for Hurrican squadrons was actually 20 - 12 in the
operational flights, four in a reserve flight (with pilots), and four
aircraft in reserve (without pilots). Spitfire squadrons had 16 - 12
in operational flights and four in reserve. To put that in
perspective, on 1 August Fighter Command had just 239 Spitfires and
348 Hurricanes operational against a total establishment of 328
Spitfires and 540 Hurricanes...after losing 366 Hurricanes and 63
Spitfires in France from 10 May to 16 June. Do the math.
BTW, the AASF and AC between them lost 243 Hurricanes...156 between 8
and 16 June, most of them as write offs of already damaged aircraft
that couldn't be evacuated. That's to 13 Hurricane squadrons...about
260 aircraft all told committed. Leaving perhaps 17 aircraft
operational by 17 June, spread between 5 squadrons dispersed from the
Channel Islands to Nantes.
But "all" that needed to be done was that they commit the roughly 331
Hurricanes and Spitfires in Fighter Command to airfields that were
barely operational. Note that they evacuated the last aircraft the
next day most of the ground crews were already gone. Nvermind the
stupidity of "they should have unloaded the Lancastria". When? It took
seven hours to get 6,000 aboard. Can our idiot savant calculate how
long to get them back ashore? What about the other ships? They had
about 9,800 men aboard as well.
For any of those that can get to Kew and care to look, the squadron
states are given daily in AIR 16/941 (May), 942 (June), 943 (July),
and so on.
Rich
wrote:
> > your obtuseness. The actual figures
> > for Killed and Died of Wounds: 11,014,
>
> Wow!! How obtuse was that!!! I was 4 out! See, I can count.
Sorry, but no, you don't get away that easily. You were not "out"
anything, Ellis was "out" in the figures that you quoted and
obstinately continue to claim validate the crackpot notions you have
proposed to substitute for the facts. But you seem incapable of
realizing still the difference between what you were claiming - that
the losses on the Lancastria were definitely one-third of ***ALL***
British Military ***CASUALTIES*** - when in fact they may have been
one-third of British Military ***KILLED AND DIED OF WOUNDS*** in the
French Campaign. Of course you are now hedging your bets further by
altering your claim ton one-third to one-quarter, but that's a minor
quibble.
Furthermore, the more investigating that is done, the less likely it
appears that the Lancastria losses were as high as later assumptions
place them. It's also an interesting excercise in how things get
warped in the telling. For example, since Sharp said that he believed
that 2,500 were all that survived that has been taken as gospel.
Except that it is recorded that HMS Beagle took 600, HMS Havelock 460,
SS John Holt 829, tanker Cymbula 252, and the liner Oronsay 1,557
survivors to England...3,698 rather than "2,500". And, reportedly,
some of the other 19-odd vessels taking off troops also carried
smaller numbers of survivors that weren't recorded. The Lancastria
Association identifies 1,738 likely victims, of which 1,428 were Army,
239 RAF, 64 Merchant Marine, and 5 civilians of Aviosn Fairey. Of
course though, there were also a large number of civilians aboard,
many sources claiming 1,000 Embassy and other refugees. The officially
reported death toll, given by the Daily Mirror on 26 July was 2,832.
If we take that figure add it to the 3,700-odd saved...and, oddly
enough, you get roughly 6,500, about the same as the last count,
6,000, plus the approxiamately 375 crew. Nor, despite years of
searching, has the Lancastria Association been able to identify more
possible Lancastria deaths from the Commonwealth War Graves listings.
Given the lack of accurate documentation, and the misunderstanding and
warping of the documentation that does exist regarding so many things
regarding this event, it seems as likely that, if there were another
2,500 crammed aboard that they weren't lost, but were simply
distributed, uncounted, on the other 19 vessels that got back to
England. Or, more likely, the loading essentially stopped after the
attack on the Oronsay as the ships maneuvered and that 6,500 is
actually about the correct figure that were aboard and that the
estimate of 2,832 was substantially correct.
Of course if that is true, then the Army loss proportionately was
about 2,327...just 21% of the total Killed and Wounded suffered by the
Army in France, so neither one-third or one-quarter.
But I rather suspect that distinction is lost on you.
Duwop
> long to get them back ashore? What about the other ships? They had
> about 9,800 men aboard as well.
>
No, the unhit ships do not count. Duuuuh. They were simply lucky, as
were all the other ships successfully evacuated that week. Only the SS
Lancastria with the sooper dooper sekret known only to a select few
(Sorry Rich, if we told you, we'd have to kill you ) counts,
Bay Man
> On Jul 8, 8:04 pm, "Bay Man" <xyxbayman...@xyxmailinator.xyxcomnospam>
> wrote:
>> > your obtuseness. The actual figures
>> > for Killed and Died of Wounds: 11,014,
>>
>> Wow!! How obtuse was that!!! I was 4 out! See, I can count.
> the losses on the Lancastria were definitely one-third of ***ALL***
> British Military ***CASUALTIES*** - when in fact they may have been
> one-third of British Military ***KILLED AND DIED OF WOUNDS*** in the
> French Campaign.
That is what I said. One third. Thank you.
> But I rather suspect that distinction is lost on you.
You are assumming lots of maths.
Rich
> England. Or, more likely, the loading essentially stopped after the
> attack on the Oronsay as the ships maneuvered and that 6,500 is
> actually about the correct figure that were aboard and that the
> estimate of 2,832 was substantially correct.
The RN also had difficulty keeping track of who was where and how many
there were. They said that ASW trawler Cambridgeshire had rescued
1,009 survivors and transferred them to SS John Holt, but then that
only 829 survivors on John Holt left for England on the 17th. So where
did the other 180 go? Our idiot savant probably thinks they would have
been put back in the water. The Navy actually reported losses as 66
crew and 2833 troops and refugees with 2,477 survivors. So 2,899
rather than the 2,832 given by the Mirror (the troops and refugees
figure minus one). However, the Navy also did not track the numbers of
non-Lancastria evacuees on the other vessels as carefully as in DYNAMO
and they also missed, apparently, some of those survivors reportedly
carried on other vessels as well (the 1,557 on Oronsay, which was a
steamer BIGGER than Lancastria, are not mentioned at all).
Interestingly though, the Navy does mention the third air attack,
given as SS Teiresia, bombed and abandoned that morning (oddly, I can
find no accounting of a vessel under that name though, so it may be a
corruption), so not "within an hour"...
Greg Schuler
wrote:
> "Rich" <RichT...@msn.com> wrote in message
>
> news:e4160dfe-fa90-4dbd...@y4g2000yqy.googlegroups.com...
>
> >> Opinions were given.
>
> > Yes, by you, but with no evidence to back that opinion up.
>
> "Opinions" were given by apologists. I was saying the British had enough
> planes to cover the ships(s), as the main fighting in France was over and
> most UK forces back in the UK. About half the men on board were RAF who
> were manning or setting up airfields - so no shortage of men to service land
> based aircraft right until the last minute - men that could have been left
> to be POWs if need be. After a raid which hit a ship men should have been
> unloaded, no matter how many got ashore they would be safe - even as POWs.
> The ship was a brilliant white superstructure.
Others have provided the numbers, which you fail to admit or provide
your own details. However, leaving behind valuable service and
technical personnel is folly, and one the RAF tried to avoid. Pilots
are important, of that there is no doubt, but sacrificing experienced
ground personnel simply because they are not pilots is egregiously
stupid (and I shouldn't be suprised it would be something you would
casually throw out in your nonsensical ramblings).
It is also apparent that you have a fixed idea of what "really"
happened and won't even consider "alternate realities". Unloading a
ship in a combat zone is tough enough, let alone during an evacuation
and retreat. How many of those men may have drowned in the unload -
are they acceptable losses? What if the Germans bomb the beaches next
time instead of the harbor (really, the hit on the Lancastria was
luck, more than skill)? The men died on land, but are dead just the
same.
As far as air cover - it has been covered very thoroughly, and of
course you have ignored it. I would simply add that even under ideal
CAP conditions, there would have been no guarantee. Look at D-Day
(1944) - even with total mastery of the air with thousands of
aircraft, the Allies do not intercept German aircraft, which are able
to offer just token resistance, but did cause casualties. Are the
scenarios comparable - not in the least. But it does show that have
air cover does not offer the absolute guarantee you seem to assume
would haev occurred.
>
> I also questioned why the event has been largely airbrushed from history as
> few major books on WW2 or the Battle of France ever mention the sinking
> which accounted for approximately 1/4 to 1/3 of the total UK casualties. So
> many casualties on one ship would alert attention, but few ever mention it.
> And why a 100 year wrap on the event. What are they hiding? I asked the
> normal type of obvious questions. Apologists answers with opinions.
It was airbrushed because Tooze couldn't fit it in his book, I would
assume. Then again, you know of it and mention, and you are completely
and utterly misguided and flat out wrong about the scale and scope and
even the timeline of events. Which is par for the course for you.
So let me ask you - what benefit is there to cover this up? The
survivors were not shot or disposed of in any way shape or form. The
survivors' organization is public and has, to the best of my
knowledge, suffered no government intervention. Yes, mistakes were
made - if this more egregious than the loss of the HMS Glorious, for
example? We, at least in the this group, know of the Lancastria. It is
not a well-guarded secret meant to protect HM Government. So what
benefit is there to cover up the sinking? None.
Rich
wrote:
> That is what I said. One third. Thank you.
I see. So now you're claiming that you never said:
"The ship accounted for around 1/3 of the total British
military***casualties*** in the Battle of France" on July 6 at 1:00
PM?
Repeating the claim that the metric was ***casualties*** when
questioned:
"Briefly, about 1/3." on July 7 at 4:04 PM?
Then "adjusting" your claim a bit, but maintaining that the metric
was***casualties***:
"few major books on WW2 or the Battle of France ever mention
thesinking which accounted for approximately 1/4 to 1/3 of the total
UK casualties. on July 8 at 9:25 AM?
Then yet again on 8 July at 11:40 AM when you again quoted a figure
for Killed and Died of Wounds, but claimed that:
"Yep I was right, about a third. "
And then yet again today at 11:11 AM when you responded to:
> the losses on the Lancastria were definitely one-third of ***ALL***
> British Military ***CASUALTIES*** - when in fact they may have been
> one-third of British Military ***KILLED AND DIED OF WOUNDS*** in the
> French Campaign.
With:
"That is what I said. One third."
So five denials of reality. Or is it simply that you are still
incapable of understanding the distinction? Or too stubborn to allow
for any revisions to your bizarre wordview?